THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF LIKENESS Joost Pauwelyn (Duke Law School) [A Review of Mireille Cossy, Some Thoughts on The

Concept of Likeness in the GATS, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-08, September 2006, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200608_e.pdf] Abstract In Some Thoughts on The Concept of Likeness in the GATS, Mireille Cossy (of the WTO Secretariat) advocates the re-introduction of an improved aims-and-effects test in the GATS. Under such test elements related to the regulatory context of the service and/or of the supplier should play a role in relation to GATS national treatment. One consequence of such test, Cossy argues, is that it would almost inevitably entail the introduction of some kind of proportionality or necessity test within the very definition of GATS national treatment. This comment raises two points. First, although Cossy follows the conventional wisdom of both WTO jurisprudence and commentators, the core of any non-discrimination principle does not lie in the threshold question of likeness (are two services/suppliers comparable?), but in the substantive test of whether the government, either de jure or de facto, favors domestic over foreign services or service suppliers (does the regulation, either in law or in effect, distinguish based on national origin). This test of what constitutes de facto discrimination a weighing exercise which, in this authors view, should include consideration of both the objective purpose of the regulation and its effects -- has received surprisingly little attention in international trade law. Second, Cossys claim that trade in services (GATS) needs something different than trade in goods (GATT) i.e. that GATS national treatment should focus on regulatory purpose and protectionism (improved aims-and-effects), but that this would be without prejudice to the approach taken under the GATT -- is unconvincing and unrealistic. If aims-and-effects are to return, in whatever guise, they should return and are already resurfacing -- in both GATS and GATT. [Key words: discrimination, national treatment, like products, GATS, GATT, WTO]

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030940

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I.

Overview

In Some Thoughts on The Concept of Likeness in the GATS, Mireille Cossy essentially does three things. First, she describes the state-of-play of like products under GATT national treatment: On the one hand, the four criteria of physical characteristics, end-use, consumer tastes and tariff classification; On the other hand, the formal rejection by the Appellate Body of the aims-and-effects test (both in GATT and GATS). Second, Cossy argues that likeness under GATS needs something different. In her words (at p. 17): The intangibility of services activities, the existence of the four modes of supply, the difficulty in separating the service from the supplier, and the fact that regulation for services is generally more complex than for goods would seem to call for a more subtle approach. Third, and finally, according to Cossy, this something different is an improved aimsand-effects test according to which elements related to the regulatory context of the service and/or of the supplier should play a role in relation to GATS national treatment (at p. 18). Cossy calls her proposal an improved aims-and-effects test in that, contrary to previous GATT cases that upheld aims-and-effects, Cossys test would ensure that only bona fide regulatory distinctions would be accepted, and that the effect on foreign services and suppliers is not disproportionate (at p. 24). This would be achieved, argues Cossy, by strengthening the aims-and-effects test so as to ensure that a reasonable nexus exists between the measure and the policy objective in question (at p. 27). This, in turn, would almost inevitably entail the introduction of some kind of proportionality or necessity test in Article XVII (at p. 27-8), that is, a necessity test within the very notion of discrimination (i.e. even before one reaches the general exceptions under Article XIV of GATS).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030940

-3For a WTO staff working paper (published also on the WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200608_e.pdf) this is an important and daring analysis. In response, this comment raises two points. Firstly, although it follows most GATT and WTO jurisprudence, as well as most commentators 1 , Cossys focus on likeness as the core element of a national treatment test, is misguided. It begs more questions than it resolves. Instead, the focus of a national treatment analysis ought to be on how to define less favorable treatment of foreign services or service suppliers, in particular: What qualifies as de facto discrimination? In the words of GATS Article XVII:3: What modifies the conditions of competition in favor of [domestic] services or service suppliers? Similarly (but not further addressed in this comment 2 ), more important than likeness is the GATS expansion from like products (under GATT) so as to include both like products (i.e. services) and like service suppliers (or what, under GATT, would be producers). The coverage of both services and service suppliers under GATS national treatment not only expands the prohibitive effect of national treatment (in that discrimination of foreign suppliers also becomes actionable). Perhaps more importantly, it equally expands the permissive effect of national treatment: Under GATS, differences not related to the product (i.e. service), but related rather to the production or process (i.e. service supplier), can clearly justify at least certain forms of differential treatment (otherwise Article XVII would not include a reference to like service suppliers). This first point likeness is not, or should not be, central to a national treatment analysis -- does not amount to saying that Cossy should have written a paper on a different topic. Rather, my point is that Cossys proposal for what she calls an improved aims-and-effects test within the definition of likeness is a dead end (or, in any event, does not resolve the core question of GATS national treatment), and that many of the For a recent example, see Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination under the Law of the WTO, 23 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2005) 215-297. 2 An earlier draft of Cossys paper had an entire section on likeness of services and/or service suppliers, not reflected in the final paper. In footnote 5, however, Cossy promises that this will be the subject of another publication.
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-4questions she struggles with under likeness are better addressed head-on under less favorable treatment of foreign services or service suppliers. 3 The second point raised in this comment is that the wedge that Cossy attempts to drive between GATT (no aims-and-effects test) and GATS (an improved aims-and-effects test) is untenable. Notwithstanding important differences between trade in services as opposed to trade in goods, to argue that GATS national treatment should focus on regulatory purpose and protectionism (improved aims-and-effects), but at the same time pretend that such would be without prejudice to the approach taken under the GATT (at p. 33), is unconvincing and unrealistic. Many differences amongst goods industries or amongst services sectors are as deep as the differences pointed out by Cossy between the broad categories of goods, on the one hand, and services, on the other. Moreover, the rationale for looking at regulatory purpose and requiring proof of protectionism is, in the end of the day, recognition that national treatment (both in GATS and GATT) is, and remains, about discrimination based on origin. Its rationale is not grounded in real or perceived differences between goods and services. In other words, if aims-and-effects is to return, in whatever guise, it should return in both GATS and GATT. II. From likeness in the air to concrete proof of de facto discrimination

The obsession with likeness in the GATT/WTO is unheard of in any other legal arena that needs to decide cases of alleged discrimination, be it in EU law, US constitutional law or before the European Court of Human Rights. In each of these other fora the big question is rather: How to define de facto discrimination? If a law or regulation explicitly differentiates based on sex, race or nationality, de jure discrimination is easily found (even though such discrimination might still be justified under exceptions). The For a similar argument in respect of GATT, see William Davey and Joost Pauwelyn, MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference to the Issue of "Like Product," in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 13-50 (PETROS MAVROIDIS & THOMAS COTTIER EDS., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS 2000), at p. 39-41 (referring to a requirement of discriminatory effect or origin based discrimination under both Article III and Article I of GATT).
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-5sticking point, of course, is to decide whether laws or regulations that are sex, race or origin-neutral on their face amount to de facto discrimination of, for example, women, blacks or foreigners. Instead of tackling this question head-on i.e., although the law or regulation is originneutral on the books, is it nonetheless more burdensome on imports? , especially WTO panels and the Appellate Body have spent most of their energy on deciding whether the domestic products and imports compared are comparable or like in the first place. Once they find likeness, discrimination almost follows naturally, as an afterthought. Yet, this bottom-up approach of deciding, in the abstract, whether two products referred to by the complainant are like -- be it shochu and vodka; asbestos and other fibres; GMOs and conventional crops is tackling the question from the wrong end. Instead of examining whether products are like with reference to some purportedly neutral criteria of physical characteristics, end use, consumer tastes and tariff classifications -- all of which are portrayed as permissible features on which to base regulatory distinctions -panels ought to focus on the specific law or regulation that is at issue, and ask the following question: Does the law or regulation differentiate, de jure or de facto, based on the one and only impermissible criterion, namely: national origin. Instead of approaching the question from what is permissible (the universe of features that validly make products unlike), panels ought to approach the question from what is not permissible (the specifics of whether the regulation distinguishes based on origin). Put differently, if a tribunal asked to decide on sex-based discrimination were to follow the WTOs (likeness) approach to nationality-based discrimination, this tribunal would, oddly enough, proceed as follows: It would focus its analysis on what makes people, in general, like or comparable in the abstract, and what are permissible features to differentiate between human beings (say, a persons formal education, skills or experience), rather than examine the specific law or regulation head on, and ask the obvious question: Does the law or regulation differentiate based on the one and only impermissible criterion, namely: gender. In both the WTO and sex discrimination cases, the legal discipline only prohibits one single type of differentiation, namely:

-6differentiation based on national origin or differentiation based on sex, respectively. All other real or perceived differences are ultimately irrelevant and any differentiation based on distinctions not related to sex or origin, are permissible. Rather than spend time on what are permissible distinctions in the abstract (making products or persons unlike), adjudicators must check whether the concrete law or regulation before it distinguishes, in form or effect, based on the one impermissible feature (national origin or gender). Rather than focus on the similarity or likeness between two types of products (e.g. GMOs and conventional crops) or between two persons (e.g. men and women; blacks and whites) in the abstract, adjudicators ought to focus on whether the concrete regulation differentiates, de jure or de facto, based on the one differential that is prohibited, namely origin, sex or race. III. Likeness as a mere threshold question which ultimately may be irrelevant

Granted, before one can even compare foreign products as opposed to domestic products, these products must be comparable. But this is only a threshold question to the real test: Assuming that the two products (or, in sex discrimination cases, the women and man compared) are broadly speaking comparable, does the regulation distinguish, de jure or de facto, between the two based on origin (or sex). In other words, likeness is only the trigger or threshold, not the substantive test. Broadly defining likeness activates the test more often. Yet, it should not normally lead to more findings of violation: If the regulation distinguishes between products based on genuine features that are not originbased (e.g. physical characteristics, end use, consumer tastes or other non-protectionist reasons), then the regulation, even where the adjudicator presumed likeness, would not be found to distinguish based on origin anyhow. Thus, the regulation would be permissible not so much because it distinguishes between unlike products, but because the complainant could not prove that it distinguishes based on origin. For example, even if one were to define like products so extravagantly broad as to find that luxury cars and bread become comparable, a higher tax on luxury cars than bread would still not breach national treatment, as it would be very hard for the complainant to demonstrate that such tax distinction is based on national origin rather than legitimate tax objectives such as

-7taxing luxury products higher than daily necessities (a form of progressive taxation). From this perspective, the test of likeness becomes irrelevant: Any argument that could have been made under likeness (e.g. GMOs are not like conventional crops because of health risks, consumer preferences, etc.) will anyhow be fished up under the real test of whether the regulation differentiates based on origin (e.g. the GMO regulation is based on health or consumer concerns; not on national origin or protectionism). IV. An improved aims-and-effects test to check de facto discrimination (not likeness) At this juncture, Cossys improved aims-and-effects test becomes crucial. Again, not to decide on likeness between services or service suppliers, but to decide on whether the services regulation amounts to de facto discrimination. In the words of GATS Article XVII:3: Does the regulation modify the conditions of competition in favor of [domestic] services or service suppliers? Since the regulation does not do so on the books, i.e., de jure, the question of the regulations effect (does it impose a heavier burden on imports?) and/or objective purpose (is the regulations structure and/or operation protectionist or rather based on non-protectionist goals?) must, as Cossy argues, play a decisive role. In contrast to Cossys approach, however, it is difficult to conceive how such search for de facto discrimination could or should be different between GATS and GATT. As noted earlier, the rationale for looking at regulatory purpose and requiring proof of protectionism is, in the end of the day, recognition that national treatment (both in GATS and GATT) is, and remains, about discrimination based on origin. Its rationale is not grounded in real or perceived differences between goods and services. In other words, if aims-and-effects is to return, in whatever guise, it should return in both GATS and GATT. As Cossy recognizes, there are important signs in recent case law that some form of aimsand-effects test is back even within the GATT. Yet, the importance of a regulations effects and objective purpose was not, in any of these cases, considered under likeness, but under other headings of the national treatment test. For tax distinctions between

-8directly competitive or substitutable products (GATT Article III:2, second sentence), effect and purpose matter under the requirement that the regulation must be shown to be applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. As the Appellate Body noted in Chile Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages: we consider that a measure's purposes, objectively manifested in the design, architecture and structure of the measure, are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. 4 In that same dispute, the Appellate Body was also willing to check whether objectives other than protectionism (e.g. health or progressive taxation) could rebut the claim that Chiles tax was applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. In the case at hand, however, the Appellate Body found that the mere reference to such other objectives was not sufficient: The conclusion of protective application reached by the Panel becomes very difficult to resist, in the absence of countervailing explanations by Chile. The mere statement of the four objectives pursued by Chile does not constitute effective rebuttal on the part of Chile. 5 Equally, even in respect of domestic regulations other than taxes (GATT Article III:4) where the requirement of so as to afford protection to domestic production was not found to apply 6 , the Appellate Body has stressed the importance of (1) the regulations effect on imports as opposed to domestic production, as well as (2) the role of alternative, non-protectionist objectives. Both this effects and this aims or purpose analysis was Appellate Body Report on Chile Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, adopted on 12 January 2000, para. 71, emphasis in the original. 5 Ibid. 6 Appellate Body Report on EC Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 25 September 1997, para. 216 (a determination of whether there has been a violation of Article III:4 does not require a separate consideration of whether a measure afford[s] protection to domestic production).
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-9conducted not under the question of likeness, but under the question of whether the regulation provides less favorable treatment to imports as opposed to domestic products. In EC Asbestos, the Appellate Body stressed that the requirement of less favorable treatment of imports is not a simple guillotine approach of finding one single imported product that is banned (say, imported asbestos) as compared to one single domestic product that is permitted (say, an alternative fiber). In addition, proof of less favorable treatment of the entire group of imports (imported asbestos and alternative fibers) as opposed to the entire group of domestic production (domestic asbestos and alternative fibers) must be demonstrated. In other words, and highlighting once more the relative unimportance of likeness, even where likeness (between asbestos and alternative fibers) is found, we are unavoidably back to square one. Indeed, after spending pages on likeness and ultimately finding likeness pursuant to an intricate test, we are led back to the original and core question with which we started the national treatment analysis, namely: Does the regulation favor the group of domestic products over the group of imports? Put differently, although there is no de jure discrimination (all asbestos is treated alike notwithstanding its origin; and all alternative fibers are treated alike, notwithstanding their origin), is there de facto discrimination of imports? Other than setting the trigger for application of this question, the likeness analysis has not brought us one step forward. In the words of the Appellate Body: even if two products are "like", that does not mean that a measure is inconsistent with Article III:4. A complaining Member must still establish that the measure accords to the group of "like" imported products "less favourable treatment" than it accords to the group of "like" domestic products a Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be "like", without, for this reason alone, according to the group of "like" imported products "less favourable treatment" than that accorded to the group of "like" domestic products. 7
7

Appellate Body on EC Asbestos, WT/FD135/AB/R, adopted on 5 April 2001, para. 100, emphasis in the original.

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In Dominican Republic Cigarettes, the Appellate Body went a step further. In that case, there clearly was a disparate impact or effect on the group of imported cigarettes as opposed to the group of domestic cigarettes: On a per cigarette basis, the bond of five million pesos to be paid by both importers and domestic producers of cigarettes imposed a higher burden on an imported cigarette as compared to a domestic cigarette (for one thing, because importers sell fewer cigarettes in the Dominican Republic then domestic cigarette producers). In the view of the Appellate Body, however, this disparate effect on imports was not enough to find a violation of national treatment: the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the market share of the importer in this case. In this specific case, the mere demonstration that the per-unit cost of the bond requirement for imported cigarettes was higher than for some domestic cigarettes during a particular period is not, in our view, sufficient to establish "less favourable treatment" under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. 8 In other words, even if a regulation has a detrimental effect on imports as opposed to like domestic products, that effect alone may not be sufficient proof of less favorable treatment of imports, i.e., protectionism of domestic production: A non-protectionist explanation here, market share, but possibly in other cases a non-protectionist alternative purpose -- may demonstrate that the regulation is not de facto discriminatory based on origin. This implied requirement of something more than differential treatment between like products, and even something more than a disparate impact on the group of imports as

Appellate Body report on Dominican Republic Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted on 19 May 2005, para. 96, underlining added.

- 11 opposed to domestic production, was reiterated most recently in the panel report on EC Biotech. In that case, the panel assumed that biotech products and non-biotech products were like (thereby cleverly skipping the likeness question altogether), but pointed out that the EC treats all biotech products alike irrespective of origin, and also treats all nonbiotech products alike irrespective of origin. The panel then found as follows: Argentina is not alleging that the treatment of products has differed depending on their origin. In these circumstances, it is not self-evident that the alleged less favourable treatment of imported biotech products is explained by the foreign origin of these products rather than, for instance, a perceived difference between biotech products and non-biotech products in terms of their safety, etc. In our view, Argentina has not adduced argument and evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that the alleged less favourable treatment is explained by the foreign origin of the relevant biotech products. 9 In sum, if the above-cited cases illustrate a trend, it is that in the future, most of the attention is likely to go not to likeness but to whether the regulation differentiates, either de jure or de facto, based on origin. The burden of proving de facto discrimination, or less favorable treatment of imports, rests on the complaining party. From the case law above, it seems that proof of de facto discrimination will be decided on a case by case basis, looking at a number of elements: the structure, design and architecture of the regulation; the way the regulation is applied; the effect of the regulation on the group of imports as opposed to the group of like domestic products; evidence of a protectionist purpose (objectively proven; not subjective intent); evidence of alternative nonprotectionist purposes that explain the regulation and why it distinguishes between like products, etc. In most cases, the fulfillment of only one of these criteria will not be enough. For example, a merely incidental effect of a higher burden on imports as opposed to domestic production may not be enough to prove a violation; nor may evidence of protectionist purpose, without any disparate effect on imports. Within this
9

Panel Report on EC Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, adopted on 21 November 2006, para. 7.2514.

- 12 mix of elements, proof of a non-protectionist purpose that justifies the regulation can play a role. In most cases, the presence of a non-protectionist purpose (say, health, the environment or consumer protection), or the absence of discriminatory effect, will come up as evidence submitted by the defendant so as to rebut the complainants claim of protectionism. In the end, it will be for the adjudicator to weigh everything together and to decide whether the complainant has met its burden of proving that the regulation treats imports less favorably as opposed to domestic production. V. A necessity test within national treatment ?

The weighing exercise for finding less favorable treatment of imports or foreign services or service suppliers, depicted earlier, is unlikely to focus exclusively on whether a nonprotectionist purpose explains the measure. In other words, contrary to Cossys prediction, national treatment in either GATT Article III or GATS Article XVII is unlikely to transform into a type of necessity test, where the panel would decide, as a separate matter, whether the regulation is necessary to, for example, protect health within the very definition of national treatment. Moreover, if, under GATT Article III or GATS Article XVII, there is to be a link between the regulation and the non-protectionist objective it aims for, this link or nexus should, in the view of the Appellate Body, be something less than necessity. Indeed, in Chile Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, in response to Chiles argument that, under GATT Article III, it was not for Chile to demonstrate that the tax was necessary to achieve the non-protectionist objectives of health protection and progressive taxation, the Appellate Body found as follows: we agree with Chile that it would be inappropriate, under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994, to examine whether the tax measure is necessary for achieving its stated objectives or purposes It appears to us that the Panel did no more than try to relate the observable structural features of the measure with its

- 13 declared purposes, a task that is unavoidable in appraising the application of the measure as protective or not of domestic production. 10 Cossy is right, however, to improve the old GATT aims-and-effects test by requiring at least some kind of nexus between the measure and the alleged non-protectionist objective that it pursues. Such reference to non-protectionist objectives, including a related nexus test, does not make the exceptions in GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV inutile. To be sure, those exceptions remain fully operational for de jure discrimination (no nonprotectionist objective can excuse de jure discrimination within GATT Article III or GATS Article XVII itself). But as the Appellate Body in Chile Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages implied, to require the strict test of necessity in national treatment itself could lead to odd results: knowing that under the exceptions to national treatment some justifications (such as conservation of exhaustible natural resources) are acceptable under a weaker related to test, to require necessity within national treatment itself, would somehow mean that the rule (necessity) is stricter than the exception (related to). In that scenario, it would also be easier to justify de jure discrimination (related to test under GATT Article XX(g)), then to avoid or justify a claim of de facto discrimination (necessity test under GATT Article III), another absurd result. So, should the nexus within national treatment itself be the somewhat weaker test of related to or rational relationship between the measure and the objective allegedly pursued? Here as well, surprising consequences may follow: knowing that some exceptions to national treatment require necessity (such as GATT Article XX(b) on human health), once a panel does find de facto discrimination under GATT Article III (i.e. the measure is not related to health), then, a fortiori, the exception in GATT Article XX(b) cannot possibly be met. Although other uses remain for Article XX, in this scenario, there would simply be no exception available (once a measure was found, under Article III, not to be related to health, then, for sure, it cannot possibly be necessary to protect health under Article XX(b)). Yet, if one adopts a related to test in national treatment for finding de facto discrimination, then at least it makes sense to be less strict on a claim of de facto discrimination (one only needs to show that the measure relates to health) and
10

Supra note 4, para. 72 (emphasis in the original).

- 14 more strict before justifying de jure discrimination (under Article XX, one needs to show that the measure is necessary to protect health). In the end, and recalling how the reference to non-protectionist objectives within national treatment is, or should be, part of a broader weighing exercise to check whether imports or foreign services/service suppliers are treated less favorably, the nexus requirement is best held flexible. Much like the Appellate Body has varied the strictness of the necessity test under GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV depending on the relative importance of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure, similarly, the nexus required within national treatment itself could vary depending on the relative importance of the nonprotectionist objective put on the table by the defendant. In that event, the required nexus could be necessity, related to or rational relationship or any other test, depending on the non-protectionist objective in question. Finally, if, as Cossy argues, there is already now a necessity test built into the national treatment discipline of GATS Article XVII, what are the negotiators under GATS Article VI currently negotiating about? As the Delimatsis paper demonstrates, the holy grail of Article VI negotiations seems to be a necessity test for all domestic services regulations. Yet, if such test is, as Cossy claims, already present within GATS Article XVII (national treatment) what more is there to negotiate (other than to expand the services sectors in which WTO Members commit to national treatment)? VI. Concluding remark

When it comes to national treatment, as well as MFN, most panels and commentators focus on the peripheral question of likeness. The more important question of what factors matter, and how much, in the weighing exercise of whether a regulation affords less favorable treatment to imports or foreign services or service suppliers, has received surprisingly little attention. 11 For trade in goods, the importance of the national treatment

11

For two notable exceptions, see Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination

- 15 discipline and how to define de facto discrimination was seriously reduced with the introduction of the SPS and TBT agreements. Those agreements impose different types of necessity tests even for measures that are not discriminatory. In other words, these necessity tests can be applied directly, without any need for a prior finding of discrimination. The same is not true for trade in services. As the paper by Delimatsis illustrates, negotiations on a necessity test for domestic services regulations are still ongoing. Thus, until these negotiations conclude, within GATS, discrimination is the central discipline and with it, the core question of defining de facto discrimination (not so much likeness) remains crucial.

in WTO Law: National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatmentor Equal Treatment? 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2002) 921-977 and Federico Ortino, From non-discrimination to reasonableness: a paradigm shift in international economic law? JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPER 01/05, available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/05/050101.pdf.