KNOW YOUR ENEMY:

A COMPARISON O F A S O V I E T MOTORIZED R I F L E

REGIMENT AND THE OPPOSING FORCES (OPFOR) MOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U.S. A r m y Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for the MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

ROBERT L . JORDAN, J R . , MAJOR, USA B . S . , T r o y S t a t e U n i u e r s i t y , 1579

Fort Leavenwor th, Kansas 1986

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

86- 35 10

MASTER OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE T H E S I S APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f c a n d i d a t e Title of

R o b e r t L. Jordan.

J r , , MAJ. USA

t h e s i s KNOW YOUR ENEMY: A C o m p a r i s o n o f a S o v i e t M o t o r i z e d R i f l e Reaiment and t h e O D p o s i n a F o r c e s (OPFOR) M o t o r i z e d R i f l e Rcsiment

A p p r o v e d by:

, ,

T h e s i s Committee Chairman

Member,

Graduate F a c u l t y

MAJ,'Raymond

F. "Arment 1 1 1 , MA

,
B r u c e W. Menning, Fh.D.

Member, C o n s u l t i n g F a c u l t y

A c c e p t e d t h i s 6 t h d a y o f June 1986 hy:

,
Philip'J. Brookes, Ph.D.

D i r e c t o r Graduate Degree Programs

The o p i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e o f t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e U.S. A r m y Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e o r a n y o t h e r government agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o t h i s study s h o u l d i n c l u d e the foreaoina statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT

KNOW YOUR ENEMY: A Comparison of a S o v i e t M o t o r i z e d R i f l e R e g i m e n t and t h e O p p o s i n g F o r c e s (OPFOR) M o t o r i z e d R i f l e R e g i m e n t

by: M a j o r R o b e r t L .

Jordan J r .

T h i s s t u d y a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y t h e m a j o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and equipment d i f f e r e n c e s between a S o v i e t M o t o r i z e d R i f l e Regiment and t h e OPFOR M o t o r i z e d R i f l e R e g i m e n t . Analysis also includes basic tactical doctrine at the regimental level.
Research i n d i c a t e s t h e r e a r e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between the t w o o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n r e g a r d t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and e q u i p m e n t a p p e a r a n c e and c a p a b l l i t i e s . A n a l y s i 5 of t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e and e m p l o y m e n t d o e s n o t r e v e a l a n y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r ences.

i i i

fiCKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I w o u l d l i k e t o thank m y w i f e and c h i l d r e n f o r t h e i r m o t i u a t i o n ,
t h e i r f a i t h , and t h e i r time.

I am g r a t e f u l t o members o f m y t h e s i s committee f o r t h e i r t i m e , p a t i e n c e , and open-mindedness.

I w o u l d a l s o 1 i k e t o thank M a j o r s John Moore and Dave Murdock f u r p r o v i d i n g c u r r e n t i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e NTC.

iu

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page T I T L E PAGE

..............................................

i
ii

T H E S I S APPROVAL PAGE ABSTRACT

....................................

i
.

................................................ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................ TABLE O F CONTENTS ....................................... L I S T OF FIGURES ......................................... (DIAQRAMS & I L L U S T R A T I O N S ) CHAPTER 1 . INTRODUCTION 1-1 BACKGROUND .............................. 1-2 PURPOSE ................................ 1-3 SCOPE .................................. 1-4 CHAPTER END NOTES ....................... CHAPTER 2 . ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4

iii
iv
V

vi i

1-1 1-3 1-3 1-5

INTRODUCTION SOVIET MRR OPFOR MRR

...........................

2-1 2-1 2-5 2-20 2-24

............................. ..............................
.......

S I G N I F I C A N T DIFFERENCES/IWALYSIS CHAPTER CONCLUSION CHAPTER END NOTES

2-5

.....................
......................

2-6
CHAPTER 3

2-25

EQUIPMENT
3-1

3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5

........................... EQUIPMENT COMPARISONS .................. S I G N I F I C A N T DIFFERENCES/ANALYSIS ....... CHAPTER CONCLUSION .....................

INTRODUCTION CHAPTER END NOTES

3-1 3-1 3-17 3-20 3-21

......................

CHAPTER 4

TACTICS 4-1
4-2

4-3

4-4 4-5 4-6

CHAPTER 5

........................... OFFENSE ................................ DEFENSE ................................ S I G N I F I C A N T DIFFERENCES/ANALYSIS .......

INTRODUCTION CHAPTER CONCLUSION CHAPTER END NOTES

4-1

4-6
4-11 4-13 4-13

.....................

......................

4-15

.
I

.
'

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5-1

INTRODUCTION SIMILARITIES DIFFERENCES

5-2
5-3 5-4

........................... ...........................

5-1 5-1

5-5
APPEND IX A

............................ RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ........ CONCLUSION .............................

...................................

5-3

5-5
5-6

. B.

Bibliography

aw

Initial Distribution List

......................

aw

ui

L I S T O F FIGURES PAGE

FIGURE

SUBJECT/TITLE MOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT ( S O V I E T ) SOVIET MRR SUBORDINATE U N I T S NATIONAL T R A I N I N G CENTER (NTC) J-SERI ES BATTALIONS MOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT (OPFOR) OPFOR MRR SUBORDINATE W I T S OPFOR MRR HEADQUARTERS OPFOR MRB OPFOR TANK BATTALION OPFOR ARTILLERY B A T T A L I ON OPFOR RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OPFOR A I R DEFENSE BATTERY OPFOR ELECTRON1C WARFARE PLATOON OPFOR HIND-E SECTION OPFOR ENGINEER COMPANY OPFOR AUGMENTATION INFANTRY COMPANIES SOVIET M I - 2 4 HIND-E OPFOR VISMOD HIND-E ZSU-23-4 122mm SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER BRDM-2 AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE BTR-60PB MT-LB T-72 TANK COMPARISON T-72 TANK BMP COMPARISON BMP INFANTRY COMBAT V E H I C L E MEETING ENGAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON

1 2 3
4 5

2-2
2-3

2-7 2-8
2-9 2-10 2-1 1 2-1 2 2-1 3 2-1 4 2-15 2-16 2-1 7 2-18 2-1 9 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-8 3-1 1 3-12 3-15 3-1 6

6
7 8

9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

4-1 I

. .

CHAPTER

I NTRODUCT IO N
1-1.
BACKGROUND: The Airland Battle doctrin (FM) for th Un i t e d

S t a t e s Army,

a s o u t 1 i n e d i n F i e l d Manual
1985,

100-5

FINAL DRAFT, facing the

d a t e d 28 O c t o b e r t h e U.S. Army.

out1 ines

contemporary Because

challenges

One

i s training.

training is truly

c o r n e r s t o n e o f success,

leaders a t a l l An

l e v e l s must maximize e v e r y

possible training opportunity. for

important element of preparing i s k n o w i n g t h e enemy. imperatives, against the

t r a i n i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g f o r war

A i r L a n d B a t t l e d o c t r i n e s t r e s s e s t e n combat t h i r d of which is In to "direct to friendly

strengths combat

enemy

weaknesses." know t h e enemy.

order

accompl i s h

this,

leaders must

A c c o r d i n g t o FM 1 0 0 - 5 :

T o d e t e r m i n e t h e t a c t i c s t o use commanders m u s t s t u d y t h e enemy O R W I Z A T I O N , EQUIPMENT, a n d TACTICS how the enemy fights. More importantly they must u n d e r s t a n d s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f t h e enemy f o r c e t h e y a r e about t o f i g h t . 1 (emphasis

When terrain, planning

tacticians

analyze

the

factors (METT-T),

of in

mission, the

enemy,
of

troops available, offensive

or

and t i m e

conduct array

defensive

operations,

they

their

combat f o r c e s

i n accordance w i t h d o c t r i n a l

ratios.

B r i g a d e and

b a t t a l i o n commanders a n d s t a f f s a r r a y enemy b a t t a l i o n a n d company s i z e e l e m e n t s when formulating courses o f action.

A

real i s t i c especially

a r r a y c a l l s f o r a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e enemy, at the r e g i m e n t a l l e v e l and below.

1-1

The Defense

following

quote

from

the

Office

of

the

Secretary

of

Report,

S o v i e t M i l i t a r r P o w e r 1985, c l e a r l y d e s c r i b e s t h e the Soviet threat. objective of S i n c e W o r l d War 1 1 , the United States the

implications of primary

security

has
the

been

d e t e r r e n c e o f S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n t o e n s u r e t h e f r e e d o m of U n i t e d S t a t e s and a l l n a t i o n s that c h e r i s h l i b e r t y . S o v i e t s c u r r e n t l y h a v e 199 a c t i v e t a n k , divisions, The

m o t o r i z e d and a i r b o r n e

98 o f w h i c h a r e o p p o s i t e t h e N o r t h A l a n t i c T r e a t y
30 of w h i c h a r e

O r g a n i z a t i o n (NATO), of the Soviet threat

i n E a s t e r n Europe. overwhelm ng. tank

The s i z e ground

ground
in

forces
is

seems

The

combat

Europe

clearly

and m o t o r i z e d f o r c e s . level, t h e above

Although

t h i s t h e s i s i s o r i e n t e d on t h e t a c t i c a l

quote a p p r o p r i a t e l y emphasizes the S o v i e t t h r e a t . As a p a r t of t h e Army t r a i n i n g s y s t e m o u t l i n e d

AR 3 5 0 - 1 ,

i n Chapter
1983,

o f Army R e g u l a t i o n ,

change

1,

dated 1 August

the

National T r a i n i n g Center

(NTC)

p r o v i d e s b a t t a l ion t a s k Asia,

f o r c e s an One
I S

environment a p p l i c a b l e t o Europe, of the realistic aspects

of

and the Middle East. the NTC

training provided a t

h i g h l y t r a i n e d O p p o s i n g F o r c e (OPFOR).

The m i s s i o n o f

t h e OPFOR

i s:

A.

R e p l i c a t e t h e m a j o r combat e l e m e n t s o f a S o v i e t BMP-equipped M o t o r i z e d R i f l e Regiment.

B.

P r o v i d e r e a l i s t i c f o r c e r a t i o s a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of c u r r e n t S o v i e t d o c t r i n e and t a c t i c s t o r o t a t i o n a l
units,

( b r i g a d e s and b a t t a l i o n s

task forces).

1-2

1-2.

PURPOSE: about

The the

purpose Soviet

of
and

thls the focus tactics,

thesis OPFOR

is

to

provide
rifle of on

information regiments

motorized the

(MRR).

The

primary and

is

on
with

areas

organization,

equipment,

emphasis

I d e n t i f y i n g and a n a l y z i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e S o v i e t and the OPFOR M R R s .

for

This study w i l l to

serve

as a t r a i n i n g r e f e r e n c e
the

document

u n i t s scheduled

train at

NTC, a n d i t

will

a l s o p r o v i d e commanders a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e OPFOR. This study Manuals,

i s not

intended t o -2,
-3,

detract

from

the

value

of

Field
Arm)

FM 100-2-1,

w h i c h s p e c i f y t h e c u r r e n t U.S.

understanding o f Soviet Army doctrine.

1-3.

SCOPE :

The

intent numerous
It

of

this

thesis

is

to

synthesize

information equipment, training, associated limitation

from and

sources does not

regarding address
or

organization, cycles, normally addi t i onal

of a

tactics. service analysis the

decision areas An

combat with i s

support, of an

other force. to

enemy

intentional

restriction

analysis

generic Soviet motorized r i f l e regiment. Chapter 2 addresses the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 5.tructur.e o f b o t h the S o v i e t a n d t h e OPFOR M R R s . with organic tanlts,

A S o v i e t MRR i s a c o m b i n e d arms f o r c e
fighting vehicles (personnel support

infantry

carriers), forces.

artillery,

combat s u p p o r t ,

and combat s e r v i c e

There a r e t h r e e m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t s i n a m o t o r i z e d and there

r i f l e division,
tank division.

i s one m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t i n a
there are two types of motorized

Additionally,

r i f l e r e g i m e n t s , BMP a n d BTR.

The OPFOR MRR a t t h e NTC i s

1-3

designed

to

replicate

the

Soviet only

BMP-equipped

MRR.

Therefore, Chapter 2 the

this

study

w i l l

address

the

BMP

regiment.

i d e n t i f i e s and a n a l y z e s t w o o r g a n i z a t i ons.

the

significant

d i f f e r e n c e s between

Chapter 3 addresses the major MRR a n d t h e OPFOR e q u i p m e n t chapter

items of equipment i n a S o v i e t these

i tems.

used to rep1 i c a t e
i s on

The
3

p r i m a r y focus of

t h e BMP a n d t a n k .

Chapter

also i d e n t i f i e s a n d a n a l y z e s t h e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n
the major items o f equipment. tactical of

Chapter 4 addresses the a Soviet MRR in the

d o c t r i n e a n d employment offensive and

of

conduct

defensive

operations,
of

and compares t h e employment o f

t h e OPFOR MRR t o t h a t t o a d i s c u s s i o n of at the NTC.

the Soviet. combat

4

Chapter 4 i s l i m i t e d i n scope
most

the

missions

frequently
and

portrayed
the

Chapter

also

identifies

analyzes

significant

differences. Chapter
analysis

5 provides
in

summary 2,

of

the and 4.

identification Chapter

and also

conducted

chapters

3,

c o n t a i n s some o u e r a l 1 c o n c l u s i o n s a n d r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .

1-4

CHAPTER 1

END NOTES
1 U . S . A r m y , FM 1 0 0 - 5 , O n e r a t i o u ( F i n a l U . S . A r m y , 28 O c t o b e r 1985. p a g e 2 - 2 6 .
Draft), Washington,

D.C.,

1-5

CHAPTER 2 ORGAN1Z A T I ONAL STRUCTURE OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

2-1.

p4-rRODUCT 1ON;The

purpose of
of

this chapter
the Soviet

i s t o analyze

the

organizational MRR

structure

both

MRR

and

the

OPFOR

.
T h e Sov i e t s h a v e o r g a n i z e d a n d e q u I p p e d t h e I r g r o u n d forces t o support t h e i r offensive doctrine. Moreover, Soviet organization and equipment are being s t r e n g t h e n e d and m o d e r n i z e d c o n s t a n t l y t o i m p r o v e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o f i g h t e i t h e r a n u c l e a r or a n o n n u c l e a r war. A n u c l e a r exchange i n Europe c o u l d e a s i l y e n t a i l t r e m e n d o u s damage t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . Therefore, i t would be c l e a r l y i n t h e S o v i e t s i n t e r e s t t o have t h e a b i l i t y t o f i g h t and w i n a war i n Europe q u i c k l y , The b e f o r e e i t h e r a i d e made u s e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s . S o v i e t s h a v e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e o n l y way t o w i n s u c h a war i s by o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . The S o v i e t c o n c e p t of t h e o f f e n s i v e e m p h a s i z e s s u r p r i s e a n d h i g h r a t e s of advance combined w i t h o v e r w h e l m i n g f i r e p o w e r . A t the heart of S o v i e t combat d o c t r i n e i s t h e c o n c e p t of combined arms.1

The MRRs 2-2.

OPFOR

MRR a t

the

NTC

is

designed

to replicate

the

Soviet

organization, THE SWIET

equipment

and t a c t ic s . MRR is the basic element combined of the arms

MRR m

The

o r g a n i z a t i o n and the most

common m a n e u v e r

Soviet

ground f o r c e s .
a n t i tank, organic
of

Motor I z e d

r i f 1 e,

tank,

a r t i 11ery,

antiaircraft

engineer,

signal,

a n d combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t a s s e t s a r e t h e MRR n o r m a l l y o p e r a t e s a s p a r t combined arms organization and

t o t h e MRR.
based

Although upon

division,

thc

structure,

i t i s capable of

independent operations.2

2- 1

The S o v i e t MRR s t r u c t u r e i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 1 . structure composition support of the with BMP regiment clearly provides mobility,

The f o r c e a and force fire

flexibility,

firepower,

.
true strength o f that a l l the of t h e MRR o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure
1 ies

The

i n the f a c t Therefore, rifle, tank,

the assets o f

the regiment are between the

organic. motorized

habitual

relationships

artillery,

a i r defense and o t h e r f o r c e s f a c i l i t a t e a t o w a r d t h e accompl i s h m e n t o f the

c o o r d i n a t e d and c o h e s i v e e f f o r t

MRR m i s s i o n .
FIGURE 1 MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT (BMP)

2 2>5

I
REGIMENTAL HEADIIUARTIRS
i ' ,

MOTORIZE0 RIFLE

I
TANK BATTALION
1.15

i
SP HOWITZER BATTALION f12Z.nml
,''i

ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE A N 0 ARTILLERY B A l l E R V

ANTITANK MISSILE

RECONNAISSANCE

1
i
'1

L
SOURCE: FM 100-2-3, The S o v i e t Army: T r o o p s . EauiDment. page 4-26.

SUPPLY A N 0 SERVICE PLATOON

Oraanization.

and

2-2

T h e MRR amount of

structure power

depicted
What

in Figure
force

1 represents

vast
to

combat

s i z e of

doe0 t h i s equate

on t h e ground?
will be

What q u a n t i t y and t y p e of

combat v e h i c l e systems

arrayed against

U.S.

Army

brigade

or

battalion equate

task
to

force?

Soviet

MRR.

at

100%

strength.

would

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 209 c o m b a t v e h i c l e s y s t e m s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d b r e a k o u t of
in Figure 2

The

t h e s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s o f t h e S o v i e t MRR a r e s h o w n

.
FIGURE 2 SOVIET MRR SUBORDINATE U N I T S

SOVIET MRR U N I T S MRR

VEHICLE TYPES TOTAL......................

QUANT I T 1 ES 209

..............................

MRR HEADQUARTERS

................. BMP ........................

MRB ( 3 , M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B n s )

.....B M P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 MRB (120mm M o r t a r s ) .............. GA 2-66 ( T r u c k ) ............. 18 TANK BATTALION ................... TA.lK....................... 40
.......... 18 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .....BMP o r BRDM ................ 3 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .....Z S U - 2 3 - 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 4 ANTI-TANK M I S S I L E BATTERY ........ BMP o r BRDM ................ 9
ARTILLERY BATTALION SP H o w i t z e r RECON COMPANY RECON COMPANY

..............122mm

...................BMP.........................
4

....................... RECON COMPANY .................... MOTOR CYCLE ................ ENGINEER COMPANY ................. BTR-60..................... ENGINEER COMPANY ................. MTU/M T-55 ( b r i d g e ) ......... SIGNAL COMPANY ................... BMP........................ SIGNAL COMPANY ................... MOTORCYCLE........ .........
....................
BRDM
2-3

4
3
3

The numbers, are important

types

and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
for numerous

structure

of

a n MRR

factors the

reasons.
i s an

Intelligence aspect of

preparation of a11 combat

b a t t e f i e l d (IPE) Step one

important

operations.

of

the

IPB p r o c e s s ,

threat

evaluation, in order

r e q u i r e s K n o w l e d g e a n d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f enemy f o r c e s

to

accurately

apply

the

technique

of

doctrinal

temp1ating*3 a n MRR

Additionally, important when

knowledge of considering

the s i z e and s t r u c t u r e o f the strength level

is

of

the

enemy u n i t .
a

Frequently intelligence
to
a

information i s provided from unit in

the

higher

headquarters
As

subordinate

form

of

percentages.

an

example,

an

intelligence

report

might

e s t l m a t e t h e s t r e n g t h of

an a t t a c k i n g m o t o r i z e d r i f l e r e g i m e n t a t report
t o have

85%.

For

the

intelligence be a b l e

m e a n i n g or

relevance,
to

t h e s t a f f must

to r e l a t e

the

intelligence
100%.

report

the

combat s t r e n g t h o f officer) relevance should

t h e enemy u n i t a t be able

T h e S-2 ( i n t e l l i g e n c e
to

to

describe report

the

commander of

the

of

the

intelligence

in

terms

percentages, enemy c o u r s e s assessing the

numbers and

types of An

combat systems, factor

and p o s s i b l e

of

action.

additional

t o c o n s i d e r when

organizational priority.

s t r u c t u r e a n d combat power
a

of

t h e enemy

is target

When

tactical

commander

establ ishes a

priority

of

t a r g et s the situation w i l l a h i g h e r or systems lower

d i c t a t e which

enemy c o m b a t s y s t e m h a s of t h e 209 c o m b a t
of

priority. in be an a Figure

I n an assesc.ment

depicted could
As

2,

many based

variations
on

target or
or

priorities

established example, higher the

the

situations

circumstances.

reconnaissance motorcycle than an enemy

BRDM

might

have
if

priority

tank.

Additionally,

t h e enemy w e r e a t t a c k i n g a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n

2-4

reinforced have a

by

an

a n t i tank

ditch,

the

MTWMT-55 system. and and

(bridge)

might
it

higher for the

priority leaders

than at

another

Therefore, company

is to an

important understand

the

battalion structure

level of

organ i z a t i onal

composi t i or1

MRR
2-3.

.
THE OPFOR MRR;
The OPFOR i s c o m p r i s e d p r i m a r i l y o f u n i t s i s the l o c a t i o n o f the

s t a t i o n e d a t F o r t I r w i n , C a l i f o r n i a , which NTC.

The u n i t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e OPFOR a r e : a. The 6 t h B a t t a l i o n ( M e c h a n i z e d ) , 31st Infantry. The 6-31

I N i s a F o r c e s Command (FORSCOM) u n i t o r g a n i z e d u n d e r t h e J - S e r i e s TOE. The 6-31 I N i s p e r m a n e n t l y s t a t i o n e d a t t h e NTC t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t ' s combat

a n d p r o v i d e s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60% o f forces (Figure 3).4

b.

The 1 s t B a t t a l i o n , 7 3 d A r m o r .

The 1-73 AR i s a l s o a The 1-73 AR

is

FORSCOM u n i t o r g a n i z e d u n d e r

t h e J - S e r i e s TOE.

p e r m a n e n t l y s t a t i o n e d a t t h e NTC a n d p r o v i d e s a p p r o x t m a t e l y 20% of t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t ' s combat f o r c e s ( F i g u r e 3 ) .

C.

The S u p p o r t B a t t a l i o n o f

t h e NTC i s a l s o a FORSCOM u n i t .

The S u p p o r t B a t t a l i o n p r o v i d e s b o t h combat s u p p o r t a n d combat s e r v i c e s u p p o r t t o t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t . (1) The f l i g h t d e t a c h m e n t p r o v i d e s c r e w s f o r U H l

to

s e r e s he1 i c o p t e r s w h i c h a r e v i s u a l l y m o d i f i e d (UISMOD)

r e p i c a t e a HIND-E he1 i c o p t e r .
(2)

The e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e d e t a c h m e n t p r o v i d e s c r e w s

f o r the ground s u r v e i I l a n c e r a d a r s and communications j a m m e r s . (3)

C Company,

2 0 3 d Mi 1 i t a r y l n t e l 1 i g e n c e B a t t a l i o n ,

p r o v i d e s o p e r a t o r s and s u p p o r t f o r a l l a c t u a l S o v i e t equipment which i s u s e d t o t r a n s p o r t d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y and e n g i n e e r s .

2-5

d.

The OPFOR MHR al5.o r e c e i v e s a u g m e n t a t i o n f o r c e s f r o m

other sources (1)

.
FOHSCOM p r o v i d e s a u g m e n t a t i o n o f two i n f a n t r y

c o m p a n i e s a n d one e n g i n e e r company.

( 2 ) R e s e r v e component u n i t s f r e q u e n t l y augment t h e
OPFOR MRR w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r s , s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m 5 t o 50, ( t h e number v a r i e s

b a s e d upon p e r s o n n e l a v a i l a b i l i t y a n d

mi 1 i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n a l spec i a1 t y ) .

(3)

The U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e ( W A F ) p r o v i d e s g r o u n d (F'AC) teams t o c o n t r o l a t t a c k a i r c r a f t . t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t A1 1 f o r c e s

based f o r w a r d a i r c o n t r o l

The command a n d c o n t r o l r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y o f

a l t e r n a t e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o m a j o r maneuver b a t t a l i o n s .

a s s i g n e d o r a t t a c h e d t o t h e OPFOR a r e s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e MRR headquarters.5 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d s t r u c t u r e o f t h e OPFOR

regiment i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 4.

2-6

FIGURE 3

NATIONAL T R A I N I N G CENTER ( N T C )

S E R I E S BATTALIONS

cx.i
I
7 -

HHC

- Mech I n f Co

Anti-tank

Co

1 s t B a t t a l i o n 73d Armor

l a
HHC

2-7

FIGURE 4

PIOTORIZED R I F L E REGIMENT

2-8

T h e OPFOR MRR d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 4 r e p r e s e n t s a v a s t

amount the

of

combat power

.
a

What

s i z e of

f o r c e does this equate

t o on

ground? arrayed

What q u a n t i t y and t y p e o f c o m b a t v e h i c l e s y s t e m s w i l l b e
against
at to

U.S.

Army The

brigade

or at

battalion

tasK

force would the

the

training
equate

the

NTC?

OPFOR MRR.
combat the

100% s t r e n g t h
systems. ejements

approximately

201
of

vehicle

on

battlefield

The

breakout

subordinate

of

OPFOR MRR a r e d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 5

FIGURE 5

OPFOR MRH SUBORDINATE U N I T S OPFOR MRR U N I T S MRR U E H I CLE TYPE(J1 SMOD) TOTAL................. BMP QUANTITI ES 201
3

.................................. MRR HEADQUARTERS .....................

MRB (3. M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n s ) TANK B A T T A L I O N

...................

..B M P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

....................... T A N K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 122mm SP H o w i t z e r . . . . . 1 2 A R T I L L E R Y BATTALION .................. A R T I L L E R Y BATTALION .................. BMP................... 2 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY ......... ZSU-23-4 .............. 4 A N T I - A I R & A R T I L L E R Y BATTERY .........EMP ................... 4 RECON COMPANY ........................ BMP ................... 4
RECON COMPANY

........................

BRDM BRDM

..................

............................. ENGINEER COMPANY .....................

E W RECCE ENGINEER COMPANY INFANTRY COMPANY INFANTRY

..................
* ..............

BTR-60

6
1

..................... .....................
2-9

AUL......,.,.......... BMP................ MT-LE

..................... COMPANY .....................

...

12

A V I A T I O N SECTION

............... 10 HIND-E ................ 4

+

T h e s e a r e n o t VISMODs.

they are actual Soviet vehicles

T h e OPFOR MRR h e a d q u a r t e r s c o n s i s t s o f t h e command a n d s t a f f elements of t h e m a n e u v e r b a t t a l i o n (6-31

of

I N o r 1-73 AR)

exercist h e MRR

i n g command a n d c o n t r o l

t h e MRR.

The o n l y p o r t i o n s of

h e a d q u a r t e r s p o r t r a y e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a r e t h e c o m b a t v e h i c l e s
of

the

MRR c o m m a n d e r ,

the

S-3 o p e r a t i o n s o f f i c e r ,

and

the

S-3

air.

T h e S-3 a i r p e r f o r m s t h e d u t i e s o f

the Soviet a i r d i r e c t i o n a i r c r a f t as a f o r w a r d air support

(CAS)

officer air

(ADO).

T h e ADO c o n t r o l s t h e HIND-E (FAC) would control

controller

close

aircraft. motorcyc 1 es employed in

Additionally,

t h e MRR h e a d q u a r t e r s h a s purposes Figure these

two messenger
are

.
the

For

safety

motorcycles structure

not the

offense.

6 d e p i c t s the

of

MRR h e a d q u a r t e r s . FIGURE 6 OPFOR MRR HQ

3 - BMP
2

Motorcycles

2-1 0

The Prior etc),

OPFOR MRR h a s t h r e e m o t o r i z e d r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s task organization

of

(MR5).

to

MRR a s s e t s ,

(tanks,

air

defense,

t h e MRE c o n s i s t of

31 EMP.

There are three motorized r i f l e three motorized r i f l e

c o m p a n i e s (MRC) p l a t o o n s (MRP) MRP.

i n e a c h MRB,

and t h e r e a r e

i n e a c h MRC,

and t h e r e a r e t h r e e BMP i n e a c h

The s t r u c t u r e of

t h e MRB i s s h o w n i n F i g u r e 7.

FIGURE 7

OPFOR

MRB

Ha

I - 5MP

MRC
(1

10

- BMP

p e r MRC C d r )

( 3 p e r MRP)
( 1 p e r squad)

2-1 1

The OPFOR MRR h a s one has three tank The companies, tank

tank b a t t a l i o n . which have to have three

The tank

tank

battalion per with team.

platoons

company. the

companies

a habitual form a

relationship arms

motorized r i f l e

battalions

combined

T h e r e a r e 40 t a n k s i n t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n , headquarters, W i t h i n the one t a n k a n d 13 t a n k s i n e a c h of there the

1 tanK three

i n the b a t t a l i o n tank companies. p l a t o o n and the tank

tank companies,

are four

tanks per

i n t h e company h e a d q u a r t e r s .

The s t r u c t u r e o f

b a t t a l i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e 8.

FIGURE 8

OPFOR

TANK

EN

HQ

1 -T-72

Tank Co

13

T-?2

( 1 p e r TK

CO CDR)

( 4 p e r TK PLT)

2-1 2

The

OPFOR MRR h a s one

a r t i l l e r y battalion.

The

artillery

b a t t a l i o n has t h r e e a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r i e s , which c o n s i s t of s i x

122mm
BMPs the

self in the

propelled howitzers,

(122mm

SP

Howitzers), the

and

two

b a t t a l i o n headquarters.
(6-31

Within
I N and

OPFOR r e g i m e n t heavy m o r t a r The

t w o maneuver b a t t a l i o n s '

1-73 A R )

platoons

each

provide

one-BMP

and six-122mm

SP H o w i t z e r .

t h i r d battery of

122mm SP H o w i t z e r s i s n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r m a n n i n g ; The structure of the artillery battalion is

it

is

notional. i n F i g u r e 9.

shown

FIGURE 9

OPFOR

ARTILLERY

BATTALION

HQ

BMP

A r t i l l e r y Battalion

(6

122mm SP Howl t z e r s per b a t t e r y )

(12

- 122mm SP

Howitzers

are actual)

(6

122mm SP How t z e r s are notional

2-1 3

The

OPFOR

MRR

has

one

reconnaissance

company.

The

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company c o n s i s t s o f f o u r EMPs a n d f o u r ERDMs w h i c h a r e d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r equal ERDM each. two Within the s e c t i o n s or teams o f the scout and 1-73 one EMP a n d one p l a t o o n s of AR) form the the

OPFOR r e g i m e n t

maneuver

battalions

(6-31

IN

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company. Training Center, the

Dur I n g t h e ear 1 y y e a r s of
OPFOR also employed

the N a t i o n a l scouts.

motorcycle

Howeuer, f o r s a f e t y r e a s o n s t h e m o t o r c y c l e s a r e n o l o n g e r u s e d i n a r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r o l e m The s t r u c t u r e of t h e OPFOR r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company i s shown i n F i g u r e 1 0 .

FIGURE OPFOR

10

RECONNAISSANCE

COMPANY

.. p:-.;
-I-I 1
1
. . .

r------

_._ -. - 0. ,.._____...__--.I

I
O f

I--- d' 1
:
I

, , ; 77/ '.

.:

1
1

BMP BRDM

EMP
BRDM

1 1

BMP BRDM

1
1

EMP
BRDM

2-14

The OPFOR MRR h a s one a i r d e f e n s e b a t t e r y . b a t t e r y consists of aircraft missiles. similiar guns, and

The a i r d e f e n s e anti-

t w o p l a t o o n s : one p l a t o o n o f ZSU-23-4
one platoon
of

SA-7/GRAIL,

surface-to-air

The S A - 7 / G R A I L to the

i s a man-portable redeye

ground t o a i r m i s s i l e missile systems.

U.S.

Army

or

stinger

W i t h i n t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t t h e 6-31 and t w o o f other two t h e f o u r SA-7/GRAIL SA-7/GRAIL in

I N p r o v i d e s t h e f o u r ZSU-23-4s The 1 - 7 3 AR p r o v i d e s t h e SA-7/GRAIL Army M113A2

systems

systems.

systems.

The U.S.

are

transported carriers.

visually Both of a

modified

and

M106A2

systems

have

the

outward

appearance
system other

characteristics than

BMP,

but

t h e y h a v e n o weapon
i s employed i n

t h e SA-7/GRAIL. because

The S A - 7 / G R A I L there is no

l i e u of

the

SA-P/GASKIN

mu1 t i p i e

integrated

1 aser The

engagement s y s t e m ( M I L E S ) s t r u c t u r e of

a v a i l a b l e t o r e p l i c a t e t h e SA-9.

t h e OPFOR a i r d e f e n s e b a t t e r y i s shown i n F i g u r e 1 1 . FIGURE OPFOR

AIR

11 BATTERY

DEFENSE

.I.

ZSU-23-4

BMP SA-7/GRAI L

2-1 5

The

OPFOR MRR h a s o n e

electronic

warfare

platoon.

The

e l e c t r o n i c w a r f a r e p l a t o o n c o n s i s t s of systems), two ground survei 1lance

t w o BRDMs ( w i t h o u t w e a p o n three
radio

radars,

jammers,

and a g r o u n d r a d a r e m i t t e r . are

T h e ground s u r v e i l l a n c e r a d a r s (GSR) There are two types

U.S.

Army

PUS-5-6

models.

of

radio
is a

jammers;

t h e XM-330

i s an FM r a d i o j a m m e r

and t h e XM-834

UHF and UHF r a d i o j a m m e r . Aviators (GRETA),

T h e Ground Radar E m i t t e r F o r T r a i n i n g system which provides

is

radar

lock-on

signals to a i r c r a f t .

T h e r a d a r s i g n a l s f r o m t h e GRETA r e p l i c a t e
and

the

Soviet

SA-6,

SA-8,

the

ZSU-23-4 Army,

weapons

systems.

The

GRETA s y s t e m i s t r a n s p o r t e d on a U . S .
a n d i s n o t e q u p p e d w i t h a UISMOD.

M548 t r a c k e d c a r r i e r , t h e OPFOR

The s t r u c t u r e o f

e l e c t r o n i c war a r e p l a t o o n

i s s h o w n i n F i g u r e 12.

FIGURE OPFOR ELECTRONIC

12

WARFARE

PLATOON

* D O ..........

__

r 1
2

_-__ t ..........
I

BRDM GSR (PUS-3B)

BRDM Jammers (XM-330)

- M548 C a r r i e r

GRETA

Jammer (XM-834)

2-16

The aircraft.

OPFOR MRR

is

augmented w i t h

one

section

of

HIND-E

The HIND-E a i r c r a f t a r e c o n t r o l l e d by an a i r d i r e c t i o n t h e MRR d u r i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f They a r e n o t employed

o f f i c e r and employed i n s u p p o r t of

MRR a t t a c k s a n d d e f e n s e o f

the main b e l t .

i n s u p p o r t o f m o t o r i z e d r i f l e b a t t a i o n s i n an advance t o c o n t a c t

or w i t h u n l t s
are visually

in

the

defense and

of

a s e c u r i t y zone. with the

The air

aircraft ground The

modified,
(AGES),

equ p p e d

engagement

systems

which

interfaces with t h e AT-6, section

(MILES).

capabi 1 i t i e s o f and the

each a i r c r a f t The

dupl i c a t e

57mm r o c k e t s , i s depicted in

30mm c a n n o n .

OPFOR HIND-E

F i g u r e 13.

FIGURE

13
SECTION

OPFOR

HIND-E

b .

HIND-E

Aircraft

AT-6 M i s s i l e
57mm R o c k e t s
30mm Cannon

2-1 7

The company. following

OPFOR

MRR

is

augmented

with

one

FORSCOM e n g i n e e r
of

The e n g i n e e r types of
U.S.

units

t r a d i t i o n a l l y provide a mix equipment

of

the

Army time

(approximations,
to the

based

upon a v a i 1 i b i 1 i t y a t

the

attachment

OPFOR):

two

D-7

bul I d o r e r s ,

two

backhoes,

two

heavy

equipment

transport

trucks with equipment

t r a i l e r s (HETs), above

a n d f o u r dump t r u c k s . employed in support

The e n g i n e e r of defensive

described

is

mission preparation, An additional

and i s n o t e m p l o y e d i n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

engineer

asset,

the

armored

vehicular

launched
is

b r i d g e (AVLB),

i s employed i n o f f e n s i v e

operations. engineer

T h e AULB forces

provided employed

by

the

1-73

AR.

When

combat

are they

in

support

of

offensive

and defensive T h e ETR-60

operations

a r e t r a n s p o r t e d i n S o v i e t BTR-60s. d r i v e personnel The

14.

i s an e i g h t w h e e l

carrier the

capable

of

transporting company
is

a crew
shown in

of

ten.

structure

of

OPFOR

engineer

Figure

FIGURE OPFOR ENGINEER

14 COMPANY

2 - 0-7 B u l l d c * z e r s
2
2 4 1
6

Backhoes

- HETs
5 t o n Dump T r k s AULB BTR-60

*
are actual

The

BTR-605,

used t o

transport

engineer

soldiers,

Soviet equipment.

2-18

The companies.

OPFOR

MRR

is

augmented

with

two

FORSCOM airborne,

infantry
air

The c o m p a n i e s ,

r e g a r d l e s s of

type

assault, m e c h a n i z e d or l i g h t

infantry

a r e employed to support

t h e OPFOR i n a d i s m o u n t e d r o l e . FORSCOM b e c a u s e t h e

T h e a u g m e n t a t i o n i s t a s k e d by

infantry soldiers

i n 6-31
The
by

IN a r e r e q u l r e d t o dismounted 6-31 IN.

infantry

c r e w 1 2 8 OPFOR UISMOD c o m b a t v e h i c l e s . companies are trained

and

supported

the

The

d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y a r e employed i n both o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e

missions.
carriers

They
and

are

transported MT-LBs which

in

BMP UISMOD M I 1 3 6 2 p e r s o n n e l is a multipurpase amphibious

Figure

Soviet

a r m o r e d t r a c k e d v e h i c l e c a p a b l e of 15 d e p i c t s companies. the organization of

t r a n s p o r t i n g t e n men. OPFOR a u g m e n t a t i o n

the

infantry

FIGURE 15

OPFOR AUGMENTATION INFANTRY COMPANIES

12 10

- BMP ( M 1 1 3 - MT-LB

UISMOD)

I n f Companies
( a p p r o x Im a t e s t r e n g t h of
men p e r c o )

116

T h e MT-LBs,

used t o transport dismounted infantry s o l d i e r s ,

are

actual S o v i e t equipment. 2-1 9

2-4.

SI ON1 F I WNT D I FFERENCES/AN6+CYSISC The d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n

structure of t h e S o v i e t a n d OPFOR MRRs

the organizational a r e numerous. The

i n t e n t here i s t o h i g h l i g h t the s i g n i f i c a n t those d i f f e r e n c e s . As a

d i f f e r e n c e s and a n a l y z e the r e l e v a n c e o f r e s u l t of comparing the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l OPFOR a n d t h e S o v i e t MRR, the

d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e differences

following significant

and s h o u l d b e taken

i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n d u r i n g the and e x e c u t i o n o f t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC.

planning, preparation,

D i s m o u n t e d I n f a n t r y : The d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y c a p a b i l i t y w i t h i n a S o v i e t MHR e q u a t e s t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 567 p e r s o n n e l . total o f 567 i s b a s e d upon t h e f o l l o w i n g c o m p u t a t i o n : ( d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d e l e m e n t o f BMP = 7)6

( 3 BMP p e r p l a t o o n = 2 1 )

The

(3 p l a t o o n s p e r company = 63) ( 3 c o m p a n i e s p e r b a t t a l i o n = 189)

(3 b a t t a l i o n s p e r r e g i m e n t = 567)
The d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y c a p a b i l a p p r o x i m a t e l y 232. dismounted i n f a n t r y
t y of

he OPFOR MRR i s

The t o t a l number o f 232 i s b a s e d upon t h e p r o v i d e d by a u g m e n t a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n F i g u r e

15 page 2-19.
The soldiers battalion/
is

difference significant

represented from a

by

335

dismounted perspective
i f a U.S.

infantry at the

training

task force l e v e l .

A s an e x a m p l e ,

task force

i s d e f e n d i n g a g a i n s t a S o v i e t MRR,

the task f o r c e c o u l d expect

567 i n f a n t r y s o l d i e r s t o p r o v i d e s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e f r o m t h e

BMPs i n a m o u n t e d o r d i s m o u n t e d a t t a c k .

However,

t h e OPFOR c a n

2-20

replicate capability.

only

40%

of

the

Soviet

MRR

dismounted

infantry

Vehicle the

l i m i t a t i o n s a l s o r e d u c e t h e OPFOks Soviet infantry, and

ability

to replicate
be d i s c u s s e d

c a p a b i l i t i e s of

this w i l l

i n c h a p t e r 3. i n f a n t r y does not have a s i g n i f i c a n t

The 1 i m i t e d number o f

i m p a c t w h e n t h e OPFOR MRR s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s p e r f o r m d e f e n s i v e missions. missions. T h e OPFOR f r e q u e n t l y c o n d u c t s MRB a n d MRC d e f e n s i v e T h e r e i s an a d e q u a t e number of p e r s o n n e l to properly

p o r t r a y a S o v i e t MRB o r MRC d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n .

Snai n e e r ComDanr : T h e OPFOR e n g i n e e r c o m p a n y o r g a n i z a t i o n c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l s t h a t of

t h e S o v i e t MRR e n g i n e e r c o m p a n y .

The p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n c e s a r e i n e q u i p m e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d a p p e a r a n c e , w h i c h a r e a d d r e s s e d i n c h a p t e r 3.

A n t i t a n k Bat t e r v i T h e a n t i t a n k ( A T ) b a t t e r y o f t h e S o v i e t
MRR i s n o t r e p l i c a t e d by t h e OPFOR. U n i t s t r a i n i n g a t the t h i s c r i t i c a l weapon
is organized

NTC n e e d t o b e a w a r e o f
system

t h e absence of

T h e S o v i e t r e g i m e n t h a s a n AT b a t t e r y w h i c h t h r e e AT platoons, t h r e e AT

as f o l ows:

detachments,

equipped

w i t h a t o t a l of AT

n i n e BRDM

2 vehicles.

The weapon s y s t e m i s t h e

5. SPANDREL m i s s i l e s y s t e m w h i c h h a s a maximum r a n g e o f 4 , 0 0 0
Each
in

meters.7

vehicle

has

total and

of

15 m i s s i l e s , available

with
for

five

mounted inside

traversable

turret

ten

reload for
in

the

vehicle.

Soviet

tactical

doctrine
in the

calls

the the the

employment o f defense.8

antitank forces forward the a b s e n c e of

o f f e n s e and

Therefore,

these

135 m i s s i l e < . i n

v a s t open t e r r a i n a t F o r t I r w i n i s e s p e c i a l l y n o t e w o r t h y .

2-21

A i r Defense: The S o v i e t a i r defense c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e

closely rep1 icated

from

structural

perspective.

The

major

s h o r t c o m i n g s of

t h e OPFOR a i r d e f e n s e w e a p o n s s y s t e m s a r e t h o s e The two S o v i e t MRR a n t i a i r c r a f t primary platoons. The missile

of

apability

and d e n s i t y . battery have

and a r t i l l e r y p l a oon o f

ZSU-23-4

t h e S o v i e t MRR i s c l o s e l y r e p l l c a t e d by t h e OPFOR MRR; are almost identical. The Soviet

the q u a n t i t y and c a p a b i l i t i e s SA-P/GASKIN

is

p l a t o o n i s not a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y e d .
on
a

T h e SA-9./GASKIN in the launch the

mounted

ERDM-2

with

four

missiles

cannisters vehicle.
t o 2,500

and

four

additional t h e SA-9

missiles

carried

inside

The r a n g e of meters.9

exceeds t h a t of

t h e SA-7 b y 1 , 5 0 0

I n a d d i t i o n t o the two p l a t o o n s d e s c r i b e d above,

the Soviet

MRBs e a c h h a v e a n o r g a n i c a n t i a i r c r a f t p l a t o o n e q u i p p e d w i t h n i n e
SA-7 G R A I L t r a n s p o r t e d i n t h r e e BMPs.10

In total,

t h e a n t i a i r c r a f t a s s e t s o f a S o v i e t MRR would

e q u a t e t o 47 s y s t e m s .

4 4 27

ZSU-23-4
SA-9/GASKIN SA-7/GRAIL
(16 m i s s i l e s )
( 9 p e r MRB)

Whereas,

t h e OPFOR MRR a s s e t s e q u a t e t o 20 s y s t e m s .

4 4

ZSU-23-4
SA-7/GRAIL (16 m i s s i l e s )

T h e u n i t t r a i n i n g a t ' t h e NTC f a c e s a r e d u c e d a i r d e f e n s e capability,

thus p r o v i d i n g g r e a t e r l a t i t u d e f o r t h e employment o f

U . S . c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t ( C A S ) and h e l i c o p t e r s u p p o r t .

2-22

122mm SP H o w i t z e r A r t i l l e r y < The S o v i e t b a t t a l i o n has three b a t t e r i e s o f the the three

122mm SP a r t i l l e r y
Two o f and

six

122mm SP h o w i t z e r s .
r e p l i c a t e d by the

b a t t e r i e s are physically The

OPFOR battery

t h i r d battery i s notional. credited in the

t h i r d (notional)
f i r e

is

c a l c u l a t e d and

indirect

control

rules of from a on the

engagement p r o c e d u r e s a t t h e NTC. training perspective,

15

The p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n c e , vehicle density

the

reduced

battlefield. 1 2 0 m M o r t a r B a t t e r i e s : The S o v i e t MHR h a s t h r e e m o r t a r b a t t e r i e s o r g a n i c t o e a c h MRB. m o r t a r s towed b y a GAZ-66 t h e OPFOR MRR a r c (notional) battery,
of

Each m o r t a r b a t t e r y h a s s i x The 18 120mm m o r t a r s w i t p l i n

As w i t h

truck.11

all

notional.

the

122mm SP h o w i t z e r

the m o r t a r s a r e c r e d i t e d through the r u l e s the i m p a c t on u n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC

engagement,

however,

i s a r e d u c e d number o f v e h i c l e s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . M o t o r c y c l e s : The S o v i e t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company h a s t h r e e m o t o r c Y c l e s - 1 2 The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f the OPFOR reconnaissance companies are t h e S o v i e t and same
WI

the

th

the

e x c e p t i o n of

the motorcycles.

The OPFOR e m p l o y e d m o t o r c y c l e e i n

t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r o l e v e r y s u c c e s s f u l l y d u r i n g t h e 1982 t o 1984

time period.
in injury to

However, personnel

as a r e s u l t and damage

of to

accidents, equipment,

which the

resulted OPFOR no at

longer the

uses motorcycles f o r need to

be

reconnaissance. of this

Units

training

NTC

aware have

significant mobility,

difference. stealth, and

Motorcycles speed.

obviously

excellent

As a r e s u l t of

t h e i r s i z e a n d mobi 1 i t y t h e y a r e d i f f i c u l t

t o a c q u i r e a n d engage w i t h d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t f i r e s .

2-23

The f o l l o w i n g q u o t e d e s c r i b e s t h e c u r r e n t S o v i e t p h i for the conduct o f mounted and dismounted a s s a u l t s .

0 5 op h Y

Soviets prefer motorized r i f l e units to assau t mounted. The f a c t o r s f a v o r i n g m o u n t e d a s s a u l t a r e : NBC c o n t a m i n a t i o n . Open t e r r a i n . R e d u c e d enemy a n t i t a n k c a p a b i l i t y . Weak enemy d e f e n s e s . I f a dismounted a t t a c k i s planned, a dismount l i n e i s d e s i g n a t e d , w i t h i n a b o u t 400 m e t e r s f r o m t h e FEBA. W i t h BTRs i n d e f i l a d e t o p r o t e c t r i f l e m e n f r o m m a c h i n e gun f i r e and u e h i c l e s f r o m a n t i t a n k f i r e s . Factors f a v o r i n g dismounted a s s a u l t are! S t r o n g enemy a n t i t a n k c a p a b i l i t y . W e l l p r e p a r e d enemy d e f e n s e s . Fords or bridges. Obstacles or m i n e f i e l d s . Rough t e r r a i n : no h i g h s p e e d a u e n u e s o f a t t a c k . Maximum f i r e p o w e r needed.20

The S o v i e t BMP h a s t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c o g n i t i o n f a c t o r s w h i c h make i t r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m o t h e r vehicles.21 (The a s t e r i s k t r a c k e d combat

i n d i c a t e s those r e c o g n i t i o n f a c t o r s

w h i c h a r e t h e same f o r a.
b.

t h e OPFOR B M P ) .

S i x r o a d wheels. Three support r o l l e r s . Two r e a r d o o r s . F o u r h a t c h e s on t h e t o p r e a r o f the h u l l .

c.

d.
e.
f.

Low s i l h o u t t e .
Sharp s l o p i n g f r o n t . The s h o r t b a r r e l o f
I

g.

t h e 73mm c a n n o n .

*
mounted

h.

D i s t i n c t i v e p o s i t i o n l n g of

t h e AT-B/SAGGER,

above t h e 73mm c a n n o n . il

* *

F l a t t u r r e t c e n t e r e d on t h e h u l l .

A c o m p a r i s o n o f S o v i e t a n d OPFOR BMP c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s p r o v i d e d i n F i g u r e 25, i n F i g u r e 26. a n d a c o m p a r i s o n o f p h o t o g r a p h s i s shown

3-1 4

2-5.

CONCLUSIONk

There a r e s i g n i f i c a n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and a Soviet and the OPFOR M R R . In

structural

d i f f e r e n c e s between

the aggregate,

t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a d d r e s s e d above s h o u l d i n d i c a t e that the OPFOR

to a

commander

MRR h a s d e f i n i t e

organizatlonal

peculiarities.. be c o g n i z a n t of

A s a r e s u l t t h e commander a n d h i s s t a f f n e e d t o these f a c t o r s d u r i n g the t h e NTC. planning, preparation, should

and e x e c u t i o n o f affect of his

training at

These d i f f e r e n c e s

training analysis of

l e s s o n s l e a r n e d upon c o m p l e t i o n

t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC. The primary differences number of air

of

include

the

shortage o f and combat and to the

infantry, absence of of the

the

reduced

defense

assets, the

antitanK OPFOR. systems vehicles elements indirect learned.

assets, The i s on are

a

all

which
122mm

1 imit SP in

power 120mm the

shortage

of

howitzer regard

mortar of

significant the

factor

number

battlefield. through

However, the

since of

these

missing

replicated their

rules

engagement

fur

fires,

absence does n o t worthy of

adversely a f f e c t note
is

lessons of

Another

factor

the

absence

m o t o r c y c l e s f r o m t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company. A total assessment o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l differences noted

b e t w e e n a S o v i e t a n d t h e OPFOR MRR r e v e a l s t h a t t h e OPFOR MRR h a s a l e s s e r d e g r e e o f combat p o w e r .

2-24

CHAPTER 2

END NOTES
1U.S. A r m y , FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 3 , T h e S o v i e t Army TrooDs: OraanU.S. Army, 1984. i z a t i o n . and E q u i p m e n t . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C., p a g e 1-3.

2m., p a g e s 4-8.
3U.S. Army, I n t e l 1 i a e n c e P r e p a r a t i o n of t h e B a t t l e p a g e s 1-5, f i e l d . U.S. G o v e r n m e n t P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 3 . a n d 1-9.
1-8,

4The a u t h o r w a s a s s i g n e d t o t h e NTC d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d May 1 9 8 2 t h r u J u n e 1 9 8 5 , and p e r f o r m e d d u t i e s as o b s e r v e r c o n t r o l l e r w i t h TRADOC, O p e r a t i o n s G r o u p , a n d b a t t a l i o n S-3, a n d XO o f 6 t h E n , 31st I n f a n t r y . 5U.S. A r m y H e a d q u a r t e r s N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g C e n t e r , TACSOP. O f f i c e o f t h e D e p u t y Commander f o r T r a i n i n g , 1 9 8 5 . p a g e 2. 6FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 3 , p a g e 4-22. The d i s m o u n t e d s q u a d e l e m e n t cons i s t of seven p e r s o n n e l . T h e d r i v e r and a s s i s t a n t s q u a d l e a d e r remain w i t h the v e h i c l e to provide f i r e support. ' I-*b i d
I

p a g e s 4-16,

5-80,

a n d 5-87.

A r m y , FM 100-2-1,The S o v i e t Army: O p e r a t i o n s a n d p a g e s 10-1 t h r u T a c t i c s . W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. U.S. A r m y , 1 9 8 4 . 10-3. 9FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 3 ,

' O w . ,

%.S.

p a g e s 5-95,

5-101,

a n d 5-103.

p a g e s 4-24

a n d 4-25. 4-24, and 5 - 6 0 .

l1U., p a g e s 4-5,

l 2 U . , page 4-15.

2-25

CHAPTER E Q U IPMENT

3-1.

JNTRODUCTION: i t e m s of

The

purpose

of

this chapter
t o that

is

t o compare
A

the major

OPFOR e q u i p m e n t

of all

a S o v i e t MRR.

b r i e f c o m p a r i s o n and a n a l y s i s a r e made o f used

by

t y p e s of
is

vehicles
the

the

OPFOR;

however, t h e T-72
the

the

primary The

focus

on

BMP

personnel attempts

carrier
to

and

tank.

OPFOR MHR a t
by

t h e NTC
1 imi ted

rep1 i c a t s

Soviet

equipment

using

quantities of Mi 1 i t a r y

a c t u a l S o v i e t v e h i c l e s p r o v i d e d by Company C , (MI) B a t t a l ion, and U.S.

by

203d
large

I n t e l 1 igence

using

q u a n t i t i e s o f v i s u a l l y m o d i f i e d (UISMOD) FQU I PMFNT COMPARISONS: the degree of

Army v e h i c l e s .

3-2.

The f o l l o w i n g equipment comparisons

in

indicate actual 1y

accuracy Sou i e t

which

the

OPFOR The

equipment

resemble s

e q u i pmen t

photograph

r e p r o d u c t i o n s o f OPFOR e q u i p m e n t a r e f r o m an OPFOR V i s u a l l y Modified NTC.1 The Mi-24/HIND, Soviet which HIND-E (UISMOD) Vehicle Recoanition Guide, prepared
at

the

is

one

of

three

versions

of

the of

is

multipurpose

helicopter,

capable

c a r r y i n g e i g h t f u l l y e q u i p p e d combat s o l d i e r s a n d a b a s i c l o a d of armament. machine The

gun

The
or
IS

armament
a

consist

of

32

57mm r o c k e t s ,

12.7mm

23mm c a n n o n ,

and f o u r ,

AT-6/SPIRAL

missiles. one
is

aircraft size

vulnerable for irregular shape

two p r i m a r y r e a s o n s , which make

the

the very

large

and

aircraft the

easily recognizable.

The o t h e r

i s the requirement for

3- 1

aircraft when

to remain

stationary

in

l i n e of

sight

with

the

target

employing the

the

AT-6

miSSile.2 UISMOD and larger,

The the

privlary

differences are
that

between the

OPFOR

HIND-E

actual

HIND-E

Soviet version

i s much

has f i v e

main r o t o r

blades,

and

due

t o MILES-AGES
a

equipment The

availability
Soviet
and

ha5

30mm

cannon

versu5

23mm

cannon.

OPFOR

aircraft

p h o t o s a r e shown

i n F i g u r e 1 6 and 17.

FIGURE 16 SOVIET M i - 2 4 HIND-E

SOURCE:

FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,

AVIATORS

RECOGNITION MANUAL, p a g e 1 - 4 8

3-2

FIGURE 17

OPFOR UISMOD HIND-E

B.

A.

Gunner's canopy. Short a u x i l i a r y wings.

B.

3-3

T h e S o v i e t ZSU-23-4 equipped w i t h four no d i f f e r e n c e s VISMOD. The

is a self-propelled

antiaircraft There

system

23mm a u t o m a t i c c a n n o n s . 3 the actual Soviet

are
and

virtuallr
the OPFOR tanK.

between

version

OPFOR VISMOD

i s m o u n t e d on

a n M551 S h e r i d a n

T h e OPFOR a n d S o v i e t ZSU-23-4

a r e s h o w n b e l o w i n F i g u r e 18. FIGURE 18 ZSU-23-4

OPFOR UISMOD ZSU-23-4

SOVIET ZSU-23-4

SOURCE:

FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,

AVIATORS

R E C O G N I T I O N MANUAL,

p a g e s 3 - 4 8 & 4P.

3-4

T h e S o v i e t 122mm s e l f - p r o p e l l e d
an

howitzer team o f

( 2 S 1 o r M1974)

is

important

p a r t of

the

combined arms

the

Soviet

MRR.
The

I t can be e m p l o y e d i n t h e d i r e c t a n d t h e v e h i c l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of required The OPFOR

i n d i r e c t f i r e mode.

t h i s h o w i t z e r p r o v i d e the c a p a b i l i t i e s
BMPs a n d
of

to

maneuver

with

tanks SP

on

the

battlefield.4 same
two

UISMOD as

version the

the

122mm

has

the The

basic major

characteristics

actual

Soviet

vehicle.

d i f f e r e n c e s a r e the p o s i t i o n of hull and

is

the t u r r e t of
is
is

i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the vehicle.
to
the

in

the

overall and the

height turret UISMOD

the

The rear.
on

Soviet
The

vehicle 1ZZmm SP

lower howitzer

farther also

OPFOR

mounted

the

PI551

Sher i d a n tanK. i n F i g u r e 19.

T h e S o v i e t a n d OPFOR 122mm SP h o w i t z e r s a r e shown

FIQURE 1 9
1 2 2 m m SELF-PROPELLED

HOWITZER

SOVIET 122mm SP H o w i t z e r

SOURCE:

WEAPONS OF THE MODERN SOVIET GROUND FORCES,

page 64.

.................................................................
OPFOR UISMOD 122mm SP H o w i t z e r

3-5

T h e S o v i e t ERDM h a s m a n y a p p l i c a t i o n s ;

however,

the vehicle The a c t u a l

i s most

commonly e m p l o y e d

in a reconnaissance r o l e .

S o v i e t ERDM-2 7.62mm

has a t u r r e t m o u n t e d 14.5mm m a c h i n e gun and a

gun.

machine

The caliber the does

vehicle machine

is

vulnerable fire.5

to
The

artillery primary
i s that

fragments

and

.50

gun

d i f f e r e n c e s between the OPFOR vehicle

actual
not

v e h i c l e and OPFOR UISMOD the 14.5mm weapon

have

system

or
The

turret.

T h e OPFOR VISMOD BRDM i s m o u n t e d on an M880 t r u c k . a r e shown i n F i g u r e 20. FIGURE 2 0

OPFOR and S o v i e t BRDM-2

BRDM-2 AMPHIBIOUS RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLE

OPFOR UISMOD BRDM

SOURCE:

WEAPONS OF THE MODERN SOVIET GROUND FORCES,

p a g e 41.

3-6

The S o v i e t a m p h i b i o u s a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r BTR-60PB an e i g h t - w h e e l - d r i v e eight passengers. vehicle, The has a crew of three,

i s

and c a r r i e s

Vehicle

armament The The

consists BTR-60

of

14.5mm

machine gun and a 7.62mm machine gun.

i s vulnerable
vehicles

to

indirect

and s m a l l

arms

fire.6

B T R - ~s ~ eries

used by t h e OPFOR a r e a c t u a l S o v i e t v e h i c l e s .

The OPFOR v e h i c l e s ured

for

do

not

have

any

weapon

systems;

they

are

transport

purposes o n l y .

The S o v i e t BTR-60PB

i s shown i n F i g u r e 2 1 .

FIGURE 19 BTR -60 PB

SOURCE:

FM 100-2-3,

THE SOUIFT ARMY TROOPS. ORGANIZATION AND

EQUIPMENT, page 5-16.

3-7

The S o v i e t MT-LB

i s an a m p h i b i o u s a r m o r e d t r a c K e d v e h i c l e ,

armed w i t h a 7.62mm m a c h i n e g u n . personnel

soldiers.
.SO

When t h e MT-LB
of
two

i s employed a s a

carrier

i t

has

crew

and

can

carry

ten

The v e h i c l e machine

i s vulnerable
fire.7

t o a r t i l l e r y f r a g m e n t s and
OPFOR M T - L B ~ are

caliber

gun

The

actual

Soviet vehicles. transportation S o v i e t MT-LB of

As w i t h

t h e BTR-60 and

they are used s t r i c t l y f o r

soldiers,

have

no

weapon

system.

The

i s shown i n F i g u r e 22. FIGURE 20 MT-LB

SOURCE:

FM 100-2-3,

THE SOVIET ARMY TROOPS, ORGANIZATION AND

EQUIPMENT, page 5-28.

3-8

There structure.

are

numerous m o d e l s of medium tank

tanks

in

the

Soviet

force in the

The T-64

i s deployed p r i m a r i l y

Group o f S o v i e t F o r c e s , Germany a n d t h e S o u t h e r n Group o f F o r c e s ,

Hungary.8

The T - 7 2

a p p e a r s t o be a h i g h p r o d u c t i o n model d e s i g n e d "The T-72 h a s been d e p l o r e d w i t h i n Pact armies the

t o c o m p l e m e n t t h e T-64. USSR a n d e x p o r t e d other countries."9

t o non-Soviet

Warsaw

and s e v e r a l

The S o v i e t T-72 medium t a n k NTC. The S o v i e t T-72

i s r e p l i c a t e d by a UISMUD a t t h e
entered the service in 1974.

medium t a n k

A s a r e s u l t o f an i n t e g r a t e d f i r e c o n t r o l s y s t e m a n d an a u t o m a t i c l o a d e r t h e S o v i e t s w e r e a b l e t o r e d u c e t h e number o f p e r s o n n e l the tank crew from f o u r t o t h r e e s l o The armament on t h e T-72 in

tank

i s t h e 12Smm s m o o t h b o r e m a i n gun a n d a 12.7mm m a c h i n e gun.

Some o f the primary recognition features of t h e S o v i e t T-72

a r e i l l (The a s t e r i s k

i n d i c a t e s those r e c o g n i t i o n f a c t o r which a r 4

t h e same w i t h t h e OPFOR a n d t h e S o v i e t T - 7 2 ) . a.
b.
C.

S i x large die-cast,

e v e n l y spaced r o a d wheels.

T h r e e t r a c k s u p p o r t roll e r s . S h a r p 1 y s l o p e d u p p e r g l ac i s w i t h V-shaped S i n g l e s n o r k e l m o u n t e d on t h e l e f t s i d e o f Rounded t u r r e t m o u n t e d m i d w a y on t h e t a n k . E n g i n e e x h a u s t on t o p o f Bore evacuator o n e - t h i r d t h e bacK d e c k . guard. the t u r r e t .

d.

e.

f. 9h.
i.

d i s t a n c e f r o m the muzzle. t h e m a i n gun.

I n f r a r e d l i g h t t o the r i g h t of

E x t e r n a l l y mounted and f i r e d machine gun. Optional, external fuel cells.

j.

3-9

T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e OPFOR UISMOD T-72 and the S o v i e t T-72 tank. The h e i g h t than

of

the

OPFOR

tank

i s two The which

f e e t and t h r e e Soviet tank

inches greater a trench

t h a t of

t h e S o v i e t T-72. capability,

has

or

ditch

crossing

e x c e e d s t h e OPFOR t a n k by a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o f e e t . 00me V I SMO items of special Soviet equipment T-72 tanks are not are

Additionally, OPFOR

r e p l i c a t e d by t h e with the

The

equipped

KM T-S
platoon,

mi n d c e a r i n g p l o w . t h r e e p e r company, T-72

The b a s i s o f

issue

i s one p e r t a n k

f o r a t o t a l o f n i n e w i t h i n a MRR.12 The s o v i e t

s a l s o e q u i p p e d w i t h a s e l f - g e n e r a t i n g smoke a n d a g r e n a d e
A c o m p a r i s o n o f S o v i e t a n d OPFOR T - 7 2 The S o v i e t a n d OPFOR

l a u n c h e d smoke c a p a b i 1 i t y .

t a n k c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s shown i n F i g u r e 23. T-72 a r e shown i n F i g u r e 2 4 .

3-10

FIGURE 23

T - 7 2 TANK COMPARISON OPFOR 13

V E H I C L E CHARACTERISTICS

SOU1 ET 1 4

HEIGHT ( t u r r e t ) LENGTH ( h u 1 1 )

9 ft 8 in
20 f t 6 i n

7 f t 5 in 20 f t 6 i n

W IDTH
ROAD WHEELS SUPPORT ROLLERS SPEED MAX GRADE ( s l o p e ) 15 TRENCH CROSSING V E R T I CLE STEP TURRET ELEVATION ( d e g r e e s ) CREW S P E C I A L EQUIPMENT

9 f t 2 in
5 each
0

10 f t
6 each

3 each

43 mph 60% 7 ft
33 i n

50 mph

58 %

8 ft
32 i n

I 1

in

-8

t o +19

-s

t o +18

f o u r men none

t h r e e men mine plow smoke

ARMAMENT:

T h e M I L E S e q u i p m e n t on t h e OPFOR t a n k r e p l i c a t e s t h e same t y p e , b a s i c l o a d , r a t e s of f i r e , p r o b a b i l i t y o f h i t a n d k i l l a s t h a t o f an a c t u a l S o v i e t T - 7 2 .

.+

OPFOR v e h i c l e s a r e r e s t r i c t e d t o a maximum s a f e s p e e d o f 2 0 mph.

3-1 1

F I G U R E 24

T-72 TANK

S O V I E T T-72

MEDIUM TANK

SOURCE;

A.
B.

FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,

A V I A T O R ' S RECOGNITION MANUALc page 4-37.

S O V I E T TROOP C@NTR@LLpage 2 1 .

OPFOR 'JISMOD T - 7 2

TANK

3-1 2

The S o v i e t November infantry 1967.

BMP was f i r s t The BMP

o b s e r v e d by

the Western w o r l d or the

in

(Broneuaya the

Mashina Pekhoty forces with

armored
first

vehicle),

provided

Soviet

i n f a n t r y combat v e h i c l e w i t h c a n n o n , machine gun. The

a n t i t a n k g u i d e d m i s s i l e , and integration vehicle to the

BMP b r o u g h t c o m b i n e d arms The BMP-1

i5

lowest tact'ca1
r e p l i c a t e d by t h e OPFOR a t BMP-2 BMP-2
is not

the

which

is
the
the

t h e NTC w i t h a UISMOD. it
is significant

Although

addressed here,

t o note that improvements

i s an

improved v e r s i o n o f

the

BMP-1.

The

in

t h e BMP-2 a r e e x t e n s i u e . 1 7 Since much d e b a t e the introduction of the BMP in 1967 t h e r e the h a s heen
Of

about

employment c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e S o v i e t s was t h e

system.
Was

primary conccrn to

basic question.

the

v e h i c l e t o be u s e d a s an a r m o r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r o r an i n f a n t r y fighting Institute indicates employment uehicle? for a A 1976 r e s e a r c h Russian training in combat. report East and study from the

U.S.

Army

Advanced

and

European

Studies

variety the

of
BMP

methodr The

philosophies indicated

of

for

that

commanders o f BMP u n i t s n e e d t o be f l e x i b l e , m a n e u v e r , n o t become s t e r e o t y p e d , employment o f t h e BMP.18 The

m a i n t a i n freedom o f

a n d c o n s i d e r new t e c h n i q u e s f o r

1973

Yom

Kippur

war

proved

to

be

disasterous t o charge

experience for

t h e BMP.

The d o c t r i n e a t

that

time w a s

o n t o enemy p o s i t i o n s w i t h weapons s y s t e m s f i r i n g ,

t o include port

f i r e d s m a l l arms, w h i l e s o l d i e r s r e m a i n e d mounted.19

3-13

FIGURE 25 BMP COMPAR ISON V E H I C L E CHARACTERISTICS OPFOR22 SOU1 E T 2 3

HEIGHT

turret)

9 ft 8 in
22 f t 2 i n

6 f t 6 in
22 f t 2 i n

LENGTH ( h u 1 1 )

W IDTH
ROAD WHEELS SUPPORT ROLLERS MAX GRADE ( s l o p e ) 2 4

9 ft 2 in
5 each
0

9 f t 9 in
6 each

3 each

60%

58 %

TRENCH CROSSING U E R T I CLE STEP TURRET ELEVATION ( d e g r e e s ) CREW

7 ft
33 i n
-8

6 f t 7 in
32 i n
-4

t o +19

t o +33 plus infantry

3 7

S P E C I A L EQUIPMENT

none

u e h smoke

ARMAMENTI

The M I L E S e q u i p m e n t o n t h e OPFOR BMP r e p l i c a t e s t h e same t y p e , b a s i c l o a d , r a t e s o f f i r e , p r o b a b i l i t y of h l t a n d k i l l a s t h a t o f an a c t u a l S o v i e t BMP.

*-

OPFOR u e h l l c l e s a r e r e s t r l c t e d t o a maximum s p e e d o f 20 mph f o r s a f e t y purposes.

3-13

F I G U R E 26 BMP I N F A N T R Y COMBAT V E H I C L E

SOU I ET

SOURCE:

A.

FM 1 - 4 0 2 ,

AVIATORS

R E C O G N I T I O N MANUAL,

p a g e 7-36.

8.

S O V I E T TROOP CONTROL,

page 2 1 .

OPFOR V I S M O D BMP

3-1 6

3-3.

~ I G N I F DII F~ FERENCES/NWLY S I S C

The d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n
As

t h e equipment of

t h e S o v i e t a n d t h e OPFOR MRRs a r e numerous.

a r e s u l t o f c o m p a r i n g t h e e q u i p m e n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e OPFOR and t h e taken Soviet MRR t h e following are s i g n i f i c a n t during the planning, a n d s h o u l d be and

into consideration

preparation,

e x e c u t i o n o f t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC.

HIND-E:
HIND-E syst;rn.

The

p r i m a r y d i f f e r e n c e s between

the

OPFOR VISMOD

a n d t h e a c t u a l S o v i e t a i r c r a f t a r c t h e s i z e a n d t h e weapon The s m a l l e r s i z e o f t h e OPFOR a i r c r a f t w i l l make i t more i n the s i z e o f a the cannon, advantage in

d i f f i c u l t t o acquire. (30mm v e r s u s over the 23mm)

The d i f f e r e n c e the OPFOR The

gives

aircraft of

slight both

Soviet

version.

pictures

aircraft

F i . g u r e s 16 a n d 17, to size, shape,

c l e a r l y show t h e v i s u a l

differences

i n regard

a n d t h e number o f r o t o r b l a d e s .

The m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e OPFOR a n d t h e S o v i e t BRDM i s t h e f a c t weapon that The t h e OPFOR UISMOD d o e s n o t h a v e a t u r r e t a n d absence the of the turret detracts of from the

system.
of

accuracy vehicle.

rep1 i c a t i n g

true

appearance

the

Soviet

The l a c k o f a 14.Smm m a c h i n e gun makes t h e v e h i c l e more however, when assessing the structure of the OPFOR

vulnerable; MRR,

there are only four

i n t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company a n d t w o i n Neither of the two a r e employed

the electronic warfare section.

to fight.

The BRDMs e m p l o y e d by t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company c a r r y Regardless o f t h e armament

a M I L E S e q u i p p e d 7.62mm m a c h i n e g u n .

c a p a b i l i t i e s t h e BRDM i s a v u l n e r a b l e v e h i c l e on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

3-1 7

BTR-60

AND

MT-I B:
the

The

actual

Soviet

BTR-60 transport

and

MT-LB

v e h i c l e s e m p l o y e d by only. are

OPFOR a r e

u s e d for

purposes
and t h e y

A s t h e BRDM t h e y a l s o l a c k a M I L E S w e a p o n s y s t e m ,

vulnerable

to

direct

and

indirect with the

fires. BTR-60

The and

loss
the

of

firepower

is

more

significant

MT-LB

b e c a u s e of t h e t o t a l q u a n t i t y (BTR-60, maximum o f ten), T h e OPFOR UISMOD T-72 t h e S o v i e t T-72. limitations

m a x i m u m of s i x and MT-LB,

T-72 TANK

tank c l o s e l y p a r a 1 l e l s t h e
t h r e e major d i f f e r e n c e s the lack of special

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of are the size, all

The

mobility
of

and

equipment,
of

w h i c h d e t r a c t f r o m t h e a c c u r a c y of T h e OPFOR t a n k T-72.
is

performance inches
the

t h e OPFOR T-72. than the

two f e e t the

and t h r e e

higher

Soviet

Because o f

excess h e i g h t

OPFOR v e h i c l e w i l l battlefield. obscure Secondly, mobil i tr. Folds

b e m o r e e a s i l y a c q u i r e d a n d d e s t r o y e d on i n the ground, i n w h i c h a S o u i e t T-72 the

the

could

itself, the The

would not OPFOR Soviet feet

adequately protect does not have an

OPFOR u e h i c l e . degree of

T-72
T-72s

equal

t r e n c h a n d gap c r o s s i n g c a p a b i 1 i t y than wi
or

is

almost

greater which

the
1 an

OPFOR

UISMOD

T-72.
of

Countermobil i ty OPFOR T-72 major may

obstacles have

restrict actual The

movement T-72. The

an
last

less e f f e c t

difference

i s special
to

equipment. the

OPFOR PIRR d o e s

not

h a v e a UISMOD d e v i c e (KM T - 6 ) , value

replicate

nine mineclearing

plows,

f o u n d i n a S o v i e t MRR.
countermobility

This shortcoming r e i n f o r c e s the

employed against the OPFOR.

of

obstacles

H o w e v e r , as w i t h t h e S o v i e t T-72s

superior

3-18

m o b i l i t y mentioned e a r l i e r , effective actual against MRR. the the OPFOR Another OPFOR

c o u n t e r m o b i l i t y obstacles which MRR

w i l l

are an

have in
of

less

effect to

on

Soviet i s

shortcoming lack and

regard smoke

special

equipment capabi 1 i t y ,

T-72's

generating The

both

sel f-generat ing

g r e n a d e - 1 aunched.

i n a b i l i t y to replicate makes t h e OPFOR T-72 offense these and defense. of

t h e smoke c a p a b i l i t i e s o f

t h e S o v i e t T-72 i n both the take when

more vulnerable t o d i r e c t f i r e
Units the of training at tank the

NTC n e e d t o
consideration

weaknesses the

OPFOR lessons

into

assessing

value The

learned

from

their

training in
in

experiences. training combat, at

OPFOR T - 7 2 than the

will

be m o r e Soviet

easily T-72

defeated
w i l l

the

NTC

actual

be

The differences from

OPFOR UISMOD BMP a l s o the Soviet BMP. As

has

several the OPFOR

noteworthy T-72
the

with

OPFOR BMP i s h i g h e r ( b y 3 f e e t

and 2

inches).

Additionally

the

OPFOR BMP h a s a r e d u c e d t u r r e t e l e v a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y , dismounted The infantry personnel, and the and cannot to

cannot c a r r y smoke. smoke

self-generate self-generate

additional

height

inability

m e r i t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s s t a t e d above OPFOR UISMOD T-72. UISMOD BMP's in The o t h e r

i n reference t o the

t w o m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s a r e t h e OPFOR

inability turret

to

carry

infantry The

personnel to

and

the

degradation

elevation.

inability

transport

i n f a n t r y and t o f i g h t inhibit the OPFOR

t h e v e h i c l e a s an i n f a n t r y f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e the Soviet doctrine stated on

from employing

page 3-14
turret

above.

A s n o t e d i n F i g u r e 25 page 3-15,
+33 d e g r e e s

t h e S o v i e t RMP BMP can

can

elevate

while

the

OPFOR V I S M O D

e l e v a t e only +19 degrees. 3-1 9

The

14

degree

difference OPFOR VISMOD

is

an

important from

factor

because

i t high

precludes ground at

the

EMP thus

engaging

targets

on

close

ranges, the

limiting

its

self

defense

capability

i n much o f

terrain at Fort Irwin.

Units training shortcomings o f equipment on a

a t t h e NTC n e e d t o be aware o f t h e s e s i g n i f i c a n t the OPFOR VISMOD BMP because the actual

battlefield of

the f u t u r e w i l l There the are

n o t be a s e a s i l y d e f e a t e d . significant equipment overall differences a n a l y s i s of that

As

3-4.

FONCLUSIONS:
a Soviet

between

and

OPFOR MRR.

I n an

t h e e q u i p m e n t d i f f e r e n c e s a d d r e s s e d above i t s h o u l d b e c l e a r the OPFOR the

MRR

has

significant and

equipment need

shortcomings. to be aware of

a the

result

commander

staff

d i f f e r e n c e s a n d t a k e them i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e p l a n n i n g , preparation, differences and should execution

of

training

at

the drawn

NTC.
from

These lessons

also a f f e c t

conclusions

l e a r n e d upon c o m p l e t i o n o f The

training at

t h e NTC. the OPFOR

p r irnary di f f e r e n c e s a n d BMP. problems

include shortcomings o f

VISMOD 7-72 with other

When t h e s e m a j o r d e f i c i e n c i e s a r e c o u p l e d addressed in regard to the

HIND-E,

BRDM,

BTR-60,

a n d MT-LB,

the

OPFOR MRR e q u i p m e n t

i s markedly

inferior

t o t h a t o f a S o u i e t MRR.

3-20

CHAPTER 3

END NOTES

cR

l T h e OPFOR V i s u a l l y M o d i f i e d (VISMOD) V e h i c l e i s a p o c k e t s i z e document, 11 papes i n l e n g t h , designed t o , 'prouide U . . S . Army personnel w i t h a r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e r e f e r e n c e w h i c h w i l l a i d i n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f UISMOD V e h i c l e s u s e d by t h e OPFOR a t t h e N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g C e n t e r , Cal i f o r n i a . " The document p r o b a b l y a c h i e v e d t h e d e s i r e d p u r p o s e when i t was f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1982. Howeuer, i t i s i n d i r e need of revision.
2U.S. A r m y , FM'100-2-3, O r a a n i z a t i o n . and Eguipment. pages 5-80 and 5-81.

The S o u i e t A r m y ! TrooDsL Washington, D . C . , U.S. A r m y ,

1934.

. , page 5-93. 4w., pages 5-49 'w.,page 5-15. 6u., page 5-16. 7u., page 5-28. ~

and 5-53.

~ , page . 5-39.

91bid., 18.
llU.S.

page 5-40.

l o R a y Bonds,

h page L
FM 1-402, Aviator's R e c o o n i t i o n Guide, page

Army,

4-36. 12FM 100-2-3, page 5-129. O D e r a t o r ' s Manual

(Crew),

13U.S. A r m y , TM 9-2350-230-10, p a g e s . 1 - 1 t h r u 1-8.

14FM 100-2-3,

pages 5-32,

5-33, and 5-40.

15The c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e S o v i e t T-72 tank and t h e S o v i e t BMP, t o ascend and decend a grade a r e e x p r e s s e d i n d e g r e e s . To compare t h a t c a p a b i l i t y w i t h t h e M551 Sheridan, t a n k , UISMOD BMP and T-72, t h e degree was c o n v e r t e d t o a p e r c e n t a g e by use o f the a r i t h m e t i c tanqent f o r m u l a . ( t h e t a n g e n t o f 30 d e g r e e s = 57.735= 58%) 16Dau i d C . 126. 3-21 I s b y , W e a ~ o n s and T a c t i c s o f The S o v i e t A r m y L page

17U.S. Army, January-February

A r m o r M a a a z i n t , "New S o v i e t BMP-2 U n v e i l e d " , 1 9 8 6 , p a g e s 2 4 a n d 25.

1 8 M a j o r James K . Mc Cast i n , Jr., S t u d e n t R e s e a r c h R e p o r t , Combat I n f a n t r y V e h i c l e s (BMP) I n Combat. 1976. 19Ray B o n d s , Weapons o f t h e M o d e r n S o v i e t G r o u n d F o r c e s . page

47.
20FM 100-2-1, 21FM 1-402, page 5-27. p a g e 7-36. pages 1-1 t h r u 1-8. a n d 5-21.

22TM 9-2350-230-10, 23FM 100-2-3,

p a g e s 5-18,

5-19,

24m., page 5-18.

3-22

CHAPTER TACT1 CS 4-1. the INTRODUCTION: tactical The p u r p o s e of a of

this chapter

i s to

compare
of

doctrine

Soviet to

MRR,

in

the

conduct

offensive t h e NTC. combat NTC

and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , T h i s chapter

t h a t of

t h e OPFOR MRR a t the the

i s l i m i t e d i n scope

t o an a n a l y s i s o f the OPFOR at

m i s s i o n s most

frequently

p o r t r a y e d by

.
The Soviet art of war includes three components: s t r a t e g y , o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , and t a c t i c s , each o f w h i c h has i t s d i s t i n c t i v e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s f o r t h e conduct o f armed combat on v a r i o u s s c a l e s . S t r a t e g y i s t h e h i g h e s t domain o f t h e a r t of w a r , . . .

O p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n c l u d e s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the conduct o f o p e r a t i o n s ( a c t i o n s ) by t h e l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s . . . T a c t i c s i s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l a s p e c t s of p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f combat by t h e s u b u n i t s , u n i t s , and f o r m a t i o n s o f the v a r i o u s s e r v i c e s o f the Armed F o r c e s . . ( e m p h a s i s added)

The s t r u c t u r e of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t i s s u b d i v i d e d i n t o three major categories; m i l i t a r y doctrine, m i l i t a r y science, military arts2 The f o c u s h e r e i n and war

is at

the

tactical the NTC

level intent to

of

a s i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e S o v i e t MMR. analyze the tactics of the

Additionally, at the

i s to

OPFOR MRR

determine

whether t a c t i c a l

employment a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t s S o v i e t r e a l i t y .

The S o v i e t s c a t e g o r i z e combat a c t i o n s i n t o t w o m a J o r f o r m s of combat, offense into three and defense.3 The attack offense against

is
a

further defending

subdivided

categories:

enemy ( c o n d u c t e d f r o m t h e m a r c h or f r o m a p o s i t i o n i n d i r e c t

4-1

contact),

m e e t i n g engagement,

and p u r s u i t .

T h i s chapter ( a t t a c k from the i s 1 imi ted of one to the

a d d r e s s e s t h e a t t a c k a g a i n s t a d e f e n d i n g enemy, march), these and two the m e e t i n g engagement. of This because

thesis the

forms

the

offense

majari ty

scenario controlled offensive operations a t t h e o t h e r form. The d e f e n s e defense, limited

t h e NTC t a k e

or

i s also subdivided i n t o three categories:

defense, and of withdrawal hasty and

hasty is

prepared to a

This prepared

thesis

discussion

defensive
W I

o p e r a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e NTC s c e n a r i o d o e s n o t e m p h a s i z e operations. Three important areas, from a d i v i s i o n t a c t i c a l

thdrawal

perspective,

w h i c h a r e i m p o r t a n t when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e S o v i e t o r OPFOR M R R a r e echelonment, f o r c e r a t i o s , and f l e x i b i l i t y . 4

i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d the

I n r e g a r d t o echelonment,
tactical missions of employed. a.
b.

the d i f f e r e n t echelons, echelon missions are:

a n d how t h e y w i l l

be

The f i r s t

P e n e t r a t e o r d e f e a t enemy f o r w a r d d e f e n s e s . Continue the a t t a c k . Under n u c l e a r c o n d i t i o n s , e x p l o i t n u c l e a r s t r i k e s on

c.

enemy d e f e n s e s . 5

The m i s s i o n s o f

the second e c h e l o n a r e : the f i r s t echelon.

a.
b.

E x p l o i t the success o f Conduct a p u r s u i t .

c.
d.

D e s t r o y bypassed f o r c e s . Replace or r e i n f o r c e f i r s t e c h e l o n f o r c e s S 6

4-2

A d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n r e g a r d t o t h e c o n c e p t of echelonment are that that the the interval between forces

i s not
rigidly

fixed

and not

s e c o n d e c h e l o n should b e u s e d t o e x p l o i t

success,

reinforce failure. F o r c e r a t i o c o m p u t a t i o n s a r e b a s e d u p o n an a g g r e g a t e comparison o f combat ratio power w h i c h results in a desired r a t i o of

3:l

or

greater Soviet

for

the

conduct

of

offensive

operations.

When t h e

commander

computes h i s s t r e n g t h the

or combat power
defending force and the combat forward desired

in order
he

t o e s t a b l i s h a s u p e r i o r r a t i o over
all of his organic, attached,

considers

combat at

support edge of

forces. the

Therefore, a r e a may

his actual
be
less

strength than the

battle

overall

r a t i0.7 The "The found first i s at final level the area of where consideration any r e a l which is that of flexibility. might be

tactical

flexibility

regiment,

i s the

smallest

fully

combined Soviet

arm3 U n i t . " 8

I t is d i f f i c u l t

t o s p e c u l a t e t o what

degree

commanders w i l l plans. echelon I t

exercise f l e x i b i l i t y also difficult

to

i n t h e e x e c u t i o n of postulate
be

tactical level or

is

at

what to

Soviet

unit

commanders w i l l

permitted

exercise impact norms on and upon

flexibility. the concept

However,

t w o f a c t o r s have a v e r y d i r e c t

of

flexibility: of which

the

Soviet

concepts

of

initiative,

both

are

~ x t r e m e l y dependent

r e c o n n a i ssance.

4-3

Norms a r e

the

performance

standards which

are r e l a t e d

to

combat t a s k s a n d c o n d i t i o n s . analysis, t r a i n i n g exercises,

" T h e y a r e f o r m u l a t e d by h i s t o r i c a l requirements, and gaming models. " 9

The e x i s t e n c e o f n o r m s p r o v i d e s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r b a t t l e d r i l l s a t the subunit can measure level ( b a t t a l i o n and l o w e r ) . Tactical commanders. compute

levels

of

combat

readiness

and

accurately

such f a c t o r s as t i m e and d i s t a n c e . of the degree of synchronization such as

T h i s i s v e r y c r i t i c a l because required fires and for employment smoke,

of

combat

multipliers close and

indirect (fixed and

(HE,

and

chemical), warfare

air

support combat

rotary), s.upport

electronic elements.

other

combat

I n i t i a t i v e i s s t r e s s e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d a g r e a t d e a l by S o v i e t

mi 1 i t a r y writings.
The d e c i s i v e n e s s o f o f f e n s i u e o p e r a t i o n s i s even more pronounced in modern c o n d i t i o n s . . . A g g r e s s i ue and d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n s make i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s t o f r u s t r a t e t h e enemy's p l a n s , impose t h e i r w i l l on h i m , s e i z e a n d k e e p t h e i n i t i a t i v e , a n d a c t w i t h the utmost determination.10

An

article

by

General

Gerasimov's the basic

in

Vorennyr of

Vestn i k planning, One

(Military surprise, of

Herald),

stresses

concepts

diversionary actions, relevant

and a c o n t i n u o u s o f f e n s i u e . states,

t h e most

passages i n h i s a r t i c l e

"Therefore the

t h e most

i m p o r t a n t and the

indispensable condition guaranteeing

i s constant,

holding of

initiative

active

reconnaissance."ll

Reconnaissance p r o v i d e s t h e upon norms.

i n f o r m a t i o n t o s u p p o r t p l a n n i n g based

Consequently good

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e w i 1 1 a l l o w t h e S o v i e t o r OPFOR commander t h e

4-4

oppor r u n t y defense

to

seize

the

initiative

in

the
is

offense the

or

the of

.
ty.

Closely

related

to

initiative

concept

f l e x ibi I
are : a.
b.

A h i g h l i g h t o f some o f

the concepts o f

f l e x i b i l itr

T h e n e e d t o a t t a c k on m u l t i p l e a x e s . S w i f t t r a n s f e r o f combat p o w e r . The a c h i e v e m e n t o f s u r p r i s e . Speed i n t h e a t t a c k . I n d e p e n d e n t a c t i o n by commanders. The n e e d t o c a r r y t h e b a t t l e d e e p . 1 2 concepts

but
of

c.

d.
e.
f.

"These

are one

not that

descriptive
is

of

rigid

offensive The
level

doctrine,

b o t h m o b i l e and f l e x i h l e . " l 3

above c o n c e p t s a p p e a r of war than the

t o be r e l a t e d m o r e t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level. However

tactical

the

degree

of

flexibility,

i n i t i a t i v e , or l a t i t u d e p e r m i t t e d a t

the t a c t i c a l

l e v e l r e m a i n s t o be s e e n a n d s h o u l d n o t b e d i s r e g a r d e d . Intelligence c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s are S o v i e t combat o p e r a t i o n s . throughout the Soviet text The v a l u e o f Taktika indispensable aspect intelligence
by
of

i s stressed General

(Tactics)

Major

Reznichenko (1984 e d i t i o n )

a s e v i d e n c e d by t h i s q u o t e :

is especially important in modern Reconnaissance combat. I t i s the most important type o f combat s u p p o r t , s i n c e w i t h o u t r e 1 i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e enemy, the terrain, and the radiac and chemical o i t u a t i o n , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o employ f r i e n d l y f o r c e s and equipment correctly, to perceive the enemy's i n t e n t i o n , and t o f o r e s t a l l h i m i n o p e r a t i o n s . Owing to the large volume of intelligence tasks, reconnaissance i s conducted c o n s t a n t l y and a g g r e s s i v e l y v i a t h e i n t e g r a t e d employment o f f r i e n d l y f o r c e s a n d e q u i p m e n t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e c o o r d i n a t e s a n d l o c a t i o n of enemy t a r g e t s w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t p o s s i b l e a c c u r a c y a n d p r o v i d e t h e t r o o p s w i t h t h e s e i n good t i m e , and t o p r o v i d e t h e commander w i t h t h e t i m e l y i n t e l l i g e n c e d a t a t h a t h e n e e d s f o r p l a n n i n g a n d command a n d c o n t r o l d u r i n g combat.14 4-5

4-2.

OFFENSE;

C h a p t e r 5,

FM 100-2-1,

Jhe

S o v i e t Army

O p e r a t i o n s and T a c t i c s ,

describes i n d e t a i l the offensive t a c t i c s The

e m p l o y e d by a S o v i e t d i v i s i o n a n d l o w e r u n i t s . OPFOR MRR a t t h e NTC a d h e r e s t o t h e t a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y c o n t a i n e d i n c h a p t e r 5. ments,

c o n c e p t s and

Based upon s c e n a r i o r e q u i r e attack w i l l attack the attack from a

t h e OPFOR MRR c o n d u c t i n g a r e g i m e n t a l

primarily position

from
in

the direct

march

but

on

occasion

will

contact.

Addi t i onal 1 y ,

scenario

p r e s c r i b e s the r e g i m e n t s order of b a t t l e w i t h i n the d i v i s i o n , t h u s d e p i c t i n g t h e OPFOR R e g i m e n t a s a m a i n o r s u p p o r t i n g a t t a c k

of

the

division

effort. the

The

scenario
Army

control

cell

at

the

NTC
It

performs the communicates tactical

duties of

U.S.

d i v i s i o n headquarters. through to the the

U.S.

i n t e l 1 igence center

indicators (TOC),

brigade The the

operations

task to

forces. portray

i n t e l 1 igence attacking boundary units.

provides

adequate main and

information secondary combat

divisions locations,

efforts, a n d combat

possible support

and p o s i t i o n s o f time

This

allows

for

t e m p l a t i n g of the brigade

f o r c e s and p r o v i d e s and t a s k forces to

enough d e t a i l e d

intelligence for

de t b r m i ne t h e a p p r o x ima t e t ime o f a t t a c K

.
first of all

The s c e n a r i o g u i d a n c e a n d o r d e r s t o t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t o u t l i n e three major areas i n the planning process: the boundaries f o r the regiment, and I a s t , second, the

immediate and

subsequent o b j e c t i ves, and t i m e f o r c r o s s i n g . regiment

U.S.

an e s t a b l i s h e d 1 i ne o f d e p a r t u r e t h e OPFOR opposing

The s c e n a r i o d o e s n o t p r o v i d e information regarding the

with

intelligence

b r i g a d e or task force.

A s a r e s u l t the regimental

4-6

planning METT-T

process

is

initially

driven

by

the

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of and time).

(mission,

enemy,

terrain,

troops

available,

Refinement o f t h e p l a n i s d e r i v e d f r o m a g g r e s s i v e reconnaissance. The reconnaissance. rep1 i c a t e OPFOR MRR the the adheres to the Soviet concept of

When

scenario division

permi ts,

select

elements (or

portions

of

reconnaissance

company

u n i t ) w h i c h c a n o p e r a t e a s f a r f o r w a r d a s SO-100 forward o f t h e m a i n body. The p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f

k i l o m e t e r s tkm) intelligence for to

t h e OPFOR i s t h e MRR r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company w h i c h o p e r a t e s up

25 km f o r w a r d o f t h e MRR.
size) are a l s o e m p l o y e d as

Separate reconnaissance p a t r o l s (squad the situation dictates, up to

19 km

forward.15 Reconnaissance e f f o r t s a r e k e y t o the r e f i n e m e n t o f OPFOR r e g i m e n t s plan of attack. F o r m s o f maneuver f o r the t h e MRBs,

e c h e l o n m e n t a n d f i r e p l a n n i n g a r e a l l b a s e d upon i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s and time d i s t a n c e f a c t o r s . determines the qualilty fire of the attack. are The Good i n t e l l i g e n c e time sequencing of synchronized

CAS a n d

indirect

preparations,

carefully

w i t h t h e movement o f t o deploy with

the regiment t o a l l o w the a t t a c k i n g echelons companies, Slight and p l a t o o n s of i n accordance prescribed

i t s b a t t a l ions,
norms.

prescribed

deviations

the

d e p l o y m e n t n o r m s a r e p e r m i t t e d by t h e r e g i m e n t a l upon t h e r e a c t i o n s o f When the the u n i t b e i n g attacked. regiment conducts

commander b a s e d

OPFOR

attacks

the

commander

o r g a n i z e s f o r combat by t a s k o r g a n i z i n g t h e t h r e e m o t o r i z e d r i f l e battal ions (MRBs). The three compan

QS

of

the

tank

b a t t a i on

s u p p o r t t h e MRBs a n d t h e a r t i l l e r y b a t a l i o n o p e r a t e s a s p a r t o f

4-7

t h e r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y group or a l l o c a t e s s e p a r a t e b a t t e r i e s i n support down

of
the

t h e MRBs.
three

The

air

defense OPFOR

battery adheres

i s a l s o assigned
to The and the tactical

to

MRBs.16
in

The

procedures

described

FM
above,

100-2-1.

l7

rmp 1 oymen t norms, are

considerations

discussed

echelonment

r i g i d l y f o l l o w e d by t h e OPFOR d u r i n g t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e a t t a c k .
Many f a c t o r s o r v a r i a b l e s on b o t h s i d e s a f f e c t s u c c e s s or f a i l u r e o f t h e OPFOR MRR a t t a c k . One o f the the most

c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s w h i c h determines the success o f attack

t h e OPFOR contained i n the

i s the r i g i d compliance t o b a t t l e drill:.

t h e OPFOR T a c t i c a l SOP. OPFOR T a c t i c a l F i e l d Pocket

The p r i m a r y s o u r c e d o c u m e n t s f o r

SOP a r e FM 100-2-1,

t h e OPFOR Maneuver U n i t , Red T h r u s t , April

Reference.

Motorized R i f l e Unit,

1985, a n d t h e R u l e s of E n g a g e m e n t . l *
conforms to.

The OPFOR T a c t i c a l

SOP

o t h e above s t a t e d r e f e r e n c e s and i s s t r i c t l y a d h e r e d
t h e OPFOR m i n i m i z e t h e r e q u i r e levels. Additionally,

B a t t e d r i l l s performed by

ments for communications b y l e a d e r s a t a l l

t h e s p e e d o f e x e c u t i o n o f t e n d e c i d e s t h e outcome o f a c r i t i c a l phase o f the b a t t l e . titled

I n an a r t i c l e f r o m I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e f e n s e R e u i e w , " S o v i e t B a t t l e D r i l l s , V u l n e r a b i l i t y or S t r e n g t h ? " , addresses t h r e e advantages o f speed of action; second, Soviet b a t t l e d r i l l . is

C.J. D i c k
The f i r s t

command a n d c o n t r o l

a i d e d by

rap

decisions;

and t h i r d ,

subordinate

leaders are able to react w i battle.19 of Battle d r i l l

g r e a t e r c o n f i d e n c e i n the h e a t of extremely c r i t i c a l S o v i e t a n d t h e U.S. i n the conduct

1s
The

a m e e t i n g engagement.

d e f i n i t i o n s o f a m e e t i n g engagement a r e

4-8

similiar,

b u t n o t t h e same.

Soviet t a c t i c s places a greater

d e g r e e o f e m p h a s i s on f r e q u e n t l y employ i t for a hasty attack.

t h e m e e t i n g engagement b e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t s i n s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e U.S. The f o l l o w i n g d o c t r i n e would c a l l to

Soviet d e f i n i t i o n applies

t h e m e e t i n g engagement.

A m e e t i n g engagement o c c u r s when b o t h s i d e s s t r i v e t o r e s o l v e a s s i g n e d m i s s i o n s by a t t a c k i n g . Troops i n a m e e t i n g engagement a i m t o r o u t t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy i n a short t i m e span, seize the initiative, and c r e a t e favorable conditions for subsequent aggressive operations. A m e e t i n g engagement c a n t a k e p l a c e on t h e march, i n an o f f e n s i v e when r e p e l I i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c o u n t e r t h r u s t s o r when e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s ~ s a n d e n g a g i n g enemy troops, a n d i n d e f e n s e when m a k i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a n d c o u n t e r t h r u s t s o r e l i m i n a t i n g enemy a i r b o r n e or amphibious.20
When t h e OPFOR MRR i s g i v e n a m i s s i o n t o c o n d u c t a m e e t i n g engagement

the s c e n a r i o general Intel as an

establishes a s i t u a t i o n which

i s vague f o r b o t h f o r c e s .
a battalion

igence i s e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d and advance guard a for a notional engagement guard of a

is

moving OPFOR

r e g i m e n t .21 organizes regiment. (CRP). its The The

The

MRB

conduct i ng as an

meet i n g advance

subordinate l e a d element

elements i s the

combat the

reconnaissance security

patrol element

CRP moves

forward of

forward

(FSE) w h i c h i s d e p l o y e d f o r w a r d o f

t h e advance g u a r d m a i n body.22
( 1 0 km f o r w a r d o f FSE)

The CRP p e r f o r m s t h e f o l l o w i n g m i s s i o n s : a. Conducts reconnaissance Reports contact. Attempts t o p e n e t r a t e main f o r c e

( R e p o r t s a c t i o n s t o commander).

b.
c.
d.
Q.

A t t e m p t s t o bypass s e c u r i t y elements. P e r f o r m s Chemical and e n g i n e e r reconnaissance.

4-9

The FSE p e r f o r m s t h e f o l l o w i n g m i s s i o n s : m a i n body) a. A d v a n c e s a t maximum s p e e d . E n g a g e s enemy l e a d e l e m e n t s . Develops the s i t u a t i o n . Seizes/holds terrain favorable

(5-10

KM f o r w a r d o f t h e

b.
c.

d.
main body. The

for

the

employment

of

advance

guard

main

body

commander t h e MRR)

performs

the

following

missions: a.
b.

(20-30

km f o r w a r d o f

P l a n s the f i g h t . I s s u e s o r d e r s t o CRP a n d FSE. Coordinates f i r e support. C o n t r o l s the a s s a u l t . the execution of with the

c.

d.

I n the conduct o f commander regiment

support.

t h e m e e t i n g engagement t h e MRB command group

of

communicates to A coordinate comparison

the

notional
f i r e

close
of

air

support

and

indirect
for

the

combat

structure

the

MRB

c o n d u c t i n g t h e m e e t i n g engagement a p p e a r s i n F i g u r e 2 7 .

4-1 0

FIGURE 27 MEETING ENGAGEMENT FORCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON SOVIET23 BMP OPFOR24 BMP

- 31
13

31 13

T-72

T-72

ZSU-23-4

ZSU-23-4

122mm SP H o w i t z e r 120mm M o r t a r s BRDM/AT-S,

18

122mm SP H o w i t z e r 120mm M o r t a r s BRDM/AT-5,

ATGM

ATGM

REMARKS:
1. F o u r of t h e 3 1 PMPs w i l l u e n e r a l l ~ b e BMP UISMOD. M 1 1 3 w i t h o u t BMP w e a p o n s , u s e d t o t r a n s p o r t d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y : 2. S i x o f t h e 1 8 , 122mm SP h o w i t z e r s a r e a c t u a l l y r e p l i c a t e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , t h e r e m a i n i n g 1 2 a r e n o t i o n a l . 3. 1 2 0 mrn M o r t a r s a r e n o t i o n a l . 4. BRDM/AT-5, ATGM a r e n o t r e p l i c a t e d . A n a l y s i s of Soviet t a c t i c s a n d t h e OPFOR TACSOP, indicate a direct parallel in regard i n concept

t o t h e m e e t i n g engagement,
a n d e x e c u t i on.

4-3.

DEFENSE i

C h a p t e r 6 , FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 1 ,

The S o v i e t Army tactics employed

in

O p e r a t i o n s and T a c t i c s ,
by

describes the defensive lower

Soviet

divisions the

and

units.25

~ ~ l ( t i k e x~ plains concepts of tactical

great

depth

strategic The OPFOR

and o p e r a t i o n a l
adheres

defensive and

operations.26

to

the

concepts

p h i l o s o p h y e x p r e s s e d i n FM 1 0 0 - 2 - 1 , The scenario at the

c h a p t e r 6. requires the OPFOR to conduct

NTC

b a t t a l i o n and c o m p a n y d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s .

The d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s

a r e b o t h h a s t y and p r e p a r e d a n d a r e c o n d u c t e d i n t h e d a y a n d a t

4-1 1

night.

The s c e n a r i o g e n e r a t e d i n t e l l i g e n c e p o r t r a y s t h e f o r w a r d of the main

d e f e n d i n g OPFOR a s p a r t o f a s e c u r i t y z o n e , defensive b e l t o r as p a r t o f planning, the main b e l t .

OPFOR p r o c e d u r e s f o r

p r e p a r a t i o n , and e x e c u t i o n o f

the defensive m i s s i o n s

p a r a l l e l Soviet doctrine.27 Soviet doctrine for the h a s t y and p r e p a r e d defense b o t h

r e q u i r e s the f o l l o w i n g i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the defense: a.

b.

The d e p l o y m e n t a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f a s e c u r i t y e c h e l o n . Th; l o c a t i o n and deployment of f o r c e s i n a main

defensive area.

c.
sites.
d.

The l o c a t i o n o f

" f i r e sacks"

( k i 1 1 zones)

a n d ambush

C o n s t r u c t i o n o f m i n e f i e l d s and o b s t a c l e s . The l o c a t i o n , composi t o n , a n d employment o f the

e.

reserue.28 The S o v i e t s e x p e c t t h e h a s t y d e f e n s e the prepared defense. detailed preparation. defense are: a.

b.

t o be m o r e common t h a n n o t a l l o w tlme f o r

The h a s t y d e f e n s e w i l l

Other f a c t o r s associated w i t h the h a s t y

The m i s s i o n o f h a s t y d e f e n s e

i s more t r a n s i t o r y . and a t t a c k

The enemy 5 i t u a t i o n i s c l e a r e r ,

i s imminent.

c.
defense;

The t e r r a i n may be u n f a v o r a b l e f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a

i t may be b e t t e r s u i t e d f o r t h e a t t a c k e r .
Time w i l l be c r i t i c a l . 2 9

d.

4-1 2

The hasty The

OPFOR s u b o r d i n a t e

elements

are

required than

to establ ish
ones. are

defensive

p o s i t i o n s more and techniques

frequently out1 ined in

prepared

principles

Soviet

tactics

a p p l i c a b l e t o b a t t a l i o n a n d company d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s a s u s e d by t h e OPFOR s u b u n i ts.30

4-4.

S I G N I FICAM and

D I FFE R E N C E W W L Y S I S :
chapter
3

Clnl i k e

chapter

2 of

(Organization) tactical

(Equipment),

the

comparison

d o c t r i n e h a s n o t r e v e a l e d any m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s between tactical employment. The c o n s t r a i n t s which fall:., do and

S o v i e t a n d OPFOR

e x i s t r e s u l t from organizational

and equipment s h o r t i n chapter 5. in TaKtika described

will
the

be addressed i n the aggregate

tactical concepts expressed to

An a n a l y s i s o f revealed FM an

have in

extremely

close

parallel tactical

those

100-2-1.

Further analysis o f

concepts o f

t h e OPFOR MANEUVER UNIT, pub1 i s h e d by R e d

( f i e l d pocket reference, Thrust,

motorized r i f l e u n i t )

FORSCOM a n d t h e NTC, 9PFnR TACSOP h a s a l s o shown a d i r e c t

p a r a l l e l a n d a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h o s e e x p r e s s e d i n FM 100-2-1. 4-5. CONCLUSI ON; between the There a are no major and the differences OPFOR MRR. in An tactical overall

employment analysis of

Soviet

tactical

m i s s i o n s p e r f o r m e d by t h e OPFOR r e v e a l s

t h a t t h e y a c c u r a t e l y r e p l i c a t e t h e t a c t i c s o f a S o v i e t MRR.
If

it

is logical

to

assume

that

the

tactical

philosophy

d e s c r i b e d i n T a l c t i K S by G e n e r a l R e z n i c h e n k o w i l l the S o v i e t Forces, i t
is fair t o assume t h a t

b e f o l l o w e d by
Army

t h e U.S.

4-1 3

will
U.S.

adhere t o t h e d o c t r i n e Armys

in F M 100-5,

Operations.

Because t h e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n FM 100-2-1 a n d b e c a u s e t h e OPFOR M R R u s e s t h e manuals as the the foundation of

closely mirrors Taktika,

FM

100-2-1, it

-2,

-3

series

its

TACSOP,

is realistic

t o conclude t h a t

t a c t i c s e m p l o y e d by In

t h e OPFOR a r e v e r y s i m i l a r

t o t h o s e e m p l o y e d by t h e S o v i e t s .

so f a r a s p o s s i b l e ,
and accurately

the

t a c t i c s e m p l o y e d by t h e what might be

OPFOR a r e v a l i d
on a future

replicate

expected

b a t t l e f i e l d. T h i s a n a l y s i s should serve as a p o s i t i v e preparing t o t r a i n a t learned future, at the NTC t h e NTC. can be The t a c t i c a l to the indication to units. c o n c e p t s and lessons. battlefield
of

applied

the

4-1 4

CHAPTER 4

END NOTES

l R e z n i c h e n K o , U.G., LTG, T a k t i k a , 1984. T r a n s a t e d by C S I M u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n , N a t i o n a l Defense H e a d q u a r t e r s Ottawa, Canada, R e v i s e d a n d p r o c e s s e d f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n b y he S o v i e t A f f a i r s Pub1 i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , D i r e c t o r a t e o f S o v i e t A f f a i r s , A i r Force I n t e l l i g e n c e Service. page 3. An e a r l i e r e d i t i o n o f t h i s book f i r s t a p p e a r e d i n 1966. The s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f T a k t i k a , 1984, i s n o t e w o r t h y b e c a u s e i t i s an e x c e l l e n t u n c l a s s i f i e d i n d i c a t i o n of the e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n S o v i e t t a c t i c s . 2U.S. Army, FM 100-2-1, The S o v i e t Army: O p e r a t i o n e a n d U.S. Army, 1984, page 2-1. Tactics. W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.,

3w., page
4 -* 1bid
9

2-5.
t h r u 2-12.

page 2-10 page . 2-10. page , 2-10.

9
6 ~

7
8 9 ~

~ , page . 2-11.
. page , 2-12. ~

page . 2-11.

1 0 R e z n i c h e n K o , T a k t i k a , page 67. l l G e n e r a 1 G e r a s i m o u , a s c i t e d i n S c o t t a n d S c o t t , The S o v i e t A r t o f War D o c t r i n e , S t r a t e a r a n d T a c t i c s . 1 9 8 2 , p a g e s 277-277. 1 1 2 10 ~0 - 2~ -1, 3 ~ page 2-12.

. page , 2-12. Taktika, page 7-2. page 55.

14Reznichenko, 15FM 100-2-1, I61bid

page 5-22.

l7M., p a g e s 5-9 t h r u 5-29.

18The R u l e s of Engagement e s t a b l i s h t h e s t a n d a r d s w h i c h a l 1 f o r c e s must obey during the conduct o f f o r c e - o n - f o r c e training at t h e NTC. The r u l e s a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l p l a y e r s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , OPFOR, a n d r o t a t i o n a l u n i t s . 19C.J. D i c k , " S o v i e t B a t t l e D r i l l s , V u l n e r a b i l i t y o r p a g e s 663-665. Strength?" I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e f e n s e Review. 1985. 4-15

20Reznichenko, T a K t i k a ,

page 135.

21The s c e n a r i o f o r c e s a m e e t i n g engagement b e t w e e n a U.S. t a s k f o r c e a n d a r e i n f o r c e d OPFOR MRB. The MRB r e p l i c a t e s t h e T h e MRR m a i n b o d y i s n o t i o n a l a d v a n c e d g u a r d o f a MRR m a i n body, a n d d o e s n o t e n t e r i n t o t h e m e e t i n g engagement s i t u a t i o n b e c a u s e p o r t i o n s of the r e g i m e n t a r b employed elsewhere p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n MRB o r MRC d e f e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n .

22FM 100-2-1,

page 5-32.

. page , 5-34.
p a g e s 72-74. t h r u 6-9. p a g e s 155 t h r u 1 9 6 .

240PFOR TACTICAL SOP, 25FM 100-2-1,

p a g e % 6-1

26Reznichenko, T a k t i K a .

27A t h o r o u g h c o m p a r i s o n o f T a k t i K a , ( 1 ? 8 4 ) , FM 100-2-1, S o v i e t A r m y , O p e r a t i o n s a n d T a c t i c s . t h e OPFOR Maneuver U n i t b y Red T h r u s t a n d t h e NTC, OPFOR TACSOP a l l r e v e a l e d a d i r e c t para1 l e l i n t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t s and p r o c e d u r e s . cL8FM 100-2-1, page 6-2.

Thr

29u., page 6-3.

30The t y p e s o f d e f e n s i v e m i s s i o n s c o n d u c t e d by t h e OPFOR a r e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e s c e n a r i o . Time f o r p r e p a r a t i o n i s t h e f a c t o r w h i c h most f r e q u e n t l y r e s t r i c t s p r e p a r a t i o n .

4-1 6

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

5-1.

JNTRODUCTION:

I n 1 i g h t o f c h a p t e r s 2,

3,

and 4,

the reader

i s reminded o f t h e purpose and the

intent of t h i s thesis:

4.

P r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e S o v i e t a n d OPFOR MRR.

B. A n a l y z e t h e m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n , equipment, and t a c t i c s .
C.
P r o u i d e commanders a n d s t a f f s a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d "9 o f t h e OPFOR. t o Keep i n m i n d t h e t w o p r i m a r y t r a n I n g

I t i s also significant
missions of

t h e OPFOR r e g i m e n t :

A.

R e p l i c a t e t h e m a j o r combat e l e m e n t s o f a S o v i e t , BMP equipped, motor i z e d r i f 1 e r e g i m e n t .

B. P r o v i d e r e a l i s t i c f o r c e r a t i o s and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c u r r e n t S o v i e t t a c t i c s t o r o t a t i o n a l u n i t s ( b r i g a d e and b a t t a l ion/taslc f o r c e ) .

Howeuer, basic Soviet the most c r i t i c a l What MRRs aspect
of

this the

thesis relates

to

two

questions: and OPFOR

impact have

will
the

differences

between

the and the

on

planning,

preparation, relate

execution of unit's

training?

How do t h e s e

differences

to

combat m i s s i o n ?

5-2.

S I M I l A R I T I ES; The a p p r o a c h u s e d i n t h i s t h e s i s e m p h a s i z e s
The n e g a t i u e f o r m throughout to

t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e two o r g a n i z a t i o n s . of compar i s o n and a n a l y51s Howeuer, has been

stressed

i d e n t i f y weaknesses.

t h e r e a r e numerous of

s i m i l a r i t i e s w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l accompl is.hmen t h e OPFOR t r a i n i n g m i s s i o n . There i s no o t h e r p l a c e i n the U

s.

5- 1

Army w h e r e

r e s o u r c e s and

time are devoted t o the vast scale.

performance o f the
U.S.
of

an OPFOR m i s s i o n o n s u c h a Army has a highly the

Consequently, force most

trained

and

dedicated Some

capable

repl icating

Soviet

MRR.

of

the

important

s i m i l a r i t i e s are:

MRR S t r u c t u r e ;
closely parallels

The

organizational of a Soviet

structure The

of

the

OPFOR combat

that

MRR.

major

elements are r e p l i c a t e d .

Therefore,

t h e OPFOR MRR

i s capable o f

r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e a p p r o p r i a t e march a n d b a t t l e f o r m a t i o n s and t h e requisite the vehicle density. to

f i gh t

An

immediate

training super i o r
to

advantage
f~ r c e .

i+

oppor tun i t y truly

a numer i c a l 1 y
forces combat,

Th i s and

factor

tests

task of

ability combat

integrate and

synchronize

all

aspects

support,

combat

s e r v i ce r u p p o r t

.
The OPFOR s u b u n i t structure of t h e MRR the b a t t a l i o n combat During each of unit the the

Subun i t S t r u c t u r c :
c a n be

t a i l o r e d to provide accurate r e p l i c a t i o n a t level.

by

a n d company conducted

14-21

days

of

simulated through

that

rotates

the

NTC
are

approximately against

60-75%

training

missions forces.

performed The

OPFOR b a t t a l i o n

a n d company

size

training

value l i e s i n the opportunity t o f i g h t in which doctrinal The force ratios are

an enemy u n d e r c o n d i t i c m s taken the into OPFOR consideration.

Tactics :

tactical

employment

of

MRH

and

its

s u b o r d i n a t e e l e m e n t s a r e an a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the S o v i e t tac i c a l concepts. The OPFOR a d h e r e s t o t h e echelonment, norms,

c o n c e p t s d e s c r b e d i n FM 100-2-1:

5-2

reconnaissance,

prebattle

and

battle

formations,

and

unit

d i s p o s i t i o n s and a c t l o n s i n t h e defense.

The t r a i n i n g v a l u e l i e s doctrine against the

in

the

opportunity

to

test

U.S.

tactical

Souiet.
I

I n the aggregate,
realistic

U.S.

units training at to Souiet

t h e NTC

experience structure,

exposure

organizational

equipment and t a c t i c s .

C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e knowledge and

e x p e r i e n c e o f l e a d e r s and s o l d i e r s I s enhanced t o a g r e a t d e g r e e . They learn more about their potential enemy and are
better

p r e p a r e d f o r combat

i n the f u t u r e .

5-3.
from

91FFFRENCES; The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f d i f f e r e n c e s m u s t be v i e w e d
the perspec t iues. First of all, to what degree
w i l l

d i f f e r e n c e s i m p a c t upon u n i t p e r f o r m a n c e a n d l e s s o n s l e a r n e d f r o m the will training the experience at t h e NTC? upon Secondly, the what relevance combat?

d i f f e r e n c e s have

preparing

unit

for

The m a j o r d i f f e r e n c e s a r e h i g h 1 i g h t e d b e l o w . pismounted infantry Soviet OPFOR's The in the

by

Infantry;

The

total of the

number number

of

dismounted in a

OPFOR f a l l s s h o r t approximately
347.

available affects

MRR

This

adversely

the

a b i l i t y t o a c c u r a t e l y r e p 1 i c a t e an a t t a c k i n g S o v i e t MRR.
infantry soldiers in the OPFOR MRR represent some
567

220

infantry soldiers not feel the

i n a S o v i e t MRR. impact
of

U n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC do the capabilities a mounted of

a

tremendous

Soviet

MRR's

s u p p r e s s i ue

f ires

during

assaul t

Additionally, diminished.

t h e p o t e n t i a l of This

a dismounted a s s a u l t t o be kept

i s equally during

s h o r t c o m i n g needs

i n mind

t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC.

U n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC n e e d t o b e

s-3

prepared

to

fight

Soviet

force

with

significantly

larger

number o f d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y p e r s o n n e l .

pir

Defense:

The t o t a l

q u a n t i t y o f OPFOR a i r d e f e n s e weapon the total number available within a experience

systems i s l e s s S o v i e t MRR. less risk

t h a n 50% o f

T h e r e f o r e , u n i t s t r a i n i n g a t t h e NTC w i l l

t h a n a g a i n s t a g e n u i n e S o v i e t MRR when e m p l o y i n g c l o s e

a i r support for the

(CAS)

and h e l i c o p t e r s u p p o r t . of air The defense

Soviet doctrine c a l l s forward defense the in all

employment operations.

assets w e l l

combat

additional

27

air

systems

available effect

t o a S o v i e t MRR w i l l
air

s e v e r e l y reduce support.

synergistic the planning air

a c c r u i n g f r o m U.S. of combat

Therefore, to reduce

and e x e c u t i o n

support

elements

Soviet

d e f e n s e c a p a b i 1 i t i e s w i 1 1 have t o be i n t e n s i f i e d .

1 2 m

sP

How1tz e r and '120m M o r t a r 1 The

of the indirect fire

OPFOR

does

not to

p h y s i c a l l y rep1 i c a t e a l l the regiment. o f engagement. The

assets organic

i n d i r e c t f i r e s are p o r t r a y e d through the r u l e s inability

T h e r e a r e t w o p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e OPFOR's

to

represent the
A

all

18

122mm

SP

howitzer

and

18

120mm m o r t a r s . battlefield is

First,

d e n s i t y of more

v e h i c l e s or concern

t a r g e t s on i s the

the

reduced.

important

inability

to portray

t h e p r o p e r march and deployment howitzers and mortars Aviation are and

formations. indicators

The p o s i t i o n i n g o f of Soviet of unit units

Key

d i s p o s i t i on.
training at of

reconnaissance

elements

t h e NTC n e e d t o b e a w a r e o f

t h i s s h o r t c o m i n g because

t h e i r a b i l i t y t o l o o k deep

i n the task f o r c e area o f o p e r a t i o n

5-4

and

area

of

influence.

They

will

see

large

formations

of

uehicles,

b u t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i l l n o t be t o t a l l y a c c u r a t e .

M o t o r r y c l e s t The S o v i e t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e company i s a c c u r a t e l y por t r a r e a t t h e NTC by t h e OPFOR w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f Units training at the three this

m ot or c yc es.
shortfal which w i

t h e NTC n e e d t o be aware o f

a n d e s t a b l i a h a u n i t s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e (SOP)

I enhance t h e i r c o u n t e r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n t o r e a c t t o

motorcycle reconnaissance. Antitank Battery: b a t t e r y which The absence of has nine The OPFOR c a n n o t r e p l i c a t e weapon systems equalling significant the S o v i e t AT 135 m i s s i l e s . in the vaot

this

unit

i s extremely I n any a c t u a l

open t e r r a i n a t meter range o f t h e U.S. tanks. assets Army's

t h e NTC. t h e AT-5

confrontation,

the 4,000

wi 1 1

degrade

the s t a n d o f f

capabi 1 i t y o f

AT s y s t e m s a n d i n c r e a s e t h e u u l n e r a b i l i t y o f U.S. have to i d e n t i f y and suppress the superior range the Soviet of AT AT

Units w i l l i n order to

negate

a n d uolume

f i r e s w h i c h a r e n o t r e p l i c a t e d a t t h e NTC.

FauiDmont: T h e r e a r e n u m e r o u s s i m i l i a r i t i e s a n d d i C f e r e n c e s
between the Souiet a n d OPFOR MRRs in equipment representation. a s p e c t s and

Units training at i n t h e l i g h t of

t h e NTC n e e d t o a n a l y z e e q u i p m e n t

a n a l y s i s assess the u a l u e o f

lessons learned f o r

f u t u r e combat o p e r a t i o n s .

5-4,

RECOM'(MWT1 ONS FOR IMPROVEMENT : B a s e d u p o n t h e d i f f e r e n c e s

n o t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a r e made: a. That t h e AT b a t t e r y b e r e p l i c a t e d .
A possible solution

w o u l d b e t o v i s u a l l y m o d i f y t h e HUMMU u e h i c l e .

5-5

b.

T h a t a d d i t i o n a l d i s m o u n t e d i n f a n t r y be p r o v i d e d t o t h e A possible s o l u t i o n would to transfer VISMOD BMP, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y I N t o the T h i s would

OPFOR.
of

t h e M551 S h e r i d a n t a n k ,

f r o m t h e 6-31

n e w l y f o r m e d a r m o r b a t t a l i o n o f t h e 1 7 7 t h AR B r i g a d e . a l l o w t h e 6-31 t h e OPFOR.

I N t o p e r f o r m the dismounted i n f a n t r y m i s s i o n f o r

c.
d.

T h a t t h e m o t o r c y c l e s be u s e d f o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . T h a t t h e SA-9 / GASKIN a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m b e r e p l i c a t e d . T h a t t h e q u a n t i t y o f SA-7 / GRAIL a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m s b e

e.

increased.

f.

T h a t weapon s y s t e m s b e c o n f i g u r e d t o t h e M 1 1 3 'JISMOD BTR-60, a n d t h e BRDM t o p r o v i d e a m o r e a c c u r a t e

BMP, MT-LB, rep1 i c a t i o n . g.

T h a t equipment

i m p r o u e m e n t s / m u d i f i c a t i o n s be a p p l i e d t o

t h e VISMOD T-72

a n d BMP f l e e t t o g i v e t h e v e h i c l e s a s e l f - g e n e r a -

t i n g smoke c a p a b i l i t y . h. T h a t c o n t r o l l e r s a t t h e NTC e m p h a s i s e t h e information

contained i n t h i s thesis i n a f t e r action reviews as appropriate. i. T h a t a c o p y of t h i s t h e s i s be p r o v i d e d t o u n i t s

p r e p a r i n g t o t r a i n a t t h e NTC.

s-5.
the

CaCCl USION : I n t h e a g g r e g a t e ,
OPFOR and the Soviet

the d i f f e r e n c e s n o t e d between substantial in the areas

of

MRR a r e

o r g a n i z a t i o n and equipment b u t r e l a t i v e l y m i n i m a l tactics. The value of training at the NTC

i n the area of be viewed

should

a g a i n s t the background o f

the d i f f e r e n c e s noted.

5-6

T r a i n i n g a d v e r s a r i e s have changed d r a s t i c a l l y Army o v e r todays the p a s t few years. I n recent

in

the

U.S.
when

training history, officers,

b a t t a l i o n commanders w e r e j u n i o r the circle trigon. In later

t h e enemy was

m o s t commonly

those
be

d a y s one u n i t w o u l d Both units

o p p o s e an o t h e r used

and r o l e s would

reversed.

U.S. Army d o c t r i n e a n d t e c h n i q u e s .
The c u r r e n t OPFOR MRR a t t h e NTC i s a q u a n t u m l e a p f o r w a r d trigon. the The OPFOR MRR The a structure OPFOR
MRH

from

closely

the

era

of

the

circle of of

replicates replicates

that that

Soviet Soviet

MRR. to

equipment than MRRs

MRR

greater
the

degree OPFOH in the

anything greatest

previously

attempted. to the

Additionally, quality of

contribution

training

Army i s t h e OPFORs

rep1 i c a t i o n o f Soviet however,

tactics. noted i n this

I t i s obvious,

from the d i f f e r e n c e s

t h e s i s t h a t t h e OPFOR MRR d o e s n o t t o t a l l y o r e x a c t l y r e p S o v i e t MRR.

icate a

O r g a n i z a t i o n a l and equipment d e f i c i e n c i e s s r i o u s l r a b i l i t y t o p o r t r a y the f u l 1 there combat are two combat power compensating for the

d e g r a d e t h e OPFOR M R R s of a Soviet which The MRR. should

Additionally, be viewed as

factors OPFOR.

multipliers

tactical

e x p e r i e n c e of

t h e OPFOR commanders,

staff,

and s o l d i e r s i s overwhelming. days a year.

They a r e f i g h t i n g i n e x c e s s o f 200

T h e y also h a v e a v e r y d i s t i n c t a d v a n t a g e b e c a u s e ul: t h e t e r r a i n a t t h e NTC. but they These t w o f a c t o r s a r e compensate for

t h e i r knowledge of difficult

to

quantifv,

definitely

d e f i c i e n c i e s n o t e d i n equipment and o r g a n i z a t i o n .

5-7

Units preparing to

train

at

t h e NTC n e e d t o m a x i m i z e
Of

the

t r a i n i n g o p p o r t u n i t y by K n o w l n g t h e OPFOR.

equal

importance future

is

the

necessity

to

maintain

focus

on

possible

aduersar i es. Whatever t h e enemy,

a unit

that

trains at

t h e NTC w i l l

be

b e t t e r p r e p a r e d f o r combat.

T h e r e f o r e I say: Know t h e enemy a n d know y o u r s e l f ; i n a h u n d r e d b a t t l e s you w i l l n e v e r b e i n p e r i l . Sun T z u

5-8

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London8

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I s b y , D a v i d C.

London:

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2.

w:

Defense I n n t e l l i g e n c c Agency. Defense I n n t e l l i a e n c e Report The S o v i e t M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n . Washington8 U.S. Gouernment P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1978. H e a d q u a r t e r s , F o r c e s Command OPFOR T r a i n i n g D e t a c h m e n t . M Unit. U.S. Gouernment P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1983.

OPFOR M

Appendix A

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Fort

Headquarters, N a t i o n a l T r a i n i n g Center. OPFOR UISMOD ( V i s u a l l y M o d i f i e d ) V e h i c l e R e c o a n i t i o n Guide. Fort Irwin: Deputy Commander f o r T r a i n i n g , 1982. H e a d q u a r t e r s , T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command. Probability of H i t K i l l f o r M u l t i o l e L a s e r Ennaoement S y s t e m s (MILES) Weapon S y s t e m s S i m u l a t o r s . F o r t Monroe: TRADOC, 1985. H e a d q u a r t e r s , T r a i n i n g a n d D o c t r i n e Command. TRADOC B u l l e t i n 7 -The BMP: C a D a b i l i t i e s and L i m i t a t i o n s . F o r t Monroe: TRADOC, 1 9 7 7 . Office of t h e S e c r e t a r y o f Defense. S o v i e t M i l i t a r y Power 1 9 8 5 . W a s h i n g t o n : Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 8 5 . Army. Army R e p u l a t i o n 3 5 0 - 1 , T r a i n i n a Army Traininq ( w i t h Change 1 ) . Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1984. Army. Army R e g u l a t i o n 350-50, T r a i n i n u National T r a i n i n a C e n t e r (NTC). Washington: Governmennt P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1980.
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I , ,

U.S.

U.S.

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.
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ruu-L-1,

Jp
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Tacticq.
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"New Sou i e t BMP-2 Unue i 1 e d . A r m o r Magaz i n e S t a f f M a a a z i n e , J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 6 , p p . 24-25. Armor Magazine S t a f f . "T-72." December 1 9 8 1 , pp.30-33.

"

Armnr

A r m o r Maaaz i n e , Nouember-

Conroy, B r u c e C. T a c t i c s o f t h e S o v i e t A r m y R e a i m e n t . U n p u b l i s h e d MMAS T h e s i s on f i l e i n t h e CARL. F o r t Leauenworth, 1979. DicK,

C.J. "Soviet Battle D r i l l s : V u l n e r a b i l i t y cjr S t r e n g t h ? " I n t e r n a t i o n a l D e f e n s e R e u i e w M a y , 1 9 8 5 , p p . 663-665.

C.J. " S o u i e t Operational Concepts: R e u i e w , S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , p p . 29-45.

DicK,

P a r t 1."

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M c C a s l i n , J a m e s K. " C o m b a t I n f a n t r y V e h i c l e s (EMF') I n Combat J o u r n a l of t h e U.S. A r m y I n n s t i t u t e f o r A d v a n c e d R u s s i a n and E a s t E u r o p e a n S t u d i e s , 1 9 7 6 . Smith, Perry. " A i r c r a f t S u r u i v a b i 1 i t y Equipment T r a i n e r s . " A v i a t i o n D i a e s t , M a r c h 1 9 8 6 , p p . 3-8.

."

I NI TI A L D I STR I BUT I O N LI ST

1.

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH L I B R A R Y U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER N CAMERON STAT1 O ALEXANDRIA, V I R G I N I A 22314 DR. BRUCE W. MENNING SOVIET STUDIES O F F I C E U . S . ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

2.

3.

4.

LTC GARRETT R . FONDA COMBINED ARMS T A C T I C S DEPARTMENT U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027
M A J RAYMOND F. ARMENT III COMBINED ARMS T A C T I C S DEPARTMENT U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 COMMANDING GENERAL N A T I O N A L T R A I N I N G CENTER AND FORT I R W I N , FORT I R W I N , C A L I F O R N I A 92310-5000 COMMANDING GENERAL COMBINED ARMS T R A I N I N G A C T I V I T Y FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 CALIFORNIA

9.

6.

7.

Appendix B