KESSELRING:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER AT ANZIO

Td and G e n e r a l Staff C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l ' T i , l l r n e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the

'degree

STER*OF-MILXTARY . ART..AND * SCIENCE

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;:' :TEDDY' D'. BI.TNER, ,CPT, USA B<!S.B;+.';'Central Missouri S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1 9 7 2 B { M.A., Wheaton Graduate S c h o o l , 1982 &)*Mi*. '; T r i n i t y T h e o l o g i c a l S e m i n a r y , 1982
, . * '

r.

F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , Kansas 1983

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n u n l i m i t e d . O t h e r r e q u e s t s f o r t h i s document m u s t b e r e f e r r e d t o HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D, F o r t Monroe, V A 23651.

b 3-4.4 b 7

KESSELRING:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER AT

ANZIO

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y of t h e U .

S . Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e requirements f o r t h e degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND S C I E N C E

B.S.B.A.,

TEDDY D. B I T N E R , CPT, USA C e n t r a l M i s s o u r i S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , 1972 M.A., Wheaton G r a d u a t e S c h o o l , 1982 D.Min., T r i n i t y T h e o l o g i c a l S e m i n a r y , 1 9 8 2

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 1983

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n u n l i m i t e d . O t h e r r e q u e s t s f o r t h i s document m u s t be r e f e r r e d t o HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATCS-D., F o r t Monroe, V A 23651.

b 3-44 8 7

MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of c a n d i d a t e :
T i t l e of thesis:

Teddy D . B i t n e r , CPT, USA KESSELRING: AT ANZIO

AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER

T h e s i s Committee Chairman

D r . R o b e r t M.

M,&

lily.
27

Epstein,'Ph.D.

v/z

Member, G r a d u a t e F a c u l t y

'

Accepted t h i s day of D i r e c t o r , G r a d u a t e Degree Programs.

1983 b y

@ h d .

The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r a n d do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e U.S. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y . (References t o t h i s study should include t h e foregoing statement).

ABSTRACT PAGE

KESSELRING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER AT A N Z I O , by C a p t a i n Teddy D. B i t n e r , U S A , 1 1 2 p a g e s . T h i s s t u d y a t t e m p t s t o a n a l y z e t h e d e c i s i o n s made by F i e l d Marshal A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g p r i o r t o and d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e of Anzio i n F e b r u a r y 1944. The f o c u s o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s on K e s s e l r i n g ' s d e c i s i o n t o s h i f t Army Group r e s e r v e s f r o m t h e Rome a r e a p r i o r t o t h e A l l i e d a m p h i b i o u s a s s a u l t a t A n z i o on 18 J a n u a r y 1944, t h e n h i s involvement i n t h e development and e x e c u t i o n of t h e German c o u n t e r a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e A l l i e d b e a c h h e a d c o n d u c t e d o n 16 F e b r u a r y 1944. The i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l s t h a t K e s s e l r i n g , t h e Army Group Commander, made a p r o p e r a n d e f f e c t i v e d e c i s i o n i n comm i t t i n g t h e Army Group r e s e r v e s t o t h e German d e f e n s i v e l i n e p r i o r t o t h e invasion, and t h a t h i s involvement i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e c u t i o n o f t h e German c o u n t e r a t t a c k a t A n z i o was d o c t r i n a l l y s o u n d a n d g e n e r a l l y e f f e c t i v e .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I.

INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . .

I1

BACKGROUND

. .

. . . . . .
e

1110

KESSELRING'S DECISIONS A T AN210

35

IV.

ANALYSIS OF KESSELRING'S DECISIONS

. .

68

V.

CONCLUSION

. . . .
0

86

APPENDIX A

---

The M e d i t e r r a n i a n T h e a t e r 1943-1944

99

APPENDIX B

G r o u n d S i t u a t i o n a f t e r t h e Commitment o f Army Group C Reserves

. .
0

101

APPENDIX C

--

F o u r t e e n t h Army C o u n t e r a t t a c k 16 February 1944

103

S ELEC TE D

BIBL IOGRAPHY

. . . . . . . .

LO6

F I E L D MARSHAL ALBERT K E S S E L R I N G

$t!APTER

CINE

INTRODUCTION

On 2 1 November 1 9 4 3 , t h e German High Command a p p o i n t e d L u f t w a f f e F i e l d M a r s h a l A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g t o t h e p o s i t i o n of Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h w e s t a n d Commander, Army G roup C .

H i t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o g i v e t h i s j o b t o K e s s e l r i n g was t h e c u l -

m i n a t i o n of a h i s t o r i c d e b a t e between K e s s e l r i n g and F i e l d M a r s h a l E r w i n Rommel, who s h a r e d a d i v i d e d command i n I t a l y , a b o u t how b e s t t o d e f e n d t h e I t a l i a n p e n i n s u l a . The d i v e r g e n t

p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e w a r i n I t a l y , a s s o l i c i t e d by H i t l e r , r e p r e s e n t e d t h e s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o f t h e two F i e l d M a r s h a l s . When H i t l e r f i n a l l y made h i s d e c i s i o n

a b o u t who w a s t o command t h e t h e a t e r , Romrnel was t r a n s f e r r e d t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e i n e v i t a b l e A l l i e d l a n d i n g i n t h e West, l e a v i n g Kesselring t o put h i s ideas into r e a l i t y . The j o b i n w h i c h K e s s e l r i n g f o u n d h i m s e l f i n November 1943

was r e a l l y n o t new, b u t a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
s i n c e h i s a p p o i n t m e n t a s Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h , i n November 1941.
At that time,

h e was g i v e n t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o s u p p l y
L a t e r , i n O c t o b e r 1 9 4 2 , h e was made

Rommel i n N o r t h A f r i c a .

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e f e n s e o f a l l German o c c u p i e d M e d i t e r r a n i a n
areas except those

u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l of Rommel.

B e c a u s e of h i s situation

e x p e r i e n c e , K e s s e l r i n g was i n t i m a t e l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e

i n I t a l y and had e x t e n s i v e working r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h h i s I t a l i a n counterparts.

I t w o u l d seem, on t h e s u r f a c e , t h a t s u c h a n a s s i g n -

ment w oul d n o t b e u n u s u a l f o r a F i e l d M a r s h a l .

Yet, i n t h i s c a s e ,

t h e r e were a t l e a s t t h r e e u n u s u a l a s p e c t s t o K e s s e l r i n g ' s j o b . F i r s t , K e s s e l r i n g was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l German f o r c e s i n h i s area of o p e r a t i o n s . When e a r l i e r a p p o i n t e d Commander i n

C h i e f , S o u t h , h e had a l s o b e e n g i v e n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l German

f o r c e s , t h u s a r g g n i z i n g t h e o n l y command o u t s i d e of t h e German High Command (OKW) w h i c h c o n t r o l l e d f o r c e s f r o m a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s . S e c o n d l y , K e s s e l r i n g was a n A i r F o r c e o f f i c e r . Aviators l i k e

K e s s e l r i n g w e r e n o t g i v e n l o n g t e r m g r o u n d a s s i g n m e n t s , a n d no o t h e r s e n i o r L u f t w a f f e o f f i c e r was p l a c e d i n t h e p o s i t i o n o f a t h e a t e r command. e s p e c i a l l y unique. I n t h i s sense, Kesselring's p o s i t i o n w a s F i n a l l y , d u r i n g t h e months p r i o r t o h i s

a p p o i n t m e n t , K e s s e l r i n g was n o t p r i m a r i l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e f e n s e of t h e I t a l i a n p e n i n s u l a , t h e I t a l i a n High Command had t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . K e s s e l r i n g o p e r a t e d on a c o o r d i n a t e

l e v e l w i t h t h e I t a l i a n H i g h Command, b e i n g d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f c o a l i t i o n w a r f a r e w i t h t h e m a j o r German a l l y

i n t h e Eurpean t h e a t e r u n t i l t h e i r c a p i t u l a t i o n t o t h e A l l i e s i n September 1943. K e s s e l r i n g w a s t h e r e f o r e , a man i n a h i g h l y r e s p o n s i b l e a n d u n i q u e p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e German command s t r u c t u r e . D e s p i t e t h i s uniqueness, t h e r e i s c u r r e n t l y very l i t t l e material p u b l i s h e d c o n c e r n i n g K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander. Aside from

h i s own m e m o i r s , a b i o g r a p h y a n d a m a g a z i n e a r t i c l e , K e s s e l r i n g
i s mentioned i n p u b l i s h e d material o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y t o s p e c i f i c

combat a c t i o n s o r d e c i s i o n s , b i o g r a p h i e s o f o t h e r l e a d e r s , o r discussed i n r e l a t i o n t o l a r g e r f o r c e developments during t h e inter-war years. Additionally, t h e r e a r e postwar h i s t o r i c a l

d o c u m e n t s p r e p a r e d by German o f f i c e r s u n d e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s , a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f w h i c h was p r e p a r e d by K e s s e l r i n g h i m s e l f , w h i c h r e l a t e t o h i s o p e r a t i o n s , b u t a r e n o t s y n t h e s i z e d i n a n y way. Our f a i l u r e t o c a r e f u l l y a n a l y z e

K e s s e l r i n g ' s s i t u a t i o n a n d a p p r o a c h t o command, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e a r e a of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , l e a v e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e g a p i n o u r h i s t o r i c a l knowledge o f t h e campaign i n I t a l y from t h e German p e r s p e c t i v e .

Purpose

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o p r o v i d e a n a n a l y s i s o f F i e l d Marshal Albert K e s s e l r i n g ' s d e c i s i o n s as t h e Axis t h e a t e r commander i n c o n t r o l o f German f o r c e s a t t h e b a t t l e of A n z i o , January-February 1944. Specifically, h i s decisions regarding

t h e commitment o f h i s Army Group r e s e r v e s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e on 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n w h i c h l e d t o t h e German c o u n t e r a t t a c k o f t h e A l l i e d b e a c h h e a d a t A n z i o b e g i n n i n g 16 F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 4 . A s a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a w i d e r s t u d y of K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander, t h i s e v a l u a t i o n i s i n t e n d e d t o f o c u s on a s i n g l e , well d e f i n a b l e

c r i s i s f a c e d b y K e s s e l r i n g d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e of I t a l y , t h u s
providing a vehicle f o r evaluation. This paper w i l l not provide

a n i n d e p t h e v a l u a t i o n of t h e b a t t l e of Anzio. A n z i o , a c o a s t a l town on t h e T y r r e n i a n S e a , s o u t h of Rome, w a s t h e s c e n e o f a m a j o r a m p h i b i o u s a s s a u l t by t h e V I C o r p s o f t h e F i f t h ( U S ) Army i n l a t e J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 . The r e s u l t i n g

s e r i e s o f b a t t l e s , f o u g h t i n l a t e J a n u a r y t h r o u g h May, were a
d e s p e r a t e s t r u g g l e f o r c o n t r o l of t h e beachhead and t h e r o u t e s l e a d i n g from i t . The A l l i e s i n t e n d e d t o o u t f l a n k German d e f e n s e s

o f t h e G u s t a v L i n e l o c a t e d f u r t h e r s o u t h , a n d o p e n t h e way t o Rome. The Germans s o u g h t t o c o n t a i n a n d d e s t r o y t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s i n t h e beachhead w h i l e p r e v e n t i n g a b r e a k t h r o u g h a l o n g t h e Gustav Line. F o r K e s s e l r i n g , t h i s c r i s i s m e a n t t h a t he h a d t o b a l a n c e

f o r c e s and t h r e a t s between t h e beachhead and t h e l i n e f u r t h e r south, i n order t o achieve h i s objectives at both locations with h i s c a r e f u l l y husbanded resources. C o n s e q u e n t l y , Anzio

c a n be viewed as a s i n g l e , i m p o r t a n t c r i s i s i n t h e c o n t e x t

of t h e l a r g e r d e f e n s i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
examine K e s s e l r i n g ' s d e c i s i o n s w i t h i n t h a t l a r g e r framework.

Need

A s s t a t e d e a r l i e r , t h e r e i s c u r r e n t l y no d e f i n i t i v e e v a l -

u a t i o n o f K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander.

T h i s l a c k p o i n t s t o a need

t o e v a l u a t e t h e c o n d u c t of t h e I t a l i a n campaign from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of one of t h e s i n g l e , most i m p o r t a n t f i g u r e s i n t h e t h e a t e r , t h e German commander i n I t a l y . h e n s i b l e t h a t t o d a t e , o f t h e many p a g e s

I t i s a l m o s t incompre-

w r i t t e n about t h e conduct

of t h i s c a m p a i g n , t h a t t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander h a s n o t t r u l y b e e n u n c o v e r e d . Among t h e many n e e d s

g e n e r a t e d from t h i s c r i t i c a l o n e , i s t h e n e e d t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e c i s i o n s made by K e s s e l r i n g a t A n z i o . Current m a t e r i a l does

not thoroughly e v a l u a t e h i s d e c i s i o n s nor t h e f a c t o r s considered by K e s s e l r i n g i n t h e t h r e e c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e o u t c o m e of t h e b a t t l e s a t A n z i o ; h i s commitment of t h e Army

Group r e s e r v e s t o the G u s t a v L i n e , h i s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e d e v e l o p -

ment o f t h e 1 6 F e b r u a r y c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n , a n d h i s r o l e i n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k .
I t i s t h e need t o f , i l l i n t h e

d e t a i l s of t h e s e a s p e c t s o f K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander t h a t t h i s paper addresses. Further, professional soldiers a r e interested in our m i l i t a r y p a s t f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s .

W e c a n l e a r n from

t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of o t h e r s , a s w e d i s c o v e r t h a t p e r h a p s new i d e a s a r e n o t s o new, a n d how t o a v o i d i m p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n s o f combat power.

As t o the l a t t e r

--

h i s t o r i c a l a c c u r a c y and accounta-

b i l i t y demand a p r o p e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e f a c t s i n r e p o r t i n g and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s a need f o r s y n t h e s i s . P a r o c h i a l views

of h i s t o r y a r e d a n g e r o u s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when p l a c e d i n t o p r a c t i c e a s a p a r t of m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e .
A s w e form o p i n i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l

l e a d e r s , t h e v i e w s o f many a r e n e e d e d t o p r e p a r e a n o b j e c t i v e assessment, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e d i f f i c u l t y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . R e p o r t s on K e s s e l r i n g a r e a c a s e i n p o i n t . As i d e from t h e

b i o g r a p h y by K e n n e t h M a c k s e y , m o s t m a t e r i a l w r i t t e n a b o u t him

i s f r o m v a r i o u s p e r s o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s , l i t t l e of w h i c h a p p e a r s
t o be objective. These views need r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n
I do n o t

f o r a p r o p e r p o r t r a i t of K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander.

p r o p o s e t o d o t h i s i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e way, b u t d o p r o p o s e t o provide a s y n t h e s i s and e v a l u a t i o n i n r e s p e c t t o t h e s t a t e d p u r p o s e of t h i s p a p e r .

Method

The p r i m a r y r e s e a r c h m e t h o d u s e d i n t h i s p a p e r i s t h e h i s t o r i c a l approach. I n order t o preserve objectivity, I w i l l

approach t h e t a s k t h r o u g h t h e u s e of r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s , t h e n
w i l l s e e k t o answer t h o s e q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h r e s e a r c h and e v a l u -

a t i v e conclusions.

The r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s a r e t h e s e :

"DO

the

d e c i s i o n s made by K e s s e l r i n g i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o a n d d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e o f A n z i o p r o v i d e a n i n d i c a t i o n of h i s a b i l i t y a s a commander?'' "If s o , how e f f e c t i v e were t h o s e d e c i s i o n s i n

achieving h i s intended objectives?" T h e s e q u e s t i o n s l e a d t o f u r t h e r s u b s e t s of q u e s t i o n s w h i c h

w i l l b e s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d i n t h e e v a l u a t i v e p o r t i o n of t h i s

paper.

Preview

This paper w i l l g e n e r a l l y follow a chronology leading t o t h e b a t t l e of A n z i o . C h a p t e r Two w i l l p r o v i d e a b a c k g r o u n d

t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i n I t a l y t h r o u g h H i t l e r ' s d e c i s i o n t o app o i n t K e s s e l r i n g t o t h e p o s t o f Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h w e s t , a b r i e f s k e t c h o f K e s s e l r i n g ' s c a r e e r t o t h e same p o i n t i n t i m e , a n d a d i s c u s s i o n of K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s o n a l i t y . Chapter

Three w i l l d i s c u s s K e s s e l r i n g ' s key d e c i s i o n s under e v a l u a t i o n i n a n a r r a t i v e f o r m a t , s e t i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h e Anzio

operation.

C h a p t e r F o u r w i l l p r o v i d e a n a n a l y s i s of t h e d e c i s i o n s Following

t h r o u g h t h e u s e of a s e r i e s of r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s .

t h e e v a l u a t i o n , C h a p t e r F i v e w i l l draw some c o n c l u s i o n s a n d make r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s f o r f u t u r e r e s e a r c h .

A bibliography w i l l

also p r o v i d e f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g s o u r c e s u s e d i n t h e

p r e p a r a t i o n of t h i s p a p e r a n d f o r f u r t h e r r e a d i n g .

CHAPTER T W O BACKGROUND

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o b u i l d a b a c k g r o u n d of i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g b o t h t h e c a r e e r a n d p e r s o n a l i t y of A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , and t h e e v e n t s i n I t a l y l e a d i n g t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e Anzio l a n d i n g . Both d i s c u s s i o n s w i l l be b r i e f , b u t

'

w i l l p r o v i d e e s s e n t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of

K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s a t A n z i o i n t h e n e x t two c h a p t e r s .

The

f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r w i l l be c o n c e r n e d s o l e l y w i t h K e s s e l r i n g ' s background t h r o u g h h i s d u t i e s u n t i l t h e f a l l o f North Africa. Then, t h e f o c u s w i l l s h i f t t o t h e development

o f t h e d e f e n s e of I t a l y , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e i n v a s i o n of S i c i l y a n d e n d i n g i n December 1943 o n t h e I t a l i a n m a i n l a n d . Finally,

some r e f l e c t i o n s of K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n w i l l end t h e c h a p t e r .

Background:

Albert Kesselring

A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g was b o r n a t M a r k s t e f t i n B a v a r i a on 30 November 1885.

He e n t e r e d s e r v i c e i n t h e 2nd B a v a r i a n

F o o t A r t i l l e r y i n 1 9 0 4 a s a n o f f i c e r i n t r a i n i n g a n d was l a t e r commissioned a l i e u t e n a n t i n t h a t r e g i m e n t and p o s t e d t o t h e German-French f r o n t i e r a t Metz. Among h i s v a r i o u s

d u t i e s a t Metz came h i s f i r s t f l i g h t e x p e r i e n c e i n t e s t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n b a l l o o n s used t o a d j u s t a r t i l l e r y f i r e . During

World War One, K e s s e l r i n g s e r v e d t h e b u l k o f h i s t i m e a s t h e a d j u t a n t of t h e 1st B a v a r i a n F o o t A r t i l l e r y and o f t h e 3d Bavarian A r t i l l e r y . I n t h e s p r i n g of 1 9 1 7 when t h e B r i t i s h

and C a n a d i a n s b e g a n a d r i v e a t A r r a s , K e s s e l r i n g was i n s t r u -

m e n t a l i n p r e v e n t i n g a r o u t o f German t r o o p s a n d h e l p i n g t o s t a b a l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n over a period of several days. He

r e p e a t e d t h e p e r f o r m a n c e a g a i n a few m o n t h s l a t e r a t M e s s i n e s . The r e s u l t was h i s d i r e c t a p p o i n t m e n t t o t h e German G e n e r a l S t a f f , w i t h o u t t h e f o r m a l i t y of t h e r e q u i s i t e a t t e n d a n c e a t t h e Kriegsakademie. The i n d i c a t i o n f o r t h e f u t u r e was a n

o f f i c e r who c o u l d e f f e c t i v e l y o r g a n i z e a n d c o n d u c t d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s under less t h a n optimal c o n d i t i o n s . F o l l o w i n g t h e F i r s t World War, K e s s e l r i n g w a s s e l e c t e d a s a member o f t h e 100,000 man R i e c h s w e h r a n d f o r a p p o i n t m e n t t o t h e T r u p p e n a m t , t h e t h i n l y v e i l e d s u c c e s s o r t o t h e German G e n e r a l S t a f f , w h i c h was now p r o h i b i t e d u n d e r t h e terms o f t h e Versailles Treaty. About s i x t y o t h e r o f f i c e r s were s e l e c t e d

a s w e l l by t h e new a r c h i t e c t of t h e R e i c h s w e h r , G e n e r a l Hans

von S e e k t .
1930's.

The work of t h e s e o f f i c e r s w a s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l

t o t h e f u t u r e r e c r e a t i o n o f t h e German armed f o r c e s i n t h e
A t o n e p o i n t , K e s s e l r i n g was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r w r i t i n g

t h e f i r s t memo d e a l i n g w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e f u t u r e Wehrmacht G e n e r a l S t a f f .2 A d d i t i o n a l l y , Kessel-

r i n g s p e n t a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f t i m e w i t h weapons d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e a s s o c i a t e d l o g i s t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e s e new weapons s y s t e m s . S e e k t moved o f f i c e r s , i n c l u d i n g K e s s e l r i n g ,

f r o m j o b t o j o b i n t h e Truppenamt i n o r d e r t o e x p o s e them t o v a r i o u s t a s k s a n d a l l o w them t o g a i n e x p e r t i s e i n s e v e r a l a r e a s . T h i s approach proved i n v a l u a b l e t o t h e development of t h e s e o f f i c e r s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e f u t u r e e x p a n s i o n of t h e German Armed F o r c e s . On 1 O c t o b e r 1933, K e s s e l r i n g was a p p o i n t e d C h i e f o f t h e Luftwaffe Administrative Office.
A t t h i s time, t h e L u f t w a f f e

e x i s t e d u n o f f i c i a l l y because of r e s t r i c t i o n s of t h e V e r s a i l l e s Treaty. Consequently, K e s s e l r i n g found h i m s e l f .out of uniform

f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n n e a r l y 30 y e a r s a n d no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d a s o l d i e r , but an airman. I n h i s new j o b , h o w e v e r , h e f o u n d

t h a t i t was b a s i c a l l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f many of t h e t h i n g s h e had b e e n d o i n g a t t h e Truppenamt.

As t h e Chief of Administration,

K e s s e l r i n g was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h e f o r c e a n d m a t e r i a l d e v e l o p ment of t h e L u f t w a f f e . Lieutenant General. By 1 9 3 6 , K e s s e l r i n g h e l d t h e r a n k o f

In t h a t year, the Luftwaffe General Staff

was f o r m e d o f f i c i a l l y w i t h W a l t h e r Wever as t h e f i r s t C h i e f
of Staff. Following Wever's untimely death i n an a i r p l a n e

c r a s h , K e s s e l r i n g was a p p o i n t e d a s t h e L u f t w a f f e C h i e f of 3 S t a f f on 15 August 1936.

A s t h e new C h i e f o f S t a f f , K e s s e l r i n g u s e d h i s i n f l u e n c e

t o resolve the s t r a t e g i c versus tactical debate then current i n t h e Luftwaffe. Some, i n c l u d i n g Wever, f e l t t h a t t h e L u f t -

waffe should develop i n t o a s t r a t e g i c f o r c e with long range bom bi ng c a p a b i l i t y w h i c h r e q u i r e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d and e x p e n s i v e equipment. K e s s e l r i n g , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , saw

t h e Luftwaffe a s a t a c t i c a l support system o r i e n t e d on supporting t h e ground f o r c e s i n c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n and u s i n g less e x p e n s i v e , b u t v e r y a c c u r a t e a t t a c k a i r c r a f t s u c h a s t h e J U 87 ( S t u k a ) . W i t h K e s s e l r i n g a s C h i e f of S t a f f , t h e d e c i s i o n t o arm f o r t a c t i c a l s u p p o r t was a s s u r e d .

A s e c o n d i s s u e d e a l t w i t h b y K e s s e l r i n g was i n t h e a r e a

of organizational authority.

Herman G o e r i n g w a s t h e Commander

i n C h i e f of t h e L u f t w a f f e a n d t h e A i r M i n i s t e r o n t h e R e i c h s Cabinet. E r h a r d M i l c h , t h e f o r m e r h e a d o f L u f t h a n s a , was t h e K e s s e l r i n g , as t h e Chief

S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Aviation.

o f S t a f f of t h e L u f t w a f f e G e n e r a l S t a f f , assumed t h a t h e s h o u l d r e p o r t d i r e c t l y t o t h e Commander i n C h i e f , a n o r m a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l arrangement. Milch, however, f e l t t h a t he s h o u l d

h a v e t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o i n t e r v e n e b e t w e e n t h e two i n a n o t h e r l a y e r of a u t h o r i t y . The p r o b l e m c e n t e r e d o n a l a c k o f d e f i n i K e s s e l r i n g pushed

t i o n of M i l c h ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d a u t h o r i t y .

f o r l i m i t i n g Milch's a u t h o r i t y and e s t a b l i s h i n g a permanent, o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e Commander i n C h i e f a n d t h e Chief of Staff.' Milch disagreed. Goering d e c i d e d i n f a v o r of

10

K e s s e l r i n g , a n d t h e L u f t w a f f e a d o p t e d a new command s t r u c t u r e d e f i n i n g t h e l i m i t s o f a u t h o r i t y of t h e v a r i o u s o f f i c e r s and e s t a b l i s h i n g o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o n 2 J u n e 1937. Having

a c c o m p l i s h e d t h i s t a s k a n d r e a l i z i n g t h a t someone e l s e s h o u l d e x e r c i s e t h e new o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , K e s s e l r i n g a s k e d t o b e r e l i e v e d and p l a c e d on t h e r e t i r e d l i s t . 5 by G o e r i n g b u t n o t r e t i r e d .

H e was r e l i e v e d

K e s s e l r i n g f o u n d h i m s e l f i n command

o f L u f t k r e i s ( A i r D i s t r i c t ) 111, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a i r d e f e n s e o f S i l e s i a , Saxony a n d C e n t r a l Germany.

His command was c h a n g e d

f r o m a n a r e a command t o a n o p e r a t i o n a l command o n 1 A p r i l 1 9 3 8 and r e d e s i g n a t e d L u f t f l o t t e 1 ( F i r s t A i r Group). This p a r t i c u l a r

command c o n t a i n e d a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s a i r power On 1 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 , Germany a t t a c k e d P o l a n d , o f f e r i n g K e s s e l r i n g t h e f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o l e a d a i r f o r c e s i n combat. His command o p e r a t e d i n t h e a r e a o f t h e N o r t h e r n Army G r o u p , commanded by G e n e r a l von Bock.
A t t h i s time, Luftwaffe doctrine

s t a t e d t h a t a i r commands were i n t e n d e d t o o p e r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f Army c o n t r o l , b u t K e s s e l r i n g s o u g h t t o work c l o s e l y w i t h t h e Army i n p r o v i d i n g c l o s e t a c t i c a l s u p p o r t t o t h e g r o u n d forces.6 During t h i s and a l l subsequent campaigns, K e s s e l r i n g ' s

mode o f o p e r a t i o n was o n e o f c o n s t a n t m o t i o n , f l y i n g i n c e s s a n t l y

t o c o n d u c t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o f t h e enemy a n d o b s e r v e h i s own p i l o t s '

a b i l i t i e s i n combat. I n t h i s t h e a t e r , h i s s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s were

t o move w i t h t h e N o r t h e r n Army Group a s t h e y d e s t r o y e d P o l i s h f o r c e s a n d l i n k e d up w i t h u n i t s i n East P r u s s i a , t o p r o t e c t B e r l i n from a i r a t t a c k , a n d t o d e s t r o y P o l i s h u n i t s . Kessel-

r i n g ' s o b j e c t i v e , a c c o r d i n g t o L u f t w a f f e d o c t r i n e , was t o d e s t r o y t h e P o l i s h A i r F o r c e and i t s ground s u p p o r t s y s t e m s i n o r d e r t o

p e r m i t t h e p r o v i s i o n of c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t .

The b a d w e a t h e r

on 1 S e p t e m b e r a n d e f f e c t i v e p r e c a u t i o n s by t h e P o l e s i n moving t h e i r a i r c r a f t from v u l n e r a b l e a i r f i e l d s p r e v e n t e d t h e i m m e d i a t e 7 Concerning h i s cooperation a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of t h e f i r s t m i s s i o n .

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w i t h v o n Bock, K e s s e l r i n g s t a t e d :
A s a n o l d army o f f i c e r , I u n d e r s t o o d t h e n e e d s a n d w o r r i e s o f t h e army t o o w e l l n o t t o r e a c h c o m p l e t e a g r e e m e n t w i t h him ( v o n Bock) i n b r i e f t a l k s . I was n o t s u b o r d i n a t e t o von Bock, b u t v o l u n t a r i l y f e l t m y s e l f t o be u n d e r h i s o r d e r s i n a l l q u e s t i o n s of g r o u n d t a c t i c s . 8

T h i s a p p r o a c h became a c o n s i s t e n t t r a d e m a r k o f K e s s e l r i n g p r i o r i t y of s u p p o r t t o t h e g r o u n d ,

-The

and c l e a r l y d e f i n e s h i s

reasons f o r pushing f o r a p r i m a r i l y t a c t i c a l a i r force.

r e s u l t o f t h i s c o o p e r a t i o n i n P o l a n d was t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e o f t h e J U 87 i n c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t a n d t h e d e l i b e r a t e u s e o f t h e

88 mm a n t i - a i r c r a f t

g u n a s a g r o u n d s u p p o r t weapon.

Following t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e P o l i s h campaign, K e s s e l r i n g
w a s asked t o s t a y i n Poland i n o r d e r t o develop a i r d e f e n s e s

f o r t h e newly a c q u i r e d t e r r i t o r i e s .

That j o b d i d n o t last

l o n g , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e h e was s o o n t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e west t o t a k e command .of L u f t f l o t t e 11 f r o m a n o l d f r i e n d f r o m T r u p p e n a m t d a y s , G e n e r a l Felmy. F e l n y had been r e l i e v e d from

command o v e r a b r e a c h of s e c u r i t y w h i c h h a d c o m p r o m i s e d t h e p l a n 9 f o r t h e i n v a s i o n of t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , B e l g i u m a n d F r a n c e . T h i s new command i n c l u d e d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r e a s o f Munster a n d Hamburg, a n a i r b o r n e g r o u p , t h r e e bomber g r o u p s , a f i g h t e r wing, and a n a n t i - a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y c o r p s . lo This transfer

came i n t i m e f o r t h e f i n a l p r e p a r a t i o n s o f t h e c o m i n g i n v a s i o n

o f t h e West. The i n v a s i o n p l a n i n c l u d e d a s i g n i f i c a n t g r o u n d f o r c e e f f o r t a s a p a r t of K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . He was

c h a r g e d w i t h p l a n n i n g a n d c o n d u c t i n g t h e employment o f t h e f i r s t l a r g e scale u s e o f a i r b o r n e , g l i d e r b o r n e , and a i r l a n d e d t r o o p s i n Western Europe. T h e s e u n i t s were t o b e u s e d t o s i e z e k e y I n t h e employment of t h e s e

p o i n t s i n a d v a n c e o f t h e main b o d y .

u n i t s , K e s s e l r i n g was c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u r p r i s e a n d t h e e x e c u t i o n of complicated t r a n s p o r t arrangements t o g e t t h e a i r b o r n e , g l i d e r , and a i r t r a n s p o r t e d u n i t s on t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . Although

t h e s e a r e s e e n as normal a i r b o r n e problems t o d a y , f o r K e s s e l r i n g ' s

12

s t a f f and t h e u n i t s , t h e s e were p i o n e e r e f f o r t s .

Kesselring

r e v i e w e d t h e p l a n s d e v e l o p e d p r i o r t o h i s a r r i v a l a n d made some c h a n g e s .
His p r i m a r y c o n c e r n , h o w e v e r , was w i t h t h e

arrangements f o r ground s u p p o r t , i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e c l o s e c o o p e r a t i o n e x i s t e d w i t h g r o u n d commanders r a t h e r t h a n t h e 11 v e r y i n d e p e n d e n t L u f t w a f f e a c t i o n e n v i s i o n e d by G o e r i n g . F o l l o w i n g t h e r a p i d p e n e t r a t i o n o f F r a n c e and t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e pocket a t Dunkirk, Goering proposed t o H i t l e r t h a t t h e e n t r a p p e d f o r c e s b e e l i m i n a t e d by t h e L u f t w a f f e , a n d t h a t t h e Army be h e l d i n p l a c e . a t the time. Kesselring objected t o t h i s proposal

H e d i d s o , n o t b e c a u s e he f e l t t h a t t h e g r o u n d

f o r c e s were b e t t e r s u i t e d f o r t h e j o b , b u t b e c a u s e h e f e l t t h a t 12 13 h i s a i r f o r c e s were t o o d e p l e t e d t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e m i s s i o n . From t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , l h K e s s e l r i n g f e l t t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e L u f t w a f f e t o reduce t h e r e s i s t a n c e a t Dunkirk s e r v e d t o v i n d i c a t e h i s judgement. The c a m p a i g n i n F r a n c e a n d t h e l a t e r B a t t l e o f B r i t a i n ( w h i c h f o r K e s s e l r i n g a c t u a l l y r a n f r o m J u n e t o December 19401, b o t h s e r v e t o d e m o n s t r a t e some of K e s s e l r i n g ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
traits.

D u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of B r i t a i n , h e d i s p l a y e d h i s w e l l

known o p t o m i s m a b o u t t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f h i s f o r c e s by p l a c i n g a l o t of confidence i n t h e i n f l a t e d Luftwaffe e s t i m a t e s of d e s t r o y e d B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t by u s i n g t h o s e f i g u r e s f o r p l a n n i n g purposes.

15

He a t t e m p t e d t o f l y a t e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e

t h e e f f e c t s of Luftwaffe a t t a c k s such as t h e a t t a c k on Coventry. The d e s i r e t o o b s e r v e t h e b a t t l e f i r s t hand a n d t o s e e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f h i s f o r c e s p e r h a p s r e f l e c t h i s 30 y e a r s ' experience a s an artilleryman.

16

A t any r a t e , t h i s t y p e of a c t i v i t y

r e s u l t e d i n h i s b e i n g s h o t o r f o r c e d down a t o t a l o f f i v e times 17 d u r i n g t h e war. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e campaign i n F r a n c e and t h e Netherlands serve t o i l l u s t r a t e Kesselring's meticulous planning a n d e x e c u t i o n o f ' a i r b o r n e o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e c o o r d i n a t i n g c l o s e s u p p o r t and a i r s u p e r i o r i t y a c t i v i t i e s . In

13

reviewing these traits, a picture is formed of a capable, optomistic and courageous commander, well suited to the type of offensive war in which he was involved. By December 1940, Kesselring was deeply involved in planning for Operation BARBAROSA as the continued Luftwaffe bombing
of Britain degenerated into a diversionary effort to mask

that invasion.

Luftflotte 11 moved to Warsaw in June 1941

just prior to the invasion as Kesselring again found himself in support of von Bock and his Army Group Center. began with air strikes at 0330, 22 June 1941. The invasion

Kesselring was

constantly in the air, observing operations, landing to coordinate with army elements and visiting crews returning from their missions: Never did he attempt to underrate their (the crews') difficulties and dangers. Always there was the broad smile and the effusive charm designed to instil confidence -and usually there was a willing response from the men, many of whose names he knew from memory, even when things.might have gone wrong. 18 During the Russian campaign, Kesselring demonstrated that he still had things to learn as a commander. During a crisis which
developed in the Elnya salient in the Army Group Center area on

2 September 1941, Kesselring committed himself to a particular

tactical course of action in order to influence a decision about the employment of ground troops. When Hitler's wishes concerning the situation became known, Kesselring reversed himself, 19 Of this situation, his apparently for political security. biographer states: Kesselring's allocation of resources in this crisis were those of the administrator who seeks a solution by compromise in an endeavor to satisfy everybody. That hard, inner stiffening which is essential in bracing the-topclass commander to an unbending purpose had yet to ossify within him. 20 Kesselring's involvement in Russia was relatively shortlived.

-/.-

In mid-September, he was asked about the possibility

21

of being transferred to the Mediterranian theater by General Hoffman von Waldau, an officer on the Luftwaffe General Staff.

14'

K e s s e l r i n g d i d n o t s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r t h e r e q u e s t a t t h e time, and soon f o r g o t about i t i n t h e h e c t i c a c t i v i t i e s of t h e R u s s i a n campaign. i n November. The r e q u e s t c h a n g e d t o a n o r d e r , however,

Rommel, t h e n i n N o r t h A f r i c a , n e e d e d s u b s t a n t i a l

a i r s u p p o r t , a n d t h e Royal A i r F o r c e , o p e r a t i n g f r o m t h e i s l a n d
o f Malta i n t h e N e d i t e r r a n i a n , w a s making r e s u p p l y o f North

A f r i c a a v e r y s e r i o u s v e n t u r e f o r t h e Axis.

On 28 November,

K e s s e l r i n g was a p p o i n t e d Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h , and g i v e n t h e m i s s i o n of i n s u r i n g t h a t s u p p l i e s g o t t o Rommel. 2 2 him went t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s o f L u f t f l o t t e 11 t o t a k e a l l Luftwaffe forces i n the Mediterranian. The command r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h d e v e l o p e d upon K e s s e l r i n g ' s a r r i v a l i n Rome was r a t h e r awkward a n d n o t i n l i n e w i t h H i t l e r ' s intentions.23 H i t l e r desired f o r Kesselring not only t o take With

command of

c h a r g e of German f o r c e s i n t h e a r e a , b u t I t a l i a n f o r c e s a s w e l l .
T h i s t u r n e d i n t o mere w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g .

Upon h i s a r r i v a l i n

Rome, K e s s e l r i n g f o u n d t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s were e x t r e m e l y s u s p e c t o f a s i t u a t i o n , i n which a German commanded a l l f o r c e s i n t h e i r theater. For t h e sake of c o o p e r a t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g agreed with

M u s s o l i n i and t h e I t a l i a n C h i e f o f S t a f f , Count C a v a l l e r o , t h a t t h e Commando Supremo ( t h e I t a l i a n High Command) would c o n t i n u e t o command a l l Axis f o r c e s i n t h e t h e a t e r , b u t t h a t n o o p e r a t i o n a l o r d e r would b e i s s u e d w i t h o u t K e s s e l r i n g ' s a p p r o v a l . 2 4 This

a r r a n g e m e n t made K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Rommel r a t h e r interesting. Rommel commanded t h e A f r i k a K o r p s , which was

a s s i g n e d by Oberkommando d e r Wehrmacht (OKW

--

t h e German Armed

F o r c e s High Command d i r e c t l y u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f H i t l e r ) t o t h e Commando Supremo. Ronlmel came undek t h e command of Governer-

G e n e r a l M a r s h a l B a s t i c o i n T r i p o l i t a n i a , who i n t u r n was u n d e r t h e Commando Supremo, who was s u p p o s e d ( b y H i t l e r ) t o b e u n d e r t h e Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h , b u t was n o t . T h i s s i t u a t i o n was

n o t made any e a s i e r by t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n B a s t i c o a n d Rommel. K e s s e l r i n g ' s p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t o g e t s u p p l i e s t o Rommel, and h e was t o h a v e t h e a i r a n d sea

assets t o do t h a t .

15

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , he d i d n o t have o f f i c i a l c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s i n g l e , m o s t i m p o r t a n t German f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t h e a t e r , t h e A f r i k a K o r p s . H a v i n g t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f a Commander i n C h i e f , b u t n o t

4

t h e a u t h o r i t y o r t h e s t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n t o c a r r y o u t t h a t resp o n s i b i l i t y , K e s s e l r i n g had t o f o l l o w t h e f i n e l i n e between p r e s s u r i n g t h e I t a l i a n s i n t o more a c t i o n on o n e s i d e a n d mane u v e r i n g t h e German commanders a r o u n d t h e I t a l i a n o b s t r u c t i o n i s t 25 a t t i t u d e s t h a t s o m e t i m e s a r o s e on t h e o t h e r . T h i s was a d i f f i c u l t t a s k u n d e r t h e b e s t o f c o n d i t i o n s , a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e N e d i t e r r a n i a n t h e a t e r i n 1941 a n d e a r l y 1 9 4 2 were f a r f r o m i d e a l . Romel, called i n to aid the faltering

I t a l i a n o p e r a t i o n s i n N o r t h A f r i c a i n F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 1 , was p u s h e d b a c k from t h e L i b y a n - E g y p t i a n f r o n t i e r t o Mersa B r e g a o n t h e

w e s t e r n s i d e of L i b y a i n t h e f i r s t month of K e s s e l r i n g ' s a s s i g n m e n t t o the theater.26 S u p p l i e s w e r e n o t g e t t i n g t h r o u g h t o Rommel

b e c a u s e o f t h e e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n by t h e B r i t i s h on Malta t o i n t e r d i c t Axis convoys heading f o r T r i p o l i . Indeed, during t h e

month o f December, n o t a s i n g l e t a n k made i t t o N o r t h A f r i c a u n t i l Christmas, though many l a y

at t h e b o t t o m of t h e s e a .

27

Malta was a t h o r n i n t h e Axis f l e s h f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g o f

t h e North A f r i c a n o p e r a t i o n .
As e a r l y a s J a n u a r y 1 9 4 1 , t h e

p r o b l e m was r e c o g n i z e d a n d X F l i e g e r C o r p s was s t a t i o n e d o n S i c i l y t o a i d t h e I t a l i a n s i n f i g h t i n g t h e B r i t i s h o n Malta. The B r i t i s h , r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n o f Malta, cont i n u e d t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s d e f e n s e s a n d became v e r y a c t i v e i n

X F l i e g e r Corps 28 was a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n of r e d u c i n g Malta from t h e a i r .

a t t a c k i n g c o n v o y s from Europe t o North A f r i c a . I n s p i t e o f t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s e f f o r t s , t h e B r i t i s h c o n t i n u e d t o make i n c r e a s i n g i n r o a d s i n t o A x i s s u p p l y e f f o r t s t h r o u g h o u t 1941. During t h e i n i t i a l b r i e f i n g with H i t l e r p r i o r t o h i s assignment t o Rome, K e s s e l r i n g was t o l d t o r e d u c e Malta from t h e a i r w i t h L u f t f l o t t e 11. Kesselring replied t h a t he f e l t it impossible

t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e i s l a n d w i t h o u t p u t t i n g ground f o r c e s on M a l t a .

16

Hitler and Goering, apparently learning nothing about tactical reduction of strongpoints from Dunkirk and the last year's efforts on Malta, devalued Kesselring's opinion and told him 29 to follow orders. Kesselring began operations against Malta on 31 December 1941, culminating in April 1942. l i e clearly saw the need to

occupy the island, and continuously attempted to persuade Hitler and Mussolini to commit ground forces to invade it, but could only elicit half-hearted agreements from either High Command. It was Kesselring's intent to soften the island using Luftflotte
11, then to invade.

The Luftwaffe's effectiveness in bombing

the island and Kesselring's own optomistic evaluation, however, served to invalidate his plan in the eyes of OKW. From 20 March

to 29 April 1942, concentrated attacks were made on the island, wrecking port facilities and reducing British fighters on island to just a few.
the

Kesselring announced on 11 April that

the Luftwaffe attack was effective, assuming that he could then persuade his vacillating superiors, naval colleagues and Italian allies that an invasion would now be simple. Instead, they

siezed the opportunity to take the view that since the Luftwaffe was so effective, an invasion was no longer necessary. I-iitler, additionally, was very suspect of the type of airborne operation required to take Malta after the serious losses from a similar situation on Crete in 1941. At a conference at Obersalzburg on 29 April 1942, the decision was made to dedicate resources to insure the reduction of Tobruk in Libya, which Rommel now had isolated, then to invade and secure Malta. Kesselring pushed his case hard at the meeting, but had to settle for a com30 promise. The compromise did not hold. Once Tobruk fell on 21

June 1942, Rommel pressed Hitler, without telling Kesselring, for permission to immediately attack to the east toward Cairo. Hitler, who had already told the designated commander of the airborne invasion force, General Student, that he felt consolidation

17

of t h e i s l a n d i m p o s s i b l e , u s e d t h i s p r e t e x t t o s c r a p t h e w h o l e plan. K e s s e l r i n g went down f i g h t i n g . On 26 J u n e , a t a m e e t i n g

w i t h Rommel, C a v a l l e r o a n d E a s t i c o , h e a r g u e d s t r o n g l y w i t h Romm e 1 t o c h a n g e h i s m i n d . 31 Rommel r e f u s e d , s e a l i n g h i s own f a t e

a s t h e B r i t i s h b e g a n t o r e b u i l d Malta q u i c k l y a n d K e s s e l r i n g
soon found i t d i f f i c u l t , t h e n n e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e , t o s u s t a i n Rommel's f o r c e s i n N o r t h A f r i c a i n t h e m o n t h s t o come. I n October 1942, a r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n of the southern

command made K e s s e l r i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a 1 1 o c c u p i e d M e d i t e r r a n i a n c o a s t a l a r e a s w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h o s e a r e a s u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l of Rommel. K e s s e l r i n g ' s r o l e w a s expanded from t h a t of

p r o v i d i n g s u p p l i e s t o Rommel t o a t r u e Commander i n C h i e f w i t h the appropriate authority. T h u s , h e became t h e o n l y German

commander who was i n c o n t r o l o f a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s w i t h i n 32 t h e s c o p e of h i s command. I n the reorganization, Luftflotte

I1 g a i n e d a s e p a r a t e commander a n d K e s s e l r i n g was a l l o w e d t o
The p r i m a r y r e a s o n f o r t h i s c h a n g e i n f o c u s w a s 33 c o n c e r n f o r a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g som ew here i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n . T h a t l a n d i n g came on 8 November 1942 a s A m eri can a n d B r i t i s h 34 f o r c e s l a n d e d i n A l g i e r s , Oran and C a s a b l a n c a . As t h e A x i s now f a c e d a two f r o n t w a r i n A f r i c a , K e s s e l r i n g ' s command was e x p a n d e d i n J a n u a r y 1943 t o i n c l u d e a l l f o r c e s i n o c c u p i e d territories. T h i s e x p a n d e d command d i d n o t e a s e t h e p r o b l e m s form a s t a f f .

i n N o r t h A f r i c a , h o w e v e r , a s y e a r s o f OKW n e g l e c t of t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n t h e a t e r c o u l d n o t b e made u p by t h e s u p p l i e s a n d men now p o u r i n g i n t o N o r t h A f r i c a . The A l l i e s w e r e t o o s t r o n g ,

l e a d i n g t o t h e i n e v i t a b l e f a l l o f T u n i s i a on 9 May 1943.

Background:

The D e f e n s e o f I t a l v

The d e f e n s e of I t a l y b e g a n w i t h t h e d e f e n s e of S i c i l y . The OKW was u n s u r e o f t h e n e x t A l l i e d move f o l l o w i n g t h e f a l l

of T u n i s i a , a s i t u a t i o n a i d e d by a v e r y e f f e c t i v e B r i t i s h r u s e

18

w h i c h p o i n t e d t o a p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n i n v a s i o n i n e i t h e r Greece o r S a r d i n i a . 36 K e s s e l r i n g was c o n s e q u e n t l y f o r c e d t o

take steps t o prepare both locations against possible attack.

As he considered t h e defense of I t a l y , he f e l t t h a t it should

begin i n S i c i l y .

I n m a k i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n , K e s s e l r i n g was

q u i t e aware o f t h e d a n g e r o f f o r c e s i n S i c i l y b e i n g c u t o f f by a n a m p h i b i o u s e n v e l o p m e n t somewhere a l o n g t h e l o n g e s t c o a s t l i n e i n E u r o p e , b u t f e l t a t t h e t i m e t h a t German i n t e l l e g e n c e would b e a b l e t o f o r w a r n him o f s u c h a p o s s i b i l i t y . I n retro-

s p e c t , K e s s e l r i n g and S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , h i s v e r y capable c h i e f o f s t a f f , saw t h e i r t a s k d e v e l o p i n I t a l y a s : maintaining the I t a l i a n theater i n order t o assure a n d k e e p t h e I t a l i a n s on o u r s i d e . The c o m p l e t e f a i l u r e o f t h e I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s i n S i c i l y , n e c e s s i t a t e d , however a "delaying defense'' on t h i s i s l a n d . The I t a l i a n p e n i n s u l a i t s e l f was t o b e " d e f e n d e d . " Italy's desertion frustrated a l s o t h i s plan. I t c o m p e l l e d t h e German command t o c h a n g e o v e r f i n a l l y t o d e l a y i n g d e f e n s e w h i c h , of c o u r s e , was t e m p o r a r i l y a l s o t u r n e d i n t o o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s . 38
As indicated, continued I t a l i a n participation following

...

t h e l o s s o f t h e i r b e s t u n i t s i n A f r i c a and g e n e r a l w e a r i n e s s w i t h t h e war a n d w i t h M u s s o l i n i were m a j o r c o n c e r n s w i t h i n t h e German command. F i r s t , w i t h t h e i n t e n t of b o l s t e r i n g t h e

s a g g i n g I t a l i a n Commitment t o t h e e f f o r t , t h e n w i t h t h e resp o n s i b i l i t y of d e f e n d i n g t h e c o u n t r y o n c e t h e I t a l i a n s p u l l e d o u t o f t h e c o n f l i c t , Germany became i n c r e a s i n g l y d r a w n i n t o r e i n f o r c e m e n t of t h i s newly v u l n e r a b l e s o u t h e r n f l a n k . What

f o l l o w s i n t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s a t r a c e of Kesselr i n g ' s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h a t commitment a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e g e n e r a l d e f e n s i v e s i t u a t i o n on t h e I t a l i a n p e n i n s u l a . On 11 J u n e 1 9 4 3 , t h e I t a l i a n g a r r i s o n on t h e i s l a n d o f P a n t e l l e r r a , 1 2 0 miles s o u t h w e s t o f P a l e r m o ( s e e Appendix A ) , f e l l t o t h e 1 s t B r i t i s h D i v i s i o n w i t h o u t a c o n t e s t . 39 For

Kesselring, t h i s event s o l i d i f i e d the feeling that the next A l l i e d e f f o r t would be i n S i c i l y . 4 o W i t h t h e i s l a n d now i n

A l l i e d h a n d s , Eisenhower had t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o l a u n c h land based

t a c t i c a l a i r s t r i k e s on S i c i l i a n beaches.
S i n c e t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of d ' A r m a t a V i t t e r o A m brosi o a s t h e I t a l i a n Chief of S t a f f t o r e p l a c e C a v a l e r o i n J a n u a r y 1943, t h e w o r k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h a n d t h e I t a l i a n Commando Supremo became i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r a i n e d . A m br os i o f e l t t h a t i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h Germany was a d a n g e r o u s c o u r s e f o r h i s c o u n t r y a t t h i s p o i n t , and d e d i c a t e d himself t o b r e a k i n g away f r o m Germany.41 The r e s u l t i n g t e n s i o n m ount ed

d u r i n g t h e months of Axis r e v e r s e s i n North A f r i c a t h r o u g h t h e i n v a s i o n o f S i c i l y i n J u l y 1943. The c h i l l was f e l t a l l t h e

way t o B e r l i n a s H i t l e r became i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e I t a l i a n com m i t m ent . In the f i n a l analysis,

t h e Axis w a s n o t b u i l t o n t h e c o m m i t m e n t s o f two n a t i o n s , b u t t h e m u t u a l i n t e r e s t s o f t h e two d i c t a t o r s . A g a i n s t t h e back-

ground o f c o n c e r n and c o a l i t i o n d e g e n e r a t i o n p l a y e d t h e opening move o f t h e I t a l i a n c a m p a i g n

--

t h e invasion of S i c i l y .

O p e r a t i o n a l l y , K e s s e l r i n g a s Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h ,
w a s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e f e n s e of

t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n , but

I t a l i a n s o i l was s t i l l u n d e r I t a l i a n c o n t r o l .

German g r o u n d

f o r c e s c o m m i t t e d t o I t a l y , t h e r e f o r e , were r e t a i n e d u n d e r I t a l i a n command,42 b u t u n d e r German l o g i s t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .

K e s s e l r i n g d i d m anage, h o w e v e r , t o r e t a i n a s i g n i f i c a n t " i n f o r m a l " command r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h German u n i t s i n I t a l y . The

I t a l i a n 6 t h Army i n S i c i l y was commanded b y G e n e r a l G u z z o n i w i t h a b o u t 200,000 p o o r l y o r g a n i z e d , personnel. t r a i n e d , deployed and equipped

Two German f o r m a t i o n s , a d d e d a s " s t i f f i n e r s " were

i n S i c f l y u n d e r 6 t h Army c o n t r o l

--

t h e 15th Panzer Grenadier

( P z G r ) D i v i s i o n a n d t h e German G o e r i n g (HG) P a n z e r D i v i s i o n , b o t h o f w h i c h were f i r s t - c l a s s units. The b a s i c I t a l i a n c o n -

c e p t f o r t h e em pl oy m ent of t h e s e f o r c e s , w h i c h w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d b y K e s s e l r i n g , was t o u s e p o o r l y t r a i n e d a n d e q u i p p e d c o a s t a l u n i t s b a c k e d by i n f a n t r y a t s t r o n g p o i n t s . The b e s t

20

I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s a n d t h e two German d i v i s i o n s were a r r a y e d as c o u n t e r a t t a c k f o r c e s within t h e i n t e r i o r . 4 3 Kesselring

i n s u r e d t h a t t h e German d i v i s i o n s were p l a c e d a l o n g t h e s o u t h e r n c o a s t o f t h e i s l a n d , w h e r e h e f e l t t h e A l l i e d m a i n e f f o r t would 44 be p l a c e d . The A l l i e s l a n d e d a l o n g t h e s o u t h e r n a n d s o u t h e a s t e r n c o a s t s o f S i c i l y e a r l y o n 10 J u l y 1 9 4 3 . The f i g h t i n g was i n t e n s e ,

a s German a n d r e g u l a r I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s t o o k t h e b r u n t o f
t h e f i g h t i n g a t t e m p t i n g t o t h r o w t h e A l l i e s from t h e beachheads. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e 6 t h Army b r o k e down q u i c k l y . o c c a s i o n s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s f r o m German f o r m a t i o n s

On n u m e r o u s

i n S i c i l y t o K e s s e l r i n g ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s o n t h e m a i n l a n d were t h e o n l y l i n k between t h e p e n i n s u l a and t h e i s l a n d . Kesselring,

c o n s e q u e n t l y , u n a b l e t o r e a c h Guzzoni a t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s , found h i m s e l f i n v o l v e d i n making o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s from t h e m a i n l a n d w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e I t a l i a n commander o n t h e i s l a n d . The I t a l i a n d e f e n s e q u i c k l y b r o k e down, a n d K e s s e l r i n g , a s w e l l a s OKW r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e Germans would h a v e t o a s s u m e responsibility f o r the defense. The Commando Supremo a l s o 46

r e c o g n i z e d t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d a s k e d OKW f o r i n c r e a s e d a i r a n d n a v a l s u p p o r t on 13 J u l y . Simultaneously, Kesselring requested

p e r m i s s i o n t o move t h e 2 9 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n f r o m t h e mainland, and t h e remainder of t h e 1st P a r a c h u t e D i v i s i o n ( o n e r e g i m e n t jumped i n t o S i c i l y o n 1 2 J u l y a s i m m e d i a t e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ) a s w e l l a s more s u b m a r i n e s a n d t o r p e d o b o a t s w i t h which t o h a r a s s A l l i e d

hipp ping.^'

Before a u t h o r i z i n g t h e

movement o f t h e s e u n i t s , H i t l e r b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e a b a n d o n ment o f S i c i l y i n o r d e r t o c o n c e n t r a t e f o r c e s on t h e m a i n l a n d . K e s s e l r i n g , h o w e v e r , d i s s u a d e d him i n o r d e r t o b o l s t e r I t a l i a n m o r a l e , w h i c h a t t h i s p o i n t was c r i t i c a l . On 1 3 J u l y , H i t l e r

a u t h o r i z e d t h e movement f r o m t h e m a i n l a n d o f t h e two d i v i s i o n s , p l u s t h e X I V P a n z e r Corps H e a d q u a r t e r s t o t a k e c o n t r o l o f t h e

21

d i v i s i o n s on t h e i s l a n d .

I t s t a s k , u n t i l 13 J u l y , had b e e n

t o provide a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l support t o t h e d i v i s i o n s c o m m i t t e d on S i c i l y , s o t h e c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n and a l r e a d y had a working r e l a t i o n s h i p with the division s t a f f s . The d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n S i c i l y , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e poor showing of I t a l i a n t r o o p s , brought Mussolini t o t h e end of h i s power. With a l o s s of c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e Duce, t h e F a c i s t

G r a n d C o u n c i l met o n 2 4 J u l y a n d v o t e d M u s s o l i n i o u t o f o f f i c e .

He was i m m e d i a t e l y a r r e s t e d a n d d e t a i n e d .

K i n g V i c t o r Emmanuel,

forwarned of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , a p p o i n t e d Marshal P i e t r o Badaglio t o h e a d t h e new g o v e r n m e n t w i t h t h e c h a r t e r t o c o n t i n u e t h e

war o p e n l y a s a member o f t h e A x i s , b u t t o s e e k a means of p e a c e 48 w i t h t h e A l l i e s as soon as p o s s i b l e .
As t h e s e e v e n t s on t h e m a i n l a n d t r a n s p i r e d ,

the situation

on S i c i l y g r e w w o r s e .

G e n e r a l Hube, t h e commander o f t h e

X I V P a n z e r C o r p s , a s s u m e d command of German f o r m a t i o n s o n t h e

i s l a n d w i t h K e s s e l r i n g o r c h e s t r a t i n g a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s from
the m a i n l a n d . 49
Hube c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s f o r c e s i n a d e f e n s i v e

p e r i m e t e r i n t h e n o r t h e a s t of S i c i l y where h i s f o u r d i v i s i o n s c o u l d b e s t u t i l i z e t h e rugged t e r r a i n on a l i n e r u n n i n g around Mount E t n a .

I t became c l e a r t o K e s s e l r i n g , a s i t d i d t o OKW,

t h a t t h e Germans m u s t s o o n w i t h d r a w t o t h e m a i n l a n d i n o r d e r
t o p r e v e n t a loss of s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e s a s h a d h a p p e n e d i n

North Africa.

I n t e n d i n g t o buy time w i t h good d e f e n s i v e p o s i -

t i o n s , K e s s e l r i n g n e v e r t h e l e s s o r d e r e d Hube t o b e g i n p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a w i t h d r a w a l i n c a s e t h e Commando Supremo s h o u l d d e c i d e t o s u r r e n d e r I t a l y t o t h e A l l i e s w i t h German f o r c e s 50 s t i l l on t h e i s l a n d . The w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e X I V P a n z e r C o r p s f r o m S i c i l y was planned and e x e c u t e d w i t h m e t i c u l o u s d e t a i l . Begun on 8

A u g u s t , w i t h o u t w a i . t i n g f o r OKW a p p r o v a l , K e s s e l r i n g o v e r s a w a p e r f e c t l y coordinated force withdrawal conducted i n cooperation

22

w i t h t h e L u f w a f f e , who p r o v i d e d a i r c o v e r a n d s u p p l i e d a conc e n t r a t e d r i n g of a i r d e f e n s e around t h e Messina S t r a i t s , and German n a v a l p a t r o l b o a t s p r e v e n t i n g A l l i e d p e n e t r a t i o n f r o m t h e

sea.
A l l German u n i t s , w i t h e q u i p m e n t , w e r e f e r r i e d t o t h e

m a i n l a n d b y 1 2 A u g u s t , a s w e l l a s some I t a l i a n p e r s o n n e l a n d equipment. A l l i e d a i r was i n e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t t h e a i r d e f e n s e 51 coverage. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n i s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n of Kesselring a t h i s best

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c a r e f u l planning of an unavoidably

c o m p l i c a t e d maneuver i n t h e m i d s t of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y and uncertainty. The Germans were s u r p r i s e d t h a t t h e y g o t o f f s o e a s i l y 52 a g a i n s t t h e s u p e r i o r A l l i e d a i r power i n t h i s o p e r a t i o n . They were n o t s u r p r i s e d i n o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e c a m p a i g n , h o w e v e r . K e s s e l r i n g l e a r n e d some v a l u a b l e l e s s o n s a b o u t t h e p l a c e m e n t o f
.~

counterattack forces against an invading force through h i s experience i n Sicily.

He saw t h e u s e l e s s n e s s o f a t t e m p t i n g

t o p l a c e c o a s t a l u n i t s v e r y c l o s e t o t h e b e a c h a n d e x p e c t them t o r e p e l a n amphibious a s s a u l t . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e saw - .

t h e wisdom o f u s i n g q u i c k r e a c t i n g m o b i l e r e s e r v e s t o meet t h e i n v a s i o n and d e s t r o y i t b e f o r e i t c o u l d d e v e l o p a f o o t hold. T h e s e r e s e r v e s , a s h e saw i t , m u s t b e p l a c e d r e l a t i v e l y

c l o s e t o t h e p o s s i b l e l a n d i n g s i t e s i n o r d e r t o move u n d e r t h e c o v e r of d a r k n e s s t o p r e v e n t e x p o s u r e t o a i r strikes o r naval gunfire.

53

The l e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n S i c i l y were l a t e r

carefully considered i n planning f o r the inevitable invasion n e a r Rome.

Background:

The N a t u r e of t h e P e n i n s u l a r D e f e n s e

P r i o r t o t h e i n v a s i o n of S i c i l y , some h i g h l e v e l d i s c u s s i o n s were p r o c e e d i n g a t d i c t a t o r l e v e l c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e f e n s e o f t h e mainland. H i t l e r became c o n v i n c e d t h a t I t a l y w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y

r e t i r e f r o m t h e w a r a n d d e s i r e d t o h a v e some o p t i o n s i n I t a l y

23

i n c a s e t h a t e v e n t s h o u l d come a b o u t .

Accordingly he in-

s t r u c t e d K e s s e l r i n g on 7 May 1 9 4 3 t o o f f e r f i v e d i v i s i o n s t o the I t a l i a n s t o help bolster t h e i r defenses. The h i d d e n a g e n d a

was t o h a v e s i g n i f i c a n t German f o r c e s i n p l a c e t o p r e v e n t

immediate A l l i e d take-over, pullout. refused.

o r a t best, t o prevent an I t a l i a n

Ambrosio, u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e n a t u r e of t h i s o f f e r ,

H i t l e r f e l t t h a t h i s s u s p i c i o n s were c o n f i r m e d a n d

i m m e d i a t e l y s e t a b o u t t o c r e a t e a f o r c e u n d e r Rommel, w h i c h e v e n t u a l l y became Army Group B , on t h e n o r t h e r n b o r d e r o f I t a l y which c o u l d e n t e r t h e c o u n t r y a t a moment's n o t i c e . Apparently,

i t was a l s o a t t h i s time t h a t I-titler b e g a n t o c o n s i d e r r e p l a c i n g

K e s s e l r i n g w i t h Rommel a s Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h , t h o u g h 54 Kesse 1t h i s was n o t m a n i f e s t e d u n t i l t h e i n v a s i o n o f S i c i l y . r i n g was n o t n o t i f i e d o f H i t l e r ' s i n t e n t i o n t o c r e a t e a n Army Group u n d e r Rommel, t h o u g h h e m u s t c e r t a i n l y h a v e known a b o u t
i t . 5 5 While t h i n g s h e a t e d up i n B e r l i n , K e s s e l r i n g c o n t i n u e d

t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Ambrosio a n d managed t o g e t t h e Commando Supremo t o a c c e p t f o u r d i v i s i o n s a n d t h e X I V P a n z e r C o r p s H e a d q u a r t e r s ( t h e s e were t h e f o r c e s e v e n t u a l l y u s e d i n t h e d e f e n s e of S i c i l y ) , t h e n w i t h t h e f a l l o f P a n t e l l e r i a , o n e more d i v i s i o n on 1 June 1943. Thus, H i t l e r ' s i n t e n t w a s f u l f i l l e d ,

w i t h o u t Rommel's f o r c e f u l i n t e r v e n t i o n , by s h e e r d i p l o m a c y a n d an aggressive A l l i e d a t t i t u d e . However, t h e s e e d s f o r t h e

c o m i n g d e b a t e a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e d e f e n s e o f I t a l y were p l a n t e d
a s Rornmel s e t t l e d i n t o p l a c e i n t h e n o r t h .

T h i n g s d i d n o t h a v e much t i m e t o c o o l down i n B e r l i n before the next crisis. on 2 5 J u l y . M u s s o l i n i w a s removed f r o m o f f i c e

H i t l e r r e a c t e d by o r d e r i n g a number o f m i l i t a r y

moves, i n c l u d i n g k i d n a p p i n g t h e K i n g a n d B a d o g l i o , l a n d i n g a i r b o r n e t r o o p s i n Rome a n d f r e e i n g M u s s o l i n i f r o m c o n f i n e ment.

Hitler a l s o i.ntended t o withdraw troops from S i c i l y

a n d C o r s i c a i n o r d e r t o c o n c e n t r a t e them o n t h e m a i n l a n d a n d p l a c e them u n d e r the. c o n t r o l o f Rommel. X e s s e l r i n g was n o t

24

i d l e , however. t o fight.

Badoglio

s t a t e d t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s would c o n t i n u e

K e s s e l r i n g b e l i e v e d him a n d p e r s u a d e d H i t l e r n o t

t o t a k e immediate a c t i o n , b u t t o c o n t i n u e t h e a l l i a n c e and a t t h e same t i m e , t o i n f i l t r a t e f o r c e s i n t o I t a l y i n s t e a d o f d e v e l o p i n g o p e n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e I t a l i a n Army on t h e m a i n l a n d . Though H i t l e r a g r e e d w i t h t h e s e p r o p o s a l s , h e s t i l l f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s would w i t h d r a w a n d d i r e c t e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n c a s e of t h a t e v e n t u a l i t y . c o n t i n g e n c y d e a l t w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g on t h e m a i n l a n d , a n d a n o t h e r w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n I t a l i a n surrender. A t a b o u t t h i s t i m e a d e b a t e d e v e l o p e d w i t h i n OKW a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of t h e d e f e n s e o f t h e I t a l i a n m a i n l a n d . p o s i t i o n s a r e d e s c r i b e d by M a n f r e d Rommel : The two One

M y f a t h e r (Rommel) t h e r e f o r e p r o p o s e d t o g i v e u p s o u t h e r n a n d c e n t r a l I t a l y a n d make a f i n a l s t a n d i n t h e Apennine l i n e s o u t h of t h e Po v a l l e y . T h i s would s h o r t e n t h e c o a s t a l f r o n t a n d e n a b l e i t t o be more t h i c k l y h e l d . K e s s e l r i n g , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , w a s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t i t was w e l l w i t h i n t h e bounds o f p o s s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n r e s i s t a n c e s o u t h of Rome f o r q u i t e some t i m e . 56

Rommel's main c o n c e r n , a s was O K W ' s , was t h a t German f o r m a t i o n s may b e c a u g h t t o o f a r s o u t h o n t h e p e n i n s u l a a n d be c u t o f f , p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h e I t a l i a n s g a v e up. Kesselring's

p o s i t i o n was w e l l s t a t e d by V i e t i n g h o f f , l a t e r t h e commander o f t h e T e n t h Army u n d e r K e s s e l r i n g .

H e s t a t e d t h a t Rommel's

p o s i t i o n should be r e j e c t e d because o f :
A considerable loss of p o l i t c a l p r e s t i g e , relinquishing

t h e v e r y i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n made by I t a l i a n war i n d u s t r i e s and a g r i c u l t u r e t o t h e Axis p o t e n t i a l , s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e Po v a l l e y , w h e r e t h e A l l i e d A i r F o r c e c o u l d a s s e m b l e i n a n y s t r e n g t h r e q u i r e d , b u t a l s o would h a v e c a u s e d t h e c o m p l e t e r e v e r s a l of t h e German o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n i n t h e B a l k a n s and F r a n c e . 57 Though K e s s e l r i n g ' s p o s i t i o n seems f a i r l y r e a s o n a b l e ,

a s d o e s Rommel's, a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b l e m w a s b u i l t i n t o h i s
b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e v i a b i l i t y of h i s p l a n . H e

25

s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s would c o n t i n u e t o f i g h t . H i t l e r d i d n o t , s o f e l t h i s a p p r o a c h t o b e more d a n g e r o u s . W h i l e t h i s d e b a t e d e v e l o p e d , S i c i l y was e v a c u a t e d o n 12 August. On 1 5 A u g u s t , Rommel was named Suprem e Commander,

N o r t h e r n I t a l y , t h u s d i v i d i n g command r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n I t a l y b e t w e e n K e s s e l r i n g a n d Rommel. Kesselring recognized the danger

o f a s p l i t command a n d t h a t h e d i d n o t h a v e t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f
H i t l e r i n t h e m a t t e r of how b e s t t o d e f e n d I t a l y . he offered h i s resignation. Consequently,

Hitler, uncertain about the best

a p p r o a c h , d e c i d e d t o k e e p b o t h commanders i n p l a c e f o r t h e immediate f u t u r e and r e f u s e d K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e q u e s t . H ow ever,

H i t l e r c o n s i d e r e d K e s s e l r i n g a n I t a l i o p h i l e and had s e r i o u s
doubts about h i s r e l i a b i l i t y t o carry out thecontingency plan dealing with a possible I t a l i a n capitulation named AXIS.58

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code

A d d i t i o n a l l y , Hitler ordered t h a t t h e Tenth

Army b e e s t a b l i s h e d i n s o u t h e r n I t a l y u n d e r G e n e r a l H e i n r i c h v o n V i e t i n g h o f f g e n n a n n t S c h e e l i n o r d e r t o g a t h e r German f o r m a t i o n s under one h e a d q u a r t e r s . r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on 2 2 A u g u s t 1 9 4 3 . The two c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s d e v e l o p e d b y OKW d e a l t w i t h two s i t u a t i o n s . I f t h e Allies invaded southern I t a l y , Kesselring V i e t i n g h o f f assumed h i s

was t o h a v e V i e t i n g h o f f c o n d u c t a f i g h t i n g w i t h d r a w a l t o a n
a r e a s o u t h o f Rome.

I f t h e I t a l i a n s c a p i t u l a t e d , P l a n AXIS

o r d e r e d t h a t I t a l i a n f o r m a t i o n s i n I t a l y be d i s a r m e d , t h a t S a r d i n i a a n d C o r s i c a b e e v a c u a t e d , t h a t t h e T e n t h Army w i t h d r a w up t h e p e n i n s u l a t o a n a r e a s o u t h of Rome u n t i l t h e e v a c u a t i o n was c o m p l e t e , t h e n w i t h d r a w t o Northern I t a l y .

N e i t h e r OKW n o r K e s s e l r i n g f o r e s a w b o t h e v e n t s h a p p i n i n g s i m ultaneously.
Ey 2 8 A u g u s t , K e s s e l r i n g h a d d e c i d e d t h a t t h e n e x t A l l i e d

a t t a c k w oul d b e a g a i n s t t h e I t a l i a n m a i n l a n d , b u t was u n c e r t a i n of the location.

OKW, a p p a r e n t l y w i t h b e t t e r i n t e l l e g e n c e ,

p r e d i c t e d t h e invasion a t e i t h e r Salerno o r Naples as e a r l y as

26

22 August.
On 3 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 , t h e B r i t i s h E i g h t h Army made a d i v e r s i o n a r y landing i n C a l a b r i a , t h e "toe" of I t a l y . Kessel-

r i n g , i n accordance with the'contingency plan f o r an Allied i n v a s i o n , began t o withdraw h i s f o r m a t i o n s f u r t h e r n o r t h . f u l l y e x p e c t e d l a n d i n g s e l s e w h e r e , and d i d n o t wish f o r h i s u n i t s t o be c a u g h t t o o f a r s o u t h . T h a t a n t i c i p a t i o n was n o t
H e

d i s a p p o i n t e d a s t h e m a i n A l l i e d l a n d i n g came a t S a l e r n o o n

8 September.

Commensurate w i t h t h e i n v a s i o n , E i s e n h o w e r a n n o u n c e d Facing t h i s unplanned s i t u a t i o n

the Italian capitulation.

--

a n A l l i e d i n v a s i o n a n d t h e I t a l i a n s u r r e n d e r a t t h e same t i m e , K e s s e l r i n g and Vietinghoff q u i c k l y improvised. Units concentrated

a t S a l e r n o t o m e e t t h e F i f t h Army l a n d i n g , w h i l e AXIS was i m p l e mented. With t h e a i d o f W e s t p h a l a n d G e n e r a l S t u d e n t , Kessel-

r i n g managed t o p e r s u a d e t h e Commando Supremo t o l a y down t h e i r

arms a n d d e c l a r e Rome a n

o p e n c i t y o n 10 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 .

V i e t i n g h o f f , u s i n g d i p l o m a c y , a l s o managed t o e f f e c t t h e same arrangements i n t h e south. Kesselring, i n conjunction with

59

AXIS, was s u c c e s s f u l i n e v a c u a t i n g S a r d i n i a o n 8 S e p t e m b e r
and C o r s i c a o n 12 September w i t h l i t t l e I t a l i a n i n t e r f e r e n c e .

Assuming t h a t K e s s e l r i n g ' s a p p r o a c h t o d e a l i n g w i t h t h e I t a l i a n s i n t h e s o u t h was f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n o f h i s I t a l i o p h i l e t e n d e n c i e s , OKW s e v e r l y c r i t i c i s e d him. Rommel i n n o r t h e r n

I t a l y , was a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of AXIS i n h i s area. F o r s a k i n g any p r e t e n c e a t n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h t h e I t a l a i n s ,

h e (Rommel) r u t h l e s s l y t o o k p r i s o n e r a n d t r a n s p o r t e d t o Germany t h o s e who would n o t a t o n c e j o i n w i t h t h e Germans, a n d t h e r e b y i n c i t e d a n a n t o g o n i s m w h i c h was t o r e v e r b e r a t e i n t o t h e f u t u r e . T h o s e I t a l i a n s who were n o t c a p t u r e d c a c h e d t h e i r a r m s o r f l e d w i t h them i n t o t h e h i l l s . 60 T h o s e weapons were l a t e r u s e d a g a i n s t t h e Germans d u r i n g partisan operations. Thus,
'I.

..

t h e r e were p e n a l t i e s t o b e

p a i d f o r o b e y i n g OKW t o t h e l e t t e r .

.'I

61 I n a l l f a i r n e s s

t o Rommel, h o w e v e r , t h e I t a l i a n u n i t s i n t h e n o r t h were much

27

less w i l l i n g t o cooperate because of t h e ongoing attempt t o

i n f i l t r a t e German u n i t s i n t h e n o r t h , a n o p e r a t i o n s u p p o r t e d b y b o t h K e s s e l r i n g a n d Rommel. Consequently, t h e diplomatic

a p p r o a c h w o u l d h a v e b e e n much m o r e d i f f i c u l t t h e r e . V i e t i n g h o f f managed and t o create a t o c o n t a i n t h e beachhead a t S a l e r n o Within the

somewhat s t a b l i z e d s i t u a t i o n .

f i r s t f e w d a y s , T e n t h Army h a d s i x d i v i s i o n s a r o u n d S a l e r n o . Though K e s s e l r i n g a n d V i e t i n g h o f f knew t h a t t h e i r p o s i t i o n a r o u n d t h e b e a c h h e a d was u n t e n a b l e , d u e t o a p o s s i b l e e n v e l o p m e n t t o t h e n o r t h , t h e y were a l s o aware o f t h e A l l i e d d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h i n t h e b e a c h h e a d , a n d were p r e p a r e d t o make t h e m o s t of the situation. A f t e r t a k i n g a p a r t i n g shot a t t h e Allies, Kessel-

r i n g ordered a withdrawal t o t h e n o r t h i n accordance with a F u h r e r o r d e r i s s u e d o n 12 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . V i e t i n g h o f f began

a s k i l l f u l w i t h d r a w a l t o t h e n o r t h , g i v i n g K e s s e l r i n g time
t o p r e p a r e a s y s t e m o f d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s s o u t h of Rome. Even a s t h e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m S a l e r n o b e g a n , t h e d e b a t e c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e f e n s e of I t a l y c o n t i n u e d a t OKW. Finally,

a f a c e t o f a c e d e b a t e was s c h e d u l e d i n t h e p r e s e n c e of H i t l e r
o n 30 S e p t e m b e r b e t w e e n K e s s e l r i n g a n d Rommel. The r e s u l t i n g

d e c i s i o n was n o t d e c i s i v e , m e r e l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n of two s e p a r a t e commands i n I t a l y w i t h Rommel i n t h e n o r t h a n d Kesselr i n g i n t h e south, each preparing t o o p e r a t e t h e i r defenses without regard t o the other.
A s t h e A l l i e s t o o k N a p l e s a n d c l o s e d o n t h e German de-

f e n s i v e s y s t e m s o u t h o f Rome, H i t l e r f i n a l l y came t o a d e c i s i o n . Som et i m e a r o u n d 2 5 O c t o b e r , H i t l e r d e c i d e d t o p l a c e t h e command i n I t a l y u n d e r Rommet a n d s h i p K e s s e l r i n g t o Norway. Be-

t w e e n 25 O c t o b e r a n d 5 November, H i t l e r c h a n g e d h i s m i nd a n d s e n t Rommel t o F r a n c e .

H i t l e r , p r o b a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by members
s k i l l f u l withdrawal and h a n d l i n g

o f h i s s t a f f a n d by K e s s e l r i n g s '

of t h e Allies i n t h e Barbara and Bernhardt Lines, t h e f i r s t two d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e s y s t e m s o u t h o f Rome, d e c i d e d

28

K e s s e l r i n g ' s defensive concept a s w e l l a s h i s 62 a b i l i t y a s a commander.

t o endorse

Background:

Kesselring the Personality

D e c i s i o n s made by men a r e complex o p e r a t i o n s .

Part of

t h e complexity a r e p e r s o n a l i t y f a c t o r s b u i l t i n t o t h e decisionmaker. Though t h e v i e w o f K e s s e l r i n g p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r Others

i s l e s s t h a n c o m p r e h e n s i v e , some f a c t o r s a r e e v i d e n t .

c a n b e a d d e d i n a n a t t e m p t t o d r a w t o g e t h e r t h e man a n d t h e t a s k f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n Chapter Four. Thus f a r , A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , t h e a r t i l l e r y m a n t u r n e d a v i a t o r , h a s p r o v e n t o be a p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t a l e n t s . In planning

and e x e c u t i n g b o t h o f f e n s i v e a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n P o l a n d , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , Belgium a n d F r a n c e , a n d d e f e n s i v e g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s i n S i c i l y , it i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s t a l e n t f o r organizing is translatable into military expertise. I d e n t i f i e d i n World War I a s

a man c a p a b l e o f c o n d u c t i n g c r i t i c a l d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , h e was r e w a r d e d by a p p o i n t m e n t t o t h e German G e n e r a l S t a f f a s a Q u a r t e r m a s t e r o f f i c e r i n I1 B a v a r i a n Army C o r p s . I n World

War 11, t h e same t a l e n t was r e w a r d e d w i t h t h k o v e r a l l command o f German f o r c e s i n I t a l y o v e r t h e more famous Rommel.

Kessel-

r i n g , a l w a y s t h e o p t o m i s t , was p e r h a p s d e c e p t i v e i n h i s charm. A l t h o u g h h i s optomism l e d him t o m i s c a l c u l a t e I t a l i a n i n t e n t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r c a p i t u l a t i o n , h e was n o t p e r h a p s a s " e a s y g o i n g ' ' a s some h a v e t h o u g h t : D e s p i t e h i s ( K e s s e l r i n g ' s ) w e l l known s m i l e , h i s a m i a b l e a n d w i n n i n g manner a n d h i s a b i l i t y t o " g e t on" w i t h o t h e r s , h e was e v e r y i n c h a l e a d e r a n d had no i n t e n t i o n o f becoming a mere " r e c o r d i n g " o f t h e d i r e c t i v e s of h i s s u p e r i o r s . 63 Y e t , he d i d g e n e r a l l y g e t a l o n g w e l l w i t h h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s .
A p a r t i c u l a r l y c o r d i a l and i m p o r t a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p developed

between K e s s e l r i n g and Westphal, a r e l a t i o n s h i p i n which Westphal

29

h a d some i n f l u e n c e o v e r h i s c h i e f .

I n dealing with h i s

s u p e r i o r s , Kesselring g e n e r a l l y used an i n d i r e c t approach. G i v e n t i m e , h e w oul d a t t e m p t t o w i n b y a l l o w i n g h i s p o s i t i o n to'vindicate itself. T h i s a p p r o a c h worked w e l l i n r e o r g a n i z i n g

t h e L u f t w a f f e command s t r u c t u r e i n 1 9 3 7 , i n i g n o r i n g H i t l e r ' s i n t e n d e d command s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n i n 1 9 4 2 , and i n g a i n i n g H i t l e r ' s c o n f i d e n c e f o r h i s p r o p o s a l t o defend I t a l y s o u t h o f Rome, i n s t e a d of i n t h e n o r t h . h o w e v e r , d i d n o t a l w a y s w ork. This approach,

Mixed w i t h v e r y d i r e c t p r o t e s t s ,

K e s s e l r i n g ' s m et hod f a i l e d t o w i n h i s p o i n t o v e r Malta w i t h

H i t l e r , Rommel a n d M u s s o l i n i .
K e s s e l r i n g was r e c o g n i z e d f o r h i s t a l e n t a t d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s n o t o n l y by h i s f e l l o w German o f f i c e r s h i s enemies as w e l l .
64

b u t by

G e n e r a l Mark C l a r k , s o o n t o t e s t Kessel-

r i n g a t A n z i o , s a i d o f hi m : F i e l d M a r s h a l A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , ( w a s ) o n e of t h e K e s s e l r i n g was a b l e s t o f f i c e r s i n t h e H i t l e r armies w e l l q u a l i f i e d , b o t h a s a commander a n d a n a d m i n i s t r a t o r , and h e c o n d u c t e d t h e Axis o p e r a t i o n s i n I t a l y w i t h g r e a t s k i l l f o r two y e a r s , a f t e r w h i c h he was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e command o f t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t i n Germany. I was g l a d t o s e e him go. 65

...

...

F i n a l l y , i n h i s optomism, K e s s e l r i n g z r u s t e d p e o p l e . T h e r e were e x c e p t i o n s , o f c o u r s e , a n d w i t h t h o s e h e d i d n o t 66 t r u s t , he c o u l d b e "determined and o b s t i n a n t . " Certainly Rommel f i t s i n t o t h i s c a t a g o r y . To t h o s e s u b o r d i n a t e s t h a t h e

t r u s t e d , he gave g r e a t l a t i t u d e and v a l u e d t h e i r o p i n i o n . T h i s t y p e of r e l a t i o n s h i p q u i c k l y developed between K e s s e l r i n g a n d t h e T e n t h Army commander, V i e t i n g h o f f , t h r o u g h t h e o p e r a t i o n s

a t Salerno and t h e

w i t h d r a w a l up t h e p e n i n s u l a i n l a t e 1 9 4 3 .

The p r o o f o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p d e v e l o p e d a s V i e t i n g h o f f , m e n t a l l y e x h a u s t e d , a s k e d t o be r e l i e v e d of command a f t e r w eeks

o f d e l a y i n g t h e A l l i e d a d v a n c e up t h e p e n i n s u l a .

"Sesselring

demonstrated h i s a c u t e i n s i g h t i n t o t h e e f f e c t s of t e n s i o n and a willingness

...

t o t a k e r e m e d i a l a c t i o n i n time. 1167 L a t e r

30

i n t h e y e a r , K e s s e l r i n g welcomed V i e t i n g h o f f b a c k a n d r e t u r n e d t o him t h e command of t h e T e n t h Army. The t r a i t s i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s summary, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d of K e s s e l r i n g ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g a n d e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which he found h i m s e l f , a l l c o m b i n e d t o i n f l u e n c e t h e c o m p l e x make-up making p r o c e s s . of the decision-

I n November 1943, t h i s man was f i n a l l y f r e e d Gone were t h e

of p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e , a t l e a s t f o r a while.

p r o b l e m s of b o d e r l i n e c o a l i t i o n w a r f a r e a n d t h e d a i l y p o s s i b i l i t y of Rome1 taking h i s job. K e s s e l r i n g was on h i s own. G i v e n a f r e e h a n d t o command,

31

Notes

' K e n n e t h Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g : The Making o f t h e Luftwaffe (New York: David McKay Company, I n c . , 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 2 4 . 2 1 b i d . , p . 37. 31bid., 41bid., p . 48.

p . 53.
William

5 A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , A S o l d i e r ' s S t o r y (New York: Morrow a n d Co., 1 9 6 3 ) , p . 29. 'Ibid., 'Macksey,

p . 40.

p. 60.

8 K e s s e l r i n g , p . 40. 9 C a j u s B e k k e r , The L u f t w a f f e War D i a r i e s (New York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 1 3 6 . -"Kesselring,. "Macksey, '*Ibid.,

p . 51.

p. 69.
p . 73.

I 3 B e k k e r , pp. 56-58. 1 4 H e r b e r t M o l l o y Mason, J r . , The R i s e of t h e L u f t w a f f e (New York: The D i a l P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 1 , p . 3 5 6 . 15Macksey, p . 8 3 . I 6 I b i d . , p. 87.

32

171bid., p . 16. 181bid., p . 95. I9Ibid., 201bid.,

p . 99.
p . 100.
p.

"Kesselring,

115.

221bid., p. 116. 231bid., 241bid.,

p . 116.
p. 117.

25Macksey, p . 107. "Kenneth Macksey, A f r i k a K o r p s (New York: B o o k s , 1 9 6 8 1 , p . 57. 2 7 1 b i d . , p . 56. 28Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g : 291bid., 301bid., 311bid., 321bid., 331bid.,
p . 107.
p. 117.

Ballantine

The Making of t h e L u f t w a f f e , p . 1 0 5 .

p . 121. p . 127. p . 128.

340rnar N. B r a d l e y , A S o l d i e r ' s S t o r y (New York: McNally, 1 9 5 1 ) , p . 190.

Rand

35Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p . 128.

33

3 6 M a r t i n Blumenson, S i c i l y : B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 42.

Whose V i c t o r y ? ( N e w York:

37Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p . 1 6 2 . 3 8 A l b e rt K e s s e l r i n g and S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , " Qu e s t i o n s R e g a r d i n g t h e G e n e r a l . S t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h e I t a l i a n Campaign" (U. S. H i s t o r i c a l Division, M S B-2701, p p . 3-4. 39 Blumenson, p . 28. 195.

40Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p. 41Blurnenson, 421bid., p. 3 6 .

p. 35.

4 3 S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , The German Army i n t h e West (London: C a s s e l l and Co. L t d . , 1 9 5 1 1 , p . 141. 44Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p .

45Blumenson, p p .

165.

SO, 6 2 .

4 6 K e s s e l r i n g , p . 194. 47Blumenson, p . 78.

49Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p . 1 9 8 . 5"Ibid., 'IIbid., p. 196.

p . 171.

The Campaign " H e i n r i c h von V i e t i n g h o f f , l l C h a p t e r VT" i n I t a l y T - l a ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 3.

5 3 K e s s e l r i n g , p . 199.

34

54B. H. L i d d e l H a r t , The R o m e 1 P a p e r s (New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace a n d W o r l d , I n c . , 1 9 5 3 ) , p . 430.

55Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p . 1 6 4 . 5 6 L i d d e l Hart, p . 446. 5 7 V i e t i n g h o f f , p.

1. 174.

58Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p. 591bid., p . 179. 601bid., Ibid., p.

178.

p . 178.

6 2 1 b i d . , p . 186. 631bid.,
p . 49.

6 4 F . W . von M e l l e n t h i n , P a n z e r B a t t l e s ( N e w York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 120.

65Mark C l a r k , C a l c u l a t e d B r o t h e r s , 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 1 8 4 .

Risk

(New York:

H a r p e r and

66Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g , p. 30. 6 7 1 b i d . , p . 185.

CHAPTER THREE KESSELRING'S DECISIONS AT A N Z I O

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o p r o v i d e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f K e s s e l r i n g ' s d e c i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e German d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s a t Anzio. the situation perspective.

at

The e v e n t s w i l l b e g i n w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e n d o f December 1943 f r o m t h e German

The i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r w i l l

s e r v e a s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e a n a l y s i s of K e s s e l r i n g ' s k e y d e c i s i o n s i n Chapter Four.

Situation:

3 1 December 1943

A s t h e Kesselring-Rommel

d e b a t e c o n t i n u e d , G e n e r a l von

V i e t i n g h o f f a n d h i s T e n t h Army f a c e d t h e i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m o f f i g h t i n g t h e A l l i e s as c h e a p l y a n d a s l o n g a s p o s s i b l e ,

i n o r d e r t o b u y t i m e t o p r e p a r e defensive p o s i t i o n s s o u t h o f
P,ome. The A l l i e d i n t e n t , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w a s t o r e a c h t h o s e p o s i t i o n s b e f o r e t h e Germans c o u l d p u t them t o good use.' T h i s d e l a y was c o n d u c t e d i n t h r e e s t a g e s . With an

e v e n t u a l t o t a l o f n i n e d i v i s i o n s o r g a n i z e d u n d e r two c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s , V i e t i n g h o f f ' s d e l a y began w i t h t h e withdrawal f r o m t h e b e a c h h e a d a t S a l e r n o a n d c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h 28 S e p t e m b e r , which completed s t a g e one. By t h e

t i m e h i s w i t h d r a w a l was

completed, Vietinghoff organized a defensive l i n e a c r o s s t h e I t a l i a n p e n i n s u l a w i t h X I V P a n z e r C o r p s i n t h e west a n d LXXVI P a n z e r Corps i n t h e east. By 2 8 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 , V i e t i n g h o f f ' s

f o r c e s w e r e a r r a y e d a l o n g a l i n e f r o m r o u g h l y 20 m i l e s s o u t h of N a p l e s on t h e T y r r h e n i a n S e a , t h r o u g h t h e c e n t e r o f t h e p e n i n s u l a t o a b o u t 2 0 miles n o r t h w e s t of M e l f i , t h e n c u r v i n g n o r t h e a s t t o a b o u t 25 m i l e s s o u t h e s t o f T e r m o l i o n t h e A d r i a t i c

35

36

coast.

F a c i n g V i e t i n g h o f f on t h e west was t h e American

F i f t h Army u n d e r L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l Mark C l a r k , w i t h X B r i t i s h C o r p s , I1 US C o r p s a n d V I US C o r p s . On t h e e a s t e r n s i d e w a s

M o n t g o m e r y ' s B r i t i s h E i g h t h Army w i t h t h e XI11 a n d V C o r p s . Kesselring ordered Vietinghoff t o withdraw t o a l i n e along t h e V o l t u r n o R i v e r i n t h e west t h r o u g h t o C a s a c a l e n d a - P a l a t a Monenero-Adriatic c o a s t o n 28 S e p t e m b e r . The l i n e j u s t d e s c r i b e d P h a s e two of V i e t i n g P o s i t i o n "A"

was known t o t h e Germans a s p o s i t i o n "A."

h o f f ' s operation was t o delay t o t h i s l i n e .

was

o c c u p i e d on 8 O c t o b e r , t h e d a t e w h i c h i n i t i a t e d of V i e t i n g h o f f ' s o p e r a t i o n . p o s i t i o n "A"

t h e f i n a l phase

P h a s e t h r e e was t h e d e l a y from

t o t h e f i n a l German d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s o u t h o f Evaluating the

Rome, a n d was c o m p l e t e d o n 4 November 1 9 4 3 .

t h e i m p a c t o f h i s d e l a y , V i e i t i n g h o f f comments: The s u c c e s s f u l T e n t h Army d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n a t S a l e r n o and t h e w i t h d r a w a l t o e s t a b l i s h a b r o a d f r o n t between t h e T y r r h e n i a n and A d r i a t i c S e a s had p r o v e d t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o e x p e c t a t i o n s ( o f H i t l e r ) German t r o o p s were c a p a b l e o f p u t t i n g up e f f e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e i n s o u t h e r n and c e n t r a l I t a l y , a r e a s g e n e r a l l y f a v o u r i n g d e f e n c e , a g a i n s t g r e a t l y s u p e r i o r A l l i e d a r m i e s . C-in-C S o u t h ( K e s s e l r i n g ) . t h e r e f o r e s u g g e s t e d t o OKW t h a t t h e p l a n t o make a f i g h t i n g w i t h d r a w a l t o t h e n o r t h e r n A p p e n n i n e s s h o u l d be d i s c a r d e d and t h a t s u i t a b l e p o s i t i o n s f u r t h e r s o u t h s h o u l d be c o n s o l i d a t e d and e f f e c t i v e l y d e f e n d e d . 2 B e c a u s e o f h i s s u c c e s s , K e s s e l r i n g ' s p o i n t was w e l l t a k e n by H i t l e r , a n d on 2 1 November 1 9 4 3 , K e s s e l r i n g w a s a p p o i n t e d Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h w e s t a n d Commander, Army Group C . Thus e n d e d t h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n K e s s e l r i n g a n d Rommel, s e t t i n g t h e s t a g e f o r t h e s t u b b o r n German d e f e n s e s o u t h o f Rome a n d t h e e v e n t u a l A l l i e d am p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n a t Anzio. The d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m t o w a r d w h i c h V i e t i n g h o f f was s l o w l y moving was c h o s e n w i t h c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Originally,

H i t l e r e n v i s i o n e d t h e T e n t h Army s t a n d i n g s o u t h o f Rome o n l y

t e m p o r a r i l y , t h e n moving on t o n o r t h e r n I t a l y .

K e s s e l r i n g hoped

t o win h i s p o i n t w i t h H i t l e r and o r d e r e d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of a

37

d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s o u t h of Rome a s e a r l y a s S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 . V i e t i n g h o f f p l a c e d h i s e n g i n e e r , M a j o r G e n e r a l Hans Bessel, i n charge of the preparations.

A t t h a t time K e s s e l r i n g a l s o

o r d e r e d V i e t i n g h o f f t o p r e p a r e h i s d e l a y time t a b l e t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e T e n t h Army d i d n o t a r r i v e a t t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s e a r l i e r t h a n 1 November i n o r d e r t o a l l o w time t o c o m p l e t e t h e f i r s t major l i n e i n t h e system, t h e 3 as t h e Bernhardt Line.

"Bl'

position,

l a t e r known

The d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m i n i t i a t e d by K e s s e l r i n g a n d d e v e l o p e d i n d e t a i l by Bessel was d e s i g n e d s o : l o c a l r e v e r s e s would n o t e f f e c t t h e e n t i r e f r o n t . The s y s t e m c o n s i s t e d of a b e l t of p o s i t i o n s a r r a n g e d i n honeycomb o r d e r w i t h two m a i n l i n e s m e e t i n g i n t h e c e n t e r and numerous i n t e r m e d i a t e flank-group p o s i t i o n s . 4 T h i s system c o n s i s t e d of t h r e e b e l t s i n t h e west. The f i r s t

. .

was t h e B a r b a r a L i n e , w h i c h was a r a t h e r i l l d e f i n e d o u t p o s t

position located two l i n e s .

i n front ( t o the southeast) of the other

The s e c o n d was t h e f i r s t m a i n d e f e n s i v e b e l t , t h e

B e r n h a r d t L i n e , w h i c h b e g a n a t t h e mouth of t h e G a r i g l i a n o
R i v e r , r a n e a s t t o t h e m o u n t a i n s y s t e m of Monte Camino-Monte

La Difensa-Monte

M a g g i o r e a n d Monte Sammucro.

The l a s t a n d

s t r o n g e s t l i n e was t h e G u s t a v L i n e ( a l s o i d e n t i f i e d a s "C" p o s i t i o n ) w h i c h b e g a n a t t h e same p o i n t a s t h e B e r n h a r d t L i n e

a t t h e mouth of t h e C i a r i g l i a n o o n t h e T y r r h e n i a n C o a s t , a n d

u t i l i z e d t h 2 n a t u r a l d e f e n s e s of t h e G a r i g l i a n o and Rapido
R i v e r s a n d t h e h e i g h t s of Monte C a s s i n o .

The G u s t a v L i n e ran

n o r t h e a s t t o w a r d t h e A d r i a t i c C o a s t a c r o s s t h e Matese M o u n t a i n Range a n d a l o n g t h e g e n e r a l t r a c e o f t h e S a n g r o R i v e r w h e r e t h e
LXXVI Panzer Corps w a s p r e p a r i n g i t s d e f e n s e s .

Kesselring

i n t e n d e d t o d e f e n d i n t h e f i r s t two p o s i t i o n s a s l o n g a s 5 p o s s i b l e , b u t t o s t o p t h e A l l i e s on t h e G u s t a v L i n e . S u c c e s s f u l l y h o l d i n g t h e Allies beyond t h e t a r g e t d a t e o f 1 November, V i e t i n g h o f f r e a c h e d t h e E e r n h a r d t L i n e on

4 November.

Upon t a k i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n t h i s l i n e , t h e u n i t s

o f t h e T e n t h Army w e r e a r r a y e d from s o u t h w e s t t o n o r t h e a s t 6 as follows:

X I V P a n z e r C o r p s (commanded by von S e n g e r ) 94th Infantry Division 1 5 t h Panzer Grenadier Division 3d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n C o r v i n B a t t l e G r o u p , Herman G o e r i n g P a n z e r D i v i s i o n LXXVI P a n z e r C o r p s (commanded by Herr) 26th Panzer D i v i s i o n 305th I n f a n t r y Division 1st Parachute Division 65th Infantry Division

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e u n i t s of t h e T e n t h Army, t h e newly a c q u i r e d F o u r t e e n t h Army i n n o r t h e r n I t a l y s e r v e d a s t h e t h e a t e r r e s e r v e and a b a s e f o r r o t a t i n g d i v i s i o n s o u t of t h e l i n e a n d r e p l a c i n g them w i t h f r e s h u n i t s .

As noted earlier,

V i e t i n g h o f f was t e m p o r a r i l y r e l i e v e d i n November a n d December by L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l J o a c h i m L e m e l s e n . T h i s p e r i o d of t i m e

m a r k e d t h e s e r i o u s d e f e n s e o f t h e German d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m , e n d i n g w i t h t h e f o r c e d o c c u p a t i o n o f most o f t h e G u s t a v L i n e by t h e end of December 1 9 4 3 .

7

Upon r e t u r n i n g t o t h e T e n t h Army

a t t h e e n d of 1943, V i e t i n g h o f f f o u n d b o t h armies a r r a y e d a s
outlined: ( a l s o s e e c o m p a r i s o n of f o r c e s on 2 2 J a n u a r y , Appendix

B)
X I V Panzer Corps 94th Infantry Division 15th Panzer Grenadier Division C o r v i n B a t t l e G r o u p , Herman G o e r i n g P a n z e r D i v i s i o n 4 4 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ( b e i n g r e p l a c e d by 7 1 s t I n f a n t r y Division) 5 t h Mountain D i v i s i o n LXXVI P a n z e r Corps 305th I n f a n t r y Division 334th I n f a n t r y Division 26th Panzer Division 1st Parachute Division T e n t h Army r e s e r v e s Herman G o e r i n g P a n z e r D i v i s i o n , l e s s t h e C o r v i n Group 90th Panzer Grenadier Division

39

The F o u r t e e n t h Army h a d a t o t a l o f 8% d i v i s i o n s i n n o r t h e r n Italy.

A t t h e b e g i n n i n g of J a n u a r y , K e s s e l r i n g was a l s o a t t e m p t i n g

t o e s t a b l i s h a n Army Group r e s e r v e i n Rome of t h r e e d i v i s i o n s . F a c i n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e , t h e two A l l i e d armies were a r r a y e d 8 from southwest t o n o r t h e a s t : ( a l s o see Appendix B f o r f o r c e a r r a y o n 2 2 J a n u a r y 1.944) F i f t h Army (commanded by C l a r k ) X B r i t i s h Corps 5 t h Armored d i v i s i o n 56th I n f a n t r y Division 46th 1.nfantry Division I1 US C o r p s 36th Infantry Division 43d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n French Expeditionary Corps 3d A l g e r i a n D i v i s i o n 2nd Moroccan D i v i s i o n V I C o r p s was b e i n g r e p l a c e d by t h e F r e n c h E x p e d i t i o n a r y Corps i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e l a n d i n g a t Anzio E i g h t h Army 78th Division X I 1 1 Corps 11th Canadian Brigade 4th Indian Division V Corps 8th Indian Division 1st C a n a d i a n D i v i s i o n

The German commanders f a c e d a number o f p r o b l e m s i n d e f e n d i n g these positions. T h e i r t r o o p s were n o t u s e d t o p r e p a r i n g deInitially, there

f e n s e s o r o p e r a t i n g i n mountainous t e r r a i n .

were no r e s e r v e s of a n y c o n s e q u e n c e a v a i l a b l e , s o commanders

had t o c a r e f u l l y c o n s e r v e t h e i r f o r c e s .

W i n t e r e q u i p m e n t was

i n i t i a l l y h a r d t o a c q u i r e , b e c a u s e i t was d i f f i c u l t t o c o n v i n c e t h e OKW b u r e a u c r a c y t h a t i t a c t u a l l y g o t v e r y c o l d i n I t a l y . E v a c u a t i o n o f t h e wounded was d i f f i c u l t o v e r t h e s t e e p m o u n t a i n trails. Most o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s were e v e n t u a l l y d e a l t w i t h , b u t

t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g was t h e t o u g h e s t

--

t h a t of r e s e r v e s .

Tenth

40

Army h e a d q u a r t e r s o f t e n h a d t o d r a w upon c o m m i t t e d u n i t s t o form r e s e r v e s a s t h e n e e d a r o s e i n a t h r e a t e n e d s e c t o r , t h u s e n d a n g e r i n g o t h e r p a r t s of t h e l i n e . Risks continually

h a d t o be t a k e n t o p r e v e n t a n o v e r w h e l m i n g A l l i e d b r e a k t h r o u g h i n a n y p o r t i o n of t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s t i o n . Kesselring clearly

r e c o g n i z e d t h e d a n g e r and s o u g h t t o d e a l w i t h i t .

The E s t a b l i s h e m e n t of German R e s e r v e F o r c e s

K e s s e l r i n g d e v e l o p e d a n e s t i m a t e of t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of 1944 which i n d i c a t e d t h e most l i k e l y A l l i e d o p t i o n was a n a t t a c k t o b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e G u s t a v L i n e i n a n a t t e m p t t o r e a c h Rome w h i l e l a n d i n g f o r c e s b e h i n d German defensive positions." Rome w a s t h e l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e f o r s u c h

a n o p e r a t i o n , b e c a u s e i t would s e r v e t o f r e e a p o l i t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t c i t y , sever V i e t i n g h o f f ' s l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d make h i s p o s i t i o n a l o n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e u n t e n a b l e . I n November 1 9 4 3 , o n c e i t became c l e a r t h a t H i t l e r i n t e n d e d

8

t o v e s t K e s s e l r i n g w i t h t h e o v e r a l l command i n I t a l y , K e s s e l r i n g b e g a n s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e method o f d e f e n s e of t h e German p o s i t i o n s .

H e d e c i d e d t o p l a c e i n f a n t r y and mountain

t r o o p s i n f o r w a r d p o s i t i o n s a n d r e t a i n t h e more m o b i l e u n i t s i n r e s e r v e t o c o u n t e r t h r u s t s and react t o amphibious l a n d i n g s , t h o u g h t h i s a r r a n g e m e n t a t times p r o v e d i m p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e o f limited resources. He i n t e n d e d t o r o t a t e u n i t s i n l i n e a s

11

n e c e s s a r y t o keep f r e s h u n i t s a v a i l a b l e , w h i l e r e c o n s t i t u t i n g t h o s e coming o f f t h e l i n e a s t h e y d o u b l e d a s a r e s e r v e a s s e t . S i t u a t i o n s d e v e l o p e d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , which l e d t o d e s i g n a t e d reserves being r e c o n s t i t u t e d i n t h e r e a r , but having a p o r t i o n o f t h e i r s u b o r d i n a t e commands s t i l l e n g a g e d d u e t o d i f f i c u l t y i n d i s e n g a g i n g them. l 2 A d d i t i o n a l l y , r e s e r v e s w e r e n o t a l w a y s

of t h e f i g h t i n g q u a l i t y o r m o b i l i t y d e s i r e d .

The c r i t i c a l r e s e r v e

s i t u a t i o n i n I t a l y was r e c o g n i z e d f r o m t h e l o w e s t u n i t commander

41

t o OKW, w i t h c e r t a i n a c t i o n s t a k i n g p l a c e a t e a c h l e v e l .
OKW r e c o g n i z e d t h e

possibility

of t h e Allies attempting

t o f l a n k V i e t i n g h o f f ' s p o s i t i o n w i t h an amphibious landing, so t h e y d e s i g n a t e d u n i t s a v a i l a b l e t o K e s s e l r i n g u n d e r two cont i n g e n c y p l a n s , o n e f o r a l a n d i n g o n t h e west c o a s t o f I t a l y c o d e named HARDER I a n d o n e o n t h e e a s t c o a s t d e s i g n a t e d M A R D E R IT. The f o r c e a l l o c a t i o n was i d e n t i c a l f o r e a c h p l a n a n d c o n s i s t e d o f a c o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s , two d i v i s i o n s , two i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s , a n d a number o f s u p p o r t u n i t s f r o m F r a n c e , Germany a n d t h e Balkans. Kesselring, a l s o r e a l i z i n g t h e inadequacies of h i s 13

reserves, developed f i v e contingency p l a n s u s i n g designated

u n i t s t i e d t o s p e c i f i c a r e a s of t h e c o a s t i n o r d e r t o meet a n y landing attempts as quickly as possible. One o f t h e s e p l a n s ,

c o d e named R I C H A R D , e v e n t u a l l y was a c t i v a t e d d u r i n g t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t Anzio. Though Rome was a n a r e a o f c o n c e r n f o r o n e o f

h i s contingencies, Kesselring f e l t that further actions s h o u l d be t a k e n . F i e l d M a r s h a l K e s s e l r i n g , i n h i s own p e r s i s t e n t m a n n e r , c o n s t a n t l y r e f e r r e d t o t h e long e s t a b l i s h e d , fundamental p r i n c i p l e t h a t a commander w i t h o u t r e s e r v e s i s u n a b l e t o e x e r t any i n f l u e n c e over t h e course of a b a t t l e . 14 I n d e m a n d i n g t h a t h i s commanders r e t a i n r e s e r v e s , h e s o u g h t t o e s t a b l i s h a n Army Group r e s e r v e a s w e l l , a n d t o p l a c e t h e

reserve where i t c o u l d respond t o e i t h e r an amphibious l a n d i n g

n e a r Rome o r a b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t h e G u s t a v L i n e . The I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s was p l a c e d i n Rome t o act as a counterattack headquarters. Under t h i s c o r p s , t h e

4 t h P a r a c h u t e D i v i s i o n was b e i n g r e o r g a n i z e d , a n d i n e a r l y J a n u a r y , e l e m e n t s o f t h e 3d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r a n d t h e 2 9 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n s were b e i n g r e o r g a n i z e d n e a r Rome u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e c o r p s as w e l l . Not o n l y were t h e s e u n i t s

a v a i l a b l e t o t h e I P a r a c h u t e Corps i n case of a l a n d i n g , b u t u n d e r Case R I C H A R D , o n e o r two u n s p e c i f i e d i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s ,

42

two o r t h r e e u n s p e c i f i e d p a n z e r g r e n a d i e r d i v i s i o n s a n d o n e u n s p e c i f i e d p a n z e r d i . v i s o n would be p r o v i d e d from b o t h t h e T e n t h a n d F o u r t e e n t h Army. Case R I C H A R D , According t o t h e t i m e t a b l e of

t h e number o f a d d i t i o n a l u n i t s a b l e t o r e s p o n d

t o a l a n d i n g i n t h e a r e a o f Rome was t o b e f r o m f i v e t o e i g h t d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n 24 h o u r s , t h r e e o f w h i c h were i m m e d i a t e l y a v a i l able.15

L a t e r i n J a n u a r y , t h e 3d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n w a s

exchanged f o r t h e LXXVI P a n z e r Corps reserve, t h e s t r o n g e r 9 0 t h Panzer Grenadier Division. Though t h e Army Group C r e s e r v e s i t u a t i o n was c e r t a i n l y n o t c o m f o r t a b l e , c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t s were made t o p l a n f o r p o s s i b l e A l l i e d a c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a l a n d i n g i n t h e area o f Rome. Kesselring obviously took t h e t h r e a t s e r i o u s l y , as

d i d OKIJ a n d d e s i g n a t e d f o r c e s f o r v a r i o u s d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s t o c o u n t e r A l l i e d o p t :1 o n s .

Decision Point:

The Commitment of t h e S t r a t e g i c Reserves

The Army Group C e s t i m a t e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 r e a d a s f o l l o w s : A f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e W i n t e r c a m p a i g n , w h i c h was c a r r i e d o u t by t h e A l l i e s i n t h e f o r m o f i n d i v i d u a l o p e r a t i o n s w i t h o f t e n s h i f t i n g t h r u s t c e n t e r s , t h e German Command h a d t o r e c k o n a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f S p r i n g , i . e . a b o u t t h e middle of F e b r u a r y w i t h l a r g e r scale u n i f i e d o p e r a t i o n s of t h e A l l i e s . On t h e c e n t r a l f r o n t t h e s e c t o r s o u t h o f C a s s i n o seemed t o b e e s p e c i a l l y e x p o s e d b e c a u s e a d r i v e t o w a r d Rome c o u l d b e c a r r i e d o u t by c o n c e n t r a t e d a r m o r o n l y by m a k i n g a t h r u s t i n t o t h e L i r i V a l l e y . At t h e same t i m e t h e a d v a n c i n g s e a s o n i n c r e a s e d t h e d a n g e r o f a new A l l i e d l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y a s t h e b a t t l e s f o r t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e f o r e f i e l d o f t h e G u s t a v L i n e had d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f c a r r y i n g o u t f r o n t a l a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e German d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m . 16 The O W e s t i m a t e f o r t h e same t i m e p e r i o d i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s
follows:

I n l a y i n g p l a n s f o r f u t u r e a c t i o n s , i t (OKW) h a d t o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e A l l i e d Command w o u l d t r y t o a c h i e v e t h e c o l l a p s e

43

o f t h e German d e f e n s e Sy s h i f t i n g t h e s t r o n g p o i n t o f t h e a t t a c k o r by l a n d i n g i n t h e h i n t e r l a n d b e h i n d t h e German lines. Based on t h i s e s t i m a t i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n , and on t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e A l l i e d o b j e c t i v e s , ( R o m e ) t h e German H i gh Command r e a l i z e d t h e n e c e s s i t y t o form a c e n t e r of r e s i s t a n c e i n t h e s o u t h e r n s e c t o r of t h e d e f e n s i v e f r o n t and t o r e i n f o r c e t h e c o a s t a l s t r e t c h e s i n t h e rear area s u f 17 ficiently. I n regard t o t h e s e estimates, Kesselring a d d i t i o n a l l y believed t h a t A l l i e d operations along t h e Gustav Line t o d r i v e 18 u p t h e L i r i v a l l e y w o u l d b e t i e d t o a l a n d i n g a r o u n d Rome. Some i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s f a l l o u t of t h e s e e s t i m a t e s . First,

i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t b o t h K e s s e l r i n g a n d OKW f e l t i t n e c e s s a r y t o

d e v e l o p c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n t h e e v e n t of a n A l l i e d a m p h i b i o u s assault.

t? s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t t o a l l o f t h e c o n t i g e n c i e s was

t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e s e r v e f o r c e s t o meet t h e p o s s i b l e i n v a s i o n . The o t h e r i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t of t h e s e e s t i m a t e s i s t h a t b o t h p o i n t e d t o w a r d e x p e c t e d A l l i e d a c t i o n s i n t h e s p r i n g , w hi ch
was d e f i n e d by Army G roup C a s a b o u t t h e m i d d l e o f F e b r u a r y .

B as ed o n t h i s e s t i m a t e , K e s s e l r i n g d e v e l o p e d a t i m e t a b l e t o prepare f o r a n t i c i p a t e d a t t a c k s along t h e Gustav Line and an invasion along the coast. C o n s e q u e n t l y , when t h e a c t i o n came

f o r b o t h a r e a s i n J a n u a r y , h i s p l a n s were n o t y e t c o m p l e t e l y executed. T he e x c h a n g e o f t h e 3d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r f o r t h e 9 0 t h

P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r , f o r e x a m p l e , was o n l y p a r t i a l l y c m p l e t e d when t h e A l l i e s b e g a n t h e i r a c t i o n s o n t h e G u s t a v L i n e . E a r l y i n J a n u a r y , i n a n e f f o r t t o g a i n a s much i n f o r m a t i o n

as possiSle concerning Allied intentions, Kesselring f i n a l l y

nanaged t o g e t a ?hot0 reconnaissance f l i g h t over Naples harbor. E a r l i e r a t t e m p t s had been t h w a r t e d because of poor The f l i g h t r e v e a l e d t h a t

w e a t h e r and A l l i e d a i r s u p e r i o r i t y .

t h e A l l i e s had put t h e h a r b o r b a c k i n t o u s e a n d i n d i c a t e d a b o u t
400,000 t o n s of s h i p p i n g were a v a i l a b l e a t t h e d o c k s . l 9

At

a b o u t t h e same t i m e , Army G roup C r e c e i v e d a German T n t e l l e g e n c e ( A bw her ) r e p o r t c o n f i r m i n g t h e n a v a l a c t i v i t y i n t h e h a r b o r .

44

I n mid-January,

German I n t e l l e g e n c e i n t e r c e p t e d a r a d i o m e s s a g e

w h i c h r e f e r r e d t o a n "imminant" A l l i e d l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n . ULTRA r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e a s t r o n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f Army Group C i n p i n p o i n t i n g p o s s i b l e l a n d i n g a c t i v i t i e s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e Germans knew t h a t two c o n v o y s e n t e r e d t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n e a r l y i n J a n u a r y w h i c h i n c l u d e d two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s a n d t r o o p s whose e q u i p m e n t i n d i c a t e d p r e p a r a t i o n f o r landing operations. The a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s were e v a l u a t e d

as follows:
The f r e s h a p p e a r a n c e s o f a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s i n ( t h e ) Mediterranian suggested t h a t ( t h e ) Allies intended t o use naval forces i n I t a l y i n a r e a s which ( h a s ) i n a d e q u a t e land-based f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n . 20

...

..

The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t German i n t e l l e g e n c e e x p e c t e d t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s t o b e u s e d i n s u p p o r t of l a n d i n g operations. Overlaying t h i s evidence f o r a f o r t h c o m i n g am-

phibious operation, w a s t h e assumption c l e a r l y s t a t e d i n both

OKW a n d Army Group
C I S

intellegence estimates

--

Allied operations

beginning i n t h e middle of February.

A f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n was

made c o n c e r n i n g t h e a n t i c i p a t e d d a t e s o f t h e l a n d i n g , K e s s e l r i n g r e c e i v e d some d i s t u r b i n g i n f o r m a t i o n .
ULTRA t r a f f i c from

K e s s e l r i n g t o OKW i n d i c a t e s t h a t on two o c c a s i o n s p r i o r t o t h e m i d d l e of J a n u a r y , A l l i e d l a n d i n g s m i g h t t a k e p l a c e i n J a n u a r y instead of February.

I b e l i e v e t h a t o n e of t h o s e m e s s a g e s

was b a s e d o n t h e r a d i o i n t e r c e p t

already mentioned, while t h e

o t h e r came f r o m a downed A l l i e d p i l o t : W i l s o n ( t h e A l l i e d Commander i n C h i e f i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n who t o o k o v e r f r o m E i s e n h o w e r o n 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 ) was p u s h i n g a h e a d w i t h i n t e n d e d l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s on b o t h c o a s t s o f Italy with a l l a v a i l a b l e forces i n t h e Mediterranian Expected d a t e approximately 15 January. (Time of m e s s a g e w a s 1 4 4 0 2 , 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 ) 2 1

...

...

Though t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w a s a v a i l a b l e t o K e s s e l r i n g , h i s p l a n f o r t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f d e f e n s e s i n I t a l y w a s a l r e a d y on t h e mid-February timetable. The a t t a c k came t o o s o o n .

45

A l l i e d D e c i s i o n for A n z i o

A s i t became c l e a r t o G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r ,

the Allied

commander i n t h e M e d i . t e r r a n i a n p r i o r t o 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 , t h a t t h e Germans were g o i n g t o make a s t a n d s o u t h of Rome, a n d a s h e l e a r n e d t h a t l a n d i n g c r a f t would b e a v a i l a b l e t o him u n t i l 1 5 December 1 9 4 3 , h e d i r e c t e d G e n e r a l A l e x a n d e r , commander

o f t h e 1 5 t h Army G r o u p , who c o n t r o l l e d A l l i e d g r o u n d f o r c e s i n I t a l y , t o prepare for a landing operation in the vicinity o f Rome. This d i r e c t i v e was i s s u e d on 8 November 1 9 4 3 .

The same d a y , A l e x a n d e r o r d e r e d C l a r k ' s F i f t h Army t o p r e p a r e f o r a l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n a t Anzio. General Eisenhower r e a l i z e d

t h a t no o p e r a t i o n c o u l d b e p u t t o g e t h e r b e f o r e t h e l o s s o f t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t o n 1 5 December, s o he a l s o r e q u e s t e d a n e x t e n s i o n f o r t h e i r use. Anzio a p p e a r e d t o b e t h e l o g i c a l c h o i c e f o r a n i n v a s i o n . Located about t h i r t y - f i v e

miles s o u t h ofRome, t h e beaches and

d o c k s were i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r s u p p o r t o f a n a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g .
A low c o a s t a l p l a i n l e d i n l a n d t o t h e A l b a n h i l l s ,

controlling

t e r r a i n f o r a n a d v a n c e t o Rome f r o m t h e s o u t h .

Good r o a d s An

l e d i n l a n d , and t h e t e r r a i n a p p e a r e d t o s u p p o r t maneuver.

a d v a n c e f r o m t h e b e a c h t o t h e A l b a n h i l l s would f a c i l i t a t e a n A l l i e d d r i v e up t h e L i r i v a l l e y f r o m t h e s o u t h t o t a k e Rome. The s u c c e s s o f t h e p l a n d e p e n d e d upon t h e a b i l i t y of t h e F i f t h Army, a t t h e G u s t a v L i n e , t o make p r o g r e s s i n t h e i r d r i v e from t h e s o u t h e a s t i n o r d e r t o g e t w i t h i n s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e of t h e l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n .

A s November t u r n e d t o

December, t h e Germans u t l i z i e d t h e i r d e f e n s i v e s y s t e m s i n t h e B a r b a r a , B e r n h a r d t a n d G u s t a v L i n e s t o slow a n d t h e n t o s t o p t h e A l l i e d advance. A n z i o seemed t o be a doomed o p e r a t i o n .

A t t h e same t i m e , t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f were c o n s i d e r i n g

r e d u c i n g t h e l e v e l of commitment i n I t a l y i n f a v o r of a n i n v a s i o n

46

o f s o u t h e r n F r a n c e , a p l a n p u s h e d by S t a l i n .

I n December,

t h e d e a d l i n e f o r a d e c i s i o n o n t h e r e l e a s e of t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t i n January quickly approached. Based o n t h e s e f a c t o r s ,

o n 18 December, C l a r k recommended t o A l e x a n d e r t h a t o p e r a t i o n SHINGLE, t h e c o d e name f o r A n z i o , b e c a n c e l l e d . agreed. SHINGLE was r e v i v e d b e c a u s e o f two t h i n g s . First, in Alexander

s u p p o r t o f t h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e A l l i e d i n v a s i o n of w e s t e r n E u r o p e , command c h a n g e s were made i n o r d e r t o a s s e m b l e t h e command e l e m e n t f o r t h e c r o s s c h a n n e l i n v a s i o n f o r c e i n E n g l a n d . The m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e s u l t o f t h e s h i f t i n command s t r u c t u r e w a s t h e a s s u m p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r A l l i e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n by t h e B r i t i s h , w h i l e t h e Americans t u r n e d t h e i r An e x a m p l e of

a t t e n t i o n t o o p e r a t i o n s i n w e s t e r n Europe.22

t h e s h i f t was t h e c h a n g e f r o m E i s e n h o w e r t o t h e B r i t i s h G e n e r a l W i l s o n a s t h e Supreme A l l i e d Commander, M e d i t e r r a n i a n . The s e c o n d was t h e i l l n e s s of P r i m e M i n i s t e r C h u r c h i l l .

He became i l l w h e n ' v i s i t i n g E i s e n h o w e r ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s i n

23

T u n i s i n December 1943.

D u r i n g t h e t i m e h e was f o r c e d t o

r e m a i n i n b e d i n T u n i s , h e became c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e l a c k of movement i n t h e I t a l i a n t h e a t e r , a n d b e g a n t o p u s h f o r more a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n t o t a k e Rome. With h i s new power i n t h e

I t a l i a n t h e a t e r b e c a u s e o f t h e c h a n g e o f t h e command s t r u c t u r e , C h u r c h i l l p r e s s e d f o r a n o p e r a t i o n t o f r e e Rome. o p e r a t i o n t o f a c i l i t a t e t h a t a c t i o n was SHINGLE.

A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e two m a j o r p r o b l e m s w i t h SHINGLE, a l r e a d y

The l o g i c a l

p i n p o i n t e d by C l a r k a n d A l e x a n d e r

--

t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e opera-

t i o n from A l l i e d p o s i t i o n s f u r t h e r s o u t h a n d t h e coming l o s s of t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t , c o n t i n u e d t o p l a g u e p l a n n i n g a s t h e number o f l a n d i n g c r a f t a v a i l a b l e f o r p l a n n i n g and t h e d a t e of t h i e r e x p e c t e d d e p a r t u r e changed through t h e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s . C h u r c h i l l was i n t e n t on g o i n g a h e a d w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n . Yet, The

f i n a l d e c i s i o n f o r A n z i o was made o n 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 a t M a r r a k e c h

47

by a m e e t i n g o f t h e k e y A l l i e d commanders i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n and M r . C h u r c h i l l . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s u c c e e d e d i n o b t a i n i n g

s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t t o s u p p o r t SHINGLE i n p u t t i n g a s h o r e a n d s u s t a i n i n g two d i v i s i o n s . Though t h e o p e r a t i o n would b e u n d e r t a k e n w h i l e t h e F i f t h Army r e m a i n e d o u t o f s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e t o t h e s o u t h e a s t , t h e p u r p o s e o f SHINGLE was t o s p e e d t h e F i f t h Army a d v a n c e t o Rome a n d t h e Roman a i r f i e l d s w h i l e t u r n i n g t h e German r i g h t 24 flank.

O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Defensive System

A t t h e b e g i n n i n g of J a n u a r y , V i e t i n g h o f f s t i l l had

f o r c e s s o u t h of t h e r i v e r l i n e o f t h e R a p i d o a n d G a r i g l i a n o , i n f r o n t of t h e main d e f e n s e s of t h e G u s t a v L i n e . In order

t o make t h e A n z i o l a n d i n g a n d a d r i v e t o Rome r e a l i s t i c , t h e F i f t h Army Commander, G e n e r a l C l a r k , was f a c e d w i t h r e d u c i n g t h e German p o s i t i o n s s t i l l s o u t h of t h i s l i n e a n d b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h t h e G u s t a v L i n e a t t h e e n t r a n c e of t h e L i r i v a l l e y , which o f f e r e d a n a t u r a l a v e n u e of a p p r o a c h t o b o t h l i n k u p w i t h t h e l a n d i n g f o r c e s a t A n z i o a n d t o d r i v e t o Rome. I n o r d e r t o get h i s

f o r c e s i n t o p o s i t i o n t o p e n e t r a t e the Gustav defenses, Clark o r d e r e d t h e B r i t i s h X C o r p s o n t h e F i f t h Army l e f t f l a n k t o t a k e Credo H i l l , s o u t h o f the Garigliano, then cross the r i v e r t o The

c a p t u r e t h e southern approaches t o t h e L i r i v a l l e y . French Expeditionary

C o r p s h a d j u s t r e p l a c e d t h e VI US C o r p s , The F r e n c h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

who would make t h e l a n d i n g a t A n z i o .

o n t h e F i f t h Army r i g h t f l a n k w a s t o c r o s s t h e R a p i d o a n d s i e z e t h e northern approaches t o t h e L i r i .

11 US C o r p s was

t o make t h e m a i n a t t a c k i n t h e c e n t e r down t h e L i r i v a l l e y . A f t e r f i g h t i n g t h e i r way t o t h e R a p i d o a l o n g Highway 6 , 11 C o r p s w o u l d c r o s s t h e R a p i d o a n d u s e t h e 1st Armor D i v i s i o n t o d r i v e f i r s t t o F r o s i n o n e , t h e n t o Rome up t h e L i r i v a l l e y , w h i l e t h e

48

X Corps and t h e French h e l d t h e f l a n k s .

T h i s p l a n was i m p l e m e n t e d o n 3 J a n u a r y a s I1 C o r p s b e g a n t o push toward t h e Rapido. They m e t d e t e r m i n e d a n d s k i l l e d

o p p o s i t i o n a l o n g t h e i r r o u t e o f a d v a n c e , as V i e t i n g b o f f d i r e c t e d u n i t s south of t h e r i v e r t o f i g h t phased delaying a c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o i n f l i c t maximum damage w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g f o r c e s t o c o n d u c t t h e main e f f o r t i n t h e Gu s t a v L i n e .

A t t h i s p o i n t , C l a r k c h a n g e d h i s p l a n somewhat.

He

intended t o both breakthrough t h e Gustav Line, y e t d e s i r e d t o a t t r a c t K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e s e r v e s f r o m Rome t o t h e a r e a t o h e l p f a c i l i t a t e t h e landing a t changed t o a f o u r phase o p e r a t i o n . The s e q u e n c e of a t t a c k was The F r e n c h would f i r s t

s i e z e t h e h i g h g r o u n d n o r t h a n d n o r t h w e s t o f C a s s i n o on 1 2 January. On 15 J a n u a r y , I1 C o r p s was t o a t t a c k t o t a k e t h e l a s t Then X C o r p s would b e g i n c r o s s i n g

h i g h ground s o u t h of t h e Rapido.

t h e G a r i g l i a n o t o s i e z e t h e h i g h ground c o n t r o l l i n g t h e L i r i v a l l e y from t h e s o u t h . F i n a l l y , on 2 0 J a n u a r y , I1 C o r p s would

c r o s s t h e Rapido t o e s t a b l i s h a b r i d g e h e a d around S a n t ' A n g e l o , t h e n u s e t h e i r a r m o r t o d r i v e up t h e L i r i t o l i n k up w i t h t h e f o r c e s a t Anzio. The o p e r a t i o n s t a r t e d o n 1 2 J a n u a r y w i t h t h e F r e n c h a d v a n c i n g f o u r m i l e s by 1 5 J a n u a r y . They were s t o p p e d , h o w e v e r ,

i n f r o n t o f t h e m a i n p o s i t i o n s of t h e G u s t a v L i n e . o p e n e d t h e i r a t t a c k o n 16 J a n u a r y .

I1 C o r p s

B e c a u s e t h e Germans h a d

a l r e a d y w i t h d r a w n t o t h e main p o s i t i o n s , t h e C o r p s f a c e d t h e r i v e r l i n e i n three hours. The X C o r p s b e g a n t h e i r o p e r a t i o n

on 1 7 J a n u a r y , a n d a c h i e v e d t a c t i c a l s u r p r i s e i n s p i t e of
h e a v i l y bombing t h e German p o s i t i o n s . The B r i t i s h managed t o

c r o s s and e s t a b l i s h b r i d g e h e a d s a c r o s s t h e G a r i g l i a n o , and t h e n expand t o s i e z e t h e i r a s s i g n e d o b j e c t i v e s .

I1 C o r p s f o l l o w e d

w i t h t h e i r a t t a c k on 20 J a n u a r y t o f o r c e a c r o s s i n g o f t h e Rapido and e n t e r t h e L i r i v a l l e y .

49

Commitment o f t h e R e s e r v e s

V i e t i n g h o f f d i d n o t see t h e F r e n c h a t t a c k a s a m a j o r t h r e a t , a n d t h e I1 C o r p s e f f o r t was e x p e c t e d . On 1 5 J a n u a r y ,

t h e T e n t h Army r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h X C o r p s would a t t e m p t t o f o r c e a c r o s s i n g o f t h e G a r i g l i a n o , defensive positions of the 94th Infantry Division. into the The 9 4 t h

D i v i s i o n was r a t h e r s p r e a d o u t i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t h u s b o t h V i e t i n g h o f f a n d t h e X I V P a n z e r C o r p s commander, von S e n g e r , were c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e e f f e c t s o f a m a j o r e f f o r t t o t u r n t h e i r right flank. When t h e B r i t i s h a t t a c k b e g a n o n t h e n i g h t

o f 17-18 J a n u a r y , von S e n g e r knew i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t h e was i n

trouble. A s ' t h e e x t e n t o f t h e B r i t i s h p e n e t r a t i o n s became

e v i d e n t , h e r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e two weak r e g i m e n t s o f t h e 9 4 t h D i v i s i o n would be u n a b l e t o h o l d t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . H e attempted

r e i n f o r c e m e n t by s h i f t i n g p a r t o f t h e C o r v i n B a t t l e Group o f t h e Herman G o e r i n g D i v i s i o n . 2 6
As t h e b a t t l e i n t h e 9 4 t h a r e a

developed, 15th Panzer Grenadier Division reported concentrations o f f o r c e s i n t h e i r a r e a a s w e l l , w h i c h w a s t h e I1 C o r p s p r e paration. V i e t i n g h o f E and von S e n g e r b o t h c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e X C o r p s a t t a c k was t h e m a i n e f f o r t . E a r l y t h e morning of

18 J a n u a r y , von S e n g e r r e a l i z e d t h a t p e r -

h a p s i t d i d n o t make a n y d i f f e r e n c e i f t h e X C o r p s was m a k i n g t h e main e f f o r t o r n o t , t h e i r advance c o u l d t h r e a t e n t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e e n t i r e G u s t a v L i n e i f t h e y were a l l o w e d t o p e n e t r a t e t o take the southern approaches t o t h e L i r i valley. Von S e n g e r

c a l l e d K e s s e l r i n g from t h e 94th D i v i s i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s , r e q u e s t i n g i m m e d i a t e commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e i n Rome. Vietinghoff for h i s opinion. Although Kesselring called

bypassed i n t h e r e q u e s t ,

V i e t i n g h o f f c o n f i r m e d von S e n g e r ' s o p i n i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a t t a c k
was s e r i o u s a n d c o u l d n o t b e s t o p p e d by t h e l i m i t e d T e n t h Army

reserves.

50

K e s s e l r i n g was f a c e d w i t h a dilemma.

Earlier i n January,

h i s own e s t i m a t e of A l l i e d i n t e n t was t h a t t h e y would p r o b a b l y a t t a c k b o t h a l o n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e a n d make a n a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f Rome.

He knew t h a t e n o u g h s h i p p i n g was

a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Naples h a r b o r e a r l y i n J a n u a r y t o conduct a l a n d i n g f r o m b o t h a p h o t o r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a n d a n Abwher r e p o r t .

He knew t h a t s h i p p i n g t o s u p p o r t a l a n d i n g was i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n , a n d a n A l l i e d POW a n d a r a d i o landing t a k i n g place soon. intercept pointed t o the

On t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e f e l t t h a t a

l a n d i n g would p r o b a b l y n o t t a k e p l a c e u n t i l C l a r k h a d b r o k e n t h r o u g h h i s d e f e n s e s a n d d r i v e n some d i s t a n c e up t h e L i r i i n o r d e r t o b e w i t h i n s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e of t h e l a n d i n g , s o h e h a d t o c o n s i d e r t h e v a l u e of h o l d i n g t h e Gustav Line i n o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e t h e A l l i e s t h a t s u c h a l a n d i n g would n o t b e w o r t h while. F u r t h e r , a few days b e f o r e , Admiral C a n a r i s , t h e head

o f t h e German I n t e l l e g e n c e S e r v i c e h a d r e s p o n d e d t o a q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g by s t a t i n g :
A t the present t i m e there is not the s l i g h t e s t sign t h a t a new l a n d i n g w i l l b e u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e . The number o f s h i p s i n N a p l e s h a r b o u r may b e r e g a r d e d a s

q u i t e normal.

27

K e s s e l r i n g ' s c h i e f of s t a f f , Westphal, tended t o a g r e e w i t h Canaris' statement. On 1 5 J a n u a r y , h e t o l d V i e t i n g h o f f :

I c o n s i d e r a large-scale landing o p e r a t i o n as being out o f t h e q u e s t i o n f o r t h e n e x t f o u r t o s i x weeks. 28

I n a d d i t i o n t o c o n s i d e r i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g n e a r Rome, K e s s e l r i n g h a d t o c o n s i d e r t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e claim t h a t t h e Gustav Line w a s i r r e p a i r a b l y threatened. I n t h i s , K e s s e l r i n g t r u s t e d h i s commanders, f o r h e knew v e r y

w e l l t h e d a n g e r of t h e A l l i e s g a i n i n g c o n t r o l of t h e L i r i v a l l e y ,

e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e t h e A l l i e d a c t i o n took p l a c e i n t h e middle of t h e Army Group C r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . K e s s e l r i n g meant t o d e f e n d In

on t h e Gustav L i n e , n o t t o withdraw i n t h e immediate f u t u r e . t h i s , h e had a l a s t p i e c e o f i n f o r m a t i o n t o c o n s i d e r

--

Hitler's

51

d i r e c t i v e was t o h o l d g r o u n d w h e n e v e r p o s s i b l e .

29

K e s s e l r i n g knew t h a t h e h a d t o make a d e c i s i o n q u i c k l y . F i n a l l y , h e d e c i d e d t h a t h e c o u l d commit t h e d i v i s i o n s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e , and h a v e t i m e t o w i t h d r a w them t o Rome p r i o r t o a l a n d i n g , w h i c h he s t i l l e x p e c t e d t o b e t i m e d t o e x p l o i t t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h , n o t t o come b e f o r e i t w a s c o m p l e t e . He saw a v e r y

d a n g e r o u s a t t a c k now d e v e l o p i n g , w h i l e t h e e x p e c t e d l a n d i n g was a f u t u r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e o f s t o p p i n g t h e i m m e d i a t e a t t a c k and d e a l i n g w i t h t h e i n v a s i o n i f i t came, h o p e f u l l y , a f t e r t h e two r e s e r v e 30 d i v i s i o n s w e r e r e t u r n e d t o Rome. A t 0900, 18 J a n u a r y, .

- ---

-.

K e s s e l r i n g d e c i d e d t o commit t h e two r e s e r v e d i v i s i o n s t o d e f e a t the Allied penetration. Not o n l y d i d h e s e n d t h e 9 0 t h a n d 2 9 t h

. -

? a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n s , b u t t h e - I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s hgadq u a r t e r s a s w e l l , l e a v i n g i n r e s e r v e o n l y two b a t t a l i o n s t o p a t r o l t h e b e a c h e s t o t h e n o r t h a n d s o u t h o f Rome a n d t h e 4th Parachute Division s t i l l being organized. I n o r d e r t o compensate f o r the- l o s s o f h i s r e s e r v e s , K e s s e l r i n g p l a c e d t h e e n t i r e command on a l e r t t h e n e x t t h r e e nights t o counter a possible Allied invasion. However, he:

l i s t e n e d t o t h e e m p h a t i c w a r n i n g s of my s t a f - f a g a i n s t t i r i n g t h e t r o o p s by a c o n t i n u o u s s t a n d - t o a n d c o u n t e r m a n d e d t h e o r d e r f o r t h e n i g h t o f 21-22 J a n u a r y 31

...

...

The I n v a s i o n a n d R e a c t i o n

A s K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e a r a r e a troops e n . j o y e d th-eir f i r s t - n i g h t

l a n d e d. o f f i n t h r e e d a y s , L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l L u c a s ' VI C o r p s ___-a t A n z i o e a r l y on t h e m o r n i n g o f 22 J a n u a r y w i t h 40,000 men and

5200 v e h i c l e s o f t h e 1 s t B r i t i s h D i v i s i o n , 3d US D i v i s i o n ,
-_
--

5 0 4 t h a n d 5 0 9 t h US P a r a c h u t e I n f a n t r - y . - R e g i m e n t s , 2nd B r i t i s h S p e c i a l S e r v i c e B r i g a d e w i t h two Commando B a t t a l i o n s , a n d t h e 6 6 1 5 t h US R a n g e r F o r c e ( P r o v i s i o n a l - ) . They met h a r d l y a n y

52

r e s i s t a n c e a s they landed, pushing inland quickly t o achieve their i n i t i a l objectives. K e s s e l r i n g had t h e r e p o r t . An h o u r a f t e r t h e f i r s t l a n d i n g , T h r e e h o u r s l a t e r , a t 0600,

-_

h e f e l t t h a t he had s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n t o r e a c t .

.Kessel- --

r i n g q u i c k l y i m p l e m e n t e d case R I C H A R D , a n d n o t i f i e d OKW o f the situation. The m e s s a g e r e a d :

Presumably one A l l i e d d i v i s i o n had l a n d e d from 95 l a n d i n g c r a f t a t Nettuno 32

A l t h o u g h h e f e l t t h a t h i s a c t i o n s may n o t h a v e b e e n q u i c k enough t o p r e v e n t a deep A l l i e d p e n e t r a t i o n from t h e beachhead t o t h r e a t e n t h e Te n t h Ar m y ' s l i n e s o f communications and t h e c i t y o f Rome, h e c o o l y i g n o r e d V i e t i n g h o f f ' s r e q u e s t t o w i t h d r a w a n d d i r e c t e d t h e T e n t h Army t o c o n t i n u e t o d e f e n d whi-l.e Army 33 Group C c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r c e s a r o u n d t h e b e a c h h e a d a r e a . I n i t i a l l y , lacking a headquarters t o control operations a t the b e a c h h e a d , K e s s e l r i n g p l a c e d G e n e r a l Schlemm, t h e commander8,of o f o u t l y i n g a r e a s a r o u n d Rome ( n o t t h e Commandant o f Rome, a s 34 is generally reported) i n c h a r g e of o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e beachhead u n t i l a h e a d q u a r t e r s c o u l d be p u t i n c o n t r o l . That headquarters

was t o be t h e I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s , who a l o n g w i t h 2 9 t h P a n - z e ~

G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n , was o r d e r e d b a c k t o Rome, a s w e l l - +%-?!1 a v a i l a b l e combat f o r c e s . Responding u n i t s i n c l u d e d elements...........

--

---

. . .

o f t h e 3d P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n f r o m LXXVI P a n z e r C o r p s a r e a
...-.. ............ ......

a n d e l e m e n t s of t h e 71st D i v i s i o n a n d 1 5 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n , e l e m e n t s o f t h e Herman G o e r i n g P a n z e r D i v i s i o n - , '

1st Parachute Division, 26th Panzer Division as w e l l a s v a r i o u s

a r t i l l e r y , t a n k and a n t i - t a n k battalions. .The F o u r t e e n..... t h .-_. .
Case RICHARD

Army p r o v i d e d t h e r e q u i r e d u n i t s l i s t e d u n d e r Case R I C H A R D a n d

OKW r e s p o n d e d w i t h u n i t s t a s k e d u n d e r MARDER I .
ti.mes :
U nits co o n. c n. t rao t~ er d~ ~ w i...... th ut a h i t c h pre_Era ___ r ye -w .t.. -. -o -~ e v e n i nc '1 u d'ed .-- _._ -__ -..---s i p s a n d c . l . e a r i n g m o u n t a i n p a sses ..... . . . . coming i n a r r i v e d . R.efue-11ing ,was i n t e r r u p t i n g t h e tempo o f movement.
.

and.LLiARDER I w e r e e x e c u t e d a s i f t h e y h a d b e e n p r a c t i c & G & y

because of e x c e l l e n t p 1ac emen t o f-.d i r e c tEn of i c e , .b e f o r e u n i t s cond.uc.L& i,n r o u , t e . , w i t h o u t

35

53

When p l a c i n g G e n e r a l Schlemmer ( n o t t o b e c o n f u s e -d-..__ with G e n e r a l Schlemm) a n d h i s I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s i n c h a r g e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g t o l d him t o p u s h b a t t a l i o n s -

- -

- _

i n t o t h e l i n e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e type o f_ -u n i t . Unbelievably, the Allies did not pursue t h e opportunity

t o c u t t h e T e n t h A r m y ' s l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o r t o move t o w a r d Rome, b u t seemed c o n t e n t t o b u i l d up t h e b e a c h h e a d from behind a defensive screen.

-.

By a f t e r n o o n -.. o n .22 - - J a n ry, -u -a_

.

K e s s e l r i n g f e l t c o n f i d e n t t h a t d i s a s t e r had been a v o i d e d , and t h a t h e c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e e n o u g h f o r c e s t o -t a.k e d e c i s i v e a c t i o n .

Y e t , h i s c o n t a i n m e n t l i n e was r a t h e r u n i q u e .

According t o jumble

K e s s e l r i n g , i t was a

'I.

. higgedly-piggly

-- u n i t s

o f n u m e r o u s d i v i s i o n s f i g h t i n g c o n f u s e d l y s i d e by s i d e .

. ." 3 6
Ac-

By a f t e r n o o n o f t h e 2 3 d , a n A l l i e d d r i v e t o c u t t h e T e n t h Army o f f f r o m Rome would b e i m p o s s i b l e . The d a n g e r was o v e r .

c o r d i n g t o h i s b i o g r a p h e r , " E x p e r i e n c e a n d l u c k had b e e n h i s s a l v a t i o n indeed. 1 1 ~ '

Events Leading t o t h e Counterattack

By 24 ~ J a n u a r -y , K e s_s e l r i n g r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e I Parachute --COJP_.S would b e u n a b l e t o c o n t r o l a l l of t h e f o r m a t i o n s b e g i n n i n g

--.

t o p o u r i n t o t h e a r e a a r o u n d t h e b e a c h h e- a d , s o h e o r d e r e d --C o l o n e l
....
-

.-

_.

teenth G e n e r a l E b e r h a r d von M a c k e n s e n , commande-r o f t h e F o u r . .-__ Army i n n o r t h e r n T t a l y , t o b r i n g h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s s o u t h t o t a k e

-. .

c o--ntro l - o f. . t h e b a t t l e . -_
..

The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n Mackensen a n d

K e s s e l r i n g was c o o l , marked by d i s a g r e e m e n t s a n d a c e r t a i n amount o f d i s t r u s t m a n i f e s t e d i n p o s t - w a r a c c o u n t s by Macken38 sen. Upon h i s a r r i v a l i n t h e a r e a , Mackensen f o u n d m a j o r elements represented under t h r e e d i v i s i o n headquarters. Herman G o e r i n g D i v i s i o n c o n t r o l l e d u n i t s i n t h e e a s t e r n
. .. . .

The area
-

o f t h e p e r i m e t e r known .a s C. i.. s t e r n a. ( .s. e e A p p e n d i x C ) .

.
.. . . .

The 3 d
. -

P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n d e f e n d e d i n t h e c e n t e r o f t h e l i--n e -a n d t h e 6 5 t h D i v i s i o n o c c u p i e d p o s i t i o n s a l o n g t h e M o l e t t a River i n

54

t h e west. K e s s e l r i n g r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e o n t h e T e n t h Army f o r c e d him t o c o u n t e r a t t a c k q u i c k l y , s o h e i n s t r u c t e d Mac.ksensen to f---_ o r........... ces i n p r e p a r e f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . t o d e s t r o y . t h..... e ,-.-

ld b e r e..... leased t h e beachhead as soon a s p o s s i b l e , so f o r c e s c o u .... ...---. ' t o r e t u r n t o t h e T e n t h Army.39 Mackensen a c c o r d i n g l y b e g a n t o

.

. c k a l o n g t h e Albano-Anzio road leading i n t o p r e p a r e f o r a n a .t .t. a ....... --

t h e beachhead from t h e n o r t h .
___..

T h i s a t t a c k , o r i g i n a l l y s c h e.d uled .-. ..

. -. .

b r u a r y , was moved t o , 2 F e b r u a r y b e c a u s e o f c on c e r__-__-.-__ n about for 1 - F -e . -a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t C i v i t a v e c c h i a , n o r t h o f Rome. The p l a n was p r e p a r e d f o r s i g n a l t o OKW o n 28 J a n u a r y , b u t n o t s e n t u n t i l 3 February.40
-.

I n t h e race t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e f i r s t
--.

..

ma-jor o f f e n s i v .e .a c t i o .n on b o t h.... s -i d e s , h o w e v e r , L u c a s b e a t Mackensen. ..-. _ . . ..... _I.I .-.__ - From i n s i d e t h e b e a c h h e a d a r e a , L u c a s s a w .his_.m-i-s,s-i.on,~ as

.

t o f i r s t e s t a b l i s h t h e b e a c h h e a d f i r m l y a n d d e v e l o p a n e f .f e . c . t.i v e l o g i s t i c a l base f o r f u t u r e operations. N s x t , h e was t o e x p a n d

_ur

t h e beachhead i n o r d e r t o r e a c h o u t t o t h e Alb .-a n - h ".i .l l s t o h e l p o p e n t h e way t o Rome. L u c a s h e s i t a t e d t o e x p a n d q u i c k l y upon landing, allowing Kesselring's quick reaction t o the Allied incursion t o reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a catastrophe through t h e p a s s a g e o f time. Lucas d i d n o t p r e s s t h e a t t a c k b e c a u s e

he w a s concerned a b o u t t h e s a f e t y of t h e V I Corps, because he had a n i n h e r e n t m i s t r u s t f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n , and b e c a u s e h e f e l t h i s o r d e r s f . r a m ~ G e n e r a l C l a r k a l l o w e d him t h e l a t i t u d e t o t a k e h i s time. Through ULTRA, C l a r k knew t h a t no GerECn r e s e r v e s L u c a s was n o t a w a r e o f t h e informa,.t&_n and

were a v a i l a b l e . 4 1

h a d no a p p a r e n t i d e a a b o u t t h e a b s e n c e o f K e s s e l r i n g !.,s s.T:ra..te,g.iic reserves.

Later, t h e c l a r i t y of Alexander's mission statement

t o L u c a s v i a C l a r k was t o b e q u e s t i o n e d

--

a question concerning

t h e r a p i d i t y of L u c a s ' a d v a n c e f r o m t h e i n i t i a l b e a c h h e a d a n d h i s 42 p r i o r i t y of t a s k s . Lucas' e v e n t u a l d e c i s i o n t o a t t a c k u p s e t t h e timt~g-u-f M a c k e n s e n 's p l a n s . , Lucas i n t e n d e d t o s e n d t h e 1st B r i t i s h

55

D i v i s i o n t o w a r d A l b a n o , f o l l o w e d by t h e 1 s t US Armor D i v i s i o n i n e x p l o i t a t i o n , t o o p e n t h e way f o r t h e F i f t h Army t o d r i v e up t h e L i r i v a l l e y a n d t o make V i e t i n g h o f f ' s p o s i t i o n u n t e n a b l e . An i n t e r m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e B r i t i s h would b e a p a r t o f t h e Rome-Cisterna

US Division, . ... . .

r a i l w a y , t o b e c a p t u r e d o n 29 J a n u a r y .

The 3d - --.__

5 0 9 t h P a r a c h u t e I n f a n t r-.y .. a n d t h e R a n g e r s . were
.

to t a k e C i s t e r n a i n o r d e r t o cut-Highway_J..and be p r e p a r e d t o
-

- --

--___.

a t t a c k t o s i e z e Valmont-one o n 0.rd-e-L..
. ..

The 1 s t B r i t i s h D i v i s i o n

s u c c e s s f u l l y c a p t u r e d Campoleoneduring t h e o f f e n s i v e which began t h e n i g h t o f 29-30 J a n u a r y , b u t t h e 1 s t US Armor D i v i s i o n found t h e t e r r a i n impossible t o support t h e i r a t t e m p t s t o exploit the British gain. On t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e b e a c h h e a d ,

t h e R a n g e r s , a t t a c k i n g e a r l y o n 30 J a n u a r y , w e r e d e s t r o y e d by t h e Herman G o e r i n g D i v i s i o n a n d e l e m e n t s o f - t h e 7 1 5 t h D i v i s i o n w hi c h h a_ d.- a r r i v e d t h a t d a y . Lucas' a t t a c k ground t o a h a l t Ironically,

-. F e b r u a r y , Mackensen's o r i g i n a l a t t a c k d a t e . on 1

i t was o n t h i s d a y t h a t G e n e r a l C l a r k , m e e t i n g w i t h G e n e r a l

Alexander i n t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e V I Corps d e f e a t , proposed a landing a t Civitavecchia i n order t o cut Kesselring's forces further north. Alexander f e l t t h e proposal t o o r i s k y The r e s u l t o f t h i s commanders' and

discarded t h e idea.
.

conference

was t o o r d --- e r Lucas t o e s t a b l i s h d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s . From M a c k e n s e n ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , but not without cost. t h e A l l i e d a t t a c k was h a l t e d ,

P r e p a r i n g f o r a n a t t a c k , Mackensen

and K e s s e l r i n g had t o q u i c k l y j u g g l e f o r c e s b o t h around t h e b e a c h h e a d a n d w i t h i n Army Group C t o stem t h e t i d e of L u c a s ' e f f o r t , a c t i o n s a t which t h e y were s u c c e s s f u l e x c e p t f o r t h e d e e p B r i t i s h s a l i e n t i n t o t h e German l i n e s a t Campoleone. T h i s area w a s t o be t h e s t a g i n g s i t e f o r Mackensen's a t t a c k on

2 F e b r u a r y , b u t would now h a v e t o b e r e t a k e n i f t h a t a p p r o a c h
were t o b e u s e d .

56

Planning f o r the Counterattack

K e s s e l r i n g w a s now d e n i e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o make a q u i c k a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e b e a c h h e a d , t h u s he a n d Mackensen were f o r c e d t o r e e v a l u a t e t h e i r p l a n f o r r e d u c i n g t h e beachhead.

. c .t i o n . K e s s e l r i n g a n d Mackensen d i s c u s s e d t h r e e c o u r s e s of a

The f i .r s t was t o d r i v e down t h e c o a s t f r o m t h e n o r th,-unhingin g . . ,._._

. ."

t h e A l l i e d l e f t f l a n k and b r e a k i n g i n t o L u c a s ' r e a r a r e a t o c u t h i s l i n e s of communications. A c c o r d i n g t o K e s s e l r i n g , he

.

f e l t t h a t t h e n o r t h e r n a p p r o a c h would b e t o o. v u l n e r a b le t o A l l-.-i e d . -. ._ .
r-

na val gunfire. .- ._ .. . .
p_.-m&.-I.

He was p e r h a p s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e r o u g h h a n d l i n g

h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k f o r c e s had e x p e r i e n c e d a t t h e h a n d s o f n a v a l g u n f i r e on S i c i l y .
. -

The s e c o n d a p p r o a c h would b e t o a t t e m p t .
...

t h e same maneuver f r o m t h e s o u t h e r n f l a n k .
.

Here, b o t h commanders

- r e a.. was t o o marshy, a n d b r o k e n t o s u p p o r t a agreed t h a t the a

m aj o r ----attack.
.. .

The t h i r d c o u r s e was t o d r i v e d i r e c t l y i n t o road. T h i s was t h e s h o r t e s - t - .r-o-ure..-

An z i o a l o n g t h e Albano-Anzio .. ... .
-.-._____.,

in t o t h e b e a c h h e-.---. a d , a n d a s u c c e s s f u l a t t a c k h e r e would q u i c k l y r e was al-so c a v e i n t h e V I C o r p s p o s i t i o n s , y e t a n a t t a c. k h. e . ..

- .... .
. . .

against the strong .. e s t A l l i e d po,Sitio.ns, and r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e

. ..
,.

B r i t i s h s a l i e n t o u t t o Campoleone had t o be r e d u c e d i n o r d e r t o c o n t r o l t h e road from t h e n o r t h . Given t h e s e drawbacks,

K -_.-e s s e l - r i n g a n d Mackensen f e l t t h a t t h e t h i r d c o u r s e _ef.-acti.on waz

_"_,_

the bezL"

B o t h commanders, d i s a g r e e d , h o w e v e r , on t h e

t i m i n g of t h e a t t a c k . K e s s e l r i n g f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t : .*"-..-n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army t o make a d e c i s i v e a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e bridgehead before t h e t o t a l forces then a v a i l a b l e were weakened by t h e p o s s i b l e t r a n s f e r of u n i t s t o t h e T e n t h Army F r o n t . A t t h a t t i m e t h e m a t e r i a l s a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h e German Command i n I t a l y w e r e v e r y l i m i t e d a n d i t was t h e r e f o r e o b l i g e d t o c o n d u c t a " p o o r m a n ' s w a r . " 44

...

A d d i t i o n a l l y , K e s s e l r i n g f e l t t h a t a n e f f e c t i v e German a t t a c k coupled w i t h t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t r a i n of b e i n g l e f t exposed i n t h e b e a c h h e a d would s e r v e t o d e f e a t t h e A l l i e s . He a l s o f e l t

t h a t h e would h a v e t o f r e e f o r c e s a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e i n c a s e

57

of a landing a t C i v i t a ~ e c c h i a . ~ O f~ c o u r s e , f r e e i n g forces t o

r e t u r n t o t h e T e n t h Army was a l s o i m p o r t a n t . I n c o n t r a s t , Mackensen f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army s h o u l d b e e n t i r e l y p r e p a r e d f o r t h e a t t a c k .

His r e a s o n i n g

was t h a t t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k must b e p r o p e r l y d o n e t h e f i r s t t i m e ,
f o r t h e German command d i d n o t h a v e e n o u g h s t r e n g t h f o r a s e c o n d 46 try. A l t h o u g h K e s s e l r i n g d o e s n o t m e n t i o n t h i s d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n i n a n y of h i s p o s t - w a r c h i e f of s t a f f d o e s . w r i t i n g s , Hauser, Mackensen's

F u r t h e r , apparently t h e disagreement

b e t w e e n t h e two g e n e r a l s was s o g r e a t t h a t Mackensen o f f e r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n , not once, but twice a t the beginning of February, t h e time d u r i n g w h i c h t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n was u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n . Mackensen h a d l i t t l e f a i t h i n t h e outcome o f t h e p l a n , i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t t o K e s s e l r i n g ' s v e r y o p t o m i s t i c o p i n i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army's p r o s p e c t s . I r o n i c a l l y , Mackensen f a c e d a commander, L u c a s ,
47

who h a d l i t t l e f a i t h i n t h e p l a n which h e was c a l l e d t o f u l f i l l . K e s s e l r i n g r e f u s e d t o a l l o w Mackensen t o r e s i g n a n d a p p a r e n t l y g a v e way t o h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k b e a c a r e f u l l y prepared operation.

As he

did a t Salerno, Kesselring

a l l o w e d t h e l o c a l commander t h e l a t i t u d e t o d e v e l o p t h e o p e r ation. The p l a n w h i c h t o o k s h a p e u n d e r Mackensen and H a user w a s - __ - .. .. . e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a s t h e p l a n d e v e l o p e d f o r t h e q u i c k . .. .. .. . -

counterattack i n late January.

I t c o n s i s t e d of t h r e e phases.
--.

P h a s e - o n e was t o s i e z e t e r r a i n t o p r - e p a r e f o r t h e m a i n a s t G k . P r i m a r i l y , Mackensen w a n t e d t o e l i m i n a t e t h e - B r i t i s h - s a l i e n t e x t e n d i n g i n t o t h e German l i n e s a n d s i e z - h a , known a s t h e " f a c t o r y " main a t t a c k . an area

t o u s e a s a jumping o f f p o i n t f o r t h e

The S e c o n d p h a s e would be t o d r i v e t h e -main att a c k d o e - t h e Albano-Anzio r o a d t o t h e - s e a , p i e r c i n g t h e A l l i e d - _The l a s t

---

main d e f e n s i v e l i n e .

p h a s e was a n a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e

M u s s o l i n i C a n d l t o e l i m i n a t e t h e l.ast_.All.*; 48 sistance.

p . o c k 3 - t ~o f re -

. -

58

Mackensen b e g a n l i m i t e d a t t a c k s o n t h e n i g h t . a L - 3 = - 4 February t o e l i m i n a t e t h e B r i t i s h s a l i e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e German

a t t a c k was s t o p p e d , L u c a s d e c i d e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h 1 s t D i v i s i o n p o s i t i o n , e x t e n d i n g w e l l i n t o t h e German l i n e s , was u n t e n a b l e and o r d e r e d t h e i r withdrawal. ,.or.dered On. 4 F e b r u a r y . , Kes.se.h..i-n,g,

e-.-._-___-___ T e n t h Army t h e LXXVI P a n z e r C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o move f r o m t h ..._. t o tak e co n t r o l o f u n i t s i n t h e c e n t e r and.-.eastern,sP.ct~.,.,o~f ..

. -...

t h e bridgehead.

Until t h i s a c t i o n took place, t h e Fourteenth

Army c o n t r o l l e d o n l y I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s , w h i c h was a t t e m p t i n g The LXXVI P a n z e r C o r p s t o o k c o n t r o l .. 4.9--. . . . -.-- -----____ o f t h e i r a r e a a t 1200, 4 F e b r u a r y 1944. t o control the entire front.
. . . .. . ..

H i t l e r ' s R e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e C o u n t e r a t t a c k

H i t l e r was i n t e n s e l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e s u c c e s s of a

German c o u n t e r a t t a c k a t A n z i o , a n d r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e p l a n b e a p p r o v e d by him. H i t l e r needed a v i c t o r y b a d l y , e s p e c i a l l y F u r t h e r , h e was

a f t e r t h e r e v e r s e s on t h e e a s t e r n f r o n t .

c o n v i n c e d t h a t a d e f e a t a t A n z i o would c a u s e t h e A l l i e s t o d e l a y o r p o s t p o n e a n i n v a s i o n of w e s t e r n E u r o p e . 50 Con.

a r t e-. rs s e q u e n t l y , Mackensen r e p o r t e d t o H i t l e r a t h i s h e a d q u - .~

i n E a s t P r u s s i a o n 5 F e b r u a r y t o p r e s e n t t h e F o u r t e e n-_ t h Army plan f o r approval. H i t l e r agreed with t h e d i r e c t i o n of a t t a c k , . but s t i p u l a t e d t h r e e r e s t r i c t i o n s f o r t h e conduct of t h e

_-

attack.
1 -

He r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e s e c t o r o f a d v a n c e b e r e d u c e d i n
This requirement

"_

w i d t h i n o r d e r t o m a s s t h e combat f o r c e s .

came d i r e c t l y f r o m h i s f i r s t w o r l d war e x p e r i e n c e , a l o n g w i t h t h e s e c o n d r e q u i r e m e n t , w h i c h was t h e u s e o f a r o l l i n g b a r rage t o lead the attack. The l a s t r e q u i r e m e n t , t h e u s e o f

t h e I n f a n t r y L e h r R e g i m e n t , a d e m o n s t r a t i o n u n i t u s e d t o show how t o c o n d u c t i n f a n t r y a t t a c k s t o new s o l d i e r s b u t was u n t e s t e d i n c o m b a t , was b a s e d on H i t l e r ' s o p i n i o n o f t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e unit.

59

Mackensen and K e s s e l r i n g h a d t o f a c e t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s a n d d e c i d e what t o do a b o u t them. The r e q u i r e m e n t t o use a

r o l l i n g a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e s e l f - d e s t r u c t e d d u e t o a l- a c k o f . -

ammunition.

N e i t h e r K e s s e l r i n g o r Mackensen o b j e c t e d t o t h e

u s e o f t h e I n f a n t r y L e h r Regiment t o l e a d t h e a t t a c k , a p p a r e n t l y a c c e p t i n g OKW's e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s a t f a c e v a l u e . K e s s e l r i n g d i d o p p o s e t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a n a r r o w f r o n t a t t a c k o f o n l y s i x k i l o m e t e r s a n d s t a t e d t h a t o p p o s i t i o n t o OKW. h i s w r i t i n g s , Kesselring does n o t i d e n t i f y t h e reason t h i s o p p o s i t i o n n o r t h e arguement used. for In

Mackensen p r o v i d e s a

c l u e t o t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army a n d Army Group C ' s o b j e c t i o n s , however. A p p a r e n t l y , t h e German commanders i n I t a l y w e r e

c o n c e r n e d t h a t t h e t r o o p s would b e massed i n t o o s m a l l a n a r e a d air, t h u s p r o v i d i n g a l u c r a t i v e t a r g e t f o r A l l i e d a r t i l l e r y a n_.

. .

b o t h of w h i c h w e r e v a s t l y s u p e r i o r t o German a s s e t s .

Additionally,

Mackensen was c o n c e r n e d t h a t a n a t t a c k on a n a r r o w f r o n t would f-a __ i l t o f o r c e L u c a s t o commit h i s r e s e r v e s .

-.

- -

_ _ _

He was c o n c e r n e d 51

a b o u t a l a c k of f l e x i b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t a n u n e x p e c t e d s u c c e s s .

K e s s e l r i n g ' s o b j e c t i o n s w e r e n o t c o n s i d e r e d by H i t l e r , a n d t h e 52 r e s t r i c t i o n s s t o o d as d i c t a t e d .

The C o u n t e r a t t a c k
, .

c I-

On t h e same. d a y t h a t M a c k e n s e n - m e t wi-th H i t l e r , t h e Herman G o.... ering P a- n zer Division and t h e 26th Panzer Division - . . . . -.

a t t a c k e d t o s t r a i g h t e n t h e l i n e i n t h e C i s t e r n a a r e a and..ga-in a d v a n t a g e o u s t e r r a i n f o r t h e coming m a j o r o f f e n s i v e .
.. .

The l -- a s t
.

ru ---a y l i m i t e d o b j , e c t . i . v e . a t t a c k was c o n d u c t e d , b e g i n n i n g 8 F e b a n d e n d i n g on 1 0 F e b r u a r y by t h e 6 5 t h D i v i s i o n i n o r d e r t o s i e z e A p r i l l i a and C a r r e c o t o . With t h e s u c c e s s o f t h i s a c t i o n ,

the stage was set t o drive the Allies i n t o the sea. The i n i t i a l atta,c.lc o r d e r was is-sued on- -9 F e b r u a - r y , s t a t i n g The

that the date - - .f o r t h e c o u n t e r a t t a . c k . w o u l d b e 16 F e b r u a r y .

60

L X V I P a n z e r C o r p s was t o make t h e main e f f o r ! __X . . . . . . . .

w i t h t h e 3d

Panzer G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n , I n f a n t r y Lehr (741 I n f a n t r y Regiment), 114th R i f l e D i v i s i o n and 715th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n t h e f i r s t wave. The s e c o n d wave i n c l u d e d t h e 2 9 t h P a n z e r

Grenadier D i v i s i o n and t h e 26th Panzer Division. The t a s k of t h e f i r s t wave was t o b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e enemy f r o n t w i t h a d r i v e t o t h e s o u t h . The s e c o n d wave w a s t h e n t o go t h r o u g h t h e g a p t h e f i r s t wave h a d c r e a t e d i n t h e enemy d e f e n c e s a n d u n d e r command of Army H.Q., make a d e e p t h r u s t t o A n z i o w h e r e i t would p r o c e e d t o r o l l u p t h e enemy o n b o t h s i d e s . A.11 s e c t o r s of t h e f r o n t n o t t a k i n g p a r t i n t h e a t t a c k were t o -be.--w&ned a s f a r a s was p o s s i b l e . I n o r d e r t o mi.s.lead t h e e.nemy,_ c o n t i n u a l a s s a u l t s were t o be made a l o n g t h , e e n t i r............. e front, p a r L i , c u l a r l y i n s e c t o r s h e l d by 4 t h E.ar.at.mag,s Diyisi,.on. and tlhe' "Herman G o e r i n g " P a n z e r D i v i s G n , , , 5 3
~

a t t a c k began a t 063 --. 0 on 1 6 F e b r u a r y . The F o -.u r t........ e e n t h Army . .

. . . .

The Herman G o e ri n g P an z e r D i v i s i o n and t h e 4 t h P a r a c h u t e Di v i . . . . __._ ......... s i o n c o n d u c t e d . f e i n t a.t.tacks, i-n. o r d e r t o 0bscu.r.e. t.he m a i n e f ...... f0r.t.. The V I - C . . .o . rps u n i t s were n o t d e c e i v e d , however, for

rea t h e y w e r e a w a r e - 0 . f . t h e German p r e p a r a t i o n s a n d p o s s i b l e a - .....

o f main effort. . . . . .
. .

The main a t t a c k f e l l o n u n i t s of t h e 4 5 t h US The

D i v i s i o n a l o n g t h e Albano-Anzio r o a d , m a k i n g e a r l y g a i n s .

Germans, h o w e v e r , were s t o p p e d by t h e commitment of t h e l o c a l r e s e r v e s and t h e e f f e c t i v e A l l i e d a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Depending

on a r t i l l e r y a n d t a n k s , t h e Germans w e r e a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y s t r i p p e d of t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e l a t t e r d u e t o a t h a w which t u r n e d t h e ground i n t o a quagmire and r e s ...... t r i c t ... ed .. -_.- t h e t a n k s . ,

.

-_.__-." t o g.wt.ds.
. . . __.

. .

A r_ t_ i -l l e E y : . . . e xpenditure a-ver~ses in - d i c a t e d that the ...........

........ .

. . . . .

V I ...... Corps f i r e d a b o u t 25,000 r o u n .d_s p e r d a y a s opposed,.,.t,o_..lSOP_ .----.-. .

. .
,.

ro u n d s p e r day which t h e F o u r t e . e . n.t h A,rmy f i r e d . .... _____. . ...

In addition

t o t h e v a s t d i f f e r e n c e s of a v a i l a b l e ammunition, a problem d e v e l o p e d i n t h e e x p e n d i t u r e of t h e a l l o c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e main a t t a c k , a p r o b l e m f i r s t a g g r a v a t e d , t h e n r e c t i f i e d by K e s s e l r i n g . Upon a r r i v i n g i n t h e b e a c h h e a d a r e a , Mackensen h a d &i.re.cted t h a t a l l a r t i l l e r y be c o n t r o l l e d d i r e c t l............... y by Army-,..he.a.d.q.uarters.

61

T h i s o r d e r i n s u r e d e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of t h e l i m i t e d a r t i l l e r y assets, a s w e l l as c r e a t i n g o r d e r out of chaos r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e f i r s t c r i t i c a l d a y s o f t h e German c o n c e n t r a t i o n . of c e n t r a l i z e d Termed " F e ~ e r l e i t - B a t t e r i e , " ~ th ~ e c o n c e p -. t ---. .

c o n t r o l proved very e f f e c t i v e i n d i r e c t i n g a r t i l l e r y f i r e .
-- .
. . .__ . -. .

--

F o r t h e m a i n a t t a c k , F o u r t e e n t h Army h a d on h a n d t e n d a y s allocation.
- .

An o l d a r t i l l e r y m a n , K e s s e- -l r i n g became n __ c o-c e r n e d ld o n t h e 1 6 t h d u r i n g a v i s i t t o t h e b a..t t l e f i e -- about the

-. .. . . . .

---

seemingL~_..laJa_ra~.. ireA.. ef A f t e r pushing General Jahn, t h e

a r t i l l e r y commander f o r a n e x p l a n a t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g was g i v e n e r r o n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t ammunition consumption rates. Ammunition e x p e n d i t u r e r e p o r .t -s . ~ t h- e n e x t - d a y r e v e a l e d t h . a t . . g n l y .

-_.. _.

-o 40% o f o n e d a.y ' s a l l o c a t i o n h a d b e e n e x p e n ded, due f i r s t - t . . . .

. . . . . ._ .. . . - .

a f a i l u r e t o move t h e a m m u n i t i o n f r o m t h e s u p p l y dumps -- a n -d -- =--s e c o n d , t o a c o n s e r v a t i o n o r d e r i s s u e d by Genera.1 J a h n - a f t e r

. .

Kesselring's visit. . -._ -5-5- -. 1 7 F e b ruary. --

The s i t u a t i o n w a s r e c t i f i e d bela_t_qdly o n

Leading t h e a t t a c k ,

t h e I n f a n t r y Lehr ( 7 4 1 s t I n f a n t r y )

R e g i m e n t q u i c k l y l o s t c o h e s i o n , b r o k e down u n d e r f i r e a n d r a n , a n a c t i o n w h i c h d i d n o t e x a c t l y l i f t German m o r a l e . Though

t h e a t t a c k d i d make some a d v a n c e s , L u c a s was n o t f o r c e d t o commit h i s reserve division. The commitment o f t h e V I C o r p s r e s e r v e s When i t became

was o n e o f b l a c k e n s e n ' s o b j e c t i v e s t h e f i r s t d a y .

c l e a r t o Mackensen a n d K e s s e l r i n g t h a t t h e i r a t t a c k would f a i l t o d r i v e through t h e 4 5 t h D i v i s i o n d e f e n s e s and c a u s e Lucas t o commit h i s r e s e r v e s , t h e 1 s t A r m o r D i v i s i o n , K e s s e l r i n g s t r o n g l y s u g g e s t e d t h a t Mackensen commit t h e s e c o n d wave t o d r i v e t h r o u g h t h e enemy

position^.^'

Mackensen d e c l i n e d a n d b e g a n Forced i n t o a narrow

t o plan f o r the next day's a c t i v i t i e s .

s e c t o r by d e s i g n , d e n i e d t a n k s u p p o r t a n d e f f e c t i v e a r t i l l e r y f i r e , f a c i n g s i g n i f i c a n t enemy a r t i l l e r y a n d n a v a l g u n f i r e a n d a i r a t t a c k s , Mackensen's a t t a c k ground t o a h a l t . The F o u r t e e n t h Army s t i l l r e t a i n e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e p u n c h .

62

P a r t of t h e f i r s t wave u n i t s r e m a i n e d u n c o m m i t t e d a n d t h e s e c o n d

wave had n o t j o i n e d t h e b a t t l e y e t .

I n order t o prevent

t h e A l l i e s r e s t a n d time t o p r e p a r e d e f e n s e s , !.lackensen o r d e r e d c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e t h r o u g h o u t t h e n i g h t , p r e s s u r e w h i c h won some positive results. One b a t t a l i o n of t h e 7 1 5 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n

managed t o c r e a t e a g a p i n t h e 1 5 7 t h R e g i m e n t o f t h e 4 5 t h Infantry Division. The n e x t m o r n i n g , t h e m a i n a t t a c k e x p l o i t e d

t h e g a p , d r i v i n g a b o u t 1%k i l o m e t e r s d e e p a n d 3 k i l o m e t e r s w i d e , n e a r l y t o t h e f i n a l b e a c h h e a d l i n e o f t h e VI C o r p s , b u t by t h e e n d of t h e d a y , t h e d r i v e had a g a i n b e e n s t o p p e d by thinly stretched infantry: The d e f e n d e r s r e f u s e d t o b r e a k . The l i n e was d a n g e r o u s l y s t r e t c h e d a n d t h e d e f e n s e s were c l o s e t o d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , b u t a g r e a t e x p e n d i t u r e o f a r t i l l e r y , t a n k , t a n k d e s t r o y e r , and m o r t a r ammunition h e l p e d t h e i n f a n t r y t o h o l d . A t t h e end o f t h e d a y , G e n e r a l L u c a s ' f i n a l b e a c h h e a d l i n e was s t i l l unbroken. 57
A s o f y e t , M a c k e n s e n ' s s e c o n d wave f o r c e s , b e i n g h e l d f o r

e x p l o i t a t i o n , were s t i l l u n c o m m i t t e d .

Accordingly, he prepared

f o r a t h i r d d a y o f b a t t l e by u s i n g t h e e x h a u s t e d f i r s t wave u n i t s t o c o n t i n u e t o a t t a c k through t h e n i g h t , and a t t e m p t a p e n e t r a t i o n w i t h t h e 2 9 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r and t h e 2 6 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n a t 0400 t h e n e x t m o r n i n g . Making i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n s , t h e s e two u n i t s were a l s o f o u g h t t o a s t a n d s t i l l on 18 F e b r u a r y by t h e 1 7 9 t h I n f a n t r y Regiment a t t h e f i n a l beachhead l i n e . By t h e e v e n i n g o f 18 F e b r u a r y , Mackensen a n d K e s s e l r i n g
were f o r c e d t o c o n c l u d e t h a t f u r t h e r e f f o r t s were f r u i t l e s s .

The a t t a c k w a s c a l l e d o f f , o n 19 F e b r u a r y .

t h o u g h small a t t a c k s c o n t i n u e d

VI C o r p s c o u n t e r a t t a c k s i n c r e a s e d i n i n t e n s i t y 58

a n d s o o n , t h e German s a l i e n t became a " d e a t h t r a p f o r h i s own ( M a c k e n s e n ' s ) t a n k s and i n f a n t r y . "

Though a n o t h e r m a j o r a t t a c k t o r e d u c e t h e b e a c h h e a d was o r d e r e d by H i t l e r and e x e c u t e d l a t e r i n t h e month, K e s s e l r i n g a n d W e s t p h a l w e r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e d e c i s i v e moment of s u c c e s s

63

had been l o s t .

I n reviewing t h e reasons f o r t h e f a i l u r e

o f t h e 16 F e b r u a r y c o u n t e r a t t a c k , H a u s e r p o i n t e d o u t these reasons: The a t t a c k f o r c e was c o n c e n t r a t e d i n a s m a l l sea,

a s o r d e r e d by H i t l e r , w i t h o u t t h e c o r r e s p o n d -- i n g supp~~t-

r e q u i r e d f o r t h e a t t a c k , a n d making German f o r c e s a l u c --rative

--

t a r g e t f o r A l l i e d a i r and a r t i l l e r y .
.

S e c o n d l y , t h e German amar

c o u l d n o t deploy o f f r o a d s due t o t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e f i e l d s .

___

T h i r d l y , h i g_ h- German l o s s -e--s u n d e r A l l i e d a r t i l l e r y s e r J S _ s l y affesLgd morale. One e x a m p l e was t h e r e a c t i o n of t h e I n f a n t r y F i n a l l y , Germans L e h r when t h e y f i r s t came u n d e r a r t i l l e r y f i r e . 59 f o u n d t h a t enemy r e s i s t a n c e w a s v e r y t o u g h .

Conclusion

K e s s e l r i n g f a i l e d i n h i s c o u n t e r a t t a c k a t t e m p t a t Anzio, but the e f f o r t helped t o c r e a t e a s t r a t e g i c stalemate which From F e b r u a r y t o May,

was a c t u a l l y a v i c t o r y f o r t h e Germans.

K e s s e l r i n g managed t o c o n t a i n t h e A l l i e s on b o t h t h e G u s t a v L i n e and a t t h e Anzio b e ac h h e a d . K e s s e l r i n g had p r e d i c t e d t o H i t l e r ,

d u r i n g t h e e a r l i e r d e b a t e w i t h Rommel, t h a t h e c o u l d h o l d t h e A l l i e s s o u t h of Rome t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r . held the Allies w e l l into the spring.

H i s efforts effectively

C r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s made

i n J a n u a r y and February i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g helped t o c r e a t e the successful containment i n both a r e a s , d e c i s i o n s w h i c h w i l l be e v a l u a t e d i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r .

64

Notes

' M a r t i n Blumenson, S a l e r n o t o C a s s i n o ( W a s h i n g t o n D . C . : O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 208. 2 : l e i n r i c h von V i e t i n g h o f f g e n n a n t S c h e e l , " C h a p t e r V I " The Campaign i n I t a l y T - l a ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 ) , p . 5. 31bid., '"German p. 3 9 . V e r s i o n of t h e H i s t o r y o f t h e I t a l i a n Campaign"

(U. S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n ) , p . 38.
5 Blumenson, p . 208.
V e r s i o n of t h e History o f t h e I t a l i a n Campaign,"

6"German

p . 43.

'Ibid.,

p . 63.
(U.

8q1Air Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Shingle" Division, M S 1 1 6 1 4 ) , Annex A .

9Viet i n g h o f f

S. H i s t o r i c a l

p. 41. p . 58

101lGerman V e r s i o n , "Vietinghoff, p . 30.

'I

1211German V e r s i o n ,

p . 63.

I3Magna E . B a u e r , " S h i f t i n g of German U n i t s B e f o r e a n d D u r i n g N e t t u n o L a n d i n g a n d E f f e c t s of A m e r i c a n R a p i d o R i v e r a t t a c k of 2 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 o n t h e Movement o f German R e s e r v e s " ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 2 . I 4 S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , " C h a p t e r 13" The Campaign i n I t a l y (LJ. S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 ) , p . 3 0 .

T-la

65

15f'German V e r s i o n o f t h e H i s t o r y o f t h e I t a l i a n Campaign,''
p . 62.

1 6 1 b i d . , p. 8 2 . "Ibid., p . 58.

I 8 A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , A S o l d i e r ' s S t o r y ( N e w York: W i l l i a m Morrow a n d C o . , 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 231. 1 9 W e s t p h a l , p . 29.

20ULTRA Document VL 3 5 4 0 M A LM DB C O AL 0 8 1 0 0 0 2 / 1 / 4 4 . 21ULTRA Document ML 3 6 9 8 LM B I KQ 9 / 1 / 4 4 ,

p . 2.

22Blurnenson, p . 296. 231bid., p. 296. Edge o f D i s a s t e r

Elsevier-Dutton,

2 4 W i l l i a m L. A l l e n , Anzio: 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 25.

( N e w York:

25Blurnenson, p. 313. 2 6 V i e t i n g h o f f , p . 55. 2 7 W e s t p h a l , p. 31. 28Blurnenson, p. 3 1 9 . 2 9 1 b i d . , p. 3 1 9 . 3 0 K e s s e l r i n g , p . 232. 311bid., p. 2 3 2 .

32ULTRA Document VL 4492 M P LM

BI S B GW KQ CO AL 2 2 1 4 0 3 2 / 1 / 4 4 .

66

3 3 B a u e r , p . 13. 34Kurt M a e l z e r , "The Problem of R o m e D u r i n g t h e F i g h t i n g Ne a r Anz io N e t t u n o u n t i l t h e E v a c u a t i o n ofRome on 4 J u n e 1944" (U. S. H i s t o r i c a l Division, M S D314), p o 5 . 3 5 W e s t p h a l , p . 31. 3 6 K e s s e l r i n g , p. 233. The Making o f t h e L u f t w a f f e 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 198.

(New York:

37Ke nne th Macksey, K e s s e l r i n g : David McKay Company I n c . ,

3 8 E b e r h a r d von Mackensen, "Supplement t o C h a p t e r 12" The German Campaign i n I t a l y T-la ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 ) , p . 28. 39Blumenson, p. 364.
"ULTRA "ULTRA

Document VL 5449 0 3 1 4 2 1 2 / 2 / 4 4 . Document VLA 4464 LM SB GQA ZU KQ C O 2210592/1/44.

4 2 A l l e n , p p . 42-43. 4 3 K e s s e l r i n g , p . 235. 44W01f H a u s e r , " C h a p t e r 12" The German Campaign i n I t a l y ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 9 . 451bid.,
p . 9.

T-l a

4'61bid., p . 9. 47Mackensen, p . 2 8 .

4 8 ~ ~ ~ p e en 85. ,

67

51Eiackensen,

p.

26.

5 2 W e s t p h a l , p . 33. 53Ha use r, p . 1 3 . 541bid., p. 15.

5 5 W e s t p h a l , p . 33. 56 H a u s e r , p . 16.

57Blurnenson, p . 422. 581bid.,

p . 424.

5 9 ~ a u s e r , p. 1 9 .

CHAPTER FOUR ANALYSIS OF KESSELRING'S DECISIONS AT A N Z I O

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o e v a l u a t e F i e l d M a r s h a l A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g ' s key d e c i s i o n s i n t h e b a t t l e o f Anzio. S p e c i f i c a l l y , I i n t e n d t o r e v i e w h i s d e c i s i o n t o commit t h e Army Group C r e s e r v e s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e on 18 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d e x e c u t i o n o f t h e 16 F e b r u a r y c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n a g a i n s t t h e Anzio b e a c h h e a d . The r e a s o n f o r

e v a l u a t i n g h i s commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e u n i t s t o t h e G u s t a v Line is t h a t he has been g r e a t l y c r i t i c i s e d f o r t h a t a c t i o n , b y b o t h f r i e n d a n d enemy. This evaluation w i l l attempt t o

b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o him, review t h e
t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , and a t t e m p t t o under-

s t a n d t h a t d e c i s i o n f r o m K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s p e c t i v e a t t h a t time and p l a c e . This evaluation i s not presented with t h e i n t e n t

o f s u p p o r t i n g o r d e n y i n g a n y c r i t i c i s m of K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s . The s e c o n d d e c i s i o n u n d e r e v a l u a t i o n , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and e x e c u t i o n of t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n , w i l l n o t o n l y a t t e m p t t o d i s c u s s t h e reasons f o r t h e p l a n ' s f a i l u r e , but t o look

a t K e s s e l r i n g ' s r o l e i n i t s development and e x e c u t i o n t o g a i n

a b e t t e r p e r s p e c t i v e of h i s a p p r o a c h t o i m p o r t a n t t a c t i c a l
a c t i o n s i n t h e d e f e n s e of I t a l y . T h i s a c t i o n w i l l n o t be

compared t o o t h e r t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s , b u t w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d o n l y i n i t s own c o n t e x t .
It is impossible, the'refore, t o

g e n e r a l i z e K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s from Anzio t o o t h e r a c t i o n s i n I t a l y , but t h i s e v a l u a t i o n can be used a s a b a s i s f o r f u t u r e comparisons. The method u s e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r i s t o p o s e a s e r i e s o f r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s f o r each of t h e d e c i s i o n s . The q u e s t i o n s

w i l l b e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of e a c h s e c t i o n , t h e n an-

wered o n e a t a t i m e w i t h a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n of t h e answer.
68

69

I n f o r m z t i o n u s e d t o a n s w e r q u e s t i o n s w i l l b e ?rc?.wr. y o n t h e p a r a l l e l n a r r a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter Three.

A s u m a r y of

each major a r e a w i l l then follow t h e s p e c i f i c answers w i t h a v i e w toward a n s w e r i n g t h e o r i g i n a l r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s posed i n C h a p t e r One.

Commitment o f t h e A r m y GrouD R e s e r v e s

I n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p t h e d i s c u s s i o n of K e s s e l r i n g ' s comm i t m e n t o f Army Group C r e s e r v e s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e o n 18 J a n u a r y 1944, t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s w i l l be used:

I.
Line?

What i n f o r m a t i o n d i d K e s s e l r i n g h a v e c o n c e r n i n g

a p o s s i b l e a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Rome a n d t h e G u s t a v

2.

Why d i d t h e Army Group e s t i m a t e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n

a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f J a n u a r y p r e d i c t t h e e x p e c t e d l a n d i n g would

occur i n t h e middle of February?

3.

Why d i d K e s s e l r i n g commit t h e r e s e r v e s t o t h e

Gustav Line?
4.
Was t h e commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e s l o g i c a l , b a s e d

on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o K e s s e l r i n g ?

I n f o r m a t i o n Ava i l a b l e t o Ke sse 1r i n g

"What i n f o r m a t i o n d i d K e s s e l r i n g h a v e c o n c e r n i n g a poss i b l e A l l i e d a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n Rome a n d t h e G u s t a v Line?'! Two s e t s o f d a t a c a n be u s e d t o a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n . The f i r s t , a n d most o b v i o u s , i s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t Army Group C h a d a t hand c o n c e r n i n g t h e A l l i e d c a p a b i l i t y t o c o n d u c t a n amphibious a s s a u l t . The s e c o n d i s more c i r c u m s t a n t i a l a n d

c a n b e d e d u c e d from K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y f o r an invasion.

70

I n v i e w i n g t h e f i r s t s e t of i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e f a c t u a l d a t a which K e s s e l r i n g a c c u m u l a t e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an invasion, t h e following t h i n g s are e v i d e n t : K e s s e l r i n g h a d no i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g C l a r k ' s i n t e n t i o n s , b u t drew h i s c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f a n a m p h i b i o u s a s s a u l t i n t h e a r e a of Rome from o t h e r 1 sources. Any i n d i c a t i o n s o f a p o s s i b l e l a n d i n g m u s t t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e A l l i e d shipping c a p a b i l i t y i n t h e Naples harbor. The h a r b o r , a v a i l a b l e f o r u s e by e a r l y J a n u a r y ,

would b e t h e l o g i c a l p o r t f r o m w h i c h t o s t a g e a l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n o n t h e w e s t e r n c o a s t of I t a l y . K e s s e l r i n g knew

t h a t a b o u t 400,000 t o n s o f s h i p p i n g were a v a i l a b l e i n t h e h a r b o r through a i r reconnaisance.*

He a l s o was aware t h a t t h e h a r -

b o r w a s f u l l y o p e r a t i o n a l and c a p a b l e of s u p p o r t i n g t h e s t a g i n g o f a m a j o r l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n , w h i c h w a s c o n f i r m e d b y German intellegence. Additionally, through a i r reconnaisance,

K e s s e l r i n g knew t h a t s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t were a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Mediterranian t o support a l a r g e scale landing. The

i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e f e a s a b i l i t y of u s i n g N a p l e s h a r b o r w e i g h e d h e a v i l y upon t h e m i n d s o f K e s s e l r i n g a n d W e s t p h a l a s t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a n A l l i e d a t t a c k . T h i s con-

cern is evident both i n the constant attempt t o detect the movement of l a n d i n g c r a f t , a s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n ULTRA d o c u m e n t s , a n d i n t h e i r q u e s t i o n i n g of A d m i r a l C a n a r i s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n during h i s v i s i t t o Kesselring's headquarters. Two o t h e r items o f i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s
well.

An i n t e r c e p t e d r a d i o m e s s a g e t r a n s m i t t e d i n m i d - J a n u a r y
Ger-

d i s c u s s e d t h e imminence o f a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n .

man i n t e l l e g e n c e l i n k e d t h i s m e s s a g e w i t h t h e B r i t i s h a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e G a r i g l i a n o o n t h e n i g h t of 17-18 J a n u a r y , cons e q u e n t l y , t h e message w a s f i l e d and f o r g o t t e n . Earlier

i n J a n u a r y , a downed A l l i e d p i l o t who f o u n d h i m s e l f i n German

71

h a n d s , i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n would t a k e p l a c e on
No German b o t h s i d e s of t h e p e n i n s u l a o n a b o u t 1 5 J a n ~ a r y . ~

o f f i c e r s o r w r i t t e n m a t e r i a l now a v a i l a b l e d i s c u s s t h i s p i l o t , s o t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f h i s s t o r y i n German e y e s i s d i f f i c u l t t o evaluate. ments.

As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , t h e second s e t o f i n f o r m a t i o n i s

W e h a v e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o n l y from ULTRA docu-

n o t " f a c t u a l , " b u t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , i n t h a t i t v i e w s n o t what K e s s e l r i n g knew a b o u t a n i n v a s i o n , b u t what h e f e l t and d i d about the p o s s i b i l i t y . The f i r s t a n d m o s t o b v i o u s e v i d e n c e o f h i s c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n was t h e e s t a b l i s h ment of r e s e r v e s a t Rome.
To s u p p o r t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of

t h e s e r e s e r v e s , and t o p r e p a r e f o r a l a n d i n g anywhere on t h e c o a s t of I t a l y , Kesselring developed f i v e contingency plans t o m e e t t h e most l i k e l y A l l i e d a m p h i b i o u s moves. These a c t i o n s

i n d i c a t e t h e s e r i o u s n e s s w i t h which K e s s e l r i n g d e a l t w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an amphibious landing, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e a r e a o f Rome. He r e a l i z e d t h e m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e

o f t h e c i t y , a n d o n c e h e had H i t l e r ' s a p p r o v a l f o r h i s d e f e n s i v e c o n c e p t , w a s committed t o m a i n t a i n i n g a d e f e n s i v e l i n e s o u t h o f Rome a s l o n g a s p o s s i b l e . An A l l i e d l a n d i n g t o a s s i s t

t a k i n g t h e c i t y would o f c o u r s e d e s t r o y K e s s e l r i n g ' s i n t e n t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h o l d i n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e , and would h a v e t o b e d e a l t w i t h a s q u i c k l y and a s e f f e c t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e

--

hence h e

e s t a b l i s h e d t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e r e s e r v e f o r c e which he c o u l d a f f o r d a r o u n d Rome. German i n t e l l e g e n c e e s t i m a t e s , b o t h t h e German High Com-

m a n d s ' s a n d Army Croup C I S , p o i n t e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a n Allied landing. Both e s t i m a t e s , h o w e v e r , p r e d i c t e d t h e l a n d i n g Kesselring, basing h i s

a t a l a t e r t i m e t h a n i t a c t u a l l y came.

defensive reorganization plan t o deal with a strong Allied o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e Custav Line i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a n amphibious o p e r a t i o n , was c a u g h t i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h a t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

72

b e c a u s e h e b a se d h i s t i m e t a b l e s o n t h e a c c u r a c y of t h e e s t i -

mates.

K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s o n a l e s t i m a t e was t h a t t h e l a n d i n g

a n d t h e o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e would m o s t l i k e l y come a t t h e same t i m e , 4 a n d t h a t C l a r k would p r o b a b l y n o t i n i t i a t e a l a n d i n g u n t i l t h e o f f e n s i v e was s u c c e s s f u l i n o r d e r t o g e t h i s f o r c e s w i t h i n s u p p o r t i n g d i s t a n c e of t h e b e a c h h e a d .

ULTRA r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e a German p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h e
movement of A l l i e d l a n d i n g c r a f t . The f l a v o r o f K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e p o r t s t o OKW, w h i c h were i n t e r c e p t e d i n e a r l y a n d midJ a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 , i s o n e of u r g e n c y a n d c o n s t a n t v i g i l a n c e o f b o t h t h e movement a n d l o c a t i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t , and o f a t t e m p t i n g t o f i n d e v i d e n c e of A l l i e d c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t a m a j o r l a n d i n g , n o t o n l y i n I t a l y , b u t i n Greece a s w e l l . These

r e p o r t s , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n p a s s e d t o OKW c o n c e r n i n g t h e r a d i o i n t e r c e p t a n d t h e downed A l l i e d p i l o t , m u s t c e r t a i n l y h a v e c a u s e d some a n x i e t y t o t h o s e A l l i e d l e a d e r s who were r e a d i n g K e s s e l r i n g ' s mail.

i n e v i t a b 1e

He h a d a m p l e w a r n i n g t h a t a l a n d i n g was

.
P r e d i c t i o n o f t h e Landing i n Mid-February

'Why d i d t h e Army Group e s t i m a t e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n a t

t h e b e g i n n i n g o f J a n u a r y p r e d i c t t h e e x p e c t e d l a n d i n g would occur i n t h e middle of February?" The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t h a t K e s s e l r i n g p l a n n e d a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e i n I t a l y b a s e d upon t h i s p r e d i c t i o n . S e v e r a l u n i t s were s c h e d u l e d f o r

movement f r o m o n e p a r t o f t h e t h e a t e r t o a n o t h e r i n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e deployment a l o n g t h e Gustav Line and t o r e t a i n a r e s p e c t a b l e Army Group r e s e r v e i n Rome. That p l a n

was o n l y p a r t i a l l y i m p l e m e n t e d when t h e f i r s t A l l i e d a t t a c k
a l o n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e t o o k p l a c e on 1 2 J a n u a r y .

73

A f t e r a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of r e s e a r c h , I h a v e y e t t o f i n d d a t a w h i c h c o n c r e t e l y s u p p o r t s Army Group C ' s e s t i m a t e . The d o c u m e n t s l o c a t e d i n t h e b i b l i o g r a p h y o f t h i s p a p e r f a i l t o provide s p e c i f i c information. The o n l y s h r e a d o f e v i d e n c e

w h i c h may r e l a t e t o t h i s e s t i m a t e comes f r o m t h e v i s i t of Admiral C a n a r i s t o K e s s e l r i n g ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s . When a s k e d by

K e s s e l r i n g and Westphal a b o u t t h e l i k e l i h o o d of a n A l l i e d l a n d i n g , i n l i g h t o f t h e amount o f s h i p p i n g i n t h e N a p l e s h a r b o r , C a n a r i s r e p l i e d t h a t t h e l e v e l of s h i p p i n g i n t h e h a r b o r was n o r m a l . T h i s a n s w e r , h o w e v e r , came much l a t e r t h a n t h e

i n t e l l e g e n c e estimate, so w a s not a f a c t o r i n its preparation.

It

i s p o s s i b l e , t h o u g h , t h a t h e may h a v e h a d some i n p u t i n t o

t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e OKW e s t i m a t e , w h i c h was p u b l i s h e d a b o u t t h e same t i m e a s Army Group C ' s e s t i m a t e ( l a t e December o r e a r l y J a n u a r y ) , t h u s i n f l u e n c i n g t h e p r e d i c t i o n of t h e t i m e of an A l l i e d invasion i n d i r e c t l y . C e r t a i n l y n o t a f a c t o r i n t h e e s t i m a t e was a n y knowledge

of Allied plans.

K e s s e l r i n g , unaware o f A l l i e d p r o b l e m s w i t h

r e t a i n i n g t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r t h e A n z i o o p e r a t i o n , would c e r t a i n l y have r e f l e c t e d an e a r l i e r l a n d i n g d a t e a t t h e outs e t i f h e knew o f t h e p r o b l e m . I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e r e a s o n f o r a p r e d i c t i o n of e x p e c t e d A l l i e d o p e r a t i o n s i n mid-February upon w e a t h e r and t i d a l f a c t o r s . may h a v e b e e n b a s e d

The _- - w e a t h e r s i t u a t i o n from

t h e 3d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n O p e r a t i o n s O r d e r , f o r A n z i o r e a d s

as f _ o l l o w s :
J a n u a r y i n t h e Rome s o u t h a r e a i s a n u n f a v o r a b l e p e r i o d f o r combined m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . I t i s t h e m i d - w i n t e r month. Temperature i s lowest; cloudiness considerqb-le; m o i s t u r e c o n t e n t h i g h ; p r e c i p i t a t i o n m o d e r a t e ; snow a p o s s i b i l i t y ; a n d wind movement t h e g r e a t e s t f o r t h e year. Following t h r e e e x c e e d i n g l y w e t months, r i v e r s and m a rsh e s r e a c h t h e i r h i g h e s t f l o o d s t a g e . J a n u a r y more t h a n a n y o t h e r month r e q u i r e s e x t r a s h e l t e r , f u e l . and c l o t h i n g f o r t h e e f f e c i e n t o p e r a t i o n of t r o o p s . 5

74

Such information, known only too well by the Germans, would seem to rule out any attempt at an amphibious landing along the Italian coast in January.

Commitment of the Reserves

'Why did Kesselring commit his reserves to the Gustav

Line?''
To truly answer this question, it is necessary to tap

into Kesselring's thinking process at that moment in time. It is certainly impossible to do so now, or perhaps for Kesselring to even recount the process later. Evidence is avail-

able, however, concerning the factors which he considered at the time in making his decision. In his memoirs, Kesselring

refelcts on three specific considerations

--

the danger of

a breakthrough by the X British Corps through the 9 4 t h In-

fantry Division area, the weakness of the Tenth Army reserves, and the words of Admiral Canaris who devalued the possibility of a landing by the Allies at that time.
6

Other factors which Kesselring considered were the opinions of von Senger and Vietinghoff, who requested the commitment of the reserves.
As already indicated, h e considered

the opinion of Canaris, and apparently Westphal agreed with Canaris' evaluation, and probably added his opinion about the probability of an invasion to the factors which Kesselring considered.
7

Kesselring, personally, concluded that Clark would not commit to a landing until his main attack had moved within supporting distance of the beachhead-. A containment of the Fifth Army action along the Gustav Line would, based on that logic, preclude an invasion. Added to this consideration must

certainly have been Kesselring in his normal state of optomism about the capabilities of his forces and the ability of the

75

enemy t o do w h a t was p r e d i c t a b l e . 8

He f e l t t h a t h e would o n l y

h a v e t o commit t h e d i v i s i o n s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e , a n d would b e a b l e t o move them b a c k t o Rome i n t i m e t o m e e t a n y i n v a s i o n . T h r e e l e v e l s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n a r e e v i d e n t i n K e s s e l r i n g ' s decision. The f i r s t i s t h e f a c t u a l l e v e l he mentions i n h i s

memoirs, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g an A l l i e d b r e a k t h r o u g h , l a c k of r e s e r v e s i n T e n t h Army a n d i n t e l l e g e n c e f r o m C a n a r i s . The s e c o n d l e v e l i s t h a t of p e r s o n a l i n p u t s f r o m two of h i s commanders a n d h i s c h i e f of s t a f f . h i s personal considerations. The f i n a l l e v e l i s t h a t of

He h a d h i s own o p i n i o n s a b o u t

what t h e A l l i e s were l i k e l y t o d o , and w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n from o t h e r s o u r c e s , a c t e d upon t h o s e o p i n i o n s . I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , K e s s e l r i n g saw a r e a l a t t a c k developing. I n t h e few h o u r s i t t o o k f o r him t o make t h e

d e c i s i o n a b o u t t h e commitment o f t h e I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s , h e most c e r t a i n l y m u s t h a v e w e i g h e d t h e r e a l i t y of a n a t t a c k f o r c i n g t h e r i g h t f l a n k o f t h e e n t i r e l i n e a g a i n s t t h e poss i b i l i t y of a l a n d i n g . I f t h e r e s e r v e s were n o t committed

and t h e G u s t a v Li n e compromised, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a b o u t a l a n d i n g would b e a c a d e m i c i n t h a t t h e L i n e would no l o n g e r b e tenable. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a d e f e a t o n t h e G u s t a v L i n e Mixing t h e s e t h o u g h t s

might preclude a landing e n t i r e l y .

w i t h W e s t p h a l ' s s u p p o r t o f V i e t i n g h o f f a n d von S e n g e r , Kess e l r i n g d e c i d e d t o commit t h e I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h t h e two d i v i s i o n s t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e o n t h e m o r n i n g of

18 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 .

The L o g i c o f Commitment

"Was t h e commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e s l o g i c a l , b a s e d o n

the information a v a i l a b l e t o Kesselring?"

As s t a t e d i n t h e l a s t s e c t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g was f a c e d w i t h

t h e v e r y r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of s e e i n g t h e Gustav Line o u t f l a n k e d ,

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t h u s f o r c i n g him t o w i t h d r a w t o t h e n o r t h o f Rome much e a r l i e r than intended.

F o l l o w i n g t h e war, K e s s e l r i n g was g r e a t l y Among t h o s e v o i c i n g

c r i t i c i s e d f o r c o m m i t t i n g h i s reserves.

c r i t i c i s m o n t h e German s i d e w e r e Mackensen, W e s t p h a l (who d i d n o t t h i n k a n a t t a c k l i k e l y ) , von S e n g e r (who a s k e d f o r t h e

reserves t o b e c o m m i t t e d ) a n d V i e t i n g h o f f

(who a g r e e d w i t h v o n

S e n g e r ' s assessment and backed h i s r e q u e s t f o r r e s e r v e s ) . K e s s e l r i n g h i m s e l f i s s i l e n t on t h e i s s u e , b u t a n o t e o f w i s t f u l n e s s i s e v i d e n t a s h e d i s c u s s e s how h e was t o o much on a r e p o r t o f A d m i r a l C a n a r i s . ,110

". .

relying

I n r e t r o s p e c t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e a t t a c k by t h e B r i t i s h X C o r p s w a s c o n s i d e r e d a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o t h e German p o s i t i o n s . K e s s e l r i n g u n d e r s t o o d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of

B r i t i s h p o s s e s s i o n of t h e h i g h g r o u n d o n t h e s o u t h e r n e n t r a n c e t o t h e L i r i v a l l e y , a n d e n v i s i o n e d t h e I1 C o r p s a t t e m p t t o break i n t o t h e valley," t h u s f e l t t h a t t h e immediate t h r e a t

w a s much more d a n g e r o u s t h a n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a l a n d i n g .

When t h e r e s e r v e s w e r e c o m m i t t e d , f o l l o w i n g K e s s e l r i n g ' s d e c i s i o n on 18 J a n u a r y , t h e y a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e i r m i s s i o n , t h e F i f t h Army o f f e n s i v e a l o n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e was h a l t e d l a r g e l y d u e t o t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e s e two d i v i s i o n s . One c a n p r o j e c t The

what might have happened i f t h e y had n o t been committed.

B r i t i s h c o u l d have s i e z e d t h e s o u t h e r n e n t r a n c e t o t h e L i r i valley. P e r h a p s 11 C o r p s would h a v e b r o k e n t h r o u g h t h e de-

f e n s e s i n f r o n t of t h e L i r i v a l l e y w i t h t h i s B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e , d r i v i n g t o w a r d Rome a n d d e s t r o y i n g t h e c o h e s i v e n e s s o f t h e Gustav Line. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e r e s e r v e s s i t t i n g i n Rome

c o u l d c o u n t e r a l a n d i n g , b u t t h e A l l i e d o b j e c t i v e s would h a v e been taken. Even i f t h e I1 C o r p s w e r e n o t s u c c e s s f u l i n

b r e a k i n g i n t o t h e L i r i v a l l e y , t h e G u s t a v L i n e would h a v e b e e n f l a n k e d , a l l o w i n g t h e A l l i e s t o move u n i t s t h r o u g h t h e g a p s between t h e r i g h t f l a n k and t h e T y r r h e n i a n S e a , t h u s f o r c i n g

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commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e s t o t h e l i n e .

I f a landing occured

u n d e r t h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e , K e s s e l r i n g ' s r e s e r v e s would p r o b a b l y n o t be a v a i l a b l e t o p u l l back t o c o u n t e r an A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t Anzio. I f e i t h e r of t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s d e v e l o p e d , t h e

G u st a v Li n e c o u l d h a v e been f l a n k e d and needed t o have been a b a n d o n e d much e a r l i e r t h a n K e s s e l r i n g i n t e n d e d .

A s events a c t u a l l y developed, Kesselring w a s a b l e t o

b o t h s t o p t h e F i f t h Army on t h e G u s t a v L i n e a n d c o n t a i n and n e a r l y d e s t r o y t h e beachhead w i t h l i m i t e d f o r c e s . Indeed,

C l a r k ' s f o r c e s were c o n t a i n e d i n b o t h l o c a t i o n s w e l l i n t o the spring.

The R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n s

I n C h a p t e r One, two r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n s w e r e a s k e d :

"DO t h e d e c i s i o n s made by K e s s e l r i n g i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o a n d
d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e o f A n z i o p r o v i d e a n i n d i c a t i o n of h i s a b i l i t y

a s a commander?" a n d " I f

s o , how d i d h e make t h o s e d e c i s i o n s ,

a n d how e f f e c t i v e w e r e t h e y i n a c h i e v i n g h i s i n t e n d e d obj ec t i v e s ? I t

I b e l i e v e enough i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e c o n c e r n i n g
t h e commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e s t o Rome t o p r o v i d e a p a r t i a l , t e n t a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander. Measuring

h i s a b i l i t y a s a commander a g a i n s t t h e a n s w e r t o t h e s e c o n d r e s e a r c h q u e s t i o n , t h a t o f a c h i e v i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n s , he was successful. Kesselring charged with t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of in-

d e f e n d i n g I t a l y , made d e c i s i o n s b a s e d o n h i s i n t u i t i o n ,

f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o h i m , a n d t h a t of h i s s t a f f and commanders. Though t h e r e w e r e i n c o r r e c t a s s u m p t i o n s b u i l t i n t o

h i s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g p r o c e s s , h e was a b l e t o r e a c t q u i c k l y t o t h e u n e x p e c t e d l a n d i n g b e c a u s e of c a r e f u l l y p r e p a r e d , and v e r y feasable contigency plans.

H i s r e a c t i o n was s w i f t a n d e f f e c I

t i v e o n c e t h e n e e d f o r C a s e R I C H A R D became a p p a r e n t .

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believe that the evidence has shown, in this particular case, that Kesselring made logical command decisions based upon the information available, advice of those he trusted, and his own intuition, yet proved flexible enough to react effectively to the unexpected. enemy. Such a man is a dangerous

The Counterattack

In evaluating the 16 February counterattack against the VI Corps positions, the following research questions

will be answered:
1.
What role did Kesselring play in the development

of the counterattack plan against the VI Corps beachhead?

2.

To what extent did Kesselring attempt to persuade

What action did Kesselring take during the battle

Hitler to modify his restrictions to the counterattack plan?

3.

to influence the flow of events?

Development of the Counterattack Plan

"What role did Kesselring play in the development of the counterattack planagainst the VI Corps beachhead?" From the beginning of operations against the Allied beachhead, Kesselring realized that quick and decisive action would be necessary, consequently, his initial input into both the immediate and the deliberate counterattack plans was designed to move Mackensen to quick decisive action. In developing the deliberate counterattack, to be launched
o n 16 February, Mackensen felt that a carefully planned ap-

proach would be necessary because of the limited resources available in the theater. The difference of opinion between

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K e s s e l r i n g a n d M ackensen a p p a r e n t l y l e d t o M a c k e n s e n ' s o f f e r 12 t o r e s i g n o n two o c c a s i o n s e a r l y i n F e b r u a r y . Kesselring d e c l i n e d t h e o f f e r , a n d Mackensen c o n t i n u e d w i t h h i s p r e parations f o r a w e l l planned, deliberate attack. Though

Kesselring apparently declined t o pursue the point a t the e x p z n s e o f l o s i n g a com m ander, h i s i n t e n t i o n s were w e l l known. E a r l y i n t h e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , K e s s e l r i n g a n d Mackensen discussed t h e various courses of a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e in forming t h e direction of the attack. B o t h a g r e e d t h a t t h e A l bano-

Anzio r o a d approach w a s b e s t , which i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e c o u r s e

o f a c t i o n s e l e c t e d i n t h e h a s t y a t t a c k d e v e l o p e d by Mackens e n p r i o r t o Lucas' a t t e m p t t o push o u t o f t h e beachhead. One o f t h e m a j o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r t h i s a v e n u e o f a p p r o a c h , from K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , w a s h i s d e s i r e n o t t o expose t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army a t t a c k t o A l l i e d n a v a l g u n f i r e w h i c h w oul d o c c u r i f e i t h e r c o a s t a l a p p r o a c h were u s e d . The i m p o r t a n c e o f l o o k i n g a t t h e s e two i n p u t s i n t o t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s i s t o m e a s u r e K e s s e l r i n g ' s e x t e n t of p r o v i d i n g p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n t o h i s s u b o r d i n a t e com m ander s , i n t h i s case

--

Mackensen, b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e Within t h i s

p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r f e r e n c e from a h i g h e r l e v e l .

c o n t e x t , K e s s e l r i n g c l e a r l y made known h i s d e s i r e f o r a q u i c k action. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s a t t a c k , he was c o n c e r n e d b o t h

a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s a l o n g t h e Gustav L i n e , and about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f a n o t h e r A l l i e d l a n d i n g f u r t h e r up t h e c o a s t , s o h e c o u l d
n o t a f f o r d t o view t h e Anzio f r o n t i n i s o l a t i o n . t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s weighing Yet, with

heavily i n t h e balance, he

d e f e r r e d t o h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commander i n t h e t i m i n g o f t h e a t t a c k , perhaps o n l y because he t h r e a t e n e d t o r e s i g n , b u t he d e f e r r e d nonetheless.

As f o r Kesselring's input into the direction

of a t t a c k , both commandersagreed,

s o w e c a n n o t know w h a t

a c t i o n h e m i g h t h a v e t a k e n t o a t t e m p t t o f o r c e Mackensen n o t

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t o d r i v e down t h e c o a s t , o r i f h e would h a v e t a k e n a n y action a t all. Here, t h e r e i s l e s s ground f o r e v a l u a t i o n . attempting

Kesselring supported h i s subordinate i n

t o d e s t r o y t h e A l l i e d b e a c h h e a d by p r o v i d i n g p r e c i o u s r e sources f o r the attack. I n t h i s a c t i o n , more t h a n a n y o t h e r ,

K e s s e l r i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d t o Mackensen h i s commitment t o t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army e f f o r t s . I n g e n e r a l , Kes-

s e l r i n g provided t h e a s s e t s without i n t e r f e r e n c e , y e t h i s i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome o f t h e b a t t l e was o b v i o u s t h r o u g h t h e two m a j o r i n p u t s h e p r o v i d e d t o Mackensen.

A t t e m p t t o Modify t h e R e s t r i c t i o n s

"To what e x t e n t d i d K e s s e l r i n g a t t e m p t t o p e r s u a d e

H i t l e r t o modify h i s r e s t r i c t i o n s t o t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k
plan?'

The p u r p o s e o f t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t w o f o l d .

First, it

i s i m p o r t a n t t o e v a l u a t e K e s s e l r i n g ' s s h o r t term p e r s u a s i v e

powers a s opposed t o h i s s u c c e s s o v e r g r e a t e r p e r i o d s of time. S e c o n d l y , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o m e a s u r e how s t r o n g l y

K e s s e l r i n g f e l t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s would r e d u c e t h e c h a n c e o f success. Mackensen p r e s e n t e d h i s p l a n t o H i t l e r on 5 F e b r u a r y f o r approval.

A s discussed i n the last chapter, H i t l e r

approved t h e p l a n with c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s .

H e desired

a v e r y n a r r o w f r o n t i n o r d e r t o mass M a c k e n s e n ' s l i m i t e d combat p o w e r , h e d e s i r e d a r o l l i n g a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e , a n d he d e s i r e d f o r t h e I n f a n t r y Lehr t o l e a d t h e a t t a c k . From

K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s p e c t i v e , n o t a l l of t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s seemed burdensome a t t h e t i , m e . H e d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e u s e of The r o l l i n g a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e By

t h e I n f a n t r y Lehr Regiment.

was i m p o s s i b l e t o o r g a n i z e d u e t o l i m i t e d a m m u n i t i o n .

t h e p r o c e s s of e l i m i n a t i o n , t h e o n l y r e s t r i c t i o n l e f t t o

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discuss is t h e width of t h e a t t a c k . K e s s e l r i n g a n d Mackensen b o t h o b j e c t e d t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a narrow f r o n t because they f e l t t h a t t h e s u p e r i o r A l l i e d a i r a n d a r t i l l e r y w oul d d e s t r o y t h e i r c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r m a t i o n s , and because t h e y f e l t t h a t t h e y might n o t be s u c c e s s f u l i n f o r c i n g L u c a s t o commit h i s r e s e r v e s e a r l y .
OKW was i n f o r m e d o f

these objections, but apparently the force

of t h e arguement w a s n o t s u c c e s s f u l i n changing H i t l e r ' s mind. K e s s e l r i n g ' s a b i l i t y t o g e t H i t l e r t o c h a n g e h i s mind i n a s h o r t term s i t u a t i o n a p p e a r s t o b e i n e f f e c t i v e . l o n g e r p e r i o d s o f time, s u c h a s t h e Rommel-Kesselring b a t e , t h e d e c i s i o n t o i n v a d e Malta a n d much e a r l i e r i n d e a l i n g with Goering over t h e organization of t h e Luftwaffe G e n e r a l S t a f f , K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s u a s i v e p o w e r s were c o n s i d e r able. ferent. H ow ever , s h o r t t e r m d e c i s i o n s a r e c o n s i s t e n t l y d i f -

Over
de-

He l o s t t h e Malta o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h a s h o r t term

d e c i s i o n o f H i t l e r ' s , h e p u l l e d f o r c e s o u t of S i c i l y w i t h o u t n o t i f y i n g OKW, p e r h a p s i n o r d e r t o a v o i d a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n , and he l o s t i n h i s a t t e m p t t o modify t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n

a t Anzio.

Though t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n h i s s u c c e s s a t

l o n g a n d s h o r t t e r m p o l i t i c a l c o n f r o n t a t i o n may b e d u e , i n a l a r g e p a r t , t o h i s a p p r o a c h t o p o l i t i c s , t h e s i t u a t i o n may be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e whole p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s of t h e T h i r d Reich a s well. I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , H i t l e r may n o t h a v e

g r a n t e d any change i n h i s r e s t r i c t i o n s under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r e g a r d l e s s o f how h a r d K e s s e l r i n g m i g h t h a v e p u s h e d hi m , f o r

Hitler wanted a v i c t o r y a t Anzio.

Knowing t h i s , i t i s d i s -

t i n c t l y possible t h a t Kesselring request f o r modification may n o t h a v e b e e n s t r o n g l y p u r s u e d . Kesselring accepted the restrictions.

He f e l t t h a t

h e h a d s u f f i c i e n t c o m b a t pow er t o d e s t r o y t h e b e a c h h e a d , e v e n w i t h t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed, s o c o n t i n u e d t h e a t t a c k as

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m o d i f i e d w i t h optomism.

Further, i n l i g h t of h i s d e s i r e t o

conclude t h e a t t a c k as quickly as p o s s i b l e , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t Kesselring wished t o conduct t h e a t t a c k as planned i n o r d e r t o release f o r c e s f o r o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s . I n t h e e n d , h o w e v e r , K e s s e l r i n g f a i l e d t o make h i s p o i n t , t h u s t h e a t t a c k f a i l e d , i n p a r t , t o a combat f o r c e t o o c o n c e n t r a t e d t o be e f f e c t i v e and a n e x c e l l e n t t a r g e t f o r enemy f i r e s . The n a r r o w f r o n t r c s t r i c t ' o n p r o v e d t o be a

f a t a l flaw i n t h e a t t a c k plan, a flaw foreseen, but not e f f e c t i v e l y p u r s u e d by K e s s e l r i n g .

The C o n d u c t o f t h e C o u n t e r a t t a c k

"What a c t i o n s d i d K e s s e l r i n g t a k e d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e t o influence t h e flow of events?''

In air

b a t t l e s i t u a t i o n s , K e s s e l r i n g h a s been s e e n t o

b e a commander who c o n s t a n t l y o b s e r v e d c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s by f l y i n g w i t h t h e a t t a c k f o r m a t i o n s , by l a n d i n g f r e q u e n t l y t o e n c o u r a g e t h e t r o o p s , a n d t o l e a d by e x a m p l e . a t t r i b u t e s extend t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d ? F o l l o w i n g t h e f a i l u r e of t h e f i r s t d a y ' s e f f o r t s t o f o r c e L u c a s t o commit h i s r e s e r v e s , K e s s e l r i n g u r g e d t h e i m m e d i a t e commitment o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army's s e c o n d wave f o r c e s , i n o r d e r t o f o r c e Lucas t o commit, and t o p r o v i d e impetus t o t h e d r i v e . Mackensen d e c l i n e d t t h e a d v i c e b e c a u s e Did t h e s e

h e h a d n o t y e t u s e d a l l o f h i s f i r s t wave u n i t s , a n d d e s i r e d t o r e t a i n t h e s e c o n d wave f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n . Kesselring re-

s p e c t e d Mackensen's d e c i s i o n , and d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e battle. He d i d t e n d t o f o l l o w h i s o l d h a b i t o f v i s i t i n g t h e

t r o o p s , h o w e v e r , a n d i n a v i s i t on t h e f i r s t d a y g o t h i m s e l f involved i n a controversy concerning a r t i l l e r y . Kesselring continued h i s constant v i s i t s with troops, b u t tended not t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s of

83

t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army command s t r u c t u r e , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e a r t i l l e r y p r o b l e m d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e . Other

t h a n p r o v i d i n g l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t t o M a c k e n s e n , a n d making s u g g e s t i o n s , h e d i d n o t i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome of t h e b a t -

tle.

The R e s e a r c h Q u e s t i o n s

"DO t h e d e c i s i o n s made b y K e s s e l r i n g i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r

t o and d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e of Anzio p r o v i d e a n i n d i c a t i o n of h i s a b i l i t y a s a commander?" I n v i e w i n g t h e commitment of t h e Army Group r e s e r v e s , c e r t a i n p i e c e s of f a c t u a l d a t a , along with K e s s e l r i n g ' s statem e n t s c o n c e r n i n g h i s t h o u g h t s a t t h e t i m e made i d e n t i f y i n g h i s decisionmaking process r e l a t i v e l y simple. Within t h e

c o n t e x t o f t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k , w h i c h c o v e r s a much g r e a t e r p e r i o d o f t i m e , a n d d e a l s w i t h much l e s s p r e c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n , i d e n t i f y i n g h i s decisionmaking process o r even h i s i n t e n t i o n s

is moredifficult.

Perhaps, i n i d e n t i f y i n g h i s a b i l i t y as

a commander, i t would b e b e t t e r s t a t e d t h a t h i s s t y l e of command was o n e o f t r u s t i n g s u b o r d i n a t e s t o do t h e i r j o b a n d p r o v i d i n g t h e m a t e r i a l n e c e s s a r y t o o b t a i n t h e d e s i r e d objective. The i n t e n d e d o b j e c t i v e a t A n z i o was n o t r e a l i z e d

--

t o d e s t r o y t h e A l l i e d beachhead, b u t t h e longterm o b j e c t i v e of k e e p i n g t h e A l l i e s s o u t h of Rome a s l o n g a s p o s s i b l e was r e a l i z e d i n t h e e f f e c t i v e German e f f o r t a t c o n t a i n i n g t h e beachhead, and i n s t a b a l i z i n g t h e Gustav Line. In measuring

K e s s e l r i n g ' s command a b i l i t y s t r i c t l y by t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e b a t t l e of Anzio, i t a p p e a r s t h a t h e w a s n o t e f f e c t i v e , b u t when t a k e n i n l i g h t of t h e l a r g e r p i c t u r e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n I t a l y , h i s o v e r a l l d e f e n s e w i t h i n t h e e a r l y m o n t h s of 1 9 4 4

was v e r y s u c c e s s f u l .

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Conclusion

M e a s u r i n g t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g a s a commander s t r i c t l y o n t h e b a s i s of h i s a c t i o n s b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e of Anzio p r o b a b l y d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e v i e w o f t h e man, b u t d o e s p r o v i d e some i n d i c a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s a p p r o a c h t o command, h i s d e a l i n g w i t h s u b o r d i n a t e s , and i n h i s t h o u g h t p r o c e s s e s i n t i g h t s i t u a t i o n s , s u c h a s t h e commitment o f t h e Army Group r e s e r v e s .

I believe

t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h i s commitment a s t h e o n l y v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t K e s s e l r i n g had a t t h e time. Looking a t

other alternatives inevitably leads t o the possibility that t h e G u s t a v L i n e would h a v e b e e n l o s t much e a r l i e r t h a n i t

was.

I n v i e w i n g t h e e v e n t s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army

c o u n t e r a t t a c k , K c s s e l r i n g becomes a commander w i l l i n g t o a l l o w
h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commander t h e l a t i t u d e t o d e v e l o p a n d e x e c u t e

t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k , n o t b e c a u s e o f h i s own w e a k n e s s a s a commander, b u t b e c a u s e of h i s t r u s t i n t h e s u b o r d i n a t e . H e is also

s e e n a s a commander who f a i l e d t o p e r s u a d e t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p t o modify r e s t r i c t i o n s t o t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k p l a n , res t r i c t i o n s w h i c h l a t e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e f a i l u r e of t h e e f f o r t . Chapter Five w i l l deal with t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e

d i s c u s s i o n p r o v i d e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r , w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n of l e a r n i n g f r o m A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , t h e Commander i n C h i e f , S o u t h w e s t i n J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y 1944.

85

Notes

'"German
(U.

V e r s i o n o f t h e H i s t o r y of t h e I t a l i a n Campaign"

S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n ) , p . 82.

T-la

2 S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , " C h a p t e r 13" The Campaign i n I t a l y ( U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 1 , p . 29.

3ULTRA Document ML 3698LM BI SB KQ 9 / 1 / 4 4 .

' A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g , A S o l d i e r ' s S t o r y ( N e w York: Morrow and C o . , 1 9 6 3 ) , p . 231. 'llThird

(U.

William

S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , MS N-12186-A,

I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n F i e l d O r d e r Number One" 10 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 ) ,

p. 31.
6

K e s s e l r i n g , p . 231.
C.:

Office

' M a r t i n Blumenson, S a l e r n o t o C a s s i n o ( W a s h i n g t o n D. of t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 1 9 6 9 1 , p . 319.

8 A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g and S i e g f r i e d W e s t p h a l , " Q u e s t i o n s R e g a r d i n g t h e G e n e r a l S t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h e I t a l i a n Campaign" (U. S. H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , M S B-270), p . 29. 9 S i e g f r i e d W.es.tpha1, The German Army i n t h e West (London: C a s s e l l a n d Co., L t d . , 1 9 5 1 ) , p . 1 5 5 . "Kesselring, "Ibid., p . 231.

p . 233.

I 2 E b e r h a r d von Mackensen, " S u p p l e m e n t t o C h a p t e r 12" The German Campaign i n I t a l y T - l a (U. S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 1 , p. 28.

CHAPTER F I V E CONCLUSION

The bulk of the analysis and specific conclusions concerning Kesselring's actions relating to the Allied amphibious assault at Anzio were addressed in Chapter Four. The

conclusions drawn from the answer to the research questions accomplished the primary investigative intent of this paper. The purpose of this chapter is to provide some generalized conclusions in attempting to transfer some of the considerations whichKesselring had to face in Italy in 1944 to our present situation.
.

The discussion will generally follow the

outline of information presented in both Chapters Three and Four.

A l s o provided will be some final comments about

Kesselring drawn from this study, and recommendations for further study. Commitment of the Reserves Kesselring's commitment of the Army Group C reserves to stop the XBritish Corps' drive to the southern approaches of the Liri valley is a study in flexibility and operational risk. During the analysis presented in Chapter Four, various

options available to Kesselring and their possible influence on both the attack along the Gustav Line and the imminent invasion at Anzio were considered. In that discussion

-- with

the luxury of time and a lot of information

--

I concluded

that Kesselring acted in the only manner which would not force him to withdraw from the Gustav Line. his reserves from Rome to He committed

stabalize the Line in order to From his perspective,

prevent a breakthrough andan exploitation.

86

87

at that point in t i m e ,

s u c h a n a c t i o n was a r i s k d i c t a t e d

i n accomplishing h i s o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e . Commanding i n combat i s a n a c t i v i t y w h i c h o b v i o u s l y demands a c e r t a i n amount o f r i s k . Though K e s s e l r i n g a t t e m p t e d

t o g a t h e r a n d u t i l i z e a s much i n f o r m a t i o n a s p o s s i b l e concerning Allied i n t e n t i o n s , he could never be f u l l y c e r t a i n t h a t G e n e r a l C l a r k would n o t a t t e m p t a n a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g w h i l e t h e Army Group C ' s r e s e r v e s were t i e d down a l o n g t h e Gustav L i n e , y e t t h e r i s k of n o t committing t h o s e r e s e r v e s seemed t o o u t w e i g h t h e d a n g e r of a p o s s i b l e a m p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g . The p o s s i b i l i t i e s w e r e e x p l o r e d , p r o b a b l y w e r e e v e n t h o u g h t o u t i n some d e t a i l i n a d v a n c e , i n f o r m a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d , and o p i n i o n s g a t h e r e d

--

t h e n t h e d e c i s i o n was made a n d

c a r r i e d o u t q u i c k l y a n d e f f e c i e n t l y w i t h good r e s u l t s along t h e Gustav Line.

As w e l e a r n t o a p p l y c o n c e p t s embedded i n t h e A i r -

Land b a t t l e , r e i n f o r c e d i n t e r e s t w i l l b e p l a c e d on t h e n e e d t o s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r r i s k s i n t h e commitment of combat a s s e t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e d e p t h of t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . Commit-

ment o f s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s a t o n e p l a c e i n t h e b a t t l e t r a n s l a t e s i n t o t h e l a c k of r e s o u r c e s i n o t h e r a r e a s of t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , and i n c r e a s e s t h e need f o r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t i m i n g violent actions a t c r i t i c a l points. been f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r t r a d e - o f f s those a s s e t s , f o r they a r e limited. f r o m two d i r e c t i o n s .
A commander h a s a l w a y s

i n t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e of Kesselring faced a danger

B e c a u s e t h e a t t a c k a g a i n s t Army Group

C was c o n d u c t e d i n a s t a g g e r e d f a s h i o n , h e had t h e l u x u r y

of u t i l i z i n g i n t e r i o r l i n e s t o c o n c e n t r a t e h i s l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s f i r s t i n t h e X I V Panzer Corps a r e a , t h e n a t t h e Anzio-Nettuno critical. beachhead. T i m i n g a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n were

Though a c t i n g i n a r e a c t i v e m a n n e r , t h e d e c i s i o n

t o commit h i s r e s e r v e s a l l o w e d K e s s e l r i n g t o q u i c k l y d e f e a t t h e F i f t h Army a t t a c k a l o n g t h e d e f e n s i v e l i n e , t h e n t o

88

s h i f t r e s e r v e f o r c e s t o t h e beachhead.

I n h i s commitment

of t h o s e r e s e r v e s , K e s s e l r i n g c o n s i d e r e d r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e i r r e m o v a l a n d re-commitment i n c a s e of a l a n d i n g . These

f a c t o r s were c o n s i d e r e d i n h i s r i s k a n a l y s i s , and a r e ins t r u c t i v e t o u s t o d a y a s we c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a c k s n o t only along our f r o n t , but a l s o deep i n t o our r e a r as w e l l . A n o t h e r a s p e c t o f K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s i n t h e commitment o f t h e Army Group C r e s e r v e s i s h i s f l e x i b i l i t y . The

Army Group r e s e r v e s were s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n e d t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t an amphibious landing i n t h e a r e a of Rome. K e s s e l r i n g a n d V i e t i n g h o f f were s h i f t i n g f o r c e s

w i t h i n t h e T e n t h Army a t t h e t i m e of C l a r k ' s e f f o r t s a l o n g t h e Gustav Line i n o r d e r t o provide f l e x i b l e r e s e r v e s f o r t h e T e n t h Army. The i n t e n t of t h o s e r e s e r v e s was t o de-

feat any enemy attempt to f o r c e the defensive positions

b o t h a l o n g t h e G u s t a v d e f e n s e s a n d t h e S a n g r o R i v e r on t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e peninsula. T h u s , when t h e B r i t i s h X C o r p s

made q u i c k p e n e t r a t i o n s i n t o t h e 9 4 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ' s a r e a o n t h e German r i g h t f l a n k , K e s s e l r i n g was a s k e d t o commit r e s o u r c e s f r o m t h e Army Group w h i c h w e r e m e a n t f o r a n o t h e r purpose. W i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i n t e n t o f Kes-

s e l r i n g ' s i m m e d i a t e c o n c e p t , t h a t r e q u e s t was " o u t o f line.'' K e s s e l r i n g knew, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e T e n t h Army was f a r

from p r o p e r l y r e s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n and v e r y p o s s i b l y c o u l d n o t stem t h e A l l i e d t i d e w i t h o u t a s s i s tance. I n l i g h t of t h e s i t u a t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g modified h i s

c o n c e p t t o a l l o w t h e t e m p o r a r y commitment of t h e I P a r a c h u t e C o r p s a n d two d i v i s i o n s . Each ccmmander, o f c o u r s e , m u s t be c a p a b l e o f dec i d i n g when a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e m o n s t r a t e f l e x i b i l i t y w i l l l e a d t o s u c c e s s a n d when t h e b e s t r o a d i s b u i l t upon t h e p l a n as it i s c u r r e n t l y conceived. In Kesselring's case,

89

h e w a s w i l l i n g t o commit t h e r e s e r v e t o t h e G u s t a v L i n e , y e t l a t e r r e f u s e d V i e t i n g h o f f ' s r e q u e s t t o w i t h d r a w from t h e Line f o l l o w i n g t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t Anzio. I n each

c a s e , K e s s e l r i n g ' s a c t i o n s were v i n d i c a t e d by s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s , y e t what was t h e f o u n d a t i o n of h i s a c t i o n s ? In part, f l e x i b i l i t y is tied t o risk, for to take a c t i o n which d e v i a t e s from a d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t o f o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e s t h e consideration of r i s k . Yet a c t i o n w h i c h d e v i a t e s

f r o m a d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t m u s t be b u i l t on c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s . I n K e s s e l r i n g ' s c a s e , t h e bot-

tom l i n e o f h i s c o n c e p t was t o p r e v e n t t h e A l l i e s from f o r c i n g t h e T e n t h Army t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e G u s t a v L i n e t o p o s i t i o n s n o r t h of Rome b e f o r e t h e e n d o f w i n t e r .

He

committed h i s reserves t o p r e v e n t t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y , t h e n l a t e r c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r c e s a t A n z i o t o a c h i e v e t h e same purpose. When V i e t i n g h o f f r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e T e n t h Army

be a l l o w e d t o w i t h d r a w b e c a u s e o f t h e d a n g e r p o s e d by t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t A n z i o , K e s s e l r i n g was u n w i l l i n g t o a l l o w t h a t a c t i o n because it v i o l a t e d h i s b a s i c operational concept. Thus K e s s e l r i n g was w i l l i n g t o b e f l e x i b l e w i t h i n t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f h i s o p e r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t , b u t was n o t w i l l i n g t o s t e p o u t s i d e o f t h o s e p a r a m e t e r s u n l e s s c o l l a p s e was i m minent. Consequently, f l e x i b i l i t y and r i s k have t h e i r l i m i t s . They a r e . l i m i t e d by t h e i n t e n t of t h e commander. Kessel-

r i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f l a t i t u d e w i t h i n h i s i n t e n t a n d t h e d i r e c t i o n g i v e n by OKW, b u t r e m a i n e d committed t o t h e o v e r a l l c o n c e p t of h i s o p e r a t i o n i n I t a l y . W i t h i n c l e a r l y s t a t e d command i n t e n t , w e m u s t be w i l l i n g t o t a k e c a r e f u l , y e t d e c i s i v e r i s k s and t o b e f l e x i b l e i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f combat power. When a s k e d a b o u t A m e r i -

c a n combat o p e r a t i o n s i n I t a l y f o l l o w i n g t h e w a r , K e s s e l r i n g r e m a r k e d t h a t o n e o f o u r g r e a t e s t s h o r t c o m i n g s was

90

our predictability and lack of risk taking.'

I do not

believe that we have significantly changed in this respect. We still tend to work from the safe side, thus we

are predictable in our combat actions. In looking at Kesselring's commitment of the Army Group C reserves, conclusions can be drawn concerning the limits of his willingness to take risk and demonstrate flexibility in combat operations. He limited both him-

self and the actions of his subordinates in the effect a certain combat initiative would have on the retention of the Gustav Line.

The Counterattack Plan

The issue involved in the discussion of the development and implementation of the 16 February 1944 counterattack plan against the Anzio beachhead by the Fourteenth Army is one of command relationships. The relationship

between Kesselring and Mackensen is primarily in view during the time that the plan was developed and during its execution. In attempting to get the restrictions modified,

the command relationship to be considered is between OKW and Army Group C

--

between Kesselring and Hitler.

As the counterattackplan developed f r o m a hasty attack earlier planned, Kesselring and Mackensen agreed on the axis of the attack and the amount of forces required to be successful. attack. They disagreed, however, on the timing of the

Kesselring wanted to begin as soon as possible

while Mackensen desired to insure that the attack be well prepared. Kesselring was either not willing o r not able Because blacken-

to force his point of view upon Mackensen.

sen felt that Kesselring lacked confidence in him over this issue, he submitted his resignation. Kesselring did not

91

accept the resignation and allowed Mackensen to develop the preparations based upon his schedule. This discussion is perennial. Every commander must

face the possibility of disagreement with a subordinate over the conduct of a tactical or operational action, and must realize that the disagreement may well be founded on excellent information with workable consequences. The

discussion between Kesselring and Mackensen is merely one of countless such discussions taken at many command levels throughout the history of warfare. What is instructive

here is not the disagreement itself, but the assumption with which Kesselring went to the disagreement

-- the as-

sumption that the attack would be successful because o f sheer Axis forces available to overwhelm the Allied positions. Thus, the basic operational assumption is one of reasonable victory despite the timing.
A

second important fac-

tor is that Kesselring approached this problem with enough trust in Mackensen t o allow him to proceed with his plan. Within the context of the development o f t h e counterattack plan, Kesselring provided resources and direction to Mackensen. Though the guidelines for conducting the action

included the direction of the attack, Kesselring chose not to make the timing of the attack a paramater, but a point available for compromise.

To generalize this situation to contemporary consideration, command relationships must be built on professional trust and clearly stated guidelines for the conduct of operations. We do not know exactly what guide-

lines were stated to Mackensen, but can surmise the conditions based upon the nature of the disagreement. Pro-

fessional discussion within the areas of latitude allowed should be encouraged and seriously considered. Kessel-

ring's disagreement with Mackensen was heated enough for

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Mackensen t o o f f e r h i s r e s i g n a t i o n

--

t h i s l e v e l of dis-

agreement i s o b v i o u s l y n o t conducive t o t h e development of t r u s t . The s e c o n d a r e a of command r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t h e i s s u e of t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k i s t h e d i s c u s s i o n b e t w e e n Army Group C a n d OKW. O b v i o u s l y , a n Army Group Commander i n t h e

Wehrmacht h a d t o d e a l n o t o n l y w i t h h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s , b u t w i t h OKW a s w e l l . S u c h r e l a t i o n s h i p s c o u l d be i n f i n i t e l y

more d i f f i c u l t , g i v e n t h e p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e of t h e T h i r d Reich. K e s s e l r i n g o b j e c t e d t o o n l y o n e of t h e t h r e e re-

s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d upon M a c k e n s e n ' s p l a n , y e t h e was u n a b l e t o g e t t h a t r e s t r i c t i o n modified. Again, Kesselring f e l t

t h a t t h e c o u n t e r a t t a c k c o u l d s u c c e e d e v e n w i t h t h e OKW r e s t r i c t i o n , thus was apparently not g r e a t l y disappointed w i t h OKW's d e c i s i o n . From t h e o p p o s i t e p e r s p e c t i v e , OKW

apparently considered the restrict ion concerning the width of t h e a t t a c k t o b e a p a r a m e t e r w h i c h would n o t b e n e g o t i a t e d . A s s t a t e d i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r , K e s s e l r i n g w a s much b e t t e r

a t m o d i f y i n g p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s o v e r t h e l o n g term a s opp o s e d t o t h e s h o r t term. The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a s e n i o r commander a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p o f t h i s c o u n t r y i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e r e h a v e b e e n many i n s t a n c e s w h e r e s p e c i f i c r e s t r i c t i o n s on t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i o n have been d i c t a t e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s u s u a l l y o c c u r d u r i n g t h e c o n d u c t of a limited war.
T a c t i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s of t h e n a t u r e w h i c h Kes-

s e l r i n g a n d Mackensen d e a l t would b e h i g h l y u n u s u a l f o r a n American commander d u r i n g a g e n e r a l war.

Yet, a s w e f a c e

t h e p - u s s - i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u e d o r i n c r e a s e d i n v o l v e m e n t i n low i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f o p e r a t i n g i n a n env i ro n m e n t w i t h s t r i c t t a c t i c a l p a r a m e t e r s d i c t a t e d by t h e n a t i o n a l command a u t h o r i t y i s h i g h . I n such s i t u a t i o n s ,

93

communication between t h e s e n i o r s e r v i c e c h i e f s and t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p m u s t be c o n c i s e , r e s u l t i n g i n c l e a r l y s t a t e d m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , economic a n d s o c i a l o b j e c t i v e s a n d t a c t i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s t o t h e u s e o f combat p o w e r . From t h e m i l i t a r y p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s a t A n z i o

were c l e a r l y s t a t e d , a n d were f o l l o w e d a s much a s p o s s i b l e ,

t o t h e detriment of t h e counterattack. During t h e conduct of t h e a t t a c k , K e s s e l r i n g d i d n o t '!interfere" with t h e tactical operations. He o b s e r v e d t h e

a c t i o n , p r o v i d e d h i s o p i n i o n a s t o t h e t i m i n g of t h e comm i t m e n t of t h e s e c o n d wave a n d i n v e s t i g a t e d p r o b l e m s w i t h a r t i l l e r y a m m u n i t i o n c o n s u m p t i o n , b u t h e a l l o w e d Mackensen t h e l a t i t u d e t o conduct t h e operation. I n h i s approach t o

t h i s a c t i o n , K e s s e l r i n g remained c o n s i s t e n t i n a l l o w i n g s u b o r d i n a t e commanders t h e f r e e d o m t o c o n d u c t t h e i r p a r t of t h e w a r . Elder: "An o r d e r s h a l l c o n t a i n e v e r y t h i n g t h a t a commander T h i s meant c a n n o t d o by h i m s e l f , b u t n o t h i n g e l s e . " t h a t t h e commander i n c h i e f s h o u l d h a r d l y e v e r i n t e r f e r e with t a c t i c a l arrangements. 2 Kesselring understood t h e importance of providing d i r e c t i o n a n d r e s o u r c e s , t h e n a l l o w i n g t h e commander t o do h i s j o b . Though i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c r i t i c i z e K e s s e l r i n g I n t h i s , h e f o l l o w e d t h e maxim of M o l t k e t h e

f o r n o t p r o v i d i n g f i r m e r c o n t r o l o v e r Mackensen i n t h e matt e r of t i m i n g t h e commitment o f t h e r e s e r v e s , s u c h was not Kesselring's approach. I n t e r f e r e n c e i n t o t a c t i c a l arrangements is something w h i c h w e a t t e m p t t o a v o i d i n t h e US m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e , y e t some i n t e r f e r e n c e i s i n e v i t a b l e .
A relatively recent

e x a m p l e , p e r h a p s t o t h e e x t r e m e , i s t h e c o n t r o l of t h e I r a n i a n r e s c u e m i s s i o n from t h e W h i t e H o u s e , t h r o u g h n o t a l l o w i n g t h e commander o n t h e s c e n e t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r n o t t o c o n t i n u e t h e m i s s i o n o n c e t h i n g s began

94

t o go wrong.

The i s s u e i n q u e s t i o n i s t h e d e g r e e t o

w h i c h a s e n i o r s h o u l d d i r e c t t a c t i c a l a c t i o n o v e r a subo r d i n a t e once t h e a c t i o n i s i n i t i a t e d . The d e c i s i o n , o f

c o u r s e , i n t h e c a s e of t h e r e s c u e m i s s i o n on t h e c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h would f o r c e a n a b o r t , h a d b e e n d e c i d e d a h e a d o f t i m e , y e t t h e commander c h a r g e d w i t h t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e r a i d
was n o t g i v e n t h e l a t i t u d e t o make t h a t d e c i s i o n . A s de-

monstrated i n t h e discussion concerning p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s b e i n g p l a c e d on a g i v e n o p e r a t i o n e a r l i e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r , t h e g e n e r a l sequence i s f o r t h e c o n s t r a i n t s t o be c l e a r l y s t a t e d by t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p , a s OKW d i d t o K e s s e l r i n g a n d M a c k e n s e n , t h e n f o r t h e commanders t o c a r r y o u t t h e mission w i t h i n those c o n s t r a i n t s , c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a c t i o n on the battlefield within stated guidelines. I n the Iranian

r e s c u e a t t e m p t , c n e of t h e c o n s t r a i n t s w a s t h e P r e s i d e n -

t i a l r e s e r v a t i o n t o a b o r t b a s e d on c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a .
tainly,

Cer-

t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n f l i c t i n t h e s e two e x a m p l e s

i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t , y e t t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e o p t i m a l chance
f o r s u c c e s s , t h e s e n i o r commander must a l l o w h i s s u b o r d i n a t e
t a c t i c a l l a t i t u d e , even t o d e v i a t e from t h e p l a n w i t h i n

h i s means a n d p a r a m e t e r s , a s l o n g a s t h e m i s s i o n i s accomplished. Kesselring allowed t h a t l a t i t u d e . The- n a t i o n a l

command a u t h o r i t y i n t h e I r a n i a n r e s c u e a t t e m p t d i d n o t .

Albert Kesselring:

The Commander

The c o n c l u d i n g s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g K e s s e l r i n g a s
a m i l i t a r y p r o f e s s i o n a l a r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , and n o t v e r y

o r i g i n a l o r profound.

H e made a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n

t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e young L u f t w a f f e a s i t s s e c o n d
C h i e f of S t a f f , commanded o p e r a t i o n a l L u f t w a f f e u n i t s i n P o l a n d , t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , B e l g i u m , F r a n c e , t h e S o v i e t Union a n d i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n i a n , a n d was a t h e a t e r commander. From

95

h i s World War I e x p e r i e n c e , K e s s e l r i n g was a r e c o g n i z e d e x p e r t i n ground d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and a n accomplished staff officer.

H e demonstrated excellent administrative

a b i l i t i e s a s o n e o f t h e b r i g h t young men r e c r u i t e d by v o n Seekt during the interwar years. These f a c t s c a n be found

a n y w h e r e t h e r e i s a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e Luftwaffe o r operations i n I t a l y .
Y e t , w h a t made A l b e r t

K e s s e l r i n g u n i q u e , w h a t made him s u c c e s s f u l i n k e e p i n g t h e

Allies a t bay i n I t a l y f o r s o long?

That i s a d i f f i c u l t question t o answer, f o r t h e r e is no s i n g l e f a c t o r w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e d t o h i s s u c c e s s .

He

had t a l e n t e d s u b o r d i n a t e s , a good s t a f f , t h e l u x u r y of d e a l i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h a l l t h r e e services as t h e t h e a t e r commander, g e n e r a l l y g o o d r a p p o r t w i t h OKW f o l l o w i n g h i s successfulwithdcawa.lfrom Salerno t o t h e Bernhardt Line, a n d a n enemy w h i c h was r e l a t i v e l y p r e d i c t a b l e .
Yet t h e s e

f a c t o r s s t i l l d o n o t s p e l l s u c c e s s , f o r K e s s e l r i n g had t o make u s e o f t h e a d v a n t a g e s a v a i l a b l e a n d m i n i m i z e Axis defeciencies. A d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y , K e s s e l r i n g was v e r y c a p a b l e

of s e e i n g s t r e n g t h s and weaknesses, and t a k i n g a c t i o n t o make t h e m o s t of o p p o r t u n i t i e s . P e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t , Once

h o w e v e r , was h i s o p t o m i s t i c , s t u b b o r n p e r s o n a l i t y .

K e s s e l r i n g made a t t e m p t s t o s t a c k a d v a n t a g e s i n h i s f a v o r , he communicated h i s i n t e n t i o n s c l e a r l y , i n v i t e d d i s c u s s i o n , t h e n s t u b b o r n l y s t o o d by t h e p a r a m e t e r s h e s e t f o r a plan while allowing h i s subordinates the opportunity t o freely operate within those parameters. K e s s e l r i n g ' s defense of I t a l y is a h i s t o r i c a l event which d e s e r v e s c l o s e r s t u d y t h a n i t h a s r e c e i v e d . Specific

a s p e c t s which should b e a d d r e s s e d w i l l b e s u g g e s t e d i n t h e next section. I n g e n e r a l , h o w e v e r , K e s s e l r i n g a s a com-

mander d e s e r v e s c l o s e a t t e n t i o n , n o t o n l y t o plumb t h e d e p t h s o f h i s command p e r s o n a l i t y , b u t t o a n a l y z e h i s m e t h o d s

96

a n d f u r t h e r e v a l u a t e command r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

Recommendations f o r F u r t h e r R e s e a r c h

A s t h i s p a p e r d e v e l o p e d , I began t o l i m i t t h e s c o p e of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o n s i d e r a b l y . A s a r e s u l t , a number

of i s s u e s were t o u c h e d u p o n , b u t n o t s e r i o u s l y a d d r e s s e d d u e t o t h e l i m i t s of t i m e a n d s p a c e . I would l i k e t o t a k e

t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o commend a f e w o f t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s f o r further research. One of t h e more t r o u b l i n g a s p e c t s o f t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n which re m a i n s u n r e s o l v e d i s t h e i n t e n t of Admiral Canaris i n h i s v i s i t t o Kesselring's headquarters p r i o r t o t h e i n v a s i o n a t Anzio.
I t h a s been a l l e g e d i n s e v e r a l

b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g The T r a i l o f t h e Fox by David I r v i n g , t h a t C a n a r i s a n d o t h e r members of t h e Abwehr w e r e i n v o l v e d i n s p r e a d i n g m i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o members o f t h e German armed forces.

I have been u n a b l e t o l i n k C a n a r i s ' v i s i t w i t h any

a t t e m p t t o d e c e i v e Army Group C a b o u t A l l i e d i n t e n t i o n s
a t Anzio.

B e c a u s e C a n a r i s was s u c h a shadowy f i g u r e , p e r -

h a p s we w i l l n e v e r know what h e r e a l l y d i d i n t h e w a r reg a r d i n g p o s s i b l e c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e A l l i e s o r i f h e was a double agent. I n d e e d , a t t e m p t i n g t o p u t a f i n g e r upon

h i s v i s i t t o K e s s e l r i n g a n d i d e n t i f y t h e i n t e n t of h i s s t a t e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e s h i p p i n g i n N a p l e s h a r b o r would probably be very d i f f i c u l t . The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h e de-

l i b e r a t e l y m i s l e d K e s s e l r i n g and Westphal, however, s t i l l e x i s t s , a n d b e c k o n s f u r t h e r h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h beyond p u b l i s h e d works i n a n a t t e m p t t o f i n d t h e t r u t h . R e f e r e n c e i s made i n t h e p a p e r t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n a r t i l l e r y c o n c e p t i d e n t i f i e d as t h e " f e u e r l e i t - b a t t e r i e . " Under t h i s c o n c e p t , a l l a r t i l l e r y i n t h e F o u r t e e n t h Army
f e l l u n d e r t h e d i r e c t c o n t r o l of t h e Army a r t i l l e r y o f f i c e r ,

97

General Jahn.

During t h e r e s e a r c h ,

f o u n d no o t h e r r e f e r -

e n c e t o t h e i d e a o r of i t s s u c c e s s .

I suggest t h a t further

r e s e a r c h b e done on t h i s s u b j e c t t o d i s c o v e r any o t h e r u s e of t h e i d e a a n d i t s r e l a t i o n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d u t i l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e German Army d u r i n g World War 11.

A p a r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n w h i c h c o u l d b e ad-

d r e s s e d i s i f t h e i d e a was o r g i n a l l y a p p r o a c h e d a t A n z i o , o r i f i t was p a r t o f a n a r t i l l e r y e v o l u t i o n w i t h i n t h e German Army. Kesselring's s t a f f did a superb job i n providing s u p p l i e s t o both t h e f o r c e s around t h e beachhead and a l o n g t h e Gustav Line under very t r y i n g c o n d i t i o n s .
R I C H A R D a n d MARDER I were i m p l e m e n t e d ,

When Case

t r o o p movements were

very effecient.

An i n t e r e s t i n g a n d i m p o r t a n t s t u d y w oul d

b e t o u n d e r t a k e a n e v a l u a t i o n o f how t h e s e f e a t s were accomplished under c o n d i t i o n s of unquestionable A l l i e d a i r superiority. During t h e a n a l y s i s of C h a p t e r Four, I i n d i c a t e d t h a t

I c o u l d f i n d no b a s i s , o t h e r t h a n w e a t h e r a n d t i d e d a t a ,

w h i c h d r o v e t h e German e s t i m a t e s t o p r e d i c t t h a t a n A l l i e d a t t a c k w oul d o c c u r a r o u n d t h e m i d d l e o f F e b r u a r y . Because

t h e Army Group C r e o r g a n i z a t i o n was b u i l t a r o u n d t h i s assumption, I f e e l t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e is worth further study

.
F i n a l Remark

Information is a v a i l a b l e t o allow scholars t o provide an indepth e v a l u a t i o n of K e s s e l r i n g i n h i s defense of I t a l y . The q u a l i t y a n d d i r e c t i o n o f t h a t e v a l u a t i o n i s f o r f u t u r e researchers t o pursue.

It is the intent of t h i s paper t o

provide a foundation f o r t h a t research.

98

Notes

A l b e r t K e s s e l r i n g and S i e g f r i e d Westphal, "Questions R e g a r d i n g t h e G e n e r a l S t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h e I t a l i a n Campaign" ( U . S. H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , M S B - 2 7 0 ) , p p . 26-27. 2Edward M. E a r l e , e d . , Makers o f Modern S t r a t e g y ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 180.

APPENDIX A

100

APPENDIX A

The M e d i t e r r a n i a n T h e a t e r 1943-1944

YUGOSLAVIA

Gustav Line
T

A,

SICILY

APPENDIX B

102

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APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS :

A l l e n , W i l l i a m L. A n z i o : Edge of D i s a s t e r . New York: E l s e v i e r - D u t t o n , 1978. A v e r y good a c c o u n t o f t h e b a t t l e , i n c l u d i n g t h e i m p a c t o f ULTRA on A l l i e d d e c i s i o n s a t A n z i o . Some e v a l u a t i o n i s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e n a r r a t i v e . T h i s book i n c l u d e s a n i n d e x a n d b i b l i o g r a p h y . Blumenson, M a r t i n . Anzio: The Gamble t h a t F a i l e d . New York: J . B. L i p p i n c o t t C o . , 1 9 6 3 . An o b j e c t i v e a c c o u n t o f A n z i o k e y i n g o n t h e A l l i e d p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i s book i n c l u d e s a n i n d e x . S a l e r n o t o C a s s i n o . Washington D . C.: Center of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 1 9 6 9 . T h i s volume i s a n e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t of o p e r a t i o n s i n I t a l y from t h e l a n d i n g a t S a l e r n o t o May 1 9 4 4 , i n c l u d i n g t h e A l l i e d l a n d i n g a t A n z i o . It i n c l u d e s an index. S i c i l y : Whose V i c t o r y ? New York: Ballantine Books, 1968. This i s a b r i e f account of t h e b a t t l e f o r S i c i l y . I t c o n t a i n s a good e v a l u a t i o n of K e s s e l r i n g i n t h a t context. B r a d l e y , O m a r N. A S o l d i e r ' s Story. New York: Rand M c N a l l y , 1951. T h i s a u t o b i o g r a p h y p r o v i d e s e x c e l l e n t background f o r A l l i e d i n t e n t i o n s and o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e S i c i l i a n campaign. Brown, Antony C. Bodyguard of L i e s . New York: Ha r p e r and Row, 1 9 7 5 . The f o c u s of t h i s book i s t h e A l l i e s ' s u r p r i s e a t t a c k o n D-Day i n F r a n c e a n d t h e r e a s o n s t h i s a t t a c k was a surprise.

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C l a r k , Mark. 1950.

Calculated Risk.

New York:

Harper and B r o t h e r s ,

T h i s book c o n t a i n s a c o n c i s e c h a p t e r on Anzio from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e F i f t h Army commander. N o index o r bibliography i s included. Colvin, Ian. Canaris, Chief of I n t e l l e g e n c e . Maidstone, E n g l a n d : G e o r g e Mann, L t d . , 1 9 7 3 . W r i t t e n by a j o u r n a l i s t f a m i l i a r w i t h pre-war B e r l i n , t h i s was t h e f i r s t p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l i m p l i cating Canaris' dealing with the A l l i e s in an attempt t o work a g a i n s t H i t l e r . F i s h e r , E r n e s t F . , J r . C a s s i n o t o t h e Al p s . Washington D. C . : C e n t e r of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , 1977. T h i s book i s a good a c c o u n t of o p e r a t i o n s i n I t a l y b e g i n n i n g w i t h b r e a k i n g t h e G u s t a v L i n e and t h e b r e a k o u t from Anzio. It i n c l u d e s an index. Graham, Dominich. C a s s i n o . New York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1970. T h i s book i s a p a r t o f t h e B a l l a n t i n e I l l u s t r a t e d H i s t o r y s e r i e s . I t o f f e r s a b r i e f a c c o u n t of a c t i o n s a t Cassino i n conjunction with the Allied landings a t Anzio. G r e e n f i e l d , Kent R . ,
D.
C.:

(ed).

Command D e c i s i o n s .

Washington

O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y ,

1960. T h i s book i s a c o m p i l a t i o n o f a n a l y s i s o f command d e c i s i o n s w r i t t e n by s e v e r a l a u t h o r s . It includes a s e c t i o n on t h e K e s s e l r i n g - R o m e 1 d e b a t e .

New York: Harper J a c k s o n , W . G. F . The B a t t l e f o r I t a l y . a n d Row, 1 9 6 7 . The b e s t p a r t o f t h i s book i s t h e e x c e l l e n t maps a n d s k e t c h e s , w h i c h a r e v a l u a b l e i n t r a c i n g t h e movement o f u n i t s . I t c o n t a i n s a good o r d e r o f b a t t l e and a n i n d e x .

Kesselring, Albert. A Soldier's Story. New York: William Morrow a n d C o . , 1 9 6 3 . This i s a straightforward autobiography with a n i n t r o d u c t i o n by S . L . A. M a r s h a l . I t i s a v a l u a b l e r e s o u r c e and i n c l u d e s a n i n d e x . L e v e r k u e h n , P a u l . German M i l i t a r y I n t e l l e g e n c e . N e w York: F r e d e r i c h A. P r a e g e r , I n c . , 1 9 5 4 . A d i s c u s s i o n o f German i n t e l l e g e n c e gy C a n a r i s ' chief i n Instanbul.

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L i d d e l - H a r t , B. H . The Rommel P a p e r s . New York: H a r c o u r t , B r a c e a n d Company, 1 9 5 3 . T h i s p u b l i c a t i o n o f Rommel's p a p e r s i n c l u d e s a d i s c u s s i o n o f Rommel's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h K e s s e l r i n g and t h e Rommel-Kesselring d e b a t e i n 1943.

Her M a j e s t y ' s L i n k l a t e r , E r i c . The Campaign i n I t a l y . London: S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1951. The A n z i o b a t t l e i s c o n t a i n e d i n a l a r g e r c h a p t e r . T h i s book c o n t a i n s good maps a n d i s o f e x c e l l e n t research value. I t includes an index.

New York: B a l l a n t i n e Macksey, K e n n e t h . A f r i k a K o r p s . Books, 1 9 6 8 . T h i s book p r o v i d e s a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e Axis o p e r a t i o n s i n No r t h A f r i c a , and i n c l u d e s i n s i g h t s i n t o command r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i n c l u d e s a b r i e f b i b 1i o g r a p hy

Kesselring: The Making o f t h e L u f t w a f f e . New York: David McKay Company, I n c . , 1 9 7 8 . This biography i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a n a l y s i s of K e s s e l r i n g ' s p e r s o n a l and p o l i t i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d some m i l i t a r y a s s e s s m e n t . I t i s w e l l w r i t t e n and of e x c e l l e n t r e s e a r c h v a l u e . I t includes an index and b i b l i o g r a p h y . Mason, H e r b e r t M a l l o y . The Rise o f t h e L u f t w a f f e . New York: The D i a l P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 . A s i m p l e a c c o u n t o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e L u f t w a f f e from 1 9 2 0 t o 1945. P a n z e r B a t t l e s . New York: B a l l a n t i n e M e l l e n t h i n , R . W. v o n . Books, 1956. T h i s book p r o v i d e s a good d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n N o r t h A f r i c a w i t h some i n s i g h t i n t o t h e command structure

Sheehan, Fred. A n z i o , E p i c of B r a v e r y . Norman: University of Oklahoma P r e s s , 1964. T h i s a u t h o r was a t A n z i o a s a s o l d i e r . The s t o r y i s t o l d from a n A l l i e d p e r s p e c t i v e . It contains maps, a b i b l i o g r a p h y a n d a n i n d e x . S e n g e r und E t t e r l i n , F r i f c b v o n . N e i t h e r F e a r n o r Hope. New York: E . P. D u t t o n a n d Co., I n c . , 1 9 6 4 . T h i s book c o n t a i n s a n e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t of Army Group C o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e C o r p s l e v e l d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e of t h e G u s t a v L i n e .

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New York: Holt, Rinehart Vaughn-Tomas, Wynford. Anzio. and Winston, 1961. T h i s work i s a b a l a n c e d a c c o u n t of t h e b a t t l e , i n c l u d i n g t h e German p e r s p e c t i v e . It includes an index and b i b l i o g r a p h y .

W e s t p h a l , S i e g f r i e d . The German Army i n t h e West. London: Cassel a n d C o . , 1 9 5 0 . An e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t w r i t t e n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e w a r f r o m a German p e r s p e c t i v e . The a u t h o r was t h e c h i e f of s t a f f t o Rommel, K e s s e l r i n g a n d R u n d s t e d t . The t r e a t m e n t o f A n z i o i s b r i e f b u t i n f o r m a t i v e .

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS :

German M o n o g r a p h s :

B e r n s t o r f f , Douglas. "The o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e 2 6 t h P a n z e r D i v i s i o n i n I t a l y ( 7 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 3 -- 2 3 J a n u a r y 1944)." U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , MS D316. Conrad, Gerhard. " P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e Commitment o f P a r a c h u t e and o t h e r A i r b o r n e U n i t s i n t h e P r o j e c t e d i n v a s i o n o f Malta." U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , MS D065. Deichmann, P a u l . " D e s i g n a t i o n o f OB Siid a s Supreme Commander Mediterranian Theater." U . S. H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , M S D008. " M i s s i o n o f O B Siid w i t h t h e A u x i l l e r y B a t t l e Command i n North A f r i c a a f t e r t h e A l l i e d Landing." U . S . Hist o r i c a l Division, M S D067. F r i e s , Walter. "Commitment o f t h e 2 9 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n d u r i n g t h e German C o u n t e r - a t t a c k f o r t h e E l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e A n z i o N e t t u n o B e a c h h e a d i n F e b r u a r y 1944." U. S . Historical Division, M S D141. "German V e r s i o n o f t h e H i s t o r y o f t h e I t a l i a n Campaign." U. S. H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n . H a u s e r , Wolf. "The F o u r t e e n t h Army i n A c t i o n a t AnzioN e t t u n o up t o 11 May 1944." The Campaign i n I t a l y T-la. U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1 9 4 7 .

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Kesselring, Albert and Westphal, Siegfried. "Questions Regarding the General Strategy during the Italian Campaign." U. S. Historical Division, MS I3270. Kesselring, Albert. "Commentary on the Paper of Graf von Klinkowstroem." U. S. Historical Division, MS D313.

"Concluding Remarks on the Mediterranian Campaign . I 1

U. S. Historical Division, MS C014.

"Italy as a Military Ally." ision, f4S C015.

U. S. Historical Div-

Klinkowstroem, Graf von. "Ztaly1s Break-Away and the Fighting Around Rome.'' U. S. Hi.storica1 Division, MS D301. Knappe, Major. "94th Infantry D.iv.is.ion (Italy) 11 December 1943-8 April 1944." U. S. Historical Division, MS D380. Kuhn, Walter. "The Artillery at Anzio-Nettuno." Historical Division, MS D158. U. S.

Mackensen, Eberhard von. "Commentary by General von Mackensen, Supplement to Chapter XII." The Campaign in Italy T-la. U. S. Historical Division, December 1947. Maelzer, Kurt. "The Problem o f Rome during the Period of the Fighting near Anzio-Nettuno until the Evacuation on 4 June 1944." U. S. Historical Division, MS D314. Moench, Hans. "Organization and Activity of Coastal Artillery in the Italian Theater of Operations 1943-1944." U. S. Historical Division MS D208. Pohl, Ritter von. Commitment of Flak and Fighters to Protect the German Routes of Supply in Italy." U. S. Xistorical Division, MS D191. Rath, Hans-Joachim. "The 1st Stuka Wing in the Mediterranian Theater, February - May 1941." U. S. Historical Division, MS D064. Schmidt, Martin. "Employment of Panzer Units in Central Italy in 1944 and Peculiarities Thereof." U. S. Historical Division, MS B204. Seibt, Conrad. "Preparations for the Capture of Malta." U. S. Historical Division, MS D094.

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Stange, Klaus. " R a i l r o a d S i t u a t i o n f r o m J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 up t o t h e B e g i n n i n g o f t h e May O f f e n s i v e ( I t a l y ) . " U. S. Historical Division, M S D049. U l l e s p e r g e r , Wilhelm. " F o r t r e s s E n g i n e e r s on t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n Coast." U. S. H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , MS B449. V i e t i n g h o f f , H e i n r i c h von. " C h a p t e r VI -- The T e n t h A r m y Campaign i n S o u t h e r n a n d C e n t r a l I t a l y w i t h s p e c i a l R e f e r e n c e t o t h e B a t t l e s a t S a l e r n o , on t h e V o l t u r n o , G a r i g l i a n o , S a n g r o and f o r C a s s i n o . " The Campaign i n I t a l y T-la. U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1947. W e h r i g , Max. " D u t i e s and O p e r a t i o n s of t h e I t a l i a n S e c t i o n of t h e C h i e f o f Wehrmacht Motor T r a n s p o r t a t i o n . " U. S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , M S D126. W e s t p h a l , S i e g f r i e d . "The Army G r o u p ' s V e r s i o n , C h a p t e r VTI." The Campaign i n I t a l y T - l a . U. S. H i s t o r i c a l Division, December 1 9 4 7 . "Army G r o u p ' s Comments, C h a D t e r XIII." The Camoaien i n I t a l y T-la. U . S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , December 1947.

O t h e r Government Documents:

" A i r Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Operation Shingle." U . S. Historical Division, M S 1 1 6 1 4 , 19 F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 4 .

"3d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n A t t a c k P l a n -- O p e r a t i o n S h i n g l e , F i e l d O r d e r Number One." U. S . H i s t o r i c a l D i v i s i o n , MS 12186A, 10 J a n u a r y 1944. "The German O p e r a t i o n s a t A n z i o . " German M i l i t a r y Document S e c t i o n , M i l i t a r y I n t e l l e g e n c e D i v i s i o n , 9 A p r i l 1946.

Government H i s t o r i c a l S t u d i e s :

B a u e r , Magna E . " S h i f t i n g o f German U n i t s b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g N e t t u n o l a n d i n g a n d e f f e c t s o f American R a p i d o R i v e r A t t a c k on 2 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 4 4 o n t h e Movement o f German R e s e r v e s . " Washington D. C . : O f f i c e of t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , November 1 9 5 5 .

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Mavrogordato, Ralph S. "XIV P a n z e r Corps D e f e n s i v e O p e r a t i o n s a l o n g t h e G a r i g l i a n o , G a r i , a n d R a p i d o R i v e r s , 17-31 J a n u a r y 1944." W a s h i n g t o n D . C . : O f f i c e of t h e Chief of M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , November 1 9 5 5 .

MAGAZINE ARTICLES :

Blumenson, M a r t i n . "Anzio: Delimma on t h e Beachhead." March 1 9 8 3 , p p . 38-48.

Army,

S i x s m i t h , Y a j o r G e n e r a l E . K. G . "Alexander and K e s s e l r i n g . " Army Q u a r t e r l y a n d D e f e n c e J o u r n a l 8 5 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 6 7 ) : 184.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.

D r . Raymond C a l l a h a n Department of H i s t o r y 4 0 1 EWG U n i v e r s i t y o f Delaware Newark, DE 1 9 7 1 1

Combined A r m s R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y US Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , KS 66027 Defense Technical Information Center Cameron S t a t i o n A l e x a n d r i a , VA 2 2 3 1 4

2.

3.

4.

D r . R o b e r t M. E p s t e i n Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e US Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , KS 66027

LTC D a v i d M. G l a n t z Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e US Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , KS 66027 LTC J o h n A . H i x s o n Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e US Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , KS 66027 P r o f e s s o r of M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e Department of M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e Wheaton C o l l e g e W heat on, IL 6018 7
D r . Thomas R o d g e r s Vice P r e s i d e n t T r i n i t y T h e o l o g i c a l Seminary 4233 Medwel D r i v e Newburgh, I N 4 7 6 3 0

5.

6.

7.

8.