Ciaran Cummins

An appeal to starting points and frameworks does not help avoid conciliatory conclusions. Is Feldman right about this? In this essay I shall propose an argument in support of the view that appeals to starting points and frameworks (SP and FW)1 help avoid conciliatory conclusions in genuine peer disagreement (PD) cases, contrary to what Richard Feldman argues in Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement2. I shall begin by making a preliminary distinction between what I do and do not take to be genuine cases of PD. Following this, I shall layout my argument and its implications for PD, followed by possible objections and responses. I shall conclude by proposing that appeals to FW allow us to reveal asymmetries within PD that can avoid conciliatory conclusions. Non/Genuine PD: If we understand the notions of a/symmetry within PD as having a connection to the peers respective FWs then we can consider the different PD cases as such: (a) Symmetrical PD explicitly matching FWs (b) Asymmetrical PD explicitly non-matching FWs (c) Non-obvious asymmetrical PD FWs appear to match but in fact do not (d) Non-obvious symmetrical PD FWs appear to not match, but in fact do I agree with Feldman on (d) cases; situations which only appear to be PD but in fact are unnoticed semantic confusions of terms. We can consider these to not be genuine cases of PD. However, I believe that my arguments conclusions differ with respect to Feldmans on (a), (b) and (c ) cases. The reason for this is that I believe we can sensibly interpret these cases to have, whether or not it is obvious to the given interlocutors, a necessary asymmetry. I will now support this claim by laying out my argument.
1

My use of the term frameworks solely within this essay is due to a preference in avoiding a confusion I believe Feldman makes when describing SP and FW in his paper. Whilst I believe that there is an important clarification to be made with these terms, it is not necessary for this essay.
2

Pg. 13, Feldman, Richard (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press.

Ciaran Cummins

The Hidden Asymmetry (HA) argument: (1) Within a case of disagreement if an interlocutor3 X appeals to their FW then it is not beyond rational scrutiny for the individual they are in disagreement with (lets call them Y)4 (2) Either (1) will reveal an asymmetry between X and Y or it will not (3) If an asymmetry is revealed, then the initial evidence (E) favours one view over the other (4) If an asymmetry is not revealed, then either: (i) (ii) There is an unknown/unaccounted for asymmetry Both X and Y can be right; the uniqueness thesis5 is wrong and reasonable disagreement is possible (5) If (4i) then X and Y will become aware of (4i), so do not have to suspend judgement as one view fares best. Having set out my argument I shall state the implications it has for our understanding of genuine PD. For (a) cases despite seemingly matching FWs, under extended and close scrutiny some asymmetry will arise, by virtue of the fact that there is disagreement. Retrospectively these become (c) cases and under subsequent FW scrutiny, they will lead to (b) cases. For (b) cases under extended and close scrutiny, one side must concede that its FW does not fare better than the other. This will lead to non-conciliatory conclusions.

My use of the term interlocutor as opposed to Feldmans peer and the epistemic peer (EP) found in the Epistemology of Disagreement generally, is used to avoid discussing an issue which I believe my argument raises for the question of who is an EP. Specifically, it is the possibility that an individuals consideration as an EP by another could be relative to their awareness of a disagreements asymmetry.
4

Here I am in agreement with Feldman, when he contends that when these defences are brought out into the open, they are every bit as open to rational scrutiny as anything else is (ibid. Pg. 15).
5

Feldmans thesis that, given a body of evidence, one [(and only one) attitude towards that evidence] is the rationally justifiable one; pg.10, Feldman, Richard (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. Oup.

Ciaran Cummins

Objections and responses: I will now examine two possible objections to my argument against Feldmans anti -FW view, and offer responses to these. Due to word limitations, I will restrict the objections to what I consider key. Firstly, it can be argued that (4i) leads to a conciliatory outcome. Indeed, the HA argument, in advising us to keep scrutinising FWs, is arguably saying we should suspend judgement on whose position should be given more credence. However, this overlooks the central fact of PD that there is disagreement. So suspending judgement would be to ignore that the FWs generating the two positions must be asymmetrical at some level, even if it is not apparent after full disclosure. This is evident from the fact that the given views are held by different people and so are generated from different FWs, meaning they must differ otherwise they would be in agreement. To argue against this, one must accept the conclusion that the interlocutors FWs are the same, yet they are still engaged in disagreement. This is bizarre as it means the interlocutors, if they are EP with the same evidence and matching FWs, are disagreeing on a point for no reason at all. Suppose the critic concedes that X and Y must at some level have asymmetrical FWs, they might still reject (3) for assuming E will support either view at all. For if scrutiny does bring out an asymmetry and leaves, say, Y in a more robust position, why does it follow that E supports their view? It is plausible that Y has the better of two ultimately wrong opinions. This is an attractive criticism; especially as it provides X with a reason to not side with Y, even after not faring best under scrutiny. However, this is to misunderstand assessing each FW in the first place. We do not always place our belief in a view because E in fact supports it rather we do so because it appears more likely to be the case. So whilst we dont know that the better-faring argument following the FW scrutiny matches completely with E, choosing to suspend judgement ignores the impact of the asymmetry.6

Some might argue that siding with Y is to bestow unfounded credence. However, assuming interlocutors to be EP then Xs judgement of Y does not seem unfounded if X considers Y to be informed with respect to the subject of disagreement at hand.

Ciaran Cummins

Conclusion To conclude, the HA argument withstanding, Feldmans view can be criticised for ignoring a tool for revealing asymmetries in disagreements that can lead to non-conciliatory conclusions, and in doing so his only recourse is to conciliationism when considering SP and FW. I have not addressed every objection that I would like; including the question of when we are justified in thinking that a FW has been sufficiently scrutinised. However, I believe that the criticism presented for Feldman stands.

Bibliography Feldman, Richard (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press Feldman, Richard (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. Oup.