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Preferred Citation: Horst, Steven W. Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind.

Berkeley: University of California Press, c1996 1996. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft%$9n!#6&

Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality

A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind Steven W. Horst

Berkeley Los Angeles Oxford

% &''( T)e Re*ents o+ t)e University o+ Cali+ornia

'or (y parents, Willia( and )rin Horst

Preferred Citation: Horst, Steven W. Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press, c1996 1996. http: ark.cdli!.or" ark: 1#$#$ ft%$9n!#6&

'or (y parents, Willia( and )rin Horst $RE!"CE *his !ook +as a lon" ti(e in the (akin". *here are parts of it that date !ack to a!o,t 19&- and other parts that are very recent indeed. .t started o,t as an atte(pt to !rin" (y o+n pec,liar philosophical !ack"ro,nd /+hich is an ,n,s,al one in co"nitive science circles0 into contact +ith +hat +as at that ti(e /and to so(e e1tent still is0 the (ainline vie+ of the (ind in analytic philosophy of (ind: the Co(p,tational *heory of 2ind /C*2 for short0. . ca(e to the st,dy of co"nitive science +ith three kinds of relevant !ack"ro,nd, each of +hich is at least a little !it off center +ith respect to the conte(porary scene in the philosophy of (ind. Perhaps the (ost prosaic of these is that . +orked (,ch of (y +ay thro,"h "rad,ate school teachin" co,rses in co(p,ter pro"ra((in", soft+are desi"n, and artificial intelli"ence. .t +o,ld !e a (ost heino,s e1a""eration if . +ere to descri!e (yself as either a co(p,ter scientist or a hacker, !,t . learned so(e theory, did so(e pro"ra((in", and (ade (y +ay thro,"h (ost of the three3vol,(e History of Artificial Intelligence +ith a class of ,nder"rad,ate st,dents. . kne+ co(p,ters in theory and in practice !efore . !e"an to think a!o,t the( as a philosopher. *his, ho+ever, +as not (y first e1pos,re to co(p,ter (odels of the (ind. . had st,died as an

,nder"rad,ate +ith Stephen 4ross!er" of Boston University, one of the fe+ people doin" contin,o,s +ork in ne,ral net+ork (odels fro( the 196$s ,p ,ntil the present, even thro,"h the t+o decades +hen it +as not a partic,larly pop,lar thin" to !e doin". So +hereas (ost people in the philosophy of co"nitive science ca(e to co"nitive science !y +ay of the sy(!ol3processin" paradi"( e(!racin" 5 1vi 5 *,rin", 2insky, 6e+ell, Col!y, Wino"rad, and 2arr /to na(e !,t a fe+0, . c,t (y teeth on ne,ral net+ork (odels. .n a +ay, . have !een in e1actly the opposite position of (ost philosophers doin" co"nitive science in recent years: +hereas they have had to learn a!o,t the 7ne+7 ne,ral net+ork paradi"( /+hich is in fact as old as the sy(!ol3processin" paradi"(0, . had to do e1actly the opposite in the late 19&$s. *he third ele(ent in (y !ack"ro,nd, of co,rse, +as (y philosophical trainin". 2y first philosophical love +as speech act theory, on +hich . +rote an ,nder"rad,ate thesis in 19&1 +ith Br,ce 'raser. *he (a8or philosophical +riters on the s,!8ect at that 8,nct,re +ere 4rice, 9,stin, Stra+son, :endler, Searle, Bach, and Harnish. With the possi!le e1ception of the last t+o, these philosophers practiced their trade in a style (arkedly different fro( that co((only fo,nd in co"nitive science today. 9t the sa(e ti(e, . +as !e"innin" to read so(e of the +orks of )d(,nd H,sserl, +hich +as to have a profo,nd infl,ence on ho+ . ca(e to vie+ philosophy. .n spite of praise fro( people like Chishol(, Sellars, ;reyf,s, '<llesdal, Ha,"eland, and /(ore recently0 P,tna(, H,sserl is not ade=,ately appreciated a(on" 9(erican analytic philosophers. 2,ch of +hat has transpired since his day in philosophy of lan",a"e is already present in the first 7>o"ical .nvesti"ation,7 and no one +as (ore keenly a+are than he of the diffic,lties and pitfalls of co(in" to a philosophical ,nderstandin" of the (ind. H,sserl?s foc,s on the centrality of intentionality (ade +hat see(s to have !een a per(anent i(pression on (e. So(e+here in 19&@ . !eca(e convinced that the st,dy of speech acts co,ld not pro"ress f,rther +itho,t a st,dy of intentionality. /.t +as "ratifyin" to see a year later that Aohn Searle had co(e to a si(ilar concl,sion.0 *hat foc,s !eca(e central to (y philosophical thinkin" for the ne1t ten years, and it still occ,pies an i(portant /tho,"h no lon"er central0 place for (e in the sche(e of i(portant philosophical pro!le(s. 9s a "rad,ate st,dent, . +orked +ith Benneth Sayre at 6otre ;a(e, one of the first philosophers to +rite a!o,t artificial intelli"ence in the early 196$s, and a lon"ti(e proponent of an alternative vision of the (ind centerin" aro,nd the 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication artic,lated !y Shannon and Weaver. .t +as, in fact, only after . started +orkin" +ith Sayre that . !e"an to read +hat (ost people consider 7(ainstrea(7 artificial intelli"ence and philosophy of co"nitive science, so the sy(!ol3 processin" paradi"( +as act,ally the third paradi"( . +as e1posed to in co"nitive science. 9lon" the +ay in (y philosophical st,dies . felt so(e infl,ence fro( the +ritin"s of Plato, 9ristotle, Bant, and Witt"enstein. 5 1vii 5 .n short, . ca(e to the conte(porary scene in co"nitive science +ith a very different list of philosophical and scientific heroes fro( those of (ost of (y collea",es in the fieldC and (,ch of +hat . fo,nd in the 7(ainstrea(7 initially str,ck (e as e(inently +ron"headed. B,t it is one thin" to thin that so(ethin" is +ron"headedC it is of co,rse =,ite another to ,nderstand +hy people +o,ld !elieve it and to identify 8,st +here yo, think the pro!le( lies. *his !ook is in lar"e (eas,re the prod,ct of a lon" process of tryin" to do t+o thin"s: first, to ,nderstand the pro8ect fro( the inside, as it +ere, in ter(s that its o+n advocates +o,ld e(!raceC and, second, to artic,late +hat see( to (e its (a8or fla+s

in a fashion that does not depend too (,ch ,pon an alternative philosophical vie+point and +hich (i"ht !e accessi!le to so(eone +ho does not share (y o+n philosophical leanin"s. 9s a res,lt, the first t+o chapters of this !ook atte(pt to lay o,t co(p,tationalis( in its historical conte1t and to e1plain to the reader +hy one (i"ht very sensi!ly think that it is offerin" so(e te(ptin" philosophical fr,it. 9t the sa(e ti(e, . have tried to e(phasiDe ele(ents in the historical conte1t and connections +ith other strands of philosophical psycholo"y that see( i(portant yet are often passed over !y those +ho consider the(selves to !e +ithin the co(p,tationalist ca(p. . hope that these chapters +ill serve as a "ood introd,ction to the co(p,tational theory for a +ide philosophical a,dience. . s,spect that they (ay also prove ,sef,l for the initiate +ho +ishes to read the critical sections of the !ook, as they atte(pt to lay o,t co(p,tationalis( +ith (ore e1actit,de than is nor(ally done and +ith a (ini(,( of rhetoric. .n a sense, the (oral of the !ook is 8,st this: if yo, are not e1tre(ely caref,l a!o,t ho+ yo, ,se +ords like ?co(p,ter?, ?sy(!ol?, ?synta1?, and ?(eanin"?, yo, are likely to st,(!le into so(e pernicio,s conf,sions a!o,t co(p,tation and the (ind and to !e te(pted !y so(e s,!tly fallacio,s ar",(ents that see( to deliver philosophical res,lts !,t in fact (islead. *he rest of the !ook "re+ "rad,ally. .t started as a p,rely critical pro8ect of de!,nkin" clai(s that C*2 provides an acco,nt of the intentionality of the (ental and a 7vindication7 of realis( a!o,t (ental states. Ence . had satisfied (yself that . had proven (y case there to (y o+n satisfaction, . !e"an to !e (ore interested in +hat co,ld !e said in a positive +ay a!o,t the i(portance of co(p,tational psycholo"y as a +ay of ,nderstandin" the (ind, and ho+ far a+ay fro( the vie+s artic,lated !y +riters like Aerry 'odor and Fenon Pylyshyn one +o,ld have to "o in order to do so. Unlike so(e critics of C*2, . do not !elieve that e(pirical research in co"nitive science stands or falls +ith the philo! 5 1viii 5 sophical clai(s of C*2. *he several chapters of the !ook that e1plore alternative +ays of lookin" at co(p,tation and the (ind +ere first drafted at the 6ational )ndo+(ent for the H,(anities S,((er Se(inar on 2ental Gepresentation held at the University of 9riDona in the S,((er of 1991. Go! C,((ins, +ho directed that instit,te, has "one far !eyond the call of d,ty !y readin" three separate drafts of the !ook in the three years since that ti(e. Chapter 6, +hich contains so(e of the (ost provocative (aterial in the entire !ook, +as +ritten after the rest of the (an,script to respond to criticis(s that Go! raised a!o,t an earlier draft. Go! has (y ,ndyin" "ratit,de for his responses alon" the +ay, and not least of all for occasionally ad(ittin" that . had convinced hi( a!o,t so(ethin". *hanks to hi( and to the 6)H, +hich helped finance that e1tre(ely prod,ctive s,((er. 2a8or thanks also "o to Ben Sayre, +ho forced (e to take C*2 serio,sly and on its o+n ter(s, and forced (e to a hi"her standard of clarity and e1actit,de than . (i"ht other+ise have attained. *hanks to Ben also for the ,sef,l +ay he en"a"ed in the process of helpin" (e ha((er o,t vie+s that +ere stron"ly related to his o+n yet contrary to his o+n for(,lations. Aay 4arfield of Ha(pshire Colle"e read and co((ented ,pon the entire (an,script very late in the "a(e, (ade so(e very s,pportive co((ents, and also (ade a n,(!er of very i(portant s,""estions that have ,lti(ately (ade the final prod,ct a (,ch !etter and (ore reada!le !ook than it other+ise (i"ht have !een. *he chapter on nat,raliDation in partic,lar is (,ch e1panded as a res,lt of Aay?s /deservedly0 pitiless attack ,pon a for(er incarnation of the sa(e. /. fear it still does not (eet +ith his entire approvalHthe credit for its e1pansion is his, any resid,al fa,lts are (y o+n.0 Gichard ;eWitt of 'airfield University also +ent !eyond the call of d,ty in readin" (,ltiple drafts of fo,r or five chapters, and has !een s,pportive of the pro8ect via n,(ero,s e3(ail e1chan"es since +e

(et at C,((ins?s 6)H se(inar. >ike+ise, (y Wesleyan collea",e Sanford Shieh (ade so(e very helpf,l s,""estions on the chapters in Part .., and pro!a!ly saved (e fro( so(e "rave e(!arrass(ents in (y ,se of ter(s that had technical (eanin"s in lo"ic of +hich . +as !lessedly ,na+are. 2any other people read or co((ented on all of part of the (an,script alon" the +ay. 9ll of the follo+in" people +ere at least so kind as to a"ree to read parts of the (an,script for (e so(e+here alon" the line. 2any (ade i(portant contri!,tions to the present for( of the +ork !y their co((ents and criticis(s: 2ichael 9nderson, Go!ert 9,di, >ynne 5 1i1 5 G,dder Baker, ;avid B,rrell, H,!ert ;reyf,s, 9aron )didin, Brian 'ay, *i( 'ischer, Pat 'ranken, Br,ce 'raser, Heather 4ert, G,th 4inD!er", :ictor 4o,revitch, Go!ert >osonsky, :a,"hn 2cBi(, Chris 2enDel, 2ark 2oes, Hans 2Iller, Shelly Park, Bill Ga(sey, Bill Go!inson, and Aoe Go,se. 'inally, . sho,ld like to thank the (any people +hose love and friendship over the years have (ade it possi!le for (e to p,rs,e so(ethin" as de(andin" as a !ook in philosophy. .n partic,lar, . +ish to thank (y parents, +ho have provided a(ple s,pport thro,"ho,t (y life, and +ho have !een in (y corner for (any years +hile . +orked on a pro8ect +hose (erits they co,ld only take on faith. Plato so(e+here descri!es intellect,al creations as a kind of pro"eny. . hope that they +ill !e pleased +ith their first "randchild. 2.;;>)*EW6, CE66)C*.CU* EC*EB)G 199J 515

*here are fe+ thin"s that hold a "reater fascination for ,s h,(an !ein"s than the pro8ect of e1plainin" o,rselves to o,rselves. En the one hand, the h,(an (ind is the part of ,s that (akes ,s +ho +e are as individ,als. .t is also o,r (inds that set ,s as a species apart fro( !r,te (atter and fro( other (e(!ers of the ani(al kin"do(. *he centrality of self3kno+led"e in Western philosophy "oes !ack at least to Socrates? adherence to the (otto inscri!ed over the te(ple of 9pollo at ;elphi: 7Bno+ thyself.7 En the other hand, the (ind has proved one of the (ost intracta!le (ysteries for (odern science. .ndeed, (odern science, conceived as a discipline concerned +ith the la+f,l ca,sal interactions of (aterial !odies, has !een hard pressed to acco((odate the +orld of tho,"hts and concepts and i(a"es that see( essential to any treat(ent of the (ind. Ene (i"ht even "o so far as to say that the central problem of modern philosophy has !een one of so(eho+ closin" the "ap !et+een t+o apparently inco((ens,ra!le disco,rses: a disco,rse a!o,t o,r (inds that speaks of ideas and i(a"es, and a disco,rse a!o,t the +orld of nat,re that speaks of ca,sal relations !et+een !odies in (otion. Since 9lan *,rin"?s introd,ction of the notion of a co(p,tin" (achine in the late 19#$s, there has !een a "ro+in" interest in a ne+ paradi"( for ,nderstandin" the (ind: a paradi"( that treats the (ind as a di"ital co(p,ter. *he arrival of (achine co(p,tation ,pon o,r intellect,al landscape has had a profo,nd and +idespread i(pact ,pon research in the (any disciplines that are concerned +ith the st,dy of the (ind. .n fields s,ch as co"nitive psycholo"y, etholo"y, lin",istics, the philosophy

5@5 of (ind, and co"nitive ne,roscience, the co(p,tational vie+ of the (ind has !eco(e a (ainstrea( vie+Hperhaps even the do(inant vie+ in recent years. )ven tho,"h there is no (onolithic consens,s a!o,t ho+ the co(p,ter paradi"( is to !e applied to the (ind, and even tho,"h there are (any researchers in all of the disciplines that st,dy the (ind +ho are +orkin" o,t of other traditions, it is !y no+ "enerally a"reed that the co(p,tational approach has e(er"ed as a force to !e reckoned +ith. 9nd th,s even +riters +ho vie+ the co(p,ter (etaphor as essentially !ankr,pt have nonetheless felt (oved to devote considera!le ink to ref,tin" it or esta!lishin" the (erits of their o+n vie+s a"ainst it. . !elieve that there are t+o very different approaches that a philosopher (ay take to this very rich !ody of 7co(p,tationalist7 +ork in the st,dy of co"nition or 7co"nitive science.7 *he first is that of the historian and philosopher of science. 9s a philosopher of science, one (ay look at the co(p,tationalist paradi"( in psycholo"y +ith an eye to+ards issues that are internal to the "arious sciences of cognition: What are the (ethodolo"ical ass,(ptions of co(p,tational psycholo"yK Ho+ do they differ fro( those of, say, !ehavioris( or associationis( or ne,roscienceK What are psycholo"ical theorists really co((itted to in their ,se of theoretical ter(s s,ch as ?representation? or ?synta1?K What are the iss,es that really stand !et+een rival research pro"ra((es s,ch as 7"ood old3fashioned 9.,7 +hich e(phasiDes r,les and representations, and ne,ral net+ork approachesK What are the i(plicit ass,(ptions of different theorists a!o,t the 7"ood3(akin"7 =,alities of scientific theories in a do(ain s,ch as psycholo"yK En the other hand, the philosopher of mind (ay also look to the co(p,tational paradi"( for ans+ers to lon"3standin" philosophical pro!le(s, s,ch as the (ind3!ody pro!le(, iss,es a!o,t the (etaphysical nat,re of the (ind and the relationship !et+een tho,"ht and (atter, the relationship !et+een psycholo"y and the nat,ral sciences, and the nat,re of intentionality. While there have !een so(e +elco(e contri!,tions of late to the history and philosophy of psycholo"y that take a caref,l look at act,al research in the sciences of co"nition,L1M !y far the "reater portion of philosophical interest in the co(p,ter paradi"( has !een concentrated on the (ore distinctively philosophical enterprises of e1plainin" intentionality and 7nat,raliDin"7 psycholo"y !y renderin" its co((it(ent to (ental states and processes co(pati!le +ith (aterialis( and the "enerality of physics. *his !ook is intended as a contri!,tion to+ards s,ch an ,nderstandin" of the nat,re of the co(p,ter paradi"( and its i(portance to the 5#5 e(pirical st,dy of co"nition and to the philosophy of (ind. .t co(!ines an e1tended e1a(ination of a 7(ainstrea(7 approach to the i(portance of co(p,tationHthe 7Co(p,tational *heory of 2ind7 /C*20 cha(pioned !y Aerry 'odor and Fenon PylyshynH+ith a preli(inary artic,lation of an alternative approach to e1a(inin" the i(portance of co(p,tational psycholo"y. *he thesis, in a sentence, is that C*2 does not provide a sol,tion to the philosophical pro!le(s that it is heralded as solvin"Hindeed, it involves so(e deep conf,sions a!o,t co(p,ters, sy(!ols, and (eanin"H!,t that this does not ,nderc,t the possi!ility that the co(p,ter paradi"( (ay provide an i(portant reso,rce /for all +e kno+, perhaps the key reso,rce0 for the develop(ent of a (at,re science of co"nition. .n short, +e +ill !e disappointed if +e look to C*2 for sol,tions to lon"3standin" philosophical pro!le(s a!o,t the (ind. B,t co(p,tational psycholo"y is nonetheless a ro!,st research pro"ra((e that is deservin" of philosophical st,dy, and the final section of this !ook s,""ests an alternative approach to vie+in" co(p,tational psycholo"y fro( the standpoint of the philosophy of science rather than that of (etaphysics.

C*2 clai(s that the (ind literally is a co(p,ter. 9nd +hat it is to !e a co(p,ter, accordin" to C*2, is to !e a device that stores sy(!ols and perfor(s transfor(ations ,pon those sy(!ols in accordance +ith for(al /or, (ore precisely, syntactic0 r,les. *here are t+o distinct and i(portant strands to this theory. *he first strand is representational and consists in the clai( that individ,al (ental states, s,ch as partic,lar !eliefs and desires, are relationships !et+een an or"anis( and (ental representations . *hese (ental representations are physically instantiated sy(!ol tokens havin" !oth se(antic and syntactic properties. *his vie+, taken alone, 'odor so(eti(es calls the 7Gepresentational *heory of 2ind.7 *he Gepresentational *heory of 2ind /G*20 is a theory a!o,t the nat,re of individ,al (ental states. *he second thread of C*2 is the clai( that (ental processes, s,ch as for(in" and testin" a hypothesis or reasonin" to a concl,sion, are computational processes that the (ind perfor(s ,pon these representations. *hat is, +hen the (ind (oves fro( one tho,"ht to another, it is "eneratin" ne+ (ental representations, and it does so !y applyin" syntactically !ased r,les to the representations already present in it, 8,st as a di"ital co(p,ter "enerates ne+ sy(!olic representations !y applyin" syntactically !ased r,les to e1istin" representations. C*2 has "enerated a "reat deal of interest a(on" philosophers !eca,se it "oes !eyond clai(s of /(ereN0 e(pirical ,tility for the co(p,ter 5J5 paradi"( and (akes s,!stantive philosophical clai(s as +ell. *+o s,ch clai(s are of partic,lar i(portance. 'irst, it is clai(ed that C*2Hor, (ore specifically, the representational co(ponent of C*2, G*2Hprovides an acco,nt of ho+ (ental states have s,ch properties as (eanin", reference, and intentionality. 9ccordin" to 'odor, (ental states 7inherit7 their se(antic properties fro( those of the representations they involve. *he second clai( is at least as !old: na(ely, that C*2 provides a 7vindication7 of 7intentional psycholo"y7 /that is, of psycholo"y that is co((itted to a realistic constr,al of e1planations in the intentional idio(0 !y sho+in" that intentional e1planations can !e tied to no(olo"ically !ased ca,sal e1planations that are in no +ay inco(pati!le +ith (aterialis( or +ith the "enerality of physics. *hese t+o clai(s are !old and a(!itio,s, to say the least. 9 theory that co,ld acco(plish either of these "oals in isolation +o,ld !e of considera!le i(portance. 9 theory that acco(plished !oth, +hile also !ein" closely linked to a !,r"eonin" (ethodolo"ical approach to act,al research in co"nition, co,ld hardly dra+ (ore attention than it deserved. .ndeed, if C*2 s,cceeds as its advocates clai(, the e(er"ence of the notion of co(p,tation +ill have provided the !asis for a revol,tion in the st,dy of (ind as f,nda(ental and i(portant as the Copernican revol,tion in astrono(y. . shall ar",e, ho+ever, that +hile the co(p,ter (ay ,lti(ately provide the !asis for the e1tension into psycholo"y of the 4alilean pro8ect of the (athe(atiDation of science, C*2?s atte(pts to e1plain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psycholo"y are !ased ,pon s,!tle !,t f,nda(ental conf,sions. 9t the heart of C*2 is the clai( that (ental states are relations to (ental representationsH to (eanin"f,l sy(!olsHand that this acco,nts for their se(antic properties and their intentionality. *he cr,cial =,estions one (,st ask of C*2, therefore, are these: /10 A,st +hat does it (ean to say that (ental states are 7relations to (eanin"f,l sy(!ols7K 9nd /@0 8,st ho+ is the post,lation of (eanin"f,l sy(!ols s,pposed to e1plain the se(antic properties and the intentionality of (ental statesK *he first =,estion calls for an e1a(ination of 8,st +hat +e are sayin" of a thin" +hen +e call it a 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ol.7 *he second calls for an application of the res,lts of s,ch an e1a(ination to the for(,lations of C*2 offered !y 'odor and Pylyshyn. .t is !oth c,rio,s and ,nfort,nate that these =,estions have received so little attention fro(

philosophers of (ind: curious !eca,se the =,es3 5%5 tions see( so cr,cial to the assess(ent of a theory that is "enerally ackno+led"ed to !e of "reat interest and i(portanceC unfortunate !eca,se an e1a(ination of these =,estions ,ncovers si"nificant a(!i",ities in s,ch notions as 7representation,7 7sy(!ol,7 7(eanin",7 and 7intentionality.7 Until +e have ackno+led"ed these a(!i",ities, it is i(possi!le either to assess C*2 or even to deter(ine e1actly +hat it is that it is clai(in". *his pro!le( has, . think, !een to,ched ,pon !y so(e +ritersHnota!ly !y Benneth Sayre and Aohn Searle, !oth of +ho( ,r"e ,pon ,s the concl,sion that there is so(ethin" a!o,t sy(!ols, and partic,larly a!o,t sy(!ols in co(p,ters, that renders the( ,ns,ita!le for an e1planation of the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states. 2y criticis(s of C*2 r,n in the sa(e vein. Where . part +ays +ith Searle and Sayre is that they look for the pro!le( specifically in the ,se of sy(!ols in co(p,ters. .n (y vie+, ho+ever, the f,nda(ental iss,e t,rns o,t in the end to have c,rio,sly little to do +ith co(p,ters. *he iss,e, rather, is +hether the notion of sy(!olic representation provides the !edrock ,pon +hich a theory of the intentionality of (ental states (ay !e !,ilt. 2y ans+er to that is no# and insofar as the pro8ect of vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y /at least as envisioned !y advocates of C*20 can !e sho+n to depend ,pon its a!ility provide a theory of intentionality, that vindication fails as +ell. Why can?t one esta!lish a theory of intentionality for (ental states ,pon a fo,ndation of sy(!olic representations in the (indK . a( afraid that . do not kno+ ho+ to "ive an ans+er to that =,estion that satisfies (y o+n standards of ri"or in less space than the several chapters it occ,pies in this !ook, !,t . shall try to "ive a short ans+er here that (ay prove helpf,l and not too inacc,rate. When one takes a close look at +hat one is sayin" +hen one calls so(ethin" a 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ol7 or a 7sy(!olic representation,7 it t,rns o,t that one is tacitly sayin" thin"s a!o,t the conventions and intentions of sy(!ol ,sers. *his is 8,st part of +hat +e are sayin" of a thin" in callin" it a sy(!ol, and of +hat +e are sayin" of a sy(!ol +hen +e say that it has se(antic properties. B,t conventions and intentions of sy(!ol ,sers are ,lti(ately facts a!o,t people?s (ental states. 9nd so any e1planation of the intentionality of (ental states that rests ,pon the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!olic representations ends ,p e1plainin" the intentionality of (ental states in a +ay that refers to other (eanin"f,l (ental states. *h,s one i(portant pro!le( +ith C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality is that it t,rns o,t to !e circ,lar and re"ressive: circ,lar !eca,se it e1plains the (eanin"f,lness of 565 (ental states !y appealin" to the (eanin"s of sy(!ols, +hile one (,st also e1plain the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols !y appealin" to the (eanin"s of (ental statesC re"ressive !eca,se the e1planation of any partic,lar (ental state +ill ,lti(ately refer !ack to other (ental states. 2oreover, it is not only the semantic properties of sy(!ols that are conventional in nat,reC syntactic properties, and the very symbol types themsel"es are ,lti(ately dependent ,pon conventions. /*he fact that so(ethin" is a letter p or an inscription of the )n"lish +ord ?do"? depends ,pon conventions that esta!lish the e1istence of those sy(!ol types.0 .n partic,lar, the kinds of syntactically !ased r,les that are necessary for compositionality are conventional in nat,re: in order to "enerate se(antic properties for co(ple1 representations, it is not eno,"h to have interpretations for the pri(itives and 7synta17 in the +eak sense of rules for legal concatenation or equi"alence classes of legal transformations .

Gather, one needs a stron"er kind of synta1 that involves r,les for ho+ syntactic patterns contri!,te to (eanin"s of co(ple1 representationsHfor e1a(ple, a r,le to the effect that if $A$ (eans 7O7 and $%$ (eans 7P,7 then $A!&!%$ +ill (ean 7O and P.7 *he only +ay +e kno+ of "ettin" this kind of co(positionality is !y +ay of conventions. .t is not clear that there is any other +ay of "ettin" co(positionalityC at very least, C*2?s advocates +o,ld have to sho+ ho+ se(antic co(position co,ld !e achieved +itho,t the aid of conventions. 6o+ of co,rse this ar",(ent rests ,pon a partic,lar constr,al of +hat it is to !e a sy(!olic representation or to !e a (eanin"f,l sy(!ol. B,t, as far as . a( a+are, this is the only sense of ?sy(!olic representation? and ?(eanin"f,l sy(!ol? that +e have. Ene is, of co,rse, inclined to +onder +hether perhaps +riters like 'odor really (ean so(ethin" different +hen they speak of the (ind containin" 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ols.7 B,t if they do, it is c,rio,s that they never infor( the reader that they are ,sin" fa(iliar e1pressions in novel +ays. .ndeed, in one place 'odor "ives a !rief "lance at this possi!ility only to dis(iss the iss,e as ,nlikely to prove i(portant. .t re(ains an open =,estion +hether internal representation, so constr,ed, is s,fficiently like nat,ral lan",a"e representation so that !oth can !e called representation ?in the sa(e sense?. B,t . find it hard to care (,ch ho+ this =,estion sho,ld !e ans+ered. *here is an analo"y !et+een the t+o kinds of representation. Since p,!lic lan",a"es are conventional and the lan",a"e of tho,"ht is not, there is ,nlikely to !e more than an analo"y. .f yo, are i(pressed !y the analo"y, yo, +ill +ant to say that the inner code is a lan",a"e. .f yo, are ,ni(pressed !y the analo"y, yo, +ill +ant to say that the inner code is in so(e sense a representational syste( that is not a lan",a"e. B,t in 5-5 neither case +ill +hat yo, say affect +hat . take to !e the =,estion that is serio,sly at iss,e: +hether the (ethodolo"ical ass,(ptions of co(p,tational psycholo"y are coherent. /'odor 19-%: -&3-90 2y contention, !y contrast, is that it does indeed (atter a "reat deal +hether +ords like ?representation? are ,sed in their ,s,al sense +ithin C*2, !eca,se . !elieve that the conventionality of lin",istic sy(!ols is not so(ethin" that can !e divorced fro( their sy(!olhood. .t is not that +e find a nonconventional property called 7(eanin"7 in lin",istic sy(!ols that additionally happens to !e conventional in nat,re. Gather, the very notion of 7(eanin"7 that +e apply to sy(!ols is inter+oven +ith conventionality thro,"h and thro,"h. 9nd th,s if +e apply these fa(iliar notions of 7representation,7 7(eanin",7 and 7synta17 to C*2, +e are led to circ,larity and re"ress. 9s 'odor says, this criticis( does not ,nderc,t the (ethodolo"ical ass,(ptions of co(p,tational psychology . B,t this is only so !eca,se co(p,tational psycholo"y /that is, e(pirical science inspired !y the co(p,ter paradi"(0 is not co((itted to the vie+ that its 7(ental representations7 literally are sy(!ols in a lan",a"e, as . shall ar",e in later chapters. 9 (erely analo"o,s ,sa"e of the +ord ?representation? is 8,st fine for co(p,tational psycholo"y. *he pla,si!ility of C*2?s philosophical clai(s, !y contrast, +o,ld see( to t,rn precisely ,pon the ass,(ption that the 7sy(!ols7 in =,estion are 7sy(!ols7 in precisely the sa(e sense that +e speak of 7sy(!ols7 in a lan",a"e. 'or(aliDation and co(p,tation sho+ ,s ho+ to tie (eanin" to ca,sation for /convention3!ased0 linguistic symbols, and not for anythin" else. .f (ental representations are so(ethin" other than lin",istic sy(!ols, +e need to see ho+ the link fro( (eanin" to ca,sation +orks for so(e ne+ class of entities. *he ar",(ents 'odor and others "ive for their clai(s a!o,t intentionality and the vindication of intentional psycholo"y si(ply do not "o thro,"h as stated if +ords like ?representation? and ?sy(!ol? are ,sed in a (erely analo"o,s or (etaphorical (anner.

En the other hand, it is clear that one (i"ht try to develop C*2 in a +ay that divorces the technical notion of (ental representation fro( convention3!ased lin",istic si"ns. *he fact that C*2?s advocates do not try to do this in any e1plicit detail does not (ean that this aven,e (i"ht not prove (ore fr,itf,l in the end. Ene (i"ht, for e1a(ple, say that the 7se(antic properties7 of (ental representations are not the sa(e sort of 7se(antic properties7 possessed !y "arden3variety sy(!ols. *hat is, one (i"ht say that e1pressions s,ch as ?se(antic property? are ho(ony(o,s, and have different senses +hen applied to "arden3variety sy(!ols 5&5 and to (ental representations, in +hich case res,lts of concept,al analysis of se(antic ter(inolo"y as applied to disc,rsive sy(!ols cannot !e ,sed to create pro!le(s for a theory of (ental representations. Unfort,nately, to the !est of (y kno+led"e, no advocates of C*2 e1plicitly p,rs,e this co,rse. B,t since it does see( to !e the only +ay of savin" the theory fro( the res,lts of (y concept,al analysis, . develop t+o +ays of p,rs,in" this line of tho,"ht. *he first is to take ca,sal theories of content like that s,pplied in 'odor /19&-0 as s,pplyin" a ca,sal definition of se(antic ter(inolo"y as applied to (ental representations. *he second is to treat se(antic ter(inolo"y as applied to (ental representations as !ein" theoretical and open3ended in character: that is, to treat ter(s s,ch as ?(eanin"f,l? and ?referential? as applied to (ental representations as ter(s +hose (eanin" +e do not presently kno+ !,t (i"ht discover as the res,lt of f,rther investi"ation. . shall ar",e in Part ... that neither of these strate"ies see(s likely to !e a!le to provide an acco,nt of intentionality or to vindicate intentional psycholo"y. *hese pro!le(s for C*2 as a philosophical thesis, ho+ever, do not entail that the co(p,ter paradi"( is of no ,se for the philosopher or the e(pirical researcher. 'or . think that there is a (,ch !etter +ay to ,nderstand the nat,re and i(portance of the co(p,ter paradi"( for the st,dy of co"nition. .f one adopts this alternative vie+, the i(portance of providin" an acco,nt of intentionality +anes si"nificantly, +hile the need to 8,stify intentional psycholo"y disappears alto"ether. *o arrive at this standpoint, ho+ever, +e (,st cease lookin" to C*2 as a so,rce of sol,tions to old philosophical p,DDles and !e"in to look at co(p,tational psycholo"y as a research pro"ra((e in psycholo"y fro( the perspective of historians and philosophers of science. *he !asis of the alternative approach is the pre(ise that t+o of the traditional distin",ishin" (arks of a (at,re science have !een the (athe(atiDation of its e1planations and the clarification of connections !et+een the do(ain and the la+s of that science and those of other areas of kno+led"e. So, to take a paradi"( e1a(ple, che(istry pro"ressed to+ards (athe(atical (at,rity thro,"h the develop(ent of the periodic ta!le, the notion of "alences, and the discovery of r,les "overnin" reactions !et+een different classes of (olec,les. .t pro"ressed to+ards connective (at,rity as the e1planations "iven in che(ical ter(s +ere a!le to provide e1planations for pheno(ena descri!ed at a hi"her level /e."., as descri!ed in the voca!,laries of (etall,r"y or "enetics0 and as cate"ories s,ch as "alence +ere in t,rn e1plained at a lo+er level in ter(s of s,ch ideas as ele(entary particles and or!itals. 595 *he interpretation of the i(portance of the co(p,ter paradi"( that . +ish to ,r"e is the follo+in": +hat the notion of co(p,tation may !e a!le to provide for the e(pirical scientist is the ri"ht kind of technical (achinery for the (athe(atiDation of the st,dy of co"nitionHpartic,larly, co"nitive psycholo"y. /. e(phasiDe the +ord ?(ay? !eca,se . seek only to ill,(inate +hat co(p,tational

psycholo"y 'ould pro"ide if successful, and not to (ake any predictions a!o,t its event,al s,ccesses or fail,res.0 *hat is, +hat co(p,ter science "ives ,s is an a!stract voca!,lary that (i"ht t,rn o,t to provide the reso,rces for psycholo"y to pro"ress to+ards (athe(atical (at,rity. . think that it sho,ld !e clear that this is of enor(o,s interest, even +itho,t the philosophical !enefits clai(ed for C*2. S,rely a lar"e part of +hat psycholo"y is a!o,t is providin" an inventory of co"nitive processes, 7(appin"7 the relations !et+een these, 7,nlockin" the !lack !o1es7 ,nderlyin" hi"h3level processes !y specifyin" lo+er3level processes that +o,ld acco,nt for the(, and sho+in" ho+ (ental processes are connected to !ehavior. *hat is, part of +hat psycholo"y is a!o,t is specifyin" the form of the (ind !y tracin" o,t the f,nctional relations (ental states !ear to one another and to !ehavior. 2any researchers interested in co"nition have staked their careers ,pon their !elief that co(p,tational notions allo+ the( to carry o,t this pro8ect in +ays that +ere previo,sly ,navaila!le. .ndeed, the stren"th of this !elief is evidenced !y the e(er"ence of 7co"nitive science7 as an approach to the (ind that is or"aniDed aro,nd the pre(ise that co"nitive processes can !e descri!ed in co(p,tational ter(s. . think this research pro8ect is of "reat interest re"ardless of +hether the notion of co(p,tation can contri!,te to the sol,tion of any philosophical pro!le(s as +ell. 2oreover, vie+ed in this +ay, co"nitive science as an e(pirical research pro"ra((e is not i(periled !y (y criticis(s of C*2. What . ar",e a"ainst C*2 is that if yo, take it as central to the very notion of computation that co(p,tation consists in the (anip,lation of meaningful symbols, then there are serio,s pro!le(s involved in sayin" that co"nition is co(p,tation. .f, on the other hand, +hat is essential to the notion of co(p,tation is functional specifiability Hin, say, the for( of a (achine ta!le Hthese pro!le(s do not arise. .f co"nitive science is oriented to+ards the thesis that cogniti"e processes are functionally specifiable, then it can atte(pt to apply the technical reso,rces of co(p,ter science to the do(ain of psycholo"y +itho,t +orryin" a!o,t pro!le(s +ith the notions of symbol or representation . .ndeed, one (i"ht even propose theories that depend ,pon the pre(ise that there are (en3 5 1$ 5 tal states or !rain states that play a role in tho,"ht, a role that is formally analogous to the roles played !y sy(!ols in the e1ec,tion of partic,lar co(p,ter pro"ra(s, +itho,t threat of incoherence fro( (is,se of s,ch +ords as ?sy(!ol? and ?(eanin"f,l?. /Ene (i"ht, +ith so(e risk, even ,se the +ord ?sy(!ol? in descri!in" s,ch states, so lon" as one +as caref,l that the ille"iti(ate i(portation of the ordinary (eanin" of the +ord ?sy(!ol? did not do any illicit +ork in one?s e1planations.0 Ef co,rse, +hat one loses in this alternative is the hope C*2 e1cited of findin" a level of e1planation Ha do(ain of (eanin"f,l (ental representations over +hich (ental co(p,tations are definedHat +hich there is a clear (eetin" of the +ays !et+een (entalistic description cast in the intentional idio( and one of the nat,ral sciences. En this vie+, co"nitive science does not 7close the "ap7 !et+een (ind and nat,re. Here, ho+ever, there is a partin" of the +ays !et+een the interests of the philosopher of (ind and those of the e(pirical scientist. 'or the co(p,ter paradi"( (i"ht help psycholo"y pro"ress to one or !oth types of scientific (at,rity +itho,t providin" a philosophical acco,nt of intentionality in the process. 'irst, it (i"ht provide the tools for the (athe(atiDation of psycholo"y +itho,t providin" for connective (at,rity as +ell. B,t it does see( likely that a "ood (athe(atiDation of co"nitive e1planation is 8,st the sort of thin" that +o,ld !e helpf,l in correlatin" states specified in the intentional idio( +ith states specified in ne,rolo"ical ter(s: that is, it is ar",a!le that the only +ay of findin" o,t ho+ co"nitive states are instantiated is to find o,t +hat in the !rain has the ri"ht /f,nctional0 7shape7 to realiDe the(. So if connection !et+een co"nitive e1planation and other kinds of e1planation is to take place, it (ay partially !e through the (athe(atiDation of !oth levels of

e1planation. 9nd for this it is a pla,si!le hypothesis that co(p,ter science provides the appropriate reso,rces. B,t it is i(portant to see that one (i"ht "et the kind of connectivity that the scientist desires +itho,t there!y solvin" any philosophical pro!le(s. *he researcher co((itted to intentional e1planation and nat,ral e1planation +ants to find o,t +hat ne,ral processes are specially associated 'ith +hat intentionally specified processes. 9nd she is interested in this association 8,st to the e1tent that intentional and nat,ralistic predictions +ill trac one another. *he (etaphysical nat,re of this 7special association7 really does not (atter as far as e(pirical science is concerned. )(pirical science is lar"ely !lind to the differences !et+een relationships stron"er than e(pirical ade=,acy, and hence a "ood inte"rated psycholo"ical theory co,ld !e e=,ally co(pati!le +ith (aterial3 5 11 5 is( and s,pervenience or +ith thoro,"h"oin" parallelist d,alis(. 9nd this, . think, sho,ld !e vie+ed as a virt,e rather than a vice: in (y !ook, consistency +ith a +ide ran"e of ontolo"ical options co,nts as a si"nificant virt,e for an e(pirical research pro"ra((e. 6o+ there is a sense in +hich s,ch an inte"rated psycholo"y +o,ld provide an 7acco,nt7 of intentionality and a sense in +hich it +o,ld not. .f !y 7an acco,nt of intentionality7 one (eans (a) a (odel of the relations !et+een intentional states, sti(,li, and !ehavior, and (b) a specification of the nat,ral syste(s thro,"h +hich intentional states and processes areHto ,se an intentionally ne,tral ter( Hreali*ed, then an inte"rated psycholo"y (i"ht +ell involve an 7acco,nt of intentionality.7 B,t if 7an acco,nt of intentionality7 (eans so(ethin" stronger Hsay, if it involves providin" nat,ral conditions ,pon +hich intentional properties +o,ld ha"e to s,pervene, then an inte"rated psycholo"y (i"ht +ell not provide this kind of 7acco,nt of intentionality.7 . !elieve, ho+ever, that it is f,nda(entally (is",ided to seek s,ch a nat,ralistic acco,nt of intentionality, for reasons that . shall develop in chapters 9 and 11. .f . a( ri"ht, then ina!ility to provide an acco,nt of intentionality in this stron" sense is not a fa,lt. . shall ar",e for a si(ilar attit,de to+ards the other "oal C*2 has so,"ht to achieve: that of vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y. *o p,t it very !riefly, . do not !elieve that intentional psycholo"y is presently in need of vindication. *he perceived need for a vindication t,rned ,pon so(e concerns a!o,t (ethodolo"y and ontolo"y that ca(e to pro(inence in the +ritin"s of !ehaviorists and red,ctionists. Ene (i"ht do +ell to ask +hether these concerns o,"ht to have s,rvived the theories that !ro,"ht the( to pro(inence. B,t even if one finds these concerns to !e serio,s ones, they (,st at very least !e p,t off for the present. By 8,st a!o,t everyone?s reckonin", any f,ll3scale (eetin" of the +ays that (i"ht take place !et+een intentional e1planation and ne,roscience /(,ch less physics0 is a lon" +ays a+ay and depends ,pon a "reat deal of research, (,ch of +hich al(ost has to !e p,rs,ed thro,"h top3do+n strate"ies in co"nitive psycholo"y. So, in a sense, any real assess(ent of co"nitivis(?s co(pati!ility +ith the "enerality of physical e1planation co,ld only take place once +e had a reasona!ly s,ccessf,l predictive co"nitive psycholo"y. Ef co,rse +e all look for occasions +hen o,r top3do+n strate"ies "et ,s to a level +here +e can find so(e pla,si!le candidate for a kno+n ne,rolo"ical (echanis( that has the ri"ht f,nctional feat,res to s,pport the kind of co"nitive process +e have post,lated. S,ch (o(ents are land3 5 1@ 5 (arks that provide so(e of the !est kinds of reasons to !elieve one?s research is on the ri"ht track. *hat

!ein" said, it is nonetheless the case that /10 intentional e1planation see(s an indispensa!le startin" point for co"nitive psycholo"y, re"ardless of +hether s,ch research +o,ld ,lti(ately allo+ ,s to 7thro+ a+ay the ladder7C /@0 it co,ld, in principle, t,rn o,t that research in co"nitive science co,ld prod,ce a "ood predictive psycholo"y +itho,t ever hookin" ,p +ith ne,roscience in a co(prehensive fashion /e."., +e +o,ld not thro+ o,t psychophysics if +e co,ld not prod,ce ne,tral (odels to acco,nt for the data0C /#0 if this +ere to happen, it is not at all clear that +e sho,ld, as a res,lt, re"ard s,ch psycholo"ical theories as fla+ed, (,ch less (etaphysically perverseC and /J0 in the (eanti(e, it is a!sol,tely pointless to e1pect e(pirical researchers to care a!o,t +hether their +ork (eets s,ch ideolo"ical tests as confor(ity +ith one?s favorite ontolo"ical theory. .n short, . do not think that intentional psycholo"y is in need of vindication at the present ti(e. *he pressin" =,estion for the philosophy of psycholo"y is +hether intentional e1planation can !e syste(atiDed and (apped o,t ,sin" so(ethin" like the techni=,es afforded ,s !y the notion of co(p,tation or !y so(e alternative notions, and +hether in the co,rse of this pro8ect o,r ordinary (entalistic notions like 7desire,7 7!elief,7 and 78,d"(ent7 +ill !e retained, !,ilt into a lar"er fra(e+ork, transfor(ed, or a!andoned alto"ether. Certain o,tco(es of this pro8ect (i"ht call for the reassess(ent of intentional psycholo"y. /9nd of co,rse there are already those +ho !elieve that it is a (istake to vie+ it as an e1planatory science in the first place.0 *here is a separate, and lar"ely e(pirical =,estion a!o,t ho+ co"nitive states are realiDed thro,"h specific physiolo"ical str,ct,res. *he connections !et+een the s,ccess or fail,re of this pro8ect and the stat,s of intentional psycholo"y are far (ore ten,o,s, !,t really need not !e fretted over at this sta"e of the "a(e. *o repeat, on (y readin" of the si"nificance of the co(p,ter paradi"(, +hat it offers is a pro8ect that (i"ht hasten the pro"ress of psycholo"y to+ards scientific (at,rity !y providin" the ri"ht technical reso,rces for (athe(atiDin" the f,nctional relationships that (ental states !ear to one another and to !ehaviors. .nterpreted in this fashion, the co(p,tational approach to co"nition is one that is distin",ished principally !y the concept,al tools it !orro+s fro( co(p,ter science. Ho+ever, the co(p,tational approach is only one research pro"ra((e a(on" several that seek to provide the ri"ht for(al tools for st,dyin" co"nition. .t is a research pro"ra((e that has rivals that s,pply different tools for the (athe(atiDation of psycholo"y. 6ota!le a(on" these are the infor(ation3 5 1# 5 theoretic approach favored !y Sayre and the net+ork3!ased (athe(atical (odels of vario,s sorts offered over the past thirty years !y Pitts and 2cC,lloch, 4ross!er", 9nderson, and others. What for(al techni=,es end ,p providin" the !est descriptions is a =,estion to !e ans+ered !y the fertility of these research pro8ects. What this !ook calls for, then, is a separation of t+o kinds of iss,es. *he first set of iss,es involves =,estions a!o,t ho+ to co(pare co(petin" theories a!o,t the (ind that e(er"e o,t of e(pirical science. 'or e1a(ple, apart fro( their a!ilities to "ive so(e description of the pheno(ena in their o+n canonical voca!,laries, 8,st +here do t+o approaches to co"nition, s,ch as C*2 and connectionis(, really differK What are the 7"ood3(akin"7 =,alities that are relevant to the assess(ent of e(pirical theories in psycholo"y, and +hich are possessed in "reater a!,ndance !y +hose theoriesK *he second set of iss,es is (ade ,p of (ore p,rely philosophical =,estions a!o,t the (ind3!ody pro!le(, the e1act (etaphysical relationship !et+een (ental states and the physical states thro,"h +hich they are realiDed, and atte(pts to "ive a lo"ically necessary and s,fficient acco,nt of notions s,ch as (eanin" and intentionality. .t is the thesis of this !ook that, contrary to pop,lar r,(or, C*2 does nothin" to solve the latter pro!le(s. 6onetheless, it is =,ite possi!le to 7!o+dleriDe7 C*2 in a fashion that avoids the pro!le(s of interpretive re"ress and to constr,e it as a special version of (achine f,nctionalis(C

and interpreted in this fashion, co(p,tational psycholo"y can !e seen as an interestin" contender +ith respect to the first set of iss,es. With C*2?s clai(s to solvin" philosophical pro!le(s o,t of the +ay, ho+ever, there is no+ a level playin" field, and co(p,tational psycholo"y (ay !e co(pared +ith its co(petitors in ter(s of their p,rely scientific (erits. 9nd in a ro,nda!o,t +ay, . think this co,nts as pro"ress.

" -rie+ .uide to T)is -oo/

*his !ook is divided into fo,r sections. Part ., co(prisin" chapters 1 thro,"h #, "ives an e1position of C*2 and of its clai(s to solve i(portant philosophical pro!le(s. .t also provides an initial state(ent of so(e potential pro!le(s for C*2 arisin" fro( criticis(s raised !y Searle and Sayre. . (ake a case that their criticis(s are not definitive, and call for a (ore caref,l analysis of the notions of 7sy(!ol,7 7synta1,7 and 7sy(!olic (eanin".7 *his analysis is provided in Part ... Chapter J presents a conventionalist analysis of sy(!ols, synta1, and sy(!olic (ean3 5 1J 5 in", +hich is then applied to sy(!ols in co(p,ters in chapter % and defended a"ainst so(e likely o!8ections in chapter 6. /*he reader +ho co(es o,t of chapter J +ith !,rnin" o!8ections +ill lose nothin" !y readin" chapter 6 !efore chapter %.0 *he res,lts of this analysis are then applied in Part ... /chapters - thro,"h 90 in a criti=,e of the philosophical clai(s of C*2. Chapter - ar",es that, if yo, interpret C*2?s talk of 7sy(!ols,7 7synta1,7 and 7se(antics7 in the ordinary convention3laden +ay, yo, are left +ith an acco,nt that is circ,lar and re"ressive. Chapter & ar",es that C*2 fares no !etter if the se(iotic voca!,lary is reconstr,cted in a nonconventionalist +ay. .n short, C*2 (aintains an ill,sion of e1plainin" intentionality only !y slippin" !ack and forth !et+een se(iotic notions !ased on conventional sy(!ols and talk of an alternative 7p,re se(antics.7 Chapter 9 !riefly (akes the case that C*2 is ,nlikely to !e s,pple(ented !y an independent nat,raliDation of content: so(e feat,res of the (ind do not see( s,scepti!le to nat,raliDation at all, +hile others see( likely to !e nat,raliDed /if at all0 only in a fashion inco(pati!le +ith the constraints laid do+n !y C*2. *he dialectical sit,ation at the end of Part ... is that C*2?s clai(s to prod,cin" distinctively philosophical fr,it have !een ,nder(ined. Part .: then presents an alternative vie+ of the i(portance of the co(p,ter paradi"(. Chapter 1$ o,tlines ho+ co(p,tation (i"ht provide psycholo"y +ith i(portant "ood3(akin" =,alities +itho,t nat,raliDin" intentionality or vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y. *he !ook concl,des, in chapter 11, +ith a philosophical e1a(ination of the ass,(ptions that intentionality needs nat,raliDin" and (ental states need vindicatin". . ar",e that, in the a!sence of stron" a prioristic ar",(ents for nat,ralis(, +e are !etter off lettin" the special sciences flo,rish as !est they (ay and shapin" o,r (etatheoretic vie+s a!o,t intertheoretic connections on the !asis of the shape that real psycholo"y takes rather than ,pon any preconceived notions of +hat it should look like. 5 1% 5


5 1- 5

C)apter ne0 T)e Computational T)eory o+ 1ind

*he past thirty years have +itnessed the rapid e(er"ence and s+ift ascendency of a tr,ly novel paradi"( for ,nderstandin" the (ind. *he paradi"( is that of (achine co(p,tation, and its infl,ence ,pon the st,dy of (ind has already !een !oth deep and far3reachin". 9 si"nificant n,(!er of philosophers, psycholo"ists, lin",ists, ne,roscientists, and other professionals en"a"ed in the st,dy of co"nition no+ proceed ,pon the ass,(ption that co"nitive processes are in so(e sense co(p,tational processesC and those philosophers, psycholo"ists, and other researchers +ho do not proceed ,pon this ass,(ption nonetheless ackno+led"e that co(p,tational theories are no+ in the (ainstrea( of their disciplines. B,t if there is "eneral a"ree(ent that the paradi"( of (achine co(p,tation (ay have si"nificant i(plications for !oth the philosopher of (ind and the e(pirical researcher interested in co"nition, there is no s,ch a"ree(ent a!o,t +hat these i(plications are. *here is, perhaps, little do,!t that co(p,ter (odelin" can !e a po+erf,l tool for the psycholo"ist, (,ch as it is for the physicist and the (eteorolo"ist. B,t not all researchers are a"reed that the co"nitive processes they (ay (odel on a co(p,ter are the(selves co(p,tations, any (ore than the stor(s that the (eteorolo"ist (odels are co(p,tations. Si(ilarly, there is si"nificant disa"ree(ent a(on" philosophers a!o,t +hether the paradi"( of (achine co(p,tation provides a literal characteriDation of the (ind or (erely an all,rin" (etaphor. *hree alternative +ays of assessin" the i(portance of the co(p,ter paradi"( stand o,t. *he (ost (odest possi!ility is that the co(p,ter (etaphor +ill 5 1& 5 prove an a!le catalyst for "eneratin" theories in psycholo"y, in (,ch the sort of +ay that n,(ero,s other (etaphors have so often played a role in the develop(ent of other sciences, yet in s,ch a fashion that little or nothin" a!o,t co(p,tation per se +ill !e of direct relevance to the e1planatory val,e of the res,ltin" theories. 9 second and sli"htly stron"er possi!ility is that the concept,al (achinery e(ployed in co(p,ter science +ill provide the ri"ht sorts of tools for allo+in" psycholo"y /or at least parts of psycholo"y0 to !eco(e a ri"oro,s science, in (,ch the fashion that concept,al tools s,ch as Cartesian "eo(etry and the calc,l,s provided a !asis for the e(er"ence of 6e+tonian (echanics, and differential "eo(etry (ade possi!le the relativistic physics +hich s,pplanted it. En this vie+, +hich +ill !e disc,ssed in the final chapter of this !ook, +hat the co(p,ter paradi"( (i"ht contri!,te is the !asis for the (at,ration of psycholo"y !y +ay of the (athe(atiDation of its e1planations and the connections !et+een intentional e1planation and e1planation cast at the level of so(e lo+er3order /e."., ne,rolo"ical0 processes thro,"h +hich intentional states and processes are realiDed. *his vie+ is co((itted to the thesis that the (ind is a co(p,ter only in the very +eak sense that the interrelations !et+een (ental states have for(al properties for +hich the voca!,lary associated +ith co(p,tation

provides an apt characteriDationHthat is, to the vie+ that there is a description of the interrelations of (ental states and processes that is iso(orphic to a co(p,ter pro"ra(. *his thesis involves no co((it(ent to the stron"er vie+ that ter(s like ?representation?, ?sy(!ol?, and ?co(p,tation? play any stron"er role in e1plainin" +hy (ental states and processes are mental states and processes, !,t only the +eaker vie+ that, "iven that +e (ay posit s,ch states and processes, their 7for(7 (ay !e descri!ed in co(p,tational ter(s. /Po, (i"ht say that, on this vie+, the (ind is 7co(p,tational7 in the sa(e sense that a relativistic ,niverse is 7differential.70 *he third and stron"est vie+ of the relevance of (achine co(p,tation to psycholo"yHone e1a(ple of +hich +ill !e the (ain foc,s of this !ookHis that notions s,ch as 7representation7 and 7co(p,tation7 not only provide the psycholo"ist +ith the for(al tools she needs to do her science in a ri"oro,s fashion, !,t also provide the philosopher +ith f,nda(ental tools that allo+ for an analysis of the essential nature of cognition and for the sol,tion of i(portant and lon"3standin" philosophical pro!le(s. *his !ook e1a(ines one partic,lar application of the paradi"( of (achine co(p,tation to the st,dy of (ind: na(ely, the 7Co(p,tational 5 19 5 *heory of 2ind7 /C*20 advocated in recent years !y Aerry 'odor /19-%, 19&$a, 19&1, 19&-, 199$0 and Fenon Pylyshyn /19&$, 19&J0. Ever the past t+o decades, C*2 has e(er"ed as the 7(ainstrea(7 vie+ of the si"nificance of co(p,tation in philosophy. .ts advocates have artic,lated a very stron" position: na(ely, that co"nition literally is co(p,tation and the (ind literally is a di"ital co(p,ter. C*2 is co(prised of t+o theses. *he first is a thesis a!o,t the nat,re of intentional states, s,ch as individ,al !eliefs and desires. 9ccordin" to C*2, intentional states are relational states involvin" an or"anis( /or other co"niDer0 and (ental representations. *hese (ental representations, (oreover, are to !e ,nderstood on the (odel of representations in co(p,ter stora"e: in partic,lar, they are sy(!ol tokens that have !oth syntactic and se(antic properties. *hese sy(!ols incl,de !oth se(antic pri(itives and co(ple1 sy(!ols +hose se(antic properties are a f,nction of their syntactic str,ct,re and the se(antic val,es of the pri(itives they contain. *he second thesis co(prisin" C*2 is a!o,t the nat,re of co"nitive processesHprocesses s,ch as reasonin" to a concl,sion, or for(in" and testin" a hypothesis, +hich involve chains of !eliefs, desires, and other intentional states. 9ccordin" to C*2, co"nitive processes are co(p,tations over (ental representations. *hat is, they are ca,sal se=,ences of tokenin"s of (ental representations in +hich the relevant ca,sal re",larities are deter(ined !y the syntactic properties of the sy(!ols and are descri!a!le in ter(s of for(al /i.e., syntactic0 r,les. *he re(ainder of this chapter +ill !e devoted to clarifyin" the nat,re and stat,s of these t+o clai(s. 9s +e shall see in chapter @, C*2?s advocates have also (ade a very pers,asive case that vie+in" the (ind as a co(p,ter allo+s for the sol,tion of si"nificant philosophical pro!le(s: nota!ly, they have ar",ed /10 that it provides an acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental states, and /@0 that it sho+s that psycholo"y can e(ploy e1planations in the intentional idio( +itho,t involvin" itself in (ethodolo"ical or ontolo"ical diffic,lties. *he clai(s (ade on !ehalf of C*2 th,s fall into the third and stron"est cate"ory of attit,des to+ards the pro(ise of the co(p,ter paradi"(. *he task ,ndertaken in the s,!se=,ent chapters of this !ook is to eval,ate these clai(s that have !een (ade on !ehalf of C*2 and to provide the !e"innin"s of an alternative ,nderstandin" of the i(portance of the co(p,ter paradi"( for the st,dy of co"nition. .n partic,lar, +e shall e1a(ine /10 +hether C*2 s,cceeds in solvin" these philosophical pro!le(s, and /@0 +hether the +eaker possi!ility of its providin" the !asis for a ri"oro,s psycholo"y in any +ay depends ,pon either the

5 @$ 5 ,nderstandin" of co"nition and co(p,tation endorsed !y C*2 or its a!ility to e1plain intentionality and vindicate intentional psycholo"y.

&.&0 Intentional States

C*2 is a theory a!o,t the nat,re of intentional states and co"nitive processes. *o ,nderstand +hat this (eans, ho+ever, +e (,st first !eco(e clear a!o,t the (eanin"s of the e1pressions ?intentional state? and ?co"nitive process?. *he e1pression ?intentional state? is ,sed as a "eneric ter( for (ental states of a n,(!er of kinds reco"niDed in ordinary lan",a"e and co((onsense psycholo"y. So(e paradi"( e1a(ples of intentional states +o,ld !e Hbelie"ing /8,d"in", do,!tin"0 that s,ch3and3s,ch is the case, Hdesiring that s,ch3and3s,ch sho,ld take place, Hhoping that s,ch3and3s,ch +ill take place, Hfearing that s,ch3and3s,ch +ill take place. *he characteristic feat,re of intentional states is that they are about something or directed to'ards something . *his feat,re of directedness or intentionality distin",ishes intentional states !oth fro( !r,te o!8ects and fro( other (ental pheno(ena s,ch as =,alia and feelin"s, none of +hich is a!o,t anythin". *he e1pressions ?intentional states? and ?co"nitive states? denote the sa(e class of (ental states, !,t the t+o ter(s reflect different interests. *he ter( ?intentionality? is e(ployed pri(arily in philosophy, +here it is ,sed to denote specifically this directedness of certain (ental states, a feat,re +hich is of i(portance in ,nderstandin" several i(portant philosophical pro!le(s, incl,din" opacity and transparency of reference and kno+led"e of e1tra(ental o!8ects. *he ter( ?co"nition? is (ost co((only e(ployed in psycholo"y, +here it is ,sed to denote a do(ain for scientific investi"ation. 9s s,ch, its scope and (eanin" are open to so(e de"ree of ad8,st(ent and chan"e as the science of psycholo"y pro"resses. 9 third ter( ,sed to indicate this sa(e do(ain is ?propositional attit,de states?. *his e1pression sho+s the infl,ence of the +idely accepted analysis of co"nitive states as involvin" an attitude /s,ch as !elievin" or do,!tin"0 and a content that indicates the o!8ect or state of affairs to +hich the attit,de is directed. Since the contents of (ental states are often closely related to propositions, s,ch attit,des are so(eti(es called propositional attit,des. *hese three e13 5 @1 5 pressions +ill !e ,sed interchan"ea!ly in the re(ainder of this !ook. .n places +here there is little dan"er of (is,nderstandin", the (ore "eneral e1pression ?(ental states? +ill also !e ,sed to refer specifically to intentional states.

&.20 1ental State "s3riptions in Intentional $sy3)olo*y and !ol/ $sy3)olo*y

9ttri!,tions of intentional states s,ch as !eliefs and desires play an i(portant role in o,r ordinary ,nderstandin" of o,rselves and other h,(an !ein"s. We descri!e (,ch of o,r lin",istic !ehavior in ter(s of the e1pression of o,r !eliefs, desires, and other intentional states. We e1plain o,r o+n actions on the !asis of the !eliefs and intentions that ",ided the(. We e1plain the actions of others on the !asis

of +hat +e take to !e their intentional states. S,ch e1planations reflect a "eneral fra(e+ork for psycholo"ical e1planation +hich is i(plicit in o,r ordinary ,nderstandin" of h,(an tho,"ht and action. 9 cardinal principle of this fra(e+ork is that people?s actions can often !e e1plained !y their intentional states. . shall ,se the ter( ?intentional psycholo"y? to refer to any psycholo"y that /a 0 (akes ,se of e1planations involvin" ascriptions of intentional states, and /b 0 is co((itted to a realistic interpretation of at least so(e s,ch ascriptions. *his ,sa"e of the e1pression ?intentional psycholo"y? sho,ld !e distin",ished fro( the co((on ,sa"e of the c,rrently pop,lar e1pression ?folk psycholo"y?. *he e1pression ?folk psycholo"y? is ,sed !y (any conte(porary +riters in co"nitive science to refer to a c,lt,re?s loosely knit !ody of co((onsense !eliefs a!o,t ho+ people are likely to think and act in vario,s sit,ations. .t is called 7psycholo"y7 !eca,se it involves an i(plicit ontolo"y of (ental states and processes and a set of /lar"ely i(plicit0 ass,(ptions a!o,t re",larities of h,(an tho,"ht and action +hich can !e ,sed to e1plain !ehavior. .t is called 7folk7 psycholo"y !eca,se it is not the res,lt of ri"oro,s scientific in=,iry and does not involve any ri"oro,s scientific research (ethodolo"y. 'olk psycholo"y, th,s ,nderstood, is a proper s,!set of +hat . a( callin" intentional psycholo"y. .t is a subset of intentional psycholo"y !eca,se it e(ploys intentional state ascriptions in its e1planations. .t is only a proper s,!set !eca,se one co,ld have psycholo"ical e1planations cast in the intentional idio( that +ere the res,lt of ri"oro,s in=,iry and +ere not co((itted to the specific set of ass,(ptions characteristic of any "iven c,lt,re?s co((onsense vie+s a!o,t the (ind. 2any of 're,d?s theories, for e1a(ple, 5 @@ 5 fall +ithin the !o,nds of intentional psycholo"y, since they involve appeals to !eliefs and desiresC yet they fall o,tside the !o,nds of folk psycholo"y !eca,se 're,d?s theories are at least atte(pts at ri"oro,s scientific e1planation and not (ere distillations of co((onsense +isdo(. Si(ilarly, (any conte(porary theories in co"nitive psycholo"y e(ploy e1planations in the intentional idio( that fall o,tside the !o,nds of folk psycholo"y, in this case !eca,se the states picked o,t !y their ascriptions occ,r at an infraconscio,s level +here (ental states are not attri!,ted !y co((onsense ,nderstandin"s of the (ind. .n ,nderstandin" the i(portance of C*2 in conte(porary psycholo"y and philosophy of (ind, it +o,ld !e hard to overe(phasiDe this distinction !et+een the (ore incl,sive notion of intentional psycholo"y, +hich e(!races any psycholo"y that is co((itted to a realistic constr,al of intentional state ascriptions, and the narro+er notion of folk psycholo"y, +hich is !y definition confined to prescientific co((onsense ,nderstandin"s of the (ental. 'or C*2?s advocates +ish to defend the inte"rity of intentional psycholo"y, +hile ad(ittin" that there (ay !e si"nificant pro!le(s +ith the specific set of precritical ass,(ptions that co(prise a c,lt,re?s folk psycholo"y. En the one hand, 'odor and Pylyshyn ar",e that the intentionally laden e1planations present in folk psycholo"y are =,ite s,ccessf,l,L1M that folk psycholo"y is easily 7the (ost s,ccessf,l predictive sche(e availa!le for h,(an !ehavior7 /Pylyshyn 19&J: @0, and even that intentional e1planation is indispensa!le in psycholo"y.L@M En the other hand, advocates of C*2 are often (ore critical of the specific "eneraliDations i(plicit in co((onsense ,nderstandin"s of (ind. 'olk psycholo"y (ay provide a "ood startin" point for doin" psycholo"y, (,ch as ani(al ter(s in ordinary lan",a"e (ay provide a startin" point for Doolo"ical ta1ono(y or !illiard !all analo"ies (ay provide a startin" point for (echanicsC !,t (ore ri"oro,s research is likely to prove co((onsensical ass,(ptions +ron" in psycholo"y, (,ch as it has in !iolo"y and physics.L#M 'olk psycholo"y is th,s vie+ed !y these +riters as a protoscience o,t of +hich a scientific intentional psycholo"y (i"ht e(er"e. Ene thin" that +o,ld !e needed for this transition to a scientific intentional psycholo"y to take place is ri"oro,s e(pirical research of the sort

,ndertaken in the relatively ne+ area called co"nitive psycholo"y.LJM S,ch e(pirical research +o,ld !e responsi!le, a(on" other thin"s, for correctin" s,ch ass,(ptions of co((on sense as (ay prove to !e (istaken. What is vie+ed as the (ost si"nificant shortco(in" of co((onsense psycholo"y, ho+ever, is not that it contains erroneo,s "eneraliDations, !,t that its "eneraliDations are not ,nited !y a sin"le theo3 5 @# 5 retical fra(e+ork.L%M C*2 is an atte(pt to provide s,ch a fra(e+ork !y s,pplyin" /a 0 an acco,nt of the nat,re of intentional states, and /b 0 an acco,nt of the nat,re of co"nitive processes.

&.40 CT15s Representational "33ount o+ Intentional States

*he first thesis co(prisin" C*2 is a representational account of the nature of intentional states . 'odor provides a clear o,tline of the !asic tenets of this acco,nt in the follo+in" five clai(s, offered in the introd,ction to +e,resentations, p,!lished in 19&1: /a 0 Propositional attit,de states are relational. /b 0 9(on" the relata are (ental representations /often called 7.deas7 in the older literat,re0. /c 0 2ental representationLsM are sy(!ols: they have !oth for(al and se(antic properties. /d 0 2ental representations have their ca,sal roles in virt,e of their for(al properties. /e 0 Propositional attit,des inherit their se(antic properties fro( those of the (ental representations that f,nction as their o!8ects. /'odor 19&1: @60 Clai(s /a 0 thro,"h /c 0 provide 'odor?s vie+s ,pon the nat,re of intentional states, +hile clai(s /d 0 and /e 0 provide the (eans for connectin" this representational acco,nt of intentional states +ith a co(p,tational acco,nt of co"nitive processes and an acco,nt of the intentionality of the (ental, respectively. 'odor s,pplies a (ore for(al acco,nt of the nat,re of intentional states in ,sychosemantics, p,!lished in 19&-. *here he characteriDes the nat,re of intentional states /propositional attit,des0 as follo+s: Claim - /the nat,re of propositional attit,des0: 'or any or"anis( . , and any attit,de A to+ard the proposition , , there is a /?co(p,tational?3?f,nctional?0 relation + and a (ental representation M, s,ch that M, (eans that , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . /'odor 19&-: 1-0 En 'odor?s acco,nt, Aones?s !elievin" that t+o is a pri(e n,(!er consists in Aones !ein" in a partic,lar kind of f,nctional relationship + to a (ental representation M, . *his (ental representation M, is a sy(!ol token, pres,(a!ly instantiated in so(e fashion in Aones?s nervo,s syste(. M, has se(antic properties: in partic,lar, M, (eans that t+o is a 5 @J 5

pri(e n,(!er. 9nd Aones !elieves that t+o is a pri(e n,(!er +hen and only +hen he is relation + to M, . *here are so(e "larin" ,nclarities a!o,t references to types and tokens of attit,des and representations in this for(,lation, !,t so(e of these are clarified +hen 'odor provides a 7cr,der !,t (ore intelli"i!le7 "loss ,pon his acco,nt of the nat,re of intentional states: *o !elieve that s,ch and s,ch is to have a (ental sy(!ol that (eans that s,ch and s,ch tokened in yo,r head in a certain +ayC it?s to have s,ch a token ?in yo,r !elief !o1,? as .?ll so(eti(es say. Correspondin"ly, to hope that s,ch and s,ch is to have a token of that sa(e (ental sy(!ol tokened in yo,r head, !,t in a rather different +ayC it?s to have it tokened ?in yo,r hope !o1.? . . . 9nd so on for every attit,de that yo, can !ear to+ard a propositionC and so on for every proposition to+ard +hich yo, can !ear an attit,de. /'odor 19&-: 1-0 En the !asis of this "loss, it see(s (ost reasona!le to read 'odor?s for(,lation as follo+s: The /ature of ,ropositional Attitudes (Modified) 'or any or"anis( . , and any attit,de3token a of type A to+ard the proposition , , there is a /?co(p,tational?3?f,nctional?0 relation + and a (ental representation token t of type M, s,ch that t (eans that , !y virt,e of !ein" an M, 3token, and . has an attit,de of type A iff . !ears + to a token of type M, .L6M While there are ar",a!ly so(e si"nificant resid,al ,nclarities a!o,t 'odor?s for(,lation in spite of these clarifications,L-M 'odor does (ake the (ain point ade=,ately clear: na(ely, that it is the relationship !et+een the or"anis( and its (ental representations that is to acco,nt for the fact that intentional states have the se(antic properties and intentionality that they have. .n the passa"e already =,oted fro( +e,resentations, for e1a(ple, he +rites that intentional states 7inherit their se(antic properties fro( those of the (ental representations that f,nction as their o!8ects7 /'odor 19&1: @60. 9nd in that essay he also +rites that 7the o!8ects of propositional attit,des are sy(!ols /specifically, (ental representations07 and that 0this fact accounts for their intensionality and semanticity0 /i!id., @%, e(phasis added0.L&M *he first thesis co(prisin" C*2 is th,s a representational account of the nature of intentional states . En this acco,nt, intentional states are relations to (ental representations. *hese representations are sy(!ol tokens havin" !oth syntactic and se(antic properties, and intentional 5 @% 5

'i",re 1 states 7inherit7 their se(antic properties and their intentionality fro( the representations they involve /see fi". 10.

&.60 Semanti3 Compositionality

9n i(portant feat,re of this acco,nt lies in the fact that the sy(!ols involved in (ental representation have !oth se(antic and syntactic properties, and (ay !e vie+ed as tokens in a 7lan",a"e of tho,"ht,7

so(eti(es called 7(entalese.7 :ie+in" the syste( of (ental representations as a lan",a"e +ith !oth se(antic and syntactic properties allo+s for the possi!ility of compositionality of meaning . *hat is, the sy(!ols of (entalese are not all le1ical pri(itives. .nstead, there is a finite stock of le1ical pri(itives +hich can !e co(!ined in vario,s +ays accordin" to the syntactic r,les of (entalese to for( a potentially infinite variety of co(ple1 representations, 8,st as in the case of nat,ral lan",a"es it is possi!le to "enerate an infinite variety of (eanin"f,l ,tterances o,t of a finite stock of (orphe(es and co(positional r,les. 2entalese is th,s vie+ed as havin" the sa(e "enerative and creative aspects possessed !y nat,ral lan",a"es. So +hile the se(antic properties of (ental states are 7inherited7 fro( the representations they contain, those representations (ay the(selves !e either se(antically pri(itive or co(posed o,t of se(antic pri(itives !y the application of syntactic r,les.

&.70 Co*nitive $ro3esses

.f a representational acco,nt of the (ind provides a +ay of interpretin" the nat,re of individ,al tho,"hts, it does not itself provide any co(para!le acco,nt of the nat,re of (ental processes s,ch as reasonin" to a concl,sion or for(in" and testin" a hypothesis, and hence does not provide the "ro,nds for a psycholo"y of co"nition. 'or a psycholo"y of co"nition, so(ethin" (ore is needed: a theory of (ental processes that ,ses 5 @6 5 the properties of (ental representations as the !asis of a ca,sal acco,nt of ho+ one (ental state follo+s another in a train of reasonin". S,ppose, for e1a(ple, that one +ishes to e1plain +hy Aones has closed the +indo+. 9n e1planation (i"ht +ell !e "iven alon" the follo+in" lines: /10 Aones felt a chill. /@0 Aones noticed that the +indo+ +as open. /#0 Aones hypothesiDed that there +as a cold draft !lo+in" in thro,"h the +indo+. /J0 Aones hypothesiDed that this cold draft +as the ca,se of his chill. /%0 Aones +anted to stop feelin" chilled. /60 Aones hypothesiDed that c,ttin" off the draft +o,ld stop the chill. so, /-0 Aones for(ed a desire to c,t off the draft. /&0 Aones hypothesiDed that closin" the +indo+ +o,ld c,t off the draft. so, /90 Aones for(ed a desire to close the +indo+. so, /1$0 Aones closed the +indo+. Here +e have not a rando( train of tho,"ht, !,t a se=,ence of tho,"hts in +hich the latter tho,"hts are pla,si!ly vie+ed as !oth /a 0 rational in li"ht of those that have "one !efore the(, and /b 0 conse=,ences of those previo,s statesHAones for(ed a desire to close the +indo+ because he tho,"ht that doin" so +o,ld c,t off the draft. 2oreover, a ca,sal theory of inference +o,ld need to for"e a close link !et+een the se(antic properties of individ,al states and their role in the prod,ction of s,!se=,ent states. .t is chan"es in the content of Aones?s !eliefs and desires that +e +o,ld e1pect to prod,ce different trains of tho,"ht and different !ehaviors. .f Aones had noticed the fan r,nnin" instead of noticin" an open +indo+, +e +o,ld e1pect hi( to entertain different hypotheses, for( different

desires, and act in a different +ay, all as a conse=,ence of chan"in" the content of his !elief fro( 7the +indo+ is open7 to 7the fan is r,nnin".7 6o+ C*2?s representational acco,nt of intentional states see(s +ell s,ited to a disc,ssion of the semantic relations !et+een intentional states, since the se(antic and intentional properties of intentional states are identified +ith those of the representations they involve. B,t +hen it 5 @- 5

'i",re @ co(es to the =,estion of ho+ intentional states can play a causal role in the etiolo"y of a process that involves the "eneration of ne+ intentional states, the notion of representation, in and of itself, has little to offer. :ie+in" intentional states as relations to representations allo+s ,s to locate the se(antic relationships !et+een intentional states in relationships !et+een the representations they involve, !,t it does little to sho+ ho+ Aones?s standin" in relation + to a representation M, at ti(e t can play a ca,sal role in Aones co(in" to stand in relation 1 to a representation M,Q at t R

. *his see(s to present a pro!le(. .n order for a se=,ence of representations to (ake ,p a rational, co"ent train of tho,"ht, the =,estion of 'hich representations sho,ld occ,r in the se=,ence sho,ld !e deter(ined !y the (eanin"s of the earlier representations. .n order for the se=,ence of representations to ma e sense, the later representations need to stand in appropriate semantic relationships to the earlier ones. B,t in order for a se=,ence of representations to !e a causal se=,ence, the =,estion of +hat representations +ill occ,r later in the se=,ence (,st !e deter(ined !y the ca,sal po+ers of the earlier representations. 6o+ intentional e1planations pick o,t representations !y their contentHthat is, !y their se(antic properties. B,t if s,ch e1planations are to !e ca,sal e1planations, they (,st pick o,t representations in a fashion that individ,ates the( accordin" to their ca,sal po+ers. B,t this can !e done only if the se(antic val,es of representations can !e linked to, or coordinated +ith, the ca,sal roles they can play in the prod,ction of other representations and the etiolo"y of !ehavior. *his has !een seen !y so(e as a si"nificant st,(!lin" !lock to the possi!ility of a ca,sal3no(olo"ical psycholo"y, as it is notorio,sly pro!le(atic to vie+ se(antic relationships as ca,sal relationships or to e=,ate reasons +ith ca,ses.L9M *he pro!le(, then, for t,rnin" a representational theory of (ental states into a psycholo"ical theory of (ental processes is one of findin" a +ay to link the se(antic properties of (ental representations to the ca,sal po+ers of those representations /see fi". @0. 5 @& 5 .t is precisely at this point that the co(p,ter paradi"( co(es to !e of interest. 'or co(p,ters are ,nderstood as devices that store and (anip,late sy(!ol tokens, and the (anip,lations that they perfor( are dependent ,pon +hat representations are already present, yet they are also co(pletely (echanical and ,ncontroversially ca,sal in nat,re. 2achine co(p,tation provides a "eneral paradi"( for ,nderstandin" sy(!ol3(anip,lation processes in +hich the sy(!ols already present play a ca,sal role in deter(inin" +hat ne+ sy(!ols are to !e "enerated. C*2 seeks to provide an e1tension of this

paradi"( to mental representations, and there!y to s,pply an acco,nt of co"nitive processes that can provide a +ay of disc,ssin" their etiolo"y +hile also respectin" the se(antic relationships !et+een the representations involved.

&.(0 !ormali8ation and Computation

C*2?s advocates !elieve that (achine co(p,tation provides a paradi"( for ,nderstandin" ho+ one can have a sy(!ol3(anip,latin" syste( that can cause derivations of sy(!olic representations in a fashion that 7respects7 their se(antic properties. 2ore specifically, (achine co(p,tation is !elieved to provide ans+ers to t+o =,estions: /10 Ho+ can se(antic properties of sy(!ols !e linked to ca,sal po+ers that allo+ the presence of one sy(!ol token s1 at ti(e t to !e a partial ca,se of the tokenin" of a second sy(!ol s@ at ti(e t R

9nd /@0 ho+ can the la+s "overnin" the ca,sal re",larities also ass,re that the operations that "enerate ne+ sy(!ol tokens +ill 7respect7 the se(antic relationships !et+een the sy(!ols, in the sense that the overall process +ill t,rn o,t to !e, in a !road sense, rationalK *he ans+ers that C*2?s advocates +o,ld like to provide for these =,estions can !e developed in t+o sta"es. 'irst, +ork in the for(aliDation of sy(!ol syste(s in nineteenth3 and t+entieth3cent,ry (athe(atics has sho+n that, for s,!stantial /al!eit li(ited0 interpreted sy(!olic do(ains /s,ch as "eo(etry and al"e!ra0, one can find +ays of carryin" o,t valid derivations in a fashion that does not depend ,pon the (athe(atician?s int,ition of the (eanin"s of the sy(!ols, so lon" as /a 0 the se(antic distinctions !et+een the sy(!ols are reflected !y syntactic distinctions, and /b 0 one can develop a series of r,les, dependent +holly ,pon the syntactic feat,res of sy(!ol str,ct,res, that +ill license those ded,ctions and only those ded,ctions that one +o,ld +ish to have licensed on the !asis of the (eanin"s of the ter(s. Second, di"ital co(p,ters are devices that store and (anip,late sy(!olic representations. 5 @9 5 *heir 7(anip,lation7 of sy(!olic representations, (oreover, consists in creatin" ne+ sy(!ol tokens, and the re",larities that "overn +hat ne+ tokens are to !e "enerated (ay !e cast in the for( of derivation3licensin" r,les !ased ,pon the syntactic feat,res of the sy(!ols already tokened in co(p,ter stora"e. .n a co(p,ter, sy(!ols play ca,sal roles in the "eneration of ne+ sy(!ols, and the ca,sal role that a sy(!ol can play is deter(ined !y its syntactic type. 'or(aliDation sho+s that /for li(ited do(ains0 the se(antic properties of a set of sy(!ols can !e 7(irrored7 !y syntactic propertiesC di"ital co(p,ters offer proof that the syntactic properties of sy(!ols can !e ca,sal deter(inants in the "eneration of ne+ sy(!ols. 9ll in all, the co(p,ter paradi"( sho+s that one can coordinate the se(antic properties of representations +ith the ca,sal roles they (ay play !y encodin" all se(antic distinctions in synta1. *hese cr,cial notions of formali*ation and computation +ill no+ !e disc,ssed in "reater detail. *hese notions are, no do,!t, already fa(iliar to (any readers. Ho+ever, ho+ one tells the story a!o,t these notions si"nificantly infl,ences the concl,sions one is likely to dra+ a!o,t ho+ they (ay !e e(ployed, and so it see(s +orth+hile to tell the story ri"ht fro( the start.

&.(.&0 !ormali8ation
.n the second half of the nineteenth cent,ry, one of the (ost i(portant iss,es in (athe(atics +as the formali*ation of (athe(atical syste(s. *he for(aliDation of a (athe(atical syste( consists in the eli(ination fro( the syste(?s ded,ction r,les of anythin" dependent ,pon the (eanin"s of the ter(s. 'or(aliDation !eca(e an i(portant iss,e in (athe(atics after 4a,ss, Bolyai, >o!achevski, and Gie(ann independently fo,nd consistent "eo(etries that denied ),clid?s parallel post,late. *his led to a desire to relieve the proced,res e(ployed in (athe(atical ded,ctions of all dependence ,pon the se(antic int,itions of the (athe(atician /for e1a(ple, her ),clidean spatial int,itions0. *he process of for(aliDation fo,nd a definitive spokes(an in ;avid Hil!ert, +hose !ook on the fo,ndations of "eo(etry, p,!lished in 1&99, e(ployed an approach to a1io(atiDation that involved a co(plete a!straction fro( the (eanin"s of the sy(!ols. *he for(aliDation of lo"ic, (ean+hile, had !een ,ndertaken !y Boole and later !y 're"e, Whitehead, and G,ssell, and the for(aliDation of arith(etic !y Peano. While there +ere several different approaches to for(aliDation in nineteenth3cent,ry (athe(atics, Hil!ert?s 7sy(!ol3"a(e7 approach is of 5 #$ 5 special interest for o,r p,rposes. .n this approach, the sy(!ols ,sed in proofs are treated as tokens or pieces in a "a(e, the 7r,les7 of +hich "overn the for(ation of e1pressions and the validity of ded,ctions in that syste(. *he r,les e(ployed in the sy(!ol "a(e, ho+ever, apply to for(,lae only insofar as the for(,lae fall ,nder partic,lar syntactic types. *his ideal of for(aliDation in a (athe(atical do(ain re=,ires the a!ility to characteriDe, entirely in notational /sy(!olic and syntactic0 ter(s, /a 0 the r,les for +ell3for(edness of sy(!ols, /b 0 the r,les for +ell3for(edness of for(,las, /c 0 the a1io(s, and /d 0 the r,les that license derivations. What is of interest a!o,t for(aliDa!ility for o,r p,rposes is that, for li(ited do(ains, one can find (ethods for prod,cin" derivations that respect the (eanin"s of the ter(s !,t do not rely ,pon the (athe(atician?s kno+led"e of those (eanin"s, !eca,se the (ethod is !ased solely ,pon their syntactic feat,res. *h,s, for e1a(ple, a lo"ician (i"ht kno+ a derivation3licensin" r,le to the effect that, +henever for(,las of the for( p and p2q have !een derived, he (ay validly derive a for(,la of the for( q . *o apply this r,le, he need not kno+ the interpretations of any of the s,!stit,tion instances of p and q , or even kno+ +hat relation is e1pressed !y 2 , !,t need only !e a!le to reco"niDe sy(!ol str,ct,res as havin" the syntactic for(s p and p 2q . 9s a conse=,ence, one can carry o,t rational, sense3 and tr,th3preservin" inferences +itho,t attendin" toHor even kno+in"Hthe (eanin"s of the ter(s, so lon" as one can devise a set of syntactic types and a set of for(al r,les that capt,re all of the se(antic distinctions necessary to license ded,ctions in a "iven do(ain.

&.(.20 " 1at)emati3al Notion o+ Computation

9 second iss,e arisin" fro( t,rn3of3the3cent,ry (athe(atics +as the =,estion of +hat f,nctions are 7co(p,ta!le7 in the sense of !ein" s,!8ect to eval,ation !y the application of a rote proced,re or al"orith(. *he proced,res learned for eval,atin" inte"rals are "ood e1a(ples of co(p,tational al"orith(s. >earnin" inte"ration is a (atter of learnin" to identify e1pressions as (e(!ers of partic,lar syntactically characteriDed classes and learnin" ho+ to prod,ce the correspondin" e1pressions that

indicate the val,es of their inte"rals. Ene learns, for e1a(ple, that inte"rals +ith the for(

have sol,tions of the for( , and so on. S,ch co(p,tational (ethods are formal, in the sense that a person?s a!ility to apply the (ethod does not re=,ire any ,nderstandin" of the 5 #1 5 (eanin"s of the ter(s.L1$M *o eval,ate

, for e1a(ple, one need not kno+ +hat the e1pression indicatesHthe area ,nder a c,rveH!,t only that it is of a partic,lar syntactic type to +hich a partic,lar r,le for inte"ration applies. Si(ilarly, one (i"ht apply the techni=,es ,sed in col,(n addition /another al"orith(ic proced,re0 +itho,t kno+in" +hat n,(!ers one +as addin". 'or e1a(ple, one (i"ht apply the (ethod +itho,t lookin" to see +hat n,(!ers +ere represented, or the n,(!ers (i"ht !e too lon" for anyone to reco"niDe the(. Ene (i"ht even learn the r,les for (anip,latin" di"its +itho,t havin" !een told that they are ,sed in the representation of n,(!ers. *he (ethod of col,(n addition is so desi"ned, in other +ords, that the res,lts do not depend ,pon +hether the person perfor(in" the co(p,tation kno+s the (eanin"s of the ter(s. *he proced,re is so desi"ned that applyin" it to representations of t+o n,(!ers A and % +ill dependa!ly res,lt in the prod,ction of a representation of a n,(!er C s,ch that A R % S C .

&.(.40 T)e S3ope o+ !ormal Symbol91anipulation Te3)ni:ues

.t t,rns o,t that for(al inference techni=,es have a s,rprisin"ly +ide scope. .n the nineteenth and early t+entieth cent,ry it +as sho+n that lar"e portions of lo"ic and (athe(atics are s,!8ect to for(aliDation. 9nd this is tr,e not only in lo"ic and n,(!er theory, +hich so(e theorists hold to !e devoid of se(antic content, !,t also in s,ch do(ains as "eo(etry, +here the ter(s clearly have considera!le se(antic content. Hil!ert /1&990, for e1a(ple, de(onstrated that it is possi!le to for(,late a collection of syntactic types, a1io(s, and derivation3licensin" r,les that is rich eno,"h to license as valid all of the "eo(etric derivations one +o,ld +ish for on se(antic "ro,nds +hile e1cl,din" as invalid any derivations that +o,ld !e e1cl,ded on se(antic "ro,nds. Si(ilarly, (any pro!le(s lyin" o,tside of (athe(atics that involve hi"hly conte1t3specific se(antic infor(ation can !e "iven a for(al characteriDation. 9 "a(e s,ch as chess, for e1a(ple, (ay !e represented !y /10 a set of sy(!ols representin" the pieces, /@0 e1pressions representin" possi!le states of the !oard, /#0 an e1pression pickin" o,t the initial state of the !oard, and /J0 a set of r,les "overnin" the le"ality of (oves !y (appin" e1pressions representin" le"al states of the !oard after a (ove m to the set of e1pressions representin" le"al s,ccessor states after (ove m R 1. So(e "a(es, s,ch as tic3 tac3toe, also ad(it of al"orith(ic strate"ies that ass,re a +innin" or nonlosin" "a(e. .n addition to "a(es, it is

5 #@ 5 also possi!le to represent the essential feat,res of (any real3+orld processes in for(al (odels of the sorts e(ployed !y physicists, en"ineers, and econo(ists. .n "eneral, a process can !e (odeled if one can find an ade=,ate +ay of representin" the o!8ects, relationships, and events that (ake ,p the process, and of devisin" a set of derivation r,les that (ap a representation + of a state S of the process onto a s,ccessor representation +Q of a state SQ 8,st in case the process is s,ch that SQ +o,ld !e the s,ccessor state to S . 9s a conse=,ence, it is possi!le to devise representational syste(s in +hich lar"e a(o,nts of se(antic infor(ation are encoded syntactically, +ith the effect that the application of p,rely syntactic derivation techni=,es can res,lt in the prod,ction of se=,ences of representations that !ear i(portant se(antic relationships: nota!ly, se=,ences that co,ld co,nt as rational, co"ent lines of reasonin".

&.(.60 Computin* 1a3)ines

*he for(aliDa!ility of li(ited sy(!olic do(ains sho+s that se(antic distinctions can !e preserved syntactically and that the application of syntactic derivation r,les can res,lt in a se(antically co"ent se=,ence of representations. .n cr,de ter(s, for(aliDation sho+s ,s ho+ to link se(antics to synta1. What is re=,ired, ho+ever, is a +ay of linkin" the se(antic properties of representations +ith their a!ility to play a ca,sal role in the "eneration of ne+ representations to +hich they !ear interestin" se(antic relationships /see fi". #0. .n and of the(selves, for(al proof (ethods and for(al al"orith(s do not provide s,ch a link, since they depend ,pon the actions of the h,(an co(p,ter +ho applies the(. .t is the paradi"( of machine co(p,tation that provides a +ay of connectin" the ca,sal roles played !y representations +ith their syntactic properties, and th,s indirectly linkin" se(antics +ith ca,sal role. *he cr,cial transition fro( for(al techni=,es dependent ,pon a h,(an (athe(atician to (echanical co(p,tation ca(e in 9lan *,rin"?s 7En Co(p,ta!le 6,(!ers7 /19#60. *his paper +as fra(ed as an ans+er to the (athe(atical pro!le( of findin" a "eneral characteriDation of the class of f,nctions that ad(it of co(p,tational /i.e., al"orith(ic0 sol,tions. *,rin"?s approach to this pro!le( +as to descri!e a (achine that +as capa!le of scannin" and printin" sy(!ols printed on a tape and "overned in part !y internal (echanis(s and in part !y the specific sy(!ols fo,nd on the tape. So(e of the details of this (achine are descri!ed in chapter %, !,t for present p,rposes it s,ffices to say that *,rin" 5 ## 5

'i",re # sho+ed that any computation that can be e"aluated by application of a formal algorithm can be performed by a digital machine of the sort he specifies. *he ori"inal intent of *,rin"?s article +as to provide a "eneral description of all co(p,ta!le f,nctions: a f,nction is co(p,ta!le 8,st in case it can !e eval,ated !y a *,rin" (achine. B,t in providin" this ans+er to a pro!le( in (athe(atics, *,rin" also sho+ed so(ethin" far (ore interestin" for psycholo"ists and philosophers: na(ely, that it is possi!le to desi"n (achines that not only passively store sy(!ols for h,(an ,se, !,t also actively distin",ish sy(!ols on the !asis of their shape and their syntactic orderin", and indeed operate in a fashion that is partially deter(ined !y the syntactic properties of the sy(!ols on +hich they operate. .n

short, *,rin" sho+ed that it is possi!le to link synta1 to ca,sal po+ers in a co(p,tin" (achine. 9 computing machine is a device that possesses several distinctive feat,res. 'irst, it contains (edia in +hich sy(!olic representations can !e stored. *hese sy(!ols, like +ritten sy(!ols, can !e arran"ed into e1pressions havin" syntactic str,ct,res and (ay !e assi"ned interpretations thro,"h an interpretation sche(e. Second, a co(p,ter is capa!le of differentiatin" !et+een representations in a fashion correspondin" to distinctions in their syntactic 7shape.7 *hird, it can ca,se the tokenin" of ne+ representations. 'inally, the ca,sal re",larities that "overn 'hat ne+ sy(!ols the co(p,ter +ill ca,se to !e tokened are dependent upon the syntactic form of the sy(!ols already stored !y the (achine. *o take a si(ple e1a(ple, s,ppose that a co(p,ter is pro"ra((ed to sa(ple t+o stora"e locations A and % +here representations of inte"ers are stored and to ca,se a tokenin" of a representation at a third 5 #J 5 location C in s,ch a fashion that the representation tokened at C +ill !e a representation of the s,( of the t+o n,(!ers represented at A and % . *he representations fo,nd at A , % , and C have syntactic str,ct,re: let ,s ass,(e that each representation is a series of !inary di"its /1s and $s0. *hey also have se(antic interpretations: na(ely, those assi"ned to the( !y the interpretation sche(e e(ployed !y the desi"ner of the pro"ra(. 6o+ +hen the co(p,ter e1ec,tes the pro"ra(, it +ill ca,se the tokenin" of a representation at C . A,st 'hat representation is tokened at C +ill depend ,pon +hat representations are fo,nd at A and % . 2ore specifically, it +ill depend ,pon the syntactic type of the representations fo,nd at A and % Hna(ely, ,pon +hat se=,ences of !inary di"its are present at those locations. What the co(p,ter does in e1ec,tin" this pro"ra( is th,s analo"o,s to the application of a for(al al"orith( /s,ch as that e(ployed in col,(n addition0, +hich is sensitive to the syntactic for(s of the representations at A and % . .f the pro"ra( has !een properly desi"ned, the overall process +ill acc,rately (i(ic addition as +ell, in the sense that +hat is tokened at C +ill al+ays !e a representation of the s,( of the t+o n,(!ers represented at A and % . *hat is, if the pro"ra( is properly desi"ned, the syntactically dependent operations perfor(ed !y the (achine +ill ens,re the prod,ction of a representation at C that !ears the desired se(antic relations to the representations at A and % as +ell. L11M *he se(antic properties of the representations play no ca,sal role in the processHthey are etiolo"ically inert. B,t since all se(antic distinctions are preserved syntactically, and syntactic type deter(ines +hat a representation can contri!,te ca,sally, there is a correspondence !et+een a representation?s se(antic properties and the ca,sal role it can play. *his e1a(ple ill,strates three salient points. *he first is the insi"ht !orro+ed fro( for(al lo"ic and (athe(atics that at least so(e se(antic relations can !e reflected or 7tracked7 !y syntactic relations. *he second is the insi"ht !orro+ed fro( co(p,ter science that (achines can !e (ade to operate ,pon sy(!ols in s,ch a +ay that the syntactic properties of the sy(!ols can !e reflected in their ca,sal roles. .ndeed, for any pro!le( that can !e solved !y the application of a for(al al"orith( A , it is possi!le to desi"n a (achine M that +ill "enerate a series of representations correspondin" to those that +o,ld !e prod,ced !y the application of al"orith( A . *hese t+o points 8ointly yield a third: na(ely, that it is possi!le for (achines to operate ,pon sy(!ols in a +ay that is, in 'odor?s +ords, 7sensitive solely to syntactic properties7 of the sy(!ols and 7entirely confined to alterin" their shapes,7 +hile at the sa(e ti(e 5 #% 5

'i",re J the (achine is so devised that it +ill transfor( one sy(!ol into another if and only if the pr opositions e1pressed !y the sy(!ols that are so transfor(ed stand in certain se(antic relationsHe."., the relation that the pre(ises !ear to the concl,sion of a valid ar",(ent. /'odor 19&-: 190 .n !rief, 7co(p,ters sho+ ,s ho+ to connect se(antical +ith ca,sal properties for symbols 7 /i!id.0. 9nd this co(pletes the desired linka"e !et+een se(antics and ca,sality: for do(ains that can !e for(aliDed, se(antic properties can !e linked to ca,sal properties !y encodin" se(antic differences in synta1 and desi"nin" a (achine that is driven !y the syntactic feat,res of the sy(!ols /see fi". J0.

&.;0 T)e Computational "33ount o+ Co*nitive $ro3esses

We have seen that the first thesis co(prisin" C*2 +as a representational acco,nt of the nat,re of intentional states: na(ely, that s,ch states are relations to (ental representations. *he second thesis co(prisin" C*2 is a co(p,tational acco,nt of the nat,re of co"nitive processes: na(ely, that co"nitive processes are computations o"er mental representations, or 7ca,sal se=,ences of tokenin"s of (ental representations7 /'odor 19&-: 1-0. 'odor +rites, 9 train of tho,"hts, for e1a(ple, is a ca,sal se=,ence of tokenin"s of (ental representations +hich e1press the propositions that are the o!8ects of the tho,"hts. *o a first appro1i(ation, to think ?.t?s "oin" to rainC so .?ll "o indoors? is to have a tokenin" of a (ental representation that (eans I$ll go indoors ca,sed, in a certain +ay, !y a tokenin" of a (ental representation that (eans It$s going to rain . /i!id.0 *his acco,nt (ay !e !roken do+n into several constit,ent clai(s. 'irst, co"nitive processes are sequences of intentional states. 6o+, 5 #6 5 accordin" to C*2, to !e in a partic,lar intentional state is 8,st to !e in a partic,lar f,nctional relation to a (ental representation. So if an or"anis( is ,nder"oin" a co"nitive process, it is passin" thro,"h a se=,ence of f,nctional relations to (ental representations. Second, there are ca,sal relationships !et+een the intentional states that (ake ,p a co"nitive process. Bein" in relation + to a representation of type M, at ti(e t /say, !elievin" at 1@:$$ noon that it is "oin" to rain0 can !e a partial ca,se of co(in" to !e in relation +Q to a representation of type M,Q at ti(e t R

/e."., co(in" to a decision at 1@:$1 to "o indoors0. *hird, the ca,sal connection !et+een the states picked o,t is not (erely incidental, !,t depends in a re",lar +ay ,pon the syntactic properties of the (ental representations. .t is because the or"anis( stands in relation + to a to en of (syntactic) type M, at t that it co(es to stand in relation +Q to a token of /syntactic0 type M,Q at t R , (,ch as o,r addin" pro"ra( ca,ses a partic,lar representation to !e tokened at C !eca,se

representations +ith partic,lar syntactic patterns are present at A and % . So 8,st as the representations in co(p,ters can play a ca,sal role in the "eneration of ne+ representations, and do so !y virt,e of their syntactic for(, so also 7(ental representations have their ca,sal roles in virt,e of their for(al properties7 /'odor 19&1: @60. 'o,rth, as in the case of a for(al al"orith( or a co(p,ter pro"ra(, any se(antic differences !et+een (ental representations are reflected !y syntactic distinctions. So for any t+o (ental representations M, and M,Q to +hich a sin"le or"anis( . is related, if M, and M, Q differ +ith respect to se(antic properties, they (,st !e of different syntactic types as +ell. *o vie+ (ental processes in this +ay is to treat the (ind as !ein" =,ite literally a di"ital co(p,ter. 9 co(p,ter is a device that perfor(s sy(!ol (anip,lations on the !asis of the syntactic feat,res of the sy(!ols, and it can do so in a fashion that respects s,ch se(antic feat,res as are encoded in the synta1. 9ccordin" to C*2, (ental states involve sy(!olic representations fro( +hich they inherit their se(antic properties. 9ll se(antic differences !et+een representations are syntactically encoded, and the (ind is a device +hose ca,sal re",larities are deter(ined !y the syntactic properties of its representations. *his acco,nt of the nat,re of co"nitive processes allo+s intentional state ascriptions to pick o,t intentional states !y +ay of properties that are correlated +ith their ca,sal po+ers. .ntentional state ascriptions pick o,t intentional states !y the se(antic val,es of the representations they involve. *hese se(antic val,es are not the(selves ca,sally efficient. B,t, accordin" to C*2, the se(antic properties of representations are cor3 5 #- 5 related +ith their syntactic types. So +hen representations are picked o,t !y their se(antic val,e, their syntactic type is ,ni=,ely picked o,t as +ell. B,t the syntactic type of a representation is a deter(inant of the ca,sal role it can play in ca,sin" tokenin"s of other representations and in the etiolo"y of !ehavior. 9nd so intentional state ascriptions can pick o,t ca,ses, and indeed the se(antic properties !y +hich intentional states are picked o,t are correlated +ith the ca,sal roles that they can play, !eca,se se(antic properties are correlated +ith syntactic properties, and syntactic properties deter(ine ca,sal po+ers. *his provides for the possi!ility of acco,ntin" for (ental ca,sation in a +ay that does not re=,ire se(antic properties to !e ca,sally active, and yet correlates se(antic val,e +ith ca,sal role.

&.<0 Summary= T)e Computational T)eory o+ 1ind

.n s,((ary, +e have no+ seen that C*2 consists in t+o (ain theses. *he first thesis is a representational acco,nt of the nat,re of intentional states. En this vie+, intentional states are relations !et+een an or"anis( and (ental representations. *hese representations are physically instantiated sy(!ol tokens havin" !oth se(antic and syntactic properties. *he second thesis is a co(p,tational acco,nt of the nat,re of co"nitive processes. Co"nitive processes, accordin" to C*2, are co(p,tations over (ental representations. *hat is, they are se=,ences of tokenin"s of (ental representations in +hich the presence of one representation can serve as a partial ca,se of the tokenin" of a second representation. A,st +hat ca,sal roles a representation (ay play in the "eneration of other representations and the etiolo"y of !ehavior is deter(ined !y its syntactic properties, and not !y its se(antic val,e. B,t +hile a representation?s se(antic val,e does not infl,ence +hat ca,sal roles it can play, the se(antic val,e is nonetheless coordinated +ith ca,sal role, !eca,se all se(antic differences !et+een representations are preserved syntactically, and synta1 deter(ines ca,sal role.

5 #& 5

C)apter T>o0 Computation, Intentionality, and t)e Vindi3ation o+ Intentional $sy3)olo*y

*he Co(p,tational *heory of 2ind has received a "reat deal of attention in recent years, !oth in philosophy and in the e(pirical disciplines +hose foc,s is co"nition. En the one hand, the co(p,ter paradi"( has inspired an enor(o,s vol,(e of theoretical +ork in psycholo"y, as +ell as related fields s,ch as lin",istics and etholo"y. En the other hand, philosophers s,ch as 'odor have clai(ed that C*2 provides a sol,tion to certain lon"3lived philosophical pro!le(s as +ell. *he pri(ary foc,s of this !ook is ,pon C*2?s clai(s to solve philosophical pro!le(s. *+o of these are of pri(ary i(portance. *he first is the clai( that CTM pro"ides a philosophical account of the intentionality and semantics of intentional states Hin partic,lar, that it does so in a fashion that provides tho,"ht +ith the sa(e "enerative and co(positional properties possessed !y nat,ral lan",a"es. *he second is the clai( that CTM 0"indicates0 intentional psychology by pro"iding a philosophical basis for an intentional psychology capa!le of satisfyin" several conte(porary concernsHin partic,lar, concerns for /10 the co(pati!ility of intentional psycholo"y +ith (aterialistic (onis(, /@0 the co(pati!ility of intentional psycholo"y +ith the "enerality of physics, and /#0 the a!ility to constr,e intentional e1planations as ca,sal e1planations !ased on la+like re",larities. *o"ether, these clai(s i(ply that vie+in" the (ind as a co(p,ter allo+s ,s to 7nat,raliDe7 the (ind !y !rin"in" !oth individ,al tho,"hts and (ental processes +ithin an entirely physicalistic +orld vie+. .t is i(portant to note that the stat,s of these distinctively philosophical clai(s is lar"ely independent of the clai( that the co(p,ter paradi"( 5 #9 5 has !een e(pirically fr,itf,l in inspirin" i(portant theoretical +ork in psycholo"y and other disciplines. En the one hand, the theory (i"ht ,lti(ately prove to !e philosophically interestin" !,t e(pirically fallo+. S,ch +as ar",a!ly the case, for e1a(ple, +ith representational theories of (ind !efore C*2, and co,ld t,rn o,t to !e the case for co(p,tationalis( as +ell if, in the lon" r,n, it "oes the +ay of so (any ,ns,ccessf,l research pro"ra((es that initially sho+ed s,ch !ri"ht pro(ise. En the other hand, it is possi!le to interpret psycholo"ical research inspired !y the co(p,ter paradi"( H7co(p,tational psycholo"y7 for shortHin a fashion that is +eaker than C*2. 'odor ackno+led"es this +hen he +rites: *here are t'o, =,ite different, applications of the 7co(p,ter (etaphor7 in co"nitive theory: t+o =,ite different +ays of ,nderstandin" +hat the co(p,ter (etaphor is . Ene is the idea of *,rin" red,ci!ility of intelli"ent processesC the other /and, in (y vie+, far (ore i(portant0 is the idea of (ental processes as for(al operations on sy(!ols. /'odor 19&1: @#3@J0 *he first and +eaker vie+ here is a machine functionalism that treats the (ind as a f,nctionally descri!a!le syste( +itho,t e1plainin" intentional states !y appeal to representations. En this vie+, Psycholo"ical theories in canonical for( +o,ld then look rather like (achine ta!les, !,t they +o,ld provide no ans+er to s,ch =,estions as 7Which of these (achine states is /or corresponds to or si(,lates0 the state of !elievin" that PK7 /i!id., @%0

*he second and stron"er application of the co(p,ter (etaphor is 'odor?s C*2, +hich adds the philosophically pre"nant notion of (ental representation to +hat is s,pplied !y (achine f,nctionalis(. 9s +e shall see in the co,rse of this chapter, 'odor?s ar",(ents for preferrin" C*2 to f,nctionalis( t,rn lar"ely ,pon its a!ility to 7vindicate7 intentional psycholo"y and not (erely ,pon factors internal to e(pirical research in psycholo"y. 9nd hence the stren"ths and +eaknesses of the philosophical clai(s (ade on !ehalf of C*2 are lar"ely independent of the via!ility of co(p,tational psycholo"y as an e(pirical research strate"y.

2.&0 CT15s "33ount o+ Intentionality

*he first philosophical clai( (ade on !ehalf of C*2 is that it provides an acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental states. *he !asic for( of this acco,nt +as already introd,ced in chapter 1: na(ely, that (ental states involve relationships to sy(!olic representations fro( +hich the states 7inherit their se(antic properties7 /'odor 19&1: @60 and intentionality. 5 J$ 5 Er, in 'odor?s +ords a"ain, 7.ntentional properties of propositional attit,des are vie+ed as inherited fro( se(antic properties of (ental representations7 /'odor 19&$!: J#10. *his clai( that intentional states 7inherit7 their se(antic properties, (oreover, is intended to provide an e3planation of the intentionality and se(antics of intentional states. Beliefs and desires are a!o,t o!8ects and states of affairs because they involve representations that are a!o,t those o!8ects and states of affairsC intentional states are (eanin"f,l and referential !eca,se they involve representations that are (eanin"f,l and referential. .n this chapter +e +ill look at this acco,nt in "reater detail, +ith partic,lar attention to+ards /a 0 locatin" it +ithin the (ore "eneral philosophical disc,ssion of intentionality and /b 0 hi"hli"htin" +hat (i"ht !e tho,"ht to !e its stren"ths.

2.20 Intentionality
Since the p,!lication of 'ranD Brentano?s ,sychologie "om empirischen Standpun t in 1&-J, intentionality has co(e to !e a topic of increasin" i(portance in philosophy of (ind and philosophy of lan",a"e. While Brentano?s o+n vie+s on intentionality have not proven to !e of end,rin" interest in their o+n ri"ht, his reintrod,ction of the Scholastic notion of intentionality into philosophy has had far3 reachin" ra(ifications. Brentano?s p,pil )d(,nd H,sserl /L19$$M 19-$, L191#M 19#1, L19%$M 196$, L19%JM 19-$0 (ade intentionality the central the(e of his transcendental pheno(enolo"y, and the +ork of s,!se=,ent ),ropean philosophers s,ch as 2artin Heide""er, Aean3Pa,l Sartre, Aac=,es ;errida, and 2ichel 'o,ca,lt has !een artic,lated in lar"e (eas,re a"ainst H,sserl?s vie+s a!o,t the intentionality of (ind and lan",a"e. .n the )n"lish3speakin" +orld, pro!le(s a!o,t intentionality have !een introd,ced into analytic philosophy !y Goderick Chishol( /19%-, 196&, 19&#, 19&Ja, 19&J!0, +ho translated and co((ented ,pon (,ch of Brentano?s +ork, and Wilfred Sellars /19%60, +ho st,died ,nder H,sserl?s p,pil 2artin 'ar!er.L1M Several of the principal aspects of Brentano?s pro!le(atic have !een preserved in s,!se=,ent disc,ssions of intentionality. Brentano?s characteriDation of the directedness and content of so(e (ental states has !een adopted +holesale !y later +riters, as has his reco"nition that s,ch states for( a nat,ral do(ain for psycholo"ical investi"ation and need to !e distin",ished !oth fro( =,alia and fro( !r,te o!8ects.L@M Gecently, (oreover, there has !een a stron" res,r"ence of interest in the relationship

!et+een +hat Brentano called 7descriptive7 /i.e., intentional0 and 5 J1 5 7"enetic7 /i.e., ca,sal, no(olo"ical0 psycholo"y. Brentano had ori"inally tho,"ht that "enetic psycholo"y +o,ld event,ally s,!s,(e and e1plain descriptive psycholo"y, !,t s,!se=,ently concl,ded that intentionality +as in fact an irred,ci!le property of the (ental and co,ld not !e acco,nted for in nonintentional and non(ental ter(s. *his position is so(eti(es descri!ed as 7Brentano?s thesis.7 *his disc,ssion in Brentano is th,s a direct fore!ear of c,rrent disc,ssions of the possi!ility of nat,raliDin" intentionality, +ith Brentano?s (at,re position represented !y +riters s,ch as Searle /19&#, 199#0. En the other hand, later disc,ssions have placed an increasin" e(phasis on several aspects of intentionality that are either "iven inade=,ate treat(ent in Brentano?s acco,nt or (issin" fro( it alto"ether. 6ota!le a(on" these are a concern for relatin" int,itions a!o,t the intentional nat,re of (ental states to other philosophical diffic,lties, s,ch as psychophysical ca,sation and the (ind3!ody pro!le(, and a conviction that intentionality is a property of language as +ell as of tho,"ht, acco(panied !y a correspondin" interest in the relationship !et+een the intentionality of lan",a"e and the intentionality of (ental states. *his interest in the 7intentionality of lan",a"e7 has taken t+o for(s. En the one hand, +riters s,ch as H,sserl /19$$0 and Searle /19&#0 have taken interest in ho+ ,tterances and inscriptions co(e to !e a!o,t thin"s !y virt,e of !ein" e1pressions of intentional states. En the other hand, Chishol( /19%-0 has coined a ,sa"e of the +ord ?intentional? that applies to lin",istic tokens e(ployed in ascriptions of intentional states.L#M *his +idespread conviction that lan",a"e as +ell as tho,"ht is in so(e sense intentional has !een paralleled !y a si(ilar conviction that so(e (ental states can !e eval,ated in the sa(e se(antic ter(s as so(e e1pressions in nat,ral and technical lan",a"es. 6ota!ly, it is +idely ass,(ed that notions s,ch as meaning, reference, and truth "alue can !e applied !oth /a 0 to occ,rrent states s,ch as e1plicit 8,d"(ents and /b 0 to tacit states s,ch as !eliefs that are not conscio,sly entertained, in (,ch the fashion that these se(antic notions are applied to lin",istic entities s,ch as +ords, sentences, assertions, and propositions. Providin" so(e sort of acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antics of (ental states is th,s +idely vie+ed to !e an i(portant co(ponent of any p,rported 7theory of (ind.7

2.40 CT1, Intentionality, and Semanti3s

*he (otivation of C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality fo,nd in 'odor /19&1, 19&-, 199$0 plays ,pon several the(es in the philosophical 5 J@ 5 disc,ssion of intentionality. .n partic,lar, it is an atte(pt to e1ploit the relationship !et+een the se(antics of tho,"ht and lan",a"e in a fashion that provides a thoro,"hly nat,ralistic acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental statesHin other +ords, an acco,nt that is co(pati!le +ith token physicalis( and +ith treatin" !eliefs and desires as thin"s that can take part in ca,sal relations. 'odor +rites, .t does see( relatively clear +hat +e +ant fro( a philosophical acco,nt of the propositional attit,des. 9t a (ini(,(, +e +ant to e1plain ho+ it is that propositional attit,des have se(antic properties, and +e +ant an e1planation of the opacity of propositional attit,desC all this +ithin a fra(e+ork s,fficiently Gealistic to tolerate the ascription of ca,sal roles to !eliefs and desires. /'odor 19&1: 1&0

'odor !e"ins his =,est for s,ch an acco,nt !y (akin" a case that intentional states are not ,ni=,e in havin" se(antic propertiesHsy(!ols have the( as +ell. 2ental states like !elievin" and desirin" aren?t . . . the only thin"s that represent. *he other o!vio,s candidates are symbols . So, . +rite /or ,tter0: ?4reycat is pro+lin" in the kitchen,? there!y prod,cin" a ?disc,rsive sy(!ol?C a token of a lin",istic e1pression. What .?ve +ritten /or ,ttered0 represents the +orld as !ein" a certain +ayHas !ein" s,ch that 4reycat is pro+lin" in the kitchenH8,st as (y tho,"ht does +hen the tho,"ht that 4reycat is pro+lin" in the kitchen occ,rs to (e. /'odor 19&-: 1i0 .t is +orth notin" that 'odor ass,(es here that +ords s,ch as ?represent? can !e predicated ,nivocally of intentional states and sy(!ols. B,t his e1a(ple also involves an even stron"er clai(: na(ely, that sy(!olic representations s,ch as +ritten inscriptions 7represent the +orld as !ein" a certain +ay . . . 4ust as L(yM tho,"ht does.7 Here the i(plication +o,ld clearly see( to !e that there is 8,st one sort of 7representation7 present in the t+o casesHan ass,(ption that +ill !e sho+n to have si"nificant conse=,ences later in this !ook. *he s,cceedin" para"raph in ,sychosemantics !e"ins to reveal 'hat 'odor takes to !e co((on to +hat initially appear to !e separate cases /i.e., (ental states and sy(!olic representation0: *o a first appro1i(ation, sy(!ols and (ental states !oth have representational content . 9nd nothin" else does that !elon"s to the ca,sal order: not rocks, or +or(s or trees or spiral ne!,lae. /'odor 19&-: 1i0 .t also reveals +here his reasonin" is headed: 5 J# 5 .t +o,ld, therefore, !e no "reat s,rprise if the theory of mind and the theory of symbols 'ere some day to con"erge . /i!id., e(phasis added0 *here are, ho+ever, at least t+o directions that a conver"ence of the philosophy of (ind and se(iotics (i"ht take. En the one hand, philosophers like H,sserl /19$$0 and Searle /19&#0 have ar",ed that the intentional and se(antic properties of sy(!ols are to !e e1plained in ter(s of the intentional and se(antic properties of (ental states. 9s +e have already seen, ho+ever, 'odor?s vie+ is =,ite the reverse: na(ely, that it is the se(antic and intentional properties of (ental states +hich are to !e e1plained, and they are to !e e1plained in ter(s of the intentional and se(antic properties of sy(!ols Hspecifically, the sy(!ols that serve as the o!8ects of the propositional attit,des. While 'odor does ackno+led"e that 'ritten and spo en sy(!ols "et their se(antic properties fro( the states that they e1press, he nonetheless holds that it is (ental representations that have se(antic properties in, one (i"ht say, the first instanceC the se(antic properties of propositional attit,des are inherited fro( those of (ental representations and, pres,(a!ly, the se(antic properties of the for(,lae of nat,ral lan",a"es are inherited fro( those of the propositional attit,des that they are ,sed to e1press. /'odor 19&1: #10 *he res,ltin" acco,nt of intentional states red,ces the clai( that a partic,lar token intentional state has se(antic or intentional properties to a con8,nction of t+o clai(s to the effect that /a 0 a (ental sy(!ol token has se(antic or intentional properties, and /b 0 an or"anis( stands in a partic,lar kind of f,nctional relationship to that sy(!ol token. 9s 'odor e1presses it in the passa"e already cited fro( ,sychosemantics,

Claim - /the nat,re of propositional attit,des0: 'or any or"anis( . , and any attit,de A to+ard the proposition , , there is a /?co(p,tational?3?f,nctional?0 relation + and a (ental representation M, s,ch that M, (eans that , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . /'odor 19&-: 1-0 .t see(s clear that =,estions a!o,t the meaningfulness and /p,tative0 reference of intentional states are to !e constr,ed as =,estions a!o,t the sy(!olic representations involved. *he sa(e (ay !e said for truth "alue in those cases +here the concept applies, tho,"h the applica!ility of tr,thf,nctional eval,ation to a "iven intentional state +o,ld see( to depend ,pon the attit,de involved, since (ost kinds of co"nitive attit,des /e."., desire, dread, etc.0 are not s,!8ect to tr,th3f,nctional eval,ation. 5 JJ 5

2.60 T)e Virtues o+ t)e "33ount

*here are several feat,res of this acco,nt that render it attractive. 'irst, the acco,nt locates the ,lti(ate !earers of se(antic properties in sy(!ol tokens, and sy(!ol tokens are a(on" the sorts of thin"s that everyone a"rees can !e physical o!8ects. *o the (any +ho +ant intentionality and +ant (aterialis( too, this is a s,!stantial advance over previo,s theories that attri!,ted intentionality either directly to (inds /+hose co(pati!ility +ith (aterialis( is in do,!t0 or directly to !rain states /+hich are pro!le(atic as lo"ical s,!8ects of se(antic predicates0. *he acco,nt also lends so(e clarity to the fa(iliar analysis of intentional states in ter(s of intentional attit,des /s,ch as !elief and desire0 and content. *he attit,de3content distinction is itself only a distinction of analysis. C*2 fleshes this distinction o,t in a +ay that no previo,s theory had done. 9ttit,des are interpreted as f,nctional relations !et+een an or"anis( and its representations, and content in ter(s of the se(antic properties of the representations. C*2 th,s !oth retains and clarifies a central feat,re of the standard analysis of intentional states. *he acco,nt of intentionality and se(antics offered !y C*2 also provides a +ay of ,nderstandin" !oth narro+ and !road notions of propositional content. 9ccordin" to C*2, +hat is necessary for an intentional state to have a partic,lar content in the narro+ senseHthat is, +hat is necessary for it to !e 7a!o,t35 7 constr,ed opa=,ely, or in s,ch a fashion as not to i(ply that there e1ists an 5 for the state to !e a!o,tHis for it to involve a relationship !et+een an or"anis( and a sy(!ol token of a partic,lar for(ally deli(ited type. Whether the state is also contentf,l in the !road sense /i.e., 7a!o,t 5 7 ,nder a transparent constr,alHone that does i(ply that there is an 5 to +hich the state is a!o,t0 +ill depend ,pon ho+ that sy(!ol token is related to e1tra(ental reality: for e1a(ple, +hether it stands in the proper sort of ca,sal relationships +ith 5 . While C*2 does not provide an acco,nt of 'hat relationships to e1tra(ental reality are relevant to the !road notion of content, the representational acco,nt of narro+ content allo+s C*2 to avoid several traditional pitfalls associated +ith the 7hard cases7 presented !y ill,sions, hall,cinations, false !eliefs, and other deviant cases of perception and co"nition. 6ota!ly, C*2 escapes the 2einon"ian tendency to post,late none1istent entities and the opposite inclination to identify the contents of intentional states +ith the e1tra(ental o!8ects to+ards +hich they are directed. *+o feat,res of C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality, ho+ever, see( to

5 J% 5 !e of ,t(ost i(portance: its relation to C*2?s acco,nt of co"nitive processes and its a!ility to endo+ tho,"ht +ith a co(positional se(antics. .t is perhaps an ,nderstate(ent to say that C*2?s representational acco,nt of intentionality +o,ld !e of little interest o,tside of narro+ly philosophical circles if it +ere not co,pled +ith a ca,sal theory of co"nitive processes. >ocatin" the arcane property of intentionality in the e=,ally (ysterio,s (eanin"s of hypothetical (ental representations +o,ld c,t little ice +ere it not for the fact that treatin" tho,"hts as relations to sy(!ols provides a +ay of e1plainin" (ental processes as co(p,tations. .ndeed, as +riters like Ha,"eland /19-&, 19&10 have noted, it is the discovery of (achine co(p,tation that has revitaliDed representational theories of the (ind. *he other si"nal virt,e of vie+in" tho,"hts as relations to sy(!olic representations is that this allo+s ,s to endo+ the (ind +ith the sa(e "enerative and creative po+ers possessed !y nat,ral lan",a"es. We do not si(ply think isolated tho,"htsH7do"N7 or 7redN7 Gather, +e for( 8,d"(ents and desires that are directed to+ards states of affairs and represented in propositional for(. 9nd o,r a!ility to think 7*he do" knocked over the vase7 is in part a conse=,ence of o,r a!ility to think 7do"7 in isolation. We are, f,rther(ore, a!le to think ne+ tho,"hts and to co(!ine the ideas +e have in novel +ays. .f . can think 7*he do" knocked over the vase7 and . can think 7cat,7 . can also think 7*he cat knocked over the vase.7 *herefore there is (ore to !e desired fro( a theory of intentional states than an acco,nt of the (eanin"s of individ,al ideas: there is also the fact that tho,"ht see(s to !e "enerative and syste(atic. :ie+in" the (ind as e(ployin" representations in a lan",a"e of tho,"ht "ives ,s this for free. 'or +e already have a +ay of ans+erin" the correspondin" =,estions in lin",istics !y e(ployin" the principle of co(positionality. .f a lan",a"e is co(positional, then the se(antic val,es of co(ple1 e1pression are a f,nction of /a 0 the se(antic val,es of the le1ical /or (orphe(ic0 ato(s and /b 0 the syntactic str,ct,re of the e1pression. *he "enerative and syste(atic =,alities of lan",a"es are e1plained !y the ,se of iterative syntactic str,ct,res and the s,!stit,tion of kno+n le1ical ite(s into the slots of kno+n syntactic str,ct,res. So if the se(antic properties of o,r tho,"hts are directly inherited fro( those of the sy(!ols they involve, and the sy(!ols involved are part of a lan",a"e e(ployin" co(positional principles, then these e1planations fro( lin",istics can !e incorporated +holesale into o,r psycholo"y. *he (ind has "enerative and syste(atic =,alities !eca,se it thinks in a lan",a"e that has a co(positional se(antics. 5 J6 5 *his is an i(portant res,lt !eca,se it is virt,ally i(possi!le to (ake sense of reasonin" !y +ay of a representational theory e1cept on the ass,(ption that co(ple1 tho,"hts, s,ch as 7*he cat knocked over the vase,7 are co(posed o,t of si(pler parts, correspondin" to 7cat7 and 7vase.7 'or +hen one has a tho,"ht of a cat knockin" over a vase, this tho,"ht is i((ediately linked to all kinds of other kno+led"e a!o,t cats and vases and ca,sality. Ene (ay infer, for e1a(ple, that an ani(al knocked over the vase, that so(ethin" knocked over an artifact, or that the vase is no lon"er ,pri"ht. .f (ental representations +ere all se(antic pri(itives, the a!ility to (ake s,ch inferences on the !asis of co(pletely novel representations +o,ld pro!a!ly !e ine1plica!le. *he si(plest e1planation for o,r a!ility to co(!ine o,r kno+led"e a!o,t cats +ith a representation (eanin" 7*he cat knocked over the vase7 is that the representation has a discrete co(ponent (eanin" 7cat,7 and that the overall (eanin" of the representation is deter(ined !y ho+ the co(ponent representations are co(!ined. *his, ho+ever, points to the need for a representational syste( in +hich synta1 and se(antics are closely connected. 'or the only kno+n +ay of endo+in" a syste( of representations +ith this kind of co(positionality is !y +ay of s,pplyin" the representational syste( +ith syntactic rules that "overn ho+ to for(

se(antically co(ple1 representations o,t of se(antic pri(itives. C*2 provides for this co(positionality, and it is not clear that any acco,nt not !ased on an ,nderlyin" syste( of lan",a"elike representations +o,ld !e a!le to say the sa(e.

2.70 CT1 as t)e -asis +or an Intentional $sy3)olo*y

*he first i(portant clai( (ade on !ehalf of C*2 is th,s that it provides an acco,nt of the se(antic and intentional properties of (ental states. *he second i(portant clai( (ade on !ehalf of C*2 is that it provides a philosophical !asis for intentional psycholo"y. C*2?s proponents !elieve that it provides a fra(e+ork for psycholo"ical e1planation that allo+s intentional state ascriptions to fi",re in s,ch e1planations, +hile also acco((odatin" several conte(porary concerns in philosophy of science. *hree s,ch concerns are of pree(inent i(portance: /10 concerns that psycholo"ical e1planations !e ca,sal e1planations !ased on no(olo"ical re",larities, /@0 concerns that psycholo"ical e1planations !e co(pati!le +ith the "enerality of physics /i.e., +ith the a!ility of an ideally co(pleted physics to s,pply e1planations for every token event0, and /#0 5 J- 5 concerns that the ontolo"y i(plicit in psycholo"y !e co(pati!le +ith (aterialistic (onis(. Proponents of C*2 th,s vie+ their pro8ect as one of 7vindicatin" co((onsense psycholo"y7 or 7sho+in" ho+ yo, co,ld have . . . a respecta!le science +hose ontolo"y e1plicitly ackno+led"es states that e1hi!it the sorts of properties that co((on sense attri!,tes to LpropositionalM attit,des7 /'odor 19&-: 1$0. *he perceived need for s,ch a 7vindication7 +as occasioned !y the disrep,te into +hich intentional psycholo"yHand indeed (entalis( in "eneralHhad fallen in the first half of the t+entieth cent,ry. By the ti(e that the notion of co(p,tation +as availa!le as a paradi"( for psycholo"y, (any philosophers and psycholo"ists !elieved that there co,ld not !e a scientific psycholo"y cast in (entalistic or intentional ter(s. *he roots of this s,spicion of (entalis( and intentional psycholo"y (ay !e traced to the vie+s a!o,t the nat,re of science in "eneral, and psycholo"y in partic,lar, associated +ith t+o (ove(ents: (ethodolo"ical !ehavioris( in psycholo"y and :ienna Circle positivis( in philosophy. .n order to ,nderstand f,lly the si"nificant e(phasis placed ,pon 7vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y7 in artic,lations of C*2 /partic,larly early artic,lations0, it is necessary !riefly to s,rvey these other (ove(ents +hich +ere so infl,ential in the earlier parts of this cent,ry.

2.(0 T)e ,isrepute o+ 1entalism0a -rie+ History

*he le"iti(acy of intentional psycholo"y +as serio,sly i(p,"ned in the first half of the t+entieth cent,ry !y ideas e(er"in" fro( (ethodolo"ical !ehaviorists in psycholo"y and fro( lo"ical positivists in philosophy. 2ethodolo"ical !ehavioris(, as artic,lated !y Watson /191#a, 191#!, 191J, 19@J0 and Skinner /19#&, 19%#0, raised (ethodolo"ical concerns a!o,t e1planations that referred to o!8ects /(ental states0 that +ere not p,!licly o!serva!le and +ere not necessary /they ar",ed0 for the prediction and control of !ehavior. )arly lo"ical positivis(, as typified !y Carnap?s Aufbau /19@&0, adopted a 7lo"ical !ehavioris(7 +hich P,tna( descri!es as 7the doctrine that, 8,st as n,(!ers are /alle"edly0 lo"ical constr,ctions o,t of sets, so mental e"ents are lo"ical constr,ctions o,t of act,al and possi!le beha"ior e"ents 7 /P,tna( L1961M 19&$: @%0. *his interpretation of (ental events is !ased ,pon a positivist acco,nt of the (eanin"s of

+ords, so(eti(es called the 7verification theory of (eanin".7 *he criteria for verification of psycholo"ical attri!,tes, the lo"ical !ehaviorists ar",ed, 5 J& 5 consist in o!servations of /a 0 the s,!8ect?s overt !ehavior /"est,res (ade, so,nds e(itted spontaneo,sly or in response to =,estions0 and /b 0 the s,!8ect?s physical states /!lood press,re, central nervo,s syste( processes, etc.0. Since (otions and e(issions of so,nds are strai"htfor+ardly physical events, they ar",ed, clai(s a!o,t psycholo"ical processes are red,ci!le to state(ents in physical lan",a"e.LJM *he concl,sion, in He(pel?s +ords, is that 7all psycholo"ical state(ents +hich are (eanin"f,l, that is to say, +hich are in principle verifia!le, are translata!le into state(ents +hich do not involve psycholo"ical concepts, !,t only the concepts of physics. . . . Psycholo"y is an inte"ral part of physics7 /He(pel L19J9M 19&$: 1&0.L%M :ienna Circle positivis( +as characteriDed !y a tension !et+een epistemological concerns /+ith a conco(itant tendency to+ards pheno(enalis(0 and a co((it(ent to materialism . >o"ical !ehavioris( e(er"ed in the conte1t of the epistemological concerns and radically e(piricist /and even pheno(enalistic0 ass,(ptions of early :ienna Circle positivis(. 9s a conse=,ence, it involved the ass,(ption that 7o!servational ter(s refer to s,!8ective i(pressions, sensations, and perceptions of so(e sentient !ein"7 /'eyera!end 19%&: #%0. Carnap?s Aufbau +as the (ost si"nificant +ork advocatin" this kind of lo"ical red,ction, tho,"h the infl,ence of pheno(enalis( (ay !e seen clearly in the early +orks of G,ssell and in the nineteenth3cent,ry 4er(an positivis( of 2ach. Pet Carnap soon re8ected the Aufbau acco,nt of the relationship !et+een physical and psycholo"ical ter(s and adopted a ne+ ,nderstandin" of science, e(phasiDin" the (aterialist the(e in positivis( instead of the episte(olo"ical3pheno(enalist the(e. 9ccordin" to this vie+, o!servation sentences do not refer to the sense i(pressions involved in the act,al o!servations, !,t to the /p,tative0 o!8ects o!served, descri!ed in an inters,!8ective 7thin"3lan",a"e.7L6M *h,s in 19#6 Carnap +rites, 7What +e have called o!serva!le predicates are predicates of the thin"3lan",a"e /they have to !e clearly distin",ished fro( +hat +e have called perception ter(s . . . +hether these are no+ interpreted s,!8ectivistically, or !ehavioristically07 /Carnap L19#6319#-M 19%#: 690. 9nd si(ilarly Popper +rites that 7every !asic state(ent (,st either !e itself a state(ent a!o,t relative positions of physical !odies . . . or it (,st !e e=,ivalent to so(e !asic state(ent of this ?(echanistic? kind7 /Popper 19%9: 1$#0. Eppenhei( and P,tna(?s 7Unity of Science as a Workin" Hypothesis7 /19%&0 has !eco(e a loc,s classic,s for this ne+er vie+, co((only called red,ctive physicalis(Hthe vie+ that every (ental type has a cor3 5 J9 5 respondin" physical type and all psycholo"ical la+s are th,s translata!le into la+s in the voca!,lary of physics.L-M *he ideal of science artic,lated !y Eppenhei( and P,tna( shares +ith lo"ical !ehavioris( and Skinnerian operationalis( a co((it(ent to a 7red,ction7 of (entalistic ter(s, incl,din" intentional state ascriptions, !,t the 7red,ctions7 e(ployed in the three pro8ects differ !oth in nat,re and in (otivation.L&M 6o+ +hile these three scientific (etatheories differ +ith respect to their (otivations and their chief concerns, each contri!,ted to a "ro+in" s,spicion of intentional psycholo"y. By the ti(e the di"ital co(p,ter +as availa!le as a (odel for co"nition, it +as +idely !elieved that one co,ld not have a

scientific psycholo"y that e(ployed intentional state ascriptions. *his skepticis( a!o,t intentional psycholo"y reflected fo,r principal concerns: /10 a concern a!o,t the nat,re of e"idence for a scientific theoryHpartic,larly a concern that the evidence for psycholo"ical theories !e p,!licly or inters,!8ectively o!serva!leC /@0 a concern a!o,t the nat,re of scientific e3planation Hin partic,lar, a concern that scientific e1planations !e causal and nomological# /#0 an ontolo"ical concern a!o,t the pro!le(s inherent in d,alis(, and partic,larly a co((it(ent to (aterialistic (onis(CL9M and /J0 a co((it(ent to the "enerality of physicsHthat is, the availa!ility of a physical e1planation for every token event.

2.;0 Vindi3atin* Intentional $sy3)olo*y ?&@= 1a3)ine !un3tionalism

*he proponents of C*2 !elieve that it has s,pplied a +ay of preservin" the inte"rity of e1planations cast in the intentional idio( +hile also acco((odatin" the concerns that had contri!,ted to the ascendancy of red,ctive approaches to (ind in the first half of the cent,ry. Historically, the atte(pt to vindicate intentional psycholo"y involved t+o distinct ele(ents: /10 the introd,ction of machine functionalism as a ri"oro,s alternative to !ehavioris( of vario,s sorts and to red,ctive physicalis(, and /@0 C*2?s co(!ination of (achine f,nctionalis( +ith the additional notions of computation and representation . .n his 19#6 description of co(p,tation, 9lan *,rin" introd,ced the notion of a co(p,tin" (achine. *he (achine, +hich has co(e to !e called a 7*,rin" (achine,7 has a tape r,nnin" thro,"h it, divided into s=,ares, each capa!le of !earin" a 7sy(!ol.7L1$M 9t any "iven ti(e, the (achine is in so(e partic,lar internal condition, called its 7m 3confi",ration.7 *he overall state of the *,rin" (achine at a partic,lar ti(e is descri!ed !y 5 %$ 5 7the n,(!er of the scanned s=,are, the co(plete se=,ence of all sy(!ols on the tape and the m 3confi",ration7 /*,rin" 19#6: @#@0. 9 *,rin" (achine is functionally specifiable: that is, the operations that it +ill perfor( and the state chan"es it +ill ,nder"o can !e capt,red !y a 7(achine ta!le7 specifyin", for each co(plete confi",ration of the (achine, +hat operations it +ill then perfor( and the res,ltin" m 3confi",ration. 2achine f,nctionalis( is the thesis that intentional states and processes are like+ise f,nctionally specifia!leHthat is, that they (ay !e characteriDed !y so(ethin" on the order of a (achine ta!le.L11M *he thesis re=,ires so(e "eneraliDations fro( the co(p,tin" (achine descri!ed !y *,rin". .n P,tna(?s 196- artic,lation, for e1a(ple, the tape of the (achine is replaced !y 7sensory inp,ts7 and 7(otor o,tp,ts,7 and a correspondin" ad8,st(ent is (ade to the notion of a (achine ta!le to acco((odate these inp,ts and o,tp,ts. P,tna( also "eneraliDes fro( *,rin"?s deter(inistic case, in +hich state transitions are co(pletely deter(ined !y the co(plete confi",ration of the (achine, to a (ore per(issive notion of a 7Pro!a!ilistic 9,to(aton,7 in +hich 7the transitions !et+een ?states? are allo+ed to !e +ith vario,s pro!a!ilities rather than !ein" ?deter(inistic7? /P,tna( L196-M 19&$: @@60. Since a sin"le physical syste( can si(,ltaneo,sly !e the instantiation of any n,(!er of deter(inistic a,to(ata, P,tna( also introd,ces 7the notion of a 6escription of a syste(.7 Ef this he +rites, 9 ;escription of S +here S is a syste(, is any tr,e state(ent to the effect that S possesses distinct states S1 , S@ , . . . , S n +hich are related to one another and to the (otor o,tp,ts and sensory inp,ts !y the transition pro!a!ilities "iven in s,ch3and3s,ch a 2achine *a!le. *he 2achine *a!le (entioned in the ;escription +ill then !e called the ',nctional

Er"aniDation of S relative to that ;escription, and the Si s,ch that S is in state Si at a "iven ti(e +ill !e called the *otal State of S /at that ti(e0 relative to that ;escription. /i!id., @@60 *his provides a +ay of specifyin" conditions for the type identity of psycholo"ical states in f,nctional ter(s. 9s Block and 'odor artic,late it, 7'or any or"anis( that satisfies psycholo"ical predicates at all, there e1ists a ,ni=,e !est description s,ch that each psycholo"ical state of the or"anis( is identical +ith one of its (achine states relative to that description7 /Block and 'odor L19-@M 19&$: @J$0. 9 psycholo"y cast in f,nctional ter(s possesses the perceived (erits of !ehaviorist and red,ctive physicalist acco,nts +hile avoidin" so(e of their e1cesses. 'irst, a f,nctional psycholo"y fo,nded on the (achine analo"y see(s to provide the ri"ht sorts of e1planations for a ri"oro,s 5 %1 5 psycholo"y. *he (achine ta!le of a co(p,ter e1presses relationships !et+een types of co(plete confi",rations that are !oth regular and causal . .f co"nition is like+ise f,nctionally descri!a!le !y so(ethin" on the order of a (achine ta!le, psycholo"y can (ake ,se of ca,sal, no(olo"ical e1planations. 2achine f,nctionalis( is also co(pati!le +ith co((it(ents to ontolo"ical (aterialis( and to the "enerality of physics. 9 co(p,tin" (achine, after all, is ,npro!le(atically a physical o!8ect, all of its parts are physical o!8ects, and all of its operations have e1planations cast +holly in physical ter(s. .f f,nctional description is +hat is relevant to the individ,ation of psycholo"ical states and processes, the res,ltin" f,nctional psycholo"y co,ld !e =,ite co(pati!le +ith the ass,(ptions that /a 0 all of the /token0 o!8ects in the do(ain of psycholo"y are physical o!8ects, and that /b 0 all of the token events e1plained in f,nctional ter(s !y psycholo"y are s,scepti!le to e1planation in +holly physical ter(s as +ell. While (achine f,nctionalis( is co(pati!le +ith (aterialis( and token physicalis(, it is inco(pati!le +ith red,ctive or type physicalis(, since f,nctionally defined cate"ories in a co(p,ter /e."., 96;3 "ates0 are s,scepti!le to indefinitely (any physical i(ple(entations that are of distinct physical types. .t is for this reason that (,ch of the early co(p,tationalist literat,re foc,ses on co(parin" the (erits of f,nctionalis( +ith those of red,ctive physicalis(. 'or e1a(ple, 'odor offers a "eneral sketch of the case a"ainst red,ctive physicalis(: *he reason it is ,nlikely that every kind corresponds to a physical kind is 8,st that /a 0 interestin" "eneraliDations . . . can often !e (ade a!o,t events +hose physical descriptions have nothin" in co((onC /b 0 it is often the case that 'hether the physical descriptions of the events s,!s,(ed !y s,ch "eneraliDations have anythin" in co((on is, in an o!vio,s sense, entirely irrelevant to the tr,th of the "eneraliDations, or to their interestin"ness, or to their de"ree of confir(ation, or, indeed, to any of their episte(olo"ically i(portant propertiesC and /c 0 the special sciences are very (,ch in the !,siness of for(,latin" "eneraliDations of this kind. /'odor 19-J: 1%0 9dditional ar",(ents for the !enefits of f,nctionalis( over red,ctionis( +ere (arshaled on the !asis of >ashley?s thesis of e=,ipotentiality, the conver"ence of (orpholo"ical and !ehavioral feat,res across phylo"enetic !o,ndaries, and the possi!ility of applyin" psycholo"ical predicates to aliens and artifacts /see Block and 'odor L19-@M 19&$0. 9dvocates of f,nctionalis( th,s see it as capt,rin" the i(portant insi"hts of red,ctionists /co(pati!ility +ith (aterialis( and the "enerality of physics0 +hile avoidin" the pro!le(s of red,ctionis(.

5 %@ 5 9dvocates of (achine f,nctionalis( vie+ it as capt,rin" the !etter side of !ehavioris( in si(ilar fashion. ',nctional definition of psycholo"ical ter(s avoids appeals to introspection and private evidence, there!y satisfyin" one of the concerns of (ethodolo"ical !ehaviorists like Watson and Skinner. 9ny ontolo"ical s,spicion of 7the (ental7 is also avoided !y (achine f,nctionalis(, since co(p,ters are plainly o!8ects that are s,!8ect to physical instantiation. ',nctionalis( also per(its the ,se of !lack3!o1 (odels of psycholo"ical processes, (,ch like !ehavioris(C and like the !ehavioris(s of *ol(an and H,ll /!,t ,nlike those of Watson and Skinner0 it per(its the (odels to incl,de interactions bet'een (ental states and does not restrict itself to characteriDations of states and processes in dispositional ter(s, there!y acco,ntin" for the int,ition that psycholo"ical states can interact ca,sally. 2achine f,nctionalis( is th,s seen !y its advocates as ,nitin" the !est feat,res of !ehavioris( +ith those of physicalis(. *his, +rites 'odor, allo+ed for the sol,tion of a nasty dile((a facin" the (aterialist pro"ra( in the philosophy of (ind: What central state physicalists see(ed to have "ot ri"htHcontra !ehavioristsH+as the ontolo"ical a,tono(y of (ental partic,lars and, of a piece +ith this, the ca,sal character of (ind3!ody interactions. Whereas, +hat the !ehaviorists see(ed to have "ot ri"htHcontra the identity theoryH+as the relational character of (ental properties. 7unctionalism, grounded in the machine analogy, seemed to be able to get both right at once . /'odor 19&1: 9, e(phasis added0

2.<0 Vindi3atin* Intentional $sy3)olo*y ?2@= Symbols and Computation

;espite its si"nificant virt,es, (achine f,nctionalis( alone is not s,fficient for vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y. What (achine f,nctionalis( esta!lishes is that there can !e syste(s +hich are characteriDed !y ca,sal re",larities not red,ci!le to physical la+s. What it does not esta!lish is that physical ob4ects picked o,t !y a f,nctional description of a physical syste( can also !e mental states or that f,nctionally descri!a!le processes can also !e rational (ental processes. 'irst, there is an ontolo"ical pro!le(: f,nctionalis( alone does not sho+ that the physical o!8ects picked o,t !y f,nctional descriptions can !e the very sa(e thin"s as the (ental tokens picked o,t in the intentional idio(. 9s a conse=,ence, e1planations in intentional ter(s are still ontolo"ically s,spect, even if there can !e some f,nctionally deli(ited kinds +hich are 5 %# 5 ,npro!le(atic ontolo"ically. *he second pro!le( is (ethodolo"ical: ,nless the kinds picked o,t !y a psycholo"y, even f,nctional psycholo"y, are the sorts of thin"s s,scepti!le to semantic relationships, the e1planations "iven in that psycholo"y do not have the characteristics that e1planations in intentional psycholo"y have.L1@M C*2 seeks to resc,e intentional psycholo"y fro( this i(passe !y ,nitin" f,nctional and intentional psycholo"ies thro,"h the notion of symbol e(ployed in the co(p,ter paradi"(. Co(p,ters, accordin" to the standard acco,nt, are not (erely f,nctionally descri!a!le physical o!8ectsHthey are f,nctionally descri!a!le symbol manipulators . Sy(!ols, ho+ever, are a(on" the sorts of thin"s that can have se(antic properties, and co(p,ter operations can involve transfor(ations of sy(!ol str,ct,res that preserve se(antic relationships. *his provides a strate"y for ,nitin" the f,nctional3ca,sal nat,re of

sy(!ols +ith their se(antic nat,re, and s,""ests that a si(ilar strate"y (i"ht !e possi!le for (ental states. *h,s 'odor +rites, Co(p,tation sho+s ,s ho+ to connect se(antical +ith ca,sal properties for symbols . So, if havin" a propositional attit,de involves tokenin" a sy(!ol, then +e can "et so(e levera"e on connectin" se(antical properties +ith ca,sal ones for thoughts . /'odor 19&-: 1&0 *his, ho+ever, re=,ires the post,lation of (ental symbols: .n co(p,ter desi"n, ca,sal role is !ro,"ht into phase +ith content !y e1ploitin" parallelis(s !et+een the synta1 of a sy(!ol and its se(antics. B,t that idea +on?t do the theory of mind any "ood ,nless there are mental sy(!ols: (ental partic,lars possessed of !oth se(antical syntactic properties. *here (,st !e (ental sy(!ols !eca,se, in a n,tshell, only sy(!ols have synta1, and o,r !est availa!le theory of (ental processesHindeed, the only availa!le theory of (ental processes that isn?t no'n to !e falseHneeds the pict,re of the (ind as a synta13driven (achine. /i!id., 193@$0 .t is this addition of the notion of symbol that (akes C*2 stron"er than (achine f,nctionalis(. 9nd it is in virt,e of this feat,re that C*2 can lay so(e clai( to solvin" pro!le(s that f,nctionalis( +as ,na!le to solve. 'irst, it can lay clai( to solvin" the ontolo"ical pro!le(. *he ontolo"ical pro!le( +as that f,nctionalis( provided no +arrant for !elievin" that the f,nctionally individ,ated /physical0 o!8ects for(in" the do(ain of a f,nctional psycholo"y co,ld also !e (ental statesHin partic,lar, it see(ed do,!tf,l that they co,ld have se(antic properties. B,t if so(e of those f,nctionally deli(ited o!8ects are physically instantiated symbols, the co(p,tationalist ar",es, this diffic,lty is solved. Sy(!ols 5 %J 5 can both !e physical partic,lars and have se(antic val,es. So if intentional states are relationships to physically instantiated sy(!ol tokens, and the se(antic and intentional properties of the sy(!ol tokens acco,nt for the se(antic and intentional properties of the (ental states, then it +o,ld see( to !e the case that (entalis( is co(pati!le +ith (aterialis(. *he second pro!le( for (achine f,nctionalis( +as that it +as ,nclear ho+ f,nctionally deli(ited ca,sal etiolo"ies of physical events co,ld also a(o,nt to rational e1planations. B,t the co(p,ter paradi"( also see(s to provide an ans+er to this =,estion. .f +e ass,(e that /10 intentional states involve sy(!ol tokens +ith se(antic and syntactic properties, that /@0 co"nitive processes are f,nctionally descri!a!le in a +ay that depends ,pon the syntactic !,t not the se(antic properties of the sy(!ols over +hich they are defined, and that /#0 this f,nctional description preserves se(antic relationships, then /J0 f,nctional descriptions can pick o,t co"nitive processes +hich are also typified !y se(antic relationships. ',nctional descriptions of co(p,ter syste(s are !ased in ca,sal re",larities, and so intentional e1planations can pick o,t ca,sal etiolo"ies. 9nd since the state chan"es picked o,t !y the f,nctional description are ca,sed !y the physical properties of the constit,ent parts of the syste(, intentional e1planation is co(pati!le +ith the "enerality of physics. C*2 th,s p,rports to have acco(plished a (a8or to,r de force. .t clai(s to have vindicated intentional psycholo"y !y providin" a (odel in +hich (entalis( is co(pati!le +ith (aterialis(, and in +hich e1planation in the intentional idio( picks o,t ca,sal etiolo"ies and is co(pati!le +ith the "enerality of physics. *he appeal of this achieve(ent, (oreover, has o,tlived the pop,larity of the (ove(ents in philosophy of psycholo"y that ori"inally (otivated the desire for a 7vindication7 of intentional psycholo"y. 'or +hile there are relatively fe+ strict !ehaviorists or red,ctionists left on the scene in

philosophy of science, it is still +idely !elieved that a scientific psycholo"y sho,ld e(ploy ca,sal3 no(olo"ical e1planations and !e co(pati!le +ith (aterialis( and +ith the "enerality of physics. .t is perhaps ironic that these desiderata e(er"ed as conse=,ences of partic,lar short3lived theories in episte(olo"y, philosophy of lan",a"e, and the lo"ic of science. *he theories fro( +hich they e(er"ed Hthe verification theory of (eanin" and the thesis that there are red,ctive translations !et+een the lan",a"es of the vario,s sciencesHhave lar"ely !een a!andoned, !,t the s,spicion of the (ental they en"endered has o,tlived the(. 9nd th,s the 7vindication7 of intentional 5 %% 5 psycholo"y +ill likely contin,e to !e perceived as a virt,e so lon" as this s,spicion re(ains.

2.'0 Summary
*his chapter has e1a(ined t+o (a8or clai(s (ade on !ehalf of C*2: that it offers an acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antics of intentional states, and that it provides a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. *hese res,lts are lar"ely independent of one another, !,t !oth depend heavily ,pon co(p,tationalists? lar"ely ,ncritical ,se of the notion of symbol . )ach of these t+o res,lts is hi"hly si"nificant in its o+n ri"ht, and if C*2 can (ake "ood on either clai(, it +ill have (ade a si"nificant contri!,tion to philosophy of (ind and psycholo"y. *he ne1t chapter +ill disc,ss so(e pro!le(s that have !een raised a!o,t C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality and se(antics, and +ill ar",e that a proper eval,ation of the acco,nt +ill re=,ire an e1a(ination of the notions of symbol and symbolic representation . 5 %6 5

C)apter T)ree0 A,erived IntentionalityA

.f the co(p,tational theory has e1cited a (aelstro( of interest in recent years, it has received a "enero,s share of criticis( as +ell. Ene i(portant line of criticis(, developed (ost nota!ly !y Aohn Searle /19&$, 19&#, 19&J, 199$0 and Benneth Sayre /19&6, 19&-0, has centered aro,nd the s,ita!ility of the notions of computation and symbolic representation for e1plainin" the se(antic properties of (ental states. . shall ar",e that there are several distinct lines of ar",(ent to !e had here, !,t they share in co((on an int,ition that there is so(ethin", either a!o,t the notion of sy(!olic representation in "eneral or a!o,t representation in co(p,ters in partic,lar, that (akes it i(possi!le to acco,nt for the se(antic properties of (ental states in representational ter(s. What . shall do in this chapter is e1a(ine the criticis(s offered !y Searle and Sayre, and develop o,t of the( three distinct lines of ar",(ent a"ainst C*2. *he first, the 7'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection,7 locates the pro!le( in C*2?s atte(pt to +ed the notion of representation +ith that of co(p,tation. .t does this !y clai(in" that co(p,tation is defined as 7for(al sy(!ol (anip,lation,7 and hence is defined only over (eanin"less 7for(al sy(!ols,7 +ith the conse=,ence that, if the (ind is a co(p,ter, it cannot operate ,pon (eanin"f,l sy(!ols as re=,ired !y C*2. *he re(ainin" ar",(ents locate the diffic,lty for C*2 (ore "enerally in the nat,re of sy(!olic (eanin". 2ore specifically, they locate the pro!le( in the clai( that sy(!olic (eanin" is 7derived,7 +hereas the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states is not

derived, !,t 7intrinsic.7 *here are, ho+ever, t+o kinds of 7derivativeness7 that need to !e e1plored 5 %- 5 here, as they provide the !ases for t+o very different o!8ections. *he first, the 7Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection,7 a"rees +ith C*2 that there is a class of properties called 7se(antic properties7 that can !e predicated !oth of sy(!ols and of (ental states, !,t it clai(s that sy(!ols (,st 7derive7 their se(antic properties fro( pree1istin" (eanin"f,l (ental states. *he second, the 7Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection7 (akes a (,ch (ore radical clai(: na(ely, that the se(antic voca!,lary /i.e., the +ords ,sed to e1press se(antic properties0 is syste(atically ho(ony(o,sHor, (ore precisely, paronymous . En this vie+, +ords in the se(antic voca!,lary e3press different properties +hen applied /a 0 to sy(!ols and /b 0 to (ental states, and in s,ch a fashion that an analysis of the (eanin"s of these ter(s as applied to sy(!ols +ill refer !ack to (eanin"f,l (ental states. 9ccordin" to this o!8ection, the 7se(antic properties7 attri!,ted to sy(!ols are /a 0 distinct fro( and /b 0 concept,ally dependent ,pon the 7se(antic properties7 attri!,ted to (ental states. *he e1a(ination of these three lines of ar",(ent in this chapter +ill not itself yield a decisive verdict +ith respect to the via!ility of C*2. .t +ill, ho+ever, (ake clear the =,estions that (,st !e addressed in s,cceedin" chapters in order to reach s,ch a verdict. *he (ain res,lts of the chapter (ay !e s,((ariDed as follo+s: C*2 relies heavily ,pon the notion of symbolic representation as a notion that can !e ,sed to acco,nt for the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states. *here is so(e =,estion, ho+ever, a!o,t +hether the notion of sy(!olic representationHand (ore precisely, sy(!olic meaning H(ay not itself !e concept,ally dependent ,pon the notion of (eanin"f,l (ental states, and hence incapa!le of e1plainin" the(. .n order to deter(ine +hether this is so, ho+ever, it +ill prove necessary to ,ndertake a f,ll3scale analysis of sy(!ols and sy(!olic (eanin" /chapter J0 and apply the res,lts of this to co(p,ters /chapter %0 and to C*2 /chapter -0. .t +ill, (oreover, prove necessary to e1a(ine an additional concern as +ell. *his chapter and several of those that follo+ it +ill share in the ass,(ption (ade !y Searle and Sayre that +hen advocates of C*2 speak of representations as 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ols,7 it is symbolic (eanin" that they have in (indHthat is, the kind of se(antic properties c,sto(arily attri!,ted to sy(!ols. .t is this ass,(ption that +ill ,nder"ird the e1a(ination of the nat,re of sy(!olic (eanin" and the atte(pt to apply this notion to an acco,nt of intentionality in chapter 6, and the thesis that +ill !e advanced in this and the ne1t three chaptersHthe parony(y of the se(antic voca!,laryHis so(e+hat radical. B,t in li"ht of the s,""estion that the se(antic voca!,lary (i"ht !e syste(atically 5 %& 5 parony(o,s, it +ill prove necessary to investi"ate a second readin" of C*2 as +ell: na(ely, that +ords in the se(antic voca!,lary, s,ch as ?(eanin"f,l,? do not e1press the sa(e properties +hen applied to (ental representations that they e1press +hen applied to "arden3variety sy(!olsHthat +ords in the se(antic voca!,lary have a special ,se +hen applied to (ental representations, a ,se +hose analysis +ill differ fro( that of the analysis of ter(s s,ch as ?(eanin"f,l? as applied to "ardenvariety sy(!ols s,ch as ,tterances and inscriptions. .f this is the case, se(iotics +ill prove irrelevant to the assess(ent of C*2, and the se(antic properties of representations +ill have to !e constr,ed in so(e other +ay. .n spite of the reasona!leness of Searle?s and Sayre?s ass,(ption that C*2 attri!,tes to (ental representations the very sa(e sorts of 7se(antic properties7 that are attri!,ted to inscriptions and ,tterances, this alternative readin" (,st also !e considered. Chapter % +ill develop an alternative interpretation of C*2?s ,se of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1?. Chapters - and &

+ill e1a(ine t+o distinct strate"ies for conceivin" the semantic co(ponent of C*2 in a +ay that does not depend on a se(iotic analysis of representation.

4.&0 Searle5s and Sayre5s Criti3isms

.n li"ht of the key role that the notion of symbol plays in C*2, it is =,ite nat,ral that so(e of the (ore i(portant criticis(s of the co(p,tational theory have !een !ased ,pon o!8ections to co(p,tationalists? ,se of that notion. Aohn Searle and Benneth Sayre have !oth artic,lated o!8ections to C*2 that are directed a"ainst /s,pposed0 pro!le(s +ith the ,se to +hich +riters like 'odor and Pylyshyn p,t the notion of symbol, especially as it occ,rs +ithin the conte1t of disc,ssions of (achine co(p,tation. Searle and Sayre have ar",ed that, +hatever the virt,es of C*2 (ay !e, one thin" that it cannot provide is a (odel for ,nderstandin" the intentionality and se(antics of (ental states. *his, they ar",e, is a strai"htfor+ard conse=,ence of definin" the notion of co(p,tation in ter(s of for(al sy(!ol (anip,lation. Sayre s,(s ,p the pro!le( in this +ay: *he heart of the pro!le( is that co(p,ters do not operate on sy(!ols +ith se(antic content. 6ot even co(p,ters pro"ra((ed to prove lo"ical theore(s do so. Hence pointin" to sy(!olic operations perfor(ed !y di"ital co(p,ters is no help in ,nderstandin" ho+ (inds can operate on (eanin"3laden sy(!ols, or can perfor( any sort of se(antic infor(ation3processin" +hatever. /Sayre 19&6: 1@#0 5 %9 5 9s Sayre sees it, the pro!le( is that in order to provide a (odel for ,nderstandin" co"nitive /intentional0 processes as (anip,lations of sy(!ols, (achine co(p,tation +o,ld have to provide a paradi"( in +hich meaningful sy(!ols +ere (anip,lated !y a co(p,ter. B,t the very definition of co(p,tation as formal sy(!ol (anip,lation, ar",es Sayre, prohi!its this: 7*here is no p,rely for(al syste(Ha,to(ated or other+iseHthat is endo+ed +ith se(antic feat,res independent of interpretation7 /i!id.0. 9nd +hile the interpretation assi"ned !y the pro"ra((er or ,ser does, in some sense, lend se(antic properties to sy(!ols in co(p,ter (e(ory, 7+hatever (eanin", tr,th, or reference they have is derivative . . . tracin" !ack to interpretations i(posed !y the pro"ra((ers and ,sers of the syste(7 /i!id.0. *he interpretations i(posed !y pro"ra((ers and ,sers are, in Sayre?s vie+, =,ite irrelevant to the clai(s of C*2. 'or to say that a sy(!ol in co(p,ter stora"e has so(e (eanin" /in virt,e of an interpretation i(posed !y a pro"ra((er or ,ser0 is not to say so(ethin" a!o,t +hat that sy(!ol is , !,t rather to say so(ethin" a!o,t ho+ it is used . B,t co(p,tationalis( atte(pts to e1plain h,(an (ental processes on the (odel of co(p,tationHthat is, on the (odel of co(p,ters 4ust as computers, not on the (odel of so(e ,se to +hich co(p,ters are or co,ld !e p,t. 'or Sayre, this see(s to r,le o,t the possi!ility of C*2 providin" a +ay of ,nderstandin" the (eanin"f,lness and intentionality of (ental states: since co(p,tation is defined in for(al ter(s, and clai(s a!o,t the (eanin"s of co(p,ter sy(!ols are clai(s a!o,t ho+ co(p,ters are used, it see(s to follo+ that 7co(p,ters, 8,st in and !y the(selves . . . do not e1hi!it intentionality at all7 /Sayre 19&6: 1@J0. 9nd hence, ar",es Sayre, thinkin" of (ental activities as co(p,tations 7is of no help in e1plainin" the nat,re of the intentionality those activities e1hi!it7 /i!id., 1@J31@%0. 9 very si(ilar case is (ade !y Aohn Searle in his 19&J !ook Minds, %rains and Science . Searle +rites that 7it is essential to o,r conception of a di"ital co(p,ter that its operations can !e specified p,rely

for(ally7 /Searle 19&J: #$0. 9 conse=,ence of this is that, in a co(p,ter, 7the sy(!ols have no (eanin". . . . they have to !e specified p,rely in ter(s of their for(al or syntactic str,ct,re7 /i!id., #10. >ike Sayre, Searle dee(s this to !e fatal to the a!ility to C*2 to acco,nt for se(antics and intentionality. He ar",es that 7there is (ore to havin" a (ind than havin" for(al or syntactical processes. E,r internal (ental states, !y definition, have certain sorts of contents. . . . *hat is, even if (y tho,"hts occ,r to (e in strin"s of sy(!ols, there (,st !e (ore to the tho,"ht than the 5 6$ 5 a!stract strin"s, !eca,se strin"s !y the(selves can?t have any (eanin"7 /i!id.0.

4.20 T)ree Impli3it Criti3isms

*he !asic thread of criticis( co((on to Searle and Sayre is clear eno,"h: sy(!olic representation in co(p,ters does not provide a fit (odel for the intentionality of (ental states. B,t if the "eneral lines of the criticis( are plain eno,"h, the e1act details are a !it (ore diffic,lt. En the one hand, there see(s to !e so(e s,""estion that the pro!le( lies specifically +ith sy(!ols in computers, to the effect that these sy(!ols /,nlike other sy(!ols0 are not (eanin"f,l at all, and hence are poor candidates for e1plainin" the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states. En the other hand, other passa"es s,""est a (ore "eneral pro!le( a!o,t the very nat,re of sy(!olic (eanin"Hna(ely, that the se(antic properties of sy(!ols, even sy(!ols in co(p,ters, are so(eho+ 7derived7 fro( the (eanin"!esto+in" acts and conventions of sy(!ol ,sers, and that this so(eho+ i(perils the possi!ility of acco,ntin" for the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states in ter(s of the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols. . shall ar",e, (oreover, that there are in fact t+o different senses in +hich sy(!olic (eanin" (i"ht !e said to !e 7derivative,7 each of +hich can serve as the !asis of an attack ,pon C*2. .n the follo+in" sections, . shall disc,ss each of these variations ,pon Searle?s and Sayre?s te1ts in t,rn. 2y concern here +ill, (oreover, !e +ith analysis of the different lines of ar",(ent rather than +ith =,estions of e1e"esis.

4.40 T)e !ormal Symbols


.n so(e places, Searle and Sayre each see( to s,""est that the pro!le( for C*2 lies specifically in the fact that it tries to +ed the notion of computation to that of symbolic meaning . Sayre +rites, for e1a(ple, that 7co(p,ters do not operate on sy(!ols +ith se(antic content,7 and he concl,des fro( this that 7pointin" to sy(!olic operations perfor(ed !y di"ital co(p,ters is no help in ,nderstandin" ho+ (inds can operate on (eanin"3laden sy(!ols7 /Sayre 19&6: 1@#0. Si(ilarly, Searle +rites that the sy(!ols in a co(p,ter 7have no (eanin". . . . they have to !e specified p,rely in ter(s of their for(al and syntactic str,ct,re7 /Searle 19&J: #10. *his, accordin" to Searle, is the cr,cial difference !et+een (ental states and sy(!ols in co(p,ters: 5 61 5 *he reason that no co(p,ter pro"ra( can ever !e a (ind is si(ply that a co(p,ter pro"ra( is only syntactical, and (inds are (ore than syntactical. 2inds are se(antical, in the sense that they have (ore than a for(al str,ct,re, they have a content. /i!id.0 9 nat,ral +ay of readin" these passa"es +o,ld !e that Searle and Sayre !elieve that co(p,tation is

defined only over a special class of 7for(al sy(!ols7 that are, !y definition, devoid of se(antic content. .ndeed, Searle +rites that a co(p,ter 7attaches no (eanin", interpretation, or content to the for(al sy(!ols it (anip,lates.7 En this readin", the pro!le( +ith the co(p,ter paradi"( is that it cannot !e applied to sy(!ols that have se(antic and intentional properties, and hence cannot !e applied to the kinds of (ental representations post,lated !y C*2. . shall call this o!8ection the 7'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection.7 .t is easy to see ho+ s,ch a line of criticis( (i"ht arise. .f co(p,ters are defined as 7for(al sy(!ol (anip,lators,7 it is te(ptin" to concl,de that this (eans that they are devices that (anip,late so(e class of entities called 7for(al sy(!ols7Hthat is, sy(!ols devoid of se(antic content. 2oreover, this interpretation of C*2 is not +itho,t te1t,al s,pport fro( i(portant advocates of C*2. Pylyshyn, for e1a(ple, speaks of co(p,tation as operation ,pon 7(eanin"less sy(!ol tokens,7 and "oes so far as to !e(oan the fact that /even0 co(p,tationalists so(eti(es e1perience an 7occasional lapse7 in +hich 7se(antic properties are . . . attri!,ted to representations7 /Pylyshyn 19&$: 11J311%0. .t is, ho+ever, easy eno,"h to find passa"es in e1positions of C*2 that are in contradiction +ith this interpretation as +ell. 'odor consistently insists that co(p,ters do operate ,pon sy(!ols that have (eanin"s, tho,"h he clai(s that co(p,ters have access only to the syntactic properties.L1M 9nd even Pylyshyn takes a line si(ilar to 'odor?s in his !ook Computation and Cognition .L@M /*here are so(e +riters Le."., Stich 19&#M +ho have advocated a p,rely 7syntactic7 theory !ased on the co(p,ter (etaphor, !,t their vie+s are si"nificantly at odds +ith C*2.0 6o+ if co(p,tation 'ere restricted !y definition to (eanin"less sy(!ols, there +o,ld indeed !e a pro!le( +ith e1tendin" the co(p,ter paradi"( to provide an acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental states in the fashion indicated !y C*2. 'or C*2 re=,ires that the (ind !e a syste( that perfor(s co(p,tations over (eanin"ful representations. 9s a conse=,ence, if co(p,tation is defined as applyin" only to (eanin"less sy(!ols, C*2 de(ands the i(possi!le, and the clai(s it (akes are self3 contradictory and hence false. 5 6@ 5 *his criticis(, ho+ever, see(s !ased ,pon a d,!io,s ,nderstandin" of the notion of co(p,tation, and (ore partic,larly ,pon a d,!io,s parsin" of the e1pression ?for(al sy(!ol (anip,lator?. .f the 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection t,rns ,pon the clai( that co(p,ters are, !y definition, capa!le of (anip,latin" only 7(eanin"less for(al sy(!ols,7 the o!8ection is deeply fla+ed and reflects a (is,nderstandin" of the ,se of the +ord ?for(al?. .f this is Searle?s and Sayre?s point, they see( to have conf,sed =,estions a!o,t the formal specifiability of sy(!ol systems +ith =,estions a!o,t the meaningfulness of symbol to ens . Sy(!ol tokens, strictly speakin", are neither for(al nor infor(al. 6eri"ation techniques are said to !e for(al if they do not depend ,pon the (eanin"s of the sy(!ols, and systems that e(ploy sy(!ol str,ct,res, s,ch as lo"ic or "eo(etry, are said to !e for(al if they involve only for(al derivation techni=,es. B,t for(al lo"ic and for(al "eo(etry "enerally do involve so(e de"ree of se(antic interpretation. .ndeed, it is only !eca,se the syste(s have interpretations that they can !e re"arded as logic and geometry . When one speaks of 7for(al sy(!ol (anip,lations,7 the +ord ?for(al? (odifies the +ord ?(anip,lations?, not the +ord ?sy(!ol?C and +hen one speaks of co(p,ters as 7for(al sy(!ol syste(s7 one does not there!y i(ply that the sy(!ols lack interpretations, !,t only that the sy(!ol manipulations perfor(ed !y the (achine do not depend upon the interpretations of the sy(!ols. *here is th,s no contradiction in sayin" that the (ind is a co(p,ter that operates on (eanin"f,l sy(!ols. *here is, of co,rse, a (,ch (ilder sort of o!8ection that (i"ht !e voiced a!o,t 'hich sy(!ols in co(p,ters do in fact have (eanin"s, or indeed if any do. *o the e1tent that sy(!ols in co(p,ters (i"ht

t,rn o,t to !e (eanin"less, co(p,ters !eco(e less appealin" as a (odel for the (ind. B,t really this poses no si"nificant threat to C*2. C*2?s clai(, after all, is not that prod,ction3(odel co(p,ters provide a "ood (etaphor for the (ind, !,t that the e1act (athe(atical notion of co(p,tation provides the ri"ht sort of reso,rces for s,pple(entin" a representational acco,nt of intentionality +ith a co(p,tational acco,nt of co"nitive processes. 9nd this clai( re=,ires only the possi!ility of consistently co(!inin" co(p,tation +ith representation in the case of mental states, re"ardless of +hether it takes place in prod,ction3(odel co(p,ters. Ho+ever, the persuasi"e force of the ar",(ents (arshaled in favor of C*2 depend in lar"e (eas,re on the clai( that the paradi"( of (achine co(p,tation sho+s that it is possi!le to co(!ine sy(!olic (eanin" +ith syntactically driven co(p,tation in the desired fashion, and ,pon the ass,(ption that this sa(e ,nion can !e (ade to +ork in 5 6# 5 the case of (ental representations, and it re(ains to !e seen +hether an investi"ation of sy(!ols and co(p,tation in co(p,tin" (achines +ill !ear these ass,(ptions o,t. 9n e1a(ination of sy(!olic representation in "eneral, and representation in co(p,ters in partic,lar, th,s see(s desira!le.

4.60 ,erived Intentionality

.f the 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection does not see( to present serio,s pro!le(s for C*2, Searle?s and Sayre?s disc,ssions raise +hat +o,ld see( to !e a (ore serio,s o!8ection as +ell. 'or +hile !oth +riters so(eti(es speak as tho,"h the pro!le( +ith C*2 lies specifically +ith sy(!ols in computers, each also says thin"s that s,""est that the pro!le( is a pro!le( concernin" sy(!olic (eanin" "enerally. *he n,! of the pro!le( is that sy(!olic (eanin" is 7derived7 fro( the (eanin"s of (ental states and fro( conventions "overnin" the ,se of sy(!ols, and th,s C*2 has the relationship !et+een sy(!olic (eanin" and (ental (eanin" precisely reversed. Searle develops this vie+ in his disc,ssion of the relationship !et+een intentional states and illoc,tionary acts. Searle holds that the sense in +hich intentional and se(antic properties (ay !e attri!,ted to sy(!ols in co(p,ters is precisely analo"o,s to the sense in +hich they (ay !e attri!,ted to illoc,tionary acts s,ch as assertions and pro(ises. .lloc,tionary acts, accordin" to Searle, have their intentional properties !eca,se they are e3pressions of intentional states: 7.n the perfor(ance of each illoc,tionary act +ith a propositional content, +e e1press a certain .ntentional state +ith that propositional content. . . . *he perfor(ance of the speech act is eo ipso an e1pression of the correspondin" .ntentional state7 /Searle 19&#: 90. *he intentionality of illoc,tionary acts /and other lin",istic tokens0 is deri"ed from the intentionality of (ental states. .ndeed, illoc,tionary acts are said to !e 7intentional7 in t+o +ays, each of +hich depends ,pon the intentionality of a (ental state. 'irst, since a speech act deri"es its content fro( the intentional state of +hich it is the e1pression, it is intentional in the sense of ha"ing a content in virt,e of its relationship to an intentional state +ith that sa(e content. /9n assertion is a!o,t >incoln, for e1a(ple, !eca,se it is an e1pression of a !elief a!o,t >incoln.0 What ,nites the ,tterance +ith the intentional state it e1presses, ho+ever, is a second intentional stateHna(ely, the intention of the speaker that his ,tterance !e an e1pression of a partic,lar intentional state /see Searle 19&#: @-0. 5 6J 5

*he intentionality of sy(!ols in co(p,ters, accordin" to Searle, can !e e1plained in 8,st the sa(e fashion. Sy(!ols in a co(p,ter, like (arks on paper or vocaliDed so,nds, are not intrinsically (eanin"f,l. 2eanin" is imputed to sy(!ols !y so(e !ein" +ho has intentional states. .n the case of lan",a"e, it is the speaker or +riter. .n the case of sy(!ols in co(p,ters, it is the desi"ner, pro"ra((er, or ,ser. .ntentional states have intentionality intrinsically# sy(!ols have it only deri"ati"ely . Sayre (akes a case a"ainst the e1tenda!ility of the co(p,ter paradi"( in a si(ilar fashion. >ike Searle, he ad(its that sy(!ols in co(p,ters (ay in some sense !e said to have (eanin"s and intentionality, !,t he (aintains that 7+hatever (eanin", tr,th, or reference they have is derivative . . . tracin" !ack to interpretations i(posed !y the pro"ra((ers and ,sers of the syste(7 /Sayre 19&6: 1@#0. Sayre ar",es that treatin" co(p,ters as dealin" +ith (eanin"f,l sy(!ols involves talkin" not 8,st a!o,t the computer, !,t a!o,t the ,ses to +hich it is p,t and the interpretations i(posed ,pon its sy(!ols and its operations !y the ,ser. 7Co(p,ters, 8,st in and !y the(selves . . . do not e1hi!it intentionality at all7 /i!id., 1@J0. Since intentional states do have intentionality 7in and !y the(selves7Hthat is, independently of i(positions of interpretations fro( o,tside so,rcesHthe co(p,ter paradi"( is ill s,ited to providin" an ,nderstandin" of the intentionality and se(antics of (ental states.

4.70 T)e "mbi*uity o+ A,erived IntentionalityA

*he notion of 7derived intentionality7 to +hich !oth Searle and Sayre appeal is of cr,cial i(portance in assessin" C*2. Pet it is also a(!i",o,s and ad(its of t+o si"nificantly different interpretations. En one interpretation, the +ord ?derived? indicates so(ethin" a!o,t ho' an o!8ect that has intentional or se(antic properties got the(. En this interpretation, +ords s,ch as ?intentionality? and ?(eanin"? e1press the sa(e properties +hen applied to sy(!ols and (ental states, and an o!8ect has deri"ed intentionality 8,st in case it received or inherited its intentional properties fro( another o!8ect havin" intentional properties !y +ay of so(e ca,sal connection. *his +ill !e called 7ca,sally derived intentionality.7 En the second interpretation, the 7derivativeness7 of the intentional properties of sy(!ols is a logical feat,re of the 'ay intentional properties can be ascribed to symbols . En this vie+, ter(s s,ch as ?(eanin"f,l? and ?intentional? cannot !e predicated ,nivocally of sy(3 5 6% 5 !ols and (ental states, and hence any theory that depends ,pon the ,nivocal application of s,ch ter(s is concept,ally conf,sed. *his +ill !e called the 7concept,ally dependent intentionality7 of sy(!ols. *hese t+o notions have si"nificantly different i(pacts ,pon C*2, and so +ill receive independent develop(ent. *he Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection ass,(es +ith C*2 that there is one kind of property called 7intentionality,7 and clai(s that there is a one3+ay inheritance relationship !et+een (ental states and sy(!ols. *he Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection clai(s that +hat +ords in the se(antic voca!,lary si"nify +hen applied to sy(!ols is /a 0 distinct fro( and /b 0 lo"ically dependent ,pon +hat they si"nify +hen applied to (ental states.

4.(0 Causally ,erived Intentionality

*he first +ay of interpretin" the e1pressions ?intrinsic? and ?derived intentionality? is to constr,e the( as pointin" to differences in the sources of the intentional properties of (ental states on the one hand, and

sy(!ols and illoc,tionary acts on the other. En this vie+, there is one property called intentionality +hich co"nitive states, sy(!ols, and illoc,tionary acts can each possess, !,t they co(e !y it in different +ays. *h,s Searle +rites, 9n ,tterance can have .ntentionality, 8,st as a !elief has .ntentionality, !,t +hereas the .ntentionality of the !elief is intrinsic, the .ntentionality of the ,tterance is deri"ed . *he =,estion then is: Ho+ does it derive its .ntentionalityK /Searle 19&#: @-0 *his +ay of phrasin" the pro!le( reflects Searle?s vie+s on the nat,re of the pro!le( of lin",istic or sy(!olic (eanin": 6o+ the pro!le( of (eanin" in its (ost "eneral for( is the pro!le( of ho+ do +e "et fro( the physics to the se(anticsC that is to say, ho+ do +e "et /for e1a(ple0 fro( the so,nds that co(e o,t of (y (o,th to the illoc,tionary actK /i!id.0 Searle?s ans+er is that ,tterances co(e to have se(antic properties !eca,se the person (akin" the so,nds intends 7their prod,ction as the perfor(ance of a speech act7 /i!id., 16#0. *his is an instance of +hat Searle calls 7.ntentional ca,sation7: the speaker?s 7(eanin" intention7 that the so,nds e1press an intentional state is a cause of the fact that the ,tterance co(es to have intentionality.L#M .f the e1pression ?derived intentionality?Hor (ore "enerally, ?derived 5 66 5 semantic properties ?His (eant to si"nify this sort of ca,sal dependence, +e (ay clarify the ,sa"e of the e1pression in the follo+in" +ay: Causally 6eri"ed Semantics 5 has se(antic property , derivatively iff /10 5 has se(antic property , /@0 *here is so(e 8 s,ch that /a 0 895 , /b 0 8 has se(antic property , , and /c 0 8 ?s havin" , is a /perhaps partial0 ca,se of 5 ?s havin" , . 5 (ay !e said to have se(antic property , intrinsically 8,st in case 5 has , and 5 does not have , derivatively. 6o+ . take it that !oth Searle and Sayre +o,ld +ish to clai( that sy(!olic (eanin" is ca,sally derivative, +hereas the intentionality of (ental states is intrinsic. *hat is, they +o,ld clai( that the se(antic properties of sy(!ols are ca,sally derived fro( the se(antic properties of the (ental states of sy(!ol ,sers, +hile there is no 8 s,ch that a (ental state M ?s (eanin" , is ca,sally dependent ,pon 8 ?s (eanin" , . .f this is correct, then C*2 errs in t+o respects: first, it ass,(es that the intentionality of (ental states is derived /i.e., fro( (ental representations0 rather than intrinsicC second, it ass,(es that the intentionality of sy(!ols can !e acco,nted for +itho,t reco,rse to ca,sal derivation fro( (ental states.

4.;0 "ssessin* t)e Causal ,erivation


.n order for the Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection to prevail a"ainst C*2, it +o,ld !e necessary to esta!lish t+o clai(s: /S10 The 6eri"ati"e Character of Symbolic Meaning: 6ecessarily, all sy(!ols +ith se(antic properties have those properties !y +ay of ca,sal derivation. /S@0 The Intrinsic Character of Mental Semantics: 9ll se(antic properties of (ental states are intrinsic /i.e., not ca,sally derived0. .t see(s =,ite clear that, if these t+o clai(s are correct, C*2 is f,nda(entally fla+ed. Unfort,nately, the ar",(ents provided !y +riters like 5 6- 5 Searle and Sayre do not esta!lish the derivative character of sy(!olic (eanin", !,t (erely the +eaker clai( that certain fa(iliar inds of sy(!olsHinscriptions, ,tterances, sy(!ols in co(p,tersHhave their se(antic properties !y +ay of ca,sal derivation. 9s for the clai( that all se(antic properties of (ental states are intrinsic, no ar",(ent has !een "iven for that clai( at all. 2oreover, !oth of these clai(s have co(e ,nder fire fro( proponents of C*2 and other +riters in co"nitive science. . shall e1plore t+o lines of response, +hich . shall call the 7'odor (ove7 and the 7;ennett (ove.7

4.;.&0 T)e A!odor 1oveA

.t is not too s,rprisin" to find that 'odor is a dissenter +ith respect to clai( /S10. .t is, ho+ever, ill,(inatin" to note ho+ far he is +illin" to "o alon" +ith Searle?s analysis of sy(!olic (eanin". 'odor lar"ely a"rees +ith the analysis Searle "ives of the se(antic properties of discursi"e sy(!ols s,ch as those involved in illoc,tionary acts, and he even see(s to sy(pathiDe +ith the notion that one (,st "ive a si(ilar sort of acco,nt of se(antics for sy(!ols in co(p,ters. B,t he also thinks that (ental representations differ fro( disc,rsive sy(!ols precisely in this re"ard: .t is (ental representations that have se(antic properties in, one (i"ht say, the first instanceC the se(antic properties of propositional attit,des are inherited fro( those of (ental representations and, pres,(a!ly, the se(antic properties of the for(,lae of nat,ral lan",a"es are inherited fro( those of the propositional attit,des that they are ,sed to e1press. /'odor 19&1: #10 *h,s 'odor a"rees +ith Searle that there are certain properties called 7se(antic properties7 that can !e possessed !y (ental states and !y disc,rsive sy(!ols. He a"rees, additionally, that disc,rsive sy(!ols "et their se(antic properties fro( the intentional states they are ,sed to e1press. He si(ply adds that there are these other, non disc,rsive sy(!ols in the (ind that /a 0 do not "et their se(antic properties the +ay disc,rsive sy(!ols do, !,t in so(e other fashion, and /b 0 are the ,lti(ate so,rce of the se(antic properties of intentional states. . shall call this reply to the Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection the 7'odor (ove.7 *here see(s to !e little in Searle?s te1ts to (ilitate a"ainst the 'odor (ove. Searle a"rees +ith 'odor that there is a class of properties s,ch as 7intentionality7 that can !e predicated indifferently of sy(!ols

and (ental states. 9nd, +hile he has ar",ed convincin"ly that certain fa(iliar 5 6& 5 classes of sy(!olsHperhaps all of the fa(iliar classesHac=,ire their se(antic properties !y +ay of ca,sal derivation, he has offered no reason to dra+ the stron"er concl,sion that there cannot !e other classes of sy(!ols that can ac=,ire se(antic properties !y other (eans. *here sho,ld, of co,rse, !e a !,rden of proof ,pon C*2?s advocates to 8,stify the clai( that there is so(e other +ay for sy(!ols to ac=,ire (eanin" /and to do so +itho,t e=,ivocatin" on the notion of 7(eanin"70, !,t ar",a!ly this is precisely +hat they are doin" +hen they seek to provide 7theories of content7 for representations.LJM

4.;.20 T)e A,ennett 1oveA

Clai( /S@0, +hich asserts the intrinsic character of the intentionality of (ental states, has like+ise (et +ith disa"ree(ents. *he very assertion of C*2 involves its e1plicit denial, since C*2 clai(s that (ental states 7inherit7 their se(antic properties fro( representations. 2oreover, the clai( of intrinsicality see(s to s+i( a"ainst a stron" c,rrent +ithin co"nitive science of atte(pts to e1plain hi"h3order co"nitive pheno(ena !y !reakin" the( do+n into /hypothetical0 lo+er3order co"nitive pheno(ena, so(eti(es e1plainin" the se(antic properties of the hi"h3order pheno(ena !y appeal to the se(antic properties of their co(ponents. ;ennett /19&-0 has perhaps taken this (ove as far as anyone, clai(in" that if socio!iolo"y provides le"iti(ate e1planations, then the se(antic properties of o,r (ental states are ,lti(ately tracea!le to the intentions of o,r "enes. /Call this the 7;ennett (ove.70 6o+ there are t+o +ays of takin" the ;ennett (ove. En the stron" readin", ;ennett is really clai(in" that "enes are in fact the ,lti(ate so,rce of intentionalityHthat they have intentionality intrinsically, and that everythin" else that has intentionality, incl,din" (ental states and disc,rsive sy(!ols, has it derivatively. /En this vie+, (any (ental representations +o,ld not have intentionality intrinsically either, !,t the intentionality of intentional states co,ld still !e ca,sally derived fro( that of (ental representations.0 *his version of the ;ennett (ove is only as pla,si!le as /a 0 the clai(s of socio!iolo"y, and partic,larly /b 0 the ass,(ption that se(antic properties can sensi!ly !e ascri!ed to entities s,ch as "enes. . think that (ost readers find these clai(s, especially /b 0, to !e (ore than a little s,spect. B,t there is also a +eaker +ay of treatin" the ;ennett (ove: na(ely, to take it as a kind of red,ctio of Searle?s Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection to theories like C*2. En this readin", 5 69 5 ;ennett?s real point is that once yo, let in the notion of ca,sal derivation of intentionality, there is no reason to stop +ith intentional states, since co"nitive scientists re",larly e1plain !eliefs and desires !y appeal to infraconscio,s states to +hich they also i(p,te se(antic properties. Perhaps the chain does not "o !ack so far as "enes, !,t +hy ass,(e that it stops +ith intentional statesK 6o+ it (ay +ell !e possi!le to (,ster an ade=,ate reply to the ;ennett (ove, !,t doin" so +o,ld see( to re=,ire so(ethin" !eyond +hat is present in the Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection. *hat o!8ection already ackno+led"es that several diverse kinds of thin"s /sy(!ols and (ental states0 have se(antic properties, and that the presence of se(antic properties in one can ca,se se(antic properties to !e present in the other. What is to prevent the possi!ility of other kinds of entities havin" s,ch properties as +ell, or to prevent the( fro( ca,sin" the se(antic properties of (ental statesK *he ans+er one 'ants to "ive, perhaps, is that there is so(ethin" si(ply outrageous a!o,t attri!,tin" se(antic

properties to "enes or nerve firin"sHthat these 8,st are not a(on" the sorts of thin"s of +hich properties s,ch as 7(eanin"7 and 7intentionality7 (ay sensi!ly !e predicated. *hey are not proper lo"ical s,!8ects for !elief attri!,tions. *o (ake a case for this, ho+ever, +o,ld re=,ire so(ethin" (ore than the notion of ca,sally derived intentionality providesHna(ely, an analysis of the nat,re of (eanin" and intentionality. .t is here that the ne1t line of criticis( +ill find (,ch of its appeal.

4.;.40 $rospe3ts o+ t)e Causal ,erivation


9ll in all, it see(s that the notion of ca,sally derived intentionality (ay serve to place a si"nificant !,rden of proof ,pon +o,ld3!e advocates of C*2, !,t it does not reveal any f,nda(ental fla+ +ith that theory. *he !,rden of proof arises fro( the fact that (ental representations +o,ld have to differ fro( all kno+n kinds of sy(!ols in a f,nda(ental respect: na(ely, in ho+ they co(e to have se(antic properties. *he only +ay +e kno+ of for sy(!ols to ac=,ire (eanin" is thro,"h interpretive acts. *his does not precl,de the possi!ility of sy(!ols ac=,irin" (eanin" in so(e other +ay, !,t it is like+ise ,nclear that there is any other +ay for the( to ac=,ire (eanin". Since C*2 requires that there !e another s,ch +ay, its advocates had !est sho+ that there can !e s,ch a +ay. *his, ho+ever, is ar",a!ly 8,st +hat C*2?s proponents are doin" +hen they disc,ss 7theories of content7 for (ental representations. 5 -$ 5

4.<0 T)e Con3eptual ,ependen3e


While . rather e1pect that so(ethin" on the order of causal dependence +as +hat Searle and Sayre had in (ind +hen they spoke of 7derived intentionality,7 there is another +ay of interpretin" the e1pression ?derived intentionality? +hich (ay da(a"e C*2 in a (ore f,nda(ental (anner. En the causal constr,al of Searle?s e1pression ?derived intentionality?, the ter( ?intentionality? co,ld !e predicated ,nivocally of !oth (ental states and sy(!ols. *he difference !et+een co"nitive states and sy(!ols lay in ho+ they came to ha"e this one property. *his is pro!a!ly +hat Searle had in (ind in his disc,ssion of derived intentionality. B,t one might read the e1pression ?derived intentionality? in =,ite another +ay. Ene (i"ht read it as (eanin" 7intentionality in a derivative sense .7 En this readin", attri!,tions of intentional and se(antic properties to co"nitive states and attri!,tions of intentional and se(antic properties to sy(!ols are not attributions of the same properties .

4.<.&0 T)e Homonymy o+ 5Healt)y5= "n "ristotelian $aradi*m

.n settin" ,p the pro!le(, it (ay !e helpf,l !riefly to recall 9ristotle?s disc,ssion of ho(ony(y. 9ristotle points o,t that so(e +ords, s,ch as ?healthy?, are ,sed in different +ays +hen they are applied to different kinds of o!8ects. We say that there are healthy people, healthy food, healthy e1ercise, healthy co(ple1ions, and so on. B,t +hen +e say that so(e kind of food is healthy, +e are not predicatin" the sa(e thin" of the food that +e are predicatin" of a person +hen +e say that he is healthy. .f . say that fish is a healthy food, . (ean that eating fish is conduci"e to health in h,(ans. B,t if . say that Aones is healthy, . (ean that he is in good health .L%M /.ndivid,al fish can !e healthy in the sa(e sense that Aones is healthy, !,t they have ceased fro( !ein" in "ood health !y the ti(e they are

healthy food for Aones.0 Pet +ords like ?healthy?, accordin" to 9ristotle, are not merely ho(ony(o,s. Gather, there is one (eanin" +hich is primary or focal, and the other (eanin"s are all to !e ,nderstood in ter(s of ho+ they relate to the pri(ary (eanin". .n the case of ?healthy?, the pri(ary (eanin" is the one that applies to people /or, (ore "enerally, to livin" !odies0: to !e healthy in the pri(ary sense is to !e in "ood health. *hin"s other than livin" !ein"s are said to !e 7healthy7 in other senses !eca,se of the +ay that they relate to !ein" in "ood health: for e1a(ple, !eca,se of the +ay they contribute to !ein" in "ood health /e."., a healthy diet or 5 -1 5 re"i(en0, or !eca,se of the +ay they indicate "ood health /e."., a healthy co(ple1ion0. 9ristotle calls this kind of ho(ony(y paronymy or 7ho(ony(y pros hen .7 *he sense of ?healthy? that applies to food is dependent ,pon, and indeed points to the sense of ?health? that applies to !odies. 7Healthy food7 means 7food that is cond,cive to !odily health.7 9nd si(ilarly the senses of ?healthy? that apply to e1ercise, appearance, and so on point to the notion of !odily health. 9s a res,lt, =,estions a!o,t the 7healthiness7 of a partic,lar food a(o,nt to =,estions a!o,t ho' it contributes to bodily health . So(eone +ho tho,"ht that !odily health +as derived fro( the 7health7 contained in the food one ate +o,ld si(ply !e (istaken a!o,t ho+ the +ord ?health? is ,sed. 9nd it +o,ld !etray concept,al conf,sion if one +ere to say, 7. don?t +ant to kno+ ho+ !roccoli contri!,tes to !odily health, . 8,st +ant to kno+ +hy it is healthy .7 Ef co,rse, so(eone could ,se the +ord ?healthy? in so(e ne' (anner. 'or e1a(ple, so(eone convinced that vita(ins +ere the so,rce of !odily health (i"ht start applyin" the +ord ?healthy? in a +ay that 8,st (eant 7f,ll of vita(ins.7 *his ,se of the +ord ?healthy? /to !e indicated ?healthyv ?0 +o,ld no lon"er !e concept,ally dependent ,pon the notion of !odily health. B,t ?healthyv ? +o,ld not (ean +hat ?healthy? is nor(ally ,nderstood to (ean either. .n partic,lar, one co,ld not dra+ ,pon any i(plications of the normal ,se of the +ord ?healthy? in reasonin" a!o,t thin"s that are healthyv . 'or e1a(ple, pres,(a!ly thin"s are healthyv in proportion to the n,(!er and =,antity of vita(ins present in the(. 9 (eal +ith ten tho,sand ti(es the reco((ended daily allo+ance of all vita(ins +o,ld !e very healthyv . B,t one cannot infer fro( this that s,ch a (eal +o,ld !e healthy /cond,cive to health0. 'irst, since ?healthyv ? no lon"er !ears a se(antic connection to the notion of !odily health, the analytically !ased inference does not "o thro,"h. Second, the concl,sion happens to !e e(pirically false. 2assive doses of so(e vita(ins are not cond,cive to health, !,t to1ic. Eld +ords can !e "iven co(pletely ne+ (eanin"s, !,t then +hat yo, have is ho(ony(y plain and si(ple. 9nd not all of the thin"s that (ay !e said of thin"s that can !e said to !e healthy can also !e said of thin"s that are healthyv .

4.<.20 A,erived IntentionalityA as t)e Homonymy o+ 5Intentional5

6o+ one co,ld interpret the e1pression ?derived intentionality? as pointin" to a concept,al dependence !et+een different ,ses of +ords s,ch as ?intentional?, ?intentionality?, ?(eanin"f,l?, ?referential?Hin short, of all 5 -@ 5

+ords ,sed in attri!,tin" intentional and se(antic properties. 9nd the nat,re of the dependence +o,ld !e alon" the follo+in" lines: !oth sy(!ols and (ental states are said to be intentional, (eanin"f,l, referential, and so on. B,t +ords s,ch as ?intentional? and ?(eanin"f,l? are not ,sed in the sa(e +ay +hen they are said of sy(!ols as +hen they are said of (ental states. .ntentional and se(antic ter(s are ho(ony(o,s. B,t they are not merely ho(ony(o,s. Gather, it is a case of paronymy, or ho(ony(y pros hen, +here there is a primary or focal sense of each ter(: specifically, the sense that is applied to co"nitive states. *he sense that is applied to sy(!ols is 7derivative7 or conceptually dependent !eca,se it refers !ack to the sense that is applied to co"nitive states. 'or e1a(ple, +hen +e say that a speech act is intentional, +hat +e mean is that it is an e3pression olean intentional state . En this vie+, there +o,ld !e no sense in +hich a speech act co,ld !e said to !e intentional that did not point to an intentional state in si(ilar fashion. 6o+ . !elieve that a vie+ of this sort is implicit in so(e of the thin"s +ritten !y Sayre and Searle, !,t . do not see that it is ever e1plicitly artic,lated in this for(, or (arshaled as an e1plicit o!8ection to C*2.L6M Searle?s analysis, (oreover, is confined al(ost e1cl,sively to illoc,tionary acts, and is not developed (ore "enerally for symbols . Since C*2 does not posit that (ental representations are illoc,tionary acts, Searle?s analysis +o,ld at very least have to !e !roadened if it is to provide a criticis( of C*2. .t is =,ite possi!le, ho+ever, that Searle has in (ind so(ethin" like this notion of concept,al dependency of sy(!olic intentionality and (eanin" +hen he !la(es the inade=,acies of C*2 ,pon the fact that the 7(eanin"f,lness7 and 7intentionality7 of sy(!ols in co(p,ters is 7dependent7 ,pon the intentions of ,sers and pro"ra((ers. Sayre?s analysis of the shortco(in"s of C*2 (i"ht also !e read as relyin" ,pon the pre(ise that the kind of intentionality that sy(!ols (ay !e said to have is concept,ally dependent ,pon the kind of intentionality that co"nitive states (ay !e said to have. Sayre places (ore stress than does Searle ,pon the role that co(p,ter ,sers and pro"ra((ers play in imbuing sy(!ols in co(p,ters +ith (eanin" and intentionality. He +rites, for e1a(ple, that none of the representations internal to the (achine has (eanin", or tr,th, or e1ternal reference, 8,st in and !y itself. Whatever (eanin", tr,th, or reference they have is derivative . . . tracin" !ack to interpretations i(posed !y pro"ra((ers and ,sers of the syste(. . . . . . . 2y point is that co(p,ters, 4ust in and by themsel"es, no (atter ho+ pro"ra((ed, do not e1hi!it intentionality at all. /Sayre 19&6: 1@#, 1@J0 5 -# 5 .f assertions +hich appear to !e 8,st a!o,t the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols in co(p,ters t,rn o,t to !e /covert0 assertions a!o,t the actions and intentions of co(p,ter ,sers and pro"ra((ers, then the co(p,ter paradi"( does involve sy(!ols +ith 7intentional7 and 7se(antic7 properties, !,t only in the sense that it involves a human!computer system in +hich the h,(ans i(p,te se(antic and intentional properties to the sy(!ols in the co(p,ter. .f this !e the case, there (ay +ell !e pro!le(s a!o,t e1tendin" the (odel to acco,nt for intentionality in h,(ans. Unlike Searle, Sayre also to,ches (ore !roadly ,pon the se(antic feat,res of sy(!ols in "eneral. .n disc,ssin" the se(antic properties of sy(!ols in a nat,ral lan",a"e, he stresses the point that nat,ral lan",a"e sy(!ols have se(antic properties only !eca,se of interpretive conventions: .nas(,ch as the )n"lish +ord 7cat7 refers to cats, the +ord consists of (ore than can !e ,ttered or +ritten on paper. .t consists of the sy(!olic for( C9* /+hich can !e instantiated in (any +ays in speech and +ritin"0 plus interpreti"e con"entions by 'hich instances of

that form are to be ta en as referring to cats . Si(ilarly, the sy(!olic for( 4o (eans the opposite of S*EP /or CE2) , etc.0 !y appropriate interpretive conventions of )n"lish, +hile !y those of Aapanese it (eans a !oard "a(e played +ith !lack and +hite stones. %ut 'ithout interpreti"e con"entions it means nothing at all . /Sayre 19&6: 1@#, e(phasis added0 .f this passa"e is read +ith the notion of concept,al dependence in (ind, it is e1tre(ely s,""estive. .f talk a!o,t the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols is necessarily /covertly0 talk a!o,t lin",istic conventions, then the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols is concept,ally dependent ,pon conventions. 9nd if this is the case, C*2 (ay !e in very serio,s tro,!le indeed.

4.<.40 T)e $otential o+ a ACon3eptual ,ependen3e


While Searle?s and Sayre?s criticis(s of C*2 (ay +ell incl,de the kernel of a 7Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection,7 no f,ll3scale develop(ent of s,ch an o!8ection has yet !een offered. ;evelopin" s,ch an o!8ection +ill, a(on" other thin"s, involve a caref,l e1a(ination of the notion of symbol and the +ays that sy(!ols of vario,s sorts (ay !e said to have se(antic and intentional properties. S,ch an analysis +ill !e ,ndertaken in chapter J. B,t even prior to s,ch an analysis, it is possi!le to see, in "eneral ter(s, +hat force s,ch an o!8ection +o,ld have. C*2?s representational 5 -J 5 acco,nt of co"nitive states consists pri(arily in the clai( that these involve sy(!olic representations +hich have se(antic properties. .f the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection can !e (ade to stick, ho+ever, all attri!,tions of se(antic and intentional properties to sy(!ols refer to so(ethin" (ore than the sy(!ol: they refer to the !ein"s +ho are responsi!le for the sy(!ol?s havin" an interpretation. *his +o,ld present t+o kinds of pro!le(s for C*2. 'irst, like the Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection, it calls the credibility of the co(p,ter paradi"( into =,estion: it 8,st see(s incredi!le to post,late that there is so(e !ein" /or !ein"s0 responsi!le for interpretin" (ental sy(!ols. B,t there is also a (ore f,nda(ental pro!le(: if all attri!,tions of sy(!olic (eanin" are /covertly0 attri!,tions of the imposition of (eanin", then attri!,tions of intentional and sy(!olic properties to any sy(!ol +o,ld have to involve attri!,tions of intentional states of so(e a"ent or a"ents responsi!le for the i(position of (eanin" ,pon that sy(!ol. 9nd this +o,ld see( to involve C*2 in re"ress and circ,larity: C*2 e1plains the intentionality and se(antics of co"nitive states in ter(s of the intentionality and se(antics of sy(!ols. B,t if the intentionality and se(antics of sy(!ols are, in t,rn, cashed o,t in ter(s of co"nitive states, there is circ,larity in the intere1planation of co"nitive states and sy(!ols, and a re"ress of co"nitive states responsi!le for the intentionality and se(antics of other co"nitive states. S,ch an o!8ection +o,ld !e far (ore da(a"in" than the Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection.

4.'0 T)e Need +or Semioti3s

*his chapter has !een devoted to a disc,ssion of attacks (arshaled a"ainst C*2 that are directed specifically a"ainst its ,se of the notion of symbol . *he ,pshot of the chapter is that the notion of symbol needs f,rther el,cidation. *he first o!8ection, the 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection, t,rned ,pon clai(s a!o,t the sy(!ols stored in and (anip,lated !y co(p,tersHspecifically, the clai(s that

co(p,ters only could store or only do store (eanin"less 7for(al sy(!ols.7 .t +as s,""ested that this o!8ection rested ,pon a conf,sion a!o,t the (eanin" of e1pressions s,ch as ?for(al sy(!ol (anip,lation?. *he 7for(ality7 of for(al syste(s and co(p,ters, it +as ar",ed, consists in the fact that the techni=,es thro,"h +hich derivations of sy(!ols are effected are !lind to the se(antic properties of the sy(!ols. 9 (athe(atical syste( or a co(p,ter can !e for(al in this sense and still operate ,pon (eanin"f,l sy(!ols. .ndeed !oth for(aliDed (athe(atical syste(s /s,ch as Hil!ert?s "eo(etry0 and di"3 5 -% 5 ital co(p,ters often do involve (eanin"f,l sy(!olsHthat is, sy(!ols that are assi"ned interpretations !y the (athe(atician, the pro"ra((er, or the co(p,ter ,ser. *he 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection is nonetheless very all,rin", and the literat,re on co(p,ters and the (ind is replete +ith s,""estions that co(p,ters operate ,pon so(e special class of 7(eanin"less for(al sy(!ols.7 *he a(!i",ity of e1pressions s,ch as ?for(al sy(!ol (anip,lation? and the diffic,lty of characteriDin" the se(antic stat,s of sy(!ols in co(p,ters "ives ,s reason to in=,ire (ore caref,lly into the nat,re of attri!,tions of se(antic properties to sy(!ols in "eneral and to sy(!ols in co(p,ters in partic,lar. 9 "eneral e1a(ination of the notion of symbol is also (ade necessary !y o,r develop(ent of the notion of 7derived intentionality.7 *he Ca,sal ;erivation E!8ection consisted in the clai( that the acco,nt one +o,ld "ive of the intentional and se(antic properties of sy(!ols cannot also !e ,sed as an acco,nt of the intentional and se(antic properties of co"nitive states, !eca,se sy(!ols have their intentional and se(antic properties only !y virt,e of ca,sal derivation. B,t all that +as really sho+n +as that illoc,tionary acts and sy(!ols in co(p,ters do not have intentionality intrinsically. Co(p,tationalists no+ "enerally a"ree that /a 0 C*2 does not provide a f,ll3fled"ed se(antic theory, and /b 0 (ental representations do not co(e !y their intentionality the +ay sy(!ols in co(p,ters do. *he =,estion of +hether so(e other kinds of sy(!ols might have intentionality and se(antics intrinsically re(ains open. 'inally, the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection ar",es that the very notion of symbol (akes essential reference to co"niDers +ho are responsi!le for the i(position of (eanin" ,pon sy(!ols, and ,pon the co"nitive states +hich are involved in this i(position of (eanin". *his o!8ection (i"ht +ell ,nderc,t C*2 co(pletely, !,t it has yet to !e developed in detail and re=,ires a caref,l e1a(ination of the nat,re of sy(!ols as a prere=,isite. 9 f,rther iss,e also arises here: if the se(antic voca!,lary does t,rn o,t to !e syste(atically ho(ony(o,s, it (ay t,rn o,t additionally that the kind of 7(eanin"7 that is to !e attri!,ted to (ental representations is not the sa(e kind of 7(eanin"7 that is attri!,ted to sy(!ols. So, in addition to assessin" the =,estion of +hether sy(!olic (eanin" can e1plain (ental (eanin", it (ay prove necessary to e1a(ine +hether there (i"ht !e other kinds of 7(eanin"7 possessed !y (ental representations /i.e., other properties e1pressed !y a distinct ,sa"e of the +ord ?(eanin"?0. *his sets so(e a"enda for the re(ainder of this !ook. Chapter J +ill 5 -6 5 ,ndertake the task of clarifyin" the notion of symbol Hspecifically, it +ill e1a(ine +hat it is to !e a sy(!ol, +hat it is to have syntactic properties, and +hat it is to have se(antic properties. *his analysis +ill !e applied to C*2 in chapter - in order to assess the force of the o!8ections (arshaled !y Sayre and Searle. 2ean+hile, chapter % +ill e1plore an alternative +ay of interpretin" the ,se of the +ords

?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? !y C*2?s advocates, and chapters & and 9 +ill e1a(ine t+o +ays of artic,latin" a notion of 7se(antics7 that is in i(portant +ays discontin,o,s +ith the ,sa"e of that +ord as applied to sy(!ols. 5 -- 5

$"RT II0 SY1- #S, C 1$UTERS, "N, TH U.HTS

5 -9 5

C)apter !our0 Symbols0"n "nalysis

*he precedin" chapter has !ro,"ht ,s to a cr,cial 8,nct,re in assessin" the (erits of the Co(p,tational *heory of 2ind. *he criticis(s raised !y Searle and Sayre point to so(e potentially serio,s pro!le(s for co(p,tationalis(. B,t the e1act nat,re and force of the pro!le(s cannot !e 8,d"ed +itho,t first ,ndertakin" an analysis of the notion of symbol, +hich fi",res pro(inently !oth in the clai(s (ade !y co(p,tationalists and in the criticis(s leveled !y their opponents. .n partic,lar, +e (,st ask +hat it is to !e a sy(!ol and ho+ sy(!ols (ay !e said to have syntactic and se(antic properties. *his chapter +ill present ans+ers to these =,estions, and +ill offer a rich set of ter(inolo"y for talkin" a!o,t sy(!ols, synta1, and se(antics. *he ter(inolo"y (akes t+o i(portant kinds of distinctions. 'irst, the ordinary ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol? as a sortal ter( is a(!i",o,s. So(eti(es the +ord is ,sed precisely to denote ,tterances or inscriptions that have se(antic interpretationsHthin"s that syrn!oli*e so(ethin". B,t in other conte1ts the +ord is ,sed to denote thin"s +hich do not have se(antic properties: there are p,rely for(al sy(!ol "a(es, for e1a(ple, in +hich the tokens have syntactic !,t not se(antic properties, and there are even sy(!ols s,ch as letters on eyecharts +hich have neither syntactic nor se(antic properties. *o distin",ish these different senses of the +ord ?sy(!ol?, three sortal ter(s +ill !e developed. *he ter( ?(arker? +ill !e ,sed to capt,re the road ,sa"e of ?sy(!ol? +hich incl,des letters on eyecharts. *o !e a (arker is 8,st to !e a token of a conventional type, and does not have any necessary se(antic or syntactic conse=,ences. *he 5 &$ 5 ter( ?si"nifier? +ill !e ,sed to denote (arkers that have se(antic interpretations. 9n o!8ect is a si"nifier 8,st insofar as it is a token of a (arker type +hich has an interpretation. *he ter( ?co,nter? +ill !e ,sed to pick o,t (arkers on the !asis of their syntactic feat,res +ithin so(e lan",a"e "a(e. *o !e a co,nter is to !e a token of a (arker type +hich has a partic,lar set of conventionally deter(ined syntactic properties in a partic,lar lan",a"e "a(e. *he ter(inolo"y developed in this chapter +ill also reflect a second, and e=,ally i(portant, distinction. 'or there are several different senses in +hich an o!8ect (ay !e said to !e a (arker, a co,nter, or a

si"nifier. 'or e1a(ple, if +e say that a (arker token 7has an interpretation,7 +e (i"ht (ean one of fo,r thin"s: /10 that there is a lin",istic convention that associates the (arker?s type +ith that interpretation, /@0 that the a,thor of the (arker (eant it to have that interpretation, /#0 that so(eone +ho apprehended the (arker too it to have that interpretation, or (erely /J0 that there is an interpretation sche(e availa!le in principle that associates that (arker?s type +ith that interpretation. *he ter(inolo"y developed in this chapter disa(!i",ates e1pressions like ?is a si"nifier? or ?has se(antic properties? !y offerin" different loc,tional sche(as for each of the fo,r le"s of the a(!i",ity. .n the fo,r cases a!ove, for e1a(ple, the (arker token +o,ld !e said, respectively, to !e /10 interpretable (under con"ention C) as si"nifyin" 5 , /@0 intended (by its author S) as si"nifyin" 5 , /#0 interpreted (by some 8) as si"nifyin" 5 , and /J0 interpretable!in!principle as si"nifyin" 5 . *hese loc,tions point to fo,r modalities ,nder +hich an o!8ect (ay !e said to have properties dependent ,pon conventions or intentions, and these (odalities also apply to the sortals ?(arker? and ?co,nter?, as +ell as ?si"nifier?, in +ays that +ill !e (ade clearer in the co,rse of the chapter. *he res,lt is a ter(inolo"y that reflects fo,r different +ays in +hich an o!8ect (ay !e said to !e a (arker /a sy(!ol in the !arest sense0, fo,r +ays a (arker (ay !e said to take on syntactic properties, and fo,r +ays it (ay !e said to take on se(antic properties. *he re(ainder of this chapter +ill !e devoted to a (ore detailed develop(ent of these distinctions.

6.&0 Symbols= Semanti3s, SyntaC, and To/enin* a Type

.t sho,ld co(e as no s,rprise that the +ord ?sy(!ol? is ,sed in +idely differin" +ays !y +riters +ith different research interests. When a lin",ist st,dyin" the develop(ent of the set of "raphe(ic characters ,sed 5 &1 5 to represent )n"lish +ords speaks of the "raphe(es as 7sy(!ols,7 he +ill very likely (ean so(ethin" different fro( +hat a A,n"ian psycholo"ist (eans +hen he e1presses an interest in findin" o,t +hat 7sy(!ols7 are i(portant to a patient. B,t even if +e restrict o,r attention to the linguistic notion of symbol that is relevant to the analysis of nat,ral, technical, and co(p,ter lan",a"es, there are still a(!i",ities that need to !e ,nraveled. 'irst, the +ord ?sy(!ol? is so(eti(es ,sed precisely to indicate o!8ects that sy(!oli*e so(ethin" else. 9n o!8ect is a sy(!ol in this sense 4ust in case it has a semantic interpretation . *his ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol? is fo,nd =,ite fre=,ently in disc,ssions of co(p,tation and the philosophy of (ind. 'odor, for e1a(ple, ,ses the +ord ?sy(!ol? in this +ay in the introd,ction to +e,resentations, +here he repeatedly "losses the +ord ?sy(!ol? +ith the phrase 7se(antically interpreted o!8ectLsM7 /'odor 19&1: @@, @#, #$0 and clai(s that the o!8ects of propositional attit,des 7are sy(!ols . . . and that this fact acco,nts for their intensionality and se(anticity7 /i!id., @J0. Ha,"eland like+ise ,ses the +ord ?sy(!ol? in this +ay +hen he +rites, 7So(eti(es +e say that the tokens in a certain for(al syste( mean so(ethin"Hthat is, they are ?si"ns,? or ?sy(!ols,? or ?e1pressions? +hich ?stand for,? or ?represent,? or ?say? so(ethin"7 /Ha,"eland 19&1: @13@@0. B,t not all +riters +ho disc,ss the tokens e(ployed in for(al syste(s follo+ Ha,"eland?s practice of applyin" the +ord ?sy(!ol? only to o!8ects havin" se(antic interpretations. Pylyshyn, for e1a(ple, distin",ishes !et+een 7a syste( of for(al sy(!ols /data str,ct,res, e1pressions07 and a sche(e of interpretation 7for interpretin" these sy(!ols7 /Pylyshyn 19&J: 1160. Here Pylyshyn ,ses the +ord ?sy(!ol? in a +ay +hich clearly and e1plicitly does not have se(antic overtones, since the 7sy(!ols7 of

+hich he speaks are p,rely 7for(al7 and are only i(!,ed +ith (eanin" thro,"h the additional i(position of a sche(e of interpretation. >o"icians interested in for(al syste(s like+ise ,se the +ord ?sy(!ol? to denote the characters and e1pressions e(ployed in those syste(s, even tho,"h !y definition se(antics falls o,tside of the p,rvie+ of for(al syste(s. S,ch a practice is also 8,stified !y ordinary ,sa"e: it is =,ite accepta!le, for e1a(ple, to ,se the +ord ?sy(!ol? to refer to "raphe(ic characters s,ch as letters, n,(erals, p,nct,ation (arks, and even to s,ch characters as those e(ployed in (,sical notation. *o (erit the application of this ,se of the +ord ?sy(!ol?, an o!8ect need not have any se(antic interpretation. 'or e1a(ple, individ,al letters e(ployed in 5 &@ 5 inscriptions in a nat,ral lan",a"e seldo( have se(antic val,es, and yet there is nothin" stran"e a!o,t referrin" to the( individ,ally as sy(!ols. Here it (i"ht see( te(ptin" to follo+ Ha,"eland?s ter(inolo"ical practice and to contrast 7sy(!ols7 /thin"s +ith interpretations0 +ith 7formal tokens7Hor, alternatively, to 8oin Pylyshyn in ,sin" the e1pression ?for(al sy(!ols? +hen referrin" to s,ch entities as character strin"s +itho,t reference to their se(antic properties. B,t to do so +o,ld !e to risk r,nnin" afo,l of a f,rther distinction. 'or the +ord ?for(al? has +eaker and stron"er ,ses. .n its +eaker ,se, it (eans 7not se(antic7C in its stron"er ,se, it (eans 7syntactic.7 *his distinction is i(portant !eca,se entities such as letters and phonemes fall into types quite independently of their syntactic properties . *he sa(e set of letter types, for e1a(ple, is e(ployed in the +ritten for(s of (ost of the ),ropean lan",a"es, and the same letters take on different syntactic properties in different lan",a"es. 6o+ if letter types +ere determined !y the syntactic positions that their tokens co,ld occ,py in a sy(!ol "a(e, then sy(!ol "a(es +ith different syntactic r,les +o,ld, !y definition, have to !e constr,ed as e(ployin" different sy(!ol types. 'or e1a(ple, "iven that the spellin" r,les of )n"lish and 'rench allo+ different co(!inations of letters to occ,r, one +o,ld have to say that )n"lish and 'rench e(ploy different letters. B,t s,rely s,ch a concl,sion +o,ld !e (is",ided: there is "ood reason to say that +ritten 'rench and +ritten )n"lish e(ploy the same sy(!ol types /i.e., the sa(e letter types0, !,t that sy(!ols of the sa(e types take on different syntactic properties +hen ,sed in inscriptions in different lan",a"es. .t is s,rely (ore nat,ral, for e1a(ple, to say that the letter y can stand alone as a +ord in 'rench !,t not in )n"lish than to say that 'rench and )n"lish have distinct sy(!ol types +hich happen to look alike, 8,st !eca,se the )n"lish y can occ,r only +ithin a lar"er +ord +hile the 'rench y can occ,r alone. Er, to take a different e1a(ple, it see(s nat,ral to say that !ase3@ notation and !ase31$ notation !oth e(ploy the n,(erals Dero and one, even tho,"h those n,(erals take on different co(!inatorial properties in the t+o syste(s. /*his is trivially tr,e, since the di"its $ and 1 can !e co(!ined in !ase31$ notation +ith di"its that are not e(ployed in !ase3@ notation.0 We th,s stand in need of three separate sortal terms to play the different roles played !y the ordinary ter( ?sy(!ol?. 'irst, +e need a ter( that desi"nates o!8ects like letters and n,(erals =,ite apart fro( any considerations a!o,t +hat syntactic or se(antic properties they (i"ht take on in a partic,lar conte1t. Second, +e need a ter( that desi"nates o!8ects 8,st insofar as they are assi"ned a se(antic interpretation. 'inally, 5 &# 5 +e need a ter( that desi"nates o!8ects 8,st insofar as they are of a partic,lar syntactic type.

6.20 1ar/ers, Si*ni+iers, Counters

. propose to ,se three e1istin" +ords in ne+ and technical +ays in order to s,pply the necessary sortal ter(s. . propose to ,se the +ord ?(arker? to replace the ter( ?sy(!ol? in its !roadest sense, the ,sa"e that can !e applied to letters and n,(erals and carries no syntactic or se(antic connotations. *here are (arker types /e."., the letter , 0 and (arker tokens /a partic,lar inscription of the letter , 0. 2arker types s,ch as letter types and n,(eral types are a partic,lar class of conventionally esta!lished types. And so an ob4ect is a mar er to en 4ust insofar as it is a to en of such a con"entional type . So(eti(es (arkers are ,sed in s,ch a fashion that they carry se(antic val,es. *he co(ple1 (arker type ?do"?, for e1a(ple, has a conventional interpretation in )n"lish, !,t does not have one in 'rench. Insofar as an ob4ect is a mar er that carries a semantic "alue, it 'ill be called a signifier . 'inally, (arkers can !e e(ployed in sy(!ol "a(es in s,ch a fashion that they have syntactic properties. *he lo+er3case letters, for e1a(ple, take on no syntactic properties +hen they are ,sed on an eyechart, !,t take on one set of syntactic properties +hen ,sed as proposition letters in the propositional calc,l,s, and take on a different set of syntactic properties +hen ,sed as varia!le letters in the predicate calc,l,s. *he syntactic r,les of a sy(!ol "a(e serve to partition the (arkers e(ployed in that "a(e accordin" to the syntactic positions they can occ,py. *hese syntactic types +ill !e called counter types, and a mar er 'ill be said to be a counter 4ust insofar as it ta es on syntactic properties 'ithin a symbol game . *hese three sortal ter(sH?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter?H+ill play a si"nificant role in the disc,ssion of the nat,re of sy(!ols and sy(!olic representation that is to follo+. 9ltho,"h this !ook does not ,ndertake to develop a thoro,"h"oin" se(iotics, it +ill prove helpf,l to ,ndertake a !rief disc,ssion of each of these three ter(s.

6.40 1ar/ers
*he first and (ost !asic of the three sortal ter(s is ?(arker?. *h,s far the develop(ent of the ter( ?(arker? has consisted of the citation of a fe+ paradi"( e1a(ples /letters, n,(erals, characters e(ployed in (,sical notation0 and a ne"ative clai( to the effect that !ein" a (arker has 5 &J 5 nothin" to do +ith synta1 or se(antics. *o co(e to a !etter ,nderstandin" of (arkers, it +ill !e ,sef,l to e(ploy a tho,"ht e1peri(ent.

6.4.&0 T)e ATeCt +rom Tan*anyi/aA ECperiment

S,ppose that the noted :ictorian3a"e e1plorer and lin",ist Sir Gichard 'rancis B,rton, +hile traversin" central 9frica in search of the so,rce of the 6ile, co(es ,pon a lost city. *here he finds a clay ta!let on +hich there are inscriptions of ,nkno+n ori"in and (eanin". Ene line of the script reads as follo+s:

What ass,(ptions can B,rton reasona!ly (ake a!o,t the inscriptionK 'irst, he can pro!a!ly proceed ,pon the ass,(ption that +hat he has co(e ,pon is an inscription in a +ritten lan",a"e, +hich he d,!s 7*an"anyikan.7 He can ass,(e that, like other +ritten lan",a"es, *an"anyikan +ill e(ploy sy(!ols,

that it +ill have a syntactic str,ct,re, and that at least so(e of the sy(!ols +ill !e ,sed (eanin"f,lly. 9t this point, ho+ever, he (ost e(phatically does not kno+ +hat any of the sy(!ols (ean. /or does he e"en no' 'hat symbolic units are meaningful . What he enco,nters (ay !e a phonetically !ased script like that ,sed in +ritten )n"lish, in +hich case fe+ if any of the individ,al characters +ill !e (eanin"f,l. En the other hand, it (i"ht !e an ideo"raphic notation like that e(ployed in +ritten Chinese, in +hich case individ,al ideo"ra( types are correlated +ith specific interpretations. Er it (i"ht !e like )"yptian or Coptic script, in +hich characters can f,nction as ideo"ra(s in so(e conte1ts and f,nction as indications of phone(es in others. /.f )n"lish +ere to !e represented in a si(ilar +ay, for e1a(ple, +e (i"ht have a character

to represent the +ord ?heart, and then represent the +ord ?hearty? !y the strin" 3y .0 9nd of co,rse it could !e the case that +hat he sees is not +ritin" at all, !,t (ere orna(entation or doodlin"s. 6o+ there is a "reat deal that B,rton can do +itho,t an interpretation sche(e for this +ritin". 6ota!ly, he can !e"in !y (akin" a list of the ato(ic characters e(ployed, and on the !asis of this he can do s,ch thin"s as co(pare the( +ith characters ,sed in other 9frican lan",a"es to see if *an"anyikan (ay !e related to any of these. 'or e1a(ple, if the +ritin" fo,nd at *i(!,kt, contains a character

, then B,rton (i"ht post,late that the sy(!ol fo,nd in *an"anyikan script is a variant of , 5 &% 5 and that *an"anyikan is related to *i(!,kt,ni. 9nd he can do all of this +itho,t kno+in" anythin" a!o,t the synta1 or se(antics of *an"anyikan. .ndeed, even if it t,rns o,t that +hat he has fo,nd are a child?s hand+ritin" e1ercises or an ancient eyechartHin +hich case +hat he sees does not have either syntactic str,ct,re or se(antic interpretationHhis concl,sions a!o,t the character type need not !e i(periled. 9nd the reason for this is that the characters the(selves can !e ,nderstood as fallin" into types =,ite independently of the lin",istic ,ses to +hich they are p,t. Ence B,rton has (ade this o!servation, he !e"ins to realiDe that it is not only ato(ic "raphe(ic character types that can !e st,died apart fro( their syntactic and se(antic properties. En the one hand, strings of characters that function together can !e treated as a sin"le ,nit, and hence B,rton can (ake so(e ",esses a!o,t +hat se=,ences of characters (ake ,p +ords.L1M En the other hand, "raphe(ic characters are not the only tokens +hose (e(!ership in a type can !e ,nderstood apart fro( synta1 and se(antics. *he very sa(e kind of analysis can !e applied to nonvis,al ,nits, s,ch as phone(es, 2orse code ,nits, or 9SC.. ,nits in co(p,ter stora"e locations. .f, for e1a(ple, B,rton had a tape recordin" of so(eone speakin" *an"anyikan, he (i"ht ,ndertake a very si(ilar analysis of the

phone(es e(ployed in the lan",a"e, even +itho,t kno+in" +here the !reaks !et+een +ords fall or +hat anythin" in the lan",a"e (eans. Er, if he +ere in a position to intercept an electronically trans(itted (essa"e s,ch as a trans(ission in 2orse code, he (i"ht !e a!le to fi",re o,t the !asic ,nits /e."., dots and dashes0 and ho+ they +ere instantiated in a tele"raph +ire or thro,"h (od,lations of radio +aves. .n li"ht of these realiDations, of co,rse, he +o,ld co(e to realiDe that he co,ld no lon"er e(ploy the ter( ?character? to cover all of the relevant cases, and +o,ld !e in search of a s,ita!ly ne,tral ter(: for e1a(ple, the ter( ?(arker.?

6.4.20 W)at Is Essential to t)e Notion o+ a 1ar/erD

.f ?(arker? is to serve as a "eneric ter( for phone(es, "raphe(es, ,nits of 2orse code, and other s,ch entities, it is +orth askin" 8,st +hat is involved in !ein" an entity of one of these kinds. 9nd the !est +ay of ans+erin" is !y (akin" a series of o!servations. /10 Mar ers are to ens of types . *he type3token distinction is applica!le to all (arkersHto letters, n,(erals, 2orse code ,nits, 9SC.. code ,nits, phone(es, and so on. /@0 Mar er types are con"entional . *o say that a "raphite s=,i""le on 5 &6 5 a sheet of paper is a letter , is to say that it is a token of a partic,lar type that is e(ployed !y partic,lar lin",istic co((,nities. *o say that it is a rho is to say that it is a token of a different partic,lar type e(ployed !y a different co((,nity. 9nd to clai( that a partic,lar s=,i""le is a , is not the sa(e thin" as to clai( that it is a rho, even if it is the case that an o!8ect has the ri"ht shape to co,nt as a , if and only if it has the ri"ht shape to co,nt as a rho. *his is !eca,se the clai( that the s=,i""le is a , /or a rho0 (akes reference to (ore than the shape of the o!8ect: it (akes reference to specific conventions of a specific lin",istic co((,nity as +ell. >ike+ise, the clai( that the s=,i""le is a , /or a rho0 is not e=,ivalent to a clai( a!o,t its shapeHfor e1a(ple, that it is co(posed of a vertical line on the left and a half3oval attached to the ri"ht side of the ,pper half of the line. When . say that (arker types are con"entional, +hat . (ean is (erely that (arker types are esta!lished !y the !eliefs and practices of lan",a"e ,sers. .n partic,lar, . +ish to e(phasiDe that (arker types are not natural inds . *o !e s,re, so,nds and s=,i""les (ay also fall into nat,ral kinds on the !asis of physical patterns present in the(, s,ch as their +avefor(s or their shapes: a so,nd +ave is a sine +ave at JJ$ kHD 8,st !eca,se of its physical characteristics, and an inscri!ed rectan"le is a rectan"le 8,st !eca,se of the distri!,tion of "raphite on paper. B,t +hen +e say that an o!8ect is a (arkerHfor e1a(ple, an inscription of the letter , or an ,tterance of the +ord ?+oodch,ck?H+e are not pickin" it o,t 8,st !y its so,nd or its shape, !,t !y the +ay it fits into esta!lished lin",istic practices in so(e co((,nity of lan",a"e ,sers. *o deter(ine +hat (arker types an o!8ect falls into, +e need to kno+ (ore than +hat patterns are present in the o!8ect: +e need to kno+ +hat (arker types there are as +ell, and +hat kinds of o!8ects can co,nt as tokens of those types. 9nd to ans+er those =,estions, +e need to kno+ +hat lin",istic co((,nities there are and +hat shared ,nderstandin"s and practices (e(!ers of those co((,nities have a!o,t ,sin" so,nds and inscriptions co((,nicatively. 9n o!8ect can only !e a P3token if there is a letter type , , and there can only !e a letter type , if there is so(e co((,nity of lan",a"e ,sers +ho have a set of shared !eliefs and practices to the effect that there is a (arker type +hose tokens are shaped in certain +ays and (ay !e e(ployed in certain activities. So +hen . say that (arker types are conventional, . (ean that the e1istence of the type is deter(ined !y the !eliefs and practices of lan",a"e ,sers.

/#0 The con"entions that establish mar er types in"ol"e criteria go" 3 5 &- 5 erning 'hat can count as to ens of those types . So +hile the assertion that a s=,i""le is a rho involves (ore than clai(s a!o,t its shape, it does entail thin"s a!o,t the shape of the s=,i""le as +ell. *he letter type rho is esta!lished !y the conventions e(ployed !y +riters of 4reek, !,t part of +hat is involved in those conventions is a set of criteria "overnin" +hat a s=,i""le has to look like in order to co,nt as a rho. /J0 The criteria go"erning 'hat can count as a to en of a mar er type pic out a set of (physically instantiable) patterns such that ob4ects ha"ing those patterns are suitable to count as to ens of that type . .n the case of letters, n,(erals, and other "raphe(es, the patterns are t+o3di(ensional visi!le spatial patterns. .n the case of phone(es, they are aco,stic patterns distin",isha!le !y the h,(an a,ditory syste(. .n the case of 2orse code and co(p,ter data stora"e they are a!stract patterns (ade ,p, respectively, of dots and dashes or !inary ,nits +hich can !e instantiated in vario,s +ays in different (edia. Ene can also have co(ple1 (arker types that are for(ed fro( arran"e(ents of si(ple (arker types: +ritten +ords, for e1a(ple, are co(ple1 (arkers co(posed of se=,ences of ato(ic (arkers /letters0. /%0 The criteria for a mar er type may be fle3ible and open!ended, and need not be sub4ect to formulation in terms of a rule . *his is clearest in the case of "raphe(ic sy(!ols. 9s ;o,"las Hofstadter /19&%0 has ar",ed, letter types see( to per(it an indefinite n,(!er of stylistic variations. 9 reader +ho has not foreseen these can nonetheless =,ickly reco"niDe the( as s,ch +hen presented +ith the(. .t is !y no (eans clear that one co,ld provide a r,le /e."., in the for( of a co(p,ter pro"ra(0 that co,ld, for e1a(ple, distin",ish all of those patterns that a person co,ld reco"niDe as stylistic variants of the letter , fro( those patterns +hich a person +o,ld not reco"niDe as s,ch. /60 Mar er types are often found in groups or clusters that are employed in the same symbol games . *h,s +e speak of different sets of "raphe(ic characters s,ch as 7the letters,7 7the n,(!ers,7 7the p,nct,ation sy(!ols,7 and so on. /-0 Criteria for mar er types may o"erlap, both 'ithin groups and across groups . *h,s the sa(e s=,i""les that co,nt as letter o?s can co,nt as Deroes and o(icrons as +ell. 9nd indeed, as anyone +ho has had tro,!le readin" another person?s hand+ritin" kno+s, hand+ritten letters are often interpreta!le in a n,(!er of different +ays. /&0 :anguage users possess a repertoire of mar er types, 'hich can be used in "arious 'ays . 2athe(aticians, for e1a(ple, are in the !,si3 5 && 5 ness of developin" ne+ sy(!ol "a(es. .n doin" so, they co((only e(ploy e1istin" (arker types s,ch as letters and n,(erals +hose ori"ins (ay !e traced to vario,s lin",istic co((,nities. 2athe(aticians ,se e1istin" (arker types, !,t p,t the( to ne+ ,ses in ne+ sy(!ol "a(es. Si(ilarly, one can ,se one?s kno+led"e of phone(es and the r,les for co(!inin" the( into +ords in one?s lan",a"e in order to coin a ne+ +ord if one is needed. /90 Mar er types can be added to or deleted from an indi"idual$s repertoire . *hat is, a person can learn (arker types and also for"et the(. /1$0 Mar er types can be added or deleted from the repertoire of a linguistic group . 6e+ +ords

/co(ple1 (arkers0 are coined, ne+ ato(ic (arkers are invented /as in the case of the inte"ration si"n ,sed in the calc,l,s or the (issionary St. Cyril?s invention of the Cyrillic alpha!et0 and i(ported /as in the case of ),rope?s adoption of the 9ra!ic n,(erals0. 2arkers also disappear fro( ,sa"e. 2any of the co(ple1 (arkers /2iddle )n"lish +ords0 one finds in Cha,cer?s +ritin"s, for e1a(ple, are no lon"er in ,seC and the Eld )n"lish letter thorn has s,rvived only in the ",ise of a y on the si"ns of an"lophilic innkeepers.L@M /110 The boundaries of a 0linguistic group0 and the e3tent to 'hich con"entions are shared 'ithin a group are highly fle3ible . .n the case of nat,ral lan",a"es, for e1a(ple, there are often si"nificant differences in dialect and idiolect +hich involve differences in the conventions for pron,nciation, inscription, and so on. .t is not al+ays f,lly clear +hen one sho,ld say that one is faced +ith separate lin",istic "ro,ps and +hen one is faced +ith a variety of practices +ithin a sin"le "ro,p. 2oreover, there (ay !e "ro,ps +ithin "ro,ps: all topolo"ists (ay o!serve certain notational practices, !,t topolo"ists +ho +ork in a partic,lar topolo"ical specialty /e."., s,r"ery theory0 (ay all o!serve an additional set of practices not shared !y other topolo"ists, and an individ,al (athe(atician +ho has developed his o+n techni=,es for a partic,lar pro!le( (ay !e the only person e(ployin" his ne+ conventions. Si(ilarly, an individ,al (ay find the need for a ne+ +ord in a nat,ral lan",a"e and (ay therefore choose a phonetic se=,ence /a co(ple1 (arker type0 that is not c,rrently ,sed in his lan",a"e and then e(ploy it as a (arker type. *he ne+ (arker type is con"entional in the sense that it is established by a human con"ention and not si(ply !y a nat,ral pattern, even tho,"h the convention that esta!lishes it is not /yet0 a convention of ;nglish, !,t (erely a convention +ithin so(e individ,al?s idiolect. /Ef co,rse, it can !eco(e a convention of )n"lishC ne+ +ords are introd,ced into lan",a"es, and they all start o,t as so(eone?s idiosyncrasies.0 5 &9 5

6.60 Si*ni+iers
While the conventions that esta!lish (arker types f,nction independently of the partic,lar ,ses to +hich the (arkers are p,t in act,al practice, it is nonetheless part of the nat,re of (arkers that they can !e ,sed (eanin"f,lly. So +hile there is nothin", for e1a(ple, a!o,t the (arker type consistin" of the se=,ence of letters d!o!g that !inds it to a partic,lar (eanin", the (arker typeH8,st !y virt,e of !ein" a (arker typeHis the sort of thin" that can !e associated +ith a (eanin" in s,ch a fashion that its tokens can co,nt as carryin" or e1pressin" that (eanin". 9nd +ithin a lin",istic co((,nityHs,ch as the co((,nity of )n"lish speakersHthere are conventions that set ,p an association !et+een (arker types and (eanin"s. When +e speak of so(ethin" as a meaningful 'ord in a nat,ral lan",a"e s,ch as )n"lish, for e1a(ple, +e refer to it as a token of a (arker type /!e it typified phonetically, "raphe(ically, or !oth0 that is associated +ith a (eanin" !y )n"lish se(antic conventions, and +e pick it o,t both !y its (arker type and !y the associated (eanin".L#M /Hence +e can distin",ish !et+een different +ords +ith the sa(e spellin" !,t different (eanin"s, and vice versa.0 Si(ilarly, +hen +e speak of a +ritten n,(!er, +e refer to a (arker strin" and to its associated (eanin". *he (arker strin" 1313$31 can !e ,sed in the representation of vario,s n,(!ers: thirteen in !ase3@ notation, thirty3seven in !ase3# notation, and so on. .n the technical ter(inolo"y introd,ced in this chapter, insofar as an o!8ect is a (arker that is associated +ith a (eanin", it (ay !e called a signifier . .t +ill prove ,sef,l to think of sy(!ols as thin"s that can !e e1a(ined at se"eral different le"els of analysis . *h,s the inscription

do" can !e seen at several levels. 'irst, it can !e e1a(ined at +hat (i"ht !e called the 7(arker level,7 at +hich it is a se=,ence of letters fro( the Go(an alpha!et, and also a co(ple1 (arker e(ployed in )n"lish. *he ato(ic (arker types are esta!lished !y the conventions of a lin",istic co((,nity, and the co(ple1 type is licensed for ,se in )n"lish !y si(ilar conventions. B,t the a!ove inscription (ay also !e e1a(ined at a second or 7si"nifier level.7 9t the si"nifier level, the inscription is a token of a si"nifier type e(ployed in )n"lish. *hat si"nifier type is esta!lished !y a lin",istic convention that associates a co(ple1 (arker type +ith a (eanin". *he conventionality of si"nifier types is a"ain a (atter of there !ein" 5 9$ 5 certain shared ,nderstandin"s and practices +ithin a lin",istic co((,nity. .ndivid,al inscriptions of the +ord ?do"? (ean dog !eca,se they are tokens of a partic,lar si"nifier type e(ployed in )n"lish. *hat si"nifier type e1ists !y virt,e of a convention: in this case, a shared ,nderstandin" a(on" speakers of )n"lish that tokens of the co(ple1 (arker type d!o!g can !e ,sed to e1press the (eanin" dog, and a shared practice of ,sin" tokens of that co(ple1 (arker type to e1press that (eanin". *here are th,s at least t+o levels of conventionality involved in !ein" a si"nifier token. 'irst, anythin" that is a si"nifier (,st also !e a (arker, and (arker types are esta!lished !y conventions. Second, si"nifier types are esta!lished !y conventions that associate (arker types +ith interpretations. *he first kind of conventionality appears at the (arker level, the second connects the (arker level to the si"nifier level. .t is !y virt,e of (arker conventions that o!8ects !earin" patterns can co,nt as (arkers, and it is !y virt,e of si"nifier conventions that (arkers can co,nt as si"nifiers.

6.70 Counters
2arkers can, of co,rse, take on syntactic as +ell as se(antic properties. B,t like se(antic properties, syntactic properties are e1trinsic to the (arker type. *hat is, there is nothin" a!o,t the (arker type , that i(plies anythin" a!o,t the syntactic properties of , 3tokens. , ?s can !e ,sed in sy(!ol "a(es +itho,t syntactic r,lesHfor e1a(ple, on eyecharts. *hey can also !e ,sed in "a(es that have syntactic r,les, s,ch as +ritten )n"lish, +ritten 'rench, al"e!raic topolo"y, and predicate lo"ic. A,st 'hat syntactic properties a , 3token can take on depends on +hat sy(!ol "a(e it is ,sed in, +hat syntactic cate"ories are involved in that sy(!ol "a(e, and +hich syntactic slots can !e occ,pied !y , 3tokens. 6o+ all of this i(plies that there is (ore to synta1 than (arker orderHthat the syntactic properties of a (arker token are inti(ately connected +ith the role it plays in lar"er lin",istic activities, and are not 8,st a (atter of the (arker?s co(!inatorial properties. Ene co,ld, of co,rse, ,se the +ord ?synta1? so !roadly as to incl,de all arran"e(ents of (arkersHor, indeed, to incl,de all arran"e(ents of ob4ects, since all o!8ects can, in principle, serve as (arkers. B,t the +ord ?synta1? has so(e paradi"( ,ses in +hich it is applied to specifically lin",istic str,ct,res, and there is ar",a!ly a "reat deal a!o,t lin",istic str,ct,re that falls ,nder the r,!ric of synta1 that "oes !eyond co(!inatorial feat,res. *here is, for e1a(ple, a sense in +hich +e sho,ld say that a sentence has a syn3 5 91 5 tactic str,ct,re +hile the order fo,nd in other entities /e."., the se=,ence of cars in a traffic 8a(, the

se=,ence of philosophy co,rses taken !y an ,nder"rad,ate (a8or0 is not pla,si!ly re"arded as syntactic. >et ,s !riefly in=,ire as to ho+ the syntactic str,ct,re of a strin" of (arkers is dependent ,pon the sy(!ol "a(e in +hich it is e(ployed. Consider, for e1a(ple, the (arker strin" 'ad What is the syntactic str,ct,re of this se=,ence of (arkersK *he ans+er depends entirely ,pon the sy(!ol "a(e that is operative. .f the letters appear on a line of an eyechart, one +o,ld !e inclined to say that the strin" of (arkers has no syntactic str,ct,re: there is an order to the (arkers, to !e s,re, !,t it is not a syntactic order. B,t if the (arkers (ake ,p the )n"lish +ord ?fad? +ith a capitaliDed f , the story is =,ite different. .t has !oth internal syntactic str,ct,re, since spellin" r,les can pla,si!ly !e called 7syntactic7 /even if spellin" is not the kind of synta1 that co(es (ost =,ickly to (ind0. .t also has e3ternal or relational syntactic properties, since the +ord ?fad? is of a "ra((atical type that can occ,py certain slots in )n"lish sentence str,ct,re, !,t not others. 'or e1a(ple, sentence /10 is "ra((atically per(issi!le in )n"lish, +hile sentence /@0 is not: /10 *he h,la hoop +as a fad. /@0 Q *he h,la hoop fad +as. *he strin" 7!a!d co,ld also !e ,sed as an e1pression in the predicate calc,l,s, +ith 7 !ein" a predicate letter and a and d its ar",(ents. Here once a"ain the strin" +o,ld have !oth internal and relational syntactic properties, !,t very different ones fro( the previo,s case. *he difference, of co,rse, lies in the fact that the sa(e (arker strin" can !e ,sed in several different lan",a"e "a(es, !,t those "a(es have different syntactic r,les, and the role that the (arkers play in the different "a(es is correspondin"ly different. 2oreover, the kinds of syntactic categories in ter(s of +hich one can analyDe a (arker strin" are closely related to kinds of sy(!ol "a(es. 6at,ral lan",a"es have no,ns, ver!s, ad8ectives, and so on. So(e nat,ral lan",a"es also have syntactic feat,res that others do not: articles, pl,ral s,ffi1es, case indicators, privative prefi1es, and so on. /4reek has all of these feat,resC Chinese has none of the(.0 *echnical lan",a"es (ay have very different cate"ories: predicate lo"ic, for e1a(ple, has no no,ns or ver!s !,t does have =,antifiers, predicate letters, 5 9@ 5 varia!le letters, and connectives, +hile the propositional calc,l,s has only sentence letters and connectives. When +e are interested precisely in the syntactic role that a (arker or (arker strin" plays in a partic,lar sy(!ol "a(e, it is ,sef,l to !e a!le to refer to it precisely as an o!8ect of a type distin",ished !y its syntactic role in that sy(!ol "a(e /as a predicate letter, for e1a(ple, or as a co,nt no,n0. )ach sy(!ol "a(e has so(e set of syntactic cate"ories. /.t (ay !e the e(pty set, as in the case of the eyechart.0 *hese are esta!lished !y the conventions "overnin" the sy(!ol "a(eHthat is, the set of !eliefs and practices, shared !y those +ho have (astered the "a(e, that "overn ho+ sy(!ols (ay !e co(!ined +ithin the "a(e. *hese conventions also "overn +hat (arkers and (arker strin"s can !e e(ployed in the sy(!ol "a(e, and +hich syntactic slots they (ay occ,py. So(eti(es, as in the case of the predicate calc,l,s or the 'ortran pro"ra((in" lan",a"e, the stock of (arkers is set ,p fro( the very !e"innin" to fall into cate"ories s,ch that one can tell fro( the (arker type itself +hat syntactic roles it can play. .n the predicate calc,l,s, capital letters can !e predicate letters !,t not varia!les, +hile lo+er3case letters can !e varia!les !,t not predicate letters. .n 'ortran, varia!les +ith na(es !e"innin" +ith the letter i can only store inte"er val,es, +hile varia!les +ith

na(es !e"innin" +ith the letter n can only store floatin"3point val,es. B,t other sy(!ol "a(es are (ore co(plicated. .n )n"lish, the (arker strin" h!o!u!s!e can !e ,sed either as a ver! or as a no,n, and one cannot tell 8,st fro( the strin" of sy(!ols +hich it +ill !e in a "iven instance. *he lan",a"e has conventions esta!lishin" !oth ?ho,se? the no,n and ?ho,se? the ver!C and there is no reason that the (arker strin" co,ld not !e ,sed as an ad8ective as +ell. >ike+ise, in the co(p,ter lan",a"e Pascal, virt,ally any strin" of 9SC.. characters can !e ,sed as a the na(e for a varia!le that can store any kind of val,e. Ene si(ply has to specify else+here +hat kind of varia!le it is, and that +ill have conse=,ences for its syntactic properties. /9 varia!le that stores a !oolean val,e, for e1a(ple, cannot appear i((ediately !efore a slash indicatin" division.0 *he +ord ?co,nter?, as it is !ein" developed here, +ill !e ,sed to indicate a (arker as it takes on partic,lar syntactic properties in a specific lan",a"e "a(e. *h,s, for e1a(ple, ?ho,se? the no,n and ?ho,se? the ver! are of separate co,nter typesC for +hile they e(ploy the sa(e (arker strin", they have different syntactic properties in )n"lish. When +e are attendin" specifically to synta1, +e (ay say that +e are +orkin" at the co,nter level. >ike the (arker and si"nifier levels, the co,nter level has 5 9# 5 its ,ses. 6ota!ly, the st,dy of for(al syste(s, for e1a(ple, takes place al(ost e1cl,sively at the co,nter level, since it !rackets se(antics and treats differences in +hat (arkers are e(ployed as 7notational variants.7 >ike+ise, (,ch of co(p,ter science is devoted to +ork at the co,nter level.

6.(0 T)e Relations)ip o+ t)e 1ar/er, Si*ni+ier, and Counter #evels

Since (arker types are independent of the syntactic and se(antic properties that their tokens can take on in different sy(!ol "a(es, +hile co,nter and si"nifier types pres,ppose the e1istence of (arker types, there is a hierarchic relationship !et+een the (arker level and the si"nifier and co,nter levels. 9nalyDin" a co(ple1 of so,nds or s=,i""les as co,nters pres,pposes dividin" the( into (arkers, and so !oth the co,nter and si"nifier levels are dependent ,pon the (arker level. *here is not, ho+ever, any a!sol,te dependence !et+een the co,nter and si"nifier levels. Ene can, for e1a(ple, assi"n interpretations to (arker types +itho,t sit,atin" the( +ithin a syntactically str,ct,red sy(!ol "a(e, and one can concoct 7p,rely for(al syste(s7 for +hich there is no interpretation sche(e. *his does not (ean, ho+ever, that synta1 and se(antics are a!sol,tely independent, either. *he se(antic val,es of so(e (arker co(ple1es, s,ch as sentences, are dependent ,pon the syntactic str,ct,re of the co(ple1es as +ell as the interpretations of the si"nifyin" ter(s. S,ch str,ct,res are s,!8ect to compositional analysis . B,t there is no absolute dependence of either the co,nter or the si"nifier level ,pon the other in the +ay that !oth are dependent ,pon the (arker level. *he (arker level is si(ilarly related to lo+er levels of analysis. 9n entity?s a!ility to co,nt as a (arker, after all, depends not only ,pon conventions !,t ,pon the fact that it !ears a physically instantiated pattern satisfyin" the criterion for its type. Ene (i"ht see s,ch patterns as a!stract physical feat,res that are literally present in o!8ects, and one (i"ht th,s speak of a 7pattern level7 +hich is connected to the (arker level a!ove it !y (arker conventions and to other physical descriptions !elo+ it !y vario,s kinds of a!straction. *hese a!stractions !racket those feat,res of an o!8ect that are not relevant to its havin" a pattern, renderin" it s,ita!le to co,nt as a token of a (arker type. We (i"ht represent the res,ltin" str,ct,re of levels of analysis "raphically as in 'i",re %, +ith the nodes representin" the o!8ects appearin" at a level and the arro+s

5 9J 5

'i",re % !et+een nodes representin" +hat relates the o!8ects appearin" at one level to those appearin" at the ne1t. 6o+ it is i(portant to note that the sortal ter(s ?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter? desi"nate conventional rather than nat,ral kinds, and that they can pick o,t the sa(e o!8ects ,nder different aspects. .ndeed, any o!8ect that is a si"nifier or a co,nter must also !e a (arker, and o!8ects that are (arkers (ay very +ell !e si"nifiers and co,nters as +ell. *he need for the sortal ter(s arises not !eca,se there are three (,t,ally e1cl,sive classes of partic,lars, !,t !eca,se there are different sorts of =,estions a!o,t sy(!ols that call for classifications !ased on different feat,res. /*here are, for e1a(ple, =,estions a!o,t ortho"raphy, synta1, and se(antics.0 *he distinction !et+een (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters is also ,sef,l for disc,ssin" certain aspects of lan",a"e, s,ch as a(!i",ity, ho(ony(y, ho(ophony, and certain kinds of perfor(ance errors. Ene kind of a(!i",ity occ,rs, for e1a(ple, +hen one has (arker strin"s that ad(it of (,ltiple se(antic interpretations. Ho(ony(y occ,rs +hen a sin"le "raphe(ic (arker strin" is associated !y different si"nifier conventions +ith t+o or (ore (eanin"s. Ho(ophony occ,rs +hen a sin"le a,ditory (arker strin" is associated +ith (,ltiple (eanin"s. Perfor(ance errors s,ch as slips of the ton",e, (alapropis(s, and spooneris(s are +ays of prod,cin" a (arker token that is not co(pati!le +ith the se(antic interpretation that one intended one?s ,tterance to have. 5 9% 5 *he different sortal ter(s also license different kinds of inferences a!o,t the o!8ects they pick o,t. 'ro( the fact that an o!8ect is a co,nter in so(e lan",a"e "a(e, it follo+s that it is a (arker and that it has syntactic properties. 6othin" follo+s, ho+ever, a!o,t +hether it has se(antic properties. Si(ilarly, if an o!8ect is a si"nifier, it follo+s that it is a (arker and that it has se(antic propertiesC !,t nothin" follo+s a!o,t +hether it is ,sed in a syntactically str,ct,red sy(!ol "a(e. 9nd fro( the fact that an o!8ect is a (arker, nothin" follo+s a!o,t +hether it has either syntactic or se(antic properties.

6.;0 !our 1odalities o+ Conventional -ein*

*his concl,des the first part of the disa(!i",ation of the notion of symbol Hthe separation of ?sy(!ol? into three separate sortal ter(s. B,t there is also a need for a second disa(!i",ation, a disa(!i",ation of the senses in +hich a thin" can !e said to 7!e7 a sy(!ol. 9nd the a(!i",ity that is of concern here is reflected in the technical ter(s ?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter?, as +ell as the ori"inal ter( ?sy(!ol?. . intend to present a case that, !eca,se each of these cate"ories is convention3dependent, there are fo,r +ays in +hich an o!8ect can !e said to !e a token of one of the types, correspondin" to fo,r +ays it can !e related to h,(an conventions and intentions. Ence a"ain, the distinctions are !est (otivated !y a series of tho,"ht e1peri(ents.

6.;.&0 Case &0T)e


9 (an na(ed Aones "oes to an opto(etrist for an eye e1a(ination. *he e1a(ination involves a test +hich re=,ires the patient to look thro,"h a device containin" a n,(!er of (ova!le lenses. *he device is pointed at an eyechart, and is so positioned that 8,st one character on the chart can !e seen thro,"h the eyepiece. *he e1a(ination !e"ins +ith the device !ein" pointed at the sin"le character on the ,pper(ost line of the chart, in this case a letter , . Aones looks into the eyepiece and sees the follo+in" i(a"e: $ *he opto(etrist asks Aones, 7What letter do yo, seeK7 Aones responds, 7*he letter , .7 'or p,rposes of this e1a(ple, ass,(e that Aones has correctly identified the character. Ene of the thin"s that Aones has acco(plished is the s,ccessf,l identification of a physical partic,lar as a token 5 96 5 of a partic,lar conventionally sanctioned (arker type. *o do this, Aones need not i(p,te any syntactic or se(antic properties to the (arker token he sees. .ndeed, if the doctor +ere to ask Aones 7What does that sy(!ol (eanK7 or 7What is its tr,th val,eK7 or 7What are its syntactic propertiesK7 Aones +o,ld likely perceive the =,estions as very =,eer indeed. >etters on eyecharts si(ply do not have syntactic or se(antic properties. 2oreover, it +o,ld !e possi!le for Aones to learn to identify the sy(!ol correctly even if he had never ,sed the Go(an letters in the representation of (eanin"f,l disco,rse, (,ch as he (i"ht learn to distin",ish Chinese ideo"ra(s +itho,t learnin" their (eanin"s or the syntactic r,les for ChineseHand even +itho,t learnin" that the ideo"ra(s +ere ,sed !y the Chinese as a for( of +ritin". )ven +ith s,ch a poverty of co(petence +ith +ritten lan",a"e, Aones co,ld still !e said to have reco"niDed and identified +hat he sa+ as a token of the type , .

6.;.20 Case 20T)e -ilin*ual


Pet if +e ad8,st the circ,(stances in the ri"ht +ays, it =,ickly !eco(es (ore diffic,lt to characteriDe +hat Aones has and has not acco(plished. S,ppose that Aones "oes to a second opto(etrist, ;r. Enassis. ;r. Enassis lives and +orks in a 4reek nei"h!orhood and has a n,(!er of clients +ho speak and read only 4reek, and so he has t+o sets of eyechartsHone +ith 4reek letters, one +ith )n"lish letters. When Aones looks thro,"h the eyepiece of ;r. Enassis?s instr,(ent, he sees the follo+in" pattern: $ ;r. Enassis asks Aones, 7What letter do yo, seeK7 9nd Aones responds, 7*he letter , .7 9t this, ho+ever, ;r. Enassis casts Aones a very p,DDled look. He then looks at the eyechart and la,"hs. 7Eh, . see,7 he says. 7. (ade a (istake, and p,t ,p the 4reek eyechart instead of the )n"lish one, and then . +as p,DDled, !eca,se the )n"lish chart !e"ins +ith the letter 1 and does not even contain a letter , . What yo, see, !y the +ay, isn?t a , !,t a rho.7 *his e1a(ple differs fro( the first in that o,r nat,ral int,itions a!o,t +hat Aones has and has not acco(plished no lon"er serve ,s as +ell as they did in the first case. .ndeed, they (ay tend to lead people to+ards t+o opposite e1tre(es. *o contin,e the story: Aones, ,pon !ein" told that +hat he is lookin" at is not a , at all, !eco(es =,ite indi"nant. 7Ef co,rse it?s a , ,7 he says. 7. kno+ +hat a ,

looks like, and . can see this one as 5 9- 5 plain as day, and it?s a , if ever .?ve seen oneN7 *his, ho+ever, is taken !y the doctor as a challen"e to his professional co(petence. 7>ook here,7 he says, 7. (ade this chart (yself, so . kno+ darned +ell +hat the letters are. . (ade it for (y 4reek patients, and (eant this sy(!ol to !e a rho, so a rho is +hat it isN7 Aones and the doctor are each partially correct in their clai(s, and each is partially (istaken as +ell. *he (ost i(portant thin" to see, ho+ever, is that they are !oth (akin" the i(plicit ass,(ption that there is 8,st one ,nivocal (eanin" to the loc,tional sche(a ?is a , ? /or ?is a rho?0, +hile in fact there are several +ays a partic,lar (ay !e said to !e a token of a conventional type. *he necessary distinctions are easily (issed, ho+ever, !eca,se the sa(e )n"lish loc,tion can !e ,sed to e1press each of the several +ays. Pet the distinctions (ay !e for(,lated o,t of fairly ordinary )n"lish loc,tions, and are easily (astered if one attends to the nat,re of the sit,ation rather than the for( of the ordinary loc,tions.

6.;.40 Interpretability
'irst, consider Aones?s line of reasonin": Aones is a co(petent ,ser of the letters e(ployed in the representation of )n"lish. /Here they +ill !e called 7the Go(an letters.70 *he pattern he sees (eets the spatial criteria for co,ntin" as a token of the (arker type , . Under the conventions "overnin" the Go(an letters, the pattern Aones sees can co,nt as a , , and cannot co,nt as a token of any of the other (arker types +hich for( the set of Go(an letters. *here is th,s a sense of 7!ein" a , 7 +hich does apply to the (ark on the eyechart. 6otice, ho+ever, that the e1position of ho+ the character Aones sees can !e said to !e a , has re=,ired an appeal to several thin"s in addition to the (ark and the (arker typeHnota!ly, it has re=,ired an appeal to /a 0 a co((,nity +hich e(ploys a certain set of (arker types +hich incl,des , , and /b 0 conventions +ithin that co((,nity +hich "overn +hat can co,nt as a token of that (arker type. *he sense of 7!ein" a , 7 that is operative here, then, t,rns o,t to !e (ore co(ple1 than is s,""ested !y the loc,tion ,sed to e1press it. *o p,t it differently, the predicate indicated !y this ,sa"e of the loc,tional sche(a ?is a , ? is (ore co(ple1 than one (i"ht ass,(e. *o spell o,t entirely the sense in +hich Aones (i"ht !e ri"ht in sayin" that +hat he sees is a , , one +o,ld have to say so(ethin" like the follo+in": 7*his (ark t has a pattern pi +hich is a (e(!er of the set , of patterns s,ita!le for tokenin" the (arker type T e(ployed !y lin",istic co((,nity : .7 5 9& 5 We (ay capt,re and codify this sense of 7!ein" a sy(!ol7 !y coinin" the technical e1pression ?is interpreta!le as a token of type T ? /e."., ?is interpreta!le as a rho?0. *he r,les for the application of this predicate (ay !e artic,lated as follo+s: /210 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable as a to en of mar er type T iff /10 there is so(e lin",istic co((,nity : +hich e(ploys (arker type T , /@0 the conventions in : +hich "overn +hat can co,nt as a token of type T allo+ any o!8ect havin" any

pattern pi<, :Tp1 , . . . , p n U to !e s,ita!le to co,nt as a token of type T , /#0 5 has a pattern p 8 , and /J0 p8<p . *his sense of 7!ein" a , 7 points to a relationship !et+een /10 a physical partic,lar, /@0 a pattern present in that partic,lar, /#0 a convention linkin" that pattern to a (arker type, and /J0 a lin",istic co((,nity ,sin" that (arker type and e(ployin" that convention. 9n o!8ect 5 related in s,ch a fashion to a (arker type T +ill !e said to !e interpretable as a (mar er) to en of type T (under con"ention C) (for linguistic group :) . *he parentheses are ,sed here to separate a short for( of the ne+ technical ter(H?interpreta!le as a token of type T ?Hfro( its co(plete for(. .n (any cases it +ill prove ,nnecessary to all,de specifically to a convention or a lin",istic "ro,p, and so the shortened loc,tion ?interpreta!le as a token of type T ? can p,rchase so(e (eas,re of si(plicity +ith little cost in ter(s of e1actit,de. *he ite(s in parentheses, ho+ever, are not optional Hany clai( that a physical pattern is interpreta!le as a token of a (arker type involves at least i(plicit reference to a convention and to a lin",istic co((,nity, even if these are not specified. .t is, of co,rse, =,ite possi!le for a sin"le o!8ect 5 to !e interpreta!le as a token of a n,(!er of different (arker types TT 1, . . . , Tn U. .n each of the opto(etrist e1a(ples, the o!8ect Aones sees is interpreta!le ,nder the conventions for Go(an letters as a , and interpreta!le ,nder the conventions for 4reek letters as a rho. .t (ay !e s,!8ect to interpretation as a token of other (arker types as +ell. *here is no inconsistency in sayin" that a (ark is interpreta!le as a token of a variety of different types. S,ch ill,sion of an inconsistency as there (ay !e is =,ickly dispelled if one looks at the lon" +ay of descri!in" interpreta!ility. .f one says 75 5 99 5 is interpreta!le as a token of type T 7 and 75 is interpreta!le as a token of type = ,7 the lon" versions of the t+o state(ents +ill al+ays reveal additional differences +hich +ill e1plain ho+ it is that 5 is (,ltiply interpreta!le. *hese +ill !e differences in +hat lin",istic co((,nity?s conventions are involved /as in the case of the !ilin",al opto(etrist0, or differences in the partic,lar conventions of a sin"le co((,nity +hich are operative in the different cases /as in the case of the n,(eral Dero and the letter o in o,r co((,nity0, or differences in +hat pattern in each partic,lar (ark is relevant to its interpreta!ility as a (arker of that type.LJM

6.;.60 Intentional To/enin* and "ut)orin* Intentions

.f Aones has so(ethin" of a point, the doctor does as +ell. *he doctor?s line of ar",(ent is that he dre+ the eyechart hi(self, and as a conse=,ence he is in a special position to say +hat the characters are. .ndeed, he (i"ht "o so far as to say that he is in a position to stipulate +hat they are. *he (ark on the chart +as, after all, (ade +ith the intention that it !e a token of a partic,lar (arker typeHin this case that it !e a token of the 4reek letter rho. *here is th,s a sense in +hich it see(s ri"ht to say that the doctor inscri!ed a rho. 9nd in this sense it +o,ld not !e correct to say that he inscri!ed a , , !eca,se he did not intend it to !e a , . Hence, in distinction +ith the interpretability of a partic,lar o!8ect 5 as a token of type T , one (ay also develop another technical loc,tion:

/2@0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to have !een intended (by S) as a to en of mar er type T iff /10 there is so(e lin",istic co((,nity : that e(ploys (arker type T , /@0 there is a lan",a"e ,ser S +ho is a (e(!er of : /or is other+ise a!le to e(ploy the conventions in : "overnin" (arker type T 0, /#0 S inscri!ed, ,ttered, or other+ise 7a,thored7 5 , and /J0 S intended +hat he a,thored to co,nt as a token of type T !y virt,e of conventions in : "overnin" (arker type T . Several clarifications and caveats are i((ediately in order. 'irst, the ter( ?intended? is (eant very !roadly here. 6ota!ly, it need not i(ply that the a,thor of the (ark (,st have a conscio,s, lin",istically for(,lated characteriDation of +hat he is doin" in prod,cin" the (arker. 5 1$$ 5 When so(eone +rites a sentence +itho,t any e1plicit a+areness of (akin" (arks +ith a pen, he +o,ld, accordin" to this ,sa"e, 7intend7 his (arks to !e letters of partic,lar types.L%M *his ,se of ?intend? is also (eant to allo+ a "reat deal of latit,de in ho+ direct a ca,sal chain there is !et+een the intention of the a,thor of the (arker and its ,lti(ate prod,ction. 6ota!ly, it is intended to !e !road eno,"h to cover at least so(e instances of the printin" of stored representations of te1t !y a co(p,ter. *he e1planation of ho+ the (arks on a printed pa"eHa pa"e of a !ook, for e1a(pleHare said to co,nt as letters /and ho+ con"lo(erations of the( are to co,nt as +ords, sentences, state(ents, and ar",(ents0 +ill need to appeal in part to the intentions of the a,thor. /.t (ay also need to appeal to the intentions of the vario,s en"ineers and pro"ra((ers +ho desi"ned the hard+are, soft+are, and codin" sche(es +hich (ediate the process +hich !e"ins +ith the a,thor?s strikin" keys on a key!oard and ends +ith the prod,ction of a printed pa"e.0 9 second clarification +hich needs to !e (ade is this: the a,thor of a (arker token (ay intend it to !e a token of (ore than one type. Within the story a!o,t the !ilin",al opto(etrist, one sho,ld say that the (ark +hich Aones sa+ +as interpreta!le as a , and interpreta!le as a rho, !,t that it +as intended as a rho and not intended as a , . .n de"ising the t+o scenarios ,sed in this tho,"ht e1peri(ent, ho+ever, the visi!le pattern that +as chosenHna(ely, $ H+as deli!erately chosen precisely for its s,scepti!ility to (,ltiple interpretations. Ene co,ld devise (ore co(ple1 enterprises +hich t,rn ,pon s,ch a(!i",ities, s,ch as acrostics +hich (ake sense in t+o lan",a"es, or +hich (ake sense in one lan",a"e vertically and another horiDontally. /.n spoken lan",a"e, p,ns (i"ht +ell fall into this cate"ory. *ake for e1a(ple the case of >e+is Carroll?s 7We called hi( the *ortoise !eca,se he taught us, 7 +hich +orks in British !,t not 9(erican )n"lish !eca,se the e1pressions ?tortoise? and ?ta,"ht ,s? so,nd the sa(e in British )n"lish, !,t different in 9(erican )n"lish.0 'ro( these t+o clarifications a third e(er"esHna(ely, that there is roo( for so(e very different +ays of intendin" an ,tterance or inscription to co,nt as a token of (ore than one type. Here are a fe+ e1a(pies: /10 .n devisin" the , rho e1a(ple, the intention +as to find an inscription that co,ld clearly co,nt as a token of either of t+o (arker types +hich (i"ht !e pres,(ed to !e fa(iliar to those likely to read these pa"es. /@0 .n le"al, political, and diplo(atic enterprises, it is often dee(ed

5 1$1 5 pr,dent to choose +hat one says or +rites so that it has (,ltiple interpretationsHin partic,lar, so that it has one nat,ral interpretation that is likely to appeal to the hearer or reader, and another (ore e1actin" interpretation +hich can !e offered as +hat +as 7really (eant7 at a later date. /'or e1a(ple, pro(isin" 7no ne+ ta1es7 does not, strictly speakin", involve pro(isin" that e1istin" ta1es +ill not !e raised !y 1$ percent or even 1$$$ percent.0 *his kind of intentional a(!i",ity is (ost i(portant on the se(antic level, !,t co,ld occ,r at the level of (arker interpreta!ility as +ell. /#0 9 sli"htly different for( of a(!i",ity is present +hen +hat is said or +ritten is intended to !e interpreta!le in (ore than one +ay, all of +hich are intended to !e ,nderstood !y the hearer or reader, +ho then chooses +hich le" of the a(!i",ity to treat as operative. 9n e1pression of interest in doin" !,siness to"ether in the f,t,re, for e1a(ple, can !e treated as an openin" (ove in ne"otiations to do !,siness or as a (ere e1pression of "ood +ill. Properly ,sed and properly ,nderstood, s,ch a(!i",o,s e1pressions can allo+ t+o parties to e1plore one another?s interests +itho,t risk of 7losin" face.7 /*his practice is reportedly e1pected !y Aapanese in !,siness dealin"s to a de"ree seldo( appreciated !y 9(erican !,siness(en.0

6.;.70 "3tual Interpretation

.n addition to the interpretability of a (arker token and its intended interpretation, one (ay identify t+o additional relationships !et+een a partic,lar (arker token and a (arker type. *he first of these is (actual) interpretation of the fi",re as a (arker of so(e partic,lar type. .n !oth of the opto(etrist e1a(ples, Aones interprets the fi",re he sees as a letter of a fa(iliar typeHhe identifies each as a , 3token. Ene (i"ht +ant to say there is a sense in +hich he +as right in so identifyin" each /!eca,se each is interpreta!le ,nder )n"lish conventions as a , 0 or that there is a sense in +hich he +as 'rong in his identification of the second fi",re /!eca,se its a,thor intended it to !e a rho and did not intend it to !e a , 0. B,t neither of these facts alters one fact a!o,t +hat Aones did: na(ely, he placed an interpretation ,pon a fi",re he sa+C he interpreted it as or too it to be a , 3token. Ence a"ain, the ne+ ter(inolo"y has hidden references to (arker types, conventions "overnin" +hat can co,nt as tokens of the types, and lin",istic co((,nities +hich ,se the types. *o interpret a fi",re as a token of type T is to !e fa(iliar +ith (arker type T e(ployed !y so(e lin",istic co((,nity : , +hich in t,rn involves ,nderstandin" /not nec3 5 1$@ 5 essarily perfectly0 ho+ to apply the criteria for interpreta!ility as a token of that type /tho,"h the 7,nderstandin"7 does not necessarily involve the a!ility to for( or conscio,sly artic,late a r,le for +hat can and cannot co,nt as a , , !,t is !etter ,nderstood as a kind of competence 0. *his notion of act,al interpretation (ay once a"ain !e e1pressed !y a (ore technical definition: /2#0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to have !een interpreted (by H) as a to en of mar er type T iff /10 there is so(e lin",istic co((,nity : +hich e(ploys (arker type T , /@0 there is a lan",a"e ,ser H +ho is a (e(!er of : /or is other+ise a!le to e(ploy the conventions in : "overnin" (arker type T 0, /#0 H sa+, heard, or other+ise apprehended 5 , and /J0 H constr,ed 5 as a token of type T .

6o+ it is i(portant to see the distinction !et+een a,thorin" intentions and (ere interpretations. 'or +hile a,thorin" intentions do, in a sense, involve interpretation, the a,thor of a (arker?s intention is not 78,st another interpretation.7 *here is a si"nificant difference !et+een ;r. Enassis?s ori"inal interpretation of the fi",re on his eyechartHthe one that +as involved in its a,thorin"Hand Aones?s interpretation of it, and this leads to o,r stron" int,ition that there is a sense in +hich the fi",re 7is a rho7 and 7is not a , .7 *he difference !et+een intended interpretation, or authoring interpretation, and other interpretations of the sa(e fi",re also applies to ;r. Enassis?s o'n later interpretations of +hat he has inscri!ed. *he a,thor of a (arker token is certainly likely to !e in a ,ni=,e episte(ic position +ith re"ard to +hat the token +as (eant to !e, even lon" after he has !ro,"ht it into !ein", and hence he is ,s,ally accorded ,ni=,e a,thority in clarifyin" any a(!i",ities +hich (i"ht !e spotted. B,t the reason for this is precisely that he is !elieved to kno+ !etter than anyone else +hat he intended to +rite or ,tter, and it is +hat he intended that deter(ines 7+hat it is7 in one senseHna(ely, in the sense capt,red !y the technical loc,tion ?intended to !e a token of type T .? /6ote, for e1a(ple, that the a,thor?s Lc,rrentM interpretation of his +ords and actions is not accorded the sa(e respect if its fidelity to his original intent is in =,estionHif he is a defendant in a li!el s,it, for e1a(ple, or if he has s,ffered a loss of (e(ory.0L6M 5 1$# 5

6.;.(0 Interpretability9in9$rin3iple
*here is one +ay of 7!ein" a sy(!ol7 that is yet to !e disc,ssed. .t is (ost easily developed for si"nifiersHand +ill !e shortlyH!,t can !e developed for (arkers as +ell, al!eit +ith less int,itive appeal. 9"ain let ,s perfor( a tho,"ht e1peri(ent. 9ss,(e that there is a sandstone cliff in the 4rand Canyon that !ears certain dark patterns a"ainst a li"hter !ack"ro,nd. >et ,s ass,(e, (oreover, that there are no act,al ortho"raphic conventions, past or present, !y virt,e of +hich these patterns +o,ld !e interpreta!le as (arker tokens. *he patterns are not no+ interpreta!le as (arker tokens. B,t consider the f,t,re. .t co,ld !e the case that so(e f,t,re c,lt,re +ill develop an ortho"raphy +hose conventions +ill !e s,ch that the patterns on the sandstone cliff +o,ld then !e interpreta!le as (arkers in that ortho"raphy. .t co,ld even !e that (e(!ers of that c,lt,re +o,ld nat,rally perceive the cliff as !earin" a (eanin"f,l (essa"e in their lan",a"e. >et ,s call this scenario 7',t,re A .7 6o+ of co,rse it co,ld also !e the case that s,ch a c,lt,re +ill not ariseHthat it +ill never !e the case that there is a c,lt,re any+here that +ill e(ploy conventions !y virt,e of +hich the patterns on the cliff face +o,ld !e rendered interpreta!le as (arker tokens. Call this scenario 7',t,re % .7 6o+ it +o,ld see( to (ake so(e sense to say that the patterns on the cliff face are already suitable to co,nt as (arkers, "iven the e1istence of the ri"ht sorts of conventions. .t see(s ri"ht to say that, if only the ri"ht sorts of conventions +ere adoptedHfor e1a(ple, the conventions that are event,ally adopted in ',t,re A !,t not in ',t,re % Hthose patterns +o,ld then !e interpreta!le as (arkers. *o p,t it sli"htly differently, +e (i"ht say that, +hile those patterns are not in fact interpreta!le /,nder any actual conventions0 as (arkers, they are nonetheless interpretable!in!principle as (arkers ,nder conventions that co,ld !e /or co,ld have !een0 adopted, and their !ein" so interpreta!le3in3principle is independent of +hich f,t,reHA or % Hact,ally co(es a!o,t. *his notion of interpretability!in!principle can !e developed (ore e1actly as follo+s: /2J0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable!in!principle as a to en of a mar er type T iff /10 a lin",istic co((,nity co,ld, in principle, e(ploy conventions "overnin" a (arker type T s,ch that

any o!8ect havin" any pattern pi<, :Tp1 , . . . , pn U +o,ld !e s,ita!le to co,nt as a token of type T , 5 1$J 5 /@0 5 has a pattern p 8 , and /#0 p8<p . *hat is, for any o!8ect 5 one (i"ht consider, if 5 has so(e pattern that co,ld, in principle, !e ,sed as the criterion for a (arker type, then 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker. /Ene co,ld, for e1a(ple, esta!lish a convention +here!y spherical o!8ects co,ld co,nt as (arkers of a partic,lar type, and hence "lo!es, oran"es, and planets are interpreta!le3in3principle as (arkers.0 6o+ it sho,ld !e i((ediately evident that this notion of interpretability!in!principle is e1tre(ely per(issive. 'or +hile the ran"e of patterns that h,(an !ein"s can easily e(ploy for (arker types is rather li(ited, and the ran"e of patterns they do in fact e(ploy is (ore li(ited still, this is (ore a conse=,ence of the nat,re of o,r !odies than of the nat,re of (arkers. *he patterns +e ,se for (arkers are chosen for the ease +ith +hich +e can perceive and i(ple(ent the(. *h,s ,ntil very recently (arker types +ere confined lar"ely to those distin",ished !y patterns that co,ld !e easily seen or heard. With the aid of instr,(ents, ho+ever, h,(ans can deal +ith (arkers that are distin",ished !y patterns of volta"e levels in a +ire or across a field of circ,its, or !y patterns of (a"netic activity, or !y vario,s other kinds of patterns. 9nd there is no reason +hy a !ein" +ith very different po+ers and senses co,ld not ,se very different sorts of thin"s as (arkers. /*o take an e1tre(e e1a(ple: an all3 po+erf,l 4od (i"ht ,se confi",rations of stars as criteria for (arker types e(ployed in storin" (essa"es for very lar"e an"els, and ,se patterns of electron activity in a sin"le ato( as criteria for (arker types ,sed to send (essa"es to very s(all an"els.0 9s a conse=,ence, it +o,ld see( that everythin" +hatsoever is interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker token.

6.;.;0 T)e !our 1odalities

*he e1pression ?is a (arker? has !een replaced !y fo,r loc,tional sche(as that have !een "iven technical definitions: H?is interpretable /,nder convention C of lin",istic "ro,p : 0 as a (arker of type M ? H?+as intended /!y its a,thor S 0 as a (arker of type M ? H?+as interpreted /!y so(e H 0 as a (arker of type M ? H?is interpretable!in!principle as a (arker? 5 1$% 5 *o these fo,r loc,tional sche(as correspond +hat (i"ht !e called four modalities of con"entional being, or fo,r +ays in +hich an o!8ect can !e related to a conventionally esta!lished type /tho,"h in the case of interpreta!ility3in3principle, the conventions and the type need not !e act,al0. *hese fo,r (odalities can !e applied not only to (arkers, !,t to other conventionally esta!lished types as +ell, as +e shall see presently. *hese loc,tional sche(es, (oreover, are intended to capt,re and distin",ish fo,r different senses in +hich one (i"ht speak of an o!8ect 7!ein"7 a (arker /e."., a letter or a 2orse code dot0 or 7!ein"7 of one of the other conventionally esta!lished types. *hese different senses are, to

so(e e1tent, already operative in ordinary and technical ,ses of the +ord ?sy(!ol?, !,t e1istin" ter(inolo"y is not s,!tle eno,"h to distin",ish the different senses.

6.<0 !our Ways o+ -ein* a Si*ni+ier

A,st as it is i(portant to distin",ish fo,r senses of 7!ein" a (arker,7 it is like+ise i(portant to distin",ish fo,r different senses in +hich a (arker (ay !e said to 7have7 or 7!ear7 se(antic properties, and hence fo,r +ays in +hich a (arker (ay !e said to !e a si"nifier. .n order to clarify these fo,r senses, +e shall e(ploy another tho,"ht e1peri(ent. *he "reat detective Sherlock Hol(es has !een called in to solve a (,rder case. *he victi(, a +ealthy !,t ,npleasant la+yer, has !een poisoned. Before dyin", ho+ever, he (ana"ed to +rite a sin"le +ord on a piece of paper. *he inscription is P9.6 .nspector >estrade of Scotland Pard has concl,ded that the deceased +as (erely e1pressin" the e1cr,ciatin" a"ony that preceded his death. Hol(es, ho+ever, (akes f,rther investi"ations and discovers that the victi(?s 'rench ho,sekeeper is also his sole heir. .t occ,rs to Hol(es that ?pain? is the 'rench +ord for !read, and ,pon in=,irin" he discovers that the ho,sekeeper did indeed do the !akin" for the ho,sehold. Perhaps, reasons Hol(es, the deceased +as poisoned !y +ay of the !read, and has tried to indicate !oth the (eans !y +hich the poison +as conveyed and the identity of his (,rderess !y +ritin" the 'rench +ord for !read. Which +as inscri!ed on the dead la+yer?s stationeryHthe )n"lish +ord ?pain? /(eanin" a partic,lar kind of sensation0 or the 'rench +ord ?pain? /(eanin" !read0K *o p,t it differently, +hat does the inscription mean Hpain or !readK .t sho,ld i((ediately !e evident that this =,es3 5 1$6 5 tion is very (,ch like the =,estion a!o,t the fi",re on the !ilin",al opto(etrist?s eyechart. 'irst, there is a sense in +hich +hat is on the paper is interpretable /,nder )n"lish conventions0 as meaning pain . .n this very sa(e sense the (ark on the paper is interpretable /,nder 'rench conventions0 as meaning bread . *hat is, the se=,ence of Go(an letters on the stationery is ,sed !y )n"lish speakers to carry one (eanin" and ,sed !y 'rench speakers to carry a different (eanin". Pet there is also a sense in +hich the inscription can !e said to (ean one thin" and not the other, provided that one ass,(es that the victi( intended +hat he +rote to (ean one thin" rather than the other. .f Hol(es?s hypothesis is correct, for e1a(ple, the la+yer (eant to +rite the 'rench +ord for !read and did not (ean to +rite the )n"lish +ord for pain. 9ss,(in" that this +as the case, there is a sense in +hich the inscription can !e said to (ean !read !,t not to (ean pain. *his distinction !et+een t+o +ays a (arker token can !e related to a (eanin" sho,ld see( fa(iliar, as it parallels the first t+o +ays an o!8ect co,ld !e said to 7!e7 a (arker tokenHna(ely, interpretability and intended /or authoring 0 interpretation . /S10 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable as signifying (meaning, referring to) 8 iff /10 5 is interpreta!le as a (arker of so(e type T e(ployed !y lin",istic "ro,p : , and /@0 there is a convention a(on" (e(!ers of : that (arkers of type T (ay !e ,sed to si"nify /(ean, refer to0 8 . /S@0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e intended (by S) to signify (mean, refer to) 8 iff

/10 5 +as prod,ced !y so(e lan",a"e ,ser S , /@0 S intended 5 to !e a (arker of so(e type T , /#0 S !elieved that there are conventions +here!y T 3tokens (ay !e ,sed to si"nify P, and /J0 S intended 5 to si"nify P !y virt,e of !ein" a T 3token. *+o o!servations sho,ld perhaps !e noted a!o,t these definitions. 'irst, neither of the( is intended to correspond precisely to +hat is (eant !y the vernac,lar ,sa"e of the +ords ?(eanin"? or ?reference?. .ndeed, the +hole enterprise of specifyin" ne+ ter(s s,ch as these is necessary only !eca,se ordinary ,sa"e is a(!i",o,s and i(precise. .n as3 5 1$- 5 s,(in" that the inscription (eant pain, >estrade +as pro!a!ly /i(plicitly0 ass,(in" both that the inscription +as interpreta!le ,nder )n"lish conventions as carryin" the (eanin" pain and that the deceased had intended the inscription to (ean pain. B,t his ass,(ption +o,ld !e i(plicit in that he has pro!a!ly never (ade the distinction ,nder disc,ssion. .t is only +hen so(eone like Hol(es notices that the ordinary ass,(ptions do not al+ays hold that distinctions can !e (ade, and at s,ch a point it is of little interest to the specialist /!e he detective or philosopher0 to ar",e a!o,t +hether interpreta!ility or a,thorin" intention or the co(!ination of the t+o !est capt,res the 7real7 /i.e., the vernac,lar, precritical0 ,se of the ter( ?(eanin"? /or ?reference?0. .t is the ne+, (ore refined ter(s that are needed. *he deter(ination of vernac,lar ,sa"e (ay !e left to the descriptive lin",ist. Pet there is (ost definitely no intention here to i(ply that ordinary ,sa"e is irrelevant in the p,rs,it of philosophy. 9ttention to ordinary ,sa"e can often !e of "reat help in solvin" philosophical pro!le(s, especially +hen those pro!le(s are the(selves ca,sed !y an i(poverished ,nderstandin" of lan",a"e on the part of the philosopher. *he point here is that lan",a"e points to the pheno(ena to !e st,died, and so(eti(es it points too va",ely and indistinctly to serve the p,rposes of the theorist. When this happens, ter(inolo"y (,st !e refined to capt,re distinctions the specialist needs !,t the ordinary person does not. *he enterprise is far (ore risky +hen the process proceeds in the opposite directionH that is, +hen ordinary ter(s are e3tended instead of refined . *he application of the ter(s ?sy(!ol? and ?representation? to the contents of intentional states is a case in point. /*his entire !ook is an e1a(ination of +hat has "one +ron" in the e1tension of s,ch ordinary ter(s as ?sy(!ol? and ?representation?.0 *he second o!servation a!o,t these definitions is that the definition of a,thorin" intention allo+s for the possi!ility that the speaker is +ildly idiosyncratic in his ,se of lan",a"e. .f, for e1a(ple, Aones !elieves that the +ord ?cat? is ,sed to refer to ne+spapers, and ,tters 7*he cat is on the (at7 to e1press the !elief that the ne+spaper is on the (at, +e (ay nonetheless say that Aones intended to signify the ne+spaper. .n partic,lar, he ,ttered a token of the (arker type ?cat?, +hich he !elieved co,ld !e ,sed to si"nify ne+spapers, and intended to si"nify the ne+spaper !y ,tterin" the +ord ?cat?. Ef co,rse, there is no convention of ;nglish that allo+s the +ord ?cat? to !e ,sed to si"nify ne+spapers. /Utterances of ?cat? are not interpreta!le, ,nder )n"lish conventions, as si"nifyin" ne+spapers.0 B,t Aones nonetheless intended to refer to the ne+spaper !y 5 1$& 5 ,tterin" the +ord ?cat?. 9nd of co,rse there co,ld !e s,!"ro,ps of )n"lish speakers +ho e(ploy se(antic conventions that are not conventions of )n"lish, !,t only of a dialect of )n"lish /as, for

e1a(ple, so(e Balti(oreans refer to street vendors as 79ra!s7 Lprono,nced ay 3ra!DM, or Bostonians refer to s,!(arine sand+iches as 7"rinders70. 9nd indeed one (i"ht even +ish to speak of idiolects in ter(s of the special se(antic conventions of a lin",istic s,!"ro,p consistin" of one (e(!er, in +hich case Aones correctly !elieves that there is a convention licensin" the ,se of ?cat? to refer to ne+spapers, !,t incorrectly !elieves that it is a convention of )n"lish rather than of his o+n idiolect. Ene (i"ht +ish to ,se the ter( ?convention? in s,ch a case !eca,se there are !eliefs and practices that can "overn ho+ a (arker (ay !e ,sed. *hese !eliefs and practices are, in principle, p,!lic and sharea!le, even tho,"h in fact only one person possesses the(. /Beca,se they are essentially p,!lic, and the fact that they are possessed !y only one person is (erely incidental, Witt"enstein?s concerns a!o,t a private lan",a"e do not arise here.0 *hird, it sho,ld !e noted that the se(antic feat,res to +hich these definitions are relevant are (eanin" and reference. *he tr,th val,e of a si"nifier is ,ndeter(ined !y the relationships !et+een the token, lin",istic conventions, and the intentions of its speaker or inscri!er. /*here are so(e e1ceptions, s,ch as analytic tr,ths, !,t here the interest is in a "eneral characteriDation of +ays o!8ects can !e said to have se(antic properties.0 .n addition to interpreta!ility /,nder conventions e(ployed !y so(e lin",istic "ro,p0 and intended interpretation, one (ay distin",ish t+o additional +ays in +hich a thin" (ay !e said to carry a se(antic val,e. *hese correspond to the t+o re(ainin" +ays that a fi",re co,ld !e said to co,nt as a (arker token: na(ely, actual interpretation (by someone apprehending the signifier) and interpretability!in!principle . Ge"ardless of +hat the deceased la+yer intended his inscription to (ean, it is nonetheless the case that it +as interpreted !y >estrade as (eanin" pain and interpreted !y Hol(es as (eanin" !read. *hese act,al acrs of interpretation are, indeed, independent of +hether the la+yer intended his inscription to (ean anything at all Hthey +o,ld !e ,naltered if, for e1a(ple, he had !een scri!!lin" rando( letters. *he notion of actual interpretation (ay !e defined for si"nifiers as follo+s: /S#0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to have !een interpreted (by H) as signifying (meaning, referring to) 8 iff /10 so(e lan",a"e ,ser H apprehended 8 , 5 1$9 5 /@0 H interpreted 5 as a token of so(e (arker type T , /#0 H !elieved there to !e a lin",istic convention C licensin" the ,se of T 3tokens to si"nify 8 , and /J0 H constr,ed 5 as si"nifyin" 8 !y virt,e of !ein" a T 3token. 'inally, it is notorio,s that any sy(!ol str,ct,re /i.e., any (arker, si(ple or co(ple10 can !e ,sed to !ear any se(antic interpretation +hatsoever. Ha,"eland, for e1a(ple, +rites of a set of n,(erical inscriptions he s,pplies as e1a(ples in Mind 6esign that 7for(ally, these n,(erals and si"ns are 8,st ne,tral (arks /tokens0, and (any other /,nfa(iliar0 interpretations are possi!le /as if the o,tp,ts +ere in a code07 /Ha,"eland 19&1: @%0. 9nd Pylyshyn +rites of sy(!ols in co(p,ters, )ven +hen it is diffic,lt to think of a coherent interpretation different fro( the one the pro"ra((er had in (ind, s,ch alternatives are, in principle, al+ays possi!le. /*here is an e1otic res,lt in (odel theory, the >o+enhei(3Skole( theore(, +hich ",arantees that s,ch pro"ra(s can al+ays !e coherently interpreted as referrin" to inte"ers and to arith(etic relations over the(.0 /Pylyshyn 19&J: JJ0 .n the ter(inolo"y developed in this chapter, +hat this (eans is that there is nothin" a!o,t (arkers that places intrinsic li(its ,pon +hat interpretations they (ay !e assi"ned, and so it is possi!le for there to

!e conventions +hich assi"n any interpretation one likes to any (arker type one likes. 6o+ there are t+o different +ays in +hich +e (i"ht +ish to for(,late this insi"ht. Ene +ay of for(,latin" it +o,ld !e to say that, for any (arker type T and any interpretation 8 , it is possi!le for there to !e a se(antic convention to the effect that 8 3tokens are interpreta!le as si"nifyin" T . .n ter(s of a technical definition: /SJ0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable!in!principle as signifying 8 iff /10 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as a token of so(e (arker type *, and /@0 there co,ld !e a lin",istic co((,nity : that e(ployed a lin",istic convention C s,ch that T 3tokens +o,ld !e interpreta!le as si"nifyin" P ,nder convention C . *hat is, to say of so(e 5 and so(e 8 that 75 is interpreta!le3in3principle as si"nifyin" 8 7 is to say /10 that one co,ld, in principle, have a (arker convention +here!y 5 +o,ld !e interpreta!le as a (arker of so(e type 5 11$ 5 T , and /@0 that one co,ld, in principle, have a se(antic convention C +here!y T 3tokens +o,ld !e interpreta!le as si"nifyin" 8 . Ene (i"ht, ho+ever, +ish to characteriDe se(antic interpreta!ilityin3principle in a different (anner. 9ll that is necessary for an o!8ect 5 to !e interpreta!le3in3principle as si"nifyin" 8 is the availa!ility of an interpretation sche(e that (aps 5 ?s (arker type onto 8 . 9nd all that this re=,ires is that 5 !e interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker, and that there !e a (appin" availa!le fro( a set of (arker types to a set of interpretations that takes 5 ?s (arker type onto 8 . .n ter(s of a technical definition: /SJQ 0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable!in!principle as signifying 8 iff /10 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as a token of so(e (arker type T , /@0 there is a (appin" M availa!le fro( a set of (arker types incl,din" T to a set of interpretations incl,din" 8 , and /#0 M(T) > 8 . ;efinitions /SJ0 and /SJQ 0 are e1tensionally e=,ivalent for real and co,nterfact,al cases. Under either definition, for any o!8ect 5 and any interpretation 8 that one (i"ht specify,L-M5 is interpreta!le3in3 principle as si"nifyin" 8 . 'irst, +e have already seen that every o!8ect is interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker token of so(e type T . 6o+, accordin" to definition /SJ0, all that is additionally necessary for 5 to !e interpreta!le3in3principle as si"nifyin" 8 is that one co,ld, in principle, have a convention licensin" T 3tokens as si"nifyin" 8 . B,t one co,ld, in principle, have s,ch a convention for any type T and any 8 . Si(ilarly, accordin" to definition /SJQ 0, +hat is necessary for 5 to !e interpreta!le3in3 principle as si"nifyin" 8 /over and a!ove 5 ?s !ein" interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker of so(e type T 0 is the availa!ility of a (appin" M fro( (arker types to interpretations s,ch that 8 is the i(a"e of T ,nder M . S,ch a (appin" is (erely an a!stract relation !et+een t+o sets, ho+ever, and there is s,ch a (appin", for any type T and any 8 , that (aps T onto 8 . So !oth /SJ0 and /SJQ 0 license the concl,sion that every o!8ect is interpreta!le3in3principle as si"nifyin" anythin" +hatsoever. *his concl,sion (ay see( !land in and of itself, !,t it is i(portant to distin",ish this sense of 7havin" a (eanin"7 or 7havin" a referent7 fro(

5 111 5 other, (ore ro!,st senses. .t is all the (ore i(portant to do so since co(p,tationalists see( at ti(es to !e interested in this sort of 7havin" a (eanin",7 !,t do not al+ays (ake it ade=,ately clear +hat role /if any0 it plays in their acco,nts of se(antics and intentionality for co"nitive states.

6.'0 !our 1odalities +or Counters

*he fo,r conventional (odalities are also applica!le to co,nters. Get,rnin" to the opto(etrist e1a(ples, s,ppose that the opto(etrist?s instr,(ent is ad8,sted so that Aones can see (ore than one sy(!ol at a ti(e. S,ppose, (oreover, that +hat he sees is the follo+in" i(a"e: pV= Aones has 8,st co(e fro( his lo"ic class, and so, +hen asked +hat he sees, says 7p and q .7 *he opto(etrist, ho+ever, is i"norant of the conventions of lo"ic. *o hi(, this is 8,st a line of three characters: the letter p , an a(persand, and the letter q . 9s the doctor sees it, the sy(!ols on the eyechart are not related to one another syntactically, because the 0eyechart game0 does not bare any syntactic rules . Ence a"ain, !oth Aones and the doctor are partially ri"ht, and in (,ch the sa(e +ays they +ere each partially ri"ht in the ori"inal e1a(ples. Aones has a point in that the fi",res he sees are interpreta!le as (arkers of fa(iliar types /and are in this case intended to !e of the types that Aones ",esses0, and he is f,rther(ore ri"ht in seein" that they are arran"ed in a fashion that is interpretable, ,nder the conventions he has !een ta,"ht for the propositional calc,l,s, as havin" a certain syntactic for( in the propositional calc,l,s. Pet the opto(etrist has a point as +ell: the chart at +hich Aones is lookin" +as desi"ned as an eyechart. /We (ay, if +e like, ass,(e once a"ain that the doctor dre+ the chart hi(self, and kno+s =,ite +ell +hat he (eant to dra+.0 .t +as not intended to contain for(,las in the notation e(ployed in propositional lo"ic, and the fact that so(e sy(!ols in the eyechart are interpreta!le as for(in" s,ch a for(,la is =,ite accidental. Si(ilarly, if a dia"onal se=,ence of letters sho,ld !e interpreta!le as a sentence in 2artian, that fact +o,ld !e =,ite accidental. When the a,thor of the eyechart dre+ it, 2artian lan",a"e played no role in his activity, and neither did the propositional calc,l,s. *o ,se ter(inolo"y developed earlier, syntactic relationships did not for( part of the authoring intention +ith +hich the 5 11@ 5

'i",re 6 chart +as created, and so the sy(!ols in =,estion +o,ld not ri"htly !e said to have !een intended to have a partic,lar syntactic for(. .t is, of co,rse, possi!le that so(eone sho,ld devise an eyechart or so(e other display of sy(!ols +ith (ore than one sy(!ol "a(e in (ind. So(eone +ho !elieved in s,!li(inal s,""estion, for e1a(ple, (i"ht devise a display of sy(!ols so that parts of it +ere interpreta!le ,nder standard )n"lish conventions in a fashion that +as not s,pposed to !e conscio,sly reco"niDed !y the reader. *h,s a "reedy opto(etrist (i"ht try to sell e1tra pairs of "lasses !y desi"nin" his eyechart like that sho+n in fi",re 6. .n this case, the fi",res on the chart can !e interpreted in t+o +ays: /10 as characters on an

eyechart, and /@0 as letters for(in" )n"lish +ords that (ake ,p the sentence 7B,y an e1tra pair no+.7 9s they are e(ployed in the 7eyechart "a(e,7 the (arkers on the display do not enter into syntactic relationships, !eca,se syntactic relationships are al+ays relati"e to a system 'ith syntactic rules, and the 7eyechart "a(e7 has no syntactic r,les. 9s (arkers ,sed in the for(ation of an )n"lish sentence token, ho+ever, they are co,nters havin" syntactic properties, !eca,se the )n"lish lan",a"e does have syntactic r,les. .n this e1a(ple, (oreover, the (arkers on the chart are not only /a 0 interpretable as syntactically ,nstr,ct,red tokens in the eyechart "a(e and /b 0 interpretable as syntactically str,ct,red tokens in a +ritten )n"lish sentence, they are also /c 0 intended as syntactically ,nstr,ct,red tokens in the eyechart "a(e and /d 0 intended as syntactically str,ct,red tokens in a +ritten )n"lish sentence. %oth 7"a(es7 are intended !y the a,thor of the chart in this caseH,nlike the earlier case, in +hich the opto(etrist did not intend the line of sy(!ols p!&!q to co,nt as a for(,la str,ct,red !y the r,les of propositional lo"ic, even tho,"h the line of sy(!ols +as nonetheless interpretable as s,ch. 5 11# 5 .n that e1a(ple, (oreover, the line of sy(!ols +as also interpreted /!y Aones0 as a for(,la in propositional calc,l,s notation, and +as interpreted in s,ch a fashion that Aones i(p,ted to it a certain syntactic str,ct,re that is provided for !y propositional lo"ic. *his interpretation is not affected in the least !y the fact that the eyechart +as not desi"ned +ith it in (ind, or even !y the fact that the a,thor of the chart +as ,nfa(iliar +ith propositional lo"ic. 'inally, as in the case of (arkers and si"nifiers, there is infinite latit,de in the +ays a display of (arkers co,ld, in principle, !e interpreted as co,nters of vario,s sorts, !eca,se any "iven (arker type can !e e(ployed in an indefinite n,(!er of syste(s characteriDa!le !y syntactic r,les. 'or any arran"e(ent of (arkers, one co,ld, as Ha,"eland says, 7i(a"ine any n,(!er of /stran"e and !orin"0 "a(es in +hich they +o,ld !e perfectly le"al (oves7 /Ha,"eland 19&1: @%0. .t is no+ possi!le to provide definitions for the fo,r +ays of !ein" a co,nter. *hese definitions +ill not !e e(ployed directly in the ar",(entation that follo+s, !,t are provided for the sake of e1actit,de and !alance in the develop(ent of se(iotic ter(inolo"y. *hey (ay safely !e ski((ed over !y the reader +ho is not interested in the definitions for their o+n sake, !,t only in their contri!,tion to the (ain line of ar",(ent. /C10 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpretable as a counter of type C iff /10 5 is interpreta!le as a (arker of type T , /@0 the (arker type T is e(ployed in so(e lan",a"e "a(e ? practiced !y a lin",istic co((,nity : , /#0 ? is s,!8ect to syntactic analysis, /J0 there is a class C of (arkers e(ployed in ? sharin" so(e set 7 of syntactic properties, and /%0 the conventions of ? are s,ch that tokens of type T fall ,nder class C . /C@0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e intended (by S) as a counter of type C iff /10 there is a lan",a"e ,ser S +ho is a!le to apply the conventions of a lan",a"e "a(e ? , /@0 the (arker type T is e(ployed in ? , /#0 ? is s,!8ect to syntactic analysis, 5 11J 5

/J0 there is a class C of (arkers e(ployed in ? sharin" so(e set 7 of syntactic properties, /%0 the conventions of ? are s,ch that tokens of type T fall ,nder class C , /60 S intended 5 to !e a (arker of type T , /-0 S intended 5 to co,nt as a (ove in an instance of lan",a"e "a(e ? , and /&0 S intended 5 to fall ,nder class C . /C#0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpreted (by H) as a counter of type C iff /10 so(e lan",a"e ,ser H apprehended 5 , /@0 H interpreted 5 as a token of type T , /#0 H is a!le to apply the conventions of lan",a"e "a(e ? , /J0 the (arker type T is e(ployed in ? , /%0 ? is s,!8ect to syntactic analysis, /60 there is a class C of (arkers e(ployed in ? sharin" so(e set 7 of syntactic properties, /-0 the conventions of ? are s,ch that tokens of type T fall ,nder class C , /&0 H interpreted 5 as co,ntin" as a (ove in an instance of ? , and /90 H interpreted 5 as fallin" ,nder class C in "a(e ? . /CJ0 9n o!8ect 5 (ay !e said to !e interpreta!le3in3principle as a co,nter of type C iff /10 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as a token of (arker type T , /@0 there co,ld !e a lan",a"e "a(e ? e(ployin" (arkers of type T , /#0 that "a(e ? +o,ld !e s,!8ect to syntactic analysis, /J0 these conventions +o,ld !e s,ch that there +o,ld !e a class C of (arkers e(ployed in ? sharin" so(e set 7 of syntactic properties, and /%0 the conventions of ? +o,ld !e s,ch that tokens of type T +o,ld fall ,nder class C . 5 11% 5

6.&E0 T)e Nature and S3ope o+ T)is Semioti3 "nalysis

*he precedin" sections of this chapter have !een devoted to the develop(ent of an analysis of sy(!ols and their se(antic and syntactic properties. .n the ens,in" chapters this analysis +ill !e applied to+ards an assess(ent of C*2?s clai(s a!o,t the nat,re of co"nition. Before proceedin" to that assess(ent, ho+ever, it is i(portant to clarify the nat,re and stat,s of the se(iotic analysis that has !een presented here. *he ne+ ter(inolo"y is intended to resolve perilo,s a(!i",ities in the ,ses of /a 0 the +ord ?sy(!ol? and /b 0 e1pressions ,sed to predicate se(antic and syntactic properties of sy(!ols /for e1a(ple, ?refers to?, ?(eans?, ?is a co,nt no,n?0. 'or p,rposes of caref,l se(iotic analysis, the technical ter(s are (eant to replace the ordinary loc,tions rather than to supplement the(. *h,s the sortal ter(s ?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter? do not na(e different species of sy(!ol, nor do they si"nify different o!8ects

than those desi"nated !y the +ord ?sy(!ol?. Gather, these ter(s serve collectively as a disa(!i",ation of the +ord ?sy(!ol? as it is applied to disc,rsive si"ns, and each sortal ter( is desi"ned to correspond to one ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol?. Si(ilarly, the (odalities of interpretability /,nder a convention0, authoring intention, actual interpretation, and interpretability!in!principle have !een referred to as 7+ays of !ein"7 a (arker, si"nifier, or co,nter. B,t this does not (ean that there is s,ch a thin" as 8,st !ein" a (arker, si"nifier, or co,nter, andHover and a!ove thatHadditional properties of !ein" interpretable as one, !ein" intended as one, and so on. 'or there is no s,ch thin" as si(ply being a sy(!ol. Symbol is not a nat,ral !,t a conventional kind, and to say that so(ethin" 7is a sy(!ol7 /a (arker0 is to relate it in so(e +ay to the conventions that esta!lish (arker types. B,t there are several +ays in +hich an o!8ect can !e related to s,ch conventions: it can !e interpretable as a token of a type !y virt,e of (eetin" the criteria for that type, it can !e intended !y its a,thor as !ein" of that type, it can !e interpreted as !ein" of that type, or it can si(ply !e s,ch that one co,ld have a convention that +o,ld esta!lish a type s,ch that this o!8ect +o,ld !e interpreta!le as a token of that type. *he case is (,ch the sa(e for se(antics and synta1: there is no s,ch thin" as a (arker si(ply being (eanin"f,l or si(ply referring to an o!8ect. *o say that a (arker has a (eanin", or that it refers to so(ethin", is to say so(ethin" a!o,t interpretation and interpretive conventions. We can say that 5 116 5 the (arker is of s,ch a type that it is interpreta!le, ,nder )n"lish se(antic conventions, as referrin" to >incoln. We can say that its a,thor intended it to refer to >incoln, or that so(eone +ho apprehended it constr,ed it as referrin" to >incoln. 9nd +e can say that one co,ld, in principle, have a convention +here!y it +o,ld !e interpreta!le as referrin" to >incoln. B,t there is no additional =,estion of +hether a sy(!ol 4ust plain refers to >incoln. )1pressions s,ch as ?refers to >incoln?, ?is a (arker?, ?is a , ?, or ?is an ,tterance of the +ord dog ? are a(!i",o,s. *he process of disa(!i",ation consists of s,!stit,tin" the fo,r e1pressions, ?is interpreta!le as?, ?+as intended as?, ?+as interpreted as?, and ?is interpreta!le3in3principle as? for ?is?. So, for e1a(ple, if so(eone asks of an inscription, 7What kind of sy(!ol is thatK7 +e sho,ld proceed !y s,pplyin" fo,r kinds of infor(ation: /10 We sho,ld provide a specification of ho+ it is interpreta!le as a (arker token !y virt,e of (eetin" the criteria for vario,s (arker types. 'or e1a(ple, +e (i"ht point o,t that it is interpreta!le ,nder )n"lish conventions as a , or ,nder 4reek conventions as a rho. /@0 .f the (ark +as in fact inscri!ed !y so(eone, +e sho,ld say +hat kind of (arker it +as intended to !e: for e1a(ple, that it +as intended as a , , or that it +as intended as a rho, or that it +as intended precisely to (eet the criteria for !oth , and rho. /#0 .f so(eone has interpreted the inscription as a (arker token, +e sho,ld say +ho did the interpretin" and +hat they took it to !e. We (i"ht say, for e1a(ple, that Aones took the sy(!ol to !e a , , +hile 2rs. 2avrophilipos took it to !e a rho. /J0 We sho,ld point to the fact that s,ch a (ark (i"ht !e ,sed in all kinds of +aysHna(ely, that one co,ld, for e1a(ple, develop ne+ (arker conventions +here!y that (ark (i"ht co,nt as a token of so(e ne+ type. Si(ilarly, if so(eone asks +hat an inscription (eans, a f,ll response +o,ld involve the follo+in": /10 9 list of the (eanin"s that the inscription co,ld !e ,sed to !ear ,nder the se(antic conventions of vario,s lin",istic "ro,ps. /'or e1a(ple, )n"lish speakers ,se the (arker strin" p!a!i!n to (ean pain +hile 'rench speakers ,se it to (ean !read.0 /@0 9 specification of +hat the a,thor of the inscription intended it to (ean. /*he deceased la+yer in the tho,"ht e1peri(ent, for e1a(ple, (i"ht have ,sed it

to (ean !read, +hile ., the a,thor of the e1a(ple, intended precisely that it !e interpreta!le as (eanin" either !read or pain.0 /#0 9 specification of ho+ anyone +ho apprehended the sy(!ol interpreted it. /'or e1a(ple, >estrade took it to (ean pain and Hol(es took it to (ean !read.0 /J0 9 reference to the fact that one co,ld, in principle, ,se (arkers of that type to refer to anythin" +hatsoever. 5 11- 5 9nd si(ilarly for co,nters, if one +ere to in=,ire as to the syntactic properties of an inscription s,ch as ?p V =?, a co(plete ans+er +o,ld re=,ire fo,r kinds of infor(ation: /10 9 list of +ays that strin" co,ld !e interpreted as !earin" a syntactic str,ct,re in different sy(!ol "a(es. /.t co,ld !e a series of syntactically ,nrelated (arkers on an eyechart, for e1a(ple, or a con8,nction in the sentential calc,l,s.0 /@0 9 specification of ho+ the inscription +as intended !y its a,thor. /'or e1a(ple, the opto(etrist intended those (arkers as ite(s on an eyechart, and did not intend the( to !ear any syntactic relation to one another.0 /#0 9 specification of ho+ s,ch persons as apprehended the sy(!ols took the( to !e syntactically arran"ed. /Say, Aones took the( to constit,te a propositional calc,l,s for(,la of the for( ?p and =?, +hile 2rs. 2avrophilipos took the( to 8,st !e individ,al letters.0 'inally, /J0 an all,sion to the fact that one co,ld devise any n,(!er of sy(!ol "a(es +ith =,ite a variety of syntactic str,ct,res s,ch that this inscription +o,ld !e interpreta!le as !ein" of the syntactic types licensed !y the r,les of those "a(es. 6o+ there are other ,ses of the ter( ?sy(!ol?Hfor e1a(ple, those e(ployed in A,n"ian psycholo"y and c,lt,ral anthropolo"y. Si(ilarly, there are other senses in +hich a (arker (i"ht !e said to 7(ean so(ethin".7 Hol(es?s co(panion ;r. Watson (i"ht, for e1a(ple, in=,ire of Hol(es, 7What does the deceased attorney?s inscription (eanK7 and Hol(es (i"ht reply, 7What it (eans, Watson, is that the ho,sekeeper is a (,rderess.7 .n this case, Watson?s =,ery, 7What does it (eanK7 a(o,nts to askin" 7What concl,sions a!o,t this case can +e dra+ fro( itK7 and Hol(es?s ans+er s,pplies the relevant concl,sion. Pet it is i(portant to e(phasiDe that there is no general sense of 7!ein" a sy(!ol7 or 7(eanin" s,ch3 and3s,ch7 over and a!ove those capt,red !y o,r technical ter(s. 'or s,ppose that so(eone +ere to ask +hat the first (ark on the eyechart +as, and +e told hi( a!o,t ho+ it +as interpreta!le ,nder vario,s conventions, ho+ it +as intended !y the doctor +ho dre+ it, ho+ it +as interpreted !y vario,s people +ho sa+ it, and pointed o,t, finally, that one co,ld develop all sorts of conventions that co,ld apply to (arks +ith that shape. S,ppose, ho+ever, that o,r =,estioner +as not satisfied +ith this, !,t insisted ,pon askin" for (ore. S,ppose he said, 7. don?t +ant to hear +hat conventional types it (eets the criteria for, or ho+ it +as intended, or ho+ anyone constr,ed it, or ho+ it co,ld, in principle, !e interpreted. . 8,st +ant to kno+ +hat kind of sy(!ol it is .7 S,ppose that it +as clear fro( the +ay that he spoke that he tho,"ht that there +as 8,st so(e kind of !r,te fact a!o,t 5 11& 5 an o!8ect that consisted in its !ein" a (arker of a partic,lar type, =,ite apart fro( ho+ it (et the criteria for conventionally sanctioned types, ho+ it +as intended, and so on. Ho+ +o,ld +e constr,e s,ch a =,estionK *here are, . think, t+o !asic possi!ilities. *he first is that the =,estioner is 8,st conf,sed, and does not realiDe that the relevant ,ses of the e1pression ?is a sy(!ol? have effectively !een replaced !y o,r technical ter(inolo"y. .f this is the case, he +o,ld see( to !e s,fferin" fro( a (is,nderstandin" of +hat is (eant +hen +e say that so(ethin" is a rho, or a , , or a token of so(e other (arker type. He is

(,ch like the person +ho (is,nderstands the ,se of the +ord ?healthy? +hen it is applied to food and de(ands of ,s that +e tell hi( +hat 7(akes vita(in C healthy7 +itho,t tellin" hi( ho+ it contri!,tes to the health of a !ody. *he second possi!ility is that the =,estioner has so(e special ,se of the e1pression ?is a sy(!ol? in (ind. He (i"ht, for e1a(ple, !e askin" for an ans+er cast in the voca!,lary of so(e partic,lar psycholo"ical or anthropolo"ical tradition. /We (i"ht, for e1a(ple, respond to a =,ery a!o,t so(ethin" on the +all of an .rish ch,rch in the follo+in" fashion: 7*his is the Celtic cross, a fine e1a(ple of syncretic sy(!olis(. .n it one finds the Christian cross, the sy(!ol of salvation thro,"h the death of Christ, co8oined +ith the ;r,idic circle, sy(!oliDin" the s,n, the so,rce of life and li"ht.70 Er he (i"ht have so(e (ore novel ,se of +ords in (ind. He (i"ht, for e1a(ple, 8,st use the +ord ?sy(!ol? in a +ay that did not (ake appeals to conventions. 9llen 6e+ell, for e1a(ple, apparently identifies sy(!ols +ith the physical patterns that distin",ish the(. 6e+ell +rites, 79 physical sy(!ols syste( is a set of entities, called sy(!ols, 'hich are physical patterns that can occ,r as co(ponents of another type of entity called an e1pression /or sy(!ol str,ct,re07 /6e+ell and Si(on L19-%M 19&1: J$, e(phasis added0. .n another place, 6e+ell /19&6: ##0 speaks of sy(!ols syste(s as involvin" a physical (edi,( and +rites that 7the symbols are patterns in that (edi,(.7 . shall disc,ss the proper interpretation of 6e+ell?s ,sa"e at len"th in chapter %, !,t the !asic point . +ish to (ake (ay !e s,((ariDed as follo+s: .n characteriDin" sy(!ols in this +ay, 6e+ell is ,sin" the +ord ?sy(!ol? differently fro( the +ay it is nor(ally ,sed in )n"lish, not ,nlike the +ay so(eone (i"ht 8,st ,se the +ord ?healthy? to (ean 7f,ll of vita(ins.7 /By the sa(e token, one could ,se the +ord ?sy(!ol? to desi"nate all and only o!8ects that have odors pleasin" to do"s. Why one sho,ld +ish to a!,se a perfectly "ood +ord in s,ch a fashion, ho+ever, is =,ite another (atter.0 *his kind of idiosyncratic ,se of +ords (ay !e conf,sin", !,t it need not !e pernicio,s so lon" as the +riter /a 0 does 5 119 5 not dra+ inferences that are !ased ,pon a conf,sion !et+een his idiosyncratic ,sa"e of the +ord and its nor(al (eanin" /e."., inferrin" that food that is healthy" Li.e., f,ll of vita(insM (,st !e healthy Li.e., cond,cive to healthM0, and /b 0 (akes his o+n ,sa"e of the +ord ade=,ately clear that his readers are not dra+n into s,ch fa,lty inferences. *h,s there is nothin" tro,!leso(e a!o,t ,sin" the +ord ?char(? to denote a property of =,arks !eca,se /a 0 physicists have an independent specification of the (eanin" of ?char(? as applied to =,arks, and /b 0 no one is likely to (istakenly infer that =,arks +o,ld !e pleasant ",ests at a soirWe. Si(ilarly, it is possi!le to ,se +ords s,ch as ?(eans? and ?refers to? in novel +ays. Ene co,ld, for e1a(ple, !eco(e so ena(ored of ca,sal theories of reference that one !e"an to use sentences like 7*he +ord ?do"? refers to do"s7 to mean so(ethin" like 7*okens of ?do"? stand in ca,sal relation + to do"s.7 *his +o,ld, of co,rse, !e an enterprise involvin" lin",istic novelty: the loc,tional sche(a ?refers to? is not "enerally ,sed !y )n"lish speakers to report ca,sal relationships per se. B,t the idiosyncratic ,sa"e of the loc,tional sche(a (i"ht !e an efficient +ay of e1pressin" so(ethin" that is i(portant and for +hich there is no (ore ele"ant (eans of e1pression. So lon" as the +riter (akes his ,sa"e of +ords clear and does not (ake illicit inferences !ased on nonoperative (eanin"s of +ords, his idiosyncrasy need not !e constr,ed as !ein" pernicio,s. B,t if, for e1a(ple, so(eone ,ses ?refers to? to (ean 7is lar"er than,7 he cannot dra+ an inference like that !elo+ fro( /90 to /B0 8,st !y virt,e of the (eanin"s of the sentences /90 *he title ?4reat )(ancipator? refers to 9!raha( >incoln.

/B0 9!raha( >incoln is also kno+n as the 4reat )(ancipator. .f one ,sed s,ch a novel definition to try to sho+ that one co,ld derive 75 is kno+n as 8 7 fro( 75 is "reater than 8 ,7 one +o,ld !e ar",in" fallacio,sly. 6or can the inference fro( /90 to /B0 !e dra+n !y virt,e of the (eanin"s of the sentences if one 8,st defines ?refers to? in ca,sal ter(s. *hat is, if one ,ses /90 to mean 7*okens of ?4reat )(ancipator? stand in ca,sal relation G to 9!raha( >incoln,7 one cannot infer fro( /90 that 9!raha( >incoln is also kno+n as the 4reat )(ancipator. Ene (i"ht, ho+ever, !e a!le to infer /B0 fro( the con8,nction of the t'o clai(s /9Q 0: 7*okens of ?4reat )(ancipator? stand in ca,sal relation + to >incoln7 and /C0: 7'or every si"nifier token M and every o!8ect / , if M stands in ca,sal relation + to / , then M refers /in the ordinary sense0 to / .7 B,t 5 1@$ 5 /9Q 0 and /C0 8ointly entail /B0 only !eca,se /9Q 0 and /C0 8ointly entail /90, and /90 entails /B0. /9Q 0 alone does not entail /90, ho+ever, even if there is a ca,sal relation + that al+ays in fact holds !et+een si"nifiers and their referents.

6.&&0 T)e !orm o+ "s3riptions o+ Intentional and Semanti3 $roperties

Ene of the (otivations for ,ndertakin" this analysis of sy(!ols +as an o!8ection to C*2 that +as s,""ested in chapter #. *his o!8ection, called the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection, involved t+o i(portant clai(s a!o,t ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties. *he first clai( +as that ter(s ,sed in ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties are a(!i",o,s: ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties to symbols and ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties to mental states have different lo"ical for(s and indeed involve attri!,tions of different properties. *he second clai( +as that ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties to sy(!ols are concept,ally dependent ,pon attri!,tions of co"nitive states. .n 9ristotelian ter(s, the ho(ony(y of se(antic and intentional ter(s is an e1a(ple of ho(ony(y pros hen, and the focal (eanin" of the ter(s is that +hich applies to co"nitive states. *hese clai(s +ere offered only provisionally in chapter #, ho+ever, and a (a8or reason for ,ndertakin" this analysis of the nat,re of sy(!ols +as to provide reso,rces for investi"atin" the clai(s. . shall ar",e in the ne1t chapter that the analysis that has !een offered here !ears o,t !oth clai(s. 'or present p,rposes, . shall confine (yself to co((entin" on the lo"ical for( of ascriptions of se(iotic properties to sy(!ols. We have discovered that the s,rface for( of ascriptions of se(antic val,es and intentionality to sy(!ols is (isleadin". When +e say, for e1a(ple, 7/.nscription0 I refers to 5 ,7 it looks as tho,"h the ver! phrase ?refers to? e1presses a t+o3place predicate +ith ar",(ents I and 5 . *his +ay of readin" the sentence, ho+ever, is +ron" in t+o respects. 'irst, the loc,tional sche(a ?refers to? is a(!i",o,s, and (ay !e ,sed to e1press fo,r very different propositions. 2ore perspic,o,s e1pressions of these propositions are s,pplied !y o,r technical ter(inolo"y: /10 I is interpreta!le /,nder convention C of lin",istic "ro,p : 0 as referrin" to 5 . /@0 I +as intended /!y its a,thor A 0 to refer to 5 . 5 1@1 5

/#0 I +as interpreted /!y so(e reader + 0 as referrin" to 5 . /J0 I is interpreta!le3in3principle as referrin" to 5 . Second, on none of these interpretations does ?refers to? t,rn o,t to !e a t+o3place predicate linkin" a sy(!ol and its referent. *he first interpretation, an attri!,tion of semantic interpretability, involves i(plicit reference to a lin",istic co((,nity and the se(antic conventions of that co((,nity. *he second interpretation, an attri!,tion of semantic authoring intention, involves i(plicit reference to the co"nitive states /na(ely, the a,thorin" intentions0 of the a,thor of the sy(!ol. *he third interpretation, an attri!,tion of actual semantic interpretation, involves i(plicit reference to the co"nitive states of an individ,al +ho apprehends I . 'inally, if +e look at the definition of interpreta!ility3in3principle, +e see that the fo,rth interpretation involves i(plicit reference as +ell, either to the availa!ility of a (appin" that takes I ?s (arker type onto an interpretation, or to possi!le conventions. What has !een said of ascriptions of reference (ay !e said of ascriptions of (eanin" and intentionality as +ell. .n each case, there are fo,r +ays of interpretin" s,ch ascriptions, and these involve covert reference to intentions and conventions in 8,st the sa(e +ays as ascriptions of reference to sy(!ols involve it.

6.&20 Summary
*his chapter has developed a set of ter(inolo"y for dealin" +ith attri!,tions of syntactic and se(antic properties to sy(!ols. *he ter(inolo"y involves the disa(!i",ation of the ter( ?sy(!ol? into three sortal ter(sH?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter?Hand a distinction !et+een fo,r +ays in +hich an o!8ect (ay !e said to !e a sy(!ol /a (arker0 and to have syntactic or se(antic properties. *he analysis has already prod,ced a si"nificant concl,sion: once +e have rendered ascriptions of se(antic properties to (arkers (ore perspic,o,s !y e(ployin" the ter(inolo"y that has !een developed here, it !eco(es apparent that the lo"ical for(s of these e1pressions involve co(ple1 relations +ith conventions and intentions. *his analysis provides the !asis for an investi"ation of the clai(s of C*2. *he ne1t chapter +ill investi"ate the i(plications of this analysis for the nat,re of se(antic attri!,tions to (inds and to sy(!ols in co(p,ters. *he one that follo+s it +ill e1a(ine an o!8ection to the analysis 5 1@@ 5 presented in this chapter and artic,late an alternative readin" of the se(iotic voca!,lary as e(ployed !y advocates of C*2. 9fter+ards, +e shall e1a(ine the i(plications of this analysis for C*2?s representational acco,nt of the nat,re of co"nitive states and its atte(pt to vindicate intentional psycholo"y !y clai(in" that co"nitive processes are co(p,tations over (ental representations. 5 1@# 5

C)apter !ive0 T)e Semanti3s o+ T)ou*)ts and o+ Symbols in Computers

*he precedin" chapter presented an analysis of the nat,re of sy(!ols, synta1, and sy(!olic (eanin". *he ,pshot of this analysis +as that sy(!olhood, synta1, and sy(!olic (eanin" are all conventional to the core. *here is no s,ch thin" as si(ply being a , , a co,nt no,n, or a referrin" ter(. Words ,sed to

attri!,te se(iotic cate"ories do not e1press si(ple one3 or t+o3place predicates, !,t hide co(ple1 relationships involvin" conventions and intentions. . shall refer to the analysis presented in chapter J as the 7Se(iotic 9nalysis.7 *he ,lti(ate reason for ,ndertakin" this Se(iotic 9nalysis +as to assess a partic,lar kind of attack ,pon C*2: na(ely, the clai(, ,r"ed on ,s !y Sayre and Searle, that the notions of symbol and symbolic meaning +ere so(eho+ ,ns,ited to the tasks of e1plainin" the intentionality of (ental states and of 7vindicatin"7 intentional psycholo"y. We shall !e"in to develop so(e definitive ans+ers to this =,estion in chapter -. Before doin" that, ho+ever, it is necessary to address t+o iss,es, +hich +ill !e the task of this chapter and the one that follo+s. *o take thin"s in reverse order, the ne1t chapter +ill address an i(portant kind of o!8ection to the Se(iotic 9nalysis: na(ely, that it conflates a 7p,rely se(antic7 ele(ent of lan",a"es that is nonconventional +ith conventional feat,res that accr,e to nat,ral lan",a"es only !eca,se they are ,sed for co((,nication. En this opposin" vie+, often identified /ri"htly or +ron"ly0 +ith *arski and ;avidson, se(antic analysis is applied to thin"s called 7a!stract lan",a"es7 that are nonconventional in nat,re, 5 1@J 5 +hile conventions co(e into play only in o,r use or adoption of s,ch lan",a"es for co((,nication. *he present chapter +ill dra+ o,t so(e conse=,ences of the Se(iotic 9nalysis in t+o very separate areas, !oth of +hich +ill prove i(portant to the lar"er ar",(ent. 'irst, the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection sketched in chapter # clai(s that the se(antic voca!,lary is parony(o,s, in that /10 the se(antic voca!,lary e3presses different properties +hen applied /a 0 to sy(!ols and /b 0 to (ental statesC and /@0 the ,sa"e that is applied to sy(!ols is conceptually dependent upon the ,sa"e that is applied to (ental states, and not vice versa. .n the first part of this chapter it +ill !e ar",ed that the Se(otic 9nalysis "ives ,s +hat +e need to 8,stify this clai( of concept,al dependence. Second, it +ill !e ,sef,l and interestin" to e1a(ine the application of the Se(iotic 9nalysis to sy(!ols in co(p,ters. En the one hand, applyin" this analysis (akes it =,ite clear that, pace the 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection descri!ed in chapter #, co(p,ters can and do store and operate ,pon entities that are sy(!ols +ith syntactic and se(antic properties in all of the ordinary senses. *hat is, +e can speak of synta1 and se(antics for sy(!ols in co(p,ters in e1actly the sa(e +ays +e speak of the( for ,tterances and inscriptions. En the other hand, it +ill !eco(e clear ,pon closer inspection that the functional analysis of co(p,ters is a co(pletely separate (atter fro( their semiotic analysis. Co(p,ters can !e analyDed in f,nctional ter(s and in se(iotic ter(s, and co(p,ter desi"ners take "reat pains to (ake these t+o descriptions line ,p +ith one another in practice. B,t it is not the f,nctional properties of the co(p,ter that (ake thin"s inside it count as (arkers, co,nters, and si"nifiers /or vice versa0. Contrary to so(e +riters, the st,dy of co(p,tation adds nothing to o,r ,nderstandin" of sy(!ols per se.

7.&0 Semioti3s and 1ental Semanti3s

*he Se(iotic 9nalysis +as an analysis of the properties of sy(!ols. 9 part of this analysis considered +hat it is +e are i(p,tin" to sy(!ols +hen +e i(p,te to the( (eanin" or reference or intentionality. *his involved lookin" !oth /10 at the lo"ical for( of s,ch ,tterances, and /@0 at the conditions for their satisfaction. Se(antic ter(s like ?(eans? and ?is a!o,t? t,rned o,t to !e !oth a(!i",o,s and s,rprisin"ly co(ple1. .f, for e1a(ple, . say,

7Sy(!ol 5 (eans , 7 5 1@% 5 . co,ld !e assertin" one or (ore of the follo+in": /10 5 is interpreta!le ,nder convention C of lan",a"e : as (eanin" , . /@0 5 +as intended !y its a,thor S to (ean , . /#0 5 +as interpreted !y so(e o!server H as (eanin" , . /J0 5 is, in principle, interpreta!le as (eanin" , . )ach of these loc,tional sche(as has a distinct lo"ical for( and a distinct set of ar",(ent slots that can !e filled !y different kinds of o!8ects. So(e of these ar",(ents do not al+ays appear in the s,rface "ra((ar of attri!,tions of se(antic properties in ordinary lan",a"e, tho,"h they are likely to !e filled in +hen a speaker is called ,pon to clarify her ,tterance. .n the first three casesHthat is, conventional interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intention, and act,al interpretationHso(e of these s,ppressed ar",(ents refer either to conventions of a lin",istic co((,nity or to intentions of those +ho prod,ce or apprehend the sy(!ol tokens. .t also t,rned o,t that there +as a pla,si!le readin" of interpreta!ility3 inprinciple +hich constr,ed it as a (odal variation ,pon interpreta!ility in a lan",a"e. Here, . think, +e have all +e need to 8,stify t+o clai(s sketched in the artic,lation of the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection in chapter #: /10 *er(s in the se(antic voca!,lary e1press different properties +hen applied to (ental states fro( those they e1press +hen applied to sy(!ols. /@0 *he applications of se(antic ter(s to sy(!ols are concept,ally dependent ,pon their applications to (ental states.

7.&.&0 T)e Homonymy o+ t)e Semanti3 Vo3abulary

*he case for ho(ony(y is fairly strai"htfor+ard. 'irst, if a nat,ral lan",a"e ver! @ is ,sed in t+o conte1ts, A and % , and the lo"ical for( of @ 3assertions in A differs fro( that in % , then @ is ,sed to e1press different predicates in the t+o conte1ts. 2oreover, predicates 'ith different logical forms e3press different properties . .n partic,lar, t+o predicates e1pressin" relational properties can only e1press the sa(e property if they relate the sa(e n,(!er of relata. Predicates +ith different n,(!ers of ar",(ent slots in their lo"ical for( relate different n,(!ers of 5 1@6 5 relata, and hence e1press different properties.L1M >ike+ise, t+o predicates +ith the sa(e n,(!er of ar",(ents do not e1press the sa(e property if the thin"s that can fill their ar",(ent slots co(e fro( different do(ains. Second, the predicates used to e3press semantic properties of symbols ha"e argument slots that must be filled by references to con"entions and intentional agents . *hey th,s e1press co(ple1 relational properties that essentially involve conventions and a"ents. *his (,ch is a strai"htfor+ard conse=,ence of the Se(iotic 9nalysis. Ene (ay contest the analysis on other "ro,ndsC !,t if one accepts it, one has already !o,"ht into this conse=,ence.

*hird, the logical forms of attributions of semantic properties to minds and mental states do not contain argument slots to be filled by references to con"entions or intentions, and hence they attribute properties distinct from the semiotic properties . . have al+ays tho,"ht that this +as pretty self3evident, !,t so(eti(es people have acc,sed (e of 8,st assertin" this point +itho,t ar",in" it. *he only +ay . see to de(onstrate this point is to test each of the sche(as developed in chapter J as a possi!le interpretation of attri!,tions of se(antic properties to (ental states and see +hether any of the( see( int,itively pla,si!le. So s,ppose Aohn is havin" a tho,"ht T at ti(e t , and +hat he is thinkin" a!o,t is Mary . We say /in ordinary )n"lish0 7Aohn is thinkin" a!o,t 2ary,7 or /in a+k+ard philosophical 8ar"on0 7Aohn?s tho,"ht * is a!o,t 2ary.7L@M 6o+ can this !e analyDed in ter(s of conventional interpreta!ility in a lan",a"eK *hat is, co,ld the lo"ical for( of this ,tterance possi!ly !e the follo+in"K /10 Aohn?s tho,"ht T is interpreta!le ,nder convention C of lan",a"e : as !ein" a!o,t 2ary. *he ans+er, . think, is clearly no . *he (ore yo, think a!o,t 7(eanin"s7 of utterances, the clearer it !eco(es that there is a notion of conventional (eanin" in a lan",a"e that applies there, and that it is part of +hat +e (eant all alon" +hen +e spoke of (eanin" for sy(!ols. B,t it is hard to see ho+ that notion co,ld apply to thoughts . )1cept for special cases like the interpretation of drea(s, there are no conventions for interpretatin" tho,"hts. 6or do tho,"hts require s,ch conventions for interpretation: tho,"hts co(e +ith their (eanin"s already attached. Po, can3 5 1@- 5 not separate the tho,"ht fro( its (eanin" the +ay yo, can separate the (arker fro( its (eanin". *his is +hy so(e +riters descri!e the se(antics of (ental states as intrinsic to the(. >ike+ise for the other se(iotic (odalities: /@0 Aohn intended that this tho,"ht T !e a!o,t 2ary. /#0 H apprehended Aohn?s tho,"ht T and interpreted it as !ein" a!o,t 2ary. We do so(eti(es have tho,"hts as a res,lt of intentions to have tho,"hts, as s,""ested in /@0. Aohn (i"ht, for e1a(ple, deli!erately think a!o,t his +ife 2ary +hile he is a+ay on a !,siness trip on their anniversary. Er, dealin" +ith transference on a therapist?s co,ch, he (ay intend to think a!o,t 2ary !,t end ,p thinkin" a!o,t so(eone else instead. *hese thin"s happen, !,t they are s,rely not +hat +e are talkin" a!o,t +hen +e say Aohn?s tho,"ht T is a!o,t 2ary. Us,ally the intentionality of o,r tho,"hts is ,nintentional. 9s for /#0, there is so(e =,estion a!o,t +hether +e apprehend one another?s tho,"hts at all. We s,rely guess at one another?s tho,"hts, and (ay ri"htly or +ron"ly s,r(ise that Aohn?s tho,"ht at a "iven ti(e is a!o,t 2ary. B,t this is very different fro( seeing a (arker as a (arker and then interpretin" it. We never apprehend tho,"hts as (arkers. 9nd (ore to the point, even if +e do apprehend people?s tho,"hts and interpret the(, this is not +hat +e (ean +hen +e attri!,te (eanin" to their tho,"hts. . (i"ht say of a symbol, 7.t (eans 5 to Aim .7 B,t it s,rely (akes no sense to say, 7Aohn?s tho,"ht (eans ?2ary? to Aim 7 /or for that (atter, 7Aohn?s tho,"ht (eans ?2ary? to Aohn70. 'inally, +hen +e say that Aohn?s tho,"hts are a!o,t 2ary, +e certainly do not (ean (erely to assert the e1istence of a (appin" relationship /i.e., interpreta!ility3in3principle0 fro( Aohn?s tho,"ht to 2ary. .f +e try to apply the

lo"ical for( of the se(iotic voca!,lary to o,r attri!,tions of (eanin" to (ental states, the res,lts are nonsensical. So se(antic ter(s like ?(eans? and ?is a!o,t? have a different lo"ical for( +hen applied to (ental states. .t does see( reasona!le to constr,e the lo"ical for( of these attri!,tions as involvin" a three3 place predicate relatin" s,!8ect, tho,"ht3token, and (eanin", as the s,rface "ra((ar s,""ests. *here are no hidden references to conventions and intentions. 9s a conse=,ence, the se(antic voca!,lary also e1presses distinct properties +hen applied to (ental states. When applied to sy(!ols, it e1presses relational properties in +hich so(e of the relata are conventions 5 1@& 5 or prod,cers and interpreters of sy(!ols. B,t these relata are (issin" in the case of (ental states. .n short, differences in lo"ical for( point to differences in properties e1pressed. .t th,s !ehooves ,s to differentiate !et+een t+o classes of properties that are e1pressed ,sin" the sa(e se(antic voca!,lary: there is one set of semiotic!semantic properties as descri!ed !y the Se(iotic 9nalysis in chapter J, and a separate set of mental!semantic properties attri!,ted to (ental states.

7.&.20 Con3eptual ,ependen3e

.t is also =,ite strai"htfor+ard to sho+ that attri!,tions of se(iotic3se(antic properties are concept,ally dependent ,pon attri!,tions of (ental3se(antic properties. .n the case of a,thorin" intentions and act,al interpretation, the analysis of se(antic attri!,tions all,des to (eanin"f,l (ental states on the part of the a,thor or interpreter: their intentions and acts of interpretation. Clai(s a!o,t a,thorin" intention and act,al interpretation are !,ilt ,pon a (ore f,nda(ental strat,( of attri!,tions /or pres,ppositions0 of (eanin"f,l (ental states to h,(an individ,als. .n the case of conventional interpreta!ility the case is only sli"htly less direct. 'or a lar"e part of +hat lin",istic conventions consist of is the shared !eliefs and practices of (e(!ers of a lin",istic "ro,p. *h,s any appeal to conventions ass,(es a prior strat,( of (eanin"f,l (ental states as +ell. .t th,s t,rns o,t that the se(antic voca!,lary is a(!i",o,s and indeed parony(o,s as clai(ed !y the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection. Words like ?(eans? and ?is a!o,t? are ,sed differently for (ental states and for sy(!ols, and the ,sa"e that is applied to sy(!ols is concept,ally dependent ,pon the ,sa"e that is applied to (ental states. .t re(ains to !e seen, ho+ever, +hat i(pact this +ill have on C*2?s clai(s to e1plain (ental3 se(antics in ter(s of the se(antics of (ental representations. .ndeed, in li"ht of this distinction !et+een different ,ses of the se(antic voca!,lary, it +ill t,rn o,t that +e have to clarify +hat kinds of 7se(antic7 properties are even !ein" attributed to (ental representations. 9re they se(iotic3se(antic properties /the nat,ral ass,(ption0K Er are they so(e other kind of properties that add a ne+ a(!i",ity to the se(antic voca!,laryK Chapter - +ill e1a(ine the prospects of se(iotic3se(antic properties for e1plainin" (ental3se(antics, and chapters & and 9 +ill e1plore t+o different strate"ies for attri!,tin" a distinct kind of 7se(antics7 to (ental representations. 5 1@9 5

7.20 Symbols in Computers

9t this point, . +ish to shift attention to a second application of the Se(iotic 9nalysis. .n the re(ainder of this chapter, . shall consider the applications of the Se(iotic 9nalysis to sy(!ols in computers . *here are really t+o parts to this e1ercise. 'irst, . shall ar",e /a"ainst the 'or(al Sy(!ols E!8ection artic,lated in chapter #0 that it is =,ite ,npro!le(atic to say that co(p,ters do, in fact, !oth store and operate ,pon o!8ects that (ay !e said to !e sy(!ols, and do have syntactic and se(antic properties in precisely the senses delineated !y the Se(iotic 9nalysis. *o !e s,re, the story a!o,t ho+ si"nifiers are tokened in (icrochips is a !it (ore co(plicated than the story a!o,t ho+ they are tokened in speech or on paper, !,t it is in essence the sa(e ind of story and e(ploys the sa(e reso,rces /na(ely, the reso,rces o,tlined in the Se(iotic 9nalysis0. Second, . shall address clai(s on the opposite front to the effect that there is so(ethin" special a!o,t sy(!ols in co(p,ters, and that co(p,ter science has in fact revealed either a ne' ind of sy(!ol or revealed so(ethin" ne' and fundamental a!o,t sy(!ols in "eneral. . shall ar",e that this sort of clai(, as advanced !y 6e+ell and Si(on /19-%0, is a res,lt of an ille"iti(ate conflation of the f,nctional analysis of co(p,ters +ith their se(iotic properties. Er, to p,t it another +ay, 6e+ell and Si(on are really ,sin" the +ord ?sy(!ol? in t+o different +ays: one that picks o,t se(iotic properties and another that picks o,t f,nctionally defined types. 6either of these ,sa"es e1plains the other, !,t !oth are i(portant and ,sef,l in ,nderstandin" co(p,ters.

7.2.&0 Computers Store

bBe3ts T)at "re Symbols

.n li"ht of the centrality of the clai( that co(p,ters are sy(!ol (anip,lators, it is c,rio,s that virt,ally nothin" has !een +ritten a!o,t ho+ co(p,ters (ay !e said to store and (anip,late sy(!ols. .t is not a trivial pro!le( fro( the standpoint of se(iotics. Unlike ,tterances and inscriptions /and the letters and n,(erals on the tape of *,rin"?s co(p,tin" (achine0, (ost sy(!ols e(ployed in real prod,ction3 (odel co(p,ters are never directly enco,ntered !y anyone, and (ost ,sers and even pro"ra((ers are !lissf,lly ,na+are of the conventions that ,nderlie the possi!ility of representation in co(p,ters. Spellin" o,t the +hole story in an e1act +ay t,rns o,t to !e c,(!erso(e, !,t the !asic concept,al reso,rces needed are si(ply those already fa(iliar fro( the Se(iotic 9nalysis. . have divided (y disc,ssion of sy(!ols in co(p,ters 5 1#$ 5 into t+o parts. . shall "ive a "eneral sketch of the analysis here and provide the (ore c,(!erso(e technical details in an appendi1 for those interested in the topic, since the details do not contri!,te to the (ain line of ar",(entation in the !ook. *he really cr,cial thin" in "ettin" the story ri"ht is to (ake a fir( distinction !et+een t+o =,estions. *he first is a =,estion a!o,t se(iotics: In "irtue of 'hat do things in computers count as mar ers, signifiers, and countersB *he second is a =,estion a!o,t the desi"n of the (achine: Chat is it about computers that allo+s the( to manipulate symbols in 'ays that 0respect0 or 0trac 0 their synta3 and semanticsB Ence +e have (ade this distinction, the !asic for( of the ar",(ent that co(p,ters do indeed operate ,pon (eanin"f,l sy(!ols is =,ite strai"htfor+ard: /10 Co(p,ters can store and operate ,pon thin"s s,ch as n,(erals, !inary strin"s representin" n,(!ers, and so on. /@0 *hin"s like n,(!ers and !inary strin"s representin" n,(!ers are sy(!ols.

D /#0 Co(p,ters can store and operate ,pon sy(!ols. Ef co,rse, +hile one could desi"n co(p,ters that operate /as *,rin"?s fictional device did0 ,pon thin"s that are already sy(!ols !y independent conventions /i.e., letters and n,(erals0, (ost of the 7sy(!ols7 in prod,ction3(odel co(p,ters are not of this type, and so +e need to tell a story a!o,t ho+ +e "et fro( circ,it states to (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters. . shall dra+ ,pon t+o e1a(ples here:

ECample &= T)e "dder Cir3uit

.n (ost co(p,ters there is a circ,it called an adder . .ts f,nction is to take representations of t+o addends and prod,ce a representation of their s,(. .n (ost co(p,ters today, each of these representations is stored in a series of circ,its called a register . *hink of a re"ister as a stora"e (edi,( for a sin"le representation. *he re"ister is (ade ,p of a series of 7!ista!le circ,its7Hcirc,its +ith t+o sta!le states, +hich +e (ay conventionally la!el $ and 1, !ein" caref,l to re(e(!er that the n,(erals are si(ply !ein" ,sed as the labels of states, and are not the states the(selves. /6or do they represent the n,(!ers Dero and one.0 *he states the(selves are "enerally volta"e levels across o,tp,t leads, !,t any physical i(ple(entation that has the sa(e on3off properties +o,ld f,nction e=,ivalently. *he adder circ,it is so desi"ned that the pattern that is for(ed in the o,tp,t re"ister is a f,nc3 5 1#1 5 tion of the patterns fo,nd in the t+o inp,t re"isters. 2ore specifically, the circ,it is desi"ned so that, ,nder the ri"ht interpretive conventions, the pattern for(ed in the o,tp,t re"ister has an interpretation that corresponds to the s,( of the n,(!ers yo, "et !y interpretin" the patterns in the inp,t re"isters.

ECample 2= TeCt in Computers

2ost of ,s are !y no+ fa(iliar +ith +ord processors, and are ,sed to thinkin" of o,r articles and other te1t as !ein" 7in the co(p,ter,7 +hether 7in (e(ory7 or 7on the disk.7 B,t of co,rse if yo, open ,p the (achine yo, +on?t see little letters in there. What yo, +ill have are lar"e n,(!ers of !ista!le circ,its /in (e(ory0 or (a"netic fl,1 density patterns /on a disk0. B,t there are con"entions for encodin" "raphe(ic characters as patterns of activity in circ,its or on a disk. *he (ost +idely ,sed s,ch convention is the 9SC.. convention. By +ay of the 9SC.. convention, a series of volta"e patterns or fl,1 density patterns "ets (apped onto a correspondin" series of characters. 9nd if that series of characters also happens to co,nt as +ords and sentences and lar"er !locks of te1t in so(e lan",a"e, it t,rns o,t that that te1t is 7stored7 in an encoded for( in the co(p,ter. 6o+ to flesh these stories o,t, it is necessary to say a little !it a!o,t the vario,s levels of analysis +e need to e(ploy in lookin" at the pro!le( of sy(!ols in co(p,ters and also say a !it a!o,t the connections !et+een levels. 9t a very !asic level, co(p,ters can !e descri!ed in ter(s of a (i1ed !a" of physical properties s,ch as volta"e levels at the o,tp,t leads of partic,lar circ,its. 6ot all of these properties are related to the description of the (achine as a co(p,ter. 'or e1a(ple, !ista!le circ,its are !,ilt in s,ch a +ay that s(all transient variations in volta"e level do not affect perfor(ance, as the circ,it +ill "ravitate to+ards one of its sta!le states very rapidly and its relations to other circ,its are not affected !y s(all differences in volta"e. So +e can ideali*e a+ay fro( the properties that don?t (atter for the !ehavior of the (achine and treat its co(ponents as digital Hna(ely, as havin" an inte"ral and finite n,(!er of possi!le states.L#M .t so happens that (ost prod,ction3(odel co(p,ters have (any co(ponents that are binary Hthey have t'o possi!le statesH!,t di"ital circ,its can, in

principle, have any /finite, inte"ral0 n,(!er of possi!le states. *reatin" a (achine that is in fact capa!le of so(e contin,o,s variations as a di"ital (achine involves so(e idealiDation, !,t then so do (ost descriptions relevant for science. *he di"ital description of the (achine picks o,t properties that are real /al!eit idealiDed0, 5 1#@ 5 physical /in the stron" sense of !ein" properties of the sort st,died in physics, like char"e and fl,1 density0, and noncon"entional . 6e1t, +e (ay note that a series of di"ital circ,its +ill display so(e pattern of di"ital states. 'or e1a(ple, if +e take a !inary circ,it for si(plicity and call its states $ and 1, a series of s,ch circ,its +ill display so(e pattern of $3states and 13states. Call this a digital pattern . *he i(portant thin" a!o,t a di"ital pattern is that it occ,pies a level of a!straction s,fficiently re(oved fro( p,rely physical properties that the sa(e di"ital pattern can !e present in any s,ita!le series of di"ital circ,its independent of their physical nat,re. /Here 7s,ita!le series7 (eans any series that has the ri"ht len"th and (e(!ers that have the ri"ht n,(!er of possi!le states.0 'or e1a(ple, the sa(e !inary pattern /i.e., di"ital pattern +ith t+o possi!le val,es at each place0 is present in each of the follo+in" se=,ences:

.t is also present in the (,sic prod,ced !y playin" either of the follo+in":

9nd it is present in the series of (ove(ents prod,ced !y follo+in" these instr,ctions: /10 A,(p to the left, then /@0 8,(p to the left a"ain, then /#0 pat yo,r head, then /J0 pat yo,r head a"ain. Er, in the case of stora"e (edia in co(p,ters, the sa(e pattern can !e present in any series of !inary devices if the first t+o are in +hatever co,nts as their $3state and the second t+o are in +hatever co,nts as their 13state. /.ndeed, there is no reason that the syste( instantiatin" a !inary pattern need !e physical in nat,re at all.0 ;i"ital patterns are real . *hey are abstract as opposed to physical in 5 1## 5 character, altho,"h they are literally present in physical o!8ects. 9nd, (ore i(portantly, they are noncon"entional . .t is, to so(e e1tent, o,r conventions that +ill deter(ine +hich a!stract patterns are i(portant for o,r p,rposes of descriptionC !,t the a!stract patterns the(selves are all really there independent of the e1istence of any convention and independently of +hether anyone notices the(. .t is di"ital patterns that for( the /real, nonconventional0 !asis for the tokenin" of sy(!ols in co(p,ters. Since individ,al !inary circ,its have too fe+ possi!le states to encode (any interestin" thin"s s,ch as characters and n,(!ers, it is series of s,ch circ,its that are "enerally e(ployed as ,nits

/so(eti(es called 7!ytes70 and ,sed as sy(!ols and representations. *he 9SC.. convention, for e1a(ple, (aps a set of "raphe(ic characters to the set of seven3di"it !inary patterns. .nte"er conventions (ap !inary patterns onto a s,!set of the inte"ers, ,s,ally in a fashion closely related to the representation of those inte"ers in !ase3@ notation. Here +e clearly have conventions for !oth (arkers and si"nifiers. *he (arker conventions esta!lish kinds +hose physical criterion is a !inary pattern. *he si"nifier conventions are of t+o types /see fi". -0. .n cases like that of inte"er representation, +e find +hat . shall call a representation scheme, +hich directly associates the (arker type /typified !y its !inary pattern0 +ith an interpretation /say, a n,(!er or a !oolean val,e0. .n the case of 9SC.. characters, ho+ever, (arker types typified !y !inary patterns are not "iven se(antic interpretations. Gather, they encode "raphe(ic characters that are e(ployed in a pree1istin" lan",a"e "a(e that has conventions for si"nificationC they no (ore have (eanin"s individ,ally than do the "raphe(es they encode. 9 strin" of !inary di"its in a co(p,ter is said to 7store a sentence7 !eca,se /a 0 it encodes a strin" of characters /!y +ay of the 9SC.. convention0, and /b 0 that strin" of characters is ,sed in a nat,ral lan",a"e to e1press or represent a sentence. . call this kind of convention a coding scheme . Beca,se !inary strin"s in the co(p,ter encode characters and characters are ,sed in te1t, the representations in the co(p,ter inherit the /nat,ral3lan",a"e0 se(antic and syntactic properties of the te1t they encode. .t is th,s clear that co(p,ters can and do store thin"s that are intepreta!le as (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters. En at least so(e occasions, thin"s in co(p,ters are intended and interpreted to !e of s,ch types, tho,"h this is (ore likely to happen on the en"ineer?s !ench than on the end3,ser?s desktop. .t is +orth notin", ho+ever, that in none of this does the co(p,ter?s nat,re as a computer play any role in the story. 5 1#J 5

'i",re *he architect,re of the co(p,ter plays a role, of co,rse, in deter(inin" +hat kinds of reso,rces are availa!le as stora"e locations /!ista!le circ,its, disk locations, (a"netic cores, etc.0. B,t +hat (akes so(ethin" in a co(p,ter a symbol /i.e., a (arker0 and +hat (akes it meaningful are precisely the sa(e for sy(!ols in co(p,ters as for sy(!ols on paper: na(ely, the conventions and intentions of sy(!ol ,sers. 6o+ of co,rse the difference !et+een co(p,ters and paper is that co(p,ters can do thin"s +ith the sy(!ols they store and paper cannot. 2ore precisely, co(p,ters can prod,ce ne+ sy(!ol strin"s on the !asis of e1istin" ones, and they can do so in +ays that are ,sef,l for enterprises like reasonin" and (athe(atical calc,lation. *he co((on story 5 1#% 5 a!o,t this is that co(p,ters do so !y !ein" sensitive to the syntactic properties of the sy(!ols. B,t strictly speakin" this is false. Synta1, as +e have seen and +ill ar",e f,rther in the ne1t chapter, involves (ore than f,nctional description. .t involves convention as +ell. 9nd co(p,ters are no (ore privy to syntactic conventions than to se(antic ones. 'or that (atter, co(p,ters are not even sensitive to mar er conventions. *hat is, +hile co(p,ters operate ,pon entities that happen to be sy(!ols, the co(p,ter does not relate to the( as sy(!ols /i.e., as (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters0. *o do so, it

+o,ld need to !e privy to conventions. *here are really t+o =,ite separate descriptions of the co(p,ter. En the one hand, there is a f,nctional3 ca,sal storyC on the other a se(iotic story. *he art of the pro"ra((er is to find a +ay to (ake the f,nctionalca,sal properties do +hat yo, +ant in transfor(in" the sy(!ols. *he (ore interestin" sy(!olic transfor(ations yo, can "et the f,nctional properties of the co(p,ter to do for yo,, the (ore (oney yo, can (ake as a co(p,ter pro"ra((er. So for a co(p,ter to !e useful, the sy(!olic feat,res need to line ,p +ith the f,nctional3ca,sal properties. B,t they need not in fact line ,p, and +hen they do it is d,e to an e1cellence in desi"n and not to any a priori relationship !et+een f,nctional description and se(iotics.

7.2.20 " Rival Vie> Re+uted

6o+ +hile . think this last point is true, . can hardly pretend that it is uncontro"ersial . *here is a rival vie+ to the one that . have 8,st presented, and this rival vie+ has en8oyed =,ite a !it of pop,larity over the years. En this vie+, there is so(ethin" a!o,t the f,nctional nat,re of the co(p,ter that contri!,tes to, and even e1plains, the sy(!olic character of +hat it operates ,pon. ;,e to the prevalence of this alternative theory, . think it is +orth presentin" it +ith so(e care and vent,rin" a dia"nosis of +hat has "one +ron" in it. So(e +riters clai( that co(p,ter science has revealed i(portant tr,ths a!o,t the nat,re of sy(!ols. 6e+ell and Si(on /19-%0, for e1a(ple, clai( that co(p,ter science has discovered /disco"eredE 0 that ?sy(!ol? is an i(portant nat,ral kind, +hose nat,re has !een revealed thro,"h research in co(p,ter science and artificial intelli"ence. *heir central concern is +ith +hat they call the 7physical sy(!ol syste( hypothesis.7 6e+ell and Si(on descri!e a 7physical sy(!ol syste(7 in the follo+in" +ay: 5 1#6 5 9 physical sy(!ol syste( consists of a set of entities, called sy(!ols, +hich are physical patterns that can occ,r as co(ponents of another type of entity called an e1pression /or sy(!ol str,ct,re0. . . . Besides these str,ct,res, the syste( also contains a collection of processes that operate on e1pressions to prod,ce other e1pressions. . . . 9 physical sy(!ol syste( is a (achine that prod,ces thro,"h ti(e an evolvin" collection of sy(!ol str,ct,res. /6e+ell and Si(on L19-%M 19&1: J$0 *heir "eneral thesis is that 7a physical sy(!ol syste( has the necessary and s,fficient (eans for intelli"ent action7 /i!id., J10. *hey define a physical sy(!ol syste( as 7an instance of a ,niversal (achine7 /i!id., J@0, !,t see( to re"ard this as a p,rely nat,ral cate"ory defined in f,nctional ter(s, not as a cate"ory involvin" the conventional co(ponent involved in (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters. .ndeed, they clai( that co(p,ter science has (ade an empirical disco"ery to the effect that sy(!ol syste(s are an i(portant natural ind, defined in physical, f,nctional, and ca,sal ter(s. .t looks as tho,"h their 7sy(!ols7 are s,pposed to !e characteriDed precisely !y 7physical patterns7 /i!id., J$0, altho,"h perhaps the f,nctional or"aniDation of the syste( plays so(e role in their individ,ation. *heir characteriDations of ho+ sy(!ols in s,ch syste(s can 7desi"nate7 o!8ects and ho+ the syste( can 7interpret7 the sy(!ols are also =,ite pec,liar: 6esignation . 9n e1pression desi"nates an o!8ect if, "iven the e1pression, the syste( can either affect the o!8ect itself or !ehave in +ays dependin" on the o!8ect. Interpretation . *he syste( can interpret an e1pression if the e1pression desi"nates a

process and if, "iven the e1pression, the syste( can carry o,t the process. /i!id., J$0LJM 6e+ell and Si(on re"ard the physical sy(!ol syste( hypothesis as a 7la+ of =,alitative str,ct,re,7 co(para!le to the cell doctrine in !iolo"y, plate tectonics in "eolo"y, the "er( theory of disease, and the doctrine of ato(is( /i!id., #&3#90. .t is this kind of clai( that has aro,sed the ire of critics s,ch as Sayre /19&60, Searle /199$0, and Horst /199$0, for +ho( s,ch clai(s see( to involve "ross li!erties +ith the ,sa"e of +ords s,ch as ?sy(!ol? and ?interpretation?. .n the eyes of these critics, 6e+ell and Si(on have in fact coined a ne+ ,sa"e of +ords s,ch as ?sy(!ol? and ?interpretation? to s,it their o+n p,rposesHa ,sa"e that ar",a!ly has a different e1tension fro( the ordinary ,sa"e and ,ndo,!tedly e1presses different properties. 5 1#- 5 .n one sense, . think this criticis( still holds "ood. Here, ho+ever, . sho,ld like to dra+ a (ore constr,ctive concl,sion. 'or 6e+ell and Si(on are also in a sense correct, even if they (i"ht have !een (ore circ,(spect a!o,t their ,se of lan",a"e: co(p,ter science does indeed deal +ith an i(portant class of syste(s, descri!a!le in f,nctional ter(s, that for( an e(pirically interestin" do(ain. *heir ,sa"e of the e1pressions ?sy(!ol syste(? and ?sy(!ol? do pick o,t i(portant kinds relevant to the description of s,ch syste(s. 9nd the historical path+ay to ,nderstandin" s,ch syste(s does in fact t,rn ,pon *,rin"?s disc,ssion of (achines that do, in a perfectly ,ncontroversial sense, (anip,late sy(!ols /i.e., letters and n,(erals0. B,t +hile it has proven convenient 'ithin the theory of computation to speak of f,nctionally descri!a!le transfor(ations as 7sy(!ol (anip,lations,7 this involves a s,!tle shift in the ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol?, and the ordinary notion of sy(!ol is not a nat,ral kind, nor are syste(s that (anip,late sy(!ols per se an e(pirically interestin" class. .n order to ill,strate this clai(, it +ill prove convenient to tell a story a!o,t the history of the ,se of the se(iotic voca!,lary in connection +ith co(p,ters and co(p,tation. *he story !e"ins +ith *,rin"?s article 7En Co(p,ta!le 6,(!ers7 /19#60Hthe article in +hich he introd,ces the notion of a co(p,tin" (achine. *he p,rpose of this article is to provide a "eneral characteriDation of the class of co(p,ta!le f,nctions, +here ?co(p,ta!le? (eans 7s,scepti!le to eval,ation !y the application of a rote proced,re or al"orith(.7 *,rin"?s strate"y for doin" this is first to descri!e the operations perfor(ed !y a 7h,(an co(p,ter7Hna(ely, a h,(an (athe(atician i(ple(entin" an al"orith(ic proced,re /*,rin" al'ays ,ses the +ord ?co(p,ter? to refer to a h,(an in this article0C second, to develop the notion of a (achine that perfor(s 7co(p,tations7 !y e1ec,tin" steps descri!ed !y *,rin" as !ein" analo"o,s to those perfor(ed !y the h,(an (athe(aticianC and third, to characteriDe a "eneral or 7,niversal7 (achine that can perfor( any co(p,tations that can !e perfor(ed !y s,ch a (achine, or !y anythin" that can perfor( the kinds of operations that are involved in co(p,tation. .t is +orth lookin" at a fe+ of the details of *,rin"?s e1position. *,rin" likens a (an in the process of co(p,tin" a real n,(!er to a (achine +hich is only capa!le of a finite n,(!er of conditions, =1 , =@ , . . . , =G , +hich +ill !e called 7m 3confi",rations7. *he (achine is s,pplied +ith a 7tape7 /the analo",e of paper0 r,nnin" thro,"h it, and divided into sections /called 7s=,ares70 each capa!le of !earin" a 7sy(!ol7. /*,rin" 19#6: @#10 5 1#& 5 /6ote the scare =,otes aro,nd ?sy(!ol? here. Ene pla,si!le interpretation is that *,rin" is e(ployin" this +ord in a technical ,sa"e, not necessarily contin,o,s +ith ordinary and e1istin" ,sa"e.0

*o contin,e the description: the (achine has a head capa!le of scannin" one s=,are at a ti(e, and is capa!le of perfor(in" operations that (ove the head one s=,are to the ri"ht or left alon" the tape and that create or erase a sy(!ol in a s=,are. 9(on" (achines (eetin" this description, *,rin" is concerned only +ith those for +hich 7at each sta"e the (otion of the (achine . . . is completely deter(ined !y the confi",ration7 /*,rin" 19#6: @#@0. *he 7co(plete confi",ration7 of the (achine, (oreover, is descri!ed !y 7the n,(!er of the scanned s=,are, the co(plete se=,ence of all sy(!ols on the tape, and the m 3confi",ration7 /i!id.0. Chan"es !et+een co(plete confi",rations are called 7(oves7 of the (achine. What the (achine +ill do in any co(plete confi",ration can !e descri!ed !y a ta!le specifyin" each co(plete confi",ration /as a co(!ination of m 3confi",ration and sy(!ol scanned0 and the res,ltin" 7!ehavio,r7 of the (achine: that is, the operations it perfor(s /e."., (ove(ent fro( s=,are to s=,are, printin" or erasin" a sy(!ol0 and the res,ltin" m 3confi",ration. *he sy(!ols are of t+o types. *hose of the first type are n,(erals: $s and 1s. *hese are ,sed in printin" the !inary deci(al representations of n,(!ers !ein" co(p,ted.L%M *hose of the second type are ,sed to represent m 3confi",rations and operationsC for these *,rin" e(ploys Go(an letters, +ith the se(icolon ,sed to indicate !reaks !et+een se=,ences. *he sy(!ols are typified !y visi!le patterns, L6M and are (eant to !e precisely the letters and n,(erals act,ally e(ployed !y h,(ans. .ndeed, the operations of the computing machine are intended to correspond to those of a human computer /i.e., a h,(an doin" co(p,tation0, +hose !ehavior 7at any (o(ent is deter(ined !y the sy(!ols +hich he is o!servin", and his ?state of (ind? at that (o(ent7 /*,rin" 19#6: @%$0. 9"ain, *,rin" first descri!es the !ehavior of a h,(an co(p,ter /i!id., @J93@%10, and then proceeds to descri!e a (achine e=,ivalent of +hat the co(p,ter /i.e., the h,(an0 does: We (ay no+ constr,ct a (achine to do the +ork of this Lh,(an SHM co(p,ter. *o each state of (ind of the Lh,(anM co(p,ter corresponds an 7m 3confi",ration7 of the (achine. *he (achine scans % s=,ares correspondin" to the % s=,ares o!served !y the Lh,(anM co(p,ter. /i!id., @%10L-M *o s,((ariDe, *,rin"?s description of a co(p,tin" (achine is offered as a (odel on +hich to ,nderstand the kind of co(p,tation done !y 5 1#9 5 (athe(aticians, a (odel on +hich 7a n,(!er is co(p,ta!le if its deci(al can !e +ritten do+n !y a (achine7 /i!id., @#$0. 6o+ there are t+o thin"s +orth notin" here. 'irst, if there is a si(ilarity !et+een +hat the (achine does and +hat a h,(an perfor(in" a co(p,tation does, this is entirely !y desi"n: the operations perfor(ed !y the (achine are envisioned =,ite e1plicitly as correspondin" to the operations perfor(ed !y the h,(an co(p,ter /tho,"h *,rin" is not caref,l to say +hether 7correspondence7 here is intended to (ean 7type identity7 or 7analo"o,s role70. Second, +hile this (achine is ,npro!le(atically s,scepti!le to analysis both /a 0 in ter(s of symbols and /b 0 in the f,nctional ter(s capt,red !y the (achine ta!le, it is i(portant to see that the factors that render it susceptible to these t'o forms of analysis are quite distinct . En the one hand, it is perfectly correct to say that this (achine is s,scepti!le to a f,nctional analysis in the sense of !ein" characteriDa!le in ter(s of a f,nction /in the (athe(atical sense0 fro( co(plete confi",rations to co(plete confi",rations. .ndeed, that is +hat the (achine ta!le is all a!o,t. What renders the (achine appropriate for s,ch an analysis is si(ply that it !ehaves in a fashion +hose re",larities can !e descri!ed !y s,ch a ta!le, and any o!8ect +hose re",larities can !e descri!ed !y s,ch a ta!le is s,scepti!le to the sa(e sort of analysis, +hether it deals +ith deci(al n,(!ers or not.

En the other hand, it is perfectly nat,ral to say that *,rin"?s (achine operates ,pon sy(!ols. By stip,lation, it operates ,pon n,(erals and letters. 6,(erals and letters are sy(!ols. *herefore it operates ,pon sy(!ols. Pla,si!ly, this (ay !e constr,ed as a fact =,ite distinct fro( the fact that it is f,nctionally descri!a!le. So(e f,nctionally descri!a!le o!8ects /e."., calc,lators0 operate on n,(!ers and letters, +hile others /e."., soda (achines0 do not. >ike+ise, so(e thin"s that operate ,pon n,(!ers and letters /e."., calc,lators0 are f,nctionally descri!a!le, +hile others /e."., erasers0 are not /see fi". &0. 2oreover, +hat (akes so(ethin" a n,(eral or a letter is not +hat the (achine does +ith it, !,t the conventions and intentions of the sy(!ol3,sin" co((,nity. /Whatever one thinks a!o,t the typin" of sy(!ols generally, this is s,rely tr,e for n,(erals and letters.0 6o+ ho+ does one "et fro( *,rin"?s article to 6e+ell and Si(on?s, forty years laterK . s,spect the process is so(ethin" like the follo+in". 'or the p,rposes of the theory of co(p,tation /as opposed to se(iotics0, the nat,ral division to (ake is !et+een the se(antics of the sy(!ols /say, the fact that one is eval,atin" a deci(al series or an inte"ral0 and the for(al 5 1J$ 5

'i",re & techni=,es e(ployed for (anip,latin" the sy(!ols in the partic,lar al"orith(ic strate"y.L&M 9nd fro( this standpoint, it does not (atter a +hit 'hat +e use as sy(!olsHn,(erals, letters, !eads on an a!ac,s, or colored stones. 9nd (ore to the point, it does not (atter for the functional properties of the operations perfor(ed !y the (achine +hether it operates on n,(erals and letters /as *,rin"?s (achine +as s,pposed to0 or ,pon e=,ivalent sets of activation patterns across flip3flops or (a"netic cores or fl,1 densities on a disk. 9s far as the theory of co(p,tation "oes, these can !e treated as 7notational variants,7 and fro( an en"ineerin" standpoint, the latter are far faster and easier to ,se than letters and n,(erals. 9nd of co,rse these circ,it states /or +hatever (ode of representation one chooses0 are at least so(eti(es 7sy(!ols7 in the senses of !ein" (arkers, si"nifiers, and co,nters: there are conventions like the 9SC.. convention and the deci(al convention that "ro,p n 3!it addresses as (arkers and (ap the( onto a conventional interpretation, and there are strai"htfor+ard (appin"s of te1t files in a co(p,ter onto ordinary te1t. *he occ,pants of co(p,ter (e(ory th,s live a kind of do,!le life. En the one hand, they fall into one set of types !y virt,e of playin" a certain kind of role in the operation of the (achineHa role defined in f,nctional3ca,sal ter(s and descri!ed !y the (achine ta!le. En the other hand, they fall into an independent set of types !y dint of /possi!le0 s,!s,(ption ,nder conventionally !ased se(iotic conventions. Both of these roles are necessary in order for the (achine to pla,si!ly !e said to !e 7co(p,tin" a f,nction7Hfor e1a(ple, eval,atin" a differential e=,ationHbut they are separate roles . .f +e have f,nctional or"aniDation 5 1J1 5 +itho,t the se(iotics, +hat the (achine does cannot co,nt as !ein", say, the sol,tion of a differential e=,ation. *his is the difference !et+een calc,lators and soda (achines. 2ore radically, ho+ever, addresses in co(p,ter (e(ory only co,nt as storin" mar ers /7sy(!ols7 in the (ost !asic sense0 !y virt,e of ho+ they are interpreted and ,sed. /We could interpret inner states of soda (achines as sy(!olsHthat is, invoke conventions analo"o,s to the 9SC.. convention for th,s constr,in" the(H

!,t +hy !otherK0 En the other hand, +e also do not "et co(p,tation if +e have se(iotics +itho,t any f,nctional3ca,sal or"aniDation /+ritin" on paper0 or the +ron" f,nctional3ca,sal or"aniDation /a !roken calc,lator0. 6o+ . think that +hat 6e+ell and Si(on have done is this: they have reco"niDed that co(p,ter science has ,ncovered an i(portant do(ain of o!8ects, o!8ects defined !y a partic,lar kind of f,nctional or"aniDation that operates on thin"s that correspond to sy(!ols. 9nd !eca,se they are interested (ore in the theory of co(p,tation than in se(iotics /or the description of nat,ral lan",a"e0, they have taken it that the i(portant ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol? is to desi"nate things pic ed out by a certain ind of functional!causal role in syste(s that are descri!a!le !y a (achine ta!le. What they have not realiDed is that this ,sa"e is critically different fro( an e=,ally i(portant, !,t distinct, ,sa"e necessary for talkin" a!o,t se(iotics. 6or, as Searle and Sayre have noted, do +riters +ho (ake this (ove see( ade=,ately sensitive to the dan"ers of paralo"istic ar",(ent that e(er"e fro( this oversi"ht.

7.40 " Ne> Interpretation o+ 5Symbol5 and 5SyntaC5

.t th,s appears that there is "ood reason to think that so(e +riters in co(p,ter science have at least i(plicitly e(ployed the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? in a fashion that has proven =,ite fr,itf,l in their investi"ations, and yet +hich !ears (arked discontin,ities +ith the ordinary ,ses of those +ords. .n ro,"h ter(s, in the conte1t of disc,ssion of co(p,ters, the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? are so(eti(es ,sed to desi"nate entities and their properties that play partic,lar roles in a f,nctionally descri!a!le syste(. *his is of interest for o,r p,rposes in eval,atin" C*2 for the si(ple reason that it (ay !e this ,sa"e of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? that C*2?s advocates have in (ind, and not the ordinary ,sa"e e1plicated in the Se(iotic 9nalysis in chapter J. Ho+ever, in order to 5 1J@ 5 clarify ho+ this +o,ld affect C*2, it is necessary to (ake this i(plicit ,sa"e of ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? (ore e1act !y s,pplyin" so(e technical ter(inolo"y and an analysis. We (ay develop this cate"ory in the follo+in" +ay. *he role that is played !y the thin"s 6e+ell and Si(on call 7sy(!ols,7 =,ite si(ply, is one of pickin" o,t ite(s in f,nctionally deter(ined cate"ories. *he technical ,se of ?sy(!ol? serves to pick o,t entities that fall into types !ased ,pon the role they play in a f,nctionally descri!ed syste(. 9 correspondin" technical ,se of ?pro"ra(? or ?for(al r,le? picks o,t ca,sal re",larities !et+een f,nctionally descri!ed str,ct,res in s,ch a syste(. We (ay even state a for(al definition for this ,se of ?sy(!ol,? +hich (ay !e replaced +ith the technical ter( ?(achine3co,nter?: 9 tokenin" of a (achine3co,nter of type T (ay !e said to e1ist in C at ti(e t iff /10 C is a di"ital co(ponent of a f,nctionally descri!a!le syste( 7 , /@0 C has a finite n,(!er of deter(ina!le states S : TS1 , . . . , s n U s,ch that C ?s ca,sal contri!,tion to the f,nctionin" of 7 is deter(ined !y +hich (e(!er of S di"ital co(ponent C is in, /#0 the presence of a (achine3co,nter of type T at C is constit,ted !y C ?s !ein" in state si , +here si< S , and /J0 C is in state s i at t . *he notion of a (achine3co,nter is defined +holly in nonconventional ter(s. .t can also do an

i(portant part of the +ork that is to !e done !y the le"iti(ately syntactic cate"ories e(ployed to descri!e co(p,ters: (achine3co,nter types correspond to the co,nter types that co,ld !e ,sed to descri!e a co(p,ter in syntactic ter(s. *o p,t it differently, for every (achine3co,nter type T of a syste( S , there is a syntactic description of S availa!le in principle that contains a co,nter type TQ s,ch that T and TQ provide f,nctionally e=,ivalent characteriDations of S . 9ny 5 that is a (achine3co,nter of type T is th,s interpreta!le3in3principle as a co,nter of type TQ . 6otice, ho+ever, that the notion of a machine!counter is not built out of a simpler notion corresponding to a mar er . Since f,nctional role is constit,tive of (achine3co,nter type, the typin" of (achineco,nters is not dependent ,pon so(e prior cate"oriDation. .n this respect, the f,nctional description of co(p,ters differs fro( se(iotic description, +hich depends on a f,nda(ental level of (arker typin". 5 1J# 5

7.60 Impli3ations o+ a Separate Usa*e o+ 5Symbol5

.t (ay +ell !e, then, that the ,sa"e of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? in co(p,ter science poses a challen"e to the Se(iotic 9nalysis presented in chapter J, !,t the challen"e it see(s to pose is not that that analysis is the +ron" analysis of the ordinary ,sa"e of ?sy(!ol?, !,t that there is a ne' and technical ,sa"e of ?sy(!ol? +hich needs to !e considered as +ell. *he i(plications of this for the assess(ent of C*2 see( to !e fairly strai"htfor+ard. .t looks as tho,"h there are at least t+o sorts of thin"s the advocate of C*2 (i"ht (ean in talkin" a!o,t 7sy(!ols7 in co(p,ters: /10 she (i"ht (ean that they are (arkers and co,nters, or /@0 she (i"ht (ean that they are (achine3co,nters. 9nd hence +hen she speaks of 7(ental representations7 !ein" 7sy(!ols,7 she (i"ht (ean that they are (arkers and co,nters, or she (ay (ean that they are (achine3co,nters. *hese are very different kinds of clai(s and need to !e !e assessed separately. 9r",a!ly the case is si(ilar +ith respect to se(antics. .t is not clear that there is any coherent nonconventional notion of 7(eanin"7 forthco(in" from computer science that is analo"o,s to the notion of a (achine3co,nter. B,t it co,ld !e that C*2?s advocates are ,sin" the se(antic voca!,lary in so(e fashion distinct fro( that ,sed to e1press se(iotic3se(antic properties. Er, even if they do not yet see the pro!le( and hence do not e1plicitly (ean to ,se the se(antic voca!,lary in a ne+ +ay, they (i"ht (ost charita!ly !e vie+ed as doin" so. *hat is, it is possi!le that the !est +ay to read advocates of C*2 +hen they speak of (ental representations as havin" 7se(antic properties7 is to read the( as attri!,tin" not se(iotic3se(antic properties, !,t so(e distinct class of properties pec,liar to (ental representations. *hese properties, pres,(a!ly nonconventional in character, +e (i"ht desi"nate M+!semantic properties, in contrast +ith the se(iotic3se(antic properties of sy(!ols and the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. .t is ,nclear +hat s,ch properties (i"ht !e, !,t +e (ay nonetheless si"nal +ith o,r ter(inolo"y that so(e distinct, nonconventional set of properties is intended in this +ay. .t has t,rned o,t, then, that co(p,ters can !e said to 7(anip,late sy(!ols7 !oth in the ordinary sense of doin" thin"s +ith o!8ects that in fact have conventional interpretations and in a distinct technical sense havin" only historical connections to the ordinary ,sa"e e1plicated !y the Se(iotic 9nalysis. *his, ho+ever, !y no (eans ,nderc,ts the Se(iotic 5 1JJ 5

9nalysis as an analysis of +hat it is to !e a sy(!ol in the ordinary sense. En the one hand, that analysis applies perfectly +ell to (any thin"s in co(p,ters. En the other hand, the technical ,sa"eHthat is, the notion of a (achine3co,nterHe1presses distinct properties fro( those e1pressed !y the ordinary ,sa"es of the +ord ?sy(!ol?. .t is necessary to see +hether either fa(ily of ,sa"es of the se(iotic voca!,lary +ill provide a via!le version of C*2, and it is necessary to e1plore !oth. *he analysis of these alternative interpretations of C*2 +ill !e ,ndertaken in chapters - thro,"h 9. Chapter - +ill assess the (erits of C*2 if it is interpreted as attri!,tin" the se(iotic properties to (ental representations. Chapters & and 9 +ill look at t+o +ays of interpretin" C*2 in a +ay other than that s,""ested !y the se(iotic cate"ories. 5 1J% 5

C)apter SiC0 ReBe3tin* Non3onventional SyntaC and Semanti3s +or Symbols

Chapter J presented the Se(iotic 9nalysis of the nat,re of sy(!ols, synta1, and sy(!olic (eanin". 9ccordin" to this analysis, lin",istic sy(!olis( is thoro,"hly dependent ,pon conventions and intentions of lan",a"e ,sers. .ndeed, this is not (erely so(e contin"ent fact a!o,t sy(!ols in p,!lic lan",a"es that accr,e to the( !eca,se of their p,!lic character, !,t a feat,re that is !,ilt into the very lo"ical for( of predicates in the se(iotic voca!,lary: to attri!,te se(antic or syntactic properties to a sy(!olHor indeed, even to call a thin" a sy(!olH8,st is to relate it to certain conventions and intentions. We sa+ in the last chapter that this has the conse=,ence that the se(antic voca!,lary is in fact a(!i",o,s, e1pressin" different properties +hen applied /a 0 to sy(!ols and /b 0 to (ental states. .n partic,lar, attri!,tions of (eanin" to sy(!ols are concept,ally dependent ,pon attri!,tions of (eanin"f,l (ental states. We sa+ as +ell that sy(!ols in co(p,ters are sy(!ols in the ordinary se(iotic sense, altho,"h the paths !y +hich interpretive conventions apply to the( (ay !e (ore circ,ito,s than in the case of disc,rsive sy(!ols s,ch as ,tterances and inscriptions. B,t +e also sa+ that recent disc,ssions of sy(!ols in co(p,ters !y +riters s,ch as 6e+ell and Si(on see(ed so(eti(es to i(ply a distinct and technical ,sa"e of the +ord ?sy(!ol? that picked o,t not the se(iotic properties of the sy(!ols, !,t their f,nctionally defined type. . ar",ed there that f,nctional typin" and sy(!ol typin" in the ordinary sense are concept,ally /and ontolo"ically0 distinct, and that !rin"in" the( to"ether in co(p,ters is a hi"hly contin"ent (atter that in fact (akes ,p (,ch of the pro"ra((er?s 5 1J6 5 art. *he relationship !et+een f,nctional analysis and se(iotics is one of craft and not of definition or dependence. *his +ill lay the !asis for the analysis of C*2 that +ill take place in the three chapters that follo+ this one. Chapter - +ill eval,ate the prospects of C*2 on the ass,(ption that the 7sy(!olic7 and 7se(antic7 properties i(p,ted to (ental representations are se(iotic3se(antic properties. Chapters & and 9 +ill address the possi!ility that C*2?s 7sy(!ols7 are not 7sy(!ols7 in the ordinary se(iotic sense, !,t si(ply f,nctionally typed entities. *hese t+o chapters +ill e1plore t+o aven,es for interpretin" the 7se(antic7 properties i(p,ted to (ental representations in a fashion that does not i(p,te convention3 and intention3!ased se(iotic3se(antic properties.

Before proceedin" to this analysis, ho+ever, it is perhaps pr,dent to address a possi!le o!8ection to the Se(iotic 9nalysis. *h,s the present chapter +ill address the o!8ection that +e can separate 7p,re syntactic7 and 7p,re se(antic7 co(ponents of o,r analysis of sy(!ols fro( a conventional co(ponent that accr,es to the( solely !eca,se they are ,sed for p,!lic lan",a"es. .n partic,lar, +e shall e1a(ine the clai( that *arskian se(antics provides ,s +ith s,ch a 7p,rely se(antic analysis,7 as see(s often to !e ass,(ed !y philosophers of (ind.

(.&0 " Criti3ism o+ t)e Semioti3 "nalysis

While the analysis of sy(!ols and sy(!olic representation presented in chapter J is in certain +ays novel and no do,!t +ill !e re"arded as controversial in so(e respects, one "eneral thr,st of the analysis Hthe idea that the nat,re of ,tterances and inscriptions depends ,pon the conventions and intentions of speakers and +ritersH(ay pla,si!ly !e re"arded as a 7(ainstrea(7 vie+. .t is a vie+ +idely held !y +riters !oth +ithin co"nitive science and o,tside it,L1M and is indeed endorsed in so(e for( !y C*2?s (ost i(portant advocates /see 'odor 19&10. *here are so(e partic,lar t+ists to (y artic,lation of this vie+Hnota!ly, the distinction !et+een the technical sortal ter(s ?(arker?, ?si"nifier?, and ?co,nter?, the clai( that there are fo,r separate 7(odalities7 of conventional !ein", and the clai( that not only se(antics !,t also synta1 and sy(!olhood are conventional in nat,re. B,t (ost o!8ections to these feat,res of (y acco,nt as an account of utterances and inscriptions +o,ld pro!a!ly take the for( of an intra(,ral de!ate !et+een +riters +ho e(!race a se(iotics !ased on convention and intention. When this acco,nt is offered as a general acco,nt of sy(!ols and sy(3 5 1J- 5 !olic (eanin", ho+ever, it so(eti(es (eets +ith "reater resistance. 'or it is often clai(ed that +hat this analysis really "ives ,s is an acco,nt of the nat,re of specifically communicati"e or discursi"e symbols Hor perhaps of symbols!as!used!communicati"ely Hand not an acco,nt of sy(!ols, synta1, and sy(!olic (eanin" "enerally, (,ch less a "eneral acco,nt of representation. 6o+ to this latter clai(Hthat the acco,nt in chapter J is not a "eneral acco,nt of representation H. "ladly defer. .t +as not (y intent there to s,pply a "eneral acco,nt of representation or an analysis of the ,ses of the +ord ?representation?, nor does doin" so fall +ithin the rhetorical scope of this !ook. What +e are disc,ssin" here, after all, is not the "eneral clai( that tho,"ht involves representation, !,t the (ore specific clai( that it involves symbolic representation.L@M .t is necessary, ho+ever, to address the clai( that the Se(iotic 9nalysis presented here is so(eho+ specifically an analysis of disc,rsive sy(!olsHof symbols!used!communicati"ely, and not symbols per se .L#M 'or this clai( +ill !e of direct relevance to the analysis of C*2, as the sy(!ols post,lated !y C*2?s advocates are not ,sed co((,nicatively. 'or p,rposes of !revity, . shall p,t this o!8ection in the critic?s voice: CG.*.C : >ook here, Horst. *he analysis yo, "ive (ay !e very +ell and "ood as an analysis of disc,rsive sy(!ols s,ch as ,tterances and inscriptions, !,t yo, have !een far too hasty in dra+in" the concl,sion that all sy(!ols are conventional in nat,re on the !asis of these e1a(ples. *he decision to confine yo,rself to conventional e1a(ples see(s to !e a (atter (ore of fiat than of principleC and as a conse=,ence, the analysis is =,estion !e""in" if it is presented as a "eneral acco,nt of sy(!ols and sy(!olic (eanin". What yo, really have here is a hybrid analysis: +hat it descri!es is not precisely 'hat it is for sy(!ols to ha"e se(antic properties, !,t also ho+ they come by them in a fashion that is

cond,cive to communicati"e use of the sy(!ols. .ther sy(!ols /e."., (ental representations and so(e representations in co(p,ters0 also have se(antic properties, !,t are not ,sed co((,nicatively. 9r",a!ly, the only reason that disc,rsive sy(!ols are conventional in nat,re is that this is necessary for their co((,nicative role in nat,ral lan",a"es. 9nd so there is no reason to s,ppose that the se(antic properties of (ental representations +o,ld share this feat,re. 2oreover, as to yo,r contention that there is no s,ch thin" as a sy(!ol si(ply 7!ein"7 of a partic,lar type or 7(eanin" so(ethin"7 apart fro( ho+ it is interpreta!le ,nder conventions, intended, interpreted, or 5 1J& 5 interpreta!le3in3principle, yo, have really sho+n less than yo, think. Po, are ri"ht that there is no =,estion of a discursi"e sy(!ol 7(eanin" so(ethin"7 apart fro( ho+ it is interpreta!le, intended, and so forthHat least if yo, (ean !y this /a 0 that yo, can?t have disc,rsive sy(!ols that are (eanin"f,l +itho,t "ettin" their (eanin"s in these +ays, and /b 0 that tellin" the story a!o,t ho+ sy(!ols are conventionally interpreta!le and ho+ they +ere intended, and so on, already says all there is to say a!o,t +hat they (ean. *hat is, yo,r conditions are !oth necessary and s,fficient for the attri!,tion of sy(!olic (eanin" in the case of disc,rsive sy(!ols. B,t this is =,ite co(pati!le +ith the possi!ility that sy(!olic (eanin" is a distinct property fro( conventional interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intentions, and the like. Consider the follo+in" analo"y: s,ppose that so(eone +anted an analysis of redness, and yo, +ere to "ive an analysis in ter(s of the reflectance properties that a solid o!8ect +o,ld have to have in order for it to !e red. .t +o,ld !e tr,e that solid o!8ects co,ld not !e red +itho,t havin" these reflectances and, ar",a!ly, that once yo, had said that an o!8ect had these reflectances, there +as nothin" (ore to its !ein" red to !e told. B,t it does not follo+ that being red is in general si(ply a (atter of reflectances or that nothin" can !e red +itho,t havin" these reflectance "radients. *here is, for e1a(ple, red light . *he property of !ein" red is acco,nted for in one +ay in solids and in another +ay in li"ht. .t is th,s a (istake to identify the property of !ein" red +ith the properties solids (,st have to !e red solids, !eca,se thin"s other than solids can !e red. Si(ilarly, yo, can have physical trian"les and a!stract trian"les, and the latter do not have all of the properties one +o,ld e1pect of the for(er. 4ive an acco,nt of trian",larity that !,ilds physical properties into the pict,re and yo, leave o,t a!stract trian"les. Si(ilarly, te(perat,re is (ean kinetic ener"y of (olec,les for "ases, !,t not for plas(a. 4ive an acco,nt of te(perat,re simpliciter as (ean kinetic ener"y of (olec,les and yo,?ve ar!itrarily r,led o,t the possi!ility of plas(a havin" a te(perat,re. 6o+ look at yo,r e1a(ples: yo,?ve restricted yo,r do(ain to co((,nicative si"ns. Po, (ay !e ri"ht that, for this do(ain, an acco,nt of se(antic properties /and sy(!olhood and synta10 has to advert to conventions and intentions. B,t all that (eans is that thin"s in this do(ain cannot realiDe s,ch properties e1cept !y +ay of conventions and intentions. .n so(e sense, te(perat,re is (ean kinetic ener"y for "ases, !,t not for plas(a. Gedness is a (atter of reflectance c,rves for solids, !,t not for li"ht. 9nd si(ilarly, (eanin" is a (atter of conventional and act,al interpretation for co((,nicative si"ns /and like+ise synta1 and 5 1J9 5 sy(!olhood0, !,t /as yo, point o,t0 not for (ental states, and arguably not for symbols that represent but are not used communicati"ely . Po, have conf,sed the analysis of the property of (eanin"f,lness simpliciter +ith an acco,nt of ho+ it "ets realiDed in partic,lar kinds of o!8ectsHna(ely, o!8ects +hose f,nction is to co((,nicate (eanin". .f yo, +ant to analyDe meaning, the analysis had !etter

+ork for nonco((,nicative sy(!ols like (ental representations as +ell. 9nd if yo, do that, ar",a!ly yo, +ill end ,p +ith an analysis that is applica!le to (ental states, too, th,s circ,(ventin" the concl,sion that the se(antic voca!,lary is parony(o,s. . cease to speak in the critic?s voice.

(.20 Initial Response

6o+ . think that this is in so(e +ays a very diffic,lt criticis( to properly co(e to "rips +ith. 'irst, . a( in so(e +ays ,neasy a!o,t the e1a(ples. /9nd let (e hasten to point o,t that they are my e1a(plesHany pro!le(s +ith the( are not the responsi!ility of other parties.0 'or it is not clear to (e that +e really o,"ht to say that there is a sin"le property called 7te(perat,re7 or one called 7redness,7 "iven that they re=,ire co(pletely different acco,nts in different (edia. /. a( (ore co(pelled !y 7trian"le,7 tho,"h ar",a!ly there si(ply are not any concrete trian"les.0 *hat is, . a( not f,lly pers,aded that these ter(s have not !een proven to !e a(!i",o,s, or at least ill defined. Er, insofar as there do see( to !e properties of te(perat,re and redness, they see( in so(e +ay to !e o!server3 related: te(perat,re in ter(s of kinds of (eas,re(ents and redness in ter(s of the propensity to prod,ce partic,lar sensations. Beyond this, ho+ever, there see( to !e t+o thin"s that one +o,ld need in order for the critic?s o!8ection to !e (ade to carry (,ch i(pact. 'irst, the critic +o,ld have to 8,stify the criticis( of (y choice of paradi"(s !y pointin" to thin"s that +ere said to !e 7sy(!ols7 and to have 7synta17 and 7(eanin"7 in the sa(e sense in +hich these thin"s are said a!o,t ,tterances and inscriptions, yet +hich +ere s,scepti!le to nonconventional analysis. Second, she +o,ld need to sho+ ho+ to provide an alternative analysis of sy(!ols and sy(!olic (eanin" that co,ld 7factor o,t7 the alle"ed 7p,rely syntactic7 and 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponents fro( the 7(erely co((,nicative7 aspects. . shall atte(pt to sho+ that these enterprises are not via!le in the re(ainder of this chapter. .n 5 1%$ 5 so(e places . +ill try to ar",e directly a"ainst the critic?s analysisC in others, . shall try to sho+ +here the critic?s story see(s to have "one +ron".

(.40 T)e C)oi3e o+ $aradi*m ECamples

'irst, let ,s consider +hether . have !een ar!itrary in (y choice of ,tterances and inscriptions as (y paradi"( e1a(ples of sy(!olhood and sy(!olic (eanin". .n partic,lar, are there in fact other paradi"( e1a(ples availa!le s,ch that /a 0 the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?/sy(!olic0 (eanin"? are predicated of those e1a(ples in the sa(e sense in +hich they are predicated of ,tterances and inscriptions, and /b 0 there is no covert reference to conventionality or (ental states +hen these +ords are ,sed of the alternative paradi"(sK 6o+ in a certain +ay, . find this a very odd o!8ection. .t is not as tho,"h +e +ere overr,n +ith thin"s +e call 7sy(!ols7 that 8,(p o,t as alternative paradi"(s. .t is tr,e that the 'ords ?sy(!ol? and ?/sy(!olic0 (eanin"? are said of other sorts of o!8ects. .n +hat follo+s, ho+ever, . shall ar",e that all of these ,sa"es are either /a 0 homonymous and e1press different properties fro( those e1pressed !y

the sa(e +ords +hen they are applied to ,tterances and inscriptions, or /b 0 contentious in +ays that render illicit their ,se as alternative paradi"(s in the present conte1t.

(.4.&0 Some ECistin* Uses o+ 5Symbol5 and 51eanin*5

'irst, there are clearly so(e alternative ,ses of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?(eanin"? in ordinary )n"lish and e1istin" ,sa"e in the sciences. A,n", for e1a(ple, +rote a !ook entitled Man and His Symbols, in +hich the +ord ?sy(!ol? is applied to thin"s other than ,tterances and inscriptions. *here see(s to !e a si(ilar and related ,sa"e in c,lt,ral anthropolo"y, +hich is interested, a(on" other thin"s, in the 7sy(!ols7 e(ployed !y a c,lt,reH(eanin" not their lin",istic tokens, !,t the +ay they e1press the(es and (ythic for(s. Ho+ever, it see(s very ,nlikely that the fact that lin",istic tokens and A,n"ian archetypes (i"ht !oth !e called 7sy(!ols7 indicates that there is a property /!ein"3a3sy(!ol0 that is co((on to !oth sets of o!8ects. .t see(s (ore likely that the +ord is ho(ony(o,s and e1presses different properties in the t+o cases, the e1istence of a co((on +ord !ein" a f,nction of fa(ily rese(!lance or analo"y rather than property sharin". Si(ilarly, the +ord ?(eanin"? and its variants has so(e different or3 5 1%1 5 dinary ,ses. We say, for e1a(ple, that dark clo,ds 7(ean rain,7 and that +hat so(e h,(an !ein"s lon" for (ost is a 7(eanin"f,l relationship7 +ith another h,(an !ein". B,t here a"ain it see(s +ron"headed to ass,(e that the +ord ?(eanin"? e1presses the sa(e property +hen applied to ,tterances, clo,ds, and relationships. )ven in the case of theorists +ho speak of 7nat,ral (eanin"7 or 7nat,ral si"ns7 /e."., 4rice 19%-0Hand it is al(ost never 7nat,ral symbols 7Hit see(s clear that the +ords ?(eanin"? and ?si"n? /or, at a stretch, ?sy(!ol?0 are ,sed here precisely to e1press the relation that is so(eti(es called 7indication7 /see ;retske 19&1, 19&&0, and not to e1press the sa(e property that is predicated of ,tterances and inscriptions. *o !e s,re, so(e +riters /nota!ly ;retske 19&1, 19&&0 have tried to (ake a case that the kind of 7(eanin"7 that accr,es to lan",a"e /i.e., the ,sa"e of the +ord ?(eanin"? that is applied to lin",istic tokens0 can ,lti(ately !e e3plained in a fashion that depends heavily ,pon indication. B,t their point is not to "ive an acco,nt of 'hat property is e3pressed by the ordinary ,sa"e of ?(eanin"?, !,t to "ive an acco,nt of ho+ this property arises. .ndeed, ;retske /19&&: %%3%60 e1plicitly e(!races 4rice?s distinction !et+een t+o ,ses /7nat,ral7 and 7nonnat,ral70 of the +ord ?(eanin"?. .f an indicator theory sho,ld prove ade=,ate as an e1planation of lin",istic (eanin", the stat,s of that theory +o,ld !e that of an e(pirical acco,nt that e1plains the presence of the property , e1pressed !y the 7nonnat,ral7 sense of ?(eanin"? in ter(s of a distinct property 1 that is e1pressed !y the 7nat,ral7 sense, and not an analysis of +hat property that +ord is ,sed to e1press. *h,s these e1a(ples are of no help to the critic. 'irst, the Se(iotic 9nalysis in no +ay clai(s that the +ords in the se(iotic voca!,lary (ay not !e a(!i",o,s in additional +ays, or that they cannot !e ,sed to e1press properties other than those (entioned in the analysis. /Who on )arth +o,ld +ant to clai( thatB 0 Second, if the ,sa"e of the se(iotic voca!,lary in C*2 is related to the convention3!o,nd ,sa"e e1plicated in the Se(iotic 9nalysis only !y +ay of analo"y or fa(ily rese(!lance, this serio,sly ,nderc,ts (,ch of the appeal of C*2. 'or one thin", if these +ords e1press different properties +hen applied to (ental representations, +e are entitled to so(e e1planation of +hat these properties are. 'or another, +hat the co(p,ter paradi"( sho+s ,s ho+ to do is to link ,p ca,sal po+ers +ith the se(iotic3 se(antic properties of the sy(!ols. .f the salient properties e1pressed !y the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?(eanin"? in C*2 e1press not se(iotic3se(antic properties !,t a distinct set of properties, +e +ill need

a ne+ assess(ent of ho+ these properties can !e linked ,p +ith ca,sal role, and hence +e +ill re=,ire a ne+ assess3 5 1%@ 5 (ent of the stat,s of the vindication of intentional psycholo"y, +hich depended so heavily ,pon the co(p,ter paradi"(.LJM

(.4.20 1ental Representations as a $aradi*m

Perhaps, ho+ever, one (i"ht say that one has an alternative paradi"( of nonconventional sy(!ols in (ental representation itself. 9fter all, people in co"nitive science have !een talkin" a!o,t (ental representations in their theories for years, and (ost of the( see( pretty clear that they do not (ean to !e talkin" a!o,t convention3dependent sy(!ols. ;rgo +e have an alternative paradi"(. *his approach, ho+ever, is either a case of ho(ony(o,s ,sa"e or else it is =,estion !e""in". 'or talk of sy(!olic representations in the (ind is either /a 0 an atte(pt to apply e1istin" ,sa"e, fi1ed !y the older paradi"(s, in a ne+ do(ain, or else /b 0 its relationship to e1istin" ,sa"e is (erely one of analo"y or fa(ily rese(!lance. 'odor at one point see(s to reco"niDe this iss,e, !,t is rather cavalier in dis(issin" it. He +rites, .t re(ains an open =,estion +hether internal representation . . . is s,fficiently like nat,ral lan",a"e representation so that !oth can !e called representation ?in the sa(e sense?. B,t . find it hard to care (,ch ho+ this =,estion sho,ld !e ans+ered. *here is an analo"y !et+een the t+o kinds of representation. Since p,!lic lan",a"es are conventional and the lan",a"e of tho,"ht is not, there is ,nlikely to !e more than an analo"y. .f yo, are i(pressed !y the analo"y, yo, +ill +ant to say that the inner code is a lan",a"e. .f yo, are ,ni(pressed !y the analo"y, yo, +ill +ant to say that the inner code is in so(e sense a representational syste( !,t that it is not a lan",a"e. /'odor 19-%: -&0 .t see(s to (e that 'odor ought to +orry a !it (ore a!o,t his options here. 'or the notions of 7sy(!ol7 and 7(eanin"7 play an a!sol,tely central role in C*2, and so one sho,ld +ish to kno+ 8,st +hat properties these +ords are s,pposed to e1press +hen applied to 'odor?s hypothesiDed (ental representations. .f these +ords e1press the sa(e properties they e1press +hen applied to lin",istic tokens, they +o,ld see( to re=,ire +hatever analysis is "iven to lin",istic tokens "enerally. *hese t,rn o,t to !e convention3 and tho,"ht3dependent, and Searle and Sayre have s,""ested that this kind of dependence renders these notions ,nfit for e1plainin" the intentionality of (ental states. /*his vie+ +ill !e ar",ed in detail in chapter -.0 B,t if the ,se of +ords like ?sy(!ol? and ?(eanin"? si"nifies only an analogy +ith lan",a"e, one needs to hear +hat properties these +ords do e1press +hen applied to (ental representations, in order to see if these properties are even candidate e1plainers for 5 1%# 5 the intentionality of (ental states. .n the first case, the critic?s ,se of (ental representation is contentio,s and =,estion !e""in", as the =,estion at hand is one of +hether the ordinary ,sa"e of ?sy(!ol? and ?(eanin"? can !e applied to so(e internal states in a fashion that +ill do +hat C*2?s advocates clai(. .n the second case, +hat +e have is not an o!8ection to the Se(iotic 9nalysis, !,t a clai( that it is not an analysis of the ,sa"e of the se(iotic voca!,lary e(ployed !y C*2?s advocates.

(.4.40 Symbols in Computers

.t also (i"ht !e s,""ested !y so(e that sy(!ols in co(p,ters present a co,ntere1a(ple to the Se(iotic 9nalysis. .n li"ht of the disc,ssion in the previo,s chapter, ho+ever, this is clearly a conf,sion. En the one hand, thin"s in co(p,ters that are nor(ally tho,"ht of as sy(!olsHfor e1a(ple, representations of n,(!ers or te1t encoded in the 9SC.. for(atHare clearly convention3 dependent in e1actly the sa(e senses as are ,tterances and inscriptions. En the other hand, the i(plicit ,sa"e of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1? in +riters like 6e+ell and Si(on /19-%0 to denote f,nctionally typed kinds is clearly a distinct /i.e., ho(ony(o,s0 ,sa"e of the +ords ?sy(!ol? and ?synta1?. *hin"s in the co(p,ter do not fall into se(iotic kinds because they fall o,t of the f,nctional description of the co(p,terC nor do they fall ,nder the f,nctional description provided !y the (achine ta!le because they are (arkers and co,nters. Gather, the "reat acco(plish(ent of s,ccessf,l pro"ra( desi"n is to "et the se(iotic types to line ,p +ith the f,nctional types so that the co(p,ter +ill perfor( operations that happen to !e of interest +hen interpreted as sy(!ol (anip,lations. So, far fro( providin" a co,ntere1a(ple to the Se(iotic 9nalysis, co(p,ters are only properly ,nderstood +hen that analysis is e(ployed.

(.60 !urt)er


.n spite of the lack of clear alternative paradi"(s for the ,sa"e of the se(iotic voca!,lary, it nevertheless (i"ht !e ar",ed that even the ordinary ,sa"e of +ords s,ch as ?sy(!ol? in fact involves t+o distinct ele(ents: a non conventional ele(ent that defines the essence of sy(!olhood, synta1, or se(antics, and a conventional ele(ent that is re=,ired in the case of ,tterances and inscriptions only !eca,se they are sy(!ols3,sed3co((,nicatively, and conventions are needed for co((,nication. .ndeed, one (i"ht s,""est that the notion of a (achine3co,nter provides 5 1%J 5 an analysis of a 7p,re7 notion of sy(!olhood and synta1, +hile so(e other kind of analysis (i"ht do the sa(e for se(antics. *he notions of 7sy(!ol7 and 7synta17 (i"ht th,s !e ade=,ately and perspic,o,sly developed alon" f,nctional or f,nctional3ca,sal lines, +hile se(antics (i"ht !e "iven a nonconventional analysis in ter(s of the kind of se(antic theory proposed !y *arski, +hich depends on an /ar",a!ly nonconventional0 notion of satisfaction .

(.70 T)e Essential Conventionality o+ 1ar/ers

'irst, let ,s consider the !are notion of 7sy(!ol7 capt,red !y the ter( ?(arker?. .s it possi!le to factor o,t the conventionality of the analysis of (arkers !y attri!,tin" that conventionality to the fact that letters and n,(erals are sy(!ols3,sed3for3co((,nicationK Er, alternatively, is it si(ply part of the essence of (arkers that they !e conventionalK . think that it is not possi!le to factor o,t the conventional aspect of (arkers. *o !e"in +ith, it see(s =,ite clear that cate"ories like 7rho7 and 7$7 and their "enera 7letter7 and 7n,(eral7 are le"iti(ate cate"ories that for( an i(portant do(ain for characteriDin" so(e aspects of h,(an life. *he iss,e, then, is not one of le"iti(atin" these cate"ories !,t of providin" a proper analysis of the(. . +ish to ar",e that these cate"ories cannot !e ade=,ately cashed o,t either /a 0 in ter(s of physical properties,

incl,din" a!stract physical properties s,ch as patterns, or /b 0 in f,nctional ter(s like those definin" the notion of a (achine3co,nter. 'irst, consider physical pattern. *he pro!le( here is that physical pattern is not a rich eno,"h condition to distin",ish !et+een (arker types. 'or t+o distinct (arker types /e."., , and rho0 (ay share criteria s,ch that the sa(e set of physical patterns is e(ployed for !oth typesHthat is, anythin" that is rho3 shaped is , 3shaped, and vice versa. *h,s physical pattern is not s,fficient for the e1planation of (arker types the(selves, even tho,"h its presence is a s,fficient condition for a physical partic,lar to co,nt as !ein" interpreta!le as a token of s,ch a type gi"en the e3istence of the con"entions associating the type 'ith particular physical patterns . *his, ho+ever, pres,(es the conventional type and does not e1plain it. .nt,itively, +hat see(s to !e re=,ired is the additional fact that rhos and , ?s play distinct roles in the lan",a"e "a(es of distinct lin",istic co((,nitiesHand hence (arker types are defined in part !y the role they occ,py in the lin",istic lives of co((,nities of lan",a"e ,sers.L%M 5 1%% 5 Pet the critic (i"ht very +ell seiDe ,pon this very characteriDation to (ake her point in another +ay. She (i"ht reason: if (arkers are deter(ined !y the role they play in a syste( of interactions !et+een persons, then they are functionally defined . 9nd hence they +o,ld appear to !e a s,!species of (achine3co,nters. 6o+ perhaps the 7syste(7 needed for definin" (arkers as a species of (achine3 co,nters +o,ld have to !e a very co(ple1 one, involvin" entire lin",istic co((,nities, r,les for coinin" ne+ sy(!ols, revisin" practices, and so on, !,t it is nonetheless a f,nctionally descri!a!le syste(. Hence (arkers are (achine3co,nters. .t is 8,st that the 7(achine7 here is so(ethin" on the order of a h,(an society. *he reason that (arkers have to !e conventional is that the (ake,p of this partic,lar syste( re=,ires it for co((,nication and decodin" !et+een individ,als. /. cease to speak for the critic.0 *his is ad(ittedly a very sed,ctive characteriDation. Ho+ever, . !elieve that it s,ffers fro( several +eaknesses. 'irst, for anyone even a little !it taken +ith the +ork of Gyle, the late Witt"enstein, or :ebens'elt!philosophie, it is contentious at best to clai( that the notion of a role +ithin a lan",a"e "a(e or a for( of life can !e cashed o,t as a f,nctional relationship in the !are (athe(atical sense of f,nction re=,ired for a (achine3co,nter. . shall not !ela!or this point here, !,t it see(s that really +hat the critic o,"ht to say is not that the role of a (arker in a lan",a"e "a(e is fully e3plicated by so(ethin" appearin" in a (achine3ta!le description of a lan",a"e, !,t rather that +e can abstract a'ay from a lan",a"e in s,ch a +ay that +hat +e end ,p +ith is a (achine ta!le, and that +e can do so in s,ch a +ay that so(e of the (achine3co,nters appearin" on the ta!le correspond to (arkers in the ordinary practice !ein" descri!ed. *his, ho+ever, raises t+o =,estions: /10 Can one in fact do this for the practices involved in (arker ,sa"eK 9nd /@0 even if +e can, does this a(o,nt to factorin" o,t the notion of (arker3hood into the notion of a (achine3co,nter pl,s conventions needed for co((,nicative ,sa"eK . think that the only really honest ans+er to the first =,estion at the (o(ent is 'e don$t really no' . *here are notorio,s pro!le(s +ith characteriDin" and si(,latin" lin",istic practices in sit,, s,ch as those descri!ed in ;reyf,s /19-@, 199@0, WeiDen!a,( /19-60, and Wino"rad and 'lores /19&60. 9r",a!ly, so(e s,ch pro!le(s co,ld !e developed to apply not only to se(antic and pra"(atic co(petence !,t to the +ays that (arker3related practices are e(!edded in a lar"er +e! of practices as +ell. .n !rief, +e are not really entitled to ass,(e that these pro!le(s can !e overco(e, "iven the fact that the re(arka!le a(al"a( of !rain3

5 1%6 5 po+er, person3ho,rs, and research dollars represented in the artificial intelli"ence co((,nity has not (ana"ed to overco(e the( in the space of several decades. B,t even if one co,ld prod,ce a (achine ta!le for lin",istic "ro,ps that isolated (arkers in the desired +ay, it is not so clear that this +o,ld acco(plish all that the critic desires. 'or +hile f,nctional descri!a!ilityHeven of the special sort re=,ired for (achine3co,ntersH(ay pick o,t kinds that are of interest for the p,rposes of co(p,ter scientists or others, f,nctional kinds /in this mathematical sense of 7f,nctional70 are notorio,sly cheap. 9s Block /19-&0 and others have noted, any o!8ect or syste( of o!8ects one likes has so(e f,nctional descriptionHor, !etter, a very lar"e n,(!er of s,ch descriptions. B,t s,rely e"en if one +ere to factor o,t a conventional co(ponent of (arkers, +hat one sho,ld 'ish to have left as a 7p,re notion of sy(!olhood7 is so(ethin" (ore ro!,st than (ere f,nctional descri!a!ility. What the critic +ants is so(ethin" that is pla,si!ly a nonconventional characteriDation of symbols per se Hso(ethin" that sho,ld !e common to thin"s that one (i"ht pla,si!ly think are or involve sy(!ols /say, co(p,ter (e(ory states, !rain states, and inscriptions0 !,t not predica!le of thin"s that are f,nctionally descri!a!le, yet not pla,si!ly constr,ed as sy(!ols /say, (olec,les of +ater in a !,cket0. B,t the f,nctional properties distinctive of (achine3co,nters are not ro!,st eno,"h to do this. 9t !est, they do half of +hat is neededHna(ely, ,nite co(p,ter (e(ory states, !rain states, and /perhaps0 inscriptionsH!,t they fail to distin",ish these as a kind fro( the rest of creation. *h,s the kind of 7definition !y role7 one finds for (achine3co,nters does not appear to !e rich eno,"h to e1plain the kind of 7definition !y role7 needed for (arkers.

(.(0 SyntaC, !un3tional Role, and Compositionality

.t is like+ise te(ptin" to see the notion of a (achine3co,nter as a +ay of factorin" o,t a 7p,rely syntactic7 ele(ent fro( the notion of a co,nter, th,s allo+in" ,s to treat the conventional aspects of the synta1 of nat,ral lan",a"es as feat,res that accr,e to the( only !eca,se nat,ral lan",a"es are ,sed for co((,nication. So(e +riters (i"ht +ell assert that the notion of a (achine3co,nter cashes o,t +hat +e do (ean in talkin" a!o,t sy(!ols and synta1Hna(ely, that synta1 really is nonconventional in character, and is ri"htly ,nderstood p,rely in ter(s of co(!inatorial properties of the ,nits (anip,lated Hin short, that syn3 5 1%- 5 tactic properties are p,rely a (atter of f,nctional role in the (athe(atical sense of ?f,nction?. 9"ain, . +ish to !e very caref,l here. .t is certainly possi!le to ,se the +ord ?syntactic? for any nonse(antic properties, or for any s,ch properties that have to do +ith orderin" or co(!ination. Ho+ever, . think that this does not do 8,stice either to the ordinary ,sa"e of the +ord ?synta1? or to the cate"ories that linguists call 7syntactic.7 .t does see( ri"ht, of co,rse, to say that lin",ists are interested, a(on" other thin"s, in the for(al, co(!inatorial properties of syntactic cate"ories, (,ch as physicists are interested in the for(al properties of !odies qua massi"e /e."., in 6e+ton?s la+s0 or as che(ists are interested in the co(!inatorial properties of classes of ele(ents. B,t the for(al and co(!inatorial nat,re of the o!8ects in these other sciences does not e1ha,st +hat it is to !e, say, a "ravitational !ody or a halo"enC and like+ise the for(al characteriDation of synta1 does not e1ha,st +hat it is to !e of a partic,lar syntactic cate"ory. *here are, . think, several "ood reasons for re8ectin" a for(al or f,nctional3role vie+ of the nat,re of

syntactic cate"ories. /10 *he +ord ?synta1? has a nat,ral do(ain: na(ely, lin",istic entities. B,t *,rin" ta!les are applica!le to any o!8ect that has a f,nctional description. .t has !een ar",ed !y n,(ero,s +riters /e."., Block and P,tna(0 that all sorts of stran"e entities (i"ht have f,nctional descriptions and !e tr,ly descri!a!le in ter(s of a *,rin" ta!le. Synta1 cannot si(ply !e orderin", !eca,se there are plenty of thin"s that are concatenated /e."., cars in a traffic 8a(0 that are not ordered syntactically . 9nd even +hen there is a +hole f,nctionally descri!a!le syste(, it is not eo ipso a syntactic syste(. Were this so, the +hole +orld +o,ld t,rn o,t to !e syntactically str,ct,red, as everythin" has at least so(e trivial f,nctional description. Ef co,rse, one could ,se the +ord ?synta1? in this +ay, !,t to do so +o,ld !e to a!,se a +ord that already has perfectly "ood ,ses, and +o,ld certainly ,nderdeter(ine the kinds of distinctions envisioned !y the lin",ist. /@0 9t least so(e of the lin",ist?s pri(itive cate"ories tend to have semantic and pragmatic overtones: notions like 7no,n,7 7pl,ral for(ative,7 7connective,7 and 7pra"(atic for(ative7 all see( to !e typed not only accordin" to co(!inatorial properties !,t in ter(s of +hat kinds of thin"s they are ,sed to e1press or to do. Perhaps, ho+ever, one (i"ht say that these cate"ories are identified in part on se(antic and pra"(atic "ro,nds, and the task of the st,dent of synta1 is to find p,rely syntactic /i.e., for(al0 characteriDations of the cate"ories. 5 1%& 5 /#0 2ore pro!le(atically, 'e seem to need a semantically pregnant notion of synta3 if 'e are to use it to e3plain compositionality . 'or here is a co((on story a!o,t co(positionality: a co(ple1 sy(!ol strin" (eans +hat it (eans !eca,se of /a 0 the (eanin"s of the pri(itives, and /b 0 the f,nction of its syntactic str,ct,re. B,t the 7f,nction7 i(plied here cannot si(ply !e 7f,nction7 in the (athe(atical sense, and it cannot a(o,nt (erely to a description of the for(al properties of the strin" of sy(!ols. 'or le1ical se(antics pl,s for(al synta1 only tells ,s ho+ +e can concatenate (eanin"f,l le1ical ite(s in le"al strin"sC it does not tell ,s ho+ to interpret the(. *hat is, it (ay tell ,s that 7Borin !it the !ear7 and 7*he !ear !it Borin7 are !oth "ra((atical sentences in )n"lish, !,t it does not tell ,s +ho !it +ho( in each case. 'or there is a consistent interpretation of )n"lish /or any lan",a"e0 that reverses assi"n(ents of a"ent and patient /+ith correspondin" chan"es for transfor(ations into the passive voice0, and there is nothin" a!o,t the for(al properties of the lan",a"e that tells ,s +hich is operative. .ndeed, there is nothin" a!o,t the for(al properties of the lan",a"e that distin",ishes (eanin"f,l sentences fro( "ra((atically +ell3for(ed nonsense /this despite a tendency of +riters s,ch as *arski and ;avidson to ,se the +ord ?(eanin"f,l? to (ean 7+ell for(ed70. So if +e +ant to tell a (ore or less fa(iliar story a!o,t co(positionality, +e need syntactic cate"ories that are partially defined in ter(s of their contri!,tion to co(positional se(antics, and s,ch cate"ories are not p,rely for(al. >ike+ise, +e need r,les for co(position that are se(antically pre"nant. 6or is this a feat,re only of nat,ral lan",a"es. *he sa(e o!servations co,ld !e (ade +ith respect to, say, predicate calc,l,s or Hil!ert?s "eo(etry. .t is =,ite possi!le for a person to ,nderstand /a 0 the ,ses of the individ,al sy(!ols, and /b 0 for(al r,les for sy(!ol (anip,lation, +itho,t ,nderstandin" +hat is asserted !y a "iven e=,ation. /. e1pect, for e1a(ple, that this is the case for (any st,dents in colle"e differential e=,ations classes.0 /J0 *+o lan",a"es can have the sa(e syntactic cate"ories +hile havin" different f,nctional descriptions. .nt,itively, one +ishes to say that different lan",a"es /e."., )n"lish and 'rench0 share so(e of the sa(e syntactic cate"ories /e."., 7co,nt no,n,7 7pl,ral affi170. B,t these cate"ories enter into different co(!inatorial relations +ith other cate"ories in the different lan",a"es, and hence differ

+ith respect to their for(al properties. We (i"ht, of co,rse, concl,de that they are th,s, contrary to appearances, distinct syntactic cate"ories. B,t this see(s =,ite ar!itrary and does violence to the nat,ral constr,al of +hat the lin",ist is 5 1%9 5 ,p to. 9 si(pler sol,tion is to concl,de that syntactic cate"ories are not typed precisely !y their for(al properties. /%0 *+o speakers of the sa(e lan",a"e (ay have different dialects that, say, per(it different collocations and allo+ different replace(ents, !,t e(ploy the sa(e syntactic cate"ories. B,t if the f,nctional3role interpretation of synta1 +ere correct, this co,ld not !e the case: differences in +hat are taken to !e le"al sentences and le"al transfor(ations +o,ld re=,ire differences in syntactic cate"ory as +ell. B,t s,rely this conse=,ence is intolera!le. /60 9 "iven speaker (ay revise her +ay of speakin" /a f,nctional chan"e0 +itho,t there!y replacin" her syntactic cate"ories. .t (ay !e, of co,rse, that children learnin" a lan",a"e at so(e points entertain incorrect hypotheses a!o,t ho+ their native lan",a"e +orks, and so +hen they learn the correct r,les they are in fact tradin" in old cate"ories for ne+. B,t ad,lt speakers can also chan"e their "ra((atical co(petence in +ays that do not see( to re=,ire this kind of interpretation. /*hey can learn, for e1a(ple, that ?as? !eco(es ?so? after ?not?.0 .t is s,rely too radical an interpretation to say that they are learnin" ne+ syntactic cate"ories 8,st on the !asis of the fact that the f,nctional description of their syntactic co(petence chan"es. Better to say that syntactic cate"ories are not defined in f,nctional ter(s, altho,"h they (ay receive a f,nctional description, and to say that the proper f,nctional description of a cate"ory (ay differ across lan",a"es, dialects, and even chan"es in a "iven speaker?s co(petence. *h,s it see(s +ron" to say that the notion of a (achine3co,nter is a "ood e1plication of the ordinary sense of ?synta1? or of the linguist$s sense of that +ord /and this even if (any lin",ists thin that syntactic cate"ories are precisely f,nctional3role cate"ories0. 9nd it see(s that convention is needed to "et fro( co(!inatorial 7synta17 to f,ll3!looded synta1. .n partic,lar, it is needed to e1plain co(positionality: t+o lan",a"es co,ld have the sa(e interpretation sche(e for the le1ical pri(itives and co(!inatorially e=,ivalent synta1es and yet have different assi"n(ents of (eanin"s to co(ple1 e1pressions. WhyK Beca,se f,ll3!looded synta1 provides, a(on" other thin"s, a (appin" fro( the ordered pair L(eanin"s of pri(itives, syntactic for(M to the (eanin" potential of the co(ple1 e1pression, and co(!inatorial properties do not provide s,ch a f,nction.L6M What does provide s,ch a f,nctionK .n nat,ral lan",a"es, it is s,rely a (atter of convention. .t is, of co,rse, +orth considerin" +hether the co(!inatorial properties to +hich (achines can !e sensitive can !e co(!ined +ith so(ethin" nonconventional to provide the 5 16$ 5 sa(e res,lts as co(!inatorial synta1, !,t that is =,ite another =,estion /one that +ill !e addressed in a later chapter0.

(.;0 W)at !un3tional ,es3ription Can5t ,o

4iven this analysis of the relationship of the f,nctional description of co(p,ters to sy(!ols and

synta1, +e (i"ht do +ell to ask +hat (i"ht have (ade the opposin" vie+ see( attractive in the first place. . !elieve that ans+er is to !e fo,nd in a certain (is,nderstandin" of +hat is "oin" on in f,nctional description. .t has !een noted !y +riters like C,((ins /19-%0 and Block /19&$0 that there are several different ,ses of the +ord ?f,nctional? and its variants. C,((ins distin",ishes the mathematical notion of f,nction, +hich is e(ployed in (achine3ta!le f,nctionalis(, fro( +hat he calls 7f,nctional analysis,7 +hich descri!es an o!8ect in ter(s of its role in a lar"er syste( /e."., the f,nction of the heart is to p,(p !lood0. 9nd Block distin",ishes f,nctionalis( as a thesis a!o,t the nat,re of (ental states fro( 7psychof,nctionalis(,7 +hich is a thesis a!o,t the (eanin"s of (ental3 state terms . . !elieve that the dan"ers of conflatin" (athe(atical f,nctionalis( and f,nctional analysis are very "reat. C*2 is concerned +ith (athe(atical f,nctionalis( insofar as (ental processes are said to !e descri!a!le !y so(ethin" like a (achine ta!le. .t is so(eti(es clai(ed additionally that assertin" that the (ind has a (ath3f,nctional description is tanta(o,nt to assertin" that the nature of (ental states is "iven !y the co(pleted (achine ta!le, and hence "iven in nonintentional ter(sHna(ely, that a (ath3 f,nctional description of the (ind yields a f,nctional analysis of (ental states as +ell, or that it is the f,nctional description of thin"s in co(p,ters that confers ,pon the( the stat,s of sy(!ols +ith syntactic properties. . +ish to ar",e that this is false, and rests ,pon a !asic (is,nderstandin" of +hat "oes on in f,nctional analysis. What does "o on in (ath3f,nctional description is si(ply a special case of (athe(atical a!straction e(ployed in the (odelin" of real3+orld pheno(ena. ',nctional description, +hether in co(p,ter science, in psycholo"y, or in lin",istics is co(pletely parallel +ith the for(ation of (athe(atical (odels in (echanics and ther(odyna(ics. /. do not (ean to i(ply, of co,rse, that the (achine3ta!le paradi"( in psycholo"y is as (at,re or as +ell confir(ed as are o,r (odels of (echanics or ther(odyna(icsH(erely that they are the sa(e kind of enterprise.0 9nd fro( the standpoint of scientific research in psycholo"y, this is one of the cardinal virt,es of the co(p,ter paradi"(: it p,rports to provide the re3 5 161 5 so,rces for a (athe(atiDation of psycholo"y, (,ch as, say, analytic "eo(etry and the calc,l,s provided the reso,rces for the (athe(atiDation of classical physics. B,t +hat is involved in (athe(atical (odelin"K 'irst, s,ch (odels involve abstraction . >a+s of "ravitation a!stract a+ay fro( other forces that are al(ost al+ays operative in vivo: (echanical force, electro(a"netis(, stron" and +eak force. 9nd like+ise for la+s "overnin" the other f,nda(ental forces. 9dditionally, all (acroscopic la+s a!stract a+ay fro( the statistical possi!ility of freak =,ant,( events, and so on. 2athe(atical (odels are not ,niversally =,antified propositions a!o,t individ,al o!8ects or events. .f they +ere, (ost of the( +o,ld !e false. Gather, they are propositions a!o,t ho+ certain forces in nat,re contri!,te to events in a!straction fro( other processes. /9n interestin" corollary: Why is psycholo"y so hard to (ake into a ri"oro,s scienceK Hint: a!stract characteriDation !eco(es e1ponentially (ore diffic,lt as the n,(!er of (,t,ally dependent varia!les increases. Ho+ (any (,t,ally dependent (od,les are there in the !rainK0 Second, yo, "et an e3act and rigorous (odel only +hen yo, can e1press it in so(e (athe(atical for(. 2any of the (ost fa(o,s s,ch (odels are e1pressed in the for( of e=,ations. />a+s are (odels e1pressed !y e=,ations.0 B,t there are other kinds of (athe(atical str,ct,re that need not involve e=,ationsHfor e1a(ple, alternative "eo(etries can serve as (odels of space3ti(e, and "eo(etric (odels are not e=,ations. 9 (odel can !e (athe(atically e1act +itho,t relyin" heavily on la+s. 9nd

even +hen la+s are central to a theory, they are only a part of a lar"er (odel. 'or e1a(ple, classical (echanics involves a (odel of space and ti(e +hose str,ct,re is ),clidean, +hile relativistic (echanics involves a (odel +hose str,ct,re is non3),clidean. *h,s "raspin" a theory s,ch as "eneral relativity involves (ore than !ein" a!le to (anip,late the e=,ations as al"e!raic entities. Ene needs to ,nderstand +hat relationships they e1press a"ainst the !ack"ro,nd of the lar"er (odel. *his leads to a third point, +hich is intended to !e the real e(phasis of this section. *here are really t+o different +ays of lookin" at a (athe(atical (odel, +hich correspond to t+o different levels of a!straction a+ay fro( real3+orld pheno(ena in vivo. *he ,lti(ate "oal of (odelin", of co,rse, is to descri!e and e1plain real3+orld pheno(ena. B,t real3+orld pheno(ena are (essy, and scientific description ai(s at capt,rin" s,ch order as is to !e fo,nd in their !ehavior. *his involves separatin" different factors that are at +ork in vivo /"ravity fro( (echanical force in physics, rationality fro( e(otion in psycholo"y0 !y +ay of a!strac3 5 16@ 5

'i",re 9 tion. We kno+ +e have a s,fficient de"ree of orderliness +hen +e can provide a (athe(atical (odel. *his is the first level of a!straction: the ,se of a (athe(atical (odel to descri!e real3+orld pheno(ena /for e1a(ple, the ,se of 6e+ton?s e=,ations to descri!e "ravitational attraction0. 9t this level of a!straction, +hich . shall call the 7rich constr,al7 of the (odel, the (odel is !y definition a (odel of so(e partic,lar real3+orld pheno(enon. 6e+ton?s e=,ations are not 8,st e=,ations /i.e., al"e!raic entities0C they are e=,ations that e1press relationships !et+een the real3+orld pheno(ena of "ravitational force, (ass, and distance. B,t +e (ay also perfor( a second act of a!straction and look at 6e+ton?s (odel p,rely in (athe(atical ter(s. We can perfor( al"e!raic operations ,pon his e=,ations, for e1a(ple, or e1a(ine the ),clidean ass,(ptions of classical physics p,rely as "eo(etric ass,(ptions. *he physicist and the (athe(atician often operate ,pon the sa(e (odels, !,t do so ,nder different constraints. *he (athe(atician is concerned +ith the (odel as a p,rely (athe(atical entity. *he physicist is concerned +ith it as a description of real3+orld pheno(ena. .f +e say that the physicist is concerned +ith a rich constr,al of the (odel, let ,s say that the (athe(atician is concerned +ith a sparse constr,al /see fi". 90. .t is i(portant to see that any scientific theory is al+ays (ore than the (athe(atics that s,(s it ,p. *he for(,la descri!es the relevant form of a process or relation, !,t it does not itself deter(ine +hat it is +hose for( it descri!es. 'or e1a(ple, there are al+ays an indefinite n,(!er of p,rely a!stract o!8ects that are descri!ed !y the sa(e (athe(at3 5 16# 5 ics, and ,s,ally a (,ltit,de of ,ninterestin" concrete o!8ects /for e1a(ple, those for(ed !y (eriolo"ical relations0 that are descri!ed !y it as +ell. 2oreover, there are so(eti(es (,ltiple non trivial nat,ral syste(s descri!ed !y the sa(e (athe(atics. *he (ost nota!le case is pro!a!ly that of ther(odyna(ics and (athe(atical theory of co((,nication, +hich treat of distinct do(ains !,t happen to share a s,!stantial portion of their (athe(atical descriptions. *he e=,ations e(ployed in these do(ains, treated as e=,ations /that is, sparsely constr,ed0, do not tell yo, that they are about heat

or infor(ation. *he (athe(atics of ther(odyna(ics and infor(ation theory does not provide a co(plete analysis of the nature of heat or infor(ation. What it provides is an e1act description of relationships !et+een the kinds of entities that are relevant to the do(ain in =,estion. .f yo, +ant to kno+ a!o,t heat or infor(ation in detail, yo, +ill need the (athe(atics. B,t if all yo, have is the (athe(atics, yo, +ill not !e a!le to derive a f,ll3!looded description of the real3+orld pheno(ena (erely fro( their (athe(atical characteriDation. 9nd so, in "eneral, (athe(atical (odelin" does not provide an analysis of the f,ll nat,re of a pheno(enon, tho,"h it tends to specify that nat,re in (ore e1act detail. 9t a rich level of description, +e kno+ that +e are talkin" a!o,t, say, "ravitation si(ply !eca,se +e e(!arked ,pon the enterprise +ith the intention of talkin" a!o,t "ravitation. 6e+ton?s e=,ations do not tell ,s +hat "ravitation is, they (erely specify its for(. 9t a sparse level of description, +e are no lon"er talkin" a!o,t "ravitation at allC +e are (erely talkin" a!o,t e=,ations as e=,ations. *hey are no lon"er !ein" treated as a (odel of anythin", and there is nothin" a!o,t the( that has the concept,al riches needed to e1plain real3+orld pheno(ena like "ravitation or heat.

(.;.&0 !un3tionalist T)eories o+ t)e 1ind

. !elieve that this is precisely the case +ith f,nctional description of the (ind and of lan",a"e as +ell. >et ,s !e"in +ith (ath3f,nctionalist theories of the (ind. *he fo,ndin" hypothesis here is that (ath3 f,nctional description of the sort provided !y (achine ta!les or "eneral3p,rpose pro"ra((in" lan",a"es provides (athe(atical tools ade=,ate to the task of descri!in" the for( of (ental states and processes. 2ental states and processes are real3+orld pheno(ena, and descri!in" the( is !o,nd to involve so(e a!straction. We treat as irrelevant thin"s like (echanical force /tho,"h people do "et !an"ed on the head, often to the detri3 5 16J 5 (ent of their thinkin"0 and "ravitation /tho,"h it has !een clai(ed that so(e individ,als are affected !y the f,ll (oon and 69S9 does psycholo"ical e1peri(ents on the effects of free3fall0, and so on. >ike+ise +e treat so(e physiolo"ical factors like !lood s,"ar and hor(one levels as constant (,ch the +ay +e treat volta"e levels in a co(p,ter as constant, a!stractin" a+ay fro( the fact that variations in these thin"s affect real3+orld perfor(ance in +ays that are of considera!le concern to doctors and syste(s operators, respectively. Perhaps this strate"y for (athe(atiDin" psycholo"y +ill pan o,t in the lon" r,n. Perhaps it is f,nda(entally fla+ed, as clai(ed !y ;reyf,s /19-@0 and Wino"rad and 'lores /19&60. Perhaps it +o,ld +ork in principle, !,t the n,(!er of (,t,ally dependent varia!les (akes it i(possi!le to carry o,t in practice. 2y concern is not +ith the prospects of this strate"y !,t +ith +hat it 'ould provide if carried o,t in detail. 9nd +hat it +o,ld provide is precisely analo"o,s to +hat, say, 6e+ton?s e=,ations provided for classical (echanics: a (athe(atically e1act (odel of (ental states and processes. 4iven the precedin" disc,ssion of (athe(atical (odels in "eneral, it sho,ld !e clear +hy a psycholo"ical (achine ta!le +o,ld not !e an analysis of the nature of (ental states and processes. 9t a rich level of description, the (odel is indeed a (odel of mental processes . B,t +e kno+ it is a (odel of those processes and not so(ethin" else for the very pedestrian reason that +e kne+ it all alon": the (odel is a (odel of the (ind !eca,se prod,cin" a (odel of the (ind +as o,r "oal fro( the o,tset. S,ch (odels can !e !etter or +orse insofar as they involve !etter or +orse appro1i(ations of the for( that is really present in processes in vivo /that is, in the sense that )instein?s (odel is !etter than

6e+ton?s, and 6e+ton?s is !etter than ;escartes?s0. So at the rich level of a!straction, the content of the (odel is not a conse=,ence of its (athe(atical for( alone. 9t this rich level +e do indeed have a description in +hich +e can identify (ental states as s,ch and characteriDe the( in ter(s of their location in a net+ork of other (ental states, inp,ts, and o,tp,ts. Ho+ever, +e can do this only !y assuming the individ,al (ental states as (ental states and ass,(in" the net+ork, and then characteriDin" the relations precisely in ter(s of the (achine ta!le. 9t !est, +e can analyDe one (ental state in ter(s of its relation to the others, holdin" their e1istence and relatedness as a kind of !ack"ro,nd ass,(ption. B,t in doin" this +e never !reak o,t of the +e! of the intentional, ,nless it sho,ld prove possi!le to define all of the inner states in ter(s of a ne,trally characteriDed set of inp,ts and o,tp,ts. B,t ar",a!ly this 7!est case7 itself involves a (is,nderstandin". 'or in s,ch a case +hat +e are 5 16% 5 doin" is pickin" o,t a set of states !y dint of an a!stract description of their ca,sal interrelations. B,t this !y no (eans ass,res that those ca,sal relations are the essential properties of the states involved, nor that there co,ld not !e a variety of distinct state types that co,ld occ,py iso(orphic ca,sal roles. En the other hand, at the sparse level the 7(odel7 is no+ 8,st a (athe(atical entity. *his level of a!straction is indeed ,sef,l even for the scientist /as opposed to the (athe(atician0 at ti(es, s,ch as +hen one is interested in seein" +hether, say, classical (echanics is a special case of relativistic (echanics, and does so p,rely !y (athe(atical (anip,lations. B,t it cannot tell ,s +hat the interpretations of the (athe(atical sy(!ols ,sed to e1press the theory (i"ht !e. 'or e1a(ple, the for(,las ,sed for infor(ation theory do not tell ,s +hether they are !ein" ,sed to e1press a (odel of infor(ation or of heatHor indeed that they are !ein" ,sed to e1press any real3+orld properties at all. .n the case of the (athe(atiDation of psycholo"y, here all +e have is the (achine ta!le, +hich is a representation of a f,nction in the (athe(atical sense. *here is nothin" a!o,t the ta!le that tells ,s +hat the do(ain of the ta!le is. .ndeed, it co,ld serve e=,ally +ell as a f,nctional description of all kinds of thin"s: so(e a!stract o!8ects, so(e interestin" real3+orld pheno(ena, so(e (onstro,s (eriolo"ical contrivances. .f +e do not start o,t kno+in" that +e are talkin" a!o,t the (ind, there is nothin" a!o,t the (ath3f,nctional description that +ill tell ,s that +e are doin" so. .n short, (ath3f,nctional description cannot provide ,s +ith an analysis of the nature of (ental states and processes any (ore than e=,ations for entropy can teach ,s the difference !et+een heat and infor(ation. What it +o,ld do is no (ore and no less than +hat other (athe(atical (odels do in the other sciences: na(ely, to specify e1actly the (athe(atical for( of real3+orld pheno(ena of +hose e1istence and nat,re +e have so(e kind of independent kno+led"e.

(.;.20 !un3tionalist T)eories o+ #an*ua*e

*he f,nctional analysis of lan",a"e r,ns a parallel co,rse. .t is, of co,rse, tr,e that lin",ists are interested in for(al descriptions of thin"s like r,les for le"al for(ation of e1pressions in a lan",a"e, transfor(ation r,les, and so on. 9nd so(e (i"ht say that even conventions can ,sef,lly !e e1a(ined as a kind of r,le3"overned activity +hich is s,!8ect to a (ore precise description. .f lin",istic conventions are esta!lished !y practices of lan",a"e ,sers, perhaps this very net+ork of practices can !e (athe3

5 166 5 (atiDed into a (achine ta!le or so(ethin" of the sort, in +hich case lan",a"e +ill have !een "iven a f,nctional characteriDation in ter(s of a syste( as lar"e as a h,(an society. . do not +ish to de!ate the lon"3ran"e prospects of s,ch an analysis here. 2y point is si(ply this: if s,ch a characteriDation +ere to !e "iven, its stat,s +o,ld !e the sa(e as that of any other (athe(atically precise (odel. En a rich constr,al, it is a description of a language, !,t only !eca,se that +as the intent of the (odelers fro( the o,tset. En a sparse constr,al, it is si(ply so(e a!stract (athe(atical str,ct,re +itho,t an interpretation. *he nat,re of the (athe(atical str,ct,reHthat is, the (ath3f,nctional propertiesHdoes not e1plain the nat,re of lan",a"e as lan",a"e, tho,"h of co,rse differences in s,ch properties are i(portant for, say, differentiatin" t+o nat,ral lan",a"es /+hich (ay have different (orphe(ic cate"ories and different "ra((ars0 or differentiatin" nat,ral lan",a"es fro( other lan",a"e "a(es like first3order predicate lo"ic. >ookin" at the for(al properties of a lan",a"e or co(parin" those of different lan",a"e "a(es is a very ,sef,l enterprise, and reveals a "reat deal a!o,t partic,lar lan",a"e "a(es. What it does not do is reveal the nat,re of sy(!olhood and synta1 in their o+n ri"ht. )ither one kno+s +hat those are !eforehand and asks a!o,t specific syste(s of sy(!ols and synta1 /rich constr,al of the (odel0 or else one has an ,ninterpreted (athe(atical (odel that does not essentially descri!e lan",a"es /sparse constr,al0.

(.;.40 T)e A!alla3y o+ Redu3tionA

*his error of (istakin" the properties of the (athe(atically red,ced (odel of a pheno(enon for the essential properties of the pheno(enon itself is s,fficiently i(portant to (erit a na(e: . shall call it the 7'allacy of Ged,ction.7 *he 'allacy of Ged,ction is co((itted +hen yo, a!stract a+ay fro( feat,res of a real3+orld process to "ive a (ore ri"oro,s characteriDation of so(e of its feat,res, and then ass,(e that it is only the properties that s,rvive the a!straction, and not those that are a!stracted a+ay fro(, that are relevant to the nat,re of the real3+orld pheno(enon. *h,s it is an instance of the 'allacy of Ged,ction to concl,de that heat and infor(ation are 7the sa(e thin"7 !eca,se they share a (athe(atics. >ike+ise it is an instance of this fallacy to concl,de that the f,nctional describability of the (ind +o,ld license the concl,sion that (ental states are f,nctionally defined . 5 16- 5

(.<0 T)e $ossibility o+ $ure Semanti3s

.t re(ains to consider the =,estion of +hether the Se(iotic 9nalysis does 8,stice to semantic notionsH in partic,lar, +hether the analysis is a hy!rid of a nonconventional 7p,rely se(antic7 ele(ent and a conventional ele(ent that accr,es only to sy(!ols3,sed3co((,nicatively. What . propose to ar",e is as follo+s: /10 *he Se(iotic 9nalysis provides a proper analysis of the properties e1pressed !y the se(antic voca!,lary as they are applied to the paradi"( e1a(ples of sy(!ols s,ch as ,tterances and inscriptions. /@0 *his analysis cannot !e factored into a nonconventional 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponent co(!ined +ith a conventional co(ponent that is needed only for co((,nicative sy(!ols. *his has the conse=,ence /#0 that people +ho +ish to speak of 7(eanin"f,l (ental representations7 (,st either !e /a 0 attri!,tin" to those representations the convention3dependent se(iotic3se(antic properties, or else /b 0 attri!,tin" to those representations a set of properties distinct fro( those nor(ally e1pressed !y the se(antic voca!,laryHproperties that +e (ay for convenience d,! 72G3se(antic properties.7

.n order for the critic to s,cceed in his o!8ection to (y analysis of sy(!ols and sy(!olic (eanin", it (,st !e possi!le to sho+ that the se(iotic analysis . have presented !l,rs the distinctions !et+een t+o different kinds of properties that accr,e to disc,rsive sy(!ols: /10 their nonconventional se(antic properties, and /@0 the conventional properties that accr,e to the( specifically !eca,se they are sy(!ols used in communication . *he critic need not sho+ that sy(!ols s,ch as ,tterances and inscriptions can in fact possess the first sort of property +itho,t the second, !,t (erely that there is in fact an ele(ent of s,ch sy(!ols that is indeed se(antic !,t in no +ay conventional, and that this ele(ent is +hat is shared !y disc,rsive sy(!ols, the (ental representations posited !y C*2, and perhaps (ental states as +ell. .n effect, he (,st sho+ that the Se(iotic 9nalysis really sho+s only a ca,sal dependence of se(antic properties ,pon convention, not a concept,al dependence. 9nd to do this, it (,st !e possi!le to present an analysis of se(antics that can apply to the paradi"( e1a(ples of 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ols7 +hich 7factors o,t7 a nonconventional se(antic co(ponent fro( a convention3 laden co((,nicative ele(ent. *he !asic iss,e that faces ,s in any atte(pt to factor o,t a 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponent fro( the Se(iotic 9nalysis is this: one thin" that does see( clear a!o,t the Se(iotic 9nalysis is that there are separate 5 16& 5 clai(s to !e (ade a!o,t conventional interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intention, act,al interpretation, and interpreta!ility3in3principle. Ho+ are +e to isolate a 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponent that is co((on to these fo,r (odalities in s,ch a fashion that +e do 8,stice to the distinction !et+een the (odalitiesK *hat is, it see(s that +e have i(portant and coherent notions of 7!ein" interpreta!le ,nder convention C as si"nifyin" 8 7 and 7!ein" intended !y S as si"nifyin" 8 7 and so on. *he critic?s clai( is that these notions are in fact a(al"a(s of a 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponent pl,s factors that are not essential to se(antics !,t necessary for co((,nication. So one i(portant constraint ,pon an analysis developed alon" these lines is that it o,"ht to do 8,stice to the notions it is intended to analyDe. We (ay sche(atiDe the approach in the follo+in" +ay. 'or each of the (odalities, the critic needs to artic,late an alternative analysis that separates t+o co(ponents: a 7p,rely se(antic7 co(ponent and a convention3!o,nd co((,nicative co(ponent. We (ay indicate o,r predicates as follo+s: CE6:(5,T,Ci,> ,>,P0: O is of a type T that is interpreta!le ,nder convention C i,> of : as si"nifyin" 8 9U*H(S,5,8): 5 +as intended !y S as si"nifyin" 8 .6*(H,5,8): 5 +as interpreted !y H as si"nifyin" 8 PP>)(5,8): 5 is, in principle, interpreta!le as si"nifyin" 8 >et ,s f,rther note the p,tative 7p,rely se(antic7 (eanin" as a relation as follo+s: 2(5,8): 5 (eans 8 /in the 7p,rely se(antic7 sense0 *he critic?s strate"y has to !e one of for(,latin" certain !iconditionals for each of these (odalities that red,ce each of the( to a clai( that 2(5,8) pl,s so(e resid,al clai( a!o,t co((,nicative ,se. *he for( of s,ch clai(s (i"ht !e indicated th,s:

+here CE6:Q denotes the aspects of CE6: that re(ain once 2(5,8) has !een factored o,t. /*he e1act lo"ical for( of CE6:Q +o,ld re=,ire s,ch an analysis to !e perfor(ed in detail.0 9nd si(ilarly

for the other (odalities: 5 169 5

What the critic +ants is a notion of 7p,re (eanin"7 that is necessary for each of the se(iotic (odalities, !,t is not sufficient for any of the( /e1cept of co,rse for interpreta!ility3in3principle, +hich is trivially satisfied +ith or +itho,t a 7p,re7 notion of (eanin"0. 'or if 7p,re (eanin"7 is a s,fficient condition for one or (ore of the other (odalities, then it so(eho+ sec,res the conventional ele(ent of se(iotic3se(antics as +ell, +hich is precisely +hat the notion of 7p,re (eanin"7 is an atte(pt to avoid. 9ltho,"h . have never seen an e1plicit atte(pt to analyDe the conventional se(antics of nat,ral and technical lan",a"es in ter(s of a p,rely se(antic co(ponent pl,s so(ethin" else, s,ch an analysis see(s i(plicit in the +ay (any people re"ard the kind of analysis of lan",a"e associated +ith *arski and ;avidson. En this vie+, a 7lan",a"e7 is vie+ed not as a historical entity distri!,ted over a co((,nity sit,ated in ti(e and space, !,t as an a!stract o!8ect that associates e1pressions +ith interpretations and (ay !e adopted !y one or (any individ,alsHor, for that (atter, !y none at all. 9 lan",a"e th,s conceived is an a!stract o!8ect, and hence pres,(a!ly its e1istence is not dependent ,pon conventions. Where convention enters the pict,re is +hen a co((,nity or an individ,al uses s,ch an o!8ect as a p,!lic lan",a"e or an idiolect.L-M .t is here, in the adoption of a pree1istin" a!stract o!8ect, that convention and intention enter the pict,re. *here 8,st are these a!stract entities :1 , . . . , : n called 7lan",a"es,7 and each of the( essentially involves a se(antic interpretation that is a (appin" fro( e1pressions to their interpretations. Convention enters the pict,re +hen a co((,nity or an individ,al decides to ,se so(e partic,lar lan",a"e :i as its lan",a"e of representation and co((,nication. *his vie+ of lan",a"es points to a possi!le analysis of the se(iotic (odalities: *he con"entional interpretability of an e1pression ; in co((,nity : a(o,nts to /10 the fact that ; (eans 8 in lan",a"e :i /i.e., the interpretation (appin" for :i (aps ; onto 8 0, and /@0 the fact that co((,nity : has adopted :i . >ike+ise, a,thorin" intention and act,al interpretation are to !e analyDed in ter(s of the e(ploy(ent of an a!stract lan",a"e. .f S intends ; to (ean 8 , then S is adoptin" lan",a"e :i and ; (eans 8 in :i . .f H interprets ; as (eanin" 8 , then H is adoptin" the 5 1-$ 5 interpretive conventions of : i and ; (eans 8 in :i . *he !asic notions here are /10 (eanin"38 3in3:i and /@0 adopting a /pree1istin"0 lan",a"e as a lan",a"e of co((,nication and representation. .t is perhaps clear +hy this vie+ sho,ld !e pop,lar a(on" people +ho +ish to provide a se(antics for (ental representationHor, (ore "enerally, to 7nat,raliDe7 se(antics. 'or this vie+ separates the p,rely se(antic ele(ent /a (appin" fro( e1pressions to o!8ects and states of affairs0 fro( a partic,lar +ay that that se(antic co(ponent "ets hooked onto co((,nicative lan",a"es. 9nd this leaves open the door to the possi!ility that the same se(antic properties (i"ht "et connected +ith other thin"s /(ental representations, tho,"hts0 in other +ays. .f one takes this vie+, the =,estion for the co"nitive scientist is to find a different relationship that plays the sa(e (eanin"3conferrin" role for (ental representations

that conventional and intentional adoption of lan",a"es plays for nat,ral lan",a"es. *his 7p,re se(anticist7 vie+ has "ained a "reat deal of c,rrency. .t also en8oys a "reat deal of int,itive pla,si!ility, and it is attractive to (any in co"nitive science precisely !eca,se it see(s to relieve co"nitive science of the pro!le(s of conventionality !y treatin" conventionality as a feat,re of the adoption of lan",a"e for communicati"e use . .t is a +orthy opponent for the Se(iotic 9nalysis. . happen to think that this vie+ is +ron" in so(e very f,nda(ental +ays, !,t to see +hy this is so +e shall need to e1a(ine a concrete e1a(ple of a pro8ect in 7p,re se(antics7 of 7a!stract lan",a"es,7 and do so in so(e detail. *hose +ho have !ro,"ht ,p this kind of vie+ as an o!8ection to the Se(iotic 9nalysis tend to refer to it as 7*arskian se(antics7 or 7*arski3;avidson se(antics,7 d,e to the infl,ence of *arski?s +ork in se(antics for for(aliDed lan",a"es. 4iven *arski?s insistence that his analysis did not apply to nat,ral lan",a"es, the connection here is not co(pletely solid. B,t the !asic (oves of post,latin" 7a!stract lan",a"es7 and treatin" their se(antic analysis e1tensionally are indeed to !e fo,nd in *arski, and !oth the stren"ths and +eaknesses of the vie+ are to !e fo,nd clearly in his +ork. *h,s it see(s in order to take a caref,l look at *arski?s +ork to see +hether it really provides a via!le 7p,re se(antics.7

(.'0 Tars/i5s Semanti3s

*arski?s +ork on tr,th, and ;avidson?s clai( that *arski?s techni=,e can also yield an acco,nt of (eanin", have "arnered a "reat deal of attention, and have !een (et +ith sharply polariDed reactions. 9 "reat deal 5 1-1 5 of the literat,re disc,ssin" *arski?s +ork has !een devoted to the pro!le( of decidin" 8,st +hat *arski?s theory does H+hat ind of theory it is, and +hat it is a theory of . .t is th,s pro!a!ly +ise to !e"in !y presentin" so(e of the essentials of *arski?s acco,nt. *arski +rote three papers that are of central i(portance to his +ork on tr,th: 7*he Concept of *r,th in 'or(aliDed >an",a"es7 /19%6!0, 7*he )sta!lish(ent of Scientific Se(antics7 /19%6c0, and 7*he Se(antic Conception of *r,th and the 'o,ndations of Se(antics7 /19JJ0. *he first of these papers !e"ins +ith the follo+in" synopsis: 7*he present article is al(ost +holly devoted to a sin"le pro!le(Hthe definition of truth . *he task is to constr,ctH+ith reference to a "iven lan",a"eHa materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term $true sentence$ 7 /*arski 19%6!: 1%@, italics in ori"inal0. *arski?s pro8ect is th,s one of providin" a 7definition7 of tr,th that is 7(aterially ade=,ate7 and 7for(ally correct.7 *his ter(inolo"y re=,ires so(e co((ent. .t is so(e+hat controversial +hat *arski (eant !y ?definition? and +hat he achieved in this re"ard. 'or the ter( ?definition? has ac=,ired a specialiDed ,sa"e in (eta(athe(atics that i(plies so(ethin" at once +eaker and stron"er than so(e (ore ordinary ,ses of the +ord. .f one constr,cts a set theoretic (odel M(6) of a (athe(atical do(ain 6 , then a concept C in 6 is said to !e 7defined !y7 the set3theoretic constr,ction that corresponds to it in the (odel.L&M *h,s, for e1a(ple, in the ,rincipia Mathematica, n,(!ers are said to !e 7defined7 !y setsC !,t it is =,ite controversial +hether this res,lt really has any conse=,ences +ith respect to the nat,re of n,(!ers. So a lo"ician?s e1pressed desire to provide a 7definition7 of tr,th (ay easily t,rn o,t to !e (erely a desire to provide a (odel3theoretic constr,ction characteriDin" tr,th in a lan",a"e. Ho+ever, *arski does say thin"s that indicate that he (ay !e interested in (ore than this. He says, for e1a(ple, that it is his +ish to provide a 7definition7 that corresponds as closely as possi!le to fa(iliar ,ses of the +ord. 9nd +hat he e1plicitly cites as the fa(iliar ,se of the +ord is the 7classical7

conception of tr,th in +hich tr,th is ,nderstood infor(ally to consist in correspondence to reality. *his +ill have direct conse=,ences for the conditions *arski !elieves to !e relevant to the 7(aterial ade=,acy7 of a tr,th definition. Before (ovin" on to these conditions, ho+ever, it is i(portant to note that *arski does not ai( to s,pply any general definition of tr,th3in3any3lan",a"e3+hatsoever. Gather, tr,th3definitions are relativiDed to lan",a"es. *he stated reason for this is that the 7sa(e sentence7 can appear in different lan",a"es, and (ay !e tr,e in one, false in another, and 5 1-@ 5 (eanin"less in a third. *arski is th,s takin" 7sentences7 or 7e1pressions7 to !e defined in ter(s of concatenations of "raphe(es or phone(es, an ass,(ption that ar",a!ly is not co(pletely ,npro!le(atic. So the search for a 7definition of tr,th7 is really a search for the conditions that (,st !e (et !y a definition of tr,th relative to any lan",a"e : . Ene s,ch condition is 7(aterial ade=,acy,7 !y +hich *arski (eans, infor(ally, that the tr,th3theory for :, T(:) , sho,ld have the conse=,ence that, for any sentence S in :, T(:) assi"ns S the val,e *GU) iff +hat is asserted !y S is tr,e. *arski s,""ests that the constraint that tr,th theories have s,ch !iconditionals as conse=,ences !e for(,lated in ter(s of a sche(a, +hich he calls convention T : (T) 5 is tr,e, if and only if, p , +here p is a sche(atic letter to !e replaced !y a sentence of : and 5 is a sche(atic letter to !e replaced !y a /7str,ct,re revealin"70 na(e of the sentence that replaces p . He +rites that 7+e shall call a definition of tr,th ?ade=,ate? if all these e=,ivalences follo+ fro( it7 /*arski L19%6!M 19&%: %$0. *arski refers to this conception of tr,th as 7the se(antic conception of tr,th7 /i!id., %10, the point !ein" that tr,th is defined in ter(s of relationships !et+een e1pressions and states of affairs in the +orld /hence a se(antic relationship0, rather than !ein" defined syntactically in ter(s of deriva!ility fro( for(ally specified a1io(s. /*his point, often "lossed over today, +as perhaps the (ost si"nificant feat,re of *arski?s approach in the cli(ate in +hich it +as first propo,nded.0 *he iss,e of 7for(al correctness7 is driven !y several concerns *arski raises +ith respect to classes of lan",a"es that are not s,!8ect to the kind of definition he desires. 'irst, he !elieves that lan",a"es can !e characteriDed in the desired fashion only if they are 7e1actly specified,7 in the sense that in 7specifyin" the str,ct,re of a lan",a"e +e refer e1cl,sively to the for( of the e1pressions involved7 /i!id., %@0. *his e1cl,des lan",a"es that involve le1ical a(!i",ity and ele(ents that are dependent ,pon pra"(atics or conte1t, s,ch as de(onstratives and inde1icals. Second, he points o,t that certain classes of lan",a"esHlan",a"es that he calls 7se(antically closed7Hare inconsistent !eca,se they are prone to the "eneration of parado1es s,ch as the antino(y of the liar. >an",a"es are said to !e 7se(antically closed7 if they contain the reso,rces for na(in" e1pressions occ,rrin" +ithin the lan",a"e, for applyin" the ter( ?tr,e? to sentences in the lan",a"e, and for statin" the tr,th conditions 5 1-# 5 of the lan",a"e /i!id., %#0. *he concept of tr,th, *arski clai(s, is not defina!le for se(antically closed lan",a"es. .t is perhaps o!vio,s that these o!servations lead to the concl,sion that tr,th is not defina!le for nat,ral lan",a"es, since these are le1ically a(!i",o,s, e(ploy de(onstratives and inde1icals, and have reso,rces for referrin" to their o+n ele(ents and (akin" tr,th3assertions a!o,t the(. *arski e(!races this concl,sion, tho,"h other +riters have since atte(pted to treat these feat,res in a +ay that avoids

*arski?s ne"ative res,lt. 2ore easily overlooked is the fact that the lin",istic feat,res that interest *arski incl,de thin"s like a1io(s and theore(s, +hich play a lar"e role in lo"ic and (athe(atics, and are stron"ly connected +ith the notion of tr,th in those do(ains, yet are nota!ly a!sent /not to (ention irrelevant to e(pirical tr,th0 in nat,ral lan",a"es. *his +o,ld !e hi"hly pro!le(atic if *arski?s stated ai( +as to provide a "eneral 7definition7 of tr,th, !,t is perhaps innoc,o,s so lon" as one is caref,lly attentive to the fact that +hat he is a!o,t is providin" a (odel3theoretic characteriDation of tr,th for those lan",a"es for +hich this (i"ht !e done.L9M *he definition of tr,th is constr,cted o,t of a (ore !asic notion of satisfaction . Satisfaction is a relation that o!tains !et+een any o!8ects and a special class of e1pressions called 7sentential f,nctions,7 +hich are e1pressions s,ch as 75 is +hite7 or 75 is "reater than 8 .7 /Sentential f,nctions are differentiated fro( sentences in that they (ay contain free varia!les.0 .nt,itively, an o!8ect . satisfies a sentential f,nction 7 if replacin" the varia!le in 7 +ith the na(e of . res,lts in a tr,e sentence. *his, ho+ever, +ill not serve as a definition of 7satisfaction7 for *arski?s p,rposes, as his ai( is to define 7tr,th.7 9nd so he e(ploys another strate"yHthat of 7definin"7 satisfaction for a lan",a"e : in an e1tensional fashion. .n order to acc,rately represent *arski here, . shall cite his o+n te1t: *o o!tain a definition of satisfaction +e have rather to apply a"ain a rec,rsive proced,re. We indicate +hich o!8ects satisfy the si(plest sentential f,nctionsC and then +e state the conditions ,nder +hich "iven o!8ects satisfy a co(po,nd f,nctionHass,(in" that +e kno+ +hich o!8ects satisfy the si(pler f,nctions fro( +hich the co(po,nd one has !een constr,cted. /*arski L19%6!M 19&%: %6, e(phasis added0 'ro( this definition of satisfaction for sentential f,nctions, one follo+s for sentences /f,nctions in +hich there are no ,n!o,nd varia!les0. Sentences are either satisfied !y all o!8ects /in +hich case they are tr,e0 or 5 1-J 5 else they are satisfied !y no o!8ects /in +hich case they are false0. *his, indeed, provides a definition of tr,th: 7Hence +e arrive at a definition of tr,th and falsehood si(ply !y sayin" that a sentence is true if it is satisfied by all ob4ects, and false other'ise 7 /i!id.0. Here +e have a "eneral sche(a for talkin" a!o,t tr,th in a lan",a"e : , "iven that : falls +ithin the specified class of lan",a"es. .t is a schema for tr,th3definitions rather than a general tr,th3definition !eca,se the t+o (ore !asic se(antic notions of naming /or, to e(ploy 'ield?s L19-@M ,sef,l paraphrase 7pri(itive denotation70 and satisfaction, are defined for e1pressions only relative to a lan",a"e. 4iven *arski?s desire for the introd,ction of all se(antic ter(s only !y definition, it is i(portant to !e attentive to the +ay in +hich satisfaction and pri(itive denotation are treated in *arski?s articles. 'or the 7definition7 of ?satisfaction? for a lan",a"e : consists (erely in /a 0 providin" a (appin" fro( si(ple f,nctions to the sets of o!8ects that satisfy the(, and /b 0 providin" a rec,rsive r,le for prod,cin" s,ch a (appin" for co(ple1 f,nctions, "iven the val,es of the si(ple f,nctions. 9nd si(ilarly, one (ay ass,(e that the 7definition7 that +o,ld !e "iven for the relation of pri(itive denotation +o,ld si(ply !e a (appin" fro( a class of e1pressions to a set of o!8ects. *hese are 7definitions7 in the (athe(atician?s sense of e1actly specifyin" the f,nction perfor(ed in settheoretic ter(s. B,t they are s,rely not 7definitions7 in the sense of e1plainin" +hat satisfaction or desi"nation consist in . *his has led to so(e criticis(s of the scope of *arski?s acco(plish(ent, so(e of +hich /'ield 19-@ and Black!,rn 19&J0 . shall all,de to in developin" a (ore "eneral analysis of the pro!le(s +ith the notion of p,re se(antics. *hese and other concerns cast so(e do,!t ,pon +hether *arskian se(antics in fact provides the 7p,re se(antics7 desired !y the critic of the Se(iotic 9nalysis.

(.'.&0 " Non3onventional "nalysisD

'irst, it is !y no (eans clear that the analysis presented !y *arski renders the se(antics of lan",a"es essentially nonconventional. *arski says that +e 7indicate +hich o!8ects satisfy the si(plest sentential f,nctions7 /*arski L19%6!M 19&%: %6, e(phasis added0. B,t in the conte1t in +hich he is speakin", this 7indication7 can !e interpreted in either of t+o +ays, both of 'hich are plausibly interpreted in con"entional terms . En the one hand, one (i"ht +ish to s,pply a se(antic analysis of an e3isting for(al lan",a"e /say, Hil!ert?s "eo(etry0. .n this case, one is ap3 5 1-% 5 proachin" an e1istin" public lan",a"e "a(e that is conventionally esta!lished. *he a!ility to 7indicate7 the o!8ects that satisfy the sentential f,nctions in s,ch a lan",a"e "a(e !y no (eans sho+s that the relationship of satisfaction is essentially nonconventional. 2akin" the (appin" fro( e1pressions to interpretations e1plicit in no +ay i(plies that the pree1istin" syste( is nonconventional. 9nd indeed the +ay in +hich the (appin" is indicated in the for(al (odel is itself conventional. 9lternatively, one (ay !e definin" a ne+ lan",a"e "a(e de novo, and hence stipulating its se(antic assi"n(ents. Here there is no pree1istin" convention3laden p,!lic lan",a"e "a(e. B,t in doin" this one is necessarily definin" a con"ention for se(antic interpretation. ;oin" so !y no (eans sho+s there is an independent strat,( of (eanin" or even satisfaction that o!tains apart fro( the conventions esta!lished !y the theorist. 9t !est, if there is a pree1istin" set of mar ers, there are infinite n,(!ers of mappings !et+een that set and sets of o!8ects. 9nd (appin"s do, indeed, e1ist independent of (appin" conventions. B,t a (appin", per se, is not a se(antic relationship. 6or does the e1istence of mappings that are independent of conventions esta!lish the e1istence of semantic relations that are independent of conventions. Se(antic assi"n(ents are represented by (appin"s and involve (appin"s, !,t (appin"s are not the(selves se(antic.

(.'.20 T)e Conventionality o+ t)e 1ar/ers

*arski has also (ade an illicit (ove in ass,(in" that 7sentences7 and 7e1pressions7 that constit,te the do(ain of the (appin" can !e defined in ter(s of concatenations of "raphe(es or phone(es, and the p,re se(anticist +o,ld !e +ron" in concl,din" that this a(o,nts to a nonconventional definition. *here are at least three pro!le(s here. 'irst, as ar",ed a!ove, (arkers and co,nters are conventional in character. *h,s, +hile it (ay !e ri"ht to say that the sa(e physical patterns (ay "et concatenated in (ore than one lan",a"e, it does not follo+ that the sa(e co(ple1 (arkers are e(ployed, nor that identical strin"s of (arkers in t+o lan",a"es are the sa(e sentence. Second, the (arker kinds the(selves are ,nderdeter(ined !y physical pattern and are essentially conventional. *hird, if sentences are defined in ter(s specific to their (ode of representation, it is not clear ho+ one is to acco,nt for the fact that the sa(e sentence can !e !oth spoken and +ritten, and can potentially !e represented in other (odalities /e."., 2orse code, 9SC.. codin", etc.0 as +ell. 9s an idealiDation, *arski?s (ove is per(issi!le +ithin certain 5 1-6 5 !o,ndsC as a real definition, it see(s inad(issi!le. *his see(s to ,nderc,t the p,re se(anticist?s clai(

that *arski?s se(antics is free fro( conventional taint. )ven if +e a"ree that the (appin" fro( e1pressions to o!8ects is nonconventional, the overall lan",a"e is still conventional !eca,se the do(ain of e1pressions is conventionally esta!lished.

(.'.40 !ield5s "r*ument

.n a 8,stly fa(o,s article, Hartry 'ield /19-@0 ,ndertakes an e1tensive e1a(ination of *arski?s theory of tr,th. 'ield ar",es that *arski s,cceeded in red,cin" tr,th to +hat 'ield calls 7pri(itive denotation,7 !,t failed to define pri(itive denotation in nonse(antic ter(s. 9nd th,s, in 'ield?s vie+, the re(ainin" pro8ect in se(antics for nat,ralists s,ch as hi(self is to provide a nonse(antic acco,nt of pri(itive denotation. *he cr,1 of 'ield?s ar",(ent is that (erely e1tensional characteriDation of se(antic notions s,ch as denotation or satisfaction, +hile ade=,ate for (odel3theoretic p,rposes, does not constit,te a "en,ine red,ction of se(antic ter(s, any (ore than +e (ay prod,ce a "en,ine red,ction of the notion of valence that proceeded !y sayin" /0; 0 /0/ 0 /; has valence nF; is potassi,( and n is R1, or . . . or ; is s,lph,r and n is 3@0. /'ield 19-@: #6#0 *here see( to !e at least t+o pro!le(s +ith (erely e1tensional characteriDations, on 'ield?s vie+. 'irst, they do not red,ce se(antic properties to nonse(antic properties in the sense of 7red,ction7 e(ployed in the sciences and relevant to the incorporation of se(antics +ithin the pro8ect of physicalis(. Second, they see( to license ,nfort,nate +o,ld3!e 7red,ctions7: 7By si(ilar standards of red,ction, one (i"ht prove that +itchcraft is co(pati!le +ith physicalis(, as lon" as +itches cast only a finite n,(!er of spells: for then ?cast a spell? can !e defined +itho,t ,se of any of the ter(s of +itchcraft theory, (erely !y listin" all the +itch3and3victi( pairs7 /i!id., #690. 'ield see(s ri"ht in his clai( that *arski?s e1tensionally !ased acco,nt of his pri(itive se(antic properties fails to yield any ro!,st acco,nt of their nat,re. What 'ield directly ar",es is that *arski?s characteriDations do not yield a red,ction of these properties in ter(s that de(onstrate co(pati!ility +ith physicalis(, !,t +e shall see !elo+ in Black!,rn?s criticis(s that this point can !e "eneraliDed !eyond 'ield?s physicalistic a"enda as +ell. 5 1-- 5

(.'.60 -la3/burn5s "r*ument

Si(on Black!,rn /19&J0 ar",es that *arski in fact "ives no definition of any se(antic notions, !,t (erely descri!es a 7ne,tral core7 that 7connects to"ether tr,th, reference, and satisfaction7 !,t 7"ives ,s no theory of ho+ to !reak into this circleC that is, of ho+ to descri!e +hat it is a!o,t a pop,lation +hich (akes it tr,e that any of their +ords or sentences deserve s,ch se(antic descriptions7 /Black!,rn 19&J: @-$0. Black!,rn?s chapter on *arski and tr,th presents a n,(!er of insi"hts that are not easily separated. B,t one i(portant o!servation he (akes is that the specific character of *arski?s characteriDations of the se(antic notions renders the( ill s,ited to serve as definitions. .n partic,lar, there are t+o pro!le(atic feat,res of these characteriDations: their e1tensional character and their relativiDation to a lan",a"e. 'irst, in "ivin" a list3description of, say, na(es in lan",a"e : and their denotations, one does nothin" to e1plain +hat the property is that is !ein" characteriDed. 9 list3 description tells yo, +hat o!8ects are na(ed !y +hat ter(s, gi"en that you no' that the property

characteriDed !y the (appin" is s,pposed to !e naming in a partic,lar lan",a"e, !,t it tells yo, nothin" a!o,t na(in" per se. Ene can (ake ,se of these lists only if one also kno+s that they are descriptions of ho+ : 3speakers ,se this set of e1pressions as names, and hence +e have no real definition here /see i!id., @6&3@690. Second, the definition of, say, ?satisfies? for :- is co(pletely different fro( the definition of that sa(e +ord /or a correspondin" +ord0 relative to :G . *he satisfaction relation is provided (erely in ter(s of e1tensional characteriDation for particular languages . .t is defined differently for each lan",a"e individ,ally, !eca,se there is a different (appin" of e1pressions onto o!8ects in each lan",a"e, and there is no overarchin" notion of satisfaction apart fro( those relativiDed to partic,lar lan",a"es. .f satisfaction +ere really defined e1tensionally /indeed, even if it +ere f,lly accounted for in e1tensional ter(s0, it +o,ld see( to !e the case that there is no property or f,nction called 7satisfaction7 co((on to :- and :G , !,t rather it +o,ld !e (ore acc,rate to speak of separate notions of satisfaction3for3:- and satisfaction3for3:G . *his, Black!,rn o!serves, is a pro!le( for *arski?s acco,nt. 'or altho,"h *arski is s,rely ri"ht in relativiDin" tr,th to a lan",a"e, it does not follo+ that there is nothing in common to . . . tr,th as e1pressed in )n"lish sentences, and as e1pressed in those of any other lan",a"e +hatsoever. Geflection ,pon the application of an a!stract se(antic syste( to any act,al pop,lation sho+s that there (,st !e. /i!id., @-$0 5 1-& 5 .n other +ords, there is clearly so(ethin" in co((on to notions s,ch as tr,th or satisfaction across lan",a"es. B,t list3acco,nts for individ,al lan",a"es do not provide any indication of this co((on feat,re. Hence *arski?s analysis does not do an ade=,ate 8o! of 7definin"7 the se(antic properties. . !elieve that this part of Black!,rn?s analysis is =,ite ri"ht. 'or o,r p,rposes, ho+ever, there is a certain aspect of Black!,rn?s approach that cannot !e si(ply accepted +itho,t so(e 8,stification. 'or +hen Black!,rn says that *arski does not tell ,s ho+ to 7!reak into the circle7 of tr,th, reference, and satisfaction, he "losses this !y sayin" that it "ives ,s no theory 7of ho+ to descri!e +hat it is a!o,t a pop,lation +hich (akes it tr,e that any of their +ords or sentences deserve s,ch se(antic descriptions7 /i!id., @-$0. Black!,rn e1plicitly re8ects the idea that one can separate a p,rely se(antic acco,nt fro( a pra"(atic acco,nt that ties a p,rely a!stract lan",a"e to the act,al practices of a co((,nity /i!id., @690. *his is, of co,rse, very (,ch in accord +ith +hat . +ish to ar",e in this chapter. B,t !y the sa(e token, it is the very point +hich the fictional critic of this chapter +ishes to contest. So the (ost +e are really per(itted to take fro( Black!,rn here is the concl,sion that *arski?s analysis does not provide a definition of the se(antic ter(inolo"y in nonse(antic ter(s /e1cept perhaps in the (odel3theoretic sense of 7definition70. What +e are not licensed to concl,de fro( Black!,rn?s ar",(ents is the (ore ro!,st thesis that the notions of satisfaction and pri(itive denotation presented !y *arski do not constit,te notions that are le"iti(ately se(antical, yet do not have conventional ele(ents. 9t !est, +e (i"ht !e a!le to (ake the follo+in" ar",(ent to+ards that concl,sion on the !asis of Black!,rn?s considerations. We (i"ht re"ard *arski?s 7definitions7 in one of the follo+in" t+o +ays: /10 as atte(pts to "ive acco,nts of fa(iliar se(antical notions in nonse(antic ter(s, or /@0 as stip,lative definitions of ho+ he is "oin" to ,se those ter(s. .f +e interpret the definitions as stip,lative in character, Black!,rn?s o!servations are eno,"h to sho+ that 7denotation7 and 7satisfaction7 th,s defined are not really se(antical notions at all, !,t (erely (odel3theoretic co,nterparts of se(antical notions. .f +e interpret *arski in the first +ay, Black!,rn?s ar",(ents sho+ that *arski has not s,ccessf,lly red,ced the fa(iliar se(antical notions, !,t Black!,rn has not sho+n that these notions are not 7p,re7 in the sense of containin" no conventional /or 7pra"(atic70 ele(ent. *his +ill re=,ire a f,rther ori"inal consideration of the i(port of *arski?s +ork.

5 1-9 5

(.&E0 A$ure Semanti3sA and A"bstra3t #an*ua*esA

*he s,""estion at hand, then, is that *arski has e(ployed notions of denotation and satisfaction and has characteriDed the( for (odel3theoretic p,rposes in p,rely e1tensional /and nonconventional0 ter(sH and, +hile his list3acco,nts do not provide any acco,nt of the nat,re of denotation or satisfaction /conventional or other+ise0, the relations of denotation and satisfaction (ay yet !e nonconventional in nat,re. 9nd, (oreover, the critic clai(s that the e1tensional characteriDation provided !y *arski is s,fficient to sho+ that +e have notions here that can !e applied indifferently to disc,rsive sy(!ols, tho,"hts, and (ental representations. . !elieve that this is the +ron" (oral to dra+ fro( *arski?s +ork. . f,rther !elieve that the pla,si!ility this thesis (ay en8oy derives fro( a co((on (is,nderstandin" of +hat is "oin" on in the for(al /(odeltheoretic0 characteriDation of a lan",a"e. *arski hi(self differentiates !et+een +hat he calls 7descriptive se(antics,7 +hich is concerned +ith descri!in" ho+ an act,al "ro,p of people e(ploys +ords, and +hat he calls 7p,re se(antics,7 in +hich a lan",a"e is considered in the a!stract. Black!,rn calls the do(ain of p,re se(antics 7a!stract lan",a"es,7 and this ind of locution, I submit, is the cru3 of the difficulty . 'or speakin" of 7a!stract lan",a"es,7 as opposed to 7lan",a"es considered in the a!stract7 s,""ests that there are these p,rely a!stract entities called 7lan",a"es,7 and it is to these that se(antics applies, and the only 8o! left for the descriptive theorist is to link a concrete co((,nity of speakers +ith the ri"ht a!stract lan",a"e. *h,s (any +riters see( to see the pro!le( of (eanin" as !ein" identical to the pro!le( of fi",rin" o,t +hich a!stract lan",a"e a "iven co((,nity or individ,al speaks. Partitionin" the pro!le(s in this +ay leads one to think that iss,es of se(antics are all handled on the side of a!stract lan",a"es +hich are, fro( the theorist?s standpoint, stip,lative in their se(antic assi"n(ents. /. s,ppose fro( the (etaphysician?s vie+point they are necessary and eternal.0 .ss,es of conventionality, on the other hand, lie on the side of descriptive se(antics. 9nd if yo, vie+ descriptive se(antics as a (atter of hookin" ,p an a!stract lan",a"e, co(plete +ith se(antics already intact, to a co((,nity of speakers, then it is nat,ral to vie+ the se(antics of lan",a"e per se as so(ethin" o,tside of the +e! of convention and in the pristine +orld of a!stract o!8ects. *his story is all,rin", !,t it is +ron". *o see +hy it is +ron", it is necessary to tell a !etter story. *he "eneral (oral is this: it is every !it as 5 1&$ 5 (isleadin" to conf,se languages!considered!in!the!abstract +ith 7a!stract lan",a"es7 as it is to conf,se material bodies!considered!in!the!abstract /e."., in ter(s of (echanical la+s0 +ith 7a!stract !odies7 /e."., point3(asses0. Strictly speakin", there are neither a!stract !odies nor a!stract lan",a"es, and feat,res that are !racketed for p,rposes of a!stract analysis are not there!y proven to !e inessential. .n short, the !elief that the do(ain of se(antics is a kind of a!stract o!8ect called an 7a!stract lan",a"e7 is to fall prey to another instance of the 'allacy of Ged,ction disc,ssed earlier in this chapter. *he 'allacy of Ged,ction, yo, +ill recall, consists in "ivin" an a!stract description of a pheno(enon as a (odel and then treatin" the properties that are clarified !y the 7red,ced7 (odel /e."., the (athe(atical description0 as precisely those properties that are constit,tive of the ori"inal

pheno(enon. *here are so(e cases, no do,!t, in +hich the properties retained in the (odel are precisely those constit,tive of the ori"inal do(ain, !,t s,ch is not "enerally the case. *he (athe(atics of ther(odyna(ics, for e1a(ple, does not tell yo, that the s,!8ect (atter is heat . /.ndeed, the sa(e (athe(atics applies to infor(ation.0 9nd in the case of a!stractions s,ch as point3(asses, one is indeed faced +ith fictional entities that do not e1ist in nat,re. So lon" as one !ears in (ind that one is involved in a theoretical activity that involves a!straction, speakin" of point3(asses is co(pletely !eni"n. B,t if +e for"et the act of a!straction and treat point3(asses as the real do(ain of (echanicsH or even as a real part of the o!8ects of (echanicsH+e have !een deceived !y o,r o+n ,se of lan",a"e. So +hat is one doin" in "ivin" a for(al (odel of se(antics for a lan",a"eK What one is doin" here is really 8,st a special case of +hat one does in "ivin" a (odel "enerallyHfor e1a(ple, in (echanics or ther(odyna(ics. /*arski hi(self is really =,ite e1plicit a!o,t this, likenin" the relationship !et+een (eta(athe(atics and partic,lar (athe(atical do(ains to that !et+een one of the nat,ral sciences and the o!8ects it st,dies.0 .n any of these cases, one !e"ins +ith an int,itively characteriDed do(ain consistin" of a set of o!8ects one +ishes to characteriDe /say, !odies or sentences0 and a set of properties or relationships to ri"oro,sly specify /say, "ravitational attraction or tr,th3f,nctionality0. Ene then a!stracts or idealiDes the o!8ects in one?s do(ain in a fashion that !rackets those properties the o!8ects have in vivo that are irrelevant to the pro!le( at hand. Ene !rackets feat,res of !odies s,ch as color, (a"netis(, and even siDe +hen one is doin" a theory of "ravitation, treatin" 5 1&1 5 !odies as point3(asses. 9nd one !rackets feat,res of lan",a"es s,ch as pron,nciation, dialectical variation, nonassertoric sentences, lin",istic chan"e, and the conventionality of the sy(!ols people really ,se +hen one is doin" a theory of ded,ction. *his kind of idealiDation is perfectly le"iti(ate so lon" as the properties that are !racketed are tr,ly irrelevant to the feat,res one +ishes to ri"oro,sly characteriDe. B,t of co,rse the =,estion of +hat (ay safely !e !racketed depends entirely ,pon +hat aspects of the int,itively characteriDed do(ains one +ishes to specify: a for(al (odel of particle collisions should !e sensitive to siDe and shape even if a (odel of "ravitation is not, and a for(al (odel of phonetics or pra"(atics sho,ld !e sensitive to feat,res that are irrelevant to tr,th3 f,nctionality. 9 for(al (odel of a lan",a"e /or of anythin" else0 is th,s a characteriDation of a lan",a"e, vie+ed ,nder a certain aspect and screenin" o,t other aspects of the lan",a"e in vivo. .t is, indeed, possi!le in so(e cases to constr,ct artificial lan",a"es that act,ally lack so(e of the feat,res that one idealiDes a+ay fro( in nat,ral lan",a"esHfor e1a(ple, lan",a"es that lack le1ical a(!i",ity, a(!i",ity in s,rface str,ct,re, notational variation, nonassertoric aspects, and chan"e in ,sa"e. 9nd indeed one ,s,ally constr,cts one?s lan",a"es for (athe(atics and other ded,ctive syste(s /*arski?s (ain interest0 in a fashion that avoids these feat,res. Ho+ever, in the description of nat,ral lan",a"es, one (erely idealiDes a+ay fro( these feat,res. 2oreover, even +ith specialiDed lan",a"es, for(al (odelin" idealiDes a+ay fro( other feat,resHnota!ly, those tied to the +ay the lan",a"e is e(ployed !y its ,sers. 'or e1a(ple, +hat is called 7denotation7 in the (odel is !o,nd ,p in +hat the lan",a"e ,ser does in referrin" in vivo, 7satisfaction7 is !o,nd ,p +ith +hat the lan",a"e ,ser does in predicatin" in vivo, and so on. 9s ar",ed earlier in this chapter, there are t+o i(portantly distinct +ays of lookin" at a (odel, correspondin" to t+o different levels of a!straction one (ay adopt +ith respect to the int,itively characteriDed do(ain. 9t the first and (ilder level of a!straction, one vie+s the (odel precisely as a (odel of the specified do(ain. Ene vie+s 6e+ton?s e=,ations as a (odel of "ravitational interaction !et+een !odies, or a *arskian tr,th3definition as a (odel of tr,th in a lan",a"e : . Here one is in fact

lookin" at the initial do(ain, !,t vie+in" it a!stractly thro,"h the lens of the (odel. Ene is (akin" assertions a!o,t !odies, al!eit !odies3considered3as3point3(asses, or assertions a!o,t tr,th in a lan",a"e : , !,t tr,th3characteriDed3e1tensionally. *his is the 7rich7 characteri3 5 1&@ 5 Dation of the (odel. Pet one (ay also perfor( a second act of a!straction and look at the (odel itself in a!straction fro( +hat it is a (odel of . Ene (ay, for e1a(ple, look at 6e+ton?s la+s si(ply as e=,ations that can !e satisfied ,nder partic,lar constraints and can !e eval,ated ,sin" partic,lar techni=,es, or one (ay look at a *arskian (odel si(ply in ter(s of the set3theoretic relations it e(ploys and the valid ded,ctions one (ay (ake on the !asis of those. Here one has ceased to look at the (athe(atical constr,ction that started o,t as a (odel as a model /for a (odel is a (odel of so(ethin"0, and treats it as an independent entity. *his is the 7sparse7 interpretation of the (odel. 6o+ this does indeed have the conse=,ence that for(al (odelin" distills a p,rely a!stract o!8ectHthe constr,ction that is the (odel sparsely characteriDed. Ho+ever, it is incorrect to vie+ this as an 7a!stract lan",a"e,7 for it is not a language at all, !,t (erely an o!8ect consistin" of a set of e1pressions, a set of o!8ects, and so(e (appin" relationships !et+een the(. Ene applies the names ?denotation? and ?satisfaction? to so(e of these relationships, !,t that is si(ply an artifact of the process thro,"h +hich +e "ot to the (odel sparsely characteriDed. *here is nothin" a!o,t the (odel sparsely characteriDed =,a set3theoretic constr,ction that (akes partic,lar (appin"s co,nt as denotation or satisfaction. .ndeed, there is nothin" a!o,t the (odel sparsely characteriDed that (akes the( co,nt as anything !,t ar!itrary (appin"s. /*his, . think, is the essence of Black!,rn?s point.0 6o+ indeed in the (odel richly characteriDed, +e are entitled to speak of these f,nctions as 7denotation7 or 7satisfaction7Hor, perhaps (ore correctly, as the e1tensional characteriDation of the denotations and satisfaction conditions of partic,lar lan",a"es. B,t the reason for this is that +e started o,t talkin" a!o,t s,ch relations as the feat,res of the int,itively characteriDed do(ain that +e +ished to speak a!o,t, and have (erely constr,cted a (odel that "ives a ri"oro,s specification of these properties in a fashion that is 7(aterially ade=,ate and for(ally correct.7 Co(pare the analo"y +ith a theory of "ravitation. .f +e look at 6e+ton?s la+s 8,st as e=,ationsHas a (odel sparsely characteriDedHthey tell ,s nothin" a!o,t +hat relationships they are s,pposed to descri!e. We (ay call the varia!les !y na(es like ?(ass? and ?distance?, !,t they are no lon"er varia!les si"nifyin" (ass and distance. Ef co,rse they do si"nify those properties in the (odel richly characteriDed, !,t a"ain that is only !eca,se the (odel richly characteriDed is o!tained !y startin" fro( an int,itively characteriDed do(ain, perfor(in" certain idealiDations, and applyin" a ri"oro,s description to +hat is left. 9 (athe(atiDation tells 5 1&# 5 ,s only the relationships !et+een the feat,res +e +ish to descri!eH!e they (ass or denotation. .t specifies only the for( of the relations and not the nat,re of the relata. 9s a conse=,ence of this, it is i(portant to see that a for(al (odel of a lan",a"e no (ore i(plies the e1istence of so(ethin" called an 7a!stract lan",a"e7 than a for(al (odel of "ravitation i(plies the e1istence of thin"s called 7point3(asses.7 *he (odel richly characteriDed is precisely a description of a fa(iliar int,itively characteriDed do(ain that ,ses an a!stract o!8ect to descri!e certain properties of that do(ain. *he 7lan",a"e7 here is the f,ll3!looded lan",a"e +e set o,t to descri!e, not so(e for(al s,!set of it, and it is fra,"ht +ith conventionality. *he (odel sparsely characteriDed is not a lan",a"e at

all, even if +e (isleadin"ly ,se +ords like 7denotation7 for a (appin" f,nction it e(ploys. 9ll it is is a constr,ction consistin" of sets of e1pressions and o!8ects and a set of (appin"s !et+een the(. 2appin"s in the(selves no (ore add ,p to denotation than e=,ations e(ployed in (echanics or ther(odyna(ics or the 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication add ,p to (ass or heat or infor(ation. .n short, there is no level at +hich +e find +hat the critic needs: an 7a!stract lan",a"e7 that has "en,inely se(antic relationships !,t no conventionality. *he (odel richly characteriDed has se(antic relationships, !,t they are the conventional ones of f,ll3!looded lan",a"es. *he (odel sparsely characteriDed does not s,ffer fro( se(antic conventionality /tho,"h it still pres,pposes the conventionally sanctioned sy(!ol types that constit,te its do(ain0C !,t it does not involve "en,ine se(antic relationships either, !,t (erely the (athe(atical3lo"ical for( that those relationships in real lan",a"es share +ith (any other nonlin",istic syste(s +ith +hich they are iso(orphic. *arskian se(antics deals +ith /real, f,ll3!looded0 lan",a"es in a!straction fro( (any feat,res fo,nd in vivo, incl,din" their conventionality. B,t it does not s,cceed in ,ncoverin" 7a!stract lan",a"es7 that can provide the do(ain for a 7p,re se(antics.7

(.&&0 Con3lusion
.t +o,ld see(, then, that it is not tr,e that se(antics is properly concerned +ith a set of a!stract entities called 7a!stract lan",a"es.7 .t is tr,e that +e can !e"in +ith f,ll3!looded lan",a"es and a!stract a+ay fro( their real3+orld feat,res in order to !e left +ith an o!8ect that is (ore s,ita!le to ri"oro,s st,dy, (,ch as +e (ay do so in, say, physics. .ndeed, 5 1&J 5 in !oth cases there are t'o levels of a!straction: a richly constr,ed (odel that treats the real3+orld processes in ter(s of their (athe(atical relations, and a sparsely constr,ed (odel that is a p,rely a!stract (athe(atical entity. 6either of these, ho+ever, has the feat,res needed to co,nt as an 7a!stract lan",a"e.7 *he rich (odel indeed has the feat,res needed to co,nt as a language, !,t is not tr,ly abstract: the lin",istic cate"ories it +orks +ith are the convention3laden ones of the f,ll3!looded language . *he sparse (odel is indeed a!stract, !,t there is nothin" a!o,t the (odel, as s,ch, that +o,ld (ake it co,nt as a lan",a"e. *his is e=,ally tr,e for the se(antic and the syntactic aspects of lan",a"e. 9nd hence the criticis( that the Se(iotic 9nalysis is really a hy!rid of a nonconventional p,re se(antics /and p,re synta10 plus a conventional ele(ent re=,ired only for sy(!ols ,sed in co((,nication fails. 5 1&% 5


! CT1
5 1&- 5

C)apter Seven0 Semioti39Semanti3 $roperties, Intentionality, Vindi3ation

*he precedin" chapters have !ro,"ht ,s to a point fro( +hich it is possi!le to ret,rn to the iss,es that +ere raised in the disc,ssion of Searle?s and Sayre?s o!8ections to C*2 in chapter #. *here it +as s,""ested that, if it +ere to t,rn o,t to !e the case that +ords ,sed in the attri!,tion of intentionality and se(antic properties are syste(atically ho(ony(o,s, this (i"ht pose pro!le(s for C*2?s acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antic properties of (ental states. *he reason for this concern +as strai"htfor+ard: C*2 atte(pts to acco,nt for the se(antic and intentional properties of (ental states !y sayin" that these are 7inherited7 fro( those of the (ental representations they contain. *he "eneral sche(a for e1plainin" the se(antic properties of a (ental state M +o,ld appear to !e so(ethin" like this: 2ental state M has se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has se(antic property , . B,t if it sho,ld t,rn o,t to !e the case that the se(antic properties predicated of (ental states are not the same properties as those predicated of sy(!ols, then this sche(a is at !est in need of refine(ent and at +orst !etrays a deep conf,sion a!o,t se(antic properties, !eca,se the e1pression 7se(antic property , 7 cannot !e said ,nivocally of sy(!ols and of (ental states, and hence one cannot sensi!ly speak of 7inheritance.7 5 1&& 5 6o+ the res,lts of chapters J and % have !orne o,t the s,spicion that the ter(s ,sed in attri!,tions of se(antic properties are syste(atically ho(ony(o,s. *he kinds of 7se(antic properties7 attri!,ted to sy(!ols are !oth different fro( and concept,ally dependent ,pon the kinds of 7se(antic properties7 attri!,ted to (ental states. .t +as s,""ested that +e can (ark this distinction !y addin" prefi1es to +ords s,ch as ?se(antic? and ?intentional? so as to disa(!i",ate these cr,cial ter(s. *he kinds of se(antic properties attri!,ted to (ental states +e (ay desi"nate mental!semantic properties, and si(ilarly the intentionality of the (ental +e (ay desi"nate mental intentionality . .n contrast, +e (ay refer to the kinds of se(antic properties attri!,ted to sy(!ols as semiotic!semantic properties, and the kind of intentionality attri!,ted to sy(!ols as semiotic intentionality . .n order to deter(ine +hether this analysis +ill have any conse=,ences for C*2, it is necessary first to revise C*2?s sche(a for e1plainin" intentionality and se(antic properties in li"ht of these ne+ distinctions. .t see(s clear that the kinds of properties of cogniti"e states that are to !e e1plained !y C*2 are their (ental3se(antic properties. What is less clear is 8,st +hat kinds of 7se(antic7 properties mental representations are s,pposed to possess, in virt,e of +hich they can provide the !asis for an acco,nt of the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. *here see( to !e three !asic possi!ilities: /10 they are (ental3se(antic properties, /@0 they are se(iotic3se(antic properties, or /#0 they are neither (ental3se(antic properties nor se(iotic3se(antic properties !,t so(e other sort of properties that have not yet !een clearly identified or distin",ished fro( (ental3 and se(iotic3se(antic properties. *his third possi!ility (,st !e considered, since it co,ld !e that references to the 7se(antic properties of (ental representations7 are !est constr,ed as attri!,tions of so(e kinds of properties that are particular to (ental representations. .t is not clear +hat these properties are s,pposed to !e, !,t if so(eone +ere to advance the clai( that there are s,ch properties, the properties (i"ht !e distin",ished fro( (ental3 and se(iotic3se(antic properties !y callin" the( M+!semantic properties, +here 72G7

is short for 7(ental representation.7 . sho,ld like to separate the task of e1e"esis of te1ts !y 'odor and other proponents of C*2 fro( the task of analyDin" variations on the acco,nt of intentionality. . do not +ish to place too (,ch e(phasis ,pon the e1e"etical task. *hat task (ay +ell !e pointless: it does not look as tho,"h 'odor reco"niDes the a(!i",ity of the se(antic voca!,lary, and if this is so, there is no point in askin" +hich le" of the a(!i",ity he in3 5 1&9 5 tended. .n spite of this, ho+ever, it (akes perfect sense to ask +hat vario,s constr,als of C*2 a(o,nt to, +hat their prospects are, and +hat advocates of the theory (i"ht need to provide in order to lend f,rther s,pport to their acco,nt. So here are three variations ,pon C*2?s acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental states: Mental!Semantic @ersion 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has (ental3se(antic property , . Semiotic!Semantic @ersion 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has se(iotic3se(antic property 5 . M+!Semantic @ersion 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has 2G3se(antic property 8 .

;.&0 " -rie+ ,is3ussion o+ t)e T)ree Versions

*hese three versions of C*2?s acco,nt of se(antics and intentionality are not all of e=,al interest. *he first version, the (ental3se(antic version, see(s plainly to !e of little (erit. While it (ay !e that this version !est reflects the fact that C*2?s advocates fail to distin",ish !et+een different kinds of 7se(antic properties,7 it is also =,ite hard to see +hat it +o,ld (ean to attri!,te (ental3se(antic properties to (ental sy(!olsHor indeed to anythin" other than a (ental state. *o e(!race the (ental3 se(antic version +o,ld !e to say that (ental representations are sy(!ols that do not 7have se(antic properties7 in the nor(al sense in +hich sy(!ols are said to have se(antic properties, !,t instead /and ,nlike other sy(!ols0 have the very sa(e kind of se(antic properties that one attri!,tes to (ental states. . a( hard pressed to see +hat s,ch a clai( co,ld really (ean, and a( fairly confident that none of C*2?s advocates +o,ld +ish to offer it as a clarification of his theory. 5 19$ 5

*he se(iotic3se(antic version of the acco,nt +o,ld clearly see( to !e the !est candidate for an interpretation of 'odor?s acco,nt of intentionality. 9fter all, 'odor repeatedly characteriDes (ental representations as 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ols,7 and one +o,ld certainly !e 8,stified in ass,(in" that these representations are s,pposed to !e sy(!ols that are 7(eanin"f,l7 in the sense that symbols /as opposed to, say, (ental states or disc,ssions +ith one?s therapist0 are said to !e 7(eanin"f,l.7 .f 'odor (eant so(ethin" else !y ?(eanin"f,l? /?se(antic?, etc.0, one +o,ld certainly e1pect that he +o,ld have said so. 'or this reason alone, the se(iotic3se(antic version sho,ld co,nt as the defa,lt readin" of C*2?s acco,nt of se(antics. .n addition, C*2 is s,pposed to !e an application of the paradi"( of (achine co(p,tationC and in the case of sy(!ols in co(p,ters, +hen +e speak of their 7se(antic properties7 it is their se(iotic3se(antic properties +ith +hich +e are concerned. *herefore it see(s reasona!le to ass,(e that it is se(iotic3se(antic properties that are attri!,ted to the (ental representations over +hich (ental co(p,tation is s,pposed to take place. 2oreover, it see(s the only option that is really on the ta!le. *he only senses of se(antic ter(s that +e have !eco(e ac=,ainted +ith are those that denote se(iotic3se(antic properties and those that denote (ental3se(antic properties, and it clearly +ill not do to attri!,te (ental3se(antic properties to (ental representations. .t (ay !e that so(eone co,ld develop another ,sa"e of +ords s,ch as ?se(antic? and ?intentionality? that co,ld !e ,sed in denotin" so(e other class of properties, perhaps properties partic,lar to s,ch (ental representations as there (i"ht !eC !,t to the !est of (y kno+led"e no one has clearly stated s,ch an alternative ,sa"e, nor (ade clear +hat it (i"ht !e ,sed to denote. *he pro!le( +ith analyDin" the 2G3se(antic version of the acco,nt of intentionality is not so (,ch that an e1planation of intentionality !ased on s,ch a pec,liar ,sa"e of se(antic ter(inolo"y is either i(possi!le or that it +o,ld not prove fr,itf,l. *he pro!le( is, rather, that it is diffic,lt to criticiDe an acco,nt that has not yet !een artic,lated. *here is, ho+ever, a trend to+ards ca,sal e1planations of the se(antic properties of (ental representations that co,ld, in principle, !e taken as pointin" to+ards a ,sa"e of se(antic ter(inolo"y that +o,ld !e pec,liar to (ental representations, and this is +orthy of so(e investi"ation. What . propose to do, therefore, is to e1a(ine in this chapter the prospects of C*2 for e1plainin" intentionality and vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y, on the ass,(ption that the 7se(antic properties7 of (ental representations are se(iotic3se(antic properties. .n the t+o chapters that follo+, . shall e1plore t+o +ays of developin" an acco,nt of 7se(antic 5 191 5 properties7 for representations that diver"es fro( se(iotic3se(antics.

;.20 Semioti39Semanti3 $roperties and CT15S "33ount o+ Intentionality

*he first order of !,siness, then, is to consider the prospects of C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality on the ass,(ption that the 7se(antic7 properties i(p,ted to (ental representations !y C*2 are the sa(e kinds of se(antic properties nor(ally i(p,ted to sy(!olsHthat is, that they are +hat . have called se(iotic3se(antic properties. .n order to proceed here, it (i"ht !e helpf,l to ret,rn to 'odor?s o+n characteriDation of co"nitive states in ,sychosemantics: Claim - /the nat,re of propositional attit,des0 'or any or"anis( . , and any attit,de A to+ard the proposition , , there is a /?co(p,tational?3?f,nctional?0 relation + and a (ental representation M, s,ch that M, (eans that , , and

. has A iff . !ears + to M, . /'odor 19&-: 1-0 En the c,rrent interpretation, the condition 7M, (eans that , 7 (ay !e interpreted as 7M, se(iotically (eans that , .7 B,t this does not yet leave ,s at a point at +hich +e can eval,ate this clai(, for the si(ple reason that clai(s a!o,t se(iotic3(eanin" are a(!i",o,s: they (i"ht !e clai(s a!o,t interpreta!ility, a!o,t intended interpretation, a!o,t act,al interpretation, or a!o,t interpreta!ility3in3 principle. So even if +e confine o,rselves to se(iotic3(eanin" of (ental representations, there are really fo,r distinct acco,nts of co"nitive states that (i"ht !e seen in 'odor?s characteriDation: Authoring Intention @ersion 'or any or"anis( . and any co"nitive attit,de A to+ards a proposition , , there is a relation + and a (ental (arker M, s,ch that M, +as intended as si"nifyin" /that0 , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . Actual Interpretation @ersion 'or any or"anis( . and any co"nitive attit,de A to+ards a proposition , , there is a relation + and a (ental (arker M, s,ch that M, +as act,ally interpreted as si"nifyin" /that0 , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . 5 19@ 5 Interpretability @ersion 'or any or"anis( . and any co"nitive attit,de A to+ards a proposition , , there is a relation + and a (ental (arker M, s,ch that M, is interpreta!le ,nder convention C as si"nifyin" /that0 , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . Interpretability!in!,rinciple @ersion 'or any or"anis( . and any co"nitive attit,de A to+ards a proposition , , there is a relation + and a (ental (arker M, s,ch that M, is interpreta!le3in3principle as si"nifyin" /that0 , , and . has A iff . !ears + to M, . E,r task th,s !eco(es one of e1a(inin" each of these fo,r versions of the acco,nt and deter(inin" +hether any of the( can s,cceed in providin" an e1planation of the intentionality and se(antic properties of (ental states. .n the follo+in" sections, . intend to address each of these versions of 'odor?s representational theory of (ental states and to ar",e that none of the( can provide an acco,nt of the se(antic and intentional properties of s,ch states. *he ar",(ents a"ainst three of the versions of the theoryHthose !ased ,pon interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intentions, and act,al interpretationHare ro,"hly co"nate +ith one another, and hence these three versions +ill !e addressed to"ether. *he case a"ainst the version !ased on interpreta!ility3in3principle is =,ite different, and +ill !e addressed separately.

;.40 Intentions, Conventions, and t)e Representational "33ount

*he first three versions of 'odor?s representational acco,nt of co"nitive states share an i(portant feat,re: all three involve /covert0 appeals to intentions and conventions. *he 9,thorin" .ntention :ersion involves the clai( that co"nitive states involve (ental representations that are intended as si"nifiers. B,t the lo"ical for( of the loc,tional sche(a ?is intended as si"nifyin" /that0 , ? re=,ires a specification of so(e author of the (arker token 'hose intention it 'as that the token si"nify /that0 , . >ike+ise, the 9ct,al .nterpretation :ersion involves the clai( that co"nitive states involve (ental representations that are interpreted as si"nifiers. B,t for so(ethin" to !e interpreted as a si"nifier, there (,st !e 5 19# 5 so(e sy(!ol user +ho does the interpretin". *he .nterpreta!ility :ersion involves the clai( that co"nitive states involve representations that are interpretable as si"nifiers. B,t for a (arker to !e interpreta!le as a si"nifier, there (,st !e a convention licensin" the interpretationC and for there to !e s,ch a convention, there (,st !e a co((,nity of sy(!ol ,sers +ho share a co((on ,nderstandin" that s,ch an interpretation is licensed. .n each of these cases, the res,ltin" acco,nt of intentional states itself contains f,rther reference to intentional states. .n the case of a,thorin" intentions and act,al interpretation, it +ill involve reference to the intentional states involved in intendin" the (arker to !ear an interpretation or in constr,in" it as !earin" an interpretation, respectively. .n the case of interpreta!ility ,nder a convention, the sit,ation is only sli"htly (ore co(ple1: conventions the(selves are not intentional states, !,t the presence of a shared set of !eliefs a!o,t ho+ (arker types (ay !e ,sed is a necessary /if not =,ite s,fficient0 condition for the presence of a se(antic convention. .t th,s t,rns o,t that versions of C*2 !ased on interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intention, and act,al interpretation are infected +ith e1actly the kind of covert reference to co"nitive states that +as disc,ssed in the develop(ent of the Concept,al ;ependence E!8ection in chapter #: the lo"ical for(s of attri!,tions of intentional and se(antic properties to sy(!ols contain references to co"nitive states. What re(ains to !e seen is +hether this fact i(perils these versions of the acco,nt. . +ish to clai( that s,ch acco,nts face fo,r serio,s pro!le(s. 'irst, they are e(pirically i(pla,si!le. Second, they do not provide an e1planation of the intentional and se(antic properties of co"nitive states. *hird, they ,nderc,t one of the f,nda(ental tenets of representational acco,nts of (ind: na(ely, the int,ition that access to e1tra(ental reality is (ediated !y (ental representations. 'inally, they lead to circ,larity and re"ress.

;.60 T)e Empiri3al Implausibility o+ t)e "33ount

*he first pro!le( +ith the versions of C*2 !ased on convention and intention is that they are hi"hly i(pla,si!le as e(pirical theories. .ndeed, they are so e(pirically i(pla,si!le that it +o,ld !e diffic,lt to find any stran"er theories in the history of science. 'or s,ppose that the se(iotic3se(antic version of C*2 is tr,e. .f this is so, then +henever yo, have a !elief that /for e1a(ple0 >incoln +as president, yo, have a (ental representation M, that (eans /that0 >incoln +as president. 9nd if one of

5 19J 5 the three versions of C*2 !ased on conventions or intentions is correct, ?(eans /that0? has to !e cashed o,t in ter(s of conventions or intentions. 9ccordin" to the .nterpreta!ility :ersion, yo, can only have a !elief that >incoln +as president if there is so(e convention C that licenses the interpretation of M, as (eanin" that >incoln +as president. 9ccordin" to the 9,thorin" .ntention :ersion, yo, can only have s,ch a !elief if so(eone 7a,thored7 M, and intended it to (ean that >incoln +as president. 9nd accordin" to the 9ct,al .nterpretation :ersion, yo, can only have s,ch a !elief if so(eone apprehends M, and takes it to (ean that >incoln +as president. 9ll of these possi!ilities see( very ,nlikely, to say the leastN Cho is it , after all, +hose intentions, interpretations and conventions are s,pposed to e1plain the (eanin"f,lness of M,B Ene possi!ility +o,ld !e that it is the thinker?s o+n intentions, interpretations, or conventions. B,t there are t+o pro!le(s here, !oth of +hich (ay !e fa(iliar fro( criticis(s of H,(e offered !y *ho(as Geid and )d(,nd H,sserl. 'irst, there is certainly no e3perience of a,thorin" or interpretin" a sy(!ol in ordinary co"nition. /9nd it is not clear +hat it +o,ld (ean to interpret or a,thor a sy(!ol one does not and cannot apprehend.0 Second, in order to intend or interpret a sy(!ol token as !ein" a!o,t so(ethin" else, one (,st have access !oth to the sy(!ol and to the thin" it is to represent. 9s +e shall see !elo+, this r,ns afo,l of so(e !asic (otivations for representational theories of (ind. B,t perhaps the relevant conventions and intentions are not those of the or"anis( itself, !,t of so(e other !ein"/s0. .t is, perhaps, conceiva!le that there are so(e s,pernat,ral !ein"s, or perhaps so(e very sophisticated 2artian psycholo"ists, +ho have s,!tle eno,"h access to h,(an !rain states to vie+ the( as co(p,tersHfor e1a(ple, !y constr,ctin" *,rin" (achine descriptions for each h,(an !ein". B,t it really see(s =,ite ,nlikely. 9nd accordin" to these convention3 and intention3!ased versions of C*2, h,(ans co,ld only !e said to !e in co"nitive states if there 'ere s,ch !ein"s. 9 theory that appeals to the ,nlikely to e1plain the (atter3of3fact s,rely has to !e re"arded as hi"hly s,spect.

;.70 T)e Irrelevan3e o+ Conventions and Intentions

.n addition to !ein" hi"hly ,nlikely, the presence of !ein"s +ho do in fact interpret h,(an psycholo"ical states is quite irrele"ant to o,r as3 5 19% 5 criptions of intentional states to h,(ans, and to ascriptions of se(antic and intentional properties to those states. 'or s,ppose that there are t+o possi!le +orlds that are indiscerni!le +ith respect to all feat,res accessi!le to h,(an o!servers. .n one +orldHall it the ;e(on WorldHthere are !ein"s called de(ons, indetecta!le to h,(ans, +ho have a kind of access to and ,nderstandin" of h,(an (ental processes that is si(ply ,ncanny. 9(on" other thin"s, they can instantly see ho+ a partic,lar h,(an !ein"?s (ind is descri!a!le as a *,rin" (achine, and can assi"n interpretations to the operations and the sy(!ols picked o,t !y this *,rin" (achine description in s,ch a fashion that the person has a (ental state of type A +ith content , +hen, and only +hen /a 0 the h,(an, descri!ed as a *,rin" (achine, has a tokenin" of a sy(!ol of type M, in a partic,lar f,nctional relationship + +ith the rest of the 7(achine,7 and /b 0 the de(on?s interpretation sche(e associates M, 3tokens +ith , and associates the propositional attit,de A +ith f,nctional relationship + . >et ,s ass,(e, (oreover, that these de(ons do 7read off7 h,(ans? (ental states, and that they can even effect tokenin"s of intentional states !y ca,sin" tokenin"s of sy(!ols in h,(ans. .n the ;e(on World, h,(ans do have states for +hich there are conventional interpretations, there are acts of interpretation of these sy(!ols, and there

are a,thorin" acts in +hich these sy(!ols are intended to have partic,lar (eanin"s. Consider no+ a second +orld. .t is indiscerni!le fro( the ;e(on World in all aspects accessi!le to h,(an o!servers. B,t this +orldHall it the ;e(on3'ree WorldHcontains no !ein"s +ho have the pec,liar kind of access to h,(an psycholo"ical states and processes that the de(ons in the ;e(on World have. H,(ans in the ;e(on3'ree World have e1actly the sa(e e1periences as h,(ans in the ;e(on World. 9nd ideally co(pleted e(pirical psycholo"ies in the t+o +orlds +o,ld co(e to precisely the sa(e concl,sions. *he t+o +orlds are, !y stip,lation, indiscerni!le +ith respect to all feat,res accessi!le to h,(an o!servers. 6o+ let ,s pose the follo+in" =,estion: +o,ld there !e any differences in +hat (ental states +e sho,ld ascri!e to h,(ans in the ;e(on World and h,(ans in the ;e(on3'ree WorldK Wo,ld they have different !eliefs, desires, and hopesK . think that the ans+er is, clearly, no . .f the t+o +orlds are indiscerni!le !oth +ith respect to the e1periences of individ,al h,(an !ein"s and +ith respect to everythin" an e(pirical psycholo"y (i"ht discover, it is hard to see ho+ there co,ld !e any "ro,nds for attri!,tin" different intentional states in the t+o +orlds. 2oreover, it is i(possi!le for us to kno+ !eyond Cartesian do,!t +hich sort of 5 196 5 +orld 'e live in. .t is episte(ically possi!le that there are, in fact, s,ch de(onsC it is si(ilarly possi!le that there are not. B,t this realiDation does not /and sho,ld not0 p,t ,s into any kind of do,!t a!o,t +hether +e have partic,lar !eliefs or desires. B,t if the intentionality of o,r (ental states +ere a (atter of o,r !ein" in relationships +ith (ental representations that +ere !o,nd to (eanin"s !y conventions or intentions, then the e1istence of !ein"s +ho e(ploy s,ch conventions or have s,ch intentions +o,ld !e a necessary condition for o,r !ein" in intentional states. Since the e1istence of s,ch !ein"s is patently irrelevant to o,r attri!,tions of intentional states, it follo+s that the intentionality of (ental states is not dependent ,pon the association of sy(!ols +ith (eanin"s via conventions or the acts of sy(!ol ,sers. Consider, in addition, the follo+in" concerns. S,ppose that the de(ons in the ;e(on World s,ddenly decide to change their interpretive conventions, and they then start interpretin" h,(an psycholo"ical states in ne+ +ays. *here is no chan"e in +hat people e3perience +hen they are in partic,lar psycholo"ical states, !,t the de(ons sh,ffle their assi"n(ents of interpretations to (arker types. Sho,ld +e say that there is a correspondin" chan"e in +hat intentional states +e sho,ld assi"n to h,(ans in the ;e(on WorldK S,rely not. X,estions a!o,t +hat intentional states people are in are s,rely not dependent ,pon anythin" so contin"ent as e1ternally i(posed interpretations. .f this is the conse=,ence of the versions of 'odor?s acco,nt !ased ,pon conventions and intentions, those acco,nts fail to provide conditions that are relevant to proper ascription of co"nitive states and of the kind of se(antic and intentional properties nor(ally ascri!ed to co"nitive states.

;.(0 Con+li3ts in t)e Notion o+ Representation

.n the previo,s section it +as ar",ed that e3ternal i(positions of interpretations to (ental representations /thro,"h a,thorin" intentions, interpretive acts, or conventions0 +o,ld !e irrelevant to the ascription of (ental states to an or"anis(, and to the ascription of se(antic and intentional properties to an or"anis(?s (ental states. Internal i(positions of interpretations are like+ise pro!le(atic, al!eit for a different reason. *he reason to !e developed here is s,""ested !y *ho(as Geid

/19&#0 and )d(,nd H,sserl /L191#M 19#10. Geid and H,sserl !oth offer ar",(ents a"ainst theories of (ind that post,late representations as o!8ects that (e3 5 19- 5 diate the (ind?s access to e1tra(ental o!8ects. Both philosophers? ar",(ents are directed pri(arily a"ainst H,(e, !,t their o!8ection to representational theories can, as Beith >ehrer /19&90 has recently s,""ested, !e (arshaled a"ainst conte(porary theories as +ell, incl,din" C*2. Geid and H,sserl !oth clai( that representational theories post,late 7i((anent o!8ects7 that (ediate perception and co"nition in order to acco,nt for the intentionality of percept,al and co"nitive states. *hey also clai( that, for a theory to !e tr,ly representational, this 7i((anent o!8ect7 (,st !e interpreted or ta en as standing for the e1tra(ental o!8ect. B,t in order for s,ch an act of interpretation to !e possi!le, Geid and H,sserl ar",e, the s,!8ect (,st have so(e kind of access both to the representation and to the thin" represented: .f Aones ,ses a sy(!ol S to stand for so(e o!8ect 5 Hif he 4udges 7S stands for 5 7 or decides 7S shall stand for 5 ,7 he (,st !e co"niDant of S , and he (,st also !e co"niDant of 5 . 9nd his access to 5 (,st !e independent of his access to S , since his ac=,aintance +ith 5 (,st precede the interpretive act that associates S +ith 5 . B,t this, ar",e Geid and H,sserl, has the conse=,ence that (ental representation is possi!le only +here there can !e independent access to e1tra(ental o!8ects. 9nd this conse=,ence ,nderc,ts the +hole (otivation for the post,lation of (ental representations, since these +ere introd,ced to e1plain ho+ access to e1tra(ental reality is possi!le. *he Geid3H,sserl o!8ection is strai"htfor+ardly applica!le to the variations on 'odor?s acco,nt of co"nitive states that +e are presently considerin". 9s for(,lated, it can stand as an attack ,pon the 9ct,al .nterpretation :ersion, since it addresses theories in +hich so(eone (,st interpret a representation as standin" for an e1tra(ental o!8ect. 9ccordin" to s,ch a theory, an or"anis( . can !e in a co"nitive state A a!o,t so(e o!8ect 5 only if /10 . is in a f,nctional relation + to a (ental representation M, , and /@0 . interprets M, as !ein" a!o,t 5 . 9s Geid and H,sserl point o,t, the appeal of representational theories lies lar"ely in +hat is to !e "ained !y sayin" that access to e1tra(ental reality is (ediated !y (ental representations. B,t if the representations are only 7(eanin"f,l7 in the sense of !ein" interpreted as !ein" a!o,t e1tra(ental o!8ects, then this (otivation for a representational theory is ,nderc,t. .n order to interpret M, as !ein" a!o,t 5, . (,st have access to M, and have independent access to 5 . .f . is to apprehend M, and decide, 79haN *his is a!o,t 5 ,7 . (,st have so(e kind of access to 5 that is not (ediated !y M, . His access to 5 (ay !e very distant and di(, and (i"ht +ell !e (ediated !y so(ethin" other than his access to M, . /'or e1a(ple, 5 (i"ht !e a n,(!er +ith a very lar"e deci(al, and . 5 19& 5 (i"ht kno+ of 5 only ,nder the aspect of !ein" the li(it of a partic,lar series of rational n,(!ers.0 B,t in order for . to interpret a partic,lar sy(!ol M, as !ein" a!o,t 5 , he (,st have so(e idea of 5 that is not (ediated !y his apprehension of that particular sy(!ol. Ether+ise interpretin" M, as !ein" a!o,t 5 a(o,nts to for(in" the 8,d"(ent 7M, is a!o,t +hat M, is a!o,t.7 6o+ the appeal of representational theories lies in lar"e (eas,re in +hat is to !e "ained !y sayin" that access to e1tra(ental reality is (ediated !y representations. B,t if representation can take place only if so(eone act,ally interprets the representation as standin" for a partic,lar o!8ect, and this re=,ires access to the o!8ect that is not (ediated !y the representation, then it t,rns o,t that representational acco,nts of intentionality are self3defeatin". 'or if +e post,late a representation M, in order to e1plain

an or"anis( . ?s access to an o!8ect 5 , !,t the very definition of representation ens,res that ,sin" M, to represent 5 pres,pposes havin" access to 5 that is not (ediated !y M, , then it is si(ply fr,itless to e1plain access to o!8ects !y post,latin" (ental representations. .f there can !e access to o!8ects that is not (ediated !y representations, it is ,nnecessary to post,late s,ch representations. .f there cannot !e access to o!8ects that is not (ediated !y representations, there cannot !e representations either, !eca,se one can only interpret a sy(!ol as !ein" a!o,t 5 if one has so(e independent idea of +hat 5 is. 6either Geid nor H,sserl develops the o!8ection specifically a"ainst symbolic representations, and neither of the( see(s to realiDe that there are several senses in +hich an o!8ect can !e said to !e a sy(!olic representation in addition to the sense of act,ally !ein" interpreted as referrin" to so(ethin" else. B,t the o!8ection can easily !e adapted so as to !e applica!le to representational acco,nts !ased on conventions or a,thorin" intentions as +ell. 'irst, s,ppose that an or"anis( . has a !elief a!o,t >incoln 8,st in case /10 . is in a partic,lar f,nctional relationship + to a (ental representation M, , and /@0 . has a convention C +here!y the representation M, is interpreta!le as !ein" a!o,t >incoln. *o have s,ch a convention, . (,st kno+ a!o,t >incoln in a +ay that is not (ediated !y M, . Si(ilarly, s,ppose that . has a !elief a!o,t >incoln 8,st in case /10 . is in a partic,lar f,nctional relationship + to M, , /@0 . a,thored M, , and /#0 . intended that M, !e a!o,t >incoln. .n order for . to intend that M, !e a!o,t >incoln, . (,st kno+ a!o,t >incoln in a +ay that is not (ediated !y M, . .n any of these cases, it is i(possi!le to (ake sense of the notion of (ental representation +itho,t s,pposin" that the or"anis( also has access to the thin" represented 5 199 5 in a fashion that is not (ediated !y s,ch a representation. B,t if this is the case, post,latin" that there is a (ental representation thro,"h +hich . apprehends >incoln is pointless. *h,s any s,ch representational acco,nt of intentionality is !o,nd to !e self3defeatin".

;.;0 Cir3ularity and Re*ress

'inally, an acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental states !ased ,pon interpreta!ility, a,thorin" intentions, or act,al interpretations of (ental representations +o,ld !e circ,lar and re"ressive. Consider first +hat +o,ld !e involved in a clai( that . ?s (ental state A (eans /that0 , !eca,se it involves a representation M, that is either /a 0 intended /!y so(e a"ent A 0 to (ean /that0 , or /b 0 interpreted /!y so(e sy(!ol ,ser H 0 as (eanin" /that0 , . .f either acco,nt +ere correct, . co,ld only !e said to !e in a (ental state A that (eans /that0 , if so(e or"anis( .Q /possi!ly, !,t not necessarily, distinct fro( E0 +ere in so(e partic,lar intentional statesHna(ely, those involved in /a 0 intendin" that M, (ean /that0 , or in /b 0 interpretin" M, as (eanin" /that0 , . B,t if this is the case, the strate"y for e1plainin" the intentionality of (ental states has serio,s pro!le(s. 'irst, it is circ,lar: the intentionality and (eanin"f,lness of (ental states is acco,nted for !y appealin" to the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols, +hile the (eanin"f,lness of the sy(!ols is acco,nted for !y appealin" to the (ental states involved in !esto+in" (eanin" ,pon those sy(!ols. Second, the acco,nt is re"ressive: each ti(e +e acco,nt for the intentionality of a (ental state A of an or"anis( . , +e all,de to the 7(eanin"f,lness7 of a representation M, . B,t the kind of 7(eanin"f,lness7 +e invoke involves covert reference to the intentional states AQ of so(e or"anis( .Q . B,t since +e are lookin" for a "eneral acco,nt of the intentionality of (ental statesHnot 8,st an acco,nt of . ?s (ental statesH+e (,st acco,nt for the intentionality of . Q ?s (ental states as +ell. Pres,(a!ly, to acco,nt for .Q ?s (ental state AQ , +e +o,ld have to posit a (eanin"f,l representation M, Q , +hose

(eanin"f,lness +o,ld in t,rn have to !e cashed o,t in ter(s of the interpretive acts of so(e or"anis( .QQ , and so on. *he res,ltin" acco,nt +o,ld not e1plain the intentionality of (ental states in nonintentional ter(sC it co,ld acco,nt for the intentionality of a gi"en (ental state only in ter(s of another (ental state. 9 very si(ilar ar",(ent can !e "iven a"ainst acco,nts +here the 7(eanin"f,lness7 of (ental representations is to !e ,nderstood in ter(s of interpreta!ility ,nder a convention. 'or +hile lin",istic conventions 5 @$$ 5 are not the(selves (ental states, they only o!tain !y virt,e of several !ein"s havin" a shared ,nderstandin" of ho+ certain sy(!ols (ay !e ,sed. /Er, if one +ishes to refer to the (eanin" assi"n(ents of idiolects as conventions, these o!tain !eca,se one !ein" has an ,nderstandin" of ho+ certain sy(!ols (ay !e ,sed, and this ,nderstandin" co,ld, in principle, !e shared !y other lan",a"e ,sers as +ell.0 9nd it is s,rely a necessary /if not a s,fficient0 condition for this shared ,nderstandin" that the !ein"s +ho share in it !e in (ental states that are si(ilar in relevant +ays. *his, . take it, +o,ld have to !e a part of the analysis of +hat it is for a "ro,p of lan",a"e ,sers to share a lin",istic convention. B,t if this is the case, then a convention3!ased acco,nt of (eanin"f,lness of (ental representations is no !etter than an intention3!ased acco,nt, since it too ,lti(ately depends ,pon all,sions to intentional states and hence ends in the sa(e kind of circ,larity and re"ress.

;.<0 T)e Interpretability9in9prin3iple Version

*here is, ho+ever, a fo,rth (odality ,nder +hich (arker tokens can !e said to !e si"nifiers: na(ely, interpreta!ility3in3principle. *he .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion of C*2 e1plained the se(antic and intentional properties of an or"anis( . ?s co"nitive state A Hsay, its (eanin" /that0 , H!y positin" a (ental representation M, and a f,nctional relation + s,ch that /10 M, is interpreta!le3in3 principle as (eanin" /that0 , , and /@0 . is in relation + to M, . *+o coe1tensive definitions for se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle +ere offered in chapter J. Ene definition +as fra(ed in ter(s of co,nterfact,als a!o,t conventions, the other in ter(s of the availa!ility of a (appin" fro( (arker types to interpretations. Since the for(er definition see(s clearly to risk r,nnin" afo,l of the sa(e pro!le(s a!o,t convention that have already !een disc,ssed, +e (ay ass,(e that the second definition holds (ore pro(ise for C*2. *his definition +as for(,lated as follo+s: /SJQ 0: 9n o!8ect O (ay !e said to !e interpretable!in!principle as signifying 8 iff /10 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as a token of so(e (arker type T , /@0 there is a (appin" M fro( a set of (arker types incl,din" T to a set of interpretations incl,din" 8 , and /#0 M(T) S 8 . 5 @$1 5 6o+ se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle is a very per(issive notion. ;"ery o!8ect is interpreta!le3in3 principle as a token of a (arker type /i.e., can, in principle, !e ,sed as a (arker if so(eone co(es ,p +ith a s,ita!le (arker convention0C and every (arker type can !e (apped onto +hatever interpretation

one likes. *herefore, for every o!8ect 5 and every interpretation , , 5 is interpreta!le3in3principle as (eanin" /that0 , . Ene thin" that sho,ld !e noted a!o,t the notion of interpreta!ility3in3principle is that the connection it (akes !et+een (arker types and interpretations is not dependent either ,pon act,ally e1istin" se(antic conventions or ,pon acts of a,thorin" or interpretation. 9nd this has the si"nificant conse=,ence that the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion of 'odor?s acco,nt of co"nitive states is i((,ne to the criticis(s raised a"ainst the .nterpreta!ility, 9,thorin" .ntention, and 9ct,al .nterpretation :ersions. *o p,t it differently, the lo"ical for( of attri!,tions of se(antic interpreta!ility3 in3principle does not involve references to se(antic conventions or (eanin"3!esto+in" acts, +ith the conse=,ence that the precedin" ar",(ents do not sho+ that the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion s,ffers fro( the pernicio,s kind of concept,al dependence that threatened the other versions. . shall ar",e, ho+ever, that the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion is also incapa!le of s,pplyin" a via!le acco,nt of the se(antic and intentional properties of co"nitive states. .n partic,lar, there are fo,r distinct pro!le(s. 'irst, s,ch an acco,nt +o,ld i(p,te to (ental states se(antic and intentional properties +hich they clearly do not have. Second, it +o,ld i(p,te the kinds of se(antic and intentional properties that +e ascri!e to (ental states to o!8ects that clearly do not have the(. *hird, it +o,ld not provide an e3planation of the intentionality and 7se(anticity7 of (ental states. 9nd, finally, the definition of !ein" interpreta!le3in3principle as a si"nifier token pres,pposes !ein" interpreta!le3in3 principle as a (arker tokenHand that does involve conventions in a +ay that leads to circ,larity and re"ress, al!eit not at the se(antic level.

;.<.&0 Spurious $roperties

*he first pro!le( +ith the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion is that it +o,ld i(p,te to (ental states intentional and se(antic properties that they clearly do not have. 9ccordin" to the .nterpreta!ility3in3 Principle :ersion, for e1a(ple, an or"anis( . can have a !elief a!o,t >incoln 8,st in case /10 . is in the ri"ht f,nctional relationship + to a (ental representation M, , and /@0 M, is interpreta!le3in3 principle as !ein" a!o,t 5 @$@ 5 >incoln. 6o+ if there are (ental representations, it is s,rely the case that any (ental representation M, is interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t >incolnHthe definition of interpreta!ility3in3principle is so per(issive as to ass,re that. B,t !y the sa(e token, the definition is also so !road as to ass,re that M, is interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t the n,(!er t+o, the Cri(ean War, or anythin" else. .ndeed, for e"ery interpretation ,, M, is interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t , . 6o+ s,ppose that /as the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion s,""ests0 . ?s !ein" in relation + to M, , in con8,nction +ith M, ?s !ein" interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t , , are conditions 8ointly s,fficient for ascri!in" to . a !elief a!o,t , . .f this is the case, then . has !eliefs a!o,t e"erything, since each (arker token M, is interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t everythin". .ndeed, each of . ?s !eliefs is a!o,t everythin", since each !elief involves a (arker token that is interpreta!le3in3principle as !ein" a!o,t everythin". S,rely this conse=,ence of the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion is intolera!le. *here (ay so(eti(es !e so(e ,nclarity, va",eness, and a(!i",ity as to 8,st +hat o,r !eliefs are a!o,t, !,t not to the e1tent that each of o,r !eliefs is a!o,t everythin"N 9nd as this is a conse=,ence of the

.nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion, so (,ch the +orse for that acco,nt.

;.<.20 Stran*e Co*ni8ers

;ependin" ,pon ho+ one takes the +ords ?or"anis(? and ?f,nctional relation? in 'odor?s characteriDation of co"nitive states, there (ay !e a second pro!le( for this version of the acco,nt as +ell. 'or one (i"ht +ell think that 'odor does not really (ean to restrict his characteriDation of co"nitive states to organisms . *o do so in the conte1t of a computational theory of (ind +o,ld !e very odd indeedN Perhaps the +ord ?syste(? co,ld ,sef,lly replace the +ord ?or"anis(?. 9nd one (i"ht +ell think that the +ord ?f,nctional? is ,sed in the sense that it is ,sed +hen one classifies di"ital (achines accordin" to their (achine ta!lesHthat is, accordin" to f,nctional relationships !et+een c,rrent states and s,cceedin" states. B,t if one does interpret 'odor in this +ay, it +o,ld see( that all kinds of thin"s t,rn o,t to !e co"niDers. 'or, accordin" to 'odor?s acco,nt, it +o,ld see( that if /a 0 t+o syste(s are f,nctionally e=,ivalent, and /b 0 their sy(!ols have the sa(e se(antic and intentional properties, and /c 0 they are in e=,ivalent f,nctional relations to their sy(!ols, then it sho,ld 5 @$# 5 !e the case that they are in the sa(e co"nitive states. B,t consider the follo+in" pro!le(. .f a co"niDer is descri!a!le in p,rely for(al ter(s, it must !e the case that there is an a!stract for(al syste( that is f,nctionally e=,ivalent to the co"niDer. 9nd if interpreta!ility3in3principle is all that is needed to "ive a sy(!ol syste( the kind of intentional and se(antic properties that (ental states en8oy, then it +o,ld see( to !e the case that a!stract sy(!ol syste(s have intentional and se(antic properties in 8,st the sa(e senses that (ental states do. Pres,(a!ly this +o,ld !e eno,"h to incl,de s,ch syste(s in the class of co"niDers. B,t s,rely s,ch a concl,sion +o,ld !e a!s,rd.

;.<.40 #a3/ o+ ECplanatory !or3e

)ven if +e co,ld avoid these pro!le(s, it is diffic,lt to see ho+ the interpreta!ility3in3principle of a (arker token co,ld s,pply anythin" in the +ay of an e3planation of the (eanin"f,lness or intentionality of a (ental state. S,ppose that . +ish to kno+ +hy a partic,lar state of Aones?s is a!o,t >incoln and so(eone tells (e that it is !eca,se Aones is in a partic,lar f,nctional relationship to a (ental representation, and that representation is a!o,t >incoln. . then ask, 7Why is that (ental representation a!o,t >incolnK7 .f the reply is (erely, 7Beca,se there is a (appin" fro( that representation?s (arker type to >incoln,7 then . have not received an e1planation. )ven if . !elieve everythin" that . have !een told, . still don?t kno+ +hy Aones?s co"nitive state is a!o,t >incoln. Pointin" to the availa!ility of a (appin" 8,st does not s,pply the kind of infor(ation that +o,ld ans+er (y =,estion. /.t is not clear 8,st +hat 'ould s,pply the ri"ht kind of infor(ation, !,t it is clear that this reply does not.0

;.<.60 T)e Reappearan3e o+ Conventionality at t)e 1ar/er #evel

'inally, ,pon closer inspection, it t,rns o,t that the notion of se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle is not so free of convention as at first it see(ed. *he connection !et+een (arker types and interpretations

is, indeed, not conventional. B,t for an o!8ect to !e interpreta!le3in3principle as a si"nifier, it (,st first !e interpreta!le3in3principle as a mar er, and the e1pression ?interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker? does have a conventional aspect. 'or re(e(!er ho+ this notion +as defined: 5 @$J 5 /2J0: 9n o!8ect O is said to !e interpretable!in!principle as a to en of a mar er type T iff /10 a lin",istic co((,nity co,ld, in principle, e(ploy conventions "overnin" a (arker type T s,ch that any o!8ect havin" any pattern ,i< , :T, 1, . . . , ,n U +o,ld !e s,ita!le to co,nt as a token of type T , /@0 5 has a pattern p 8, and /#0 p8<, . 9n o!8ect?s !ein" interpreta!le3in3principle as a (arker is not 8,st a (atter of there !ein" a (appin" fro( one o!8ect to another, !eca,se (arker types are necessarily conventional. *he very notion of a (arker is convention3dependent. *his has the conse=,ence that the .nterpreta!ility3in3Principle :ersion does involve concept,al dependence ,pon co"nitive notions. 'or +hile attri!,tions of se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle do not involve tacit ascriptions of semantic conventions or intentions, they do involve tacit reference to mar er conventions. 9ny e1planation of (arker conventions, like se(antic conventions, +o,ld have to involve reference to a co((,nity of sy(!ol ,sers +ho share a certain ,nderstandin" a!o,t (arker types and tokenin". 9nd this shared ,nderstandin" (,st s,rely consist in lar"e (eas,re in the (e(!ers of the co((,nity !ein" in relevantly si(ilar (ental states. B,t if this is so, the .nterpreta!ility3in3 Principle :ersion is !o,nd to end in the sa(e kind of circ,larity and re"ress as the other versions.

;.'0 "ppli3ability o+ T)ese Criti3isms

6o+ one (i"ht +ish to pa,se at this point and consider ho+ directly these criticis(s affect C*2. 'or one (i"ht !e te(pted to think that in developin" (y ter(inolo"y . have set ,p a stra+ (an that (y ar",(ents are s,ited to knockin" do+n. 'odor and other proponents of C*2 ackno+led"e, after all, that there are differences !et+een the fashions in +hich disc,rsive sy(!ols, (ental states, and (ental representations have se(antic properties. .n partic,lar, they ackno+led"e that disc,rsive sy(!ols "et their se(antic properties fro( those of the (ental states they are ,sed to e1press. *hey si(ply deny that the sa(e is tr,e of those sy(!ols that serve as (ental representations. .t (i"ht therefore see( that, in likenin" (ental representations to disc,rsive sy(!ols, . a( ar3 5 @$% 5 ",in" a"ainst a position that 'odor and others have e1plicitly re8ected. B,t this is not the case. What 'odor clai(s is that disc,rsive sy(!ols, (ental states, and (ental representations all have the sa(e kind of se(antic properties, !,t co(e !y the( in different +ays. . have sho+n that (ental states and disc,rsive sy(!ols do not have the sa(e kind of se(antic properties, and that it is not clear +hat sort of 7se(antic properties7 (ental representations are clai(ed to have. Here . have !een concerned +ith e1a(inin" +hat happens if yo, s,ppose that (ental representations have the sa(e kinds of se(antic propertiesHna(ely, se(iotic3se(antic propertiesH

that sy(!ols (ay ,ncontroversially !e said to have. 9ll of the pro!le(s that have arisen here arise p,rely fro( sayin" that the kinds of se(antic properties representations have are se(iotic3se(antic properties. *he pro!le(s do not arise !eca,se of so(e additional feat,re havin" to do +ith ho+ they came !y those propertiesC the pro!le(s arise !eca,se of the kinds of properties that are !ein" attri!,ted, and +hat they are ,sed to e1plain. *he position (ay !e easily knocked do+n, !,t it is not the one that 'odor clearly re8ects, and is in fact the (ost pla,si!le interpretation of the a(!i",o,s characteriDation that he offers.

;.&E0 T>o $ossible Responses

6o+ there are t+o kinds of o!8ections that one (i"ht e1pect to hear at this point, each !ased on key differences !et+een co(p,ters and paper or other passive (edia for the stora"e of sy(!ols. 'irst, co(p,ters do not 8,st store individ,al sy(!ols. *he co(p,ter?s sensitivity to the syntactic feat,res of the sy(!ols and its a!ility to "enerate ne+ representations in accordance +ith for(al r,les allo+ the overall syste( to encode the se(antic relationships !et+een the sy(!ols as +ell. .f +e ask ho+ a sy(!ol3(anip,lation process in a co(p,ter co,nts as, say, addition, +e (,st not talk (erely a!o,t the interpretations sanctioned !y pro"ra((ers and ,sers, +e (,st say so(ethin" a!o,t the process that "oes on in the co(p,ter as +ell. .t looks as tho,"h the co(p,ter has its o+n contri!,tion to (ake to+ards the sy(!ols it stores havin" se(antic val,es. .f there is (ore to tell a!o,t the (eanin"f,lness of sy(!ols in co(p,ters than can !e told in ter(s of the conventions and intentions of lan",a"e ,sers, the o!8ections offered here (ay not ,nderc,t C*2?s acco,nt of se(antics and intentionality entirely. Second, co(p,ters can !e e=,ipped +ith transd,cers that allo+ the( to !e sensitive to feat,res of their environ(ents. 9s a conse=,ence, it is 5 @$6 5 possi!le for the tokenin" of sy(!ols in a co(p,ter to covary in re",lar +ays +ith the presence of partic,lar kinds of o!8ects and circ,(stances in their environ(ents. .f a co(p,ter is a!le to detect +hen a li"ht has !een t,rned on, and inscri!es 7*he li"ht has !een t,rned on7 +henever it detects the li"ht !ein" t,rned on, one (i"ht !e inclined to think that s,ch an inscription is about the li"ht !ein" t,rned on in a +ay that a rando( inscription of the sa(e sy(!ol strin" +o,ld not !e a!o,t the li"ht !ein" t,rned on. Ene (i"ht +ell think that the co(p,ter paradi"( s,""ests (ore than a se(iotic e1planation of the intentionality of (ental states: if the (ind is a co(p,ter, and co(p,ters can s,pport ca,sal covariations !et+een o!8ects in the environ(ent and the tokenin" of sy(!ols of partic,lar types, this kind of ca,sal covariation (i"ht +ell for( an i(portant part of the e1planation of the intentionality of (ental states as +ell. .n the follo+in" sections, . propose to ar",e that neither of these lines of ar",(ent can resc,e C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality. *he first line of ar",(ent fails !eca,se one can talk a!o,t the syste(aticity of (eanin" relationships in a sy(!ol syste( only if one can first talk a!o,t assi"n(ents of interpretationsC syste(aticity contri!,tes nothin" to the assi"n(ent of interpretations. *he second line of ar",(ent (ay present an interestin" theory, !,t that theory is si(ply not C*2?s representational acco,nt of the se(antics and intentionality of co"nitive states. 2oreover, as +e shall see shortly, there are additional pro!le(s for C*2 that arise fro( the fact that synta3, as +ell as semantics, is conventional in character.

;.&&0 Systemati3 Symbol 1anipulation

Co(p,ters do not (erely store isolated, inert sy(!ols. .ndeed, (,ch of +hat see(s special a!o,t the co(p,ter paradi"( is to !e fo,nd in the +ay thin"s in a co(p,ter are interrelated in the ri"ht +aysH the +ay se(antic relationships are (irrored !y syntactic relationships, for e1a(ple, and the +ay that derivations of sy(!ol str,ct,res are tr,th3preservin" ,nder the ri"ht interpretation. 2oreover, the syste(atic nat,re of the co(p,ter places constraints on ho+ the sy(!ols (ay sensi!ly !e interpreted: the lar"er and (ore co(ple1 the representational syste(, the fe+er reasona!le interpretations are availa!le. Ha,"eland, for e1a(ple, +rites that 7an interpretation that renders a syste(?s theore(s as tr,ths is a rare and special discovery,7 and that there is a sense in +hich 7rando( interpretation sche(es don?t really "ive interpretations at all7 /Ha,"eland 19&1: @-0. 5 @$- 5 9nd this is, in lar"e (eas,re, correct: interpretation sche(es do take on special interest +hen they have certain properties: nota!ly, /a 0 +hen they (ap (arker strin"s onto true propositions, /b 0 +hen the interpretation of a (arker coincides +ith so(ethin" that is causally related to the tokenin" of that (arker, and /c 0 +hen the interpretation sche(e 7(akes sense7 of the overall perfor(ance of the syste(Hthat is, +hen it "ives it an interpretation that (akes it see( as tho,"h it is actin" rationally.L1M .t is i(portant, ho+ever, to distin",ish the =,estion of ho+ a sy(!ol syste( is suitable for bearing a partic,lar interpretation fro( the =,estion of ho' the symbols may be said to bear any interpretation in the first place . .n the case of a co(p,ter, the ans+er to the first =,estion has t+o parts: /a 0 a specification of ho+ all of the se(antic relationships necessary for a "iven interpretation sche(e are reflected in syntactic relationships, and /b 0 an acco,nt of ho+ the for(al r,les that allo+ tr,th3and sense3preservin" derivations are linked to ca,sal re",larities thro,"h the f,nctional architect,re of the (achine. *he ans+er to the second =,estionHthe =,estion of ho+ the sy(!ols (ay !e said to !ear any interpretation at allHhas little or nothin" to do +ith co(p,ters per se. *he =,estion of ho+ it is that sy(!ols (ay !e said to have (eanin"s is a =,estion a!o,t se(iotics, and the ans+er +o,ld have to !e "iven in ter(s of the interpreta!ility of the sy(!ols ,nder conventions, the intentions and interpretations of the sy(!ol ,sers /pro"ra((ers, desi"ners, and ,sers of co(p,ters0, and the fact that sy(!ols are interpreta!le3in3principle as !earin" any interpretation +hatever. 9s +e sa+ in chapter %, the f,nctional analysis of the co(p,ter and its se(iotic interpretation are t+o distinct iss,es: "ettin" the( to coincide is a virt,e of "ood pro"ra((in" and not a f,nda(ental a1io( of se(iotics. What +e sa+ in that chapter +as that se(iotic analysis and (ath3f,nctional analysis +ere distinct enterprises. *hat res,lt still holds "ood here. B,t one (ay also ar",e a stron"er point: na(ely, that the f,nctional or"aniDation of the co(p,ter as a sy(!ol (anip,lator cannot ,ni=,ely deter(ine a sin"le privile"ed se(iotic3se(antic interpretation sche(e for sy(!ols in a co(p,ter, eitherHand hence e"en the combination of semiotic!semantics 'ith functionally describable symbol manipulation cannot e1plain the ,ni=,e (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. >et ,s reconsider the e1a(ple of a co(p,ter pro"ra((ed to perfor( operations correspondin" to addition. *he co(p,ter has three stora"e locationsH9, B, and CHeach of +hich !ears a strin" of !inary di"its representin" an inte"er ,nder so(e interpretation sche(e I . *he co(p,ter 5 @$& 5 proceeds !y sa(plin" the sy(!ols present at 9 and B and ca,sin" the tokenin" of a sy(!ol at C. *he

co(p,ter is so desi"ned and pro"ra((ed that /10 the syntactic patterns of the sy(!ols present at 9 and B +ill deter(ine +hat sy(!ol is tokened at C, and /@0 the sy(!ol that is tokened at C +ill !e (apped !y interpretation sche(e I onto the n,(!er that is the s,( of the n,(!ers represented /,nder I 0 !y the sy(!ols stored at 9 and B. 6o+ if +e ask, 7What (akes this syste( s,ch that one (i"ht sensi!ly refer to +hat it does as additionK7 part of o,r ans+er +ill have to (ake reference to the feat,res of the syste( as a system . We (i"ht e1press +hat is needed in al"e!raic ter(s: if +e take the set % of !inary strin"s that can !e present at 9, B, and C, and the f,nction 7 that (aps pairs of strin"s fo,nd at 9 and B onto the strin" that they +o,ld ca,se to !e tokened at C, +e (ay speak of a "ro,p ? +hich is defined in ter(s of the ele(ents of % and the f,nction 7 .L@M 6o+ for this syste( to !e s,ita!le for s,pportin" 7co(p,ter addition7 of so(e s,!set of the inte"ers, there (,st !e so(e s,!set of the inte"ers S s,ch that the "ro,p consistin" of the ele(ents of S ,nder the operation of addition is iso(orphic to ? . *hat is, there (,st !e a one3to3one (appin" M !et+een !inary strin"s in % and inte"ers in S s,ch that for any three !inary strin"s b1 , b@ , and b # in % , and any three inte"ers i1 , i @ , and i# in S , if M /b1 0 S i1 , M /b@ 0 S i@ , and M /b# 0 S i # , then 7 /b1 ,b@ 0 S b# iff i 1 R i@ S i# . Er, to p,t thin"s =,ite infor(ally, +hat is needed to render a co(p,ter syste( s,ita!le for s,pportin" an interpretation is that it have a f,nctional description that has the ri"ht for(al properties for s,pportin" that interpretation. 6o+ +hen a co(p,ter has a partic,lar f,nctional descriptionHsay, that descri!ed !y "ro,p 4 descri!ed a!oveHthis renders it s,ita!le for s,pportin" any number of interpretations. .f, for e1a(ple, its operations are s,ita!le to !e interpreted as addition over the first n nat,ral n,(!ers, they are e=,ally s,ita!le to !e interpreted as addition over the first n even nat,ral n,(!ers, or indeed as addition over any set of n,(!ers "enerated !y takin" the first n nat,ral n,(!ers and (,ltiplyin" each !y the sa(e real n,(!er r . 9nd it is s,ita!le for !earin" any n,(!er of other interpretations as +ellHso(e p,rely (athe(atical, so(e referrin" to syste(s involvin" concrete o!8ects. B,t the s,ita!ility of a syste( as a +hole for !earin" an interpretation sche(e that interprets !oth the sy(!ols and the operations does not f,lly deter(ine +hat the sy(!ols or the operations (ay !e said to (ean. 9 syste(?s for(al properties render it interpreta!le3in3principle ,nder a n,(!er of interpretation sche(es, !,t confer pride of place ,pon none of the(. *his does C*2 no "ood: if the for(al properties of co"nitive 5 @$9 5 processes render the overall syste( interpreta!le3in3principle ,nder several different interpretation sche(es, !,t do not ,ni=,ely pick o,t the ri"ht interpretations for each representation, then se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle of (ental representations, even +hen applied to a +hole syste( of s,ch representations, is not s,fficient to acco,nt for the se(antic properties of co"nitive states. 9nd it is definitely the case that the for(al properties of co"nitive processes 'ould leave the( interpreta!le3in3 principle in (ore than one +ay, !eca,se it can !e sho+n that any for(al syste( has (ore than one consistent interpretation. .n partic,lar, each has an interpretation in n,(!er theory. .f se(antic interpreta!ility3in3principle of (ental representations 'ere a s,fficient condition for the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states, it +o,ld t,rn o,t that all of o,r tho,"hts are a!o,t n,(!ers, since any syste( of co(p,tations over (ental representations +o,ld have a consistent n,(!er3theoretic interpretation. B,t it is clearly not the case that all of o,r tho,"hts are a!o,t n,(!ersC therefore there (,st !e (ore involved in the (eanin"f,lness and intentionality of co"nitive states than the availa!ility of a consistent syste(atic interpretation of (ental representations. 9nd hence the fact that co(p,ters (anip,late sy(!ols does not save C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality if the 7se(antic7 properties attri!,ted to (ental representations are se(iotic3se(antic properties.

;.&20 Causality and Computers

*here is, ho+ever, a second aven,e of response to the ar",(ents offered in this chapter. *his response starts fro( the o!servation that co(p,ters (ay !e e=,ipped +ith transd,cers in s,ch a fashion as to render the( sensitive to environ(ental sti(,li. What it is for a co(p,ter to !e 7sensitive to environ(ental sti(,li7 is for it to !e so confi",red that it +ill dependa!ly prod,ce partic,lar sy(!ol tokens +hen partic,lar conditions are present or +hen partic,lar events take place in its environ(ent. *hat is, a co(p,ter is sensitive to environ(ental sti(,li to the e1tent that there are re",lar, ca,sal covariations !et+een conditions or events in the co(p,ter?s environ(ent and tokenin"s of partic,lar sy(!ol types in the co(p,ter: for e1a(ple, that it +rites o,t 7Hello, Professor Pe(!rooke7 +henever Professor Pe(!rooke enters the roo(, or tokens 72y, !,t it?s dark in hereN7 +henever the li"hts "o o,t. 6o+ it is very te(ptin" to ass,(e that an inscription of 72y, !,t it?s dark in hereN7 that is prod,ced 'hene"er the li"hts "o o,t and because the li"hts have "one o,t is about the li"hts "oin" o,t, and in a fashion 5 @1$ 5 that an inscription of the sa(e sy(!ol strin" that +as not ca,sally connected to the li"hts "oin" o,t +o,ld not !e a!o,t the li"hts "oin" o,t. Ge",lar, ca,sal covariations +ith o!8ects and conditions in the environ(ent, (oreover, are pla,si!ly a factor relevant to the intentionality of (ental states as +ell: it see(s pla,si!le that part of +hat it is for (y tho,"hts to !e a!o,t >incoln is for there to !e a ca,sal chain stretchin" !ack to >incoln and incl,din" (y tho,"hts. .t is little +onder, then, that advocates of the co(p,ter (etaphor in philosophy of (ind have often "ravitated to+ards an application of the co(p,ter paradi"( that involves a ca,sal co(ponentHin partic,lar, to+ards acco,nts that e1plain the intentionality and se(antics of (ental representations in ter(s of re",lar, ca,sal covariations !et+een o!8ects or conditions in the environ(ent and the tokenin" of sy(!ols of partic,lar types. 'odor, for e1a(ple, has placed increasin" e(phasis on ca,sality. .n The :anguage of Thought, p,!lished in 19-%, his e(phasis +as co(pletely ,pon the 7internal code7 of intrinsically (eanin"f,l representations in a lan",a"e of tho,"ht. .n 72ethodolo"ical Solipsis(,7 p,!lished in 19&$, the e(phasis +as still ,pon (eanin"f,l representations, !,t 'odor hinted at the possi!ility of a nat,ralistic theory of reference /tho,"h he ar",es that this possi!ility is d,!io,s, and says nothin" a!o,t a nat,ralistic theory of (eanin"0. ,sychosemantics /19&-0 and A Theory of Content /199$0 incl,de the artic,lation of a sketch of a se(antic theory that still acco,nts for the intentionality and se(antics of co"nitive states in ter(s of the intentionality and se(antics of (ental representations, !,t also tries to "ro,nd se(antics and intentionality in ca,sal relationships +ith o!8ects in the environ(ent. B,t ho+ is this s,pposed to resc,e the acco,nt of intentionalityK *he ans+er, it see(s, depends ,pon the relationship of the ca,sal co(ponent of the theory to the representational co(ponent. . see fo,r !asic possi!ilities for s,ch a relationship. 'irst, ca,sal re",larity 8,st adds an additional condition for intentionality over and a!ove +hat is s,pplied !y the representational acco,nt. Second, the se(iotic3 intentional properties of (ental representations are still s,pposed to provide an ade=,ate acco,nt of the (ental3se(antic properties of co"nitive states, !,t ca,sal re",larities, in t,rn, are s,pposed to provide an acco,nt of the se(iotic3se(antic properties of (ental representations. *hird, the ca,sal acco,nt is s,pposed to provide an alternative definition for se(antic ter(s as applied to (ental representations. 'o,rth, se(antic ter(s are applied in so(e ,ndisclosed +ay to (ental representations, and these 7se(antic7 properties are still s,pposed to e1plain the (ental3se(antic properties

5 @11 5 of co"nitive states, +hile ca,sal re",larities are s,pposed to e1plain these 7se(antic7 properties. *hese fo,r possi!ilities +ill no+ !e e1a(ined in (ore detail.

;.&2.&0 Representation $lus Causation

*he first possi!ility is +hat Aohn Searle /19&$0 has called 7the Go!ot Geply7 to his ar",(ents a"ainst co(p,tational theories of (ind. 9ccordin" to the Go!ot Geply, co(p,tation over sy(!ols does not, indeed, provide a s,fficient condition for the ascription of co"nitive states, (eanin", or intentionality. B,t if the co(p,ter +ere, additionally, connected to the e1ternal +orld in the ri"ht +ays !y (eans of transd,cers, then it +o,ld provide a (odel for ,nderstandin" co"nition. En this acco,nt, the se(iotic3 se(antic properties of (ental representations +o,ld not !e s,fficient to acco,nt for the intentionality and se(antics of co"nitive states, !eca,se part of +hat is involved in a !elief !ein" a!o,t >incoln is that it !e part of a ca,sal chain involvin" >incoln. B,t if one +ere to provide an acco,nt of co"nitive states that all,ded !oth to the (eanin"f,lness of (ental representations and to the ca,sal chains involved in the for(ation of !eliefs /and other co"nitive states0, this pro!le( co,ld !e re(edied. 6o+ it (i"ht +ell !e possi!le to for(,late a ,sef,l theory alon" these lines. 9s Searle has pointed o,t, ho+ever, this is no lon"er the sa(e theory that +as ori"inally offered as part of C*2. *he ori"inal clai( +as that 7the o!8ects of propositional attit,des are sy(!ols /specifically, (ental representations0 and that this fact acco,nts for their intensionality and se(anticity7 /'odor 19&1: @J0. B,t if one (,st, additionally, appeal to ca,sal factors to e1plain the 7intensionality and se(anticity7 of co"nitive states, then one cannot acco,nt for it (erely !y sayin" that the o!8ects of the attit,des are sy(!ols. .f an acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antics of co"nitive states needs to appeal to (ental representations and needs, additionally, to appeal to ca,sality, then C*2?s acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antics of co"nitive states is not via!le.

;.&2.20 Causality ECplains Semanti3s

6o+ +hile so(e +riters certainly endorse the Go!ot Geply, it is not clear that this is 'odor?s strate"y +hen he appeals to ca,sality in e1plainin" se(antics. .n ,sychosemantics, for e1a(ple, 'odor invokes ca,sality at 5 @1@ 5 the level of e1plainin" the se(antic properties of (ental representations. .n so doin", he appears to !e takin" ,p a pro8ect at the point at +hich he left it off at the end of the introd,ction to +e,resentations . .n that introd,ction, 'odor "ives +hat is perhaps his !est artic,lation of C*2 and ho+ it e(er"ed. He also "ive a clear indication of +hat it is intended to acco(plish: 7.t does see( clear +hat +e +ant fro( a philosophical acco,nt of the propositional attit,des. At a minimum, 'e 'ant to e3plain ho' it is that propositional attitudes ha"e semantic properties 7 /'odor 19&1: 1&, e(phasis added0. Pet if C*2 is s,pposed to provide an e1planation of 7ho+ it is that propositional attit,des have se(antic properties,7 it is c,rio,s that 'odor +rites on the last pa"e of that introd,ction, 7What +e need no+ is a se(antic theory for (ental representationsC a theory of ho+ (ental representations represent. S,ch a theory . do not have7 /i!id., #10. 6o+ one +ay of readin" this passa"e +o,ld !e as an ad(ission that C*2 has

th,s far failed (isera!ly at (eetin" 'odor?s o+n standards for a theory of co"nitive states. S,ch, ho+ever, is hardly the tone of the chapter in +hich it occ,rs. 9 !etter +ay of (akin" sense of this passa"e, and of 'odor?s s,!se=,ent treat(ent of the se(antics of representations in ,sychosemantics +o,ld !e as follo+s: 'odor !elieves that C*2?s representational acco,nt of the se(antic and intentional properties of co"nitive states is s,ccessf,l. Sayin" that co"nitive states involve (eanin"f,l representations is eno,"h to e1plain the (eanin"f,lness of co"nitive states: for e1a(ple, sayin" that Aones is in a partic,lar f,nctional relation to a (ental representation that (eans 7>oN a horseN7 is all that needs to !e said to provide an e1planation of +hy Aones !elieves that there is a horse !efore hi(. B,t this still leaves an additional pro!le(: ho+ do +e acco,nt for the se(antic and intentional properties of the representationsB Why does the (ental representation (ean 7>oN a horseN7K 9nd it is here that 'odor +ishes to "ive a ca,sal ans+erHto the =,estion of +hy (ental representations that (ean 7horse7 do, in fact, refer to horses. 'odor?s initial, 7cr,de7 for(,lation of s,ch a theory is that 7a pla,si!le s,fficient condition for ?9?s to e1press A is that it?s no(olo"ically necessary that /10 every instance of A ca,ses a token of ?9?C and /@0 only instances of A ca,se tokens of ?9?7 /'odor 19&-: 1@60. So it so,nds as tho,"h 'odor +ishes to (ake t+o separate clai(s: the first is 8,st the representational acco,nt of the se(antics and intentionality of co"nitive states: na(ely, that co"nitive states 7inherit7 their se(antic and intentional properties fro( the representations they involve. *he second clai( is a ca,sal theory of the se(antic properties of (en3 5 @1# 5 tal representations. /'odor "ives only a sketch of s,ch a theory, and repeatedly voices do,!ts that a f,ll3 fled"ed se(antic theory can !e developed.0 .n order to assess these clai(s, it is a!sol,tely cr,cial at this point to deter(ine /10 8,st +hat 'odor means +hen he ,ses +ords like ?intentional? and ?(eanin"f,l? of (ental representations, and /@0 ho+ the +ay 'odor picks o,t se(antic properties is related to his ca,sal acco,nt of se(antics. *he first and (ost o!vio,s possi!ility is that 'odor is applyin" se(antic ter(s to sy(!ols in the ordinary +ay: that is, ,sin" the( to attri!,te se(iotic3se(antic properties. *his sho,ld, . think, !e the defa,lt readin" of e1pressions like ?(eanin"f,l sy(!ol?. 9fter all, if so(eone says he is !rin"in" yo, 7healthy food7 and prod,ces a live fish in a !o+l, yo, (i"ht +ell think that he is ,sin" lan",a"e in a pec,liar (annerHa reaction that +ill not !e chan"ed if he e1plains, 7Well, he is food, after all, and yo,?ve never seen a fish that +as in !etter healthN7 Si(ilarly, if so(eone says that co"nitive states are (eanin"f,l /referential, intentional, etc.0 !eca,se they involve 7(eanin"f,l sy(!ols,7 yo, (ay reasona!ly e1pect that he is ,sin" ?(eanin"f,l? in the +ay it is ,s,ally ,sed +hen it (odifies ?sy(!ol?Hand that, if he is not ,sin" it in that +ay, he sho,ld specify 8,st ho+ he is ,sin" it. 'odor and other advocates of C*2 "ive no +arnin" that they are ,sin" se(antic ter(inolo"y in nonstandard +ays, so it is reasona!le to !e"in !y ass,(in" that the standard /i.e., se(iotic0 ,sa"e is in force. .f the standard ,sa"e is in force, ho+ever, C*2?s representational acco,nt of se(antics and intentionality for co"nitive states fails, for reasons descri!ed earlier in this chapter. 9nd if the ca,sal acco,nt of the se(antics of (ental representations is s,pposed to !e independent fro( the representational acco,nt of the se(antics of co"nitive states, it can do nothin" to !olster it. .f the se(iotic3se(antic properties of representations cannot e1plain the (ental3se(antic properties of co"nitive states, it does not (atter, for p,rposes of an acco,nt of the intentionality of co"nitive states, ho+ the representations "et their se(iotic3se(antic properties. Chate"er the ans+er to that =,estion (i"ht !e, it does the representational acco,nt of the intentionality of co"nitive states no "ood.

;.&2.40 Causal and

t)er ,e+initions o+ Semanti3 Terms

*he final t+o candidates for the relationship !et+een representation and ca,sal covariation do not really fall +ithin the p,rvie+ of this chapter. Ene candidate +as the vie+ that the ,sa"es of ter(s s,ch as ?(ean3 5 @1J 5 in"f,l? and ?se(antic? sho,ld si(ply !e defined in ca,sal ter(s. *he other +as the vie+ that the ,sa"es of se(antic ter(s as applied to (ental representations do not denote se(iotic3 or (ental3se(antic properties, and are not to !e defined in ca,sal ter(s, !,t that they denote properties that can !e e1plained thro,"h ca,sal covariations. .n either case, the theory offered does not e1plain the (ental3 se(antic properties of co"nitive states in ter(s of the se(iotic3se(antic properties of representations. Whether s,ch variations on C*2 can provide any solace +ill !e e1a(ined in the ne1t t+o chapters.

;.&40 Compositionality and t)e Conventionality o+ SyntaC

*h,s far +e have sho+n syste(atic disre"ard for one feat,re of C*2 +hich is in so(e +ays =,ite i(portantHna(ely, that it is s,pposed to s,pport se(antic co(positionality. *he representations envisioned !y 'odor and other advocates of C*2, after all, are not all le1ical pri(itivesC the vast (a8ority of the( are (ade ,p of a lar"e n,(!er of pri(itives co(!ined +ith the help of syntactically !ased co(positional r,les. *he se(antic properties of co(ple1 representations are e1plained !y /a 0 the se(antic properties of their ato(ic constit,ents, in co(!ination +ith /b 0 the co(positional r,les !y +hich those constit,ents are co(!ined. 6o+ this feat,re of C*2 leaves the theory no !etter off +ith respect to the o!8ections already raised: if the 7se(antic properties7 are of the conventional or intentional kind, the fact that co(positionality is thro+n in does not resc,e the theory fro( circ,larity or re"ress. Any taint of se(antic convention or intention is eno,"h to sc,ttle the +hole pro8ect. B,t the appeal to co(positionality does introd,ce a f,rther pro!le(: accordin" to the analysis of sy(!ols in chapter J, synta1, as +ell as se(antics, is conventional in nat,re, and hence there is a second kind of conventionality involved in C*2 for the co(ple1 representations, ass,(in" that C*2?s advocates (ean !y 7synta17 +hat one nor(ally (eans +hen speakin" of the syntactic properties of sy(!ols. *he pro!le( (i"ht !e looked at in the follo+in" +ay. .n order for there to !e co(positionality, it is not eno,"h to have assi"n(ents of interpretations to pri(itive ele(ents and r,les "overnin" le"al concatenations of sy(!ols. *hat is, it is not eno,"h to assi"n 7>incoln7 to A and 7;o,"las7 to % and say that there is a le"al sche(a for e1pressions ?3 3V3y ? into +hich A and % (ay !e s,!stit,ted. *here (,st, additionally, !e a r,le that +ill f,rther deter(ine that ?A V % ? co,nts as (eanin" 7>in3 5 @1% 5 coln and ;o,"las7 and not, say, 7>incoln, ;o,"las7 /a list0, 7>incoln is "reater than ;o,"las,7 or 7>incoln or ;o,"las.7 Se(antic co(positionality re=,ires a notion of synta1 that consists in (ore than r,les for le"al concatenationHit re=,ires a notion of synta1 that delivers co(ple1 se(antic val,es. /.t is +orth notin" that most of the ti(e +hen +e speak of syntactic cate"ories +e speak of the( in +ays that have so(e se(antic overtones: for e1a(ple, 7co,nt no,n,7 7dependent cla,se,7 7con8,nction

sy(!ol,7 or even 7Boolean operator.70 B,t this is =,ite pro!le(atic if +e try to (ove fro( nat,ral lan",a"es /+here conventions are a co((onplace0 to an inner lan",a"e of tho,"ht, +here conventions are an e(!arrass(ent. 'or the only +ay +e have of "eneratin" co(ple1 symbolic (eanin"s fro( ato(ic (eanin"s is thro,"h syntactically !ased co(!inatorial r,les, and the only s,ch r,les +e have are conventional r,les. B,t if the (eanin"s of (ental states are dependent ,pon syntactic convention, the old pro!le(s a!o,t se(antic conventions reassert the(selves at a different level: in !rief, /10 the act,al e1istence of s,ch conventions is e1tre(ely d,!io,s, /@0 their e1istence is in fact irrelevant to the (eanin"s of o,r (ental states, and /#0 positin" s,ch conventions +o,ld lead to a re"ress of (ental states. *his pro!le( +ith the conventionality of synta1, (oreover, in so(e +ays poses a pro!le( for C*2 (ore f,nda(ental than that posed !y the conventionality of se(iotic3se(antic properties. 9s +e shall see in the ne1t chapter, one (i"ht try to resc,e C*2 !y developin" a notion of 7se(antic properties7 for representations that is not convention3 or intention3dependent. So(e +o,ld say +e already have s,ch notions. .t is far less clear, ho+ever, that +e do have or could have an acco,nt of co(positionality that +as not ,lti(ately !ased ,pon conventions, and hence this o!8ection +ill rec,r for the versions of C*2 to !e e1plored in chapters & and 9.

;.&60 Semioti39Semanti3s and t)e Vindi3ation o+ Intentional $sy3)olo*y

Up to this point, this chapter has !een directed to+ards sho+in" that C*2 cannot provide an acco,nt of the intentionality and se(antics of (ental states !ased ,pon the se(iotic3se(antic properties of (ental representations. What a!o,t C*2?s other clai(Hthe clai( to provide a vindication of intentional psycholo"yK *here is a fairly strai"htfor+ard case that, !eca,se the se(iotic3se(antic version of 'odor?s acco,nt cannot e1plain the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states, it proves 5 @16 5 ,na!le to vindicate intentional psycholo"y as +ell. *he reason this is so is that the vindication of intentional psycholo"y t,rns o,t to !e dependent ,pon an acco,nt of intentionality in +ays that (ay th,s far have !een ,nforeseen. *o see ho+ this is so, consider ho+ C*2 +as s,pposed to provide a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. What the co(p,ter paradi"( +as s,pposed to sho+ +as that the se(antic properties of sy(!ols in co(p,ters can !e coordinated +ith their ca,sal po+ers !eca,se se(antics can !e coordinated +ith synta1, and in a co(p,ter a sy(!ol?s syntactic type deter(ines its ca,sal role. .f +e ass,(e that the (ind is a co(p,ter, and that the se(antic properties of (ental states are inherited fro( the sy(!ols +hich it ,ses in its co(p,tations, then e1planations cast in intentional voca!,lary can /in principle0 pick o,t psycholo"ical cate"ories in a fashion that "ets the ca,sal re",larities ri"ht. *his line of reasonin", ho+ever, is co(pro(ised !y the analysis of sy(!ols and se(antics in chapters J and %. 'or +hat +e need for a vindication of intentional psycholo"y is an acco,nt of ho+ the (ental3 se(antic properties of (ental states can !e coordinated +ith ca,sal properties, and the (ost that a co(p,tational theory of (ind can "ive ,s, it see(s, is an acco,nt of ho+ the se(iotic3se(antic properties of (ental representations can !e coordinated +ith ca,sal po+ers. Ef co,rse, if one co,ld acco,nt for the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states in ter(s of the se(iotic3se(antic properties of (ental representations, the vindication of intentional psycholo"y co,ld proceed intact. B,t +hat +e have seen in this chapter is that one cannot acco,nt for (ental3se(antic properties in this fashion. So

even if there are (ental representations +ith se(iotic3se(antic properties, and even if the se(iotic3 se(antic properties of these are coordinated +ith ca,sal roles, this does intentional psycholo"y little "ood, !eca,se it does not e1plain ho+ the kind of se(antic properties ascri!ed to !eliefs and desires can link ,p +ith ca,sal re",larities.

;.&70 Summary
C*2 clai(s that the (ind is a co(p,ter that operates ,pon (ental representations that are sy(!ols havin" se(antic properties. B,t +e have seen that the e1pression ?se(antic properties? is a(!i",o,s. .n order to see 8,st +hat C*2 (i"ht !e clai(in", and ho+ this (i"ht or (i"ht not s,pport the clai(s to e1plainin" intentionality and to vindicatin" intentionality psycholo"y, it +as necessary to s,!stit,te different senses of ?se(antics? into C*2?s acco,nt. Here +e have seen that neither the acco,nt 5 @1- 5 of intentionality nor the vindication of intentional psycholo"y can proceed ,pon the ass,(ptions that the 7se(antic properties7 ascri!ed to (ental representations are (ental3se(antic or se(iotic3se(antic properties. /*hat is, they cannot proceed ,pon the ass,(ption that they are the kinds of se(antic properties ascri!ed to (ental states or to sy(!ols, respectively.0 .n the follo+in" chapter +e shall e1a(ine +hether s,!stit,tin" so(e other sense of the e1pression ?se(antic property? (i"ht prod,ce (ore hopef,l res,lts. 5 @1& 5

C)apter Ei*)t0 Causal and Stipulative ,e+initions o+ Semanti3 Terms

.n the last chapter +e !e"an a pro8ect of assessin" C*2?s clai(s /10 that the intentionality of (ental states can !e e1plained in ter(s of the se(antic properties of (ental representations, and /@0 that this +ill also provide a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. *he !asic clai( a!o,t the intentionality and se(antics of (ental states that +e set o,t to e1a(ine +as this: 2ental state M has se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has se(antic property , . .n li"ht of the distinction !et+een (ental3 and se(iotic3se(antic properties, ho+ever, it +as necessary to revise this sche(a for e1plainin" intentionality in the follo+in" fashion: 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has YYYYYYY3se(antic property 5 . *he lac,na in cla,se /@0 is to !e filled !y so(e (ore specific kind of 7se(antic property.7 What +as sho+n in the last chapter is that fillin" the

5 @19 5 lac,na in a +ay that offers an acco,nt in ter(s of (ental3se(antic properties or se(iotic3se(antic properties +ill not provide an e1planation of the intentionality of the (ental. 9nd indeed, the pro!le(s arise not only at the level of the conventionality of se(iotic meaning, !,t also involve pro!le(s +ith the conventionality of synta3 and even of (ere mar er!hood . .f ?sy(!ol? (eans mar er, then it +ill not do to speak of the (ind as a (anip,lator of sy(!ols, since that +o,ld a"ain involve ,s in a re"ress of conventions. Ho+ever, +e sa+ in chapter % that it is possi!le to develop the notion of a (achine3co,nter in a fashion that see(s to provide everythin" C*2 sho,ld re=,ire +hen it speaks of 7sy(!ols7 and 7synta1,7 yet in a +ay that avoids co((it(ents to conventions or intentions. .t is therefore necessary to consider +hether C*2 (i"ht provide a via!le acco,nt of the (ind if +e interpret the talk a!o,t 7sy(!ols7 not as talk a!o,t mar ers and counters, !,t as talk a!o,t machine!counters . .n order to do this, ho+ever, +e +ill re=,ire (ore than the notion of a (achine3co,nter. *hat notion (i"ht !e s,fficient for an artic,lation of the kind of 7syntactic theory of (ind7 advocated !y Stich /19&#0, !,t an interpretation of C*2 +ill also re=,ire an interpretation of talk a!o,t the 7se(antic properties of the sy(!ols7 that s,pple(ents the notion of a (achine3co,nter +ith a nonconventional notion of se(antics. .n this chapter, therefore, . shall present a +ay of interpretin" C*2 that avoids pro!le(s of the conventionality of sy(!ols and synta1 !y interpretin" C*2 as dealin" +ith (achine3co,nters. 9dditionally, . shall e1plore t+o +ays of interpretin" C*2?s ,se of se(antic voca!,lary as e1pressin" so(e set of properties distinct fro( se(iotic3se(antic properties. 'irst, . shall e1plore the possi!ility of treatin" 'odor?s ca,sal covariance theory of content as a stip,lative definition of his ,se of se(antic ter(s as applied to (ental representations. *hen, . shall e1plore the possi!ility of treatin" the se(antic voca!,lary in C*2 as a tr,ly theoretical voca!,lary, +hose (eanin" is deter(ined !y its ,se in the theory.

<.&0 T)e Vo3abulary o+ Computation in CT1

.n order to reinterpret C*2?s clai(s so as to avoid the taint of convention and intention, +e (,st find alternative interpretations for its talk a!o,t 7sy(!ols,7 7synta1,7 and 7se(antics.7 Chapter % already "ives ,s a pla,si!le alternative constr,al of talk a!o,t 7sy(!ols7 and 7synta1.7 'or there +e sa+ that so(e +riters in co(p,ter science, like 6e+ell and Si(on /19-%0, see(ed i(plicitly to ,se the +ord ?sy(!ol? to denote 5 @@$ 5 not the convention3!ased se(iotic typin", !,t a typin" tied directly to the f,nctional analysis of the (achine. *here +e s,""ested the technical notion of a (achine3co,nter in an effort to (ake this ,sa"e (ore precise. *he notion of a (achine3co,nter +as developed as follo+s: 9 tokenin" of a (achine3co,nter of type T (ay !e said to e1ist in C at ti(e t iff /10 C is a di"ital co(ponent of a f,nctionally descri!a!le syste( 7 , /@0 C has a finite n,(!er of deter(ina!le states S :Ts1 , . . . , sn U s,ch that C ?s ca,sal contri!,tion to the f,nctionin" of 7 is deter(ined !y +hich (e(!er of S di"ital co(ponent C is in, /#0 (achine3co,nter type T is constit,ted !y C ?s !ein" in state si , +here s1 <S , and

/J0 C is in state s i at t . . ar",ed in that chapter that this f,nctional typin" is =,ite distinct fro( the se(iotic typin" and can serve neither as an analysis nor as an e1planation of it. B,t at the sa(e ti(e, this kind of f,nctional typin" (ay provide 8,st +hat C*2 needs to escape fro( the conventionality of (arkers and co,nters. .t is th,s only nat,ral to try to reconstr,ct C*2 in a +ay that s,!stit,tes an ,no!8ectiona!le notion like that of a (achine3co,nter for the pro!le(atic convention3laden notions of 7sy(!ol7 and 7synta1.7 .nt,itively, the idea is that the (ind has a f,nctional analysis in ter(s of a (achine ta!le, and there are thin"s in the (ind or !rain that /a 0 appear as (achine3co,nters in s,ch an analysis and /b 0 covary +ith content. We are th,s ready to reconstr,ct C*2 in a +ay that avoids the pro!le(s of conventionality e1plored in earlier chapters.

<.20 " -o>dleri8ed Version o+ CT1

.n :ictorian )n"land, there +as a practice of prod,cin" editions of !ooks that had !een e1p,r"ated of all o!8ectiona!le (aterial /references to ankles and other s,ch scandalo,s license0. S,ch !ooks +ere said to have !een 7!o+dleriDed,7 the +ord derivin" fro( the na(e of one of the nota!le practitioners of s,ch editin". What . propose to do here is to descri!e a !o+dleriDed version of C*2HBC*2H+hich avoids o!8ectiona!le s,""estions that 2G3se(antic properties are (ental3 or se(iotic3se(antic properties !y characteriDin" 2G3se(antics in ter(s of 5 @@1 5 the +ork that the se(antic voca!,lary see(s to do in C*2. 6ote that it is C*2 in partic,lar that is ,nder disc,ssion, and not co"nitive theories "enerally: the operative (eanin" of se(antic ter(inolo"y (i"ht t,rn o,t =,ite differently if one +ere disc,ssin" other philosophical theories /e."., those of ;ennett, Searle, or ;retske0 or if one +ere disc,ssin" partic,lar e(pirical +ork /say, that of Col!y, 6e+ell and Si(on, 2arr, or 4ross!er"0. So, +itho,t tro,!leso(e references to sy(!ols and se(antics, it see(s to (e that +hat C*2 +ishes to clai( is the follo+in": %o'dleri*ed Computational Theory of Mind (%CTM) /B10 *he (ind?s co"nitive aspects are f,nctionally descri!a!le in the for( of so(ethin" like a (achine ta!le. /B@0 *his f,nctional description is s,ch that /a 0 attit,des are descri!ed !y f,nctions, and /b 0 contents are associated +ith local (achine states. Call these cogniti"e counters . /B#0 *hese co"nitive co,nters are physically instantia!le. /BJ0 .ntentional states are realiDed thro,"h relationships !et+een the co"niDer and co"nitive co,nters. .n partic,lar, for every attit,de A and every content C of an or"anis( . , there is a f,nctional relation + and a co"nitive co,nter type T s,ch that . takes attit,de A LC M 8,st in case . is in relation + to a tokenin" of T . BC*2 (ay !e re"arded as a special for( of (achine f,nctionalis(. .t is stron"er than mere (achine f,nctionalis( in several respects. Condition /B10 asserts that (achine f,nctionalis( is applica!le to

(inds. Condition /B@0 "oes !eyond this to (ake special clai(s a!o,t ho+ the attit,de3content distinction +ill !e cashed o,t in f,nctional ter(s. 2achine f,nctionalis(, in and of itself, does not (ake s,ch a clai( and indeed does not even ass,re that the attit,de3content distinction 'ill !e reflected in a psycholo"ical (achine ta!le. 6or does (achine f,nctionalis( clai(, as /BJ0 does, that thin"s that are picked o,t !y f,nctional description +ill also play a role in deter(inin" content. .f +e interpret co(p,tational psycholo"y in the +ay s,""ested !y BC*2, the notion of r,le3"overned sy(!ol (anip,lation !eco(es (ore of a ",idin" (etaphor for psycholo"y than the literal sense of the theory. Co"nitive co,nters are not 7sy(!ols7 in the ordinary se(iotic sense, 5 @@@ 5 !,t (achine3co,ntersHspecifically, they are the thin"s that occ,py the slots of (achine3co,nters in the f,nctional analysis of thought, as opposed to other f,nctionally descri!a!le syste(s. En this vie+, the (ind shares +ith co(p,tin" (achines the fact that the salient description of their ca,sal re",larities is (ath3f,nctional in character, !,t differs in that +hat is descri!ed !y the f,nction ta!le is not a set of entities +ith conventional se(iotic interpretations !,tH+ell, so(ethin" else +hose tr,e nat,re is not yet kno+n. .f the theory is ri"ht, +e presently kno+ co"nitive co,nters and their 2G3se(antic properties only thro,"h the role they play in contri!,tin" to so(ethin" +e kno+ (ore i((ediately: na(ely, intentional states and (ental processes. . sho,ld stress that . vie+ this as a reconstr,ction of C*2 and not as an atte(pt to ",ess at +hat its advocates had in (ind. . think it see(s clear that 'odor and others have "enerally ass,(ed the ,nivocity of the se(antic voca!,lary, and like+ise ass,(ed that there +as a perfectly ordinary ,sa"e of ter(s like ?se(antics? and ?(eanin"? that co,ld !e e1tended to (ental representations. .n li"ht of the pro!le(s that have already !een sho+n to e1ist for that ass,(ption, . a( no+ tryin" to see +hether there is an alternative interpretation of co(p,tational psycholo"y that can avoid the pro!le(s already raised. /. a( tryin" to p,ll C*2?s chestn,ts o,t of the fire, if yo, +ill.0 .n the end, . think there are t+o very different =,estions here: one a!o,t the via!ility of co(p,tational psycholo"y as an empirical research programme, and another a!o,t the distinctively philosophical claims C*2?s advocates have (ade a!o,t e1plainin" intentionality and vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y. .n the re(ainder of this chapter, . shall try to ar",e that BC*2 does not allo+ the co(p,tationalist to (ake "ood on these philosophical clai(s. .n the final section of the !ook . shall e1plore an alternative approach to co(p,tational psycholo"y that li!erates its e(pirical research a"enda fro( ,nnecessary philosophical !a""a"e.

<.40 T)e $roblem o+ Semanti3s

.f s,ccessf,l, the analysis of se(antic properties in chapters J thro,"h 6 has sho+n several i(portant thin"s a!o,t the task of e1plainin" the intentionality of (ental states. 'irst, +hat +e call 7(eanin"7 and 7intentionality7 +ith respect to (ental states are not e1actly the sa(e properties +e ascri!e to sy(!ols +hen +e ,se those +ords. Second, the properties +e ascri!e to sy(!ols are concept,ally dependent ,pon those +e ascri!e to (ental states. 9nd hence, as sho+n in chapter -, +e can3 5 @@# 5 not ,se se(iotic3se(antics to e1plain (ental3se(antics. 2ost artic,lations of C*2 have see(ed to ass,(e, on the contrary, that the se(antic voca!,lary can !e predicated ,nivocally to (ental states,

overt sy(!ols, and (ental representations, and that the se(antic properties of representations co,ld !e ,sed to e1plain those of (ental states thro,"h 7property inheritance7 !eca,se they are, after all, the very sa(e properties and need only !e passed ,p the e1planatory chain. .n li"ht of the previo,s chapters, this direct e1planation of intentionality !y +ay of 7property3 inheritance7 see(s to !e closed off. .f the 7se(antic properties7 of (ental representations are se(iotic3 se(antic properties, they cannot e1plain (ental se(antics. 9nd if they are not se(iotic3se(antic properties, it re(ains to !e seen +hat kind of properties they are s,pposed to !e. Ho+ever, it is possi!le that +aitin" in the +in"s there is a +ay to finesse this pro!le( the +ay +e +ere a!le to finesse pro!le(s of synta1 and sy(!olhood !y +ay of the notion of a (achine3co,nter. *hat is, perhaps the se(antic voca!,lary e1presses so(e distinct kind of property +hen applied to (ental representations, and this kind of property "ives ,s +hat +e need to e1plain the intentionality of (ental states. Ef co,rse, +e do not have a theory ,ntil +e spell o,t +hat these properties are s,pposed to !e. B,t +e (ay for the (eanti(e indicate the fact that they are s,pposed to !e distinct fro( (ental3se(antic properties and se(iotic3se(antic properties !y indicatin" the( as 72G3se(antic7 properties. /*hat is, the kind of properties e1pressed !y the se(antic voca!,lary +hen applied to (ental representations.0 Pres,(a!ly, +hat is co((on to (ental3, se(iotic3, and 2G3se(antic properties is that in each case there is a relationship !et+een the typin" of the theory /i.e., types of intentional content, types of sy(!ol, types of representation0 and a set of o!8ects or states of affairs. .ndeed, pres,(a!ly the (athe(atically red,ced a!stractions of the three sets of properties are in very close correspondence: since +ords are e1pressions of tho,"hts, +ords3to3+orld (appin"s +ill closely track tho,"ht3to3+orld (appin"s. 9nd if there are indeed (ental representations, pres,(a!ly representation3to3+orld (appin"s +ill closely parallel tho,"ht3to3+orld (appin"s. /.n the ideal case, they +ill !e iso(orphic. B,t it is likely that the relationship falls short of iso(orphis( d,e to factors s,ch as t+o +ords e1pressin" the sa(e concept or one +ord a(!i",o,sly e1pressin" (,ltiple concepts.0 9s +e have seen, this does not add ,p to a 7co((on7 notion of se(antics, !eca,se the nat,re of the relations e1pressed !y the (appin"s is different in each case. /'or e1a(ple, in the se(iotic 5 @@J 5 case it is essentially conventional, +hile in the case of intentional states it is not.0 *he pro!le( for a co(p,tational3representational se(antics is to artic,late a theory of 2G3se(antics that can (eet the follo+in" desiderata: /10 the 2G3se(antic typin" of representations (,st correspond to their (achine3co,nter typin"C /@0 the relation that esta!lishes a (appin" !et+een representation types and their 2G3(eanin"s (,st !e s,ch as to !e a!le to e1plain the presence of the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental statesC and /#0 the (appin" so esta!lished for representations (,st have a proper de"ree of correspondence to that of the se(antics of mental states . .n this chapter . shall e1plore t+o possi!le +ays of developin" s,ch a se(antics for (ental representations. 'irst . shall e1a(ine the possi!ility of ,sin" 'odor?s Ca,sal Covariation *heory of .ntentionality /CC*.0 as a stipulati"e definition of the properties e1pressed !y the se(antic voca!,lary +hen it is applied to representations. >ater, . shall t,rn to the possi!ility that the se(antic voca!,lary, as applied to representations, is a tr,e theoretical voca!,lary, +here the (eanin"s of the ter(s are deter(ined !y the e1planatory role they play in the theories in +hich they are introd,ced.

<.60 " Stipulative Re3onstru3tion o+ t)e Semanti3 Vo3abulary

.f, then, the se(antic voca!,lary is !ein" ,sed in so(e novel +ay +hen applied to (ental representations, ho+ is it !ein" ,sedK Ene reasona!le hypothesis +o,ld !e to s,ppose that it is !ein" ,sed to s,pply precisely the properties that 'odor ascri!es to representations in his o+n theory of representational se(anticsHthe so3called 7ca,sal covariation acco,nt.7 *o repeat, . do not think that 'odor +as in fact offerin" his se(antic theory as a stip,lative definition of the se(antic voca!,lary. B,t if the theory +orks, and the se(antic voca!,lary is in need of definition for (ental representations, it see(s a via!le candidate. 9nd if, as a stip,lative definition, it is incapa!le of (eetin" the desiderata listed a!ove, it +ill fail as a nondefinitional acco,nt as +ell, and so ti(e spent criti=,in" it +ill not !e ill spent. Consider, then, +hat 'odor has to say a!o,t the nat,re of the 7se(antic properties7 of (ental representations. What 'odor provides !y +ay of an 7acco,nt of se(antic properties for (ental representations7 5 @@% 5 is +hat he calls a 7ca,sal theory of content.7 *he (otivation for this pro8ect 'odor e1plains as follo+s: 7We +o,ld have lar"ely solved the nat,raliDation pro!le( for propositional3attit,de psycholo"y if +e +ere a!le to say, in nonintentional and nonse(antic idio(, +hat it is for a pri(itive sy(!ol of 2entalese to have a certain interpretation in a certain conte1t7 /'odor 19&-: 9&0. *his theory of 7+hat it is for a pri(itive sy(!ol of 2entalese to have a certain interpretation7 has !eco(e pro"ressively less va",e in 'odor?s +ork fro( 19&1 to 199$, and 'odor descri!es the 199$ theory as providin" an acco,nt of content havin" 7the for( of a physicalist, ato(istic, and p,tatively s,fficient condition for a predicate to e1press a property7 /'odor 199$: %@0. *he 199$ version of this acco,nt reads as follo+s: . clai( that 7O7 (eans O if: 1. ?Os ca,se 7O7s? is a la+. @. So(e 7O7s are act,ally ca,sed !y Os. #. 'or all P not S O, if Ps =,a Ps act,ally ca,se 7O7s, then Ps causing 7O7s is asy((etrically dependent on Os causing 7O7s. /i!id., 1@10 .t is clear fro( the conte1t that this acco,nt is s,pposed to apply only to (ental representationsHthat is, to !e restricted to the cases +here 7O7 indicates a (ental representationHso +e +o,ld see( to !e on the ri"ht track in lookin" for an e1plication of ?(eans? as it is ,sed of (ental representations. >et ,s, then, ass,(e that this acco,nt of 2G3se(antic properties can serve as a stip,lative definition of the se(antic voca!,lary as applied to (ental representations. We (ay no+ s,!stit,te this acco,nt of 2G3se(antic properties into C*2?s !asic sche(a for e1plainin" the intentionality of the (ental, o!tainin" a Ca,sal Covariation *heory of .ntentionality /CC*.0: Causal Co"ariation Theory of Intentionality (CCTI) 2ental state M (ental3(eans , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ of type + , /@a 0 , s ca,se + s is a la+, /@b 0 so(e + s are act,ally ca,sed !y , s, and

/@c 0 for all 19, , if 1 s =,a 1 s act,ally ca,se + s, then 1 s ca,sin" + s is asy((etrically dependent ,pon , s ca,sin" + s. 5 @@6 5 We shall no+ e1a(ine the prospects of CC*.. CC*. is pri(arily intended as an e1a(ination of the conse=,ences of ,sin" ca,sal covariation as a stip,lative definition of the se(antic voca!,lary. B,t of co,rse CC*. co,ld serve as a state(ent of 'odor?s acco,nt of (ental se(antics "enerally, +hether cla,ses /@a 0 thro,"h /@c 0 are s,pplied !y definition of se(antic ter(s or (erely provide necessary and s,fficient conditions. *he assess(ent that follo+s, therefore, is of interest as a criti=,e of ca,sal covariation acco,nts, +hether they involve stip,lative definition or not. .n +hat follo+s, . shall ar",e that this approach to savin" C*2 has several serio,s pro!le(s. 'irst, even if CC*. provides a consistent theory that avoids the pro!le(s of interpretational se(antics, it does not inherit (,ch of the pers,asive force ori"inally (arshaled for C*2, !eca,se (,ch of that pers,asive force t,rned ,pon the int,ition that the same 7se(antic properties7 co,ld !e attri!,ted ,nivocally to (ental states, disc,rsive sy(!ols, and (ental representations. With this ass,(ption already ,nderc,t, it is inc,(!ent ,pon C*2?s advocates to (ake clear the connection !et+een 2G3 se(antics and (ental3se(antics in s,ch a fashion that the for(er can acco,nt for the latterHthat is, to sho+ ho+ ca,sal covariation is even a potential e1plainer of (ental3se(antics. *his leads to a (ore f,nda(ental pro!le( a!o,t the ca,sal covariation acco,nt. What this acco,nt see(s to atte(pt to provide is a de(arcation acco,nt for (eanin" assi"n(ents, not an e1planation of (eanin"f,lness. *hat is, it see(s to correlate partic,lar (ental3(eanin"s /i.e., (eanin"35 as opposed to (eanin"38 0 +ith certain nat,ralistic conditions, on the ass,(ption that there is some (eanin" there in the first place. What it does not do is e1plain +hy (ental states are (eanin"f,l /rather than (eanin"less 0 in the first place, or ho+ ca,sal covariation is s,pposed to ,nder+rite this fact. .n this re"ard CC*. co(pares ,nfavora!ly to so(e other nat,ralistic acco,nts, !,t there is also reason to do,!t that any nat,ralistic acco,nt co,ld provide an ade=,ate acco,nt of the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states. 'inally, at !est, CC*. +o,ld provide an acco,nt of the se(antic pri(itives of (entalese, leavin" the se(antic val,es of co(ple1 e1pressions to !e "enerated thro,"h co(positional r,les. B,t as +e have seen in the last chapter, the only +ay +e kno+ of to provide syntactically !ased co(positionality is thro,"h con"entions . So even if CC*. s,cceeds in escapin" the pro!le(s of conventionality at the level of se(antic pri(itives, those pro!le(s +ill still reassert the(selves as soon as one is concerned +ith e1pressions +hose se(antic properties are d,e to co(positionality. 5 @@- 5

<.6.&0 W)at Is .ained and #ost in Causal ,e+inition

Before (akin" a direct frontal assa,lt ,pon the Ca,sal Covariation *heory of .ntentionality, it +ill !e ,sef,l first to !eco(e clear a!o,t +hat is "ained and +hat is lost in adoptin" the strate"y of definin" se(antic ter(inolo"y for (ental representations in ca,sal ter(s. *here see( to !e three i((ediate !enefits. 'irst, +e have clarified the se(antic ter(inolo"y to a point +here +e see( in little dan"er of r,nnin" afo,l of the a(!i",ities in the se(antic voca!,lary. Second, +e are no lon"er in the e(!arrassin" position of not !ein" a!le to say +hat kinds of properties it is that are s,pposed to e1plain the intentionality of (ental states. *hird, +e have done so in a fashion that (ana"es to avoid all of the a+f,l pro!le(s a!o,t conventions and intentions that pla",ed the se(iotic3se(antic acco,nt. .f ca,sal

covariation is not free fro( the taint of the conventional, it is hard to i(a"ine +hat +o,ld !e. En the other hand, it is i(portant to see that a tr,ly vast a(o,nt of the persuasi"e stren"th of the case for C*2 is lost in the transition. *he case for C*2, after all, traded in lar"e (eas,re ,pon the int,ition that tho,"hts and sy(!ols have so(e i(portant thin"s in co((on: na(ely, !oth are (eanin"f,l, !oth represent, !oth have se(antic properties. *his is a point to +hich 'odor repeatedly ret,rns. *o take a fe+ sa(ple =,otes: Propositional attit,des inherit their se(antic properties fro( those of the (ental representations that f,nction as their o!8ects. /'odor 19&1: @60 2ental states like !elievin" and desirin" aren?t . . . the only thin"s that represent. *he other o!vio,s candidates are symbols . /'odor 19&-: 1i0 Sy(!ols and (ental states !oth have representational content . 9nd nothin" else does that !elon"s to the ca,sal order: not rocks, or +or(s or trees or spiral ne!,lae. /'odor 19&-: 1i0 *he reasonin" that is s,pposed to follo+ fro( s,ch clai(s see(s =,ite clear: co(p,tational e1planation in co"nitive psycholo"y (akes it see( necessary to s,ppose that there are (ental sy(!ols over +hich the co(p,tations are perfor(ed. Perhaps these have se(antic properties as +ell, and it is the se(antic properties of the sy(!ols that acco,nt for the se(antic properties of the intentional states in +hich they are involved. *hat is, one is inclined to ar",e as follo+s: /10 2ental states have se(antic properties. /@0 Sy(!ols have se(antic properties. 5 @@& 5 D /#0 *here is a class of propertiesHse(antic propertiesHshared !y sy(!ols and (ental states. so, /J0 .t see(s reasona!le to try to red,ce the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states to that of the representations they involve. Ef co,rse, in li"ht of the distinctions (ade in chapters J and %, the ar",(ent fro( /10 and /@0 to /#0 is e1posed as a paralo"is(, since ?have se(antic properties? (,st (ean so(ethin" different in the t+o conte1ts /(ental3 and se(iotic3se(antic properties, respectively0. 9nd +itho,t /#0, there is (,ch less reason to !e inclined to+ards /J0. .t is one thin" to clai( /90 M ental state M has property , !eca,se M involves M+ , and M+ has , . .t is =,ite another to clai( /B0 2ental state M has property , !eca,se M involves M+ , and M+ has 5 , and O9, . /B0 re=,ires a kind of ar",(entation !eyond +hat is re=,ired for /90, !eca,se /90 proceeds on the ass,(ption that property , is in the pict,re to !e"in +ith, and 8,st has to e1plain ho+ M "ets it. /B0, on the other hand, has to do so(ethin" (ore: it has to e1plain ho+ , /in this case, (ental3intentionality0 co(es into the pict,re at all . 9s for the =,otes cited a!ove, their interpretation !eco(es =,ite pro!le(atic once they are read in li"ht of the distinctions !et+een different kinds of 7se(antic properties.7 .f +ords like ?se(antic?, ?represent?, and ?content? are defined in ca,sal ter(s for (ental representations, clai(s s,ch as these are irrelevant at !est. 9t +orst they are lo"ical ho+lers. *o say, for e1a(ple, that 7(ental states and /disc,rsive0 sy(!ols !oth represent7 is perilo,sly (isleadin". 9s +e have seen in chapter J, there is no one

property called 7representin"7 that is shared !y (ental states and disc,rsive sy(!ols. .nstead, ?represent?, like other se(antic ter(s, (eans different thin"s +hen applied to sy(!ols and to (ental states. So the sentence, 7(ental states and sy(!ols !oth represent7 involves fa,lty parallelis( that dis",ises a (ore !asic concept,al error. *he sa(e kind of pro!le( occ,rs if +e 8,st define ?refers to? or ?(eans? in ca,sal ter(s for (ental representations. S,ppose 7(ental represen3 5 @@9 5 tation M, refers to , 7 8,st means 7(ental representation M, +as ca,sed !y , in fashion 7 .7 What, then, +o,ld +e (ake of s,ch assertions as 7propositional attit,des inherit their se(antic properties fro( those of the representations that serve as their o!8ects7K *his assertion, like the clai( that (ental states and sy(!ols 7!oth represent,7 is perilo,sly (isleadin". 'or the clai( i(plies that there is so(e set of properties called 7se(antic properties7 that are ascri!ed !oth to (ental states and to (ental representations. .f the 7se(antic properties7 ascri!ed to (ental representations are defined in ca,sal ter(s, ho+ever, the se(antic properties ascri!ed to (ental states (,st !e defined in ca,sal ter(s as +ell, if they are to !e the sa(e properties. B,t s,rely this is not so. When +e say that Aones is thinkin" a!o,t >incoln, +hat +e (ean is s,rely not precisely that he stands in a partic,lar ca,sal relation to >incoln. We certainly (ean nothin" of this kind +hen +e say that Aones is thinkin" a!o,t unicorns or numbers . So if +e define se(antic ter(s applied to (ental representations in ca,sal ter(s, it is (isleadin" to speak of the 7inheritance7 of se(antic properties: s,ch properties as (i"ht !e conferred ,pon (ental states !y representations are not the sa(e properties that are possessed !y the (ental representations the(selves. 9nd s,ch ar",(ents for C*2 as depend ,pon a "en,ine inheritance of the same 7se(antic properties7 t,rn o,t to !e fallacio,s. 9 si(ilar pro!le( can !e (ade for C*2?s atte(pt to vindicate intentional psycholo"y. *he strate"y for the vindication +as to sho+, on the !asis of the co(p,ter paradi"(, that the post,lation of (ental representations co,ld provide a +ay of coordinatin" the se(antic properties of (ental states +ith the ca,sal roles they play in tho,"ht processes. S,ch an ar",(ent (i"ht !e for(,lated as follo+s: Argument @/10 2ental states are relations to (ental representations. /@0 2ental representations have syntactic and se(antic properties. /#0 *he syntactic properties of (ental representations deter(ine their ca,sal po+ers. /J0 9ll se(antic distinctions !et+een representations are preserved syntactically. D /%0 *he semantic properties of representations are coordinated +ith ca,sal po+ers /#,J0. 5 @#$ 5 /60 *he se(antic properties of (ental states are inherited fro( the representations they involve. D /-0 *he se(antic properties of (ental states are coordinated +ith ca,sal po+ers /%,60. 6o+ consider 8,st steps /%0 thro,"h /-0. .f +e +ere to interpret the e1pression ?se(antic properties? ,nivocally, +e co,ld recast /%0 thro,"h /-0 as follo+s: Argument @G /%Z0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a representation$s se(antic properties and its ca,sal

po+ers. /6Z0 9 mental state M has se(antic property , if and only if it involves a representation M+ that has se(antic property , . D /-Z0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a mental state$s se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. En this constr,al +e appear to have a reasona!le and valid ar",(ent. B,t consider this second constr,al, +hich is forced ,pon ,s !y the reco"nition of the ho(ony(y of se(antic ter(s: Argument @H /%Q 0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a representation?s 2G3se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. /6Q 0 9 (ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , if and only if it involves a representation M+ that has 2G3se(antic property 5 . D /-Q 0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a (ental state?s (ental3se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. *he pla,si!ility of the ded,ction to /-Q 0 depends in lar"e (eas,re ,pon the pla,si!ility of /6Q 0. *he pla,si!ility of /6Q 0, in t,rn, +ill depend ,pon +hat 2G3se(antic properties t,rn o,t to !e. B,t +hatever they (ay t,rn o,t to !e, /6Q 0 lacks so(e of the i((ediate pri(a facie appeal of /60 and /6Z0, since it depends ,pon a /contin"ent0 correlation of different kinds of properties, +hereas /60 and /6Z0 involve ascriptions of the same properties to t+o different o!8ects. *his kind of contin"ent correlation is itself in need of e1planation. *he ,pshot of these o!servations is this: if the 7se(antic properties7 5 @#1 5 of (ental representations are defined in ca,sal ter(s, the proponent of C*2 o+es ,s so(ethin" that he did not o+e ,s on the ass,(ption that the se(antic properties of (ental states +ere the very properties possessed !y (ental representations: na(ely, he o+es ,s a pla,si!le acco,nt of +hy havin" a representation M+ +ith certain 2G3se(antic properties /say, certain ca,sal connections +ith o!8ects in the environ(ent0 sho,ld !e a s,fficient condition for havin" a (ental state +ith certain (ental3 se(antic properties /say, a !elief a!o,t do"s0. *his is si"nificant !eca,se the ar",(ents "iven in favor of C*2 see( to ass,(e that the sa(e kinds of 7se(antic properties7 can !e ascri!ed indifferently to sy(!ols, (ental representations, and (ental states. B,t if one defines the se(antic ter(inolo"y that is applied to representations in ca,sal ter(s, (ost of +hat 'odor says to co((end C*2 to the reader is patently fallacio,s. .n s,((ary, then, +e (ay say that definin" 2G3se(antic properties in ter(s of ca,sal covariations allo+s ,s to avoid the (a8or pitfalls presented for earlier readin"s of C*2, !,t the case for C*2 no+ see(s (,ch +eaker than it once did. *he reason for this is that ori"inally the road fro( representations to (ental states +as a road fro( se(antics to se(antics, and the road fro( se(antics to se(antics see(ed relatively short and strai"ht. .f the 7se(antic properties7 of (ental states and representations +ere the same properties, there +o,ld !e no =,estion !,t that the latter are the sort of thin"s that could acco,nt for the presence of the for(er, !,t only a =,estion a!o,t +hether s,ch 7inheritance7 indeed takes place. En the c,rrent interpretation, ho+ever, the road fro( representations to (ental states is a road fro( ca,sal covariation to (ental3se(antics. *hat road is s,rely (,ch lon"er, and there is no

s(all =,estion a!o,t +hether the roads shall (eet at all. .t (ay !e that they are like ;o+n )ast roads: 7Pa can?t "et there fro( hereN7

<.6.20 Covariation and 1ental9Semanti3s

*he vital =,estion, then, is +hether ca,sal covariation is the ri"ht sort of notion to provide an e1planation of the se(antic properties of (ental states. . !elieve that it is not. B,t in order to see +hy it is not, it (ay prove ,sef,l to see +hat it is s,ited to doin" and ho+ that falls short of e1plainin" (ental3se(antics. .n order to do this, it +ill !e helpf,l to (ake t+o sorts of distinctions. 'irst, +e (ay distin",ish !et+een t+o sorts of acco,nts: those that provide e3planations of 'hat it is to be an 5 , and those that (erely provide criteria for the demarcation of 5 ?s fro( non35 ?s. 5 @#@ 5 Second, +e (ay distin",ish !et+een acco,nts of (eanin" assignments /i.e., distri!,tion of (eanin"s0 fro( acco,nts of (eanin"fulness . *he for(er differentiate thin"s that (ean A fro( those that (ean % , on the ass,(ption that the ite(s in =,estion (ean something# the latter e1plain +hy ite(s (ean so(ethin" rather than nothin". . shall ar",e that CC*. is s,ited at !est to providin" a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents, +hereas an acco,nt of (ental3se(antics re=,ires so(ethin" stron"er: an e1planation of (eanin"f,lness.

<.6.2.&0 ECplanation and ,emar3ation

*o !e"in +ith, let ,s distin",ish !et+een acco,nts that "ive an e3planation of +hy so(ethin" is an 5 fro( acco,nts that (erely provide a criterion for the demarcation of 5 ?s fro( non35 ?s. 9ristotle?s characteriDation of h,(ans as featherless !ipeds is an atte(pt at a de(arcation criterion. .t happens to !e a poor atte(pt, since apes, tyrannosa,rs, and pl,cked chickens are also featherless !ipeds. B,t even if h,(ans +ere, in point of fact, the only featherless !ipeds, the featherless3!iped criterion +o,ld at (ost "ive ,s a lit(,s for distin",ishin" h,(ans fro( other species. .f +hat +e +anted +as an e1planation of 'hat ma es Plato a h,(an !ein", the fact that he is a featherless !iped is clearly a non3 starter. *he pro!le( is not that de(arcation criteria can !e +ildly contin"ent, for in fact they need not !eHso(e de(arcation criteria can !e (etaphysically necessary. )ven de(arcation criteria that are (etaphysically necessary, ho+ever, can fail to !e e1planatory. 'or e1a(ple, if yo, +ant to kno+ +hat (akes a fi",re a trian"le, the ans+er had !etter !e so(ethin" like 7the fact that it has three sides.7 B,t there are descriptions that distin",ish trian"les fro( everythin" else that do not provide this infor(ation: for e1a(ple, 7si(plest ortho"onal t+o3di(ensional poly"on,7 7shape of the faces on a re",lar octahedron,7 and /+orst of all0 7Horst?s favorite "eo(etric e1a(ple.7 /*his last, of co,rse, is not (etaphysically necessary.0 .f yo, +ant to kno+ +hat (akes a fi",re a trian"le, the fact that it has the sa(e shape as one of the faces of an octahedron 8,st +ill not do as an e1planation, tho,"h it is necessary and s,fficient. *here are relationships !et+een de(arcation criteria and e1planations. Si"nificantly, thin"s that can serve as e1planations are a proper s,!set of thin"s that can serve as de(arcation criteria. En the one hand, an acco,nt that e1plains +hat it is to !e an 5 (,st also !e a!le, at least in principle, to serve as a de(arcation criterion for distin",ishin" 5 ?s fro( non35 ?s. En the other hand, the opposite is not tr,e: +e have already seen e1a(ples of de(arcation criteria that lack e1planatory po+er. 9

5 @## 5 corollary of this is that one +ay of sho+in" that so(ethin" is not an e1planation of +hat it is to !e an 5 is to sho+ that it does not even distin",ish 5 ?s fro( non35 ?s.

<.6.2.20 1eanin* "ssi*nment and 1eanin*+ulness

>et ,s f,rther distin",ish !et+een t+o aspects of acco,ntin" for a token T ?s (eanin"35 . En the one hand, one (i"ht +ant to acco,nt for +hy T (eans 5 as opposed to (eanin" so(ethin" else, treatin" it as a !ack"ro,nd ass,(ption that T can (ean something . When +e e1plain the role of partic,lar (orphe(es in deter(inin" the (eanin"s of poly(orphe(ic +ords, for e1a(ple, +e take it as a "iven that +ords can (ean so(ethin" and confine o,rselves to askin", say, ho+ vario,s sorts of affi1es interact +ith the (eanin"s of root (orphe(es. *his provides an acco,nt of +hy +ords have the partic,lar (eanin"s they have +itho,t to,chin" ,pon the =,estion of ho+ lan",a"e "ets to !e (eanin"f,l in the first place. B,t one (i"ht ask this second =,estion as +ell, and it is here that, say, G,th 2illikan?s acco,nt of tr,th and (eanin" for lan",a"es is at odds +ith acco,nts !ased on convention or speaker (eanin". S,ch acco,nts are acco,nts of (eanin"fulness rather than of (eanin" assignment .L1M Pres,(a!ly one (ay offer an acco,nt of (eanin" assi"n(ents +itho,t there!y offerin" an acco,nt of (eanin"f,lness, and vice versa.

<.6.2.40 W)y We Need an ECplanation o+ 1eanin*+ulness

6o+ +hat kind of 7acco,nt of (eanin"7 is re=,ired for (ental3se(antic properties of (ental statesK Well, if one +ants to kno+ ho+ it is that thin"s in the (ind "et to !e a!o,t thin"s in the +orld, one pres,(a!ly +ants to kno+ both ho+ tho,"hts "et to !e a!o,t particular thin"s and ho+ they "et to !e a!o,t anything at all Hthat is, one +ants acco,nts of (eanin" assi"n(ent and of (eanin"f,lness. 6o+ s,ppose f,rther that +e are interested /as C*2?s (ost nota!le advocates clearly are interested0 in a naturalistic acco,ntHone that e1plains (ental3se(antic properties on the !asis of so(e nat,ralistic properties /763properties70. Here the pro!le( of (eanin" assi"n(ent !eco(es one of associatin" partic,lar (ental3se(antic properties /e."., (eanin" 7horse70 +ith partic,lar 63properties /e."., ca,sal covariations +ith horses0. 9nd if all +e are interested in is a nat,ralistic demarcation criterion for partic,lar (ental3(eanin"s, all the 7association7 need a(o,nt to is strict correlationHso(e set of 63 properties that all and only horse3tho,"hts /as opposed to co+3tho,"hts, ,nicorn3tho,"hts, etc.0 possess. B,t if +e are interested 5 @#J 5 not (erely in a de(arcation criterion, !,t in an e1planation of +hat it is to (ental3(ean 7horse,7 o,r nat,ralistic acco,nt of (eanin" assi"n(ents needs to !e a,"(ented +ith a nat,ralistic acco,nt of (eanin"f,lness as +ell. Unless 63properties are s,fficient to e1plain (ental3(eanin"f,lness, partic,lar 63properties cannot e1plain partic,lar (ental3(eanin"s either. .f CC*. is to provide an ade=,ate acco,nt of intentionality and (ental3se(antics, then, it (,st provide an e1planation of (ental3(eanin"f,lness. . shall no+ ar",e, ho+ever, that CC*. cannot pla,si!ly !e s,pposed to do this. 9ll it can pla,si!ly !e s,pposed to do is provide a de(arcation criterion for (eanin"3assi"n(ents. . shall first ar",e that CC*. atte(pts to provide a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents, and then ar",e that it fails to do (ore than this.

<.6.40 CCTI "s a ,emar3ation Criterion +or 1eanin* "ssi*nments

*here are three (ain reasons to see CC*. as a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents. 'irst, there is a stron" tendency in the literat,re to see the task of 7fi1in" (eanin"s of representations7 as a (atter of i(posin" a s,ita!le interpretation sche(eHna(ely, one that assi"ns the ri"ht (eanin"s. Second, CC*. see(s nat,rally s,ited to providin" a de(arcation criterion of the desired sort. *hird, the !,lk of the disc,ssion of the ca,sal covariation version of C*2 has !een centered aro,nd CC*.?s success or failure at providin" a s,ccessf,l s,ch de(arcation criterion.

<.6.4.&0 ,emar3ation, Interpretation, and 1eanin* !iCation

9 reader of the co"nitive science literat,re +ill have noticed that there is a stron" tendency to vie+ the pro!le( of acco,ntin" for content of representations as one of i(posin" a coherent representational sche(e. Pylyshyn +rites, for e1a(ple, that the co(p,tational approach to the (ind involves the ass,(ption that there is a nat,ral and reasona!ly +ell3defined do(ain of =,estions that can !e ans+ered solely !y e1a(inin" /10 a canonical description of an al"orith( /or a pro"ra( in so(e s,ita!le lan",a"eH+here the latter re(ains to !e specified0, and /@0 a syste( of for(al sy(!ols /data str,ct,res, e1pressions0, together 'ith 'hat Haugeland (-IJK) calls a 0regular scheme of interpretation0 for interpreting these symbols as e3pressing the representational content of mental states /i.e., as e1pressin" +hat the !eliefs, "oals, tho,"hts, and the like are a!o,t, or +hat they represent0. . . . 6otice . . . that +e have not said anythin" a!o,t the sche(e for interpretin" the sy(!olsHfor e3ample, 5 @#% 5 'hether there is any indeterminacy in the choice of such a scheme or 'hether it can be uniquely constrained by empirical considerations /s,ch as those arisin" fro( the necessity of ca,sally relatin" representations to the environ(ent thro,"h transd,cers0. /Pylyshyn 19&$: 116, e(phasis added0 6otice t+o thin"s a!o,t this =,ote. 'irst, se(antic properties are disc,ssed in ter(s of a 7sche(e of interpretation.7 Second, the =,estion a!o,t this sche(e that see(s fore(ost in Pylyshyn?s (ind is +hether the (eanin" assi"n(ents of a "iven sche(e can !e constrained so as to !e ,ni=,e. Si(ilar iss,es arise in Ha,"eland /19&1: intro.C 19&%: chap. #0. .t see(s clear that these +riters vie+ the iss,e of findin" a se(antics for (ental representations as one of findin" a +ay to constrain the specification of an interpretation sche(e for representations so that it is ,ni=,e and so that it "ets the ca,sal relationships ri"htHthat is, their concern is for providin" an ade=,ate de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents.

<.6.4.20 T)e Suitability o+ CCTI +or ,emar3ation

CC*. also see(s +ell s,ited to providin" a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents. /Er, to !e (ore precise, it see(s s,ited to providin" a candidate for s,ch a criterion, since there is one =,estion a!o,t +hat it sets o,t to do and another a!o,t +hether it acco(plishes it.0 .t is =,ite easy to see that,

+hatever else CC*. (i"ht !e ,sed to do, it at very least p,rports to !e a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents. 'or it is set ,p to "ive s,fficient conditions, in nat,ralistic ter(s, for partic,lar (ental3(eanin"s: the (ental states that (ental3(ean , are the ones that have (ental representations that are in a relation of ca,sal covariation +ith the class of o!8ects or states of affairs desi"nated !y , . *his acco,nt (ay or (ay not !e tr,e, !,t if it is tr,e, it provides a +ay of separatin" (ental states that (ean , fro( those that (ean 1 : the for(er involve representations characteristically ca,sed !y , ?s and the latter involve representations that are characteristically ca,sed !y 1 ?s.

<.6.4.40 T)e $roblem o+ 1isrepresentation

6o+ there has !een a s,!stantial a(o,nt of disc,ssion of CC*. in the literat,re, assessin" the (erits of ca,sal covariation as a +ay of e1plainin" (ental3se(antics. What this disc,ssion see(s to center on, ho+ever, are the prospects for causal co"ariation as a 'ay of pro"iding a demarcation criterion for meaning assignments . *his provides so(e evidence that s,pports the concl,sion that this is the role that the theory is co((only re"arded as perfor(in". 5 @#6 5 *he foc,s of this disc,ssion has !een ,pon CC*.?s a!ility to acco,nt for the possi!ility of (isrepresentation. 9ccordin" to CC*., those tho,"hts are a!o,t , ?s that involve representations of a type ca,sed !y , ?s. B,t it is s,rely possi!le to have tho,"hts a!o,t , ?s that are not ca,sed !y , ?s and, +orse yet, to have tho,"hts that are a!o,t , ?s that are ca,sed !y so(ethin" other than , ?sH1 ?s, for e1a(ple. So, for e1a(ple, so(eone visitin" 9,stralia (i"ht see a din"o and say to hi(self, 7Eh, there?s a do""ie o,t !ack in the o,t!ackN7 /;in"os are not do"s, ety(olo"ically speakin".0 *his person?s tho,"ht has the content 7do",7 !,t is ca,sed !y a nondo", a din"o. 9nd it is even possi!le for this error to !e syste(atic: so(eone (i"ht al'ays (istake din"os for do"s, +rens for sparro+s, "n,s for cattle, and so on. *he pro!le( is that, accordin" to CC*., tho,"hts are s,pposed to !e a!o,t +hatever it is that is the characteristic ca,se of their representations. B,t if din"os syste(atically ca,se a to3kenin" of the sa(e kind of representation that do"s ca,se, it +o,ld see( to follo+ that +hat this kind of representation 2G3(eans is the dis8,nctive class do"3or3din"o. *his has several ,n+elco(e res,lts. 'irst, (y do"3tho,"hts t,rn o,t to (ean not 7do",7 !,t 7do" or din"o.7 /9nd this =,ite ,n!ekno+nst to (e and contrary to +hat . have ass,(ed all alon".0 Second, it +o,ld see( to !e i(possi!le to (isrepresent a 1 as a , , since the fact that 1 ?s ca,se the sa(e representations as , ?s ,nder certain conditions +ill occasion a chan"e in the 7(eanin"7 to !e assi"ned to s,ch representations. /9nd it 8,st see(s +ron" to say, for e1a(ple, that so(eone +ho (istakes holo"ra(s of ,nicorns for real ,nicorns has tho,"hts that (ean 7holo"ra(7 and not 7,nicorn.70 *here are related pro!le(s arisin" fro( the fact that tho,"hts a!o,t do"s can !e ca,sed !y thin"s other than distal sti(,li entirelyHfor e1a(ple, . can think a!o,t do"s in drea(s or in free fancy. .t is hard to see 8,st ho+ a strict ca,sal theory sho,ld treat these cases. *his pro!le(, +hich 'odor likes to call the 7dis8,nction pro!le(,7 +as apparently a si"nificant incentive in his develop(ent of the ca,sal covariation acco,nt of intentionality fro( the for( in +hich he artic,lated it in 19&- to the for( it took in 199$. What is ne+ in the (ore recent acco,nt is the addition of a notion of 7asy((etric dependence,7 +hich is introd,ced to handle the dis8,nction pro!le(. Gecall the for( of the acco,nt in 'odor /199$0, +hich +e have ,sed here to develop CC*.: . clai( that 7O7 (eans O if: 1. ?Os ca,se 7O7s? is a la+.

@. So(e 7O7s are act,ally ca,sed !y Os. 5 @#- 5 #. 'or all P not S O, if Ps =,a Ps act,ally ca,se 7O7s, then Ps causing 7O7s is asy((etrically dependent on Os causing 7O7s. /'odor 199$: 1@10 *he first and second cla,ses are already i(plicit in the older for(,lation. *he notion of asy((etric dependence appears in cla,se /#0. *he idea is as follo+s: a tho,"ht involvin" a "iven representation + can (ean 7do"7 and not 7din"o7 or 7do"3or3din"o,7 even if it is re",larly ca,sed !y !oth do"s and din"os, if it is the case that the ca,sal connection !et+een din"os and + 3tokenin"s is asy((etrically dependent ,pon the ca,sal connection !et+een clo"s and + 3tokenin"s. 9nd the nat,re of this 7dependence7 is cashed o,t in p,rely modal ter(s: +hat it (eans is that if do"s did not ca,se + 3tokenin"s, din"os +o,ld not either, !,t not the reverse. /.n other +ords, din"os (i"ht fail to ca,se + 3tokenin"s +itho,t do"s failin" to do so as +ell.0 6o+ . have no interest in contri!,tin" here to the already "ood3siDed literat,re de!atin" the s,ccess or fail,re of this (ove. What . +ish to do is (erely to point to +hat it is a de!ate about . 9nd +hat it is a de!ate a!o,t is +hether CC*. provides (eanin" assignments in the +ays +e sho,ld +ish a se(antic theory for the (ind to do so. .t is a!o,t s,ch =,estions as +hether s,ch a theory +o,ld assi"n co,nterint,itive (eanin" assi"n(ents /s,ch as 7do"3or3din"o70 and +hether it can acco((odate s,ch patent facts as (isidentification, in +hich one has a tho,"ht the content of +hich does not (atch the thin" one is tryin" to identify. .t (ay !e that the fancy foot+ork provided !y the notion of asy((etric dependence can finesse a +ay thro,"h these pro!le(s, !,t it is these pro!le(s that it see(s intended to finesse.

<.6.60 W)at CCTI ,oes Not ,o

What CC*. nota!ly does not see( to do is provide more than an de(arcation acco,nt of (eanin"3 assi"n(ents. .t is not clear that it is e"en an attempt to provide an acco,nt of (eanin"f,lness for (ental statesC and if it is so intended, the acco,nt it provides is +oef,lly inade=,ate. . shall atte(pt to ar",e this in t+o different +ays. 'irst, . shall ar",e that CC*. does not provide so (,ch as a de(arcation criterion for (eanin"f,lness /as opposed to (eanin" assignments 0, and hence cannot provide an e3planation of (eanin"f,lness, since an acco,nt that e1plains +ill also provide a de(arcation criterion. Second, . shall ar",e that CC*. lacks the ri"ht sort of e1planatory character to e1plain the intentionality of the (ental. 5 @#& 5

<.6.6.&0 !ailure to ,emar3ate t)e 1eanin*+ul

While ca,sal covariation (ay or (ay not provide a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assignments , it does not provide a de(arcation criterion for (eanin"fulness Hthat is, for separatin" thin"s that (ean something fro( those that (ean nothing . 'or the notion of ca,sal covariation is cashed o,t in ter(s of re",lar ca,sation, and re",lar ca,sation is a feat,re not 8,st of (ental states and processes, !,t of o!8ects and events "enerally. *he overall pro8ect here is to e1plain the (ental3se(antic properties of

(ental states in ter(s of so(e set / of nat,ralistic properties, and the proposal at hand is that 63 properties are ca,sal covariation relations. B,t this set of properties has a do(ain far !roader than that of (ental representations: any n,(!er of o!8ects and events not i(plicated in tho,"hts have characteristic ca,ses, and hence have 63properties. Co+3tho,"hts are not the only thin"s relia!ly ca,sed !y co+s: so are (ooin" noises, sta(pedes, and co+pies, to na(e a fe+. *he CC*. cannot !e a via!le de(arcation criterion of (eanin"f,lness, !eca,se it does not distin",ish tho,"hts a!o,t co+s fro( sta(pedes and co+pies. 9nd this is s,rely a de(arcation +e sho,ld e1pect a theory that acco,nted for (eanin"f,lness to entail. So either +e (,st i(p,te (ental3se(antic properties to all kinds of o!8ects and events, endo+in" (,ch of nat,re +ith content, or +e (,st allo+ that so(ethin" (ore than 63properties are re=,ired to e1plain (ental3se(antics. *he o!vio,s strate"y for sidesteppin" this o!8ection is to point o,t that, +hile representations (ay share 63properties +ith (any other sorts of o!8ects, it is only (ental representations that take part in the relations characteristic of intentional states. *here (ay appear to !e a threat of endo+in" the +orld +ith contentHna(ely, +ith 2G3se(antic properties. B,t re(e(!er that the +ord ?se(antic? in 72G3 se(antic7 is not doin" (,ch +ork, since +e have defined the e1pression ?2G3se(antic properties? in ter(s of ca,sal covariation. *h,s in allo+in" (ost of nat,re to have 2G3se(antic properties, +e have not endo+ed the( +ith anythin" co,nterint,itive, even tho,"h the +ord ?se(antic? (i"ht s,""est as (,ch. 2oreover, CC*., as +e have for(,lated it, involves (ore than ca,sal covariation: it involves e1plicit reference to the effect that the ite(s that have 2G3se(antic properties are also part of an intentional state . .t is this additional fact that differentiates the( fro( o!8ects in nat,re "enerally. *o ,se so(e ter(inolo"y that has not yet !een ,sed here, +e (i"ht say that indication or nat,ral (eanin" plays a role in the prod,ction of (ental3(eanin" only 'hen the indicator is present in an organism in one of the functional relations characteristic of intentional attitudes . Er, to p,t it sli"htly differently, 5 @#9 5 the do(ain over +hich the CC*. is =,antified is not all o!8ects, !,t all o!8ects that are representations involved in intentional states. *here is so(ethin" appealin" a!o,t this strate"y, !,t it is i(portant to note that it violates one of the f,nda(ental canons of C*2: na(ely, that the se(antic properties of (ental states !e 7inherited7 fro( the 7se(antic properties7 of representations. 9ccordin" to the for(,lation in the previo,s para"raph, ho+ever, this is not the case: (ental3se(antic properties are not e1plica!le solely in ter(s of 2G3 se(antic properties of representations, !,t in ter(s of 2G3se(antic properties of representations plus something else . Worse yet, this 7so(ethin" else7 see(s to consist precisely in the fact that the representations are ele(ents of an intentional stateN B,t if +e (,st all,de to the fact that representations are part of an intentional state to (ake CC*. proof a"ainst the se(antification of nat,re, +e have failed to provide a nat,ralistic e1planation of (ental3(eanin", since part of o,r acco,nt still pres,(es the intentional rather than e1plainin" it. .t is, of co,rse, possi!le to !e"in !y ass,(in" intentionality, and then askin" the =,estion of +hat kinds of nat,ral properties are involved in the realiDation of intentional statesC and if +e do this, +e need not +orry a!o,t the fact that part of +hat differentiates (ental representations fro( other thin"s that participate in ca,sal covariation is that they also play a role in intentional states. B,t if +e do this, +e are no lon"er seekin" an acco,nt that provides s,pervenience or e1planatory insi"ht. 9nd this, it +o,ld see(, is less than C*2?s advocates "enerally desire !y +ay of an 7acco,nt of intentionality7 /even if it is, in (y vie+, a far (ore sensi!le strate"y0. *he ,pshot of this is that CC*. does not s,cceed in providin" a criterion for the de(arcation of the (eanin"f,l fro( the (eanin"less. .t is not really clear that it +as intended to provide s,ch a criterion,

!,t it fails to do so re"ardless. .t follo+s fro( this a forteriori that it does not provide an e3planation of (eanin"f,lness, since an e1planation +o,ld also provide a de(arcation criterion.

<.6.6.20 W)y CCTI ,oes Not ECplain 1eanin*+ulness

.t is also possi!le to tackle the iss,e of the e1planation of (eanin"f,lness !y +ay of a frontal assa,lt. 9nd it see(s pr,dent to do this, since so(eone (i"ht !e inclined to try to resc,e CC*. as a potential de(arcation criterion for (eanin"f,lness !y +ay of so(e clever patch+ork, (,ch as 'odor has tried to resc,e it as a criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ent !y +ay of the notion of asy((etric dependence. *o do so, ho+ever, +o,ld !e to (iss a (,ch (ore serio,s point. *he deep pro!le( +ith CC*. is not that 5 @J$ 5 . have so(e clever co,ntere1a(ples that it has failed to catch in its net, and that (i"ht !e !ro,"ht into line +ith the insertion of an additional cla,se or t+o. *he deep pro!le(, rather, is that ca,sal covariation is 8,st not s,ited to e1plainin" +hy so(e 5 is capa!le of (eanin" so(ethin" rather than nothin". Ca,sality is 8,st too !land a notion for that task, and fancy patch+ork +o,ld only serve to reveal this pro!le( rather than to re(edy it. 6o+ the +ay . sho,ld li e to !e a!le to proceed here +o,ld !e to provide a really ti"ht and co(pellin" analysis of e1planation and then "ive a knock3do+n ar",(ent to the effect that CC*. does not fit that analysis if the e3planandum is (eanin"f,lness. )1planation, ho+ever, is a notion that is notorio,sly diffic,lt to analyDe, and . shall have to content (yself +ith a sli"htly (ore ro,nda!o,t co,rse for "ettin" to the sa(e concl,sion: . shall atte(pt to esta!lish one of the cr,cial 7(arks7 of s,ccessf,l e1planations, and then atte(pt to ar",e that the acco,nt of intentionality offered !y C*2 lacks this (ark. Ene characteristic of s,ccessf,l e1planation is the kind of reaction it prod,ces: the 79haN7 reaction that co(es +ith ne+ insi"ht. S,ppose . have so(e fa(iliarity +ith so(e pheno(enon , , +ith a set S of nota!le feat,res. 6o+ s,ppose that . try to e1plain , !y (eans of an e1planation ; , cast in ter(s of so(e set of entities and relations 5 . 6o+ ; s,cceeds as an e1planation to the e1tent that ,nderstandin" 5 "ives (e insi"ht into S Hthat is, to the e1tent that ,pon ,nderstandin" 5 . !eco(e inclined to say, 79h, no+ . see +hy thin"s in S are as they are.7 .ndeed, in the ideal case, ,nderstandin" of 5 sho,ld !e s,fficient for (e to infer S , even if . have no prior kno+led"e of S . So(eone +ith an ade=,ate kno+led"e of the !ehavior of physical particles, for e1a(ple, +o,ld !e a!le to derive the notion of 7valence7 and the la+s of ther(odyna(ics, and hence particle theories provide first3rate e1planations for these other pheno(ena. Ef co,rse, in practice the process of e1planation pro"resses in the other direction, !,t an ideal "rasp of the e1plainin" pheno(ena co,ld !e s,fficient to allo+ for the deri"ation of the e1plained pheno(ena. *his idea that an ideal e1planation sho,ld allo+ the derivation of one pheno(enon fro( another /e."., a (ore co(ple1 one fro( a si(pler one0 is part and parcel of the 4alilean (ethod of resol,tion and co(position that has infor(ed (,ch of (odern science and (odern philosophy of science, and is fo,nd nota!ly in recent philosophy of science in !oth red,ctionist and s,pervenience acco,nts.

<.6.6.40 Instantiation and Reali8ation

. think that the +eakest sort of e1planation (eetin" this stron" re=,ire(ent is +hat Go!ert C,((ins

/19&#0 calls an 7instantiation analysis.7 5 @J1 5 /*here are stron"er sorts of e1planation (eetin" it as +ell, of co,rse, s,ch as red,ctions.0 C,((ins proposes the notion of an 7instantiation analysis7 as a +ay of ,nderstandin" theories that identify instantiations of a property P in a syste( S !y specifyin" or"aniDations of co(ponents of S that +o,ld co,nt as instantiations. 9n instantiation analysis of a property P in a syste( S has the follo+in" for(: /6i0 9nythin" havin" co(ponents C1 . . . Cn or"aniDed in (anner EHi.e., havin" analysis LC1 . . . Cn , EMHhas property PC S has analysis LC1 . . . Cn , EMC S has property P.

/6ii0 /6iii0

/C,((ins 19&#: 1-, n,(!erin" preserved fro( ori"inal te1t0 .nstantiation analyses are distin",ished fro( reductions /i!id., @@3@60 !y the fact that a sin"le property can have multiple instantiations in different syste(s, +hereas the red,ction of a property re=,ires a unique specification of conditions ,nder +hich it is present. B,t the instantiatin" property is intended to e3plain the presence of the instantiated property. .ndeed, C,((ins +rites that one sho,ld !e a!le to deri"e a proposition of the for( /6i0 fro( a description of the properties of the co(ponents of the syste(, and that +hen +e can do this +e can 7understand ho' P is instantiated in S7 /i!id., 1&, e(phasis added0. *hat is, fro( a specification of the properties of the co(ponents of the syste( in the for( /6a0 *he properties of C1 . . . Cn are [+hatever\, respectively, +e sho,ld !e a!le to deri"e /6i0 9nythin" havin" co(ponents C1 . . . Cn or"aniDed in (anner EHi.e., havin" analysis LC1 . . . Cn , EMHhas property P: *h,s, +ith an instantiation analysis, s,pplyin" a description of the interrelations of the co(ponents of a syste( S sho,ld !e eno,"h to sho+ that a property , is instantiated in S , !eca,se one can derive the concl,sion that S has , fro( a state(ent s,ch as /6i0, and one can, in t,rn, derive /6i0 8,st fro( a description co(ponents of S Hthat is, fro( a state(ent s,ch as /6a0. 9nd since one can derive the concl,sion that , is instantiated in S in this +ay, providin" s,ch an analysis sho,ld !e s,fficient to allay do,!ts that , can !e instantiated in S: "iven a proper description of the co(ponents of S , one can, =,ite si(ply, infer the instantiation of , in S . 5 @J@ 5

We (ay also distin",ish the notion of an instantiation analysis fro( that of a +eaker sort of acco,nt, +hich . shall call a reali*ation account . 9 realiDation acco,nt provides a specification of ho+ a property , is realiDed in a syste( S thro,"h the satisfactions of so(e set of conditions C1 , . . . , Cn H !,t 'ithout any i(plication that the satisfaction of C1 , . . . , Cn provides a (etaphysically s,fficient condition for the presence of , . . shall "ive several e1a(ples: /10 *here are individ,al o!8ects that have a partic,lar stat,s, s,ch as the :ictoria Cro+n kept in the *o+er of >ondon or the 2ona >isa. Ene co,ld, in principle, "ive a co(plete physical description of the (atter thro,"h +hich the 2ona >isa is realiDed. B,t (eetin" that description does not provide a s,fficient condition for !ein" the 2ona >isa. 9dditional o!8ects (eetin" that description +o,ld not !e additional 2ona >isas, !,t perfect for"eries. >ike+ise, there are o!8ect3kinds s,ch as 7dollar !ill7 that (,st !e realiDed thro,"h o!8ects +ith a partic,lar physical description. B,t once a"ain, (eetin" that description alone does not (ake so(ethin" a "en,ine dollar !ill. .f yo, or . (ake one, it is a for"ery. ;ollar !ills are realiDed thro,"h partic,lar (aterial confi",rations, !,t no instantiation analysis of dollar !ills is possi!le. /@0 So(e kinds of h,(an attri!,tes are realiDed thro,"h a person?s !ehavior +itho,t the !ehavior itself providin" a s,fficient criterion for the presence of the attri!,te. 'or e1a(ple, Aones and S(ith (ay !oth "ive a s,!stantial portion of their reso,rces to persons in need, yet in a very different spirit. .t (ay !e that Aones does so !eca,se he is "enero,s, +hile S(ith does so only !eca,se he !elieves that it is the sole +ay of savin" hi(self fro( the fla(es of hell. Aones?s !ehavior is a realiDation of "enerosity, +hile S(ith?s is not, even if the !ehaviors the(selves are indistin",isha!le. /#0 We have seen that there are certain senses in +hich a co(p,ter (ay !e said to perfor( s,ch operations as addin" t+o n,(!ers. S,ch operations (ay !e said to !e realiDed thro,"h the processes that take place in the co(p,ter?s co(ponents. B,t a specification of the processes that take place in the co(p,ter?s co(ponents does not provide a s,fficient condition for the co(p,ter?s overall !ehavior co,ntin" as addition, !eca,se it only co,nts as addition !y virt,e of (eanin"3!esto+in" intentions or conventions of desi"ners, pro"ra((ers, or ,sers, and these are not (entioned in specifications of the interactions of the co(ponents thro,"h +hich the addin" process is realiDed in the (achine. 6o+ there is an i(portant (ethodolo"ical and theoretical difference 5 @J# 5 !et+een instantiation analyses and realiDation acco,nts. GealiDation acco,nts proceed on the assumption that one (ay sensi!ly talk a!o,t the property , !ein" realiDed in so(e syste( S . *hey do nothin", and can do nothin", to sho+ that the or"aniDation of co(ponents of S 'ould res,lt in the presence of , . .ndeed, it need not res,lt in itHa partic,lar set of !ehaviors (i"ht !e a realiDation of 8ealo,sy or a realiDation of a fear of perdition, and a certain confi",ration of (atter only co,nts as the :ictoria Cro+n or a dollar !ill in the conte1t of partic,lar instit,tional facts and historical acts. GealiDation acco,nts do not re=,ire even s,pervenience. 9s a conse=,ence, a realiDation acco,nt co,ld not do anythin" to allay do,!ts a!o,t , ?s !ein" s,scepti!le to realiDation in S: it proceeds on the ass,(ption that , can !e realiDed in S , and hence cannot 8,stify that ass,(ption. .n the case of instantiation analysis, !y contrast, one can infer the conditions for the ascription of , fro( a description of the co(ponents of S . 9s a res,lt, providin" an instantiation analysis of , in S also serves to "indicate the clai( that , can !e instantiated in a syste( like S . .t vindicates it !eca,se it sho+s that it can !e so. 9 realiDation acco,nt, on the other hand, does not in any co(para!le sense sho+ that a property , can !e instantiated in a syste( S . .f so(eone is

inclined to do,!t that Aones is capa!le of "enerosity, for e1a(ple, pointin" to Aones?s siDa!le donations to vario,s charities +ill not prove the do,!t to !e (istaken. *he donations (i"ht, of co,rse, !e realiDations of "enerosity in Aones, !,t it (i"ht alternatively !e the case that Aones really is incapa!le of "enerosity, and is (erely "ivin" of his +ealth !eca,se he is tryin" to !,y his +ay into heaven. Sho+in" ho+ a property is realiDed in a syste( "ives ,s insi"ht into the property and the syste( in +hich it is realiDed, !,t the res,ltin" description cannot !e ,sed to de(onstrate that the property is realiDed in the syste( or even that it can be .

<.6.6.60 Instantiation and t)e ECplanation o+ 1eanin*+ulness

6o+ . think it sho,ld !e clear that in order to e1plain (eanin"f,lness in nat,ralistic ter(s, it +o,ld !e necessary to provide so(ethin" on the order of an instantiation analysis for (eanin"f,lnessHthat is, to provide an acco,nt s,ch that an ade=,ate ,nderstandin" of the e1plainin" properties +o,ld !e s,fficient to "ro,nd inferential kno+led"e of the properties e1plained as +ell. .t also see(s clear that, as an e1plainin" property, ca,sal covariation does not co(e +ithin a co,ntry (ile of (eetin" this condition. Ca,sal covariation (i"ht very +ell provide +hat is needed for 5 @JJ 5 seein" +hy so(e tho,"hts are a!o,t one thin" and other tho,"hts are a!o,t so(ethin" else. /*hen a"ain it (i"ht notH. have no interest in takin" sides here.0 Chat it does not do is pro"ide understanding of 'hy causal regularities might contribute to meanings in the case of mental states 'hile failing to do so in all of the other cases of causal co"ariation occurring in nature . 9nd it is precisely here that the pro!le( of (eanin"f,lness lies. 6or +ill any (inor patch+ork help in the sli"htest. 9sy((etric dependence, for e1a(ple, is of no assistance here. *hat can, at !est, e1plain +hy (y tho,"ht does not (ean 7din"o7 or 7do"3or3din"o.7 9!o,t +hy it (eans 7do"7Hor, (ore to the point, +hy it (eans something and other things caused by dogs do not /let the reader?s i(a"ination r,n +ild0His in no +ise clarified !y the notion of ca,sal covariation. Go!ert C,((ins has s,""ested to (e an alternative +ay of (akin" this point: theoretical identifications, s,ch as the identification of heat +ith a kind of (otion, are of interest only insofar as they help ,s to ,nderstand so(ethin" a!o,t the pheno(ena that are !ein" e1plained. ;escartes /:e Monde, chap. @0, for e1a(ple, re8ects the Scholastic vie+ that 7fire7 or 7heat7 na(es a kind of s,!stance in favor of the vie+ that fire involves a kind of chan"e of state in the (atter of the co(!,sti!le (aterial, and that heat consists in the increased level of a"itation of the (atter. Ether theorists +ere i(pressed !y s,ch factors as the a!ility to convert (echanical force into heat /as +hen a nail "ets hot +hen it is driven !y a ha((er0 and !ack a"ain /as in the case of a stea( en"ine0. :ie+in" heat in ter(s of the (otion of (atter /and ,lti(ately in ter(s of kinetic ener"y0 allo+s ,s to ,nderstand +hy iron "lo+s +hen heated and +hy nails "et hot +hen po,nded +ith a ha((er. 6o+ if CC*. is to !e of interest as an e3planation of intentionality, one +o,ld at very least e1pect there to !e so(ethin" a!o,t intentional states that +e are a!le to ,nderstand !etter once +e vie+ the( thro,"h the lens provided !y the theory. B,t in fact there see(s to !e nothin" of the sort. *here +as perhaps once hope of s,ch a res,lt +hen ca,sal theorists +ere (ore inclined to identify content +ith infor(ation, and hence to vie+ the ca,sal chains involved in their acco,nts as !ein" chains of infor(ation trans(ission. B,t the inco(pati!ility of strict infor(ation acco,nts +ith (isrepresentation has ca,sed ca,sal theories s,ch as CC*. to a!andon this identification. .nfor(ation at least looked like an int,itively pla,si!le

candidate for e1plainin" 7a!o,tness7 in a +ay that ca,sation does not. .f there is anythin" a!o,t intentional states that is e1plained !y CC*., its nat,re needs to !e (ore clearly sho+n. .n short, it does not 5 @J% 5

'i",re 1$ see( that CC*. e1plains the nat,re of intentionalityC and indeed, it is not clear that there is anythin" of interest a!o,t intentionality that it does e1plain. .n s,((ary then, CC*. see(s at !est to s,pply a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents, and neither an e1planation of the sa(e nor any sort of acco,nt of (eanin"f,lness /see fi". 1$0.

<.6.70 Some Tellin* Comparisons

*he iss,e (i"ht !e p,t into f,rther perspective !y contrastin" the e1planatory po+er of CC*. +ith that of so(e other 7acco,nts of intentionality.7 *here are a n,(!er of +riters +ho address the iss,e of intentionality, either in "eneral or in specific conte1ts s,ch as vis,al perception, +hose acco,nts see( to (e at least to provide a certain de"ree of e1planatory insi"ht that CC*. fails to provide. *he acco,nts that co(e (ost =,ickly to (ind for (e in this re"ard are G,th 2illikan?s /19&J0 e1planations of feat,res of (ind and lan",a"e in ter(s of reprod,ctively esta!lished cate"ories +ith a selectional history, Benneth Sayre?s /19&60 and 'red ;retske?s /19&1, 19&&0 infor(ation3theoretic acco,nts of intentionality in perception, and ;avid 2arr?s /19&@0 acco,nt of vision. )ach of these acco,nts is in so(e sense an atte(pt to red,ce so(e kind of intentionality to so(e set of states and processes and relationships that can !e specified nat,ralistically. /Er, if information is not a nat,ral !,t a for(al cate"ory, each tries to "ive a nonintentional specification of intentionality.0L@M 9nd in each of their acco,nts ca,sality 5 @J6 5 plays so(e e1planatory role /in contrast, for e1a(ple, +ith Searle?s L19&#M acco,nt, +hich is lar"ely an ontolo"ically ne,tral analysis of intentionality0. B,t in each of these acco,nts, ca,sality fits into the pict,re only 'ithin the frame'or of a much richer story a!o,t the (echanis(s thro,"h +hich perception and co"nition are acco(plished. 6o+ each of these acco,nts is e1tre(ely co(ple1 and stron"ly resists presentation !y +ay of a th,(!nail sketch. . shall th,s ass,(e that the reader (ay refer !ack to the ori"inal so,rces for any details !eyond the follo+in" !rief sketches. Sayre /19&60 tells a story of ho+ infor(ation /in the technical sense of Shannon and Weaver L19J9M0 is conveyed, in a +ell3defined series of sta"es, fro( an o!8ect perceived to a sta"e of co"nitive processin" that (i"ht !e rich eno,"h to (erit the na(e 7intentionality.7 *he acco,nt is an atte(pt to !,ild 7infor(ation,7 in the se(antically pre"nant sense of the ter(, o,t of 7infor(ation7 in the technical sense of 7red,ced ,ncertainty7 or 7ne"entropy,7 and ass,(ptions a!o,t the f,nctions of percept,al syste(s as descri!a!le as processors of infor(ation in the technical sense. ;retske e(ploys a so(e+hat looser sense of 7infor(ation7 to si(ilar ends. Both have stories a!o,t +hat it is for a tho,"ht to !e a!o,t an o!8ect, stories that involve ans+ers to

=,estions a!o,t, for e1a(ple, fidelity of perception and a!o,t +hat it is that connects o!8ect to intentional state and is co((on to !oth.L#M 2illikan?s acco,nt of !elief also (akes ,se of ca,sal connections !et+een the intentional state and its o!8ect, !,t these are e(!edded in a lar"er story a!o,t the f,nction of !elief and ho+ it has !een selected for +ithin o,r species. *o ,nderstand intentional states, on 2illikan?s vie+, is to ,nderstand a relationship !et+een an or"anis( and its environ(ent that is the prod,ct of a history of adaptation and selection +ithin the species. 2arr presents an ela!orate and detailed acco,nt of ho+ the (ind transfor(s sensory inp,t into a three3di(ensional vis,al representation thro,"h the application of a series of co(p,tational al"orith(s involvin" several distinct levels of representation of vis,al infor(ation. 6o+ these acco,nts do several thin"s, in varyin" (eas,res, that co,ld contri!,te so(ethin" to+ards le"iti(ate insight into the pheno(ena they set the(selves to disc,ssin". /Ef co,rse it only (erits the description of insi"ht insofar as it t,rns o,t to !e correct in the lon" r,n, !,t at least these acco,nts, if correct, yield ne+ insi"hts.0 'irst, they s,!s,(e the pheno(ena to !e e1plained /e."., intentionality0 ,nder (ore "eneral cate"ories, and there!y provide a characteriDation, in nonintentional ter(s, of +hat ind of pheno(enon it is. 2illikan ,ses the notions of a 5 @J- 5 reprod,ctively esta!lished kind and selection history to do this for intentionality "enerally. Sayre treats perception and percept,al intentionality as a very rapid kind of adaptation to environ(ental feat,res /(,ch as learnin" and evol,tion are (,ch slo+er sorts of adaptation0, f,rther characteriDed !y a state of hi"h (,t,al infor(ation. Second, these acco,nts "ive so(e insi"ht into +hat kinds of (echanis(s are necessary to the realiDation of partic,lar kinds of (ental states, +hether the for(al properties of these (echanis(s !e characteriDed in ter(s of al"orith(s fro( co(p,ter science /2art0 or in ter(s of the 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication /Sayre0. *here is, to !e s,re, a p,rely e(pirical co(ponent in this latter enterprise, !,t there is also a co(ponent that one (i"ht descri!e as 7transcendental.7 *alk of thin"s s,ch as intentionality of perception is pri(arily (otivated !y o,r o+n case, and it therefore (akes sense to ask +hat must !e tr,e of creat,res +ho perceive as 'e do, (,ch as it (ade sense for Bant to ask +hat (,st !e tr,e of !ein"s +hose only contact +ith an e1ternal +orld is thro,"h sens,o,s int,itions. .nsofar as +e take the pheno(ena "oin" on in o,r o+n (ental lives as "iven and try to provide an acco,nt of the(, +e "ain s,!stantial insi"ht fro( acco,nts that s,cceed in tellin" ,s +hat sorts of processes (,st "o on for s,ch pheno(ena to take place.LJM 6o+ . do not think that any of these acco,nts "oes so far as to provide an instantiation analysis for intentionality or any partic,lar variety thereof. . shall present (y reasons for this concl,sion in the ne1t chapter. *here are, ho+ever, +ays of providin" (ore or less insi"htHand hence of co(in" closer to providin" an ade=,ate e1planationHshort of an instantiation analysis. 2y intent here has !een to indicate that, in co(parison +ith these other acco,nts, CC*. fares co(paratively poorly in e1planatory (erits. 'or +hile the acco,nts offered !y 2illikan, Sayre, or 2arr (ay not provide an instantiation analysis for intentionality, they do /if s,ccessf,l0 provide at least the t+o kinds of insi"ht already (entioned. .f, for e1a(ple, the thin"s 2illikan says are essentially correct, and . take the ti(e to (aster her theory, . +ill have "ained s,!stantial insi"ht into the nat,re of intentionality. 9s far as . can see, the sa(e cannot !e said for ca,sal covariation acco,nts. .t (ay +ell !e that an ade=,ate acco,nt of intentionality +o,ld have to involve a ca,sal co(ponent, !,t +hen . entertain this proposition, . do not have a sense that any f,nda(ental secrets a!o,t intentionality have there!y !een revealed, or that . have achieved a "rasp of even one principal aspect of the nat,re of intentionality. 2y o+n sense is that, if it is a fact a!o,t intentional states that they /characteristically0 involve representations standin"

5 @J& 5 in a relationship of ca,sal covariation +ith the intentional o!8ects of those states, this fact stands +ith respect to intentionality in a relationship analo"o,s to that in +hich !ein" the shape of a face of an octahedron stands to trian",larity, or perhaps the relation that !ein" a featherless !iped stands to !ein" h,(an /that is, if +e are talkin" a!o,t intentional states generally, and not a!o,t specific kinds of intentional states, s,ch as percept,al 8,d"(ents, in +hich ca,sal connections do see( to !e essential0. Ca,sal covariation might provide so(e kind of de(arcation criterion, !,t it see(s to (e that it provides no insi"ht into (eanin"f,lness, and indeed can !e invoked only +ith the prior ass,(ption of (eanin"f,lness. .t does not provide an e3planation of (ental3(eanin" or intentionality. /. have "rave do,!ts a!o,t ca,sal covariation even as a de(arcation criterion for (eanin" assi"n(ents. *hese +ill !e a special case of the ar",(ents a"ainst 7stron" nat,raliDation7 in the ne1t chapter.0L%M

<.6.(0 T)e Tension bet>een .enerality and ECplanatory !or3e

6o+ the consideration of acco,nts s,ch as those offered !y 2illikan, Sayre, ;retske, and 2arr !rin"s ,p an additional iss,e that is +orthy of consideration. En the !asis of the sa(ple presented !y these acco,nts, it +o,ld see( that acco,nts of intentionality !eco(e (ore pla,si!le as e1planations of +hat it is to !e a!o,t so(ethin" or to (ean so(ethin" as they !eco(e (ore detailed in their descriptions of ho+ a syste( is related to its environ(ent. B,t as they !eco(e (ore detailed, they !eco(e correspondin"ly more specific and less general . B,t this has the conse=,ence that as they !eco(e (ore e1planatory, they stray f,rther fro( !ein" "eneral acco,nts of intentionality, and look (ore like acco,nts of, say, the reali*ation of intentionality in the "isual perceptual apparatus of human beings . What +o,ld see( to !e re=,ired for a "eneral acco,nt of intentionality or (ental3se(antics, ho+ever, +o,ld !e a characteriDation that applied e=,ally +ell to different kinds of co"niDers /h,(an, 2artian, an"elic, silicon3!ased0 and that +as indifferent to the intentional (odality /perception, 8,d"(ent, +ill, etc.0. *his kind of "enerality, (oreover, is absolutely essential if +e +ant to vie+ co"nition as co(p,tation over (eanin"f,l representations of the sort that 'odor post,lates, !eca,se the 2G3 se(antic properties of the representations (,st !e independent of +hat kind of propositional attit,de they are involved in. /.ndeed, even if one is not co((itted to co(p,tationalis(, this +o,ld 5 @J9 5 see( to !e i(plicit in the fa(iliar attit,de3content analysis of intentional states.0 *o take an ill,strative e1a(ple, consider the acco,nt of the intentionality of vis,al perception in Sayre /19&60. Sayre?s acco,nt is co(pellin" insofar as it (akes a case for ho+ so(e feat,res of percept,al intentionality co,ld !e acco,nted for !y vie+in" certain environ(ental conditions and feat,res of the percept,al apparat,s in infor(ation3theoretic ter(s. While Sayre?s acco,nt does not s,pply lo"ically s,fficient conditions for "ettin" se(antics o,t of 7infor(ation in the technical sense,7 it is a co(pellin" atte(pt to sho+ ho+ the realiDation of percept,al intentionality is acco(plished. B,t the details that (ake Sayre?s acco,nt co(pellin" also render it too local to !e a "eneral acco,nt of intentionality. 'or e1a(ple, Sayre?s acco,nt is concerned +ith (echanis(s involved in perception, and hence is oriented to+ards s,ccessf,l cases of perception and to+ards transparent constr,als of ascriptions of intentionality. 'a(iliar philosophical pro!le( cases s,ch as !rains in vats and Cartesian de(ons lie far afield of Sayre?s paradi"( cases, and it is not clear ho+ his (odel co,ld address the pro!le(s they present for "ivin" an acco,nt of intentionality that acco((odates int,itions a!o,t opa=,e constr,als of intentional ver!s. Second, Sayre?s acco,nt of percept,al intentionality treats the intentionality involved

in perception as directed to+ards an o!8ect rather than a proposition or proposition3like psycholo"ical state. .t is =,ite possi!le that perception differs fro( other intentional (odalities in this re"ard, ho+ever, and so the e1tension of Sayre?s acco,nt to hi"her co"nitive f,nctions (ay +ell re=,ire a si"nificantly different sort of acco,nt fro( his acco,nt of percept,al intentionality. *hird, +hile Sayre?s acco,nt is s,fficiently a!stract to avoid !ein" specific to a species, it does see( to !e !ased ,pon a constr,al of the a!stract nat,re of the processes that !ein"s s,ch as o,rselves ,nder"o in perception. .t is conceiva!le that other !ein"s (i"ht reach a si(ilar "oal /percept,al intentionality0 !y a different path, one not descri!a!le !y Sayre?s story. 2illikan?s story a!o,t intentionality has feat,res that (ake it ar",a!ly even (ore local: to e1plain intentionality yo, have to tell a story a!o,t adaptive role and selection history. 9nd selection history is dependent ,pon linea"e. .ndeed, accordin" to 2illikan, if a !ein" +ere s,ddenly to e(er"e into e1istence that +as identical +ith one of ,s in str,ct,re, in inp,t3o,tp,t conditions, and in s,!8ective e1periential states, this !ein" +o,ld nonetheless have no !eliefs or desires, !eca,se, accordin" to 2illikan, +hat it is to !e a !elief or a desire involves !ein" the prod,ct of a certain kind of selection history. *his +o,ld see( to have the 5 @%$ 5 conse=,ence that +e +o,ld have to tell separate stories a!o,t intentionality in species +here the relevant f,nctions did not develop in a co((on evol,tionary history. /Perhaps even if the histories +ere co(pletely parallel to one another.0 *his (i"ht not (ean that +e +o,ld have to tell separate stories for h,(ans and chi(ps /since the relevant selection process (ay have taken place !efore the species diver"ed0, !,t +e +o,ld have to tell separate stories for h,(ans and 2artians, or even h,(ans and *+in3)arthers. /Ho+ +e +o,ld tell s,ch a story a!o,t !ein"s +itho,t an evol,tionary historyH s,ch as 4od, an"els, and intelli"ent artifactsHis =,ite !eyond (e.0 6o+ it is not f,lly clear +hat (oral one o,"ht to dra+ fro( this. Ene distinct possi!ility is that +hat +e have here is evidence that, contrary to co((onsense ass,(ptions, there is no one pheno(enon called 7intentionality,7 !,t several different pheno(ena +hich re=,ire rather different sorts of acco,nts. 9 sli"htly (ore (odest (oral +o,ld !e that +e have evidence here that the direction of in=,iry o,"ht to !e to !e"in +ith (ore local pheno(ena that so(eti(es receive the la!el 7intentionality7Hfor e1a(ple, 7intentionality7 as it appears in vis,al perceptionHand proceed to an atte(pt at a "eneral theory only +hen +e have a "ood ,nderstandin" of specific kinds of intentionality already in hand.L6M *here is, ho+ever, a very different possi!ility, +hich +ill !e developed (ore f,lly in the ne1t chapter: na(ely, that the pro!le( (ay lie not +ith the notion of intentionality, !,t +ith atte(pts to provide a 7nat,raliDation7 of it. .n partic,lar, it (ay !e that all a nat,ralistic theory can hope to do +ith respect to the (ental is to spell o,t ho+ (entalistic properties are reali*ed in partic,lar kinds of physical syste(s, in +hich case it co(es as little s,rprise /a 0 that +hat is co((on to different cases is not capt,red !y the nat,ralistic theory, or /b 0 that different kinds of acco,nts (ay !e re=,ired for different kinds of !ein"s havin" the sa(e intentional properties, since the sa(e (entalistic properties (i"ht need to !e realiDed thro,"h different (eans in different kinds of !ein"s.

<.6.;0 Compositionality Revisited

)ven if CC*. +ere to s,cceed as an acco,nt of the se(antics of the pri(itive ele(ents in the hypothesiDed lan",a"e of tho,"ht, C*2 +o,ld not there!y !e i((,ne to criticis(. 'or in addition to tellin" a story a!o,t the se(antic properties of the pri(itives, C*2 atte(pts to tell a compositional

story a!o,t the se(antics of the co(ple1 representations. Unfort,nately, the only +ay +e kno+ of tellin" a story a!o,t co(posi3 5 @%1 5 tionality is to tell a story a!o,t sy(!ols +hose se(antic properties, in con8,nction +ith syntactically !ased r,les, "enerate (eanin"s for sy(!olic e1pressions. 6o+ on the one hand it is not clear that there is any real force left to speakin" of representations as symbols if one is no lon"er endo+in" the( +ith symbolic meaning /i.e., se(iotic3(eanin"0. En the other hand, +e still have no nonconventional +ay of "eneratin" (eanin"s for co(ple1 e1pressions /i.e., co(ple1 (achine3co,nters0 o,t of concatenations of si(ple e1pressions, even if +e take the (eanin"s of the si(ple e1pressions for "ranted. 9t !est, the acco,nt leaves the fact that there are s,ch co(positional f,nctions an ,ne1plained !r,te fact. What +e need, in addition, is so(e r,le that (akes it the case that, for e1a(ple, thin"s of the for( 3!&!y +ill (ean 75 and 8 .7 .n overt lan",a"es, this is acco(plished thro,"h convention. .t is not clear that it could !e acco(plished in any other +ay. 'or it is not clear that there is any other path+ay that +ill yield the kind of specificity of interpretation that +e are a!le to "et !y dint of ar!itrary conventions in a nat,ral lan",a"e. 9t the very least, even if advocates of CC*. co,ld (ake their analysis of se(antic pri(itives stick, they +o,ld f,rther need to provide a nat,ralistic acco,nt of co(positionality !efore their acco,nt co,ld !e re"arded as via!le. *he notion of synta1 that yields co(positionality is conventional to the core, as ar",ed in chapter 6, and no theory of co(positionality has !een developed for (achine3co,nters.

<.70 " Se3ond Strate*y= T)eoreti3al ,e+inition

.f this stip,lative definition of the se(antic voca!,lary +ill not save C*2?s acco,nt of intentionality, it !ehooves ,s to e1a(ine a second possi!le reinterpretation as +ell: na(ely, that the se(antic voca!,lary e(ployed in C*2 is to !e ,nderstood as a theoretical voca!,lary +hose interpretation is fi1ed !y the +ork it does in the theories in +hich it is e(ployed. *he very !rief ans+er, . shall ar",e, is no: if the se(antic voca!,lary of C*2 is defined theoretically, then +e do not have an e3planation of intentionality /and hence no vindication of intentional psycholo"y0 ,ntil the ,nderlyin" nat,re of these properties that are initially specified theoretically is spelled o,t. Until then, the so3called 7e1planation7 of intentionality !y appeal to 7se(antic properties of representations7 really a(o,nts to an appeal to dor(ative virt,es. 6o+ +hat do +e (ean !y 7theoretical definition7K So(eti(es ter(s e(ployed in scientific theories (ean precisely +hat they (eant all alon" in ordinary lan",a"e. .n other cases, ho+ever, scientific theories appro3 5 @%@ 5 priate ordinary3lan",a"e ter(s and ,se the( in ne+ +ays. *er(s like ?(atter? and ?particle? pro!a!ly at one ti(e had as part of their (eanin" all of the notions !o,nd ,p in the Cartesian notion of 7e1tension,7 s,ch as siDe, shape, and definite location. 2odern physics, ho+ever, co,ntenances the ,se of these ter(s even for o!8ects that lack one or (ore of these properties. Whatever the ordinary connotations of ?+ork?, it has a very specific technical definition in physics. 9nd nat,rally the property of 7char(7 attri!,ted to =,arks has nothin" to do +ith "ood !reedin" and eti=,ette. Ef co,rse, science also co,ntenances the introd,ction of ne+ ter(s as a part of theories as +ell. 9nd so(eti(es these also

have their se(antic val,es fi1ed !y the theories in +hich they play a part. *he +ord ?"ene? in !iolo"y, for e1a(ple, +as at one ti(e defined only !y the theory in +hich it played a role: a "ene +as, !y definition, the kind of thin", +hatever it +o,ld t,rn o,t to !e, that acco,nted for phenotypes of livin" thin"s. When Watson and Crick discovered that the loc,s of this "enetic encodin" +as the ;69 (olec,le, the ter( perhaps ,nder+ent a chan"e in (eanin"C !,t !efore that ti(e it +as a purely theoretical term Hthat is, a ter( +hose (eanin" +as fi1ed solely !y the role it played in a theory. *he s,""estion . +ish to e1plore is that +hen C*2 speaks of 7se(antic properties of representations,7 the +ords ?se(antic properties? e1press properties that are theoretically defined in (,ch the sa(e fashion. *hese properties, +hich +e have called 72G3se(antic properties,7 (i"ht th,s !e defined as follo+s: M+!semantic properties S df *hose properties of (ental representations, +hatever they t,rn o,t to !e, that e1plain the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. *he act,al nat,re of these properties is th,s left ,nspecified at the o,tset, tho,"h pres,(a!ly it (ay !e deter(ined in the co,rse of f,rther research. *his reconstr,ction of the se(antic voca!,lary e(ployed in C*2 provides a ne+ +ay of interpretin" that theory that avoids the pro!le(s involvin" conventions and intentions.

<.7.&0 ,oes T)eoreti3al ,e+inition ECplain IntentionalityD

>et ,s then look at the clai( that the kind of theoretical definition of se(antic ter(s e(ployed in BC*2 provides ,s +ith an acco,nt of the in3 5 @%# 5 tentionality of (ental states. )arlier, +e proposed a sche(atic version of C*2?s proposed acco,nt of intentionality: Schematic Account 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has 2G3se(antic property 5 . Havin" specified that 2G3se(antic properties are defined in theoretical ter(s, +e can s,!stit,te o,r theoretical definition into o,r sche(atic acco,nt. B,t there are t+o different +ays of s,!stit,tin" into o,r definition, +hich +e (ay think of as the de dicto and de re s,!stit,tions. *he de dicto s,!stit,tion si(ply replaces the e1pression ?2G3se(antic property 5 ? +ith its theoretical definition as follo+s: 6e 6icto Interpretation 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has that property of M+ , +hatever it is, that acco,nts for (ental3se(antic property , . *he de dicto interpretation yields a pse,do3e1planation of a +ell3kno+n type. En this readin", 2G3 se(antic properties fail to e1plain for precisely the sa(e reason that +e cannot e1plain the soporific po+ers of a (edicine !y appeal to its 7dor(ative virt,es.7 .f sayin" 7(ental states inherit their

se(antic properties fro( (ental representations7 a(o,nts to nothin" (ore than sayin" 7(ental states "et their se(antic properties fro( so(ethin" that has the property of "ivin" the( se(antic properties,7 +e do not have a le"iti(ate e1planation of se(antics or intentionality. Ho+ever, it is also possi!le to s,!stit,te o,r theoretical definition into the sche(atic acco,nt in another +ay that does not share this pro!le(: na(ely, !y s,!stit,tin" a de re readin" of the theoretical definition as follo+s: 6e +e Interpretation 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se /10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , /@0 M+ has so(e property 5 , 5 @%J 5 /#0 the fact that M+ has 5 e1plains the fact that M has , , and /J0 5 is called an 72G3se(antic property7 !eca,se /a 0 it is a property of a (ental representation, and /b 0 it is the property that e1plains the fact that M has , . En this interpretation, there are no dor(ative virt,es l,rkin" in the +in"s. Unfort,nately, as the acco,nt stands, there is no e3planation of intentionality either ,ntil +e kno+ /10 +hat the all3i(portant property 5 (i"ht !e, and /@0 ho+ +e can derive the intentionality of (ental states fro( the fact that co"nitive co,nters have this +onderf,l property /the +ay +e can, say, derive ther(odyna(ic la+s fro( statistical (echanics0. BC*2 does not s,pply ,s +ith this infor(ationC therefore BC*2 does not s,pply an acco,nt of intentionality. BC*2 no (ore e1plains intentionality than nineteenth3cent,ry "enetics e1plained phenotype. With re"ard to intentionality, on a !est3case scenario /that is, on the ass,(ption that BC*2 is on the ri"ht track +ith respect to the f,nctional shape of the (ind and the ,lti(ate possi!ility of e1plainin" intentionality !y appeal to the properties of localiDed states0, BC*2 is in the position "enetics +as in !efore Watson and Crick: it is a f,nctional3descriptive theory in search of an ,nderlyin" e1planation. /Ef co,rse, in the +orst3case scenario, (ental representations and their 2G3se(antic properties "o the +ay of heavenly spheres and Piltdo+n (an.0 .n short, it see(s to (e that BC*2 (akes no pro"ress at all on the se(antic front. .t does not so (,ch provide an e1planation of intentionality as it (akes evident the a!sence of s,ch an e1planation. *his fact has "enerally !een o!sc,red !y conf,sions that res,lt fro( ass,(in" that the se(antic voca!,lary can !e applied ,nivocally to (ental states, sy(!ols, and representations. .f +e say, 72ental states inherit their (eanin"s fro( (ental representations,7 it loo s as tho,"h there is pro"ress on the se(antic front, !eca,se +e have red,ced the pro!le( of (ental (eanin" to a pro!le( a!o,t the (eanin"s of sy(!ols in the !rain. 2eanin", at any rate, looks like the ri"ht sort of thin" to !e a potential e1plainer of (eanin", !eca,se +e do not have to e1plain ho+ (eanin" ca(e ,pon the scene in the first place in order to e1plain (ental3se(antics. Ho+ever, if it t,rns o,t that the se(antic voca!,lary applied to representations is a tr,ly theoretical voca!,lary, the appearance of pro"ress !e"ins to look like s(oke and (irrors. 9s +e noted earlier in the chapter, it is one thin" to clai( 5 @%% 5

/10 2ental state M has property , !eca,se M involves M+ , and M+ has , . B,t it is =,ite another to clai( /@0 2ental state M has property , !eca,se M involves M+ , and M+ has 5 , and 59, . Clai( /10 proceeds on the ass,(ption that property , is in the pict,re to !e"in +ith, and 8,st has to e1plain ho+ M "ets it, +hile clai( /@0 has to do so(ethin" (ore: na(ely, to e1plain ho+ , /in this case, (ental intentionality0 co(es into the pict,re at all . C*2 si(ply does not do this, and to descri!e C*2 as 7e1plainin" intentionality7 is si(ply a "ross distortion of +hat it act,ally acco(plishes.

<.(0 1r9Semanti3s and t)e Vindi3ation o+ Intentional $sy3)olo*y

*he reader +ill recall that the e1planation of intentionality +as the first of t+o philosophical treas,res that C*2 +as s,pposed to have ,nearthed, the second !ein" a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. >et ,s no+ ret,rn to the pro!le( of vindication. Gecall ho+ the atte(pted vindication +as inspired !y the co(p,ter (odel. .n a co(p,ter, the se(iotic3se(antic properties of the sy(!ols are coordinated +ith the ca,sal role sy(!ol tokenin"s can play in the syste(. .t is a ,sef,l contrivance to speak of the relationship !et+een sy(!ols and ca,sality as !ein" (ediated !y synta1, !,t speakin" of the 7syntactic properties7 of the sy(!olsHindeed, talkin" a!o,t co(p,ter states as sy(!olsHis lar"ely a (atter of convenience. *he sy(!olic and syntactic character of the sy(!ols is conventional in ori"in and etiolo"ically inert. What (atters is that the se(iotic interpretations of sy(!ols are coordinated +ith the f,nctional3ca,sal role they can play. 6o+ the hope C*2 presented +as that the (ind +as a co(p,ter, and hence it (i"ht !e that the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states co,ld !e coordinated +ith the ca,sal roles they play in inference, th,s sho+in" that /contrary to appearances0 intentional e1planation is "ro,nded in la+like ca,sal re",larities. 6otice that p,r"in" C*2 of dependence ,pon sy(!ols and synta1 has th,s far done nothin" to +eaken the case for the vindication of intentional psycholo"y. 'or in point of fact, the notions of sy(!ol and synta1 5 @%6 5

'i",re 11 played less of a role in the case of co(p,ters than +as co((only !elieved. B,t notice also that there is an i(portant difference !et+een coordinatin" the se(iotic3se(antic properties of sy(!ols in co(p,ters +ith their f,nctional3ca,sal roles, and coordinatin" the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +ith their f,nctional3ca,sal roles: the for(er is done directly, the latter is done /accordin" to C*20 !y an inter(ediate step: na(ely, coordinatin" the 2G3se(antic properties of representations +ith their ca,sal roles. *he difference is represented "raphically in fi",re 11. *his ill,stration reveals several respects in +hich the co(p,ter paradi"( itself falls short of providin" a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. *hese are not reasons that one cannot vindicate intentional psycholo"y in the (anner s,""ested, !,t they do sho+ +hat (ore one needs if s,ch a vindication is to proceed as planned. /10 *he co(p,ter paradi"( sho+s that se(iotic3se(antic properties can !e coordinated +ith f,nctional3ca,sal properties. What one needs for C*2, ho+ever, is a de(onstration that so(e other

kinds of 7se(antic7 properties /i((ediately, the 2G3se(antic properties of (ental representations0 can !e coordinated +ith f,nctional3ca,sal properties. *he co(p,ter paradi"( !y no (eans ass,res that this can !e done. /9fter all, there (i"ht !e so(ethin" special a!o,t se(iotic3se(antics.0 /@0 *he co(p,ter paradi"( only sho+s ho+ t+o sets of properties of one sort of o!8ect can !e coordinated. C*2 needs so(ethin" (ore: it needs to sho+ that, !y coordinatin" the 2G3se(antic properties of representations +ith their ca,sal roles, it can there!y coordinate the (ental3 5 @%- 5 se(antic properties of mental states +ith their ca,sal roles as +ell. *his +o,ld see( to place so(e additional constraints ,pon the 7vindication7 !eyond +hat is involved in sayin" the (ind is a co(p,ter. .n +hat follo+s, . sho,ld like to !,ild a case that each of these pro!le(s is potentially very serio,s. 'irst, there is "ood reason to hesitate in concl,din" that other types of 7se(antic7 properties can !e coordinated +ith ca,sal role in the fashion that se(iotic3se(antic properties are so coordinated in co(p,ters. Second, in order for BC*2 to license a vindication of intentional psycholo"y, it +o,ld have to !e a!le to sho+ that the coordination of 2G3se(antic properties +ith ca,sal role +o,ld there!y sec,re the coordination of (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +ith ca,sal role as +ellC and in order to do this, it 'ould ha"e to supply an instantiation analysis of (ental3se(antics in ter(s of 2G3 se(anticsHa realiDation acco,nt is not eno,"h for vindication.

<.(.&0 T)e Spe3ial 3ase o+ Semioti39Semanti3 $roperties

*he co(p,ter paradi"( sho+s that a sy(!ol?s se(iotic3se(antic properties can !e correlated +ith the ca,sal role the sy(!ol can play, so lon" as all se(iotic3se(antic distinctions !et+een sy(!ols are reflected in syntactic distinctions. What links the se(iotic3se(antic properties to the (arker type, ho+ever, are the conventions and intentions of sy(!ol ,sers. So if an addin" circ,it has the !inary pattern $$$1 tokened in one re"ister and $$11 in a second and prod,ces a tokenin" of $1$$ in a third as a res,lt, the tokenin" of the third is acco,nted for !y the f,nctional architect,re of the (achine and the specific patterns present in the re"isters, !,t the overall process is said to !e an instance of addin" one and three and o!tainin" a s,( of fo,r only !eca,se of the interpretive conventions that are !ein" applied. 6o+ +hat, in this paradi"(, acco,nts for the 7coordination7 of synta1 +ith se(anticsK En the one hand, the f,nctional properties of the syste( provide necessary conditions for the reflection of se(antic distinctions in the synta1. En the other hand, it is the conventions of sy(!ol ,sers that act,ally esta!lish /a 0 the (arker types e(ployed, /b 0 the syntactic types !y virt,e of +hich (arkers can !e co,nters, and /c 0 the se(antic interpretation sche(es !y virt,e of +hich the (arkers (ay !e said to have se(antic properties. *he 7coordination7 of synta1 and se(antics depends ,pon the relationship !et+een se(antic and syntactic conventions, and so is hi"hly convention3dependent. . sho,ld like to s,""est that this convention3dependence is precisely 5 @%& 5 +hat "ives the 7coordination7 of synta1 +ith se(iotic3se(antics in co(p,ters one of its (ore ,sef,l feat,res, and that +e sho,ld not e3pect synta1Hor, (ore e1actly, f,nctional role and syntactic interpreta!ility3in3principleHto !e 7coordinated7 +ith non3se(iotic3se(antic properties in the sa(e

sort of +ay. 'or one thin" that interpretive conventions /or intentions0 can do is pick o,t a unique interpretation for each (arker that is to serve as a co,nter. *his is si"nificant !eca,se /notorio,sly0 any sy(!ol syste( is s,!8ect to (ore than one consistent interpretation. /6ota!ly, there +ill al+ays !e an interpretation entirely +ithin the do(ain of n,(!er theory.0 .t is the conventions and intentions of sy(!ol ,sers that acco,nt for the fact that a token in a "iven sy(!ol "a(e (eans /for e1a(ple0 dog and not the set of prime numbers . 9nd it is these conventions and intentions that deter(ine 'hich se(antic properties are coordinated +ith 'hich syntactic properties. 6o+ there is really so(ethin" at once ,ni=,e and (,ndane a!o,t the coordination !et+een se(iotic3 se(antic and syntactic properties of sy(!ols. .f so(eone asks +hy a "iven co,nter type is associated +ith /i.e., is interpreta!le as !earin"0 a partic,lar interpretation, the ans+er is not at all (ysterio,s: it is associated +ith that interpretation !eca,se there is a convention to that effect a(on" a partic,lar "ro,p of sy(!ol ,sers. 9nd if so(eone asks +hy it is not associated +ith /i.e., is interpreta!le as !earin"0 another interpretation, the ans+er is that there is no convention linkin" it to that interpretation. .t (ay indeed !e s,rprisin" that sy(!ol "a(es as large as "eo(etry and si"nificant portions of arith(etic can !e for(aliDed, and it (ay !e s,rprisin" that for(aliDa!le syste(s can !e a,to(ated in the for( of a di"ital co(p,ter, !,t the !asis of the connection !et+een co,nter types and se(iotic3se(antic interpretation is not at all arcane. What +o,ld see( to !e unique a!o,t this kind of association !et+een se(antic val,es and (arker types is that the relationship !et+een se(antic val,e and (arker type is deter(ined !y stipulation H and it is this that allo+s for the association of (arker types +ith ,ni=,e interpretations. 6o+ it (i"ht !e the case that there are other factors that co,ld deter(ine ho+ syntactic feat,res of mental representations are to !e connected to particular /nonse(iotic0 se(antic properties and not to others. B,t it is not at all clear that +e o,"ht to e3pect it to !e the case. 'or one (i"ht +ell think that it is only the stipulati"e character of se(iotic conventions and (eanin"3!esto+in" acts that can provide the kind of unique correlation of se(antic val,e +ith co,nter type that one finds in sy(!olic representations in a co(p,ter. . kno+ of no convincin" ar",3 5 @%9 5 (ent that +o,ld a!sol,tely r,le o,t the possi!ility that so(e other factor co,ld provide s,ch a ,ni=,e correlation, !,t . (,st say that it see(s a !it (ysterio,s 8,st +hat other kind of factors co,ld provide a ,ni=,e association !et+een the syntactic properties of any (ental representations there (i"ht !e and their 2G3se(antic properties. .t must not !e a (atter of stip,lation, !eca,se that +o,ld lead to the kind of se(antic re"ress disc,ssed in the previo,s chapter. B,t +itho,t stip,lation, it is ,nclear ho+ one co,ld "et ,ni=,eness of interpretation. *he prospects of applyin" the co(p,ter paradi"( analo"o,sly are th,s rendered do,!tf,l, tho,"h not precl,ded entirely.

<.(.20 Instantiation, Reali8ation, Vindi3ation

6o+ even if it is possi!le to coordinate 2G3se(antic properties +ith ca,sal role, this is not eno,"h for the vindication of intentional psycholo"y. 'or that one also needs it to !e the case that coordinatin" the 2G3se(antic properties of representations +ith their ca,sal roles sec,res the f,rther coordination of the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +ith their ca,sal roles. Presented in the +ay the case +as ori"inally presented, +hen +e ass,(ed that the 7se(antic7 properties of (ental states +ere the very sa(e properties as those of their representations, sec,rin" this f,rther coordination see(ed al(ost trivial. *he ar",(ent for it is e1pressed !y this ar",(ent presented earlier in the chapter:

Argument @G /10 2ental states are relations to (ental representations. /@0 2ental representations have syntactic and se(antic properties. /#0 *he syntactic properties of (ental representations deter(ine their ca,sal po+ers. /J0 9ll se(antic distinctions !et+een representations are preserved syntactically. /%Z0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a representation$s se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. /6Z0 9 mental state M has se(antic property , if and only if it involves a representation M+ that has se(antic property , . D /-Z0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a mental state$s se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. 5 @6$ 5 B,t of co,rse once one has distin",ished different kinds of se(antic properties, the ar",(ent has to !e adapted as follo+s: Argument @H /10 2ental states are relations to (ental representations. /@0 2ental representations have syntactic and 2G3se(antic properties. /#0 *he syntactic properties of (ental representations deter(ine their ca,sal po+ers. /J0 9ll 2G3se(antic distinctions !et+een representations are preserved syntactically. /%Q 0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a representation?s 2G3se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. /6Q 0 9 (ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , if and only if it involves a representation M+ that has 2G3se(antic property 5 . D /-Q 0 *here is a strict correspondence !et+een a (ental state?s (ental3se(antic properties and its ca,sal po+ers. *he iss,e here t,rns ,pon /6Q 0, the clai( that (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states can !e coordinated +ith 2G3se(antic properties of representations, and the inference to /-Q 0, the clai( that (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +o,ld there!y !e coordinated +ith ca,sal po+ers. .n order for /6Q 0 to !e tr,e, the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +o,ld have to !e at least correlated +ith the 2G3se(antic properties of representations. B,t in order for this ar",(ent to provide a vindication of intentional psycholo"y, so(ethin" (ore is re=,ired: one (,st !e a!le to sho' that the 2G3se(antic properties of representations deter(ine the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. 'or in order to vindicate so(ethin", one (,st sho' that it co,ld !e the case. *o "indicate intentional psycholo"y, one +o,ld have to sho' that the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states can !e coordinated +ith ca,sal roles, and not (erely sho+ +hat !enefits 'ould !e derived if they 'ere so coordinated. 4iven that +e can sho+ that 2G3se(antic properties of representations can !e coordinated +ith ca,sal roles, +e +o,ld still have to sho+ that, as a conse=,ence, (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states +o,ld !e coordinated +ith ca,sal role as +ell.

6o+ +hat sort of acco,nt of (ental3se(antic properties +o,ld !e 5 @61 5 needed to achieve this endK What is re=,ired is an instantiation analysis of (ental3se(antics in ter(s of 2G3se(anticsHa realiDation acco,nt is not eno,"h. 'or recall a key difference !et+een instantiation and realiDation: since an instantiation acco,nt provides conditions fro( +hich one can infer the instantiated property, it provides a vindication of e1istence clai(s for that property, "iven that the instantiatin" properties are satisfied. B,t +ith a realiDation acco,nt, no s,ch !enefit accr,es: since the realiDin" properties are not a s,fficient condition for the realiDed property, they do not provide proof for so(eone +ho do,!ts that s,ch a property can !e realiDed. 6o+ +e are seekin" an acco,nt that vindicates the clai( that the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states can !e coordinated +ith their ca,sal po+ers. 9n acco,nt of ho+ (ental3se(antic properties are instantiated through the 2G3 se(antic properties of representations co,ld provide s,ch a proof, !eca,se one +o,ld !e a!le to infer the (ental3se(antic properties of the (ental states from the 2G3se(antic properties of the representations. 9 realiDation acco,nt, on the other hand, (erely presupposes that there is so(e special relationship !et+een the properties picked o,t in the intentional idio( and those picked o,t !y the f,nctional3ca,sal acco,nt, +itho,t either specifyin" the nat,re of the relationship or sho+in" +hy it o!tains. S,ch a pres,pposition (ay have "reat advanta"es if yo, are doin" e(pirical psycholo"y, !eca,se yo, can do yo,r research +itho,t +aitin" for definitive res,lts of de!ates a!o,t d,alis(, red,ction, s,pervenience, or psychophysical ca,sation. B,t for this version of the vindication of intentional psycholo"y to +ork, +e must not assume s,ch a special connection, !eca,se the possibility of such a connection is precisely 'hat has been called into doubt . .f so(eone do,!ts that the se(antic and intentional properties of (ental states can !e coordinated +ith nat,ralistic properties, and one "ives a realiDation acco,nt for the intentional and se(antic properties of (ental states that 8,st assumes that they are specially connected to so(e nat,ralistic properties, one has not ass,a"ed the do,!t so (,ch as !e""ed the =,estion.

<.;0 Summary
*he "eneral concl,sion of these past t+o chapters is that C*2 does not, in fact, provide an acco,nt of intentionality. .t provides the illusion of s,ch an acco,nt !y sayin" that the se(antic properties of (ental states are inherited fro( those of (ental representations. B,t on closer inspection, +e have not fo,nd any properties of 7(ental representations7 5 @6@ 5 /i.e., o,r hypothetical co"nitive co,nters0 that co,ld serve to e1plain (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states. Se(iotic3se(antic properties, as +e sa+ in the last chapter, fail on a n,(!er of "ro,nds, incl,din" the fact that they render the e1planation circ,lar and re"ressive. Ene foc,s of this chapter +as ,pon the possi!ility that the kind of ca,sal covariation acco,nt of se(antics cha(pioned !y 'odor (i"ht act,ally !e a!le to serve as a stip,lative definition of se(antic ter(s as applied to representations. . have serio,s do,!ts that this +as 'odor?s intention. B,t if one +ere to (ake s,ch a (ove, it +o,ld serio,sly ,nderc,t the pers,asive force of 'odor?s apolo"ia for C*2, since that involved e1plicit and i(plicit ar",(ents that t,rn o,t to !e !latantly fallacio,s if notions s,ch as (eanin" and intentionality are defined in ca,sal ter(s for (ental representations.

2oreover, ca,sal covariation stories do not "o very far to+ards providin" an acco,nt of +hat it is for a (ental state to !e (ental3(eanin"f,l or (ental3intentionalHthey don?t provide an e3planation . 'irst, the ca,sal covariation story 8,st see(s like the +ron" kind of 7acco,nt7: it appears to "ive a de(arcation criterion that does not e1plain, and it see(s to distin",ish states that have different (eanin"s instead of distin",ishin" the (eanin"f,l fro( the (eanin"less. *hat is, it see(s to assume that it is dealin" +ith (eanin"f,l entities, and then asks, 7Ho+ can +e distin",ish the ones that (ean 5 fro( the ones that (ean 8 K7 .n addition, . have tried to (ake a case that, if the notion of ca,sal covariation is too !land a notion to provide an e1planation of intentionality or (eanin"f,lness, this !landness see(s the price one (,st pay for "enerality: nat,ralistic acco,nts !eco(e (ore e1planatory as they !eco(e (ore detailed, !,t in the process they lose the "enerality one +o,ld +ant fro( an 7acco,nt of intentionality.7 'inally, . have ar",ed that even if CC*. +ere to s,cceed as an acco,nt of se(antics for the pri(itive representations, it +o,ld need to !e s,pple(ented !y a nat,ralistic acco,nt of co(positionality as +ell, and it is hard even to i(a"ine ho+ s,ch an acco,nt (i"ht proceed. *he ,pshot of this is that ca,sal covariation does not provide ,s +ith a notion of representational (eanin" that can e1plain (ental3(eanin" or vindicate intentional psycholo"y. *he theoretical definition of the se(antic voca!,lary for representations fares no !etter. En one constr,al /the de dicto constr,al0, it provides a fallacio,s pse,do3e1planation that appeals to dor(ative virt,es. En another /the de re constr,al0 it provides no e1planation at all. *his, . think, is as far as C*2 can !e (ade to stretch: it is a theory of the for( of (ental processes that stands "larin"ly in need of an acco,nt of se(antics to s,pple(ent it. We sa+ as +ell that +e cannot 7vindicate7 in3 5 @6# 5 tentional psycholo"y in the +ay envisioned !y C*2?s advocates ,nless +e have s,ch an acco,ntHand indeed a nat,ralistic acco,ntHof se(antics and intentionality in hand. .n the ne1t chapter, +e shall e1plore the prospects for s,ch a 7nat,ralistic theory of content.7 .n the final section of the !ook, +e shall e1plore an alternative +ay of lookin" at the co(p,ter paradi"( in psycholo"y that renders ,nnecessary !oth the nat,raliDation of the (ental and its vindication. 5 @6J 5

C)apter Nine0 $rospe3ts +or a Naturalisti3 T)eory o+ Content

.n the previo,s chapters it has !een ar",ed that C*2 does not itself provide the e1planation of intentionality that is clai(ed for it, and as a res,lt it cannot prod,ce the kind of 7vindication7 of intentional psycholo"y it set o,t to perfor(. 9t !est, a !o+dleriDed version of C*2 (i"ht provide a +ay of descri!in" the for( of (ental processes, and this in t,rn (i"ht for( a part of a lar"er theory that +o,ld s,pply an independent theory of content. .n o,r pro8ect of assessin" C*2, it +o,ld not !e co(pletely ,n8,st to leave the (atter +here it no+ stands. .t is strictly speakin" false that C*2 e1plains intentionality, and this !elies (,ch that is co((only said a!o,t it. With the i(post,re ,n(asked, +e co,ld "o strai"ht to the credits and the final c,rtain +itho,t !ein" tr,ly ,n8,st. Ho+ever, one does not have to look very hard to see that, +hile BC*2 does not itself s,pply an acco,nt of intentionality, it co,ld !e a part of a lar"er theory that does so if it +ere only to !e s,pple(ented !y +hat is co((only called 7a theory of content for (ental representations.7 .ndeed, in at least so(e places /e."., the introd,ction to +e,resentations 0 'odor hi(self see(s to vie+ the sit,ation in this

+ay. 9nd ho+ever yo, slice the pie, the o"erall e1planatory a"enda for the co(p,tational3 representational pro8ect is pretty (,ch the sa(e. Perhaps the (ore co((on /if (istaken0 interpretation has !een that the se(antics of (ental states have !een e1plained !y appeal to (eanin"f,l sy(!ols, !,t no+ the (eanin"f,lness of the sy(!ols needs e1planation, and that is +hat calls for a nat,ralistic theory of content /see fi". 1@0. .f yo, take the se(antic voca!,lary for (ental representations to !e theoretical in char3 5 @6% 5

'i",re 1@ acter, the (iddle level si(ply falls o,t, and yo, need an acco,nt that directly ties the (eanin"f,lness of (ental states to so(e ,nkno+n properties of f,nctionally deli(ited proper parts of the (ind or !rain that are s,fficient to e1plain (ental3se(antics. )ither +ay, yo, ,lti(ately need a path+ay fro( nonse(antic and nonintentional properties of yo,r 7representations7 or co"nitive co,nters to (ental3 se(antic properties of intentional states. 9ll that is lost in (ovin" fro( 'odor?s narrative to BC*2 is the /paralo"istic0 ill,sion of havin" (ade so(e pro"ress on the se(antic front alon" the +ay. So the idea that BC*2 is really a theory of the for( of (ental states and processes that is still in search of an e1planation of se(antics and intentionality (i"ht not !e all that rep,"nant to (any in the co(p,tationalist ca(p. *he !,r"eonin" ind,stry of nat,raliDin" content, after all, is keepin" plenty of philosophers e(ployed, and holds o,t the hope of so(eone playin" Watson and Crick to 'odor?s, P,tna(?s, or Pylyshyn?s 2endel. .t th,s !ehooves ,s to "ive at least a !rief e1a(ination of the prospects of co(pletin" this pro8ect !y e1plainin" the (ental3se(antic properties of (ental states in nonintentional ter(s in a fashion co(pati!le +ith 5 @66 5 BC*2. *his is a !i" ,ndertakin", and it is very different in character fro( the rest of this !ook. *he precedin" sections have !een concerned +ith assessin" the li(itations of a partic,lar theory. 9 co(plete assess(ent of the prospects for a nat,ralistic acco,nt of intentionality, !y contrast, +o,ld re=,ire ,s to e1a(ine not only all those theories that have act,ally !een proposed /variations on +hich see( to (,ltiply !y the ho,r0 !,t also all possi!le theories that have not !een tho,"ht of as +ell. X,ite a da,ntin" task, really, and definitely !eyond the intentions of this !ook. What . propose to do in this chapter is (,ch (ore (odest. . shall endeavor to do fo,r thin"s: 'irst, . shall distin",ish +eaker and stron"er +ays of 7"ivin" an acco,nt,7 +hich . +ill refer to respectively as 7+eak nat,raliDation7 and 7stron" nat,raliDation7 of the (ental. Second, . shall point to so(e different classes of (ental states to +hich the +ord ?intentionality? is applied and (ake a case that +hat needs to !e e1plained in these different classes (ay indeed !e very different /e."., !road vers,s narro+ content, pheno(enolo"y vers,s f,nctional relations and !ehavior0. *hird, . shall try to (ake a case that at least so(e kinds of 7intentional states7 /the ones +ith a pheno(enolo"y0 have properties that it see(s ,nlikely that +e shall !e a!le to nat,raliDe. 9nd finally, . shall (ake a case that, +ith the re(ainder of 7intentional states,7 it see(s d,!io,s that the e1planation of (eanin"f,lness /as opposed to the de(arcation of (eanin" assi"n(ents0 +ill foc,s on localiDed co"nitive co,nters, as re=,ired !y BC*2, !,t rather +ill re=,ire an e1a(ination, at the very least, of an entire thinker or or"anis(, and

very likely its sit,ation in its social and ecolo"ical environ(ent as +ell.

'.&0 Stron* and Wea/ Naturali8ation

We are th,s !ro,"ht to the =,estion of eval,atin" the prospects for a nat,ralistic theory of content that co,ld !e "rafted onto BC*2. .n recent years it see(s to have !eco(e al(ost a kind of reli"io,s co((it(ent in so(e corners of the philosophy of (ind that one !elieve that there can !e a nat,raliDation of content. Upon closer inspection, ho+ever, it !eco(es clear that nat,ralis( is not only loosely ar",ed for, !,t loosely defined as +ell. 'or even a(on" people espo,sin" a co((it(ent to 7nat,ralis(7 or 7nat,raliDation7 yo, +ill find enor(o,s disa"ree(ent a!o,t +hat +o,ld co,nt as a nat,raliDation of the (ind, incl,din" differences as to +hat is constit,tive of the 7nat,ral7 /is it the do(ain of physical o!8ectsK of ca,sal interactionsK of la+f,l ca,sationK the non3nor(ative and nonteleolo"icalK0 and differences as to +hat kind of 5 @6- 5 7acco,nt7 or 7theory7 is at iss,e. .s it eno,"h to co,nt as nat,raliDation if yo, specify !rain states /or a!stract states realiDed in !rains0 +ith +hich content varies +itho,t specifyin" any relationship stron"er than lo"ically contin"ent covariationK Er does a nat,raliDation of psycholo"y re=,ire so(ethin" (ore: say, a metaphysical relationship s,ch as red,ction or s,pervenience, or an e3planatory relationship s,ch as concept,al ade=,acyK A,st "ettin" a "rip on the different possi!le (oves here is a da,ntin" task, and +o,ld pro!a!ly re=,ire a !ook entirely devoted to that topic. What . +ish to do here is to (ake a kind of first ;edekind c,t that +ill separate t+o very different kinds of pro8ects. 'irst, consider an a(!itio,s for( of nat,ralis(: a nat,ralis( that seeks to !rin" the (ind +holly +ithin the real( of nat,re !y sho+in" ho+ it is possi!le to s,!s,(e o,r special disco,rses a!o,t tho,"ht +ithin the fra(e+ork of the nat,ral sciences. 9s a (odel for the kind of stron" e1planatory relationship s,ch a pro8ect seeks, +e (i"ht take s,ch stron" intertheoretic relationships as the fa(o,s proofs that ther(odyna(ics can !e derived fro( the (echanics of particle collisions, or the a!ility of the ato(ic theory to e1plain feat,res of the periodic ta!le and co(!inatorial la+s of nineteenth3cent,ry che(istry. Statistical (echanics provides a kind of e1planation of ther(odyna(ics that has i(portant properties !oth (etaphysically and as e1planation. 2etaphysically, the (echanical la+s are lo"ically s,fficient for the ther(odyna(ic la+s: that is, !asic (echanical la+s, in co(!ination +ith necessary tr,ths of lo"ic and (athe(atics, are eno,"h to entail the ther(odyna(ic e=,ations. 2oreover, this entail(ent is episte(ically transparent: a person +ith an ade=,ate ,nderstandin" of (athe(atics and (echanics co,ld derive the ther(odyna(ic e=,ations even if she lacked a prior ac=,aintance +ith ther(odyna(ics as a !ranch of physics. . call this kind of e1planation 7concept,ally ade=,ate e1planation.7 A is a concept,ally ade=,ate e1planation of % 8,st in case the concept,al content of A is eno,"h to derive the concept,al content of % +itho,t the addition of contin"ent !rid"e la+s.L1M . shall refer to the pro8ect of e1plainin" the (ind in a fashion that is in si(ilar fashion (etaphysically s,fficient and concept,ally ade=,ate as strong naturali*ation . 9 stron" nat,raliDation of an intentional property I +o,ld e1plain I !y appeal to so(e 7nat,ralistic7 properties / , +here the ter( ?nat,ralistic? i(plies at least /a 0 that the properties that co(prise / are the(selves nonintentional, and /b 0 that they do not pres,ppose intentional properties. /'or e1a(ple, conventions are not the(selves intentional, !,t ar",a!ly pres,ppose intentional states.0 E!vio,sly,

5 @6& 5 i(portant candidates for the properties in / are properties fo,nd in the disco,rses of sciences s,ch as ne,rolo"y and !iolo"y, !,t . have deli!erately left the description of the 7nat,ral7 open to possi!ilities that properties of nat,ral o!8ects that are not relevant to the other sciences (i"ht prove i(portant for psycholo"y.L@M .n contrast +ith stron" nat,raliDation, consider a (,ch +eaker kind of pro8ect: that of specifyin", so far as possi!le, the (echanis(s in the nervo,s syste( thro,"h +hich (ental states are 7realiDed7H+here 7realiDation7 i(plies so(e special connection +hose (etaphysical nat,re (ay !e left va",e. /S,ch a pro8ect need not confine itself to relations !et+een (inds and sin"le or"anis(sHit co,ld also, of co,rse, specify any cr,cial relationships !et+een the thinker and her social or ecolo"ical environ(ent +ith si(ilar (etaphysical ne,trality.0 S,ch a pro8ect need not prod,ce intertheoretic relationships that are necessary or s,fficient, and the nat,ralistic properties specified need not e3plain the (ental properties to +hich they are linked. *his kind of acco,nt s,ffers no lack of precedent. *he relationships !et+een varia!les +ithin a "iven theory are "enerally of this sort /tho,"h they are so(eti(es e1plained !y an additional theory that provides a (icroe1planation0, as are !rid"e la+s and state(ents s,ch as that of the +ave3particle d,ality of (atter. *he psychophysical re",larities in s,ch a theory +o,ld serve as a kind of contin"ent !rid"e la+ !et+een an intentional psycholo"y and a nonintentional ne,roscience. We (i"ht call this kind of pro8ect in psycholo"y 'ea naturali*ation in contrast to the 7stron" nat,raliDation7 descri!ed a!ove. Ho+ever, it is +ith so(e (is"ivin"s that . apply the na(e 7nat,raliDation7 to it at all, as /a 0 (ost people callin" the(selves 7nat,raliDers7 see( to have stron" nat,raliDation in (ind, and /b 0 (any people +ho +o,ld nor(ally !e considered so(ethin" other than nat,ralists co,ld s,!scri!e to this 7+eak nat,raliDation7 pro8ect as +ell. .ndeed, it is a pro8ect in +hich ;escartes +as an i(portant pioneer, to +hich SpinoDa e1plicitly s,!scri!ed, and +hich even Berkeley (i"ht have !een a!le to endorse in connection +ith e(pirical research. 9s a res,lt, . a( so(eti(es (ore inclined to refer to it as the 76e,tral Pro8ect.7 BC*2 can !e located, +ith (inor variations, +ithin either kind of pro8ect: stron"ly or +eakly nat,ralistic. Ho+ever, a strong nat,raliDation of the (ental is re=,ired if C*2 is to acco(plish either of the t+o philosophical "oals that it has set o,t for itself. *o acco,nt for the intentionality of (ental states, it is not eno,"h to specify so(e contin"ent correlations !et+een (ental3state type and so(e physical or a!stract 5 @69 5 property. 'or this +o,ld not e1plain +hy (eanin"f,lness appears on the scene at allC and that, after all, is the pri(ary p,DDle for the nat,ralist. Contin"ent correlations are si(ply not e1planatory. 9nd to "indicate intentional psycholo"y, it is necessary to sho' that (ental states can !e ,nderstood in a +ay that (eets the desired criteria. 9nd this, in t,rn, re=,ires e1planation that is episte(ically transparent. 2achine co(p,tation sho+s, for e1a(ple, that for for(aliDa!le do(ains, the se(iotic3se(antic properties of the sy(!ols can !e linked to the physical3ca,sal properties of the (achine. *he physical3 ca,sal properties of the (achine, indeed, entail its description /or descri!a!ility0 in ter(s of a (achine ta!le /tho,"h not ,ni=,ely0. Pet the physical3ca,sal properties of the (achine do not e1plain the se(iotic3se(antic properties, !eca,se these depend ,pon conventions as +ell. . think that this (,ch is likely to prove to !e (,ch the sa(e in the case of (ental states. Where the t+o sit,ations diver"e /and this is +hat affects vindication0 is the fact that, in the case of sy(!ols in co(p,ters, +e can (ake it transparent that the o!8ects of the se(iotic description are the "ery same ob4ects as the o!8ects of

physical3ca,sal description /the series of !ista!le circ,its and +hatnot0, +hereas identity ascriptions !et+een (ental and physical states are at !est (ere ",ess+ork. *he reason yo, can see this in the case of sy(!ols in co(p,ters and not in the case of (ental states t,rns ,pon the fact that there is so(ethin" a!o,t the notion of a symbol that entails that a sy(!ol have criteria involvin" a physical pattern. 9 token si"nifier is necessarily a token (arker, and a token (arker is necessarily a token physical o!8ect. B,t there is no si(ilar connection +ith (aterial o!8ecthood !,ilt into the notion of a (ental state. *he connection !et+een sy(!olhood and physical o!8ecthood is concept,ally necessary. *hat !et+een (ental states and physical o!8ecthood is contin"ent at !est. 9nd to sho' the co(pati!ility of (entalis( +ith (aterialis(, yo, need (ore than ",ess+orkC yo, need to (ake the identity transparent. Ether+ise there is no proof of co(pati!ility, hence no vindication. *his only (akes a difference to those +ho are really sold on the pre(ise that intentional psycholo"y is in need of vindication, !,t it sho,ld (atter =,ite a lot to the(.

'.20 W)at Is AT)e 1entalAD

.f assessin" the possi!ility of 7nat,raliDin" the (ental7 re=,ires so(e disc,ssion of the notion of nat,raliDation, it is e=,ally in need of so(e disc,ssion of its intended do(ain, 7the (ental7 and even 7the intentional.7 5 @-$ 5 *h,s far, +ith the e1ception of a fe+ hed"es in chapter 1, +e have proceeded as tho,"h there +ere a clear and shared ,nderstandin" of the pop,lation of the intentional !estiary and of the 7ordinary7 or 7pretheoretic7 notion of intentionality. Ho+ever, . have !eco(e convinced in recent years that this is not so. *here are really several different kinds of thin"s that are called 7(ental7 and even 7intentional states.7 2ost i(portant, . think, is the distinction !et+een conscio,s episodes like percept,al e1periences, conscio,s 8,d"(ents, and episodes of recollection on the one hand, and dispositional states like !eliefs and desires on the other. *heir salient properties are very different fro( one another, and hence re=,ire very different acco,nts. 2oreover, different "ro,ps of philosophers take different classes of states as their paradi"( e1a(ples and, as a res,lt, operate ,nder very different ass,(ptions a!o,t +hat a 7theory of (ind7 or an 7acco,nt of intentionality7 +o,ld have to e1plain.

'.2.&0 !our Ginds o+ A1ental StateA

. have ar",ed else+here /Horst 199%0 that +e (ay ,sef,lly distin",ish fo,r kinds of entities that "o ,nder the na(e of 7(ental.7 /10 Conscious .ccurrent ;pisodes (4udgments, perceptions) . Until fairly recently, people interested in the (ental in "eneral and intentionality in partic,lar tended to concentrate on episodes of conscio,s tho,"ht in +hich so(e o!8ect or state of affairs +as, as it +ere, 7!efore the (ind?s eye.7 .t see(s =,ite clear that this is the sort of thin" that the pioneers of (odern +ork in intentionality like Brentano and H,sserl had in (ind, and it is s,rely tr,e as +ell of +ork on the (ind !y (ost of the )arly 2odern philosophers s,ch as ;escartes, the British e(piricists and Bant, as +ell as livin" philosophers s,ch as 4each /19%-0, 6a"el /19&60, 4old(an /199@, 199#a, 199#!0, and Searle /19&#, 199@0. S,ch states +o,ld incl,de thin"s like percept,al "estalts, in +hich an o!8ect or scene is presented vis,ally, occ,rrent 8,d"(ents /7By ",(N *hat?s a din"oN70, conscio,s +ishes /7Eh, that Ghett +o,ld co(e !ack to *araN70, recollections, i(a"ination, free fancy, and so on. S,ch thin"s are events, they are conscio,s

or at least conscio,sly accessi!le, they have a pheno(enolo"y, and there is a =,ite palpa!le sense in +hich it (akes sense to say they are 7directed7 to+ards so(ethin" and have an 7intentional o!8ect7 that need not !e a real o!8ect. .n these cases the (ind in so(e sense not only intends the o!8ect, !,t attends to it as +ell. S,ch episodes are, to a certain e1tent /and not infalli!ly0, s,scepti!le to introspection, and are certainly 5 @-1 5 not 7p,rely theoretical7 in the sense that protons are theoretical or that Pl,to +as theoretical !efore its e1istence +as confir(ed !y telescopy. /*hat is, +e have direct, =,asi3o!servational evidence for their e1istence as +ell as retrod,ctive evidence.0 /@0 6ispositional States (beliefs, desires) . 2ost recent +riters in co"nitive science have concentrated, !y contrast, on thin"s like !eliefs and desires, "enerally constr,ed /+ith varyin" de"rees of strictness0 in dispositional ter(s. ;ispositions are !y definition ,no!serva!le. 9nd +here ?!elief? (eans so(ethin" other than 7conscio,s 8,d"(ent7 /+hich it is so(eti(es ,sed to (ean0, it does see( to indicate so(ethin" that is tr,ly theoretical and indeed cannot !e confir(ed thro,"h direct o!servation. Perhaps so(e dispositions have a pheno(enolo"yHsay, !elievin" that there is a lovin" 4od fosters a sense of inner peace and !elievin" that the 2o! has p,t o,t a contract on yo, prod,ces a sickenin" an1ietyH!,t the connection !et+een the dispositional !elief or desire and its pheno(enolo"y is far less direct /and ar",a!ly less essential0 than that !et+een occ,rrent states and their pheno(enolo"y. *he 7a!o,tness7 of a percept,al "estalt is very closely related to the fact that . a( appeared to in a fashion that involves an i(a"e of a do", presented fro( a partic,lar perspective /say, fro( !ehind0, and ,nder a partic,lar interpretation /i.e., 7*hat?s Marco$s do", and she?s che+in" on (y shoeN70. 9nd all of this has a pheno(enolo"y. 'or the (ost part, !eliefs only ac=,ire a distinctive pheno(enolo"y +hen they event,ate in conscio,s episodes. /#0 The 7reudian =nconscious . 're,d speaks of 7,nconscio,s7 (ental states. *hese see( to !e !,ilt on the (odel of conscio,s states, and are taken to !e of the sa(e kind, +ith the sole proviso that they are repressed. *hey can /it is said0 !e !ro,"ht to conscio,s a+areness in therapy. . do not intend to p,rs,e 're,dian theory here, !,t (erely to point o,t that s,ch events start o,t as theoretical entities, and partic,lar ones (ay cease to !e p,rely theoretical +hen (ade conscio,s. *hey (ay have a va",e and e1trinsic pheno(enolo"y that (anifests itself in so(e of the co(plaints that !rin" the patient to the therapist?s co,ch, !,t these are not partic,lar to the content of the state in the +ay that, say, the pheno(enolo"y of perception is connected to ho+ . a( thinkin" of the o!8ect of perception /for a si(ilar vie+, see Searle 199@0. /J0 Infraconscious States . 'inally, co"nitive scientists often speak of thin"s lyin" !elo+ the level of the conscio,sly accessi!le in (entalistic ter(s. We hear talk of co"nitive s,!syste(s, for e1a(ple, cashed o,t in ter(s of 7!eliefs7 and 7desires7 of the s,!syste(s. S,ch states are s,rely nonconscio,s, have a pheno(enolo"y only incidentally, and indeed (ay 5 @-@ 5 !ear no (ore than analo"ical relations to other thin"s called 7!eliefs7 and 7desires,7 as ar",ed !y Searle /199@0. S,ch states are also clearly theoretical in the stron" sense that protons are theoretical. /.n other +ords, o,r only +arrant for !elievin" in the( is that doin" so "ives ,s a certain a(o,nt of e1planatory payoff.0 6o+ clearly, +hen yo, are askin" for an acco,nt of 7(ental states7 it +ill (ake a "reat deal of

difference +hat kinds of 7(ental states7 yo, have in (ind. .n fact, there are plenty of people +ho are co((itted to one or (ore of these cate"ories +hile re(ainin" skeptical a!o,t others. 2any people think 're,dian psycholo"y is !,nk, for e1a(ple, !,t !elieve in conscio,s states or !eliefsC and o,tside of co"nitive science it is co((on to find people +ho a"ree +ith Searle and (yself that (any of the attri!,tions of 7!eliefs7 to infraconscio,s states and processes are tr,e only if interpreted (etaphorically. .ndeed, so(e of ,s think that nothin" co,ld !e (ore clearly real than conscio,s states !,t har!or deep3seated (is"ivin"s a!o,t dispositional !eliefs and desires. Conversely, so(e people see( not to ,nderstand talk of pheno(enolo"y and s,!8ectivity at all /perhaps in the +ay so(e people do not e1perience i(a"ery0, and others think that the conscio,s e1perience of (ental states is (erely a "a,dy epipheno(enon that is irrelevant to the 7real7 /i.e., ca,sal0 nat,re of !eliefs and desires. What yo, choose as yo,r paradi"( e1a(ples +ill have a si"nificant i(pact on +hat yo, consider 7essential7 to the 7(ental7 and hence +hat stands in need of e1planation. Perception, i(a"ination, recollection, 8,d"(ent, conscio,s yearnin"s, and the like all involve a kind of directedness of the sort reported !y Brentano, +hich in t,rn involves at least the possi!ility of conscio,sness, a pheno(enolo"ical 7+hat3it?s3like,7 a perspectival character of the o!8ect3as3presented /+e see and think a!o,t o!8ects ,nder only so(e of their aspects0, and a kind of s,!8ectivity /this e1perience is essentially my e1perience0. 9ll of this see(s to !e !o,nd ,p in +hat +riters like Brentano, H,sserl, Searle, and 6a"el mean +hen they talk a!o,t intentionality in partic,lar and the (ental in "eneral. .f this is ho+ yo, are ,sin" those +ords, on the one hand, it is only nat,ral to ass,(e that an 7acco,nt7 of 7the (ental7 or of 7intentionality7 sho,ld acco,nt for all these feat,res. .f yo,r paradi"( e1a(ple of the (ental is a dispositional !elief, on the other hand, yo, are ,nlikely to incl,de s,ch feat,res in yo,r list of thin"s needin" e1planation, and ri"htly so. . happen to think that these distinctions e1plain a lot of the conte(porary i(passes in the philosophy of (ind. People +ho think (ental states are 7theoretical7 tend to !e thinkin" of dispositional !eliefs, the 5 @-# 5 ,nconscio,s, or the infraconscio,s. People +ho are thinkin" of perception and 8,d"(ent re"ard characteriDations of the (ental as 7theoretical7 as o,tra"eo,s. People in the occ,rrent3state ca(p also tend to re"ard pheno(enolo"y, s,!8ectivity, and conscio,sness as cr,cial to the (ental in "eneral and to intentionality in partic,lar, +hile those concerned +ith !eliefs and desires often do not. .t see(s to (e /see Horst 199%0 that there is roo( for a dissol,tion of these i(passes that saves face for all: na(ely, that thin"s like 8,d"(ents, i(a"ination, and perception are not theoretical entities, and do essentially involve pheno(enolo"y, s,!8ectivity, and conscio,sness, +hile dispositional states and infraconscio,s states are theoretical in character and do not involve these feat,res, e1cept incidentally. L#M

'.2.20 Intentionality and ,ire3tedness

. think that there is like+ise so(e variety in the literat,re in ho+ the +ords ?intentionality? and ?intentional state? are ,sed. When the +ord +as reintrod,ced into philosophical parlance !y Brentano /1&-J0, it see(s clear that he (eant ?intentionality? to denote a feat,re of certain kinds of +hole (ental states /and not their proper parts0. .ndeed, Brentano speaks of intentionality as !ein" the distinctive feat,re of his 7(ental7 as opposed to 7physical7 pheno(ena, !,t it is clear on closer inspection that his 7physical7 pheno(ena are not physical o!8ects !,t =,aliaN *his (ay see( (ysterio,s at first "lance, !,t the (ystery is resolved +hen one reco"niDes that Brentano is startin" fro( the e(piricist startin"

point of e1a(inin" the contents of the (ind fro( the first3person perspective /see 2c9lister 19-J, 19-60. His 7pheno(ena7 are literally 7thin"s that appear7Hso(e of +hich /those he ,nfort,nately calls 7physical70 involve only sensation, others of +hich /those he calls 7(ental70 involve the presentation of so(e o!8ect as an o!8ect. Brentano?s e(piricist fo,ndations, as +ell as his e1a(ples, (ake it clear that he is dealin" +ith (ental episodes in +hich one is conscio,s of so(e 7intentional o!8ect7 as it is presented, as it +ere, 7!efore the (ind?s eye.7 *he reason for speakin" of the 7directedness7 of s,ch states is =,ite palpa!le: +hen . have percept,al e1perience of a do", or i(a"ine a do", or have a recollection of the fa(ily do", (y (ental "aDe is, as it +ere, directed to+ards the o!8ect of (y tho,"ht. 9nd fa(o,sly, of co,rse, this kind of 7directedness7 does not re=,ire the e1istence of an e1tra(ental o!8ect correspondin" to o,r ideas. 'ro( the e(piricist standpoint, or ,nder H,sserl?s pheno(enolo"ical 7!racketin",7 7directedness7 is a feat,re of e1perience itselfH 5 @-J 5 the fact that it is an e1perience that presents ,s +ith a p,tative o!8ect and not 8,st a sensationHand not a relation to e1tra(ental reality. So in Brentano, the 7(ental states7 that are characteriDed !y his notion of 7intentionality7 are conscio,s episodes and not dispositional !eliefs or desires. .ndeed, it is not clear that the kind of 7directedness7 one finds in Brentano?s e1a(ples can !e applied to ,nconscio,s dispositions. Brentano also ,ses the ter( ?intentionality? to apply to +hole (ental states, and not to their proper s,!parts. *his leaves the e1act application of the ter( open to so(e interpretation. Writers like H,sserl and Searle have taken the notion of intentionality to incl,de the +hole pheno(enolo"ically rich net+ork of (ental states that is involved in the directedness of conscio,s tho,"hts. When (y tho,"hts are directed to+ards an o!8ect, there is a conscio,s e1perience in +hich H. a( present as the s,!8ect of the tho,"ht, Han o!8ect is presented ,nder certain aspects and not others, and Hthe e1perience has a pheno(enolo"y. So(eone startin" fro( this vanta"e point +ill nat,rally e1pect an 7acco,nt of intentionality7 to e1plain all of the salient aspects of s,ch states, incl,din" their pheno(enolo"ical feel and s,!8ectivity. *hro,"h the (iddle part of the cent,ry, ho+ever, disc,ssions of intentionality inter!red +ith disc,ssions of the se(antics of lin",istic entities, +ith the res,lt that (any people no+ see( to ,se the +ord ?intentionality? or the ?directedness? of (ental states to !e (ore or less e=,ivalent to the lin",istic notions of (eanin" and reference. 9nd those infl,enced !y the vie+ of for(al se(antics ar",ed a"ainst in chapter 6 (ay !e inclined to vie+ !oth si(ply in ter(s of 'hate"er esta!lishes a (appin" fro( +ords or tho,"hts to +orld. *his notion of intentionality, ,nlike its predecessor, see(s applica!le to !eliefs and desires as +ell as to conscio,s (ental episodes. 9nd it see(s nat,ral, if yo, ,se the +ord ?intentionality? in this +ay, not to vie+ thin"s like conscio,sness and s,!8ectivity as !ein" essential to intentionality.

'.2.40 -road Content, Narro> Content, $)enomenolo*i3al Content

Si"nificantly, the pro!le( of acco,ntin" for 7content7 shapes ,p differently dependin" on +hich tradition yo, are startin" fro(. .n recent years, analytic philosophy has "iven a "reat deal of disc,ssion to 7!road7 ver3

5 @-% 5 s,s 7narro+7 content. B,t the nat,ral constr,al of 7content7 fro( the pheno(enolo"ical standpoint does not e1actly (ap onto either of these. *here the nat,ral distinction is !et+een +hat +e (i"ht call the 7intentional character7 of (ental states /the feat,res that are invariant over all possi!le ass,(ptions a!o,t e1tra(ental reality0 and 7veridicality7 /hookin" ,p to the +orld in a felicito,s +ay0. *he notion of 7content7 that is a part of intentional character is neither +ide nor narro+ content e1actly. *he !asic idea !ehind the distinction !et+een !road and narro+ content is that at least so(e +ords and concepts depend for their se(antics ,pon thin"s o,tside of the (ind. Writers like Bripke /19-10 and P,tna( /19-%0 have ar",ed, for e1a(ple, that it is part of the se(antics of o,r notion of 7+ater7 /and like+ise the +ord ?+ater?0 that it refer to H@ E, and that it did so even prior to the discovery that +ater +as H@ E. .ndeed, on this vie+, 7+ater7 +o,ld have referred to H@ E even if +e all !elieved that +ater +as of so(e other (olec,lar type. .f there +ere !ein"s on *+in )arth +ho +ere pheno(enolo"ically, f,nctionally, and physically identical to ,s !,t +ere e1posed to so(e other co(po,nd OPF in the sa(e conte1ts +e are e1posed to +ater, their concept 7+ater7 +o,ld (ean not H@ E !,t OPF. /Ef co,rse, to (ake this +ork, yo, have to !racket the pro!le(s that arise fro( ,sin" a s,!stance that co(prises (ost of o,r !ody +ei"ht for the e1a(ple. . s,""est s,!stit,tin" another kind of s,!stance if this distracts yo,.0 9 second kind of ar",(ent is raised !y B,r"e /19-9, 19&60, +ho clai(s that (any +ords, s,ch as ?arthritis?, are often ,sed !y people +ho do not kno+ their f,ll sense. 9ccordin" to B,r"e, +e (ay ,se s,ch +ords felicito,sly even +itho,t kno+in" their sense !eca,se +e are tied into a social3lin",istic net+ork +ith e1perts +ho do kno+ the sense of the +ords: +hen . say ?arthritis?, . intend to refer to +hatever condition it is that the e1perts refer to +hen they e(ploy the +ord. 7Broad7 contentHor perhaps the !road notion of contentHis th,s so(ethin" that depends on (ind3+orld relations. *his kind of 7e1ternalist7 vie+ co(es in t+o varieties: the 7ecolo"ical7 kind, +hich ties se(antics to the thinker?s environ(ent thro,"h relations like ca,sation, adaptation, learnin", and selection, and the 7social7 kind, +hich e(!eds se(antics +ithin a social, and partic,larly a lin",istic fra(e+ork. 76arro+7 content /or the narro+ notion of content0, !y contrast, is often characteriDed as +hat is 7in the head.7 .t is often said that (olec,lar /or f,nctional0 d,plicates /=,aintly called doppelgLngers 0 +o,ld necessarily share narro+ content, tho,"h they (i"ht differ +ith respect to !road content d,e to !ein" thr,st into different social and nat,ral environ(ents. 5 @-6 5 'ro( the pheno(enolo"ical startin" point, ho+ever, the nat,ral distinction to (ake is not the distinction !et+een !road and narro+ content, !,t !et+een those properties that are contained +ithin the e1perience itself, re"ardless of the relation of the e1perience to e1tra(ental reality, and those properties that depend ,pon e1tra(ental reality as +ell. *h,s H,sserl invites the reader to perfor( an epochM or 7!racketin"7 of everythin" that is dependent ,pon e1tra(ental reality in order to st,dy intentional states as they are in their o+n ri"ht. 9nd Chishol( and others resort to t,rns of phrase like 7see(in" to see a tree7 or 7!ein" appeared3to3tree+ise7 to distin",ish the sense of ver!s like ?see? that (erely report the character of the e1perience fro( those that i(ply a kind of s,ccess as +ell. . shall (ark this distinction !y speakin" of the notion of intentionality that i(plies a correspondence +ith e1tra(ental reality as "eridical intentionality . *he aspect of intentionality that does not vary +ith ass,(ptions a!o,t e1tra(ental reality . shall call the intentional character of the (ental.LJM What . (ean !y this latter e1pression are those aspects of an intentional state that do not vary +ith variations in e1tra(ental reality. 9nd there are t+o kinds of invariants here: invariants in modality and invariants in content .

>et ,s consider an e1a(ple of an intentional state. S,ppose, for e1a(ple, that . e1perience a percept,al "estalt of a ,nicorn on (y front la+n. *hat is, . have an intentional state +ith the intentional (odality :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 and the content L,nicorn on (y front la+nM. 6o+ there are certain thin"s that one can say a!o,t s,ch a (ental state that do not depend ,pon iss,es s,ch as +hether there really is a ,nicorn there /or any+here0 or +hat ca,ses (e to have the e1perience that . have. Ge"ardless of +hether there is a ,nicorn there /or any+here0, it re(ains the case /a 0 that (y e1perience has the intentional (odality of :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 /it appears to me as though there is a ,nicorn on (y la+n0, and /b 0 that (y e1perience has the content of presentin" a !east of a certain for( and +ith certain associations /it appears to (e as tho,"h there is a unicorn Hrather than a cat or a rockHand it appears as tho,"h it is on my la'n 0. )ach of these aspects of (y e1perience has a certain pheno(enolo"y to it. *here is a 7+hat3it?s3like7 to havin" a percept,al "estalt, and it is different fro( +hat it is like to have a recollection, ho+ever vivid, or to have a desire acco(panied !y i(a"ery, and so forth. Perhaps there are patholo"ies in +hich s,ch distinctions are lost, and in so(e cases +e (ay not differentiate ade=,ately !et+een (odalities /e."., !et+een different stren"ths of conviction of !elief or !et+een i(a"ination and perception0C !,t in ordinary cases, +e can =,ite si(ply tell 5 @-- 5 +hat intentional (odality is at +ork. .(a"ine ho+ (,ch (ore co(plicated life +o,ld !e if +e +ere syste(atically ,na!le to distin",ish e1periences that +ere percept,al "estalts fro( those that +ere (e(oriesN *here is like+ise a 7+hat3it?s3like7 for havin" an e1perience +ith the content L,nicorn on (y front la+nM, and it is very different fro( +hat it is like to !e presented +ith an e1perience havin" the content Lcat on (y front la+nM. *o deter(ine +hether . a( havin" a "estalt of a cat or a ,nicorn, . do not have to consider (y !ehavioral dispositions or the f,nctional relations of (y state of (ind to other states of (ind, any (ore than . have to do so to identify the feelin" of pain as pain.L%M *here is si(ply a difference in +hat different kinds of intentional states are like. So occ,rrent states have an intentional character that ar",a!ly dispositional !eliefs do not have, and the notion of 7content7 that e(er"es fro( this perspectiveH+hich +e (ay call phenomenological content His a proper part of intentional character, +hich also involves an intentional (odality as +ell. .t sho,ld !e clear that pheno(enolo"ical content is not e=,ivalent to !road content, since the for(er partitions the (ental in a +ay that is insensitive to relations to e1tra(ental reality +hile the latter depends essentially ,pon s,ch relations.L6M *he relationship !et+een pheno(enolo"ical content and narro+ content is (ore diffic,lt. 6arro+ content is so(eti(es associated +ith the notion of 7(ethodolo"ical solipsis(7 /'odor 19&$0, +hich see(s to i(ply slicin" the intentional pie accordin" to thin"s that are invariant for the thinker =,a thinker. /.t see(s hard to see ho+ a third 3person f,nctionalist approach co,ld (erit the na(e of 7solipsis(7N0 *his +o,ld see( to i(ply in t,rn that narro+ content is 8,st pheno(enolo"ical content. B,t narro+ content has also !eco(e associated +ith characteriDation in ter(s of +hat is /necessarily0 shared !y physical or f,nctional doppel"]n"ers, and that see(s to !e different fro( pheno(enolo"ical content. 9fter all, it see(s episte(ically possi!le !oth that . do have a !ody and that . do not /the Cartesian de(on scenario0. Si(ilarly it see(s conceiva!le, hence lo"ically possi!le, that there !e a !ein" that is (y pheno(enolo"ical doppel"]n"er !,t not (y physical or f,nctional doppel"]n"er, and vice versa. .n the a!sence of any +ay of deri"ing a partic,lar pheno(enolo"y fro( a partic,lar physical or f,nctional description /or vice versa0, it see(s to (e +e sho,ld ass,(e that these notions diver"eHperhaps in real cases, !,t certainly in co,nterfact,al ones. . s,spect and hope that talk of narro+ content is really a +ay of "ettin" at pheno(enolo"ical content, +ith incorrect ass,(ptions !ein" (ade a!o,t the necessity of relationships

!et+een the 5 @-& 5 t+o. B,t for p,rposes of clarity, . shall treat the notion of narro+ content here as tho,"h it +ere defined in ter(s of +hat physical or f,nctional d,plicates +o,ld necessarily share in co((on.

'.2.60 T)e $lan o+ "tta3/

2y plan of attack on nat,ralistic theories of content, then, is as follo+s. *here are different iss,es a!o,t e1plainin" the pheno(enolo"ically pre"nant notion of directedness associated +ith occ,rrent states, on the one hand, and e1plainin" the !road and narro+ content of dispositional states like !eliefs and desires, on the other. . shall ar",e that, if one is concerned +ith thin"s like perceptions, recollections, and 8,d"(ents, then e1plainin" the directedness of these does involve one in e1plainin" their s,!8ectivity, perspectival character, and pheno(enolo"y, and that +riters like Searle and 6a"el are ri"ht in sayin" that these feat,res cannot !e red,ced to a third3person nat,ralistic disco,rse. 2oreover, no nat,ralistic disco,rse can provide necessary or s,fficient conditions for the invariants distinctive of intentional character and pheno(enolo"ical content. B,t these ar",(ents do not transfer directly to !eliefs and desires. *here . shall ar",e not that no nat,ralistic theory can provide an acco,nt of content /tho,"h . happen to !elieve it0, !,t (erely that the likely for( of any s,ch theory, +ere it to e(er"e, +o,ld not place the e1planation of (eanin"f,lness +here BC*2 says it o,"ht to !eHna(ely, in the so3called 7representations.7 *his is fairly o!vio,s in the case of !road content. . shall ar",e that it is very likely tr,e of narro+ content as +ell.

'.40 $)enomenolo*y and t)e 1ental

E,r first ai(, then, is to e1a(ine pheno(enolo"ical content and the pheno(enolo"ically rich properties of conscio,sness, perspective, aspect, and s,!8ective 7feel.7 .n +hat follo+s, . +ish to separate three (a8or sorts of iss,es concernin" pheno(enolo"ically typed (ental states. 'irst, +e shall e1a(ine the legitimacy of the pheno(enolo"ical approach: +hether the pheno(enolo"ical feat,res are real , +hether they are essential to intentional states /or partic,lar kinds of intentional states0, and +hether they (ake for a via!le classification of (ental states. Second, +e shall e1a(ine the =,estion of +hether pheno(enolo"ical properties, ho+ever legitimate or real they (i"ht !e, are likely to play (,ch of a role in the for(ation of a scientific psycholo"y. 'inally, +e shall consider 5 @-9 5 +hether pheno(enolo"ical properties are the sorts of thin"s that can !e stron"ly nat,raliDed.

'.4.&0 T)e #e*itima3y o+ t)e $)enomenolo*i3al "pproa3)

.t is one of the stran"e t,rns of t+entieth3cent,ry philosophy that the pheno(enolo"ical properties that provided the episte(ic !edrock of seventeenth3 and ei"hteenth3cent,ry philosophy are no+ tho,"ht !y (any to !e in need of le"iti(ation. *here are really a n,(!er of separate iss,es here. Ene i(portant iss,e is that of the connection !et+een pheno(enolo"y and science. *hat +ill !e considered in a later

section. .n this section +e shall consider the follo+in" =,estions: /10 9re pheno(enolo"ical properties Hreal as opposed to ,nrealK Ho!servational as opposed to theoreticalK Hacc,rately descri!ed as opposed to inacc,rately descri!edK Hf,nda(ental as opposed to nonf,nda(entalK /@0 9re pheno(enolo"ical feat,res s,ch as s,!8ectivity, perspective, and 7feel7 essential to the occ,rrent conscio,s states to +hich they attach the(selves, and (ore partic,larly, are they essential to the intentionality of those statesK /#0 ;oes the pheno(enolo"ical approach provide the !asis for a classification of (ental states /especially a classification accordin" to 7pheno(enolo"ical content70K

'.4.20 T)e Reality o+ $)enomenolo*i3al !eatures

'irst, let ,s consider +hether pheno(enolo"ical feat,res are real feat,res. B,t 7real7 as opposed to +hatK *hey are certainly not ,nreal in the sense that fictions are ,nreal. . s,ppose that it is possi!le that there are people +ho do not have the kinds of pheno(enolo"ical properties that . have, or that they do not have any at all, in (,ch the +ay that it appears likely that so(e people do not e1perience any (ental i(a"ery +hile others do so very vividly. B,t for those of ,s +ho do report pheno(enolo"ical properties, it see(s as clear as anythin" co,ld !e that there is a +hat3it?s3like to, say, seein" a do" in the yard, and that it?s different fro( the 7feel7 of i(a"inin" the sa(e scene or seein" so(ethin" different. >ike+ise, s,!8ectivity and perspective see( to !e ind,!ita!ly le"iti(ate feat,res to 5 @&$ 5 attri!,te to (y e1perience. 'or those of ,s +ho report a pheno(enolo"y, the clai( that pheno(enolo"ical feat,res fail to !e real the +ay fictions fail to !e real is clearly a nonstarter. .t is =,ite another (atter, ho+ever, if the iss,e is one of +hether partic,lar clai(s about pheno(enolo"y, or even partic,lar descriptions of it, are as acc,rate as they (i"ht !e. People +ho co(plain a!o,t pheno(enolo"y are often really concerned only a!o,t clai(s of special access that i(ply incorrigibility . B,t this is a red herrin". . do not kno+ any (a8or philosopher in the pheno(enolo"ical ca(p +ho has clai(ed that pheno(enolo"y +as easy, or that +e co,ld not !e (istaken a!o,t it, especially at the level of a!stract characteriDation. H,sserl +as contin,ally stressin" the diffic,lty of pheno(enolo"ical description to the point of descri!in" hi(self as a 7perpet,al !e"inner7 at itC and contrary to the co((on li!el, ;escartes ackno+led"ed that +e co,ld !e =,ite (istaken a!o,t o,r (ental states, even in s,ch see(in"ly strai"htfor+ard cases as pain /see ,rinciples 1.6- L9* :...9.#@3##M0. . a( not a+are of anyone +ho serio,sly tho,"ht that a thoro,"h"oin" pheno(enolo"ical acco,nt co,ld !e naively 7read off7 fro( introspection of one?s o+n e1perience. /*ho,"h British e(piricists and co((on sense philosophers so(eti(es spoke this +ay.0 .f the e3istence of pheno(enolo"ical feat,res is indisp,ta!le, it is e=,ally clear that +e have no definitive +ord on the topo"raphy of pheno(enolo"ical space, nor even fir( evidence that s,ch a definitive description (i"ht !e forthco(in". . think, ho+ever, that there is an i(portant sense in +hich this i(plies that o,r talk a!o,t

pheno(enolo"y is 7theory3laden,7 !,t also an i(portant sense in +hich pheno(enolo"ical properties are not 7theoretical.7 *here is a +eak sense of 7theory3ladenness7 +hich i(plies only that the +ay +e descri!e a thin" /any thin"0 is set a"ainst a set of !ack"ro,nd ass,(ptions a!o,t the +orld and a net+ork of interrelated concepts or +ords. .f this kind of net+ork theory of (eanin" is tr,e of lan",a"e "enerally, it is s,rely tr,e of o,r lan",a"e for descri!in" o,r o+n (inds as +ell /,nless, perhaps, one e(!races the kind of pheno(enalist ato(is( that G,ssell espo,sed at one point0. B,t there is also a stron"er sense of 7theory7 that i(plies retroduction , and this has i(plications a!o,t the kind of episte(ic access +e have to a thin". 9n entity or property that is 7theoretical7 in this stron" sense is one s,pposed to e1ist 8,st !eca,se this s,pposition e1plains so(ethin" else. Pl,to +as 7theoretical7 in this sense ,ntil it +as o!served +ith a telescope. Protons are still 7theoretical7 in this sense. B,t it see(s clear to (e that phe3 5 @&1 5 no(enolo"ical properties are al(ost !y definition not 7theoretical7 in this stron" sense /,nless perhaps to so(eone +ho has heard a!o,t the( !,t not e1perienced the(, if that is indeed possi!le0. .f yo, e3perience pheno(enolo"ical properties, it cannot !e the case that yo,r only access to the( is inferential. Po, (ay, of co,rse, hold so(e theory3laden !eliefs a!o,t the( /especially if yo, are a philosopher0, 8,st as +e (ay still hold (any theory3laden !eliefs a!o,t Pl,to /or, for that (atter, a!o,t rocks and ra!!its0. B,t they are not retroducti"e in ori"in or +arrant. 'inally, =,estions a!o,t the 7le"iti(acy7 of pheno(enolo"ical cate"ories are so(eti(es =,estions a!o,t +hether s,ch cate"ories 7c,t nat,re at the 8oints.7 .n partic,lar, one (i"ht +onder if they are /a 0 f,nda(ental as opposed to derivative properties, and /b 0 relevant to the syste(atic description of the +orld characteristic of science or (erely epipheno(enal. 6o+ . think that raisin" the =,estion of +hether pheno(enolo"ical properties are f,nda(ental is i(portant and appropriate at so(e point. B,t it is s,rely a ridic,lo,s iss,e to !rin" ,p early in the "a(e as an atte(pt to discredit pheno(enolo"y. Cartesian physics ta,"ht that li"ht, (a"netis(, and "ravitation +ere derivative fro( (echanical collision. 6e+tonian physics treated "ravitation, li"ht, and (echanical force as separate f,nda(ental forces. 2any people o!8ected to the 6e+tonian vie+ on the "ro,nds that it see(ed to involve action at a distance. 9nd perhaps they +ere ri"ht and perhaps they +ere +ron" to do so. B,t no one /at least no one +ho( +e re(e(!er0 s,""ested that the irred,ci!ility of "ravitation to contact interactions +o,ld ,nderc,t the le"iti(acy of the phenomenon /as opposed to the theory0 of "ravitation. *o do so +o,ld have !een sheer (adness, not to (ention !ad scientific practice. Science ai(s at !ein" syste(atic and ,niversal, !,t it does so !y inte"ratin" disco,rses that are initially local and partic,lar. .f +e sho,ld arrive at a ,nified field theory in physics, it +ill !e !eca,se +e first had serio,s theories of (echanics, "ravitation, electro(a"netis(, and stron" and +eak force. We red,ced che(istry to physics !eca,se +e first had a serio,s che(istry. >ike+ise, if pheno(enolo"y is red,ci!le to so(ethin" else, the only +ay +e +ill discover this is !y takin" pheno(enolo"ical properties serio,sly in their o+n ri"ht, and this (eans co,ntenancin" the possi!ility that they (i"ht !e f,nda(ental in the sense of not !ein" deriva!le fro( nonpheno(enolo"ical properties. 9 posteriori ar",(ents on this s,!8ect are for the end"a(e, not the o,tset. . have never heard a va",ely pla,si!le a priori ar",(ent to the effect that (ental properties (,st not !e f,nda(ental. 5 @&@ 5

'.4.40 Is $)enomenolo*y Essential to Some 1ental StatesD

6e1t, let ,s consider +hether pheno(enolo"ical properties are essential to certain kinds of intentional states. X,estions of essentiality are al+ays diffic,lt, !,t +e (i"ht approach the iss,e !y considerin" so(e e1a(ples of conscio,s (ental episodes and then ask +hether they co,ld re(ain the sa(e kind of episode if deprived of their pheno(enolo"y. Consider first a si(ple kind of percept,al e1perience, s,ch as havin" a percept,al e1perience of a s=,are, +here the e1pression ?percept,al e1perience of a s=,are? is interpreted in that distinctively intentionalistic +ay that does not i(ply a relation to an act,al s=,are. Ef co,rse, one never si(ply has perceptual e1periencesC they are al+ays percept,al e1periences in so(e partic,lar (odalityHa tactile e1perience, say, or a "isual e1perience. So let ,s say the e1perience in =,estion is one of :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 Ls=,areM. 6or(ally, s,ch an e1perience has a partic,lar kind of pheno(enolo"y, !oth in ter(s of its =,alitative ele(ents /not 8,st any confi",ration of =,alia can !e constit,ted as a s=,are0 and its concept,al ones /s=,ares have a different 7feel7 fro( circles or trian"les0.L-M 6or(ally, s,ch e1periences have very co(plicated relations to environ(ental and !ehavioral co,nterfact,als as +ell. E,r nat,ral3lan",a"e attri!,tions tend to !e !ased on ass,(ptions a!o,t s,ch nor(al cases. B,t s,ppose that a !ein" +ere to have states that +ere very si(ilar to o,rs in its relations to the environ(ent and !ehavior, !,t a radically different pheno(enolo"y or no pheno(enolo"y at all. We (i"ht +ell say that it +as in so(e kind of percept,al state, !,t +o,ld +e +ant to say that that state +as :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 K *he ans+er, . think, is not easy. Consider first that +e can o,rselves have perceptions of the sa(e thin"s, and !ehave in si(ilar +ays, on the !asis of several percept,al (odalities. We can feel s=,ares as +ell as see the(, and !lind h,(ans can for( (ost of the sa(e concepts and ne"otiate (ost of the sa(e environ(ents as si"hted h,(ans. .t is 8,st that none of their percept,al states is "isual in nat,re. *he sa(e "oes for echolocation in !ats: pres,(a!ly, echolocation plays a very si(ilar role in !at navi"ation that si"ht plays in h,(an navi"ation, !,t it is a different (odality and pres,(a!ly has a different pheno(enolo"y. B,t to (ake the point (ore clearly, S,r, 4arra"hty, and Goe /19&&0 perfor(ed e1peri(ents +ith ferrets in +hich the optic nerve +as severed and reconnected to nonvis,al tiss,e in the !rain. *he ferrets +ere a!le to respond to vis,al sti(,li in a strikin" display of e=,ipotentiality. S,p3 5 @&# 5 pose that the sa(e thin" co,ld !e done +ith h,(an !ein"s: the evil ;r. 6o re+ires yo,r nervo,s syste( so that yo,r optical si"nals do not "o to the vis,al corte1, !,t so(e+here else. 6o+ the h,(an !rain is pro!a!ly si"nificantly (ore specialiDed than are ferret !rains, +hich lessens the pro!a!ility that the special3p,rpose f,nctions of the h,(an vis,al corte1 co,ld !e d,plicated !y other tiss,eC !,t it is at least +orth entertainin" the possi!ility /a 0 that vis,al sti(,li +o,ld prod,ce, say, a,ditory =,alia, and /b 0 that yo, co,ld !e conditioned to distin",ish so(e kinds of o!8ects on the !asis of these sti(,li, th,s for(in" a ne+ kind of percept,al "estalt. Po,r e1perience (i"ht have the content Ls=,areM, !,t +o,ld !e acco(panied !y aco,stical rather than vis,al =,alia. 6o+ ordinary lan",a"e (i"ht +ell descri!e s,ch an e1perience as 7hearin" shapes7 or the like, !,t a (ore so!er assess(ent +o,ld pro!a!ly !e that the victi( of s,ch re+irin" +as in fact e1periencin" a ne+ kind of percept,al e1perience. )ven if the process co,ld !e done so sea(lessly that the patient co,ld respond to the f,ll panoply of vis,al sti(,li that nor(al h,(ans do +ith the sa(e ran"e of !ehaviors, . think (ost of ,s sho,ld !e loath to call his e1periences :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 , precisely !eca,se of the differences in =,alia. .ndeed, even if so(eone?s !rain +ere +ired like a nor(al h,(an !rain, . sho,ld !e disinclined to call his states :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6S if . so(eho+ ca(e to !elieve that their pheno(enolo"y +as aco,stical.

>ike+ise +ith other intentional states. S,ppose . have a recollection of (y first day at colle"e. *his (ay or (ay not !e acco(panied +ith vis,al or a,ditory i(a"eryC !,t in order to !e a G)CE>>)C*.E6 it (,st !e presented as so(ethin" that happened to me in the past . *his is really a !it tricky, tho,"h. .t is possi!le to !eco(e so en"a"ed in (e(ories, i(a"ination, and partic,larly drea(s that one (istakes the( for c,rrent e1periences. Ho+ever, it is i(portant to distin",ish t+o different iss,es here. So(eti(es, callin" so(ethin" a 7(e(ory7 reports its ca,sal history. 2e(ories are e1periences +hose contents are dred"ed ,p o,t of previo,s e1periences, +hereas, say, perceptions are ca,sed !y one?s environ(ent. *h,s the distinction !et+een (e(ory and perception can !e a distinction of the source of the e1perience. B,t one (i"ht also ,se the sa(e +ords to (ark a distinction in the ind of e3perience involved: that is, a difference in intentional character Hand (ore specifically in (odality. .n the ordinary cases, e1periences that are dred"ed ,p fro( (e(ory have the (odality of G)CE>>)C*.E6 and those ca,sed !y o,r environ(ents have the (odality of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 . .n patholo"ical cases and in drea(s, ho+ever, this need not !e so. We (ay take an i(a"e 5 @&J 5 fro( (e(ory in a drea( and have it presented ,nder the (odality of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 . /*hat is, +e (istakenly !elieve that +e are havin" veridical perceptions +hen in fact +e are replayin" old i(a"ery ,nder the (odality of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 .0 >ike+ise it is possi!le for i(a"ination to ca,se states +ith the (odality of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 . 9nd of co,rse it is possi!le to have states of G)CE>>)C*.E6 that are false (e(ories, or episodes presented as 'G)) '96CP that are in fact i(a"es that are re(e(!ered, and so on. So +hen . say that, say, states of recollection have a distinctive pheno(enolo"y, . (ean precisely that states that present the(selves as recollections do so, and not that states that in fact dra+ ,pon (e(ory share a pheno(enolo"y. *he sa(e (ay !e said for (any other intentional states. So(e, for e1a(ple, have a partic,lar e(otional pheno(enolo"y. . cannot e1perience remorse a!o,t so(e action of (ine, for e1a(ple, +itho,t havin" certain e3periences, re"ardless of ho+ . act. 9 sociopath (i"ht fake re(orse even if he cannot feel it. >ike+ise, . cannot feel re(orse over an action ,nless . represent it as my action, and so on. *he point here is that if +e take a+ay the e1periential character of s,ch states, or chan"e it too drastically, +e are no lon"er left +ith the sa(e kind of state. >et (e hasten to ca,tion the reader, ho+ever, a!o,t several thin"s that are not i(plied !y this. /10 *he pheno(enolo"ical properties of s,ch states need not !e noticed or attended to . Ene can, for e1a(ple, see feat,res of a scene that one does not actively notice . Ene si"n of this is the a!ility to notice later thin"s a!o,t a previo,s e1perience that +ere not noticed at the ti(e. Ene notices a s=,are and later realiDes that it +as set a"ainst a li"hter !ack"ro,nd. /@0 6ot all psycholo"ical distinctions need !e reflected in pheno(enolo"ical distinctions. .t is not clear, for e1a(ple, that different kinds of 8,d"(entH8,d"(ent +ith certainty, con8ect,re, scientific hypothesisHare distin",isha!le !y pheno(enolo"ical feat,res for everyone. /#0 Pheno(enolo"ical typin" need not !e the only valid typin" of psycholo"ical states, and states that differ +ith respect to pheno(enolo"y (ay !e "ro,ped to"ether ,nder a different typin". 'or e1a(ple, there are ,ndo,!tedly typin"s that "ro,p to"ether psycholo"ical (echanis(s +e share +ith other species re"ardless of +hether ani(als are e1periencin" s,!8ects. *here is nothin" partic,larly o,t of the ordinary for t+o o!8ects or events to share one typin" and diver"e +ith respect to another, nor for t+o diver"ent typin"s each to !e ,sef,l for a different kind of in=,iry.

5 @&% 5

'.4.60 ,oes $)enomenolo*y Yield a Classi+i3ation o+ t)e 1entalD

*here are really a variety of =,estions here. .t certainly see(s tr,e that at a certain level of "ran,larity of description, o,r nat,ral distinctions !et+een conscio,s (ental states /e."., !et+een 8,d"(ents and percept,al "estalts and i(a"inin"s0 are acco(panied !y correspondin" pheno(enolo"ical differences. >ike+ise, it see(s clear that +e are in a si"nificantly different epistemic position +ith respect to states that have a pheno(enolo"y and those that do not, s,ch as !eliefs and desires. .f the latter are tr,ly dispositional in nat,re, there is ar",a!ly a si"nificant ontolo"ical difference there as +ell. .t is far less clear that all (eanin"f,l psycholo"ical distinctions, even !et+een states that have a pheno(enolo"y, are reflected in pheno(enolo"ical differences. 'or the ordinary lan",a"e classification of (ental states is likely to prove as (,ch a (i1ed !a" of pheno(enolo"ical, !ehavioral, and theoretical feat,res as is the ordinary lan",a"e classification of speech acts, +hich incl,des lots of co"nitive, social, and e(otional feat,res as +ell as distinctions in illoc,tionary force. *he pro8ect of ta1ono(iDin" speech act ver!s t,rned o,t to !e a (are?s nest !eca,se of this /see 9,stin 196@, 2cCa+ley 19-#, :endler 19-@, 'raser 19&1, Bach and Harnish 19-9, and Searle 1969 and 19-10, and the sa(e (ay hold tr,e of the co((onsense list of (ental states. *he difference !et+een, say, spec,latin" and hypothesiDin" (ay not consist in so(ethin" that has a pheno(enolo"y, !,t ,pon so(ethin" like o,r social conventions a!o,t kinds of thinkin". *he really vital =,estion for o,r p,rposes, ho+ever, concerns the typin" of intentional attitudes and contents accordin" to e1periential invariants. 6o+, +hatever e1periential invariants there are, it see(s clear that they +ill yield some partition of possi!le +orlds: for e1a(ple, !et+een those in +hich . /or (y co,nterpart0 have e1actly the sa(e pheno(enolo"ical properties that . act,ally have and all the rest. *he iss,e is not +hether pheno(enolo"y yields some classification, !,t +hether the classification it yields is a good one. B,t "ood for +hatK .t is certainly a "ood one for descri!in" the (ental fro( a first3person vie+point. /What kind of classification co,ld !e !etter for thatK0 9nd if yo, think that pheno(enolo"y is cr,cial to the (ental, this is itself "ood reason for likin" this classification. B,t there is also another reason for likin" it: it see(s really cr,cial to all the other +ays +e have of classifyin" the (ental. .t see(s to (e that all of the talk a!o,t 7f,nctional classification of 5 @&6 5 the (ental7 is deeply (isleadin" at !est. People spea of f,nctional classification of intentional (odalities and even of contents. B,t yo, never see s,ch a characteriDation prod,ced. . think this is =,ite ironic, as one of the stock ar",(ents a"ainst the !ehaviorists t,rns ,pon e1actly the sa(e ina!ility act,ally to prod,ce a sin"le definition of the sort their theory depends ,pon. When characteriDin" intentional (odalities, rather, +riters like 'odor appeal to the kind of (ental state +e are in +hen +e think, as it +ere, 7>oN a horseN7 B,t this is clearly an appeal to so(ethin" on the (odel of a conscio,s occ,rrent state. We all kno+ +hat kind of (ental state is (eant, !,t only !eca,se +e associate the description +ith a kind of state +e have e1perienced. .t (i"ht !e the case that an ideal psycholo"y co,ld prod,ce a psycholo"ical *,rin" ta!le fro( +hich one co,ld derive characteriDations of each kind of (ental state holdin" the rest as constant. B,t this is s,rely not ho+ +e act,ally "o a!o,t classifyin" the (entalHpro!a!ly not even in the case of !eliefs and desires, and certainly not in the

case of percept,al "estalts and 8,d"(ents and i(a"inin"s. Gather, pheno(enolo"y "ives ,s at least a ro,"h initial classification to start +ith, and +e test this a"ainst o!servations of people?s !ehavior and try to syste(atiDe and refine it thro,"h ri"oro,s (odelin" /incl,din" co(p,ter (odelin"0. .t is not as tho,"h the 7f,nctional classification7 of the (ind i(plied !y so(e disc,ssions of narro+ content +as carried o,t in isolation fro( a pheno(enolo"ically !ased startin" point. /.ndeed, it is not as tho,"h s,ch a classification has ever act,ally !een carried o,t at allHa point that is (issed +ith shockin" re",larity.0 9ny f,nctional classification of the (ental there (i"ht !e is a distillation of a classification that started o,t in pheno(enolo"yHand +hich, . shall ar",e in the ne1t section, (,st ans+er to pheno(enolo"y as +ell. *he notion of 7narro+ content7 is really a kind of theory3laden a!straction fro( pheno(enolo"ical content. /9nd, . e1pect, the f,nctional notion of !elief is ,lti(ately a theory3 laden a!straction fro( conscio,s 8,d"(ents as +ell.0 9s for !road content, that certainly "oes !eyond +hat is present, strictly speakin", in pheno(enolo"y /that is, in intentional character0. B,t, first, it contains i(plications of intentional character: a veridical perception is, a(on" other thin"s, a percept,al "estalt. 9nd, second, it see(s to (e that +riters like H,sserl have !een correct in sayin" that intentional states in so(e sense carry +ith the( their o+n 7conditions of satisfaction.7 Havin" a veridical perception of a do" re=,ires ,s to !e in the ri"ht ca,sal relationship +ith a do". WhyK Beca,se that is !,ilt into the notion of the intentional (odality of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*.E6 . *his 5 @&- 5 is no "reat e(pirical discovery. .t is si(ply an e1plication of +hat is i(plicit in the pheno(enolo"y of this partic,lar intentional (odality. >ike+ise, if the !road content of 7+ater7 is fi1ed !y so(ethin" in the environ(ent, it is !eca,se the intentional character of the state i(plies that it sho,ld !e so. So in short it see(s to (e that it is si(ply !ootless to deride pheno(enolo"ical classification in favor of so(e other kind of classification, since the other kinds of classification that have !een proposed t,rn o,t to depend heavily ,pon o,r prior pheno(enolo"ical ,nderstandin".

'.60 $)enomenolo*y and S3ienti+i3 $sy3)olo*y

9s often as not, those +ho (ini(iDe the role of pheno(enolo"ical properties /or, for that (atter, of the (ental in "eneral0 do so not so (,ch as a re8ection of the reality of s,ch properties or of their ,tility in co((onsense predictions as they do as a re8ection of the idea that s,ch properties +ill play a role in an e1planatory science of psycholo"y. Ef co,rse, it is not ,nco((on on the c,rrent scene for a concept?s incl,sion in the theoretical voca!,lary of a science to !e held ,p as a standard of its ontolo"ical le"iti(acyHa vie+ . shall ar",e a"ainst in chapter 11H!,t really that is a stron"er position than one need take here. .t is eno,"h for the (o(ent to say that pheno(enolo"ical properties, al!eit real, are not the sorts of properties that enter into ca,sal3no(olo"ical relations /e1cept perhaps insofar as they are relia!ly prod,ced as epipheno(ena of !rain events0, and that pheno(enolo"ical typin" +ill correspond to the typin" of a (at,re psycholo"y accidentally if at all. . think that there are certain thin"s that are ri"ht a!o,t this vie+, !,t (any (ore that are (istaken. En the one hand, it is s,rely ri"ht that there are lar"e do(ains of psycholo"y that cannot !e e1plained in ter(s of conscio,s (ental states at all, (,ch less in ter(s of their pheno(enolo"ical feat,res. While perception event,ates in conscio,s states +ith a pheno(enolo"y, the processes that prod,ce this prod,ct are al(ost entirely infraconscio,s. >ike+ise (e(ory and i(a"ination have conscio,s prod,cts, !,t also involve (echanis(s that (,st !e of an entirely different sort. 9nd +hile there are

conscio,s processes of reasonin", association, and inference, there are also nonconscio,s processes that "o !y the sa(e na(esHand even the conscio,s ones (,st have their o+n nonconscio,s (echanis(s +hich s,pport the(. So if the iss,e is one of +hether conscio,s states +ith a pheno(enolo"y can provide the !,lk of 5 @&& 5

'i",re 1#. 'ro( 4aetano BaniDsa, 7S,!8ective Conto,rs,7 Scientific 9(erican @#J /9pril 19-60: %1. Copyri"ht ^ 19-6 !y Scientific 9(erican, .nc. 9ll ri"hts reserved. the e1planatory reso,rces needed !y psycholo"y, the ans+er is s,rely no . En the other hand, there are clearly some kinds of e1planation that do call for appeal to states +ith a pheno(enolo"y. 6ota!ly, +hen +e ask +hy a person spoke or acted in the (anner that she did, +e +ill often appeal not 8,st to dispositional !eliefs and desires, !,t to conscio,s 8,d"(ents and perceptionsH and in partic,lar, +e +ill appeal to the pheno(enolo"ical content of her 8,d"(ents and perceptions. Why did Aane pick ,p the flys+atterK Beca,se the thin" flyin" aro,nd loo ed li e a fly to her . 6ote that =,estions of !road content are irrelevant hereHthe e1planation is ,naffected if all of Aane?s fly3 "estalts +ere ca,sed !y (id"es. >ike+ise narro+ content, if defined in p,rely f,nctional3ca,sal ter(s, does ,s no "ood here: it +on?t do to say that Aane picked ,p the flys+atter !eca,se she +as in the kind of (ental state ca,sed !y flies and res,ltin" in flys+atter "ra!!in" !ehavior. Perhaps even (ore clearly, +e need to appeal to pheno(enolo"ical content to e1plain +hy people !ehave the +ay they do in the case of optical ill,sions like s,!8ective conto,r fi",res, in +hich the s,!8ect 7sees7 a fi",re that is 7not really there7 in the sense that there is no o!8ective reflectance "radient that (akes ,p a fi",re of the type that is seen. 'or e1a(ple, a s,!8ect seein" the BaniDsa s=,are /fi". 1#0 +ill report seein" a li"ht s=,are a"ainst a sli"htly darker !ack"ro,nd, and +ill e1perience !orders (akin" ,p the ed"es of the s=,are, even tho,"h there is no reflectance "radient to !e fo,nd in those positions in the sti(,l,s /see BaniDsa 19-6 and 19-90. 6o+ s,ppose +e ask o,r s,!8ect to respond in one +ay +hen she sees a s=,are and another +ay +hen she sees a fi",re that is not a s=,are. When presented +ith the BaniDsa s=,are, she !ehaves as tho,"h presented +ith a s=,are. Ho+ are +e to e1plain thisK What ,nites the cases of !ein" presented +ith an act,al s=,are +ith the 5 @&9 5 cases of !ein" presented +ith the BaniDsa s=,are, and hence ,nites the !ehaviors involvedK . s,!(it that it is precisely that they share a certain pheno(enolo"yHna(ely, the pheno(enolo"y of e1periences havin" the intentional character of :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 Lli"ht s=,are a"ainst darker !ack"ro,ndM. .n short, it see(s to (e that, +henever it is necessary to appeal to conscio,s states like 8,d"(ents or perceptions to e1plain !ehavior, it +ill very likely !e a typin" accordin" to pheno(enolo"ical content

that +ill !e relevant. 6o+ +hether typin" !y pheno(enolo"ical content +ill prod,ce the kinds of re",larities needed for so(ethin" syste(atic eno,"h to co,nt as a no(olo"ical science is still to !e deter(ined /as is the distinct yet related =,estion of +hether +e co,ld catch s,ch re",larities if they +ere there0. B,t it does see( pla,si!le that at least so(e s,ch e1planations +ill resort to pheno(enolo"ical typin". B,t there is another connection !et+een pheno(enolo"y and scientific psycholo"y that is, to (y (ind, far (ore i(portant. .f pheno(enolo"ical properties (ake ,p a relatively s(all portion of the e3planatory apparatus of psycholo"y, they co(prise a si"nificantly lar"er portion of the phenomena that a scientific psychology needs to e3plain . *hat is, they (ake ,p (,ch of the data of psycholo"y. . think that the case can !e (ade (ost forcef,lly here in the case of the relationship !et+een psychophysics and theoretical +ork in perception. Psychophysics, +hich is vie+ed !y (any as the one area of psycholo"y that has already attained so(e of the !ench(arks of scientific (at,rity, is lar"ely concerned +ith the (eas,re(ent of relationships !et+een sti(,li and the percepts that they prod,ce. *he properties of the sti(,li to !e st,died incl,de thin"s s,ch as the o!8ective intensity of the sti(,l,s and the spatial and te(poral patterns of intensity in sti(,li. Percepts, ho+ever, are e1periencesHthey are pheno(enolo"ical in character. *hey involve properties like ho+ intense a sti(,l,s seems or +hether one seems (ore intense than another, or the +ay the percept is or"aniDed into a percept,al "estalt. . shall disc,ss t+o +ell3kno+n e1peri(ental res,lts fro( the psychophysical literat,re and sho+ ho+ pheno(enolo"y is essential to psychophysics. 'irst, consider the We!er la+s that descri!e the relationship !et+een sti(,l,s intensity and percept intensity in ter(s of a lo"arith(ic la+ /'echner 1&&@0, or, in alternative versions, a po+er la+ /Stevens 19%1, 19-%0. Here the relata are an a!sol,te property of a sti(,l,s /say, its l,(inance0 and the s,!8ective property of a percept /the +ord ?!ri"htness? is often ,sed in contrast +ith ?l,(inance? for this s,!8ective property0. 5 @9$ 5 6o+, first of all, it see(s 8,st inescapa!le here that the pheno(enon +e are after involves a pheno(enolo"ical property. *ake a+ay the property of perceived !ri"htness and there is no We!er la+ left. Second, it see(s e=,ally clear that the kind of description of h,(an perception that the We!er la+ presents is e1actly the sort of thin" that +e sho,ld re=,ire of o,r theories of perception. 9 (odel of perception that does not o!ey the We!er la+ or that does not prod,ce the optical ill,sions that h,(ans e1perience is, to that e1tent at least, a !ad /or at least an inco(plete0 (odel /see *odorovicLQM 19&-0. X,alitative pheno(enolo"y is essential to psychophysical data s,ch as the We!er la+ and provides (,ch of the data for theories of vision and other percept,al (odalities. *he sa(e can !e said for pheno(ena involvin" at least si(ple for(s of intentionality. Consider a"ain the BaniDsa s=,are. Here the psychophysical data sho+ that there is a certain class of conditions ,nder +hich +e 7see7 so(ethin" that 7is not there7Hin this case, +e perceive a s=,are +here there is no s=,are and perceive it as !ri"hter than its !ack"ro,nd +hen in fact the 7interior7 of the 7s=,are7 and its 7!ack"ro,nd7 are act,ally e=,al in l,(inance. *his kind of (is(atch !et+een the 7o!8ective7 feat,res of the sti(,l,s and the 7s,!8ective7 feat,res of the percept tends to !e +hat (akes a "iven sti(,l,s3 percept pair an 7effect7 and renders it of partic,lar psycholo"ical interest. /Po, can?t (ake yo,r rep,tation in e1peri(ental psycholo"y !y findin" that people see s=,ares +hen they are presented +ith s=,aresC if they see s=,ares +hen presented +ith circles, yo, "et to have an effect +ith yo,r na(e in front of it.0 9nd the a!ility to reprod,ce s,ch effects is precisely the sort of thin" that can !e ,sed to test the ade=,acy of a partic,lar (odel of ho+ perception +orks in h,(an !ein"s. 9"ain, o,r data involve a relationship /a (is(atch0 !et+een an o!8ective property of l,(inance distri!,tion and a

pheno(enolo"ical property of seein" a partic,lar kind of fi",re. *ake a+ay the pheno(enolo"y and there is no effect. *ake a+ay the effects and there is no psychophysics. *ake a+ay the psychophysics and there is nothin" for theoretical psycholo"y of perception to e1plain. Unlike the We!er la+, (oreover, s,!8ective conto,r feat,res involve at least a pri(itive for( of intentionality. *he s,!8ect does not (erely e1perience (ore and less intense =,aliaHshe constit,tes the( as a fi",re of a partic,lar kind and shape and constit,tes the fi",re as !ein" in a partic,lar relationship to its !ack"ro,nd. 2oreover, this kind of ill,sion vividly ill,strates +hat Chishol( has cited as the cardinal property of intentionality and intentional o!8ects: the s,!8ect can 7see7 a s=,are +hen there is no s=,are there to !e seen. 5 @91 5 . think that so(e other pheno(enolo"ical properties like+ise provide data that set tasks for psycholo"ical theories. .t see(s clear, for e1a(ple, that the o!8ect3directed character of intentional states is so(ethin" that needs to !e (irrored in any s,ccessf,l theory. /.t has s,rely (otivated (,ch +ork in artificial intelli"ence.0 >ike+ise the perspectival character of conscio,s e1periences: a theory of thinkin" (,st do (ore than provide for the fact that +e think a!o,t o!8ectsC it (,st provide for the fact that +e think a!o,t the( ,nder partic,lar aspects and fro( partic,lar points of vie+. .t (,st, for e1a(ple, acco,nt for the fact that +e can infer the hidden ed"es of fa(iliar three3di(ensional o!8ects, or (ove !et+een different thin"s +e kno+ a!o,t an o!8ect +e are vie+in" +itho,t keepin" all of its kno+n properties !efore the (ind?s eye at once. *he ,lti(ate so,rce of o,r kno+led"e that tho,"ht has these properties is pheno(enolo"ical, and so once a"ain pheno(enolo"y sets constraints on the for( of a scientific psycholo"y.

'.70 W)y $)enomenolo*y Cannot -e Naturali8ed

9 n,(!er of kinds of ar",(ents have !een offered over the years to the effect that so(e one or (ore feat,res of the (ental cannot !e nat,raliDedHfeat,res s,ch as s,!8ectivity, the +hat3it?s3like of e1perience, the first3person perspective, and conscio,sness. . shall e1a(ine so(e variations on ar",(ents of this sort in this section, as +ell as addin" one of (y o+n at the end.

'.7.&0 T)e "r*ument +rom Epistemi3 $ossibility ?Cartesian ,emons Revisited@

*he kinds of episte(olo"ical iss,es involved in old3style tho,"ht e1peri(ents involvin" Cartesian de(ons ste( fro( the pheno(enolo"ical perspective on content. *he Cartesian de(on e1peri(ent is, if nothin" else, a (arvelo,s tool for drivin" a +ed"e !et+een the intentional character of (y (ental states and all =,estions of their veridicality. 9s ;escartes points o,t, . can !e (istaken a!o,t the ca,ses of (y e1periences and a!o,t +hether they correspond to e1tra(ental reality, !,t . cannot !e (istaken in the sa(e +ay a!o,t +hat kind of ideas . a( e1periencin".L&M . can !e s,re that . a( e1periencin" a partic,lar kind of percept,al "estalt, !,t . cannot !e si(ilarly s,re, for instance, that there is indeed a cat !efore (e. 5 @9@ 5 *ho,"ht e1peri(ents involvin" s,ch e1otica as !rains in vats and Cartesian de(ons do not en8oy the

pop,larity that once they en8oyed. *here are no do,!t a n,(!er of factors contri!,tin" to their decline. Ene +o,ld pro!a!ly !e the shift a+ay fro( episte(olo"ical interests in the philosophy of (ind. 9nother +o,ld !e a shift in interest fro( providin" acco,nts involvin" lo"ically necessary and s,fficient conditions to findin" acco,nts that are e(pirically ade=,ate. Considerations of necessity and s,fficiency do see( to !e in order +ith acco,nts that p,rport to provide a stron" nat,raliDation, tho,"h. .f (ental3se(antic properties are to s,pervene ,pon nat,ralistic properties, those nat,ralistic properties (,st provide s,fficient conditions for the(. 9nd if the res,ltin" acco,nt is to !e an acco,nt of the nat,re or essence of (ental3se(antics or intentionality, it had !est !e necessary as +ell: if an o!8ect co,ld have a property A +hile lackin" % , then % cannot !e essential to A . 6o+ . think that so(e of the traditional tho,"ht e1peri(ents are +ell s,ited to sho+in" that nat,ralistic properties are neither necessary nor s,fficient for intentionality or (ental3se(antics. >et ,s !e"in +ith necessity. *he notions of s,pervenience and of instantiation analyses the(selves clai( nothin" a!o,t the necessity of the conditions they provide. .f A s,pervenes ,pon % , it does not follo+ that % is a necessary condition for A C and if A is "iven an instantiation analysis in ter(s of % , it si(ilarly does not follo+ that % is a necessary condition for A . B,t this is in so(e +ays very (isleadin". When people say that the s,pervenience of A ,pon % does not involve a necessary relation fro( A to % , +hat they tend to !e concerned +ith is the lo+er3order physical properties thro,"h +hich a (ental property is realiDedH+ith the fact that it does not (atter +hether the ,nderlyin" str,ct,re is +et+are or hard+are or +hatever. B,t +hen people try to "ive a nat,ralistic acco,nt of intentionality, they tend not to !e specifyin" the instantiatin" syste( at that lo+ a level, !,t in ter(s of notions s,ch as ca,sal covariation, adaptational role, or infor(ation content. *hese notions for( an inter(ediate level of e1planation that is ne,tral as to ,nderlyin" str,ct,re. 9nd theorists +ho propose s,ch theories "enerally do take it that the conditions they artic,late at these intermediate le"els are necessary conditions for intentionality and (ental3se(antics. 2illikan, for e1a(ple, is =,ite clear a!o,t this: a !ein" that does not share o,r adaptational history not only does not share o,r partic,lar !eliefs, it does not have !eliefs at allN Si(ilarly stron" vie+s (i"ht !e i(p,ted to ca,sal covariation theorists. .n 'odor?s acco,nt, it is a necessary condition for a representation of type M+ to (ean 7, 7 that M+ ?s are so(eti(es ca,sed !y , ?s. Si(ilarly, +ith 5 @9# 5 ;retske?s acco,nt, a representation cannot (ean 7, 7 if its type +as never ca,sed !y a , in the learnin" period. So +hile the lan",a"e of s,pervenience and token physicalis( s,""ests that nat,ralistic e1planations do not provide necessary conditions, this is !elied !y act,al practice of theorists. ;ither accounts in terms of causal co"ariance and adaptational role are not naturalistic accounts, or the best! no'n contemporary naturalistic accounts of intentionality in"ol"e a commitment to pro"iding necessary conditions . 9nd this see(s =,ite appropriate in a +ay, since s,ch theorists clai( to provide acco,nts of the nature or essence of (ental3se(antics and intentionality. *his !ein" said, . think that there is "ood reason to !elieve that nat,ralistic acco,nts of these sorts do not s,cceed in providin" necessary conditions, for reasons that (ay !e developed !y +ay of so(e fa(iliar sorts of tho,"ht e1peri(ents. Consider the Cartesian scenario of a !ein" that has e1periences 8,st like o,rs, not !eca,se he is in fact co(in" into contact +ith el( trees and +oodch,cks, !,t !eca,se he is !ein" syste(atically deceived !y a (alicio,s de(on. S,ch a scenario is clearly i(a"ina!le, since one cannot reach Cartesian certainty that it is not in fact an acc,rate description of one?s o+n case. /*here is, after all, no e1peri(ent one can perfor( to deter(ine +hether one?s e1periences are veridical or syste(atically (isleadin".0 9nd there see(s little reason to deny that s,ch a scenario is lo"ically possi!le. 6o+ a !ein" in s,ch a state +o,ld !e in (any of the sa(e sorts of intentional states that +e

are in3that is, states +ith the sa(e attit,de and the sa(e pheno(enolo"ical content. /Whether yo, have percept,al "estalts or recollections, after all, does not depend on +hether yo, t,rn o,t to !e the victi( of a Cartesian de(on.0 B,t it +o,ld not share (ost of o,r nat,ralistic properties. .n partic,lar, the intentional states it has +o,ld not !e hooked ,p to the +orld in the +ays called for !y a respecta!le nat,ralistic psycholo"y. *ho,"hts a!o,t do"s are not ca,sed !y do"s, nor are !eliefs a!o,t el( trees ca,sed !y el( trees, and the !ein" (ay not even have the ancestors re=,isite for an adaptational history. 9ll of his !eliefs are de(on3ca,sed /altho,"h they are not a!o,t de(ons0. Here +e have an e1a(ple of a !ein" that has (eanin"f,l intentional states !,t does not share the nat,ralistic descriptions that apply to ,s. 9 fortiori, it is possi!le for a !ein" to !e in a state +ith a (ental3se(antic property M +hile lackin" nat,ralistic property / . *herefore 6 cannot !e a necessary condition for M . *herefore nat,ralistic properties cannot !e necessary conditions for (ental3se(antic properties. .t re(ains to consider s,fficiency. .n order for there to !e an instan3 5 @9J 5 tiation analysis of so(e (ental3se(antic property M in ter(s of so(e nat,ralistic property / , it (,st !e the case that / is s,fficient for M . .ndeed, it (,st !e the case that so(eone +ho had an ade=,ate ,nderstandin" of / +o,ld !e a!le to infer M fro( / . So if there can !e cases of an entity possessin" / !,t lackin" M, / is not a s,fficient condition for M , and hence one cannot have an instantiation analysis of M in ter(s of / . >et ,s no+ !rin" so(e (odal int,itions into play. .t see(s to !e i(a"ina!le, and hence pla,si!ly (etaphysically possi!le, that there (i"ht !e !ein"s +ho +ere co(pletely like ,s in physical str,ct,re and in !ehavioral (anifestations, yet lacked the kind of interiority, or first3person perspective, that +e have. When one st,!s her toe, she says 7E,chN7 and +ithdra+s her foot, !,t she has no e1perience of pain. When one is asked to co((ent ,pon Shakespeare, she ,tters thin"s that so,nd every !it as intelli"ent as +hat a rando(ly selected h,(an !ein" (i"ht say, !,t she never has any (ental e1periences of ponderin" a =,estion or hittin" ,pon an insi"ht. .f one co,ld co(e ,p +ith a talented telepath, the telepath +o,ld deliver the verdict that nothin" (ental is "oin" on inside this !ein". *hese !ein"s, !y stip,lation, share all of o,r nat,ral properties, yet they do not enter into any of the paradi"( e1a(ples of (ental states. Hence nat,ralistic properties do not provide s,fficient conditions for intentional states, either.

'.7.20 "n bBe3tion= 1etap)ysi3al and ANomolo*i3alA Su++i3ien3y

Ene concern . can e1pect this ar",(ent to raise +o,ld !e that people interested in s,pervenience acco,nts tend to vie+ the kind of s,fficiency involved not as logical or metaphysical s,fficiency, as . have ass,(ed, !,t as so(ethin" called 7no(olo"ical s,fficiency.7 . (,st confess to so(e p,DDle(ent a!o,t +hat is (eant !y 7no(olo"ical s,fficiency.7 .t (,st (ean so(ethin" (ore than material s,fficiency, since (aterially s,fficient conditions (ay !e co(pletely ,nrelated to +hat they are conditions for. .f the tallest (an +ho ever lived +as in fact (arried to the first +o(an to cli(! )verest, and +as her only h,s!and, then !ein" (arried to the first +o(an to cli(! )verest is (aterially s,fficient for !ein" the tallest (an +ho ever lived. B,t s,rely no(olo"ical s,fficiency a(o,nts to (ore than this. Perhaps no(olo"ical s,fficiency a(o,nts to so(ethin" like 7(aterial s,fficiency in all possi!le +orlds that have the sa(e nat,ral la+s as the act,al +orld.7 B,t, accordin" to the tho,"ht

5 @9% 5 e1peri(ent a!ove, the +orld descri!ed is like the act,al +orld in all physical la+s. .f these ass,red that the psychophysical relationships (,st !e the sa(e the +ay fi1in" yo,r statistical (echanics fi1es yo,r ther(odyna(ics, +e sho,ld !e a!le to deri"e this fact the +ay +e can do so in the case of ther(odyna(ics. B,t this see(s plainly to !e i(possi!le. .t see(s, then, that nat,ralistic conditions +o,ld not !e nomologically s,fficient for intentionality either. B,t perhaps no(olo"ical s,fficiency does not apply to all +orlds +ith nat,ral la+s like o,r o+n, !,t only ones specified !y a certain co,nterfact,al. B,t +hich co,nterfact,alK 9nd ho+ do +e kno+ that a +orld like the one descri!ed a!ove does not fall +ithin the scope of itK .ndeed, ho+ does one kno+ that the actual +orld (eets the desired criterionK B,t perhaps no(olo"ical s,fficiency is (aterial s,fficiency in all +orlds sharin" psycho physical la+s +ith the act,al +orld. *his stip,lation, ho+ever, +o,ld !e inad(issi!le for t+o reasons. 'irst, this violates the condition of stron" nat,ralis( that the relation !e (etaphysically necessary and episte(ically transparent. Second, +e do not kno+ that the nat,ralistic criteria are (et in the act,al +orld. 'inally, let ,s !e =,ite clear a!o,t separatin" the =,estion of lo"ical possi!ility fro( the =,estion of +arranted !elief. 6o one is clai(in" that it is reasona!le to !elieve that one is, for e1a(ple, in the cl,tches of a Cartesian de(on. 9nd +hile so(e people do clai( that there are non(aterial thinkin" !ein"s, their ,se in this kind of e1a(ple is not !ased ,pon the likelihood of their e1istence, !,t ,pon their possi!ility. .f one has an acco,nt of +hat it is to !e in a (eanin"f,l (ental state, it had !etter apply to all possi!le !ein"s that co,ld have s,ch (ental states. Ge"ardless of the li elihood of Cartesian de(ons or none(!odied spirits, if they are possible, then an acco,nt of the nat,re of intentionality had !est apply to the( too.

'.7.40 T)e $)enomenolo*i3al AW)at9It5s9#i/eA

9 n,(!er of +riters have ar",ed that at least so(e (ental states /the conscio,s ones0 have an e1periential =,ality for the s,!8ect of the e1perience that is not capt,red in any third3person 7o!8ective7 characteriDations. *his point no+ see(s +idely accepted +ith respect to =,alitative states s,ch as pain: even if +e kno+ that C3fi!er firin"s are the physiolo"ical !asis of pain, a co(plete kno+led"e of the ne,rolo"y of C3fi!er firin"s co,ld not yield an ,nderstandin" of +hat pain feels li e . *o kno+ +hat pain feels like, yo, have to feel it. 9nd like+ise for other =,alia: a !lind person +ho kno+s state3of3 the3art theory in electro3 5 @96 5 (a"netis(, optics, and the physiolo"y of vision +ill not there!y "ain a kno+led"e of ho+ (a"enta looks, and so on /see Aackson 19&@0. *ho(as 6a"el has developed this point fa(o,sly in an article entitled 7What .s .t >ike to Be a BatK7 /19-J0, in +hich he points o,t that a sensory (odality like echolocation +o,ld, like vision, have its o+n pheno(enolo"yC and lackin" this fac,lty, +e cannot i(a"ine +hat it +o,ld !e like to have it. While (any +riters in philosophy of (ind ackno+led"e that there is a pro!le( for nat,ralistic theories in tryin" to e1plain =,alia, it is less often reco"niDed that there is a si(ilar pro!le( for intentional states, +hich also have a pheno(enolo"y. *ake percept,al e1periences, like seein" a do" in the yard. *here is a +hat3it?s3like to seein" a do" in the yard, and it is different fro( +hat it?s like to see a pine tree in the yard /chan"e of content0 and fro( +hat it?s like to i(a"ine a do" in the yard /chan"e of intentional (odality0. 9nd the differences here are not 8,st differences in =,alia. S,ppose yo, are at the

+a1 (,se,(. Po, t,rn the corner and see a fa(iliar face and say, 72y "oshN *hat?s Bill ClintonN7 Po, have an intentional state of the for(: :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 LBill ClintonM. B,t then yo, re(e(!er +here yo, are and correct yo,rself. 7Eh,7 yo, say, 7that?s 8,st a +a1 replica of Bill ClintonN Boy a( . a dopeN7 Po,r intentional state chan"es fro( :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 LBill ClintonM to :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 L+a1 stat,e of Bill ClintonM. *he =,alia have not chan"edC it is 8,st the content of the "estalt that has chan"ed. B,t part of that "estalt is concept,al, and that concept,al part has a pheno(enolo"y. *he difference !et+een havin" an e1perience of seein" Bill Clinton and that of seein" a replica of Bill Clinton is not 8,st a f,nctional difference in ho+ they relate to !ehavior and other (ental statesHthey are different as e3periences as +ell. >ike+ise in percept,al ill,sions like the 6ecker c,!e and the faces3vase ill,sion: the =,alia re(ain the sa(e +hile the interpretation chan"esC !,t clearly there is a difference in +hat it is like to see the faces and +hat it is like to see the vase. *he sa(e point can !e (ade +ith 6a"el?s !at. Percept,al (odalities are a(on" the sorts of thin"s that have a pheno(enolo"y. B,t this pheno(enolo"y is not confined to individ,al =,alia. *here are +ays of constit,tin" thin"s as o!8ects in vis,al perception, in to,ch, in hearin"C and in perception one sit,ates oneself relative to the o!8ects one constit,tes as !ein" in one?s presence. 9 person lackin" one of the sensory (odalities is indeed ,na!le to ,nderstand the =,alia associated +ith that (odalityC !,t she is also ,na!le to ,nderstand +hat it is like to constit,te o!3 5 @9- 5 8ects ,nder that (odality. 'or e1a(ple, there are people !lind fro( !irth +ho have had operations that restore the inte"rity of the vis,al path+ay and +ho, as a conse=,ence, s,ddenly e1perience vis,al =,alia. 2any s,ch people are already co(petent at identifyin" o!8ects and persons !y so,nd and to,ch, !,t this a!ility does not translate to the for(ation of vis,al "estalts. *he person +ith restored vis,al path+ays s,ddenly kno+s +hat vis,al =,alia are like, !,t not vis,al perceptions . /.n fact, they tend to feel =,ite disoriented !y vivid !,t ,ninterpreta!le vis,al =,alia.0 Perception is characteriDed !y a partic,lar kind of intentional as opposed to qualitati"e e1perience that essentially involves constit,tin" so(ethin" as an o!8ect. E!8ect e1periences involvin" a sensory (odality involve o!8ect3constit,tin" operations that are (odality3specific. Pres,(a!ly the sa(e +o,ld hold tr,e +ith echolocation. We co,ld perhaps !,ild prosthetic devices that +o,ld d,plicate the f,nction of the !at?s vocal cords and ears and s,r"ically connect their o,tp,t to so(e portion of the h,(an !rain. Perhaps the s,!8ect +o,ld even e1perience so(e ne+ =,alia. B,t this in itself +o,ld not add ,p to echolocation ,ntil there +ere also e1periences correspondin" to the concept,al representation of o!8ects ,nder partic,lar aspects +ithin this sensory (odality. *o kno+ +hat it is like to !e a !at, it is not eno,"h to kno+ +hat it is like to have the !at?s =,aliaC +e +o,ld also have to have the !at?s e1periences of constit,tin" o!8ects on the !asis of those =,alia as +ell. 6a"el and others ,r"e ,pon ,s the idea that the +hat3it?s3like of e1periences cannot !e acco,nted for in none1periential ter(s. .n so(e cases, the ar",(ent appears to !e an episte(ic one: Aackson /19&@0, for e1a(ple, appears to ar",e as follo+s: /10 9 person co,ld kno+ the ne,rophysiolo"y of a (ental state !,t fail to kno+ +hat (ental state it +as. /@0 .f yo, can "ive an acco,nt of , in ter(s of 1 , then an ade=,ate kno+led"e of 1 sho,ld let yo, kno+ yo, +ere dealin" +ith , . D /#0 Po, cannot "ive an acco,nt of (ental states in ter(s of their ne,rophysiolo"y. Searle and 6a"el, ho+ever, clai( that their point is (etaphysical as +ell: na(ely, that the pheno(enolo"ical +hat3it?s3like is a property of conscio,s (ental states. Searle points o,t, for

e1a(ple, that so(e thin"s have a +hat3it3feels3like +hile others do not, and ar",es f,rther that the ,nit3 5 @9& 5 in" feat,re for those that do is conscio,sness: *he disc,ssion of intentionality nat,rally leads into the s,!8ective feel of o,r conscio,s states. . . . S,ffice it to say here that the s,!8ectivity necessarily involves the +hat3it3feels3 like aspect of conscio,s states. So, for e1a(ple, . can reasona!ly +onder +hat it feels like to !e a dolphin and s+i( aro,nd all day, frolickin" in the ocean, !eca,se . ass,(e dolphins have conscio,s e1periences. B,t . cannot in that sense +onder +hat it feels like to !e a shin"le nailed to a roof year in and year o,t, !eca,se in the sense in +hich +e are ,sin" the e1pression, there isn?t anythin" at all that it feels like to !e a shin"le, !eca,se shin"les are not conscio,s. /Searle 199@: 1#131#@0 .n a sense, tho,"h, the real cr,1 of the (atter is neither p,rely episte(olo"ical nor p,rely (etaphysical: the real iss,e is +hether yo, can "ive an account of the e1periential +hat3it?s3like in third3person nat,ralistic ter(s. .f the kind of 7acco,nt7 yo, +ant is a stron" nat,raliDation, yo, need lo"ical s,fficiency and concept,al ade=,acy. 9nd it does not look as tho,"h yo, are "oin" to "et either of those thin"s. 9 person +ho did not have a co((onsense notion of heat co,ld still derive ther(odyna(ic la+s fro( the (echanics of particle collisions. B,t a person +ho did not kno+ +hat a vis,al "estalt +as like co,ld not derive that fro( a kno+led"e of optics and the physiolo"y of vision, or indeed fro( any list of sciences yo, (i"ht "ive. *he sciences as +e kno+ the( 8,st do not see( to have the ri"ht concept,al reso,rces to "enerate the necessary concepts. *o !e s,re, the physiolo"y of vision can e1plain +hy o,r pheno(enolo"ical color space has so(e of the properties it has. /4iven contin"ent relations !et+een partic,lar =,alia and partic,lar !odily states, it can e1plain +hy certain for(s of color !lindness occ,r, ho+ color perception is affected !y sat,rated li"htin", +hy partic,lar optical ill,sions occ,r and not others, etc.0 >ike+ise, an acco,nt of the vis,al cascade thro,"h the vis,al corte1 (ay e1plain +hy +e can detect certain pri(itive shapes and not others and +hy +e are s,!8ect to certain ill,sions. 9nd they +ill hopef,lly tell ,s +hat !rain processes are involved in the very e1periences +e descri!e in pheno(enolo"ical ter(s. What they do not see( to have the reso,rces to do is e1plain the pheno(enolo"ical 7feel7 of those e1periences. .t is, of co,rse, risky to (ake ar",(ents a!o,t +hat cannot !e done. En the other hand, it see(s clear at this point that any ass,rance that +e can derive pheno(enolo"y fro( ne,roscience the +ay +e can derive ther(odyna(ics fro( statistical (echanics places a "reat deal of none(pirically !ased faith in the idea that 5 @99 5 a partic,lar paradi"( of e1planation can !e applied ,niversally. *his kind of nat,ralis( see(s to !e (ore ideolo"y than +ell3ar",ed position.

'.7.60 $erspe3tive, SubBe3tivity, and t)e #o*i3al Resour3es o+ Natural S3ien3e

6e1t, let ,s consider t+o other feat,res of intentional states that so(e +riters think render the( ins,scepti!le to nat,raliDation. 'irst, Searle points o,t that intentional states are perspecti"al in character: 2y conscio,s e1periences, ,nlike the o!8ects of the e1periences, are al+ays perspectival.

*hey are al+ays fro( a point of vie+. B,t the o!8ects the(selves have no point of vie+. . . . 6oticin" the perspectival character of conscio,s e1perience is a "ood +ay to re(ind o,rselves that all intentionality is aspectual . Seein" an o!8ect fro( a point of vie+, for e1a(ple, is seein" it ,nder certain aspects and not others. . . . )very intentional state has +hat . call an aspectual shape . /Searle 199@: 1#10 Second, an e1perience al+ays involves a first3person perspective. 9nd that first3person perspective is one of the identity conditions for the e1perience. Po, can have an e1perience 8,st like (ine, !,t yo, cannot have (y e1perience. )ven if yo, +ere a telepath or e(path like the ones depicted in science fiction stories, yo, +o,ld not !e e1periencin" (y tho,"hts and e(otions, !,t reprod,cin" the( in yo,r o+n (ind ,nder so(e intentional (odality distinctive to telepaths or e(paths. Er, as Searle p,ts it, 7'or it to !e a pain, it (,st !e somebody$s painC and this in a (,ch stron"er sense than the sense in +hich a le" (,st !e so(e!ody?s le", for e1a(ple. >e" transplants are possi!leC in that sense, pain transplants are not7 /i!id., 9J0. Here a"ain it is possi!le to interpret the case in episte(ic or in (etaphysical ter(s. B,t here a"ain . think the real iss,e lies in the possi!ility of e3plaining s,!8ectivity and aspect,al shape in third3person, 7o!8ective,7 nat,ralistic ter(s. 9nd there is a +eaker and a stron"er variation of the case a"ainst nat,raliDation here. 'irst the +eaker one. *he pro8ect of e1plainin" intentionality in nat,ralistic ter(s is one of ,nitin" t+o !odies of disco,rseHthe lan",a"es of t+o sciences, if yo, +ill. /Er, if yo, do not think disco,rse a!o,t e1perience is scientific, a science and a nonscience.0 >et ,s call the lan",a"e of o,r nat,ralistic disco,rse / and that of o,r pheno(enolo"ical psycholo"y , . *he =,estion is, does / have the ri"ht kind of concept,al reso,rces for ,s to derive , fro( / 5 #$$ 5 in the +ay, say, that +e derive ther(odyna(ics fro( statistical (echanics, or perhaps even the +ay +e 7derive7 arith(etic fro( set3theoretic constr,ctionsK 9nd there are feat,res of aspect,al shape and s,!8ectivity that "ive ,s reason to s,ppose that the ans+er (ay +ell !e no . *he reason s,!8ectivity and aspect,al shape pose pro!le(s for the +o,ld3!e nat,raliDer is that a disco,rse that enco(passes s,!8ectivity and aspect,al shape +o,ld see( to re=,ire lo"ical feat,res that do not see( to !e present in the lan",a"es ,sed for the nat,ral sciences. *his, . think, is +hat Searle is after +hen he says that 7the +orld itself has no point of vie+, !,t (y access to the +orld thro,"h (y conscio,s states is al+ays perspectival, al+ays fro( (y point of vie+7 /Searle 199@: 9J39%0 and 7(y conscio,s e1periences, ,nlike the o!8ects of the e1periences, are al+ays perspectival. *hey are al+ays fro( a point of vie+. B,t the o!8ects the(selves have no point of vie+7 /i!id., 1#10. B,t if Searle is ri"ht a!o,t the !asic iss,e here, he is +ron" a!o,t the specific for( it takes +ith respect to aspect,al shape. .t is tr,e of co,rse that o!8ects the(selves are nonperspectivalC !,t it is also tr,e that all of the sciences do represent o!8ects ,nder partic,lar aspects: say, as !odies havin" a (ass or as livin" !ein"s. *he pro!le( is not in "ettin" a perspective into o,r disco,rse, !,t +ith the fact that disco,rse a!o,t (ental states re=,ires that +e !,ild a second layer of perspective into that disco,rse: to attri!,te an intentional state to so(eone is not (erely for us to represent an o!8ect ,nder an aspect, !,t to represent a person as representin" an o!8ect ,nder an aspect. 9nd it is not at all clear that the reso,rces for this are present in the kind of disco,rse fo,nd in the nat,ral sciences. >ike+ise +ith s,!8ectivity. *he special pro!le( here is that, in order to talk a!o,t (y e1perience as e1perience, . have to talk a!o,t it as essentially mine, as e1perienced fro( a first3person perspective. 9nd this see(s to re=,ire a lan",a"e that has reso,rces for e1pressin" first3person as +ell as third3 person state(ents. B,t the lan",a"es of the nat,ral sciences ar",a!ly lack s,ch reso,rces. 9s 6a"el

ar",es, a co(plete description of the +orld in third3person ter(s, incl,din" the person . happen to !e, see(s to leave o,t one cr,cial kind of fact: the fact that that person is me . . interpret 6a"el to (ean !y this that third3person disco,rse, even third3person psychological disco,rse, lacks a +ay of linkin" itself into the first3person disco,rse that is vital to o,r description of o,r (ental lives. *his see(s to (e to !e a po+erf,l o!8ection to the pro8ect of stron" nat,raliDation. .f the kinds of disco,rse e(ployed in the nat,ral sciences lack the lo"ical and concept,al reso,rces to "enerate the kind of disco,rse 5 #$1 5 needed to talk a!o,t s,!8ectivity and aspect,al shape, then these feat,res of o,r (ental lives cannot !e stron"ly nat,raliDed. 9nd if these feat,res are part and parcel of the pheno(enon +e call 7intentionality,7 then intentionality cannot !e stron"ly nat,raliDed either.

'.7.70 T)e bBe3tive Sel+ and t)e Trans3endental E*o

9n even (ore radical variation on the sa(e sort of clai( is, . think, to !e fo,nd in the +ritin"s of Bant, H,sserl, and Witt"enstein. *hese +riters see( to note that every intentional tho,"ht re=,ires an analysis that involves at least three feat,res: /10 a thinker /the 7transcendental e"o70, /@0 a content /(eanin", or Sinn 0, and /#0 an o!8ect ai(ed at /the 7intentional o!8ect70. Ho+ever, it is i(portant to noteHas Bant, Witt"enstein, and H,sserl do and (any other +riters do notHthat these 7feat,res7 in the analysis of intentional states do not f,nction in e1perience as three things, !,t as aspects or features of a seamless unity . Witt"enstein e1presses this as follo+s in the Tractatus: %.6#1 *here is no s,ch thin" as the s,!8ect that thinks or entertains ideas. .f . +rote a !ook called The Corld as I found it, . sho,ld have to incl,de a report on (y !ody, and sho,ld have to say +hich parts +ere s,!ordinate to (y +ill, and +hich +ere not, etc., this !ein" a (ethod of isolatin" the s,!8ect, or rather of sho+in" that in an i(portant sense there is no s,!8ectC for it alone co,ld not !e (entioned in the !ook .H %.6#@ *he s,!8ect does not !elon" to the +orld: rather it is a li(it of the +orld. Where in the +orld is a (etaphysical s,!8ect to !e fo,ndK Po, +ill say that this is e1actly like the case of the eye and the vis,al field. B,t really yo, do not see the eye. 9nd nothin" in the "isual field allo+s yo, to infer that it is seen !y an eye. %.6J Here it can !e seen that solipsis(, +hen its i(plications are follo+ed


o,t strictly, coincides +ith p,re realis(. *he self of solipsis( shrinks to a point +itho,t e1tension, and there re(ains the reality co3ordinated +ith it. %.6J1 *h,s there really is a sense in +hich philosophy can talk a!o,t the self in a non3psycholo"ical +ay. What !rin"s the self into philosophy is the fact that ?the +orld is (y +orld.? *he philosophical self is not the h,(an !ein", not the h,(an !ody, or the h,(an so,l, +ith +hich psycholo"y deals, !,t rather the (etaphysical s,!8ect, the li(it of the +orldHnot a part of it. /Witt"enstein 1961, (y ,nderlinin"0

5 #$@ 5 H,sserl si(ilarly speaks of intentional e1perience as a ,nity enco(passin" s,!8ect, (eanin", and o!8ect. He +rites that the e1periencin" )"o is still nothin" that (i"ht !e taken for itself and (ade into an o!8ect of in=,iry on its o'n acco,nt. 9part fro( its 7+ays of !ein" related7 or 7+ays of !ehavin",7 it is co(pletely e(pty of essential co(ponents, it has no content that co,ld !e ,nravelled, it is in and for itself indescri!a!le: p,re )"o and nothin" f,rther. /Ideas _&$0 Bant like+ise speaks of the transcendental e"o only in the conte1t of the transcendental ,nity of apperceptionHthat is, the possi!ility of the 7. think7 acco(panyin" every possi!le tho,"ht /Critique of ,ure +eason, Sec. @, _16, B1#10. *he reason this distinction see(s i(portant is that, if +riters like Witt"enstein and H,sserl are ri"ht, the "reat divide lies not so (,ch !et+een mental and physical ob4ects as !et+een disco,rse a!o,t the /lo"ical0 structure of e3perience and disco,rse a!o,t ob4ects "enerally /incl,din" tho,"hts treated as o!8ects0. En this vie+, +hen one co(es to a proper ,nderstandin" of thinkin", +hat one finds there are not several interrelated things /the self, the intentional state, the content, and the o!8ect3as3intended0, !,t a sin"le act of thinkin" that has a certain lo"ical str,ct,re that involves it !ein" /a 0 the thinkin" of so(e s,!8ect /b 0 ai(in" at so(e o!8ect /c 0 !y +ay of a certain content !ein" intended ,nder a certain (odality. .t is possi!le, of co,rse, to perfor( an act of analysis +here!y one directs one?s attention separately to self, content, (odality, and intentional o!8ect. 9nd +hen one does that, each of these thin"s co(es to occ,py the 7o!8ect7 slot of another intentional act. .ndeed, fro( the perspective of the analysis of e1perience, 'hat it is to be an ob4ect is to be a possible occupant of the ob4ect!slot of an intentional act .L9M B,t if this is so, then the lo"ical str,ct,re of intentional states is in so(e sense lo"ically prior to the notion of o!8ect, and the ta"s ?e1periencin" self?, ?content?, and ?o!8ect?, as they are applied to (o(ents or aspects of e1periencin", are not na(es of interrelated o!8ects. .ndeed, they are not ob4ects and hence are not related /since relations can only relate o!8ects0.L1$M 6o+ if this is ri"ht, the task of relating o!8ectival and e1periential disco,rse !eco(es all the harder: relations are thin"s that o!tain !et+een o!8ects. .f the 7.7 and the content that appear in e1periential analysis do not appear there as o!8ects, there can !e no =,estion of relatin" the( to thin"s appearin" in disco,rse a!o,t o!8ects. *here can !e no =,estion of o!8ectival3e1periential relations, !eca,se in the

e1periential analysis, 5 #$# 5 the e1periencin" 7.7 and the content do not appear as o!8ects at all. 6or is it possi!le to 7cash o,t7 the lo"ical str,ct,re of intentional e1perience in ter(s of relations !et+een o!8ects, for reasons already descri!ed. /Er, as H,sserl s,""ests, at least doin" so necessarily involves a distortion of one?s s,!8ect (atter.0 *he only other +ay to !rid"e the Cartesian divide !et+een (ind and nat,re, it +o,ld see(, +o,ld !e to find a +ay to s,!s,(e o!8ectival disco,rse +ithin e1periential disco,rse, as H,sserl tries to do in his transcendental pheno(enolo"y. . shall not p,rs,e this possi!ility here, !,t shall point o,t that it see(s ri"ht in at least one re"ard: na(ely, that intentional character is in a certain +ay concept,ally anterior to the notion of an o!8ect in the +orld. 'or it is the content of an intentional state that lays do+n the satisfaction conditions deter(inin" +hat kind of o!8ect or state of affairs +o,ld have to e1ist in order for the state to !e f,lfilled. .t is the content 7,nicorn7 that specifies +hat criteria so(ethin" +o,ld have to f,lfill to !e a real ,nicorn, and not vice versa. /.t is, of co,rse, possi!le si(ply to live +ith the dissatisfyin" res,lt that there is an ,n!rid"ea!le "ap !et+een t+o disparate real(s of disco,rse. *o those ,neasy +ith s,ch a ",lf, . heartily reco((end a caref,l consideration of the kind of co(!ination of transcendental idealis( and transcendental realis( advocated !y H,sserl.0

'.7.(0 T)e "r*ument +rom t)e C)ara3ter0Veridi3ality ,istin3tion

'inally, it see(s to (e that there is a fairly strai"htfor+ard ar",(ent to the effect that intentional character cannot !e acco,nted for in nat,ralistic ter(s. .ntentional character +as defined in ter(s of the aspects of intentional states that are invariant ,nder alternative ass,(ptions a!o,t e1tra(ental reality. Hence, it sho,ld !e clear that any analysis +e (i"ht "ive of intentional character (,st not depend ,pon anythin" outside the do(ain of e1perience. 6ota!ly, it (,st not depend ,pon any pres,(ptions a!o,t /a 0 correspondence to e1tra(ental o!8ects, /b 0 the ca,ses of the intentional states, or /c 0 ontolo"ical ass,(ptions a!o,t the (ind. 'or havin" an e1perience +ith the character of, say, :.SU9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 L,nicorn on (y front la+nM is co(pati!le /a Z0 +ith there !ein" or not !ein" a ,nicorn there, /b Z0 +ith the e1perience !ein" ca,sed !y a ,nicorn ,nder nor(al li"htin" conditions, a do" ,nder a!nor(al conditions, >S;, or a Cartesian de(on, and /c Z0 +ith (aterialis(, d,alis(, transcendental idealis(, 9ristotelianis(, and 2iddle Platonis(, to na(e a fe+ possi!ilities. 9nd it see(s to follo+ strai"htfor+ardly fro( this that 5 #$J 5 any acco,nt of intentionality that is not si(ilarly ne,tral cannot serve as an acco,nt of intentional character !eca,se s,ch an acco,nt +o,ld have to !e valid for all possi!le instances of the pheno(enon it e1plains. .n partic,lar, an acco,nt fra(ed in ter(s of ass,(ptions a!o,t the act,al nat,re of physical +orld, incl,din" h,(an physiolo"y, cannot !e !road eno,"h to cover all possi!le cases that +o,ld share a partic,lar intentional content. Hence one cannot have a nat,ralistic theory of contentHat least if !y a 7theory of content7 one (eans so(ethin" like 7an acco,nt of the essential feat,res of intentional character7 as opposed to, say, 7a specification of the nat,ral syste(s thro,"h +hich intentional character is realiDed.7L11M

'.7.;0 Summary o+ $roblems +or Naturali8in* $)enomenolo*y

.n short, then, the prospects for stron"ly nat,raliDin" the pheno(enolo"ical properties of (ental states appear to !e rather di(. *ho,"ht e1peri(ents a!o,t !rains in vats and Cartesian de(ons cast si"nificant do,!t on +hether there co,ld !e (etaphysically necessary relations !et+een pheno(enolo"ically typed states and nat,ralistic states. 9nd properties like s,!8ectivity, perspectival character, and the 7+hat3it?s3like7 all,ded to !y 6a"el do not see( to !e s,scepti!le to concept,ally ade=,ate e1planation in nat,ralistic ter(s. 2oreover, typin" !y intentional character necessarily classifies (ental states in a +ay that is insensitive to e1tra(ental realities, so that it is i(possi!le for a nat,ralistic theory to capt,re the sa(e invariants. 9nd finally, there is the tantaliDin" s,""estion that disco,rse a!o,t 7the e1periencin" self,7 7the tho,"ht,7 and 7the intentional o!8ect7 is not really disco,rse that relates ob4ects at all, in +hich case it is hard to see ho+ nat,ralistic disco,rse co,ld have the ri"ht sorts of lo"ical3"ra((atical reso,rces to s,!s,(e it. .f the kind of 7content7 +e +ish to nat,raliDe is the kind that is deli(ited alon" pheno(enolo"ical lines, +eak nat,raliDation /i.e., (athe(atical description and localiDation0 is the !est +e are entitled to hope for.

'.(0 Naturali8in* -road Content

9 very different set of iss,es confronts ,s +hen +e t,rn to the !road notion of content. *here has !een a "reat deal of disc,ssion in recent philosophical p,!lications a!o,t the i(plications of !road content for a representational theory of the (ind. .t is not (y intention to canvass these 5 #$% 5 or to disc,ss this already lar"e conversation in any detail. .nstead, . +ish to foc,s on a very specific point. Unlike the ar",(ents in the previo,s section, . shall not try to ar",e that !road content cannot !e nat,raliDed. /*ho,"h . s,spect this is so.0 .nstead, . shall ar",e that the kind of theory that +o,ld !e needed to nat,raliDe !road content +o,ld not !e a!le to foc,s its e1planation on the properties of localiDed representations, as re=,ired !y C*2, !,t +o,ld have to appeal to !roader relations involvin" the entire or"anis( and its environ(ent as +ell. S,ppose, for e1a(ple, that +e +ant a nat,ralistic acco,nt of +hy a partic,lar kind of tho,"ht (eans 7arthritis,7 and that +e accept B,r"e?s contention that this story +ill have to !e dependent ,pon the +ay the individ,al lan",a"e ,ser?s +ords and concepts are tied in +ith those of e1pert ,sers. We ask, 7Why does this (ental state M have the (ental3se(antic property /call it , 0 of (eanin" /!road sense0 ?arthritis?K7 9nd here +e (i"ht !e askin" one of t+o thin"s: /10 +hy does M (ean 7arthritis7 as opposed to (eanin" so(ethin" else /the pro!le( of (eanin" assi"n(ents0, or /@0 +hy does M (ean 7arthritis7 as opposed to not (eanin" anythin" at all /the pro!le( of (eanin"f,lness0K

'.(.&0 1eanin* "ssi*nments

'irst, let ,s consider ho+ C*2?s e1planation of se(antics co,ld !e applied to the assi"n(ent of !road content. *he sche(atic for( of C*2?s e1planation of (ental3se(antics +ent as follo+s: Schematic Account 2ental state M has (ental3se(antic property , !eca,se

/10 M involves a relationship to a (ental representation M+ , and /@0 M+ has 2G3se(antic property 5 . 6o+ ,nder the ass,(ptions +e have adopted, this sche(atic (i"ht !e ,no!8ectiona!le if the +ord ?!eca,se? +ere replaced !y ?iff?. B,t in fact the sche(atic a!ove is not intended (erely as a !iconditional !,t as an e1planation. 9nd as an e1planation of !road content assi"n(ent, it see(s to !e !arkin" ,p the +ron" tree. *he key iss,e in !road content assi"n(ent is +hat (akes it the case that co"nitive co,nters hook ,p +ith partic,lar o!8ects and properties and not +ith others. Whatever ans+er +e "ive (,st e1plain the +e! of relations !et+een or"anis( and envi3 5 #$6 5 ron(ent that acco,nts for the relations that are th,s esta!lished. .t (ay !e tr,e that (y !rain has a state that has the !road content 7arthritis7 and (y co,nterpart has a str,ct,rally identical state that (eans 7osteoporosis7 d,e to the fact that people on *+in )arth say 7arthritis7 +hen they +ant to refer to osteoporosis /?+ater? for OPF, etc.0. We (i"ht even say that (y !rain state has a property of (eanin"3 arthritis /(eanin"3H@ $, etc.0 +hile his has a property of (eanin"3osteoporosis /(eanin"3OPF, etc.0. B,t the fact that there is s,ch a property +o,ld not e3plain !road content assi"n(ent, !,t !e a !y3 prod,ct of s,ch an e1planation. *he e1planation of !road content assi"n(ent +o,ld have to foc,s not on localiDed properties of co"nitive co,nters, !,t on the net+ork of relations !et+een or"anis(, co"nitive co,nter, and environ(ent that endo+s those co"nitive co,nters /and the (ental states in +hich they play a part0 +ith !road content. Properties of representations, in and of the(selves, are 8,st not the ri"ht sorts of thin"s to e1plain !road content assi"n(ent. 2oreover, once +e have to appeal to properties of +hole or"anis(s and their environ(ents to e1plain /si(,ltaneo,sly0 the !road content of the co"nitive co,nter and that of the (ental state, it is no lon"er clear +hy +e sho,ld try to localiDe the (ental3se(antics of tho,"hts to so(e properties of their proper parts in the first place.L1@M

'.(.20 1eanin*+ulness
C*2 fares no !etter +ith the e1planation of !road3(eanin"f,lness. Here the iss,e, a!ove and !eyond the iss,es involved in narro+3(eanin"f,lness, is that of ho+ tho,"hts (ana"e to attach the(selves to partic,lar real3+orld o!8ects and properties in a +ay that is ,nderdeter(ined !y their sense and !y other factors internal to the or"anis(. 6o+ one (i"ht think that !eca,se co"nitive co,nters are the(selves internal to the or"anis(, this sho,ld dis=,alify the( fro( !ein" e1plainers of !road contentf,lness. B,t this is not e1actly ri"ht: even tho,"h the co"nitive co,nters the(selves are internal to the or"anis(, their properties (ay nonetheless !e relational properties +hose relata incl,de ecolo"ical and social factors. *he pro!le(, rather, lies once a"ain +ith the foc,s of the e1planation. .f +e ask +hy a partic,lar tho,"ht is a!o,t 'ater, as opposed to 8,st consistin" of a !,nch of descriptions, it +o,ld see( that +hat +e need is a story that sho+s ,s ho+ to "et !road content o,t of an a(al"a( of /10 the or"anis(, /@0 its narro+3contentf,lness, /#0 the co"nitive 5 #$- 5 co,nters, and /J0 the environ(ent. *he e1planation cannot foc,s solely on properties of the co"nitive co,nters, as C*2 +o,ld see( to have it, !eca,se the properties that can !e e1plained !y lookin" 4ust at

these entities re(ain constant over the cases of (e, (y co,nterpart on *+in )arth, and indeed over co,nterparts +ho (ay fail to have !road3contentf,l states at all.L1#M >et (e (ake it clear +hat points . a( and a( not tryin" to (ake here. . a( not sayin" that !road content cannot !e stron"ly nat,raliDed. /*ho,"h . happen to !elieve that it cannot.0 6or a( . sayin" that so(e for( of C*2Hsay, BC*2Hcannot !e (akin" tr,e assertions a!o,t the for( of (ental processes. Gather, . a( sayin" that even if +e grant !oth of these ass,(ptions, and "rant that se(antic properties of (ental states covary +ith properties of local states of co"nitive co,nters, +e cannot e3plain !road content (erely !y lookin" at the properties of these localiDed ,nits, !,t (,st look !ack at the lar"er syste( e(!racin" the +hole thinker and her environ(ent. 9nd once +e have done this, +e (i"ht do +ell to reassess +hat is !o,"ht !y tryin" to 7red,ce7 the (entalse(antic properties of (ental states to 2G3se(antic properties of their proper parts.

'.;0 Naturali8in* Narro> Content

'inally, let ,s consider the =,estion of +hether narro+ content can !e stron"ly nat,raliDed. *he first pro!le( +e face here is in deter(inin" 8,st +hat narro+ content is s,pposed to !e. 9n int,itive +ay of lookin" at narro+ content is that it is the kind of content, or the portion of content, that is not dependent ,pon e1tra(ental factors s,ch as ecolo"ical and social relations. *his, ho+ever, so,nds a "reat deal like pheno(enolo"ical content. So one hypothesis a!o,t narro+ content +o,ld !e that it is the sa(e thin" as pheno(enolo"ical contentHthat is, t+o (ental states have the sa(e narro+ content 8,st in case they are indistin",isha!le to the e1periencin" s,!8ect, and nothin" lyin" o,tside of e1perience can !e constit,tive of a difference in narro+ content. *his also see(s consistent +ith so(e disc,ssions of 7(ethodolo"ical solipsis(7 in the philosophy of (ind /see 'odor 19&$0. Ho+ever, (ost disc,ssions of narro+ content have concentrated not ,pon invariants of e1perience !,t invariants of str,ct,re and f,nction. 6arro+ content is characteriDed as the property that (olec,lar or f,nctional d,plicates +o,ld necessarily share. 6o+ this +o,ld !e consistent +ith the thesis that narro+ content 5 #$& 5 is pheno(enolo"ical content if it co,ld !e sho+n that (olec,lar or f,nctional d,plicates +ere necessarily pheno(enolo"ical d,plicates as +ell, !,t that thesis is contentio,s at !est. So rather than (ake ass,(ptions a!o,t the nat,re of narro+ content, . shall e1plore fo,r possi!ilities: /10 narro+ content is pheno(enolo"ical content, /@0 narro+ content is defined in ter(s of the properties (olec,lar d,plicates +o,ld share, /#0 narro+ content is defined in ter(s of properties f,nctional d,plicates +o,ld share, /J0 narro+ content is defined in ter(s of so(e other property of co"nitive co,nters. 'irst, if narro+ content is 8,st pheno(enolo"ical content, then all of the pro!le(s of acco,ntin" for pheno(enolo"ical content accr,e to it as +ell. *o acco,nt for pheno(enolo"ical content, yo,r theory has to e1plain s,!8ective feel, conscio,sness, s,!8ectivity, and the perspectival character of intentional states. We have ar",ed in the previo,s section that there are si"nificant o!stacles to this kind of e1planation, and they +o,ld si(ply carry over as pro!le(s for stron" nat,raliDations of narro+ content as +ell if narro+ content is pheno(enolo"ical content. .f narro+ content is defined in ter(s of str,ct,ral properties, one is faced +ith a n,(!er of (essy pro!le(s. 'irst, it is not transparent +hy so(ethin" defined in str,ct,ral ter(s o,"ht to !e called 7content7 at all. *he (entalistic overtones re=,ire e1planation here. Second, if narro+ content is defined in str,ct,ral ter(s, it is trivial that it can !e stron"ly nat,raliDed, as pres,(a!ly str,ct,ral descriptions are already cast in a disco,rse that is patently nat,ralistic. B,t, third, if this is the case, it is

not clear that any e1planation of the (ental has taken place. ;efinin" narro+ content in str,ct,ral ter(s +o,ld si(ply sh,ffle the (ystery aro,ndHthe (ystery +o,ld then !e ho+ yo, "et fro( str,ct,rally defined narro+ content to the mental . *o arrive at a stron" nat,raliDation of the (ental, yo, need to have a road fro( yo,r nat,ralistic description /in this case, a str,ct,ral description0 to yo,r (entalistic description that en8oys (etaphysical necessity and e1planatory transparency. 9s anyone +ho has tried to s,pply s,ch e1planations kno+s, this is no trivial task. ;efinin" narro+ content in str,ct,ral ter(s does not solve the pro!le( here, it (erely presents ,s +ith a special variation on the pro!le(. Si(ilar pro!le(s arise if +e define narro+ content in f,nctional ter(s. 'irst, +e (,st !e caref,l to specify +hat ,se of the +ord ?f,nctional? is operative here. 9t one level of a!straction /the 7rich7 level0, +e can look at the (ental, =,a (ental, as a (ath3f,nctionally descri!a!le syste(. 9t a second level /the 7sparse7 level0, +e can look at the f,nctional de3 5 #$9 5 scription in p,rely for(al ter(s, a!stractin" fro( the fact it +as ori"inally a description of (ental states. 9 richly constr,ed f,nctional (odel of the (ind does not really define (ental states in f,nctional ter(s, tho,"h it (ay provide a ,ni=,e characteriDation of each partic,lar kind of (ental state in ter(s of its f,nctional relations to the others and to sti(,li and !ehavior. 9 rich (odel ass,(es so(e kno+led"e of +hat content is, and does not e1plain its nat,re in f,nctional ter(s, any (ore than, say, 6e+ton?s la+s e1plain +hat "ravity is. B,t as +e have seen, a sparse f,nctional (odel cannot serve as a definition or e1planation of the (ental, on the "ro,nds that /10 the sa(e f,nctional description can apply to (any thin"s /e."., a!stract n,(!er3theoretic entities0 that are not (ental, and /@0 nothin" a!o,t the f,nctional description has the concept,al riches to "enerate the distinctively (ental character of intentional states. So it looks as tho,"h narro+ content +ill have to !e defined in so(e other +ay if it is to !e a via!le notion at all. . +ish that . had a candidate for s,ch a definition, !,t . don?t. *he int,itive notion of content that . +ork +ith is the notion of pheno(enolo"ical content. Perhaps other people operate +ith a different notion, !,t if they do they have not (ade it very clear, !eyond the constraints /10 that it is not to !e !road, /@0 that it is not to !e pheno(enolo"ically !ased, /#0 that it is so(eho+ to (ap thin"s in the head onto thin"s in the +orld, /J0 that it is necessarily to !e shared !y (olec,lar or f,nctional d,plicates, and /%0 that it is to !e ,npro!le(atically (ental in nat,re. . a( not s,re that there is anythin" that does fit this !ill. /Si(ilar skepticis( a!o,t the cate"ory of narro+ content is voiced !y Baker L19&-M and 4arfield L19&&M.0 B,t let ,s consider the possi!ility in any case, ho+ever va",ely specified. 'irst, note that this notion of content !ears a pec,liar dialectical relation to the pro8ect of stron" nat,raliDation. .f one of the definin" feat,res of narro+ content is that (olec,lar d,plicates (,st share narro+ content, then the (etaphysical side of stron" nat,raliDation is ass,red. )ither there is s,ch a thin" as narro+ content and narro+ content assi"n(ents are i(plied !y physical description, or else there is no s,ch thin" as narro+ content. *he other side of stron" nat,raliDation, ho+everHthe e1planatory sideHis pro!a!ly less easy to co(e !y. Whatever narro+ content is s,pposed to !e, a stron" nat,raliDation (,st not (erely !ind it to nat,ralistic conditions !y contin"ent !rid"e la+s, !,t de(onstrate its presence fro( so(e lo+er3level theory. *he via!ility of this +ill of co,rse t,rn heavily ,pon +hat one (eans !y 7narro+ content,7 !,t it is a tall order to fill in any case. 5 #1$ 5

Second, it see(s to (e that there is a pro!le( for e1plainin" narro+ content in ter(s co(pati!le +ith C*2 in 8,st the +ay there +as a pro!le( for e1plainin" !road content +ith these constraints. .f +e ass,(e for p,rposes of ar",(ent that there are so(e nat,ralistic feat,res of co"nitive co,nters that covary +ith narro+ content, +e still do not have a stron" nat,raliDation of narro+ content ,nless +e can sho+ +hy the fact that a proper s,!part of an intentional syste( has partic,lar nat,ralistic properties (akes it the case that the syste( has a tho,"ht a!o,t o!8ects or states of affairs in the +orld. . a( not at all convinced that s,ch an e1planation is to !e had at all, !,t if it is to !e had, it see(s clear that the place to look is not in properties of the co"nitive co,nters the(selves, !,t in relations !et+een the overall syste( and its environ(ent. 9"ain, the point here is not that BC*2 (,st !e +ron" as a theory of the for( of (ental states. Gather, the point is that, even if BC*2 is right a!o,t its f,nctional description of the (ind, and co"nitive co,nters are the thin"s that covary +ith (eanin" assi"n(ent, +e need a theory +ith a very different foc,s to acco,nt for (eanin"f,lness. .f the =,estion is 7Why does this tho,"ht (ean 5 rather than PK7 it (ay !e appropriate to look at co"nitive co,nters. .f the =,estion is +hy the properties of co"nitive co,nters are so inti(ately associated +ith the (entalistic property of (eanin"f,lness, it see(s that +e shall have to look else+here, at a theory that e(!races a lar"er syste(.

'.<0 Con3lusion
*his chapter has !een a very =,ick e1a(ination of the prospects for +hat is co((only called a 7nat,ralistic theory of content.7 We have seen that there are (any iss,es l,rkin" in the +in"s hereH iss,es a!o,t +hat co,nts as 7nat,raliDation,7 +hat co,nts as a 7theory,7 and +hat kind of 7content,7 7intentionality,7 and 7(ental states7 are at iss,e. What . have tried to ar",e here (ay !riefly !e s,((ariDed as follo+s: /10 .f +e are talkin" a!o,t conscio,s tho,"hts /the paradi"(s e(!raced !y +riters like Brentano, H,sserl, and Searle, a(on" others0, these states do indeed see( indefeasi!ly to have properties like pheno(enolo"ical feel, s,!8ectivity, and the like, and there do see( to !e serio,s o!stacles to stron"ly nat,raliDin" s,ch properties. /@0 .f +e are talkin" a!o,t dispositional states like !eliefs and desires, and a!o,t their !road and narro+ content, it (ay or (ay not prove possi!le to stron"ly nat,raliDe these properties. B,t if it is possi!le to do so, it looks as tho,"h the kind of e1planation +e need +ill not foc,s on local properties of co"nitive co,n3 5 #11 5 ters, as does C*2, !,t +ill appeal to relational properties of co"nitive co,nters, the entire or"anis( that is doin" the thinkin", and its environ(ent. . +ish to dra+ !oth a +eak (oral and a stron" one fro( this. *he +eak (oral concerns +here the !,rden of proof sho,ld lie. 2,ch of the c,rrent disc,ssion in the philosophy of (ind ass,(es the possi!ility of a fairly stron" sort of nat,raliDation. B,t once +e have distin",ished the pro8ects of stron" and +eak nat,raliDation, +e can see that stron" nat,raliDation calls for so(e fairly e1actin" /and rare0 kinds of connections !et+een disco,rses: na(ely, (etaphysical s,fficiency and concept,al ade=,acy. 9nd once +e look closely at the prospects of 7e1plainin"7 the (ental in these very strin"ent senses of 7e1planation,7 there see( to !e so(e very lar"e and "larin" pro!le(s, especially if +e add the f,rther constraint of locatin" the ne1,s of (eanin" in properties of localiDed representations. *h,s it see(s to (e that the !,rden of proof o,"ht to !e on the +o,ld3!e stron" nat,raliDer: +e have reason to !elieve in stron" nat,ralis( +hen +e see it acco(plished and not !efore. *here is also a stron"er (oral one (i"ht dra+, one that . +ant to state in a (ore assertive voice. 9ll in

all, it looks d,!io,s that +e shall ever have a stron" nat,raliDation of the (ental. .t looks even less likely that +e sho,ld have one of the sort called for !y C*2. C*2 certainly does not provide s,ch a theory of intentionality, and +itho,t it, those +ho do,!t the propriety of intentional psycholo"y have not !een ref,ted. .t is hard to see ho+ to vie+ co(p,tational psycholo"y as a s,ccess if its s,ccess is to !e 8,d"ed !y the standard of ho+ +ell it nat,raliDes intentionality and vindicates intentional psycholo"y. B,t perhaps these are not the ri"ht standards !y +hich to 8,d"e co(p,tational psycholo"y in the first place. Perhaps it is possi!le to separate iss,es a!o,t co(p,tational psycholo"y as an e(pirical research pro"ra((e fro( its relationship to (ore p,rely philosophical pro!le(s a!o,t the (ind. .n the final section of this !ook . shall atte(pt to present the !e"innin"s of an alternative philosophical approach to co(p,tational psycholo"y that frees it fro( the constraints of stron" nat,raliDation and vindication. 5 #1# 5


5 #1% 5

C)apter Ten0 "n "lternative "pproa3) to Computational $sy3)olo*y

*he precedin" chapters have presented an e1tended ar",(ent to the effect that C*2 does not (ake "ood on either of its principal philosophical clai(sHthat is, it provides neither an e1planation of intentionality nor a vindication of intentional psycholo"y. 9t !est, +e are left +ith a +eakened, 7!o+dleriDed7 version of C*2 /really a stron" version of (achine f,nctionalis(0 that p,rports to descri!e the for( of (ental processes +hile treatin" the nat,re and le"iti(acy of intentional cate"ories as a !ack"ro,nd ass,(ption. ;eprived of its i(pressive philosophical clai(s, C*2 +ill see( to so(e to have lost its appeal entirely. 9nd perhaps even (ore i(portantly, so(e +riters see( dra+n to infer that the fail,re of C*2 as a philosophical pro8ect entails the !ankr,ptcy of computational psychology as an empirical research strategy as +ell. Co(p,tationalis(?s critics and defenders alike often see( to ass,(e that a s,ccessf,l scientific psycholo"y o,"ht to solve philosophical pro!le(s /like the (ind3 !ody pro!le(0 as +ell. En this vie+, the stron" nat,raliDation of the (ental !eco(es a criterion for a s,ccessf,l scientific psycholo"y, and even for the le"iti(acy of intentional cate"ories. 9s a res,lt, the failure of C*2 to (eet the philosopher?s diffic,lt (etaphysical and e1planatory criteria is tho,"ht to i(p,"n the scientific enterprise of co(p,tational psycholo"y o,t of +hich C*2 arose as +ell. . think this vie+ is distinctly +ron"headed. /9nd, incidentally, . have yet to find a practicin" scientist +ho shares it.0 . (ake no clai(s a!o,t +hether co(p,tational psycholo"y 'ill t,rn o,t to provide the fo,ndations for a (at,re science of co"nition, !,t it see(s clear that +hat is 5 #16 5 needed for a s,ccessf,l scientific research pro"ra((e is s,!stantially +eaker than +hat is needed for a

sol,tion to the (ind3!ody pro!le( or a stron" nat,raliDation of the (ental. . said in an earlier chapter that in the end +e +o,ld need to distin",ish !et+een the clai(s of co(p,tational psycholo"y as an e(pirical research pro"ra((e and C*2?s distinctly philosophical clai(s. . intend to (ake "ood on that clai( in this final section of the !ook !y presentin" the o,tline of an alternative interpretation of the i(portance of co(p,tational psycholo"y as an e(pirical research pro"ra((e. En this vie+, +hat the co(p,ter (etaphor tries to provide for psycholo"y are t+o feat,res that have +idely !een considered cardinal virt,es of (at,re sciences: na(ely, /10 (athe(atically e1act descriptions and e1planations, and /@0 strate"ies for connectin" o,r disco,rse a!o,t (ental events +ith other kinds of disco,rseHpartic,larly 7lo+er3level7 descriptions s,ch as those provided !y ne,roscience. .t is presently ,nclear +hether co(p,tational psycholo"y +ill succeed in either of these "oals, or +hether it +ill perfor( !etter than other co(petitor theories arisin" fro( ne,roscience or ne,ral net+ork approaches. B,t +ere it to s,cceed in these "oals, even +itho,t stron"ly nat,raliDin" the (ental, this +o,ld co,nt as s,!stantive scientific pro"ress, and in +ays that have i(portant precedents in the history of science. 9nd all that is needed for this kind of pro"ress is the kind of 'ea nat,raliDation called for !y BC*2. Strong nat,raliDation, . shall ar",e, is not a re=,ire(ent internal to the practice of science, !,t rather an e1ternally i(posed criterion derivin" fro( a partic,lar philosophical ideolo"y. 'ro( the standpoint of the practicin" scientist, it is not necessary to prod,ce an instantiation analysis of (ental statesHa realiDation acco,nt is eno,"h. 9nd like+ise for the scientist it is not necessary to "indicate thin"s like percept,al "estaltsHs,ch thin"s are ass,(ed as data to !e e1plained, and their stat,s is never called into =,estion.

&E.&0 " Story about t)e 1aturation o+ S3ien3es

. sho,ld like to !e"in !y pointin" to t+o feat,res that see( to !e co((on to the sciences that have traditionally !een re"arded as 7(at,re7 and 7hard.7 *he first characteristic of s,ch sciences is that they have achieved a certain de"ree of ri"or in their e1planations. .n partic,lar, they have discovered (athe(atical e1pressions that capt,re, +ith "reater or lesser de"rees of e1actit,de, the relationships a(on" the o!8ects for(3 5 #1- 5 in" the do(ain of a "iven science insofar as they take part in the pheno(ena that that science seeks to e1plain. *he second characteristic of s,ch sciences is that they involve +hat are so(eti(es called 7str,ct,ral e1planations7 or 7(icroe1planations7Hor, (ore "enerally, connections !et+een do(ains of disco,rse. *hese e1planations relate pheno(ena that occ,r at one level of description :- to the o!8ects, relationships, and processes at a (ore !asic level of description :G that are ,lti(ately responsi!le for pheno(ena at :- . 2icroe1planation can occ,r +holly +ithin the !o,nds of a sin"le science, and it can also occ,r across the !o,ndaries of sciences, as in the case of the e1planation of the co(!inatorial properties of the ele(ents /che(istry0 !y reference to the !ehaviors of char"ed particles /physics0. *he iss,e of +hether feat,res s,ch as these are necessary for scientific (at,rity is an i(portant loc,s of contention in philosophy of science. 6ota!ly, there have !een heated disp,tes a!o,t the stat,s of !iolo"y in this re"ard. . +ish to sidestep s,ch iss,es here: . e(!race 6e+ton3S(ith?s /19&10 idea that scientific theories can en8oy a pl,rality of 7"ood3(akin"7 =,alities. 2athe(atiDation and connectivity are t+o s,ch =,alities, and happen to !e ones that have !een e(phasiDed in the 7(odern7 vie+ of science. 2y clai( here is not that they are essential to a discipline?s scientific stat,s, nor that they are the only virt,es relevant to scientific (at,ration, !,t (erely that co(p,tational psycholo"y (ay fr,itf,lly !e seen as an atte(pt to endo+ psycholo"y +ith these virt,esC and that if it s,cceeded in

doin" so, this +o,ld !e a si"nificant achieve(ent. 9 third feat,re that is often closely connected to the (at,ration of a science is the occ,rrence of a concept,al revol,tion that involves seein" the pheno(ena a science sets itself to descri!in" and e1plainin" in a f,nda(entally ne+ +ay. *he ,se of metaphor often plays a cr,cial role in s,ch concept,al revol,tions, tho,"h as often as not the (etaphor is a!andoned once ri"oro,s (athe(atical description of the do(ain in its o+n ri"ht has !een achieved. . a( inclined to re"ard concept,al revol,tion and the ,se of ",idin" (etaphor (ore as a feat,re of cr,cial sta"es in the process of (at,ration rather than a feat,re of (at,re sciences as s,ch.L1M /9fter all, concept,al chan"e and the ,se of (etaphor are 8,st as (,ch a part of atte(pts at science that never "et off the "ro,nd as they are of s,ccessf,l science.0 *h,s the concl,sion of previo,s chapters that co(p,tin" (achines provide only (etaphorical inspiration for co(p,tational psycholo"y is in keepin" +ith the role of (etaphor in other sciences as +ell. 9 fe+ e1a(ples of (athe(atiDation and (icroe1planation (ay !e of 5 #1& 5 ,se in settin" the sta"e for a disc,ssion of psycholo"y and co(p,ter science.

&E.&.&0 Coperni3us, .alileo, Ne>ton

*he e(er"ence of the 7ne+ science7 of the si1teenth and seventeenth cent,ries is so(eti(es referred to ,nder the headin" of the 7Copernican revol,tion7 in physics. 9nd it is tr,e that Copernic,s played a cr,cial role in startin" a concept,al revol,tion in astrono(y that paved the +ay for the develop(ent of +hat +as to !eco(e 6e+tonian (echanics. .t is i(portant to see, ho+ever, that Copernican astrono(y in its o+n ri"ht is only the first step to+ards a (at,re physics.L@M Copernic,s?s o+n concerns +ere still lar"ely those of an astronomer . He +as concerned +ith findin" a description of planetary (otion. His o+n (odel of that (otion, ho+ever, +as hi"hly infl,enced !y his Ptole(aic predecessors: a syste( of circ,lar or!its and epicycles aro,nd a point close to the s,n.L#M /*he s,n +as not at the center of Copernic,s?s syste(C it, like the planets, or!ited another point in space. .t is also +orth notin" that Copernic,s?s (odel contained (ore epicycles than Ptole(y?s. *he virt,e of this (odel lay neither in its ele"ance nor in its predictive acc,racy Lsee B,hn 19%-: 16931-1M.0 Bepler, !y contrast, +as en"a"ed in a pro8ect of findin" a kind of (athe(atical description of planetary (otion that +o,ld at once !e ele"ant and e1act. Ene i(portant !reakthro,"hHthe one +e pro!a!ly i(printed ,pon +hen +e learned a!o,t the pro"ress of (odern physicsH+as Bepler?s discovery of the fact that planetary or!its are elliptical and that or!ital speed can !e deter(ined on the !asis of the area of the ellipse s,!tended !y a portion of the or!it.LJM B,t +hen +e learned this, +e pro!a!ly overlooked +hat +as really i(portant a!o,t this discovery. *he fact that or!its take the for( of an ellipse rather than so(e other conic for( is really irrelevant to the pro"ress of physics. What is cr,cially i(portant is that the (otions of the planets can !e descri!ed e1actly !y (athe(atical e1pressions, re"ardless of +hich ones, and that they can all !e descri!ed !y the sa(e kinds of e1pressions.L%M Physics +o,ld have done 8,st as +ell if planetary or!its had !een of a different, yet precisely descri!a!le shape. Celestial (echanics +o,ld have "otten no+here so lon" as the only descriptions of planetary (otion +ere in ter(s of a (otley !atch of epicycles havin" no discerni!le overarchin" pattern. *he f,rther pro"ress of (odern physics +as facilitated !y the e(er"ence of t+o other (athe(atical innovations: the develop(ent of al"e!raic "eo(etry allo+ed for the possi!ility of perfor(in" al"e!raic cal3

5 #19 5 c,lations ,pon the (otions of the planets thro,"h ti(e, and the calc,l,s provided for the possi!ility of (akin" calc,lations a!o,t acceleration. *he c,l(ination of these advances +as 6e+tonian (echanics, +hich s,((ariDed the interactions of "ravitational !odies in a set of e1tre(ely ele"ant (athe(atical e=,ations that ca(e to !e kno+n as 76e+ton?s la+s.7 6e+tonian (echanics ,nified the fields of astrono(y, celestial (echanics, and s,!l,nary physics ,nder one set of (athe(atical descriptions, and stood as the standard for scientific theories ,ntil displaced !y relativity theory /+hich +as, itself, dependent ,pon the develop(ent of differential "eo(etry for its descriptions of space and ti(e0. .t is +orth e(phasiDin" that 6e+ton?s achieve(ent lies in his havin" left ,s a ri"oro,s and "eneral description of the effects of "ravitational !odies ,pon one another. His a(!ivalent atte(pts to address the 'hy of "ravity /his (,ch3disc,ssed flirtation +ith 7forces70 add nothin" to the pict,re, and his fail,re to solve the 7+hy7 of "ravity detracts not in the least fro( the po+er and the ,tility of 6e+tonian (echanics.L6M Ene (i"ht +ell s,spect that "ravity a(o,nts to so(ethin" (ore than the e(pirical re",larities of ho+ !odies (ove in relation to one another, and it is appealin" to seek so(e insi"ht into this 7so(ethin" (ore,7 !,t s,ch insi"ht is not needed in order to (ake 6e+tonian (echanics 7"ood science.7 .n !rief, 6e+tonian (echanics provides for the (athe(atical (at,rity of a lar"e portion of physics +itho,t providin" any (icroe1planation for "ravitational attraction in ter(s of so(e s,!"ravitational level of e1planation. 4ravitation is treated as fundamental . 9nd the lack of s,ch an e1planatory connection is not "enerally vie+ed as a fatal o!8ection to 6e+tonian (echanics as "ood science, even tho,"h it is in so(e +ays dissatisfyin". 2oreover, it displaced a Cartesian physics +hich did offer a (icroe1planation of "ravitation in ter(s of (echanical interactions of particles.L-M

&E.&.20 C)emistry
9 second e1a(ple can !e s,pplied !y che(istry, +hich e1perienced distinctly separate sta"es of pro"ress to+ards (athe(atical and connective (at,rity. *here +as a ti(e +hen che(istry +as lar"ely independent of physics. .n fact, che(istry attained a re(arka!le de"ree of (athe(atical (at,rity +ith very little help fro( physics, and it is possi!le to learn lar"e portions of che(istry +ith little or no kno+led"e of physics. /.ndeed, . !elieve it is still the practice in teachin" che(istry in the schools 5 #@$ 5 first to present a che(istry that involves little or no physics !efore (ovin" on to those parts +here physics !eco(es cr,cial.0 'or there +as s,!stantial pro"ress in ,nderstandin" !asic la+s "overnin" co(!inations of the ele(ents !efore there +as any ,nderlyin" physical theory a!o,t +hat sorts of (icrostr,ct,re (i"ht acco,nt for these la+s. *he periodic ta!le /2endeleev aro,nd 1&690, the notion of valence /'rankland in 1&%@0, and a re(arka!le set of la+s "overnin" co(!inations of ele(ents /as early as >avoisier?s +ork p,!lished in 1-&-0 +ere developed lon" !efore these notions +ere f,rther "ro,nded in a theory of s,!ato(ic particles in the t+entieth cent,ry. With the develop(ent of the periodic ta!le, the notion of valence, and la+s of co(!ination, che(istry achieved a si"nificant de"ree of (athe(atical (at,rity. .n this respect, the a"e of >avoisier (ade a si"nificant step !eyond the proced,res and +isdo( of previo,s che(ists and alche(ists, ho+ever "reat their technical skill, !eca,se there +as, for the first ti(e, a ri"oro,s and syste(atic description of ho+ the ele(ents reacted

in co(!ination. *he (a8or pro"resses in theoretical che(istry since the ti(e of 2endeleev have !een in the connections, the !order (arches, !et+een che(istry and other disciplines s,ch as physics and !iolo"y. .n order to ,nderstand reactions !et+een lar"e (olec,les, for e1a(ple, it +as necessary to ,nderstand so(ethin" of their physical str,ct,re. *he propensities of (olec,les to co(!ine in certain +ays /so(e of +hich see(ed ano(alo,s0 called for an e1planation in ter(s of ,nderlyin" str,ct,re, an e1planation s,pplied !y s,ch notions as electron or!itals, ionic and covalent !ondin", and the post,lation of char"ed and ,nchar"ed s,!ato(ic particles. .n the process, che(istry !eca(e increasin"ly connected to physics. 9t the sa(e ti(e, it !eca(e evident that (any !iolo"ical pheno(ena co,ld !e acco,nted for !y che(ical e1planations: the !ondin" !et+een he(o"lo!in and o1y"en acco,nts for the transport of o1y"en thro,"h the circ,latory syste( to cells thro,"ho,t the !ody /and he(o"lo!in?s preference for !ondin" +ith car!on (ono1ide e1plains the ease of car!on (ono1ide s,ffocation0C i(portant parts of processes s,ch as the Bre!s cycle are che(ical in nat,reC and of co,rse the !asic ele(ent ,nderlyin" "enetics, the ;69 (olec,le, is typified !y a partic,lar (olec,lar str,ct,re. With the advent of discoveries s,ch as these, che(istryH+hich already had a hi"h de"ree of (athe(atical (at,rityH ac=,ired a lar"e a(o,nt of +hat +e (i"ht call connecti"e maturity as +ell. .t is +orth notin", ho+ever, that (ost of these connections +ere not (ade ,ntil the latter half of the t+entieth cent,ry, (ore than a cent,ry after 5 #@1 5 che(istry had "ained si"nificant (athe(atical (at,rity. So(e thin"s take ti(e. .t see(s safe to say that sciences tend to !eco(e !oth (ore po+erf,l and (ore fir(ly esta!lished as they !eco(e (ore inti(ately connected +ith one another. Che(istry raises =,estions that physics has to ans+er, and provides ans+ers to =,estions raised !y !iolo"y. 9strono(y provides a la! for physics to st,dy thin"s that cannot !e reprod,ced here and no+, and physics provides a la! for testin" hypotheses a!o,t thin"s that are too far a+ay to investi"ate firsthand.

&E.20 T)e "ppeal o+ a 1ature $sy3)olo*y

.t sho,ld !e a!,ndantly clear that any develop(ents that co,ld !rin" all or part of psycholo"y to+ards either or !oth of these kinds of (at,rity +o,ld !e of (a8or i(portance. .ndeed, in the case of psycholo"y, the a!sence of these kinds of (at,rity has !een a lar"e factor contri!,tin" to the +idespread senti(ent that psycholo"y is not and perhaps cannot !e a (at,re science. Consider first the (atter of (athe(atiDation. Psycholo"ical e1planation has traditionally !een a(on" the least syste(atic !odies of e1planation a(on" those disciplines that aspire to the na(e of science. )ven hi"her3level disciplines s,ch as econo(ics have a stock of (athe(atical la+s that descri!e their s,!8ect (atter, even if only ,nder 7ideal7 conditions. B,t +hile psycholo"y has (ade inroads in ter(s of (eas,re(ent of a!ilities /partic,larly in percept,al psychophysics0, and see(s s,scepti!le to statistical "eneraliDations over pop,lations, the kind of e1planation that takes place a!o,t and in ter(s of co"nitive states has !een notorio,sly resistant even to ro,"h "eneraliDation, (,ch less (athe(atiDation.L&M *he sit,ation is little !etter +ith connectivity. While it is the case that so(e hi"her3level disciplines s,ch as econo(ics proceed on ass,(ptions a!o,t co"nition /e."., rational decision (akin"0, the connections !et+een psycholo"y and lo'er 3level disciplines s,ch as ne,rolo"y and !iolo"y /not to (ention physics0 have !een at once contentio,s and ,nedifyin". En the one hand, there has lon" !een

al(ost ,niversal a"ree(ent that there are syste(atic and 7special7 connections !et+een (ind and !rain. )ven ;escartes, notorio,s to (any as the arch3d,alist, attri!,ted a +ide array of psycholo"ical processes to the !rain and nervo,s syste(, reservin" only lan",a"e, reasonin", and the +ill for the i((aterial so,l.L9M ;escartes also vie+ed the connection !et+een so,l and !ody 5 #@@ 5 as e1tre(ely inti(ateHfar (ore so than that !et+een a pilot and the ship he steersHand pro!a!ly s,i "eneris /Meditation :. L9* :... &1M0. En the other hand, the nat,re of s,ch a 7special connection7 has !een el,sive !oth philosophically and e(pirically. *he philosophers cannot see( to a"ree on +hat the precise nat,re of the 7special connection7 (i"ht /or (,st0 !e, and the e(pirical scientists have !een hard pressed to discern +hat the ele(ents on the ne,rolo"ical /physiolo"ical, physical0 side of the relationship (i"ht !e. .f one of the (arks of a (at,re psycholo"y +o,ld !e havin" discoveries of the for( 72ental pheno(enon M !ears special relation + to ne,rolo"ical pheno(enon / ,7 there see( to !e t+o pro!le(s: the scientists cannot discover +hat / is, and the philosophers cannot decide +hat + has to !e. *o p,t it very (ildly, it +o,ld !e "reat pro"ress if one co,ld find a +ay !eyond this old and fr,stratin" i(passe. 6o+ (odern psycholo"y has, in fact, (ade so(e pro"ress on so(e fronts. *here has !een so(e si"nificant =,antification of percept,al psychophysics, and =,antification of at least so(e of the o!servations in co"nitive psycholo"y. 9t the sa(e ti(e, ne,roscience has e(er"ed as a distinct offshoot of physiolo"y that can dra+ ,pon other for(al and e(pirical disciplines. Pro!le(s that +ere kno+n to Hel(holtD !,t ,nsolva!le in his day are no+ solva!le d,e to advances in (athe(atics /see 4ross!er" 19&$0. 9nd the localiDation of (ental f,nctions in the !rain has !een "reatly aided !y (ore e1actin" and less intr,sive o!servational techni=,es, s,ch as those s,pplied !y (a"netic resonance i(a"in". B,t ,ntil recently the do(ain of co"nition see(ed lar"ely ,nto,ched !y these advances.

&E.40 Computation, 1at)emati8ation, and Conne3tivity

.t is here that the co(p,ter paradi"( (ay prove to !e of considera!le +orth. What co(p,ter science provides is a ri"oro,s set of ter(s and (ethods for talkin" a!o,t certain kinds of syste(s: syste(s +hose distinctive characteristic is their f,nctional or"aniDation. What can !e characteriDed in f,nctional ter(s can !e descri!ed ri"oro,sly !y co(p,ter science. 6o+ in order for this to !e of ,se to psycholo"y, several thin"s (,st !e the case. 'irst, psycholo"ical pheno(ena (,st !e f,nctionally descri!a!le. 9nd here the sense of 7f,nction7 is the technical (athe(atical sense. *o p,t it differently, psycholo"ical pheno(ena (,st !e s,ch as to he descri!a!le !y an al"orith( or effective proced,re e1pressi!le in the for( of a (achine ta!le. Here co(p,ter science 5 #@# 5 s,pplies t+o thin"s: first, a lan",a"e /or set of lan",a"es0 for the ri"oro,s specification of al"orith(sC and second, an ass,rance that a very lar"e class of al"orith(s /the finite ones0 have a str,ct,re that can !e instantiated !y a physical syste(. So the co(p,ter paradi"( (i"ht do t+o thin"s here for psycholo"y: it (i"ht provide a ri"oro,s lan",a"e for characteriDin" the syste( of ca,sal interrelations !et+een psycholo"ical pheno(ena, and at the sa(e ti(e provide ass,rance that this characteriDation can !e realiDed in a physical (echanis( that does not si(ply flo,t every la+ of nat,re. .n short, the co(p,ter paradi"( (i"ht provide the ri"ht tools for the (athe(atiDation of at least so(e part of

psycholo"y. .f co(p,ter science (i"ht directly provide the ri"ht tools for psycholo"y to pro"ress to+ards (athe(atical (at,rity, it (i"ht there!y indirectly provide an i(portant contri!,tion to+ards connective (at,rity as +ell. Ef co,rse, co(p,tation is not the ri"ht sort of notion to provide e"erything needed for connective (at,rity. Co(p,tation is an a!stract or for(al notion, and is therefore ne,tral, in i(portant +ays, a!o,t +hat sorts of thin"s it descri!es. *his is not to say that it does not itself specify f,nctionally deli(ited kinds, !,t rather that in so doin" it re(ains a!sol,tely a"nostic a!o,t /a 0 +hat the nat,re of these kinds (ay !e, apart fro( their for(al interrelations, and /b 0 ho+ these f,nctions are realiDed. 9 sin"le co(p,tational description co,ld apply e=,ally +ell to a set of silicon chips, a net+ork of cells, a str,ct,re of "ears and levers, a set of "ala1ies, or the chan"es in affections of a Cartesian i((aterial s,!stance. Hence, even the !est i(a"ina!le co(p,tational description of co"nition +o,ld, in and of itself, do nothin" a!o,t connectin" psycholo"y +ith other disciplines. 'or all that co(p,tational description !,ys ,s, it (i"ht still t,rn o,t that the thin"s so descri!ed are not !rain processes after all, !,t processes in an i((aterial so,l +itho,t even any analo"o,s processes takin" place in a !rain. *o !e s,re, the fact that co(p,tational str,ct,res can !e physically instantiated is 7!racin" st,ff7 to so(eone +ho feels co((itted !oth to co"nitivis( and to (aterialis(. .t sho+s that the evidence for intentional realis( (ay not !e evidence a"ainst (aterialis(, and vice versa. B,t the clai( that co"nitive processes are f,nctionally descri!a!le has no conse=,ences for the de!ate over +hether (aterialis( is correct in its ontolo"ical clai(s. 6or does any co(p,tational description of co"nitive processes have any direct conse=,ences for ho+ they are realiDed in the nervo,s syste(. *his is, of co,rse, a fa(o,s !enefit of the co(p,tational approach: it allo+s for the possi!ility of the realiDation of e=,ivalent f,nctions in vastly 5 #@J 5 different architect,resHh,(an, an"elic, 2artian, or 2acintosh. *he stron"est constraint the co(p,tational description (i"ht place ,pon the realiDin" syste( is that it share the f,nctional str,ct,re characteristic of the realiDed co"nitive process. *hat is, if co"nitive pheno(enon C is realiDed thro,"h a realiDin" syste( + , and C is characteriDed !y f,nctional str,ct,re 7 , it (,st !e the case that + is also characteriDed !y 7 . B,t +hile this does not directly connect psycholo"y +ith, say, ne,roscience, it (ay provide 8,st the sort of link that is needed to for"e a connection !et+een the t+o. *he !rain, after all, is a co(ple1 and !e+ilderin" set of interrelated ,nits, and those +ho +ander in its tractless +astes are constantly "ropin" to discern +hat are the si"nificant ,nits and relations. *he availa!ility of caref,l characteriDations of co"nitive processes is the sort of thin" that (i"ht serve, if not as a Gosetta stone for the !rain, at least as a hastily scri!!led (ap. .ndeed, the "rand appeal of the f,nctionalist strate"y in e(pirical psycholo"y lies lar"ely in the fact that startin" 7top3do+n7 and ,nlockin" !lack !o1es one sta"e at a ti(e has often see(ed to !e the only +ay one can proceed if one is interested in pheno(ena lyin" at a hi"her level than, say, on3center off3s,rro,nd str,ct,res. 9s a so(e+hat idealiDed characteriDation, so(eti(es the only +ay to proceed is to "et as clear as possi!le on the for( of the process yo, +ish to descri!e and then look for so(e candidate realiDin" syste( that has the ri"ht 7shape7 to (atch it. .t th,s appears that pro"ress to+ards (athe(atical (at,rity is one of the (ore likely roads to+ards connective (at,rity as +ell. *he link !et+een the t+o is not hard and fast: one (i"ht "et a "ood descriptive f,nctional psycholo"y +itho,t (akin" (,ch pro"ress in seein" ho+ the f,nctional str,ct,res are realiDed in the !rain, (,ch as +e have no (icroe1planations for "ravity or (a"netis(. B,t then a"ain, pro"ress in (athe(atiDation (i"ht !rin" connective pro"ress in its +ake, as

co(!inatorial che(istry +as event,ally s,pple(ented !y a str,ct,rally oriented che(istry that is stron"ly linked to physics. Ene si(ply does not kno+ in advance ho+ the cards +ill fall.

&E.60 T)e Impli3it !orm o+ Co*nitive $sy3)olo*y

*hese considerations s,""est an o,tline of ho+ co"nitive science proceeds and ho+ it is related to intentional psycholo"y. .t is perhaps +orth a !rief di"ression to e(phasiDe a fe+ !asic points. 'irst, co"nitive science is not 5 #@% 5 so (,ch in the !,siness of 4ustifying psycholo"ical pheno(ena as tryin" to !rin" the( to so(e clarity. .n partic,lar, it is concerned +ith developin" (odels of (ental states and processes that "et their for(al properties ri"ht, and in a fashion that is precisely stata!le. Second, to e(ploy this sort of strate"y, it is necessary to proceed fro( so(e preco(p,tational ,nderstandin" of (ental states and processes. *o !e s,re, the process of (odelin" often alters o,r precritical ,nderstandin" of o,r s,!8ect (atter /!e it psycholo"y or fl,id dyna(ics0C !,t +e have to start fro( so(ethin" like co((onsense !elief3desire psycholo"y /or one of the preco(p,tational atte(pts to (ake it (ore ri"oro,s0. *he application of the co(p,ter paradi"( is an atte(pt to clarify a (ode of description and e1planation +e already ,se, and intentional states are involved in +hat one +o,ld nor(ally take to !e !oth the e1planatory posits of psycholo"y and the data to !e e1plained. *hird, research tends to proceed top3do+n, fro( !ehavior and conscio,sly entertained intentional states and processes, to hypotheses a!o,t ,nderlyin" intentional states that co,ld e1plain the(, to (echanis(s that co,ld s,pport s,ch states and processes. 'o,rth, the initial specification of ,nderlyin" (echanis(s e(phasiDes their for(al properties rather than their physical nat,re. )vent,ally one +o,ld +ish to reach a sta"e +here the for(al properties necessary to e1plain so(e hi"her3order process are precisely those of si(ple physical (echanis(s like ne,rons or even co(ple1 (echanis(s like fields of interconnected ne,rons. B,t it is not clear ho+ (any inter(ediate for(al 7infor(ation3processin"7 levels are needed to (ediate !et+een intentional description and ne,rolo"ical description. 'inally, there are clearly distinct pro8ects of (athe(atiDation and connection, and it (i"ht !e possi!le to (ake pro"ress in one +itho,t pro"ress in the other. 6ota!ly, it (i"ht !e possi!le to achieve considera!le insi"ht into the for(al str,ct,re of co"nition thro,"h co(p,ter (odelin" +itho,t there!y achievin" (,ch pro"ress to+ards kno+in" ho+ that str,ct,re is realiDed thro,"h !rain tiss,e. .t is therefore conceiva!le that co(p,tational research in psycholo"y co,ld prod,ce (athe(atical (at,rity +itho,t connective (at,rity. En the other hand, it is si(ilarly possi!le that ne,roscience and connectionist research +o,ld prod,ce (odels that +o,ld, to the "reat s,rprise of (any, e1hi!it e(er"ent for(al properties that are (,ch like those independently desira!le for description of intentional states and processes, in +hich case pro"ress in (athe(atiDation and connection (i"ht co(e to"ether. 5 #@6 5

&E.70 Intentionality
>et ,s no+ (ake o,r disc,ssion so(e+hat (ore concrete !y lookin" at ho+ one (i"ht apply the reso,rces of co(p,tational psycholo"y to the descriptionHand, so far as possi!le, the e1planationHof intentionality. .n so doin", +e shall take caref,l note of +hat kinds of connections are for"ed !et+een do(ains and +hat kinds of e1planation are act,ally likely to arise. .t +ill !e helpf,l to distin",ish several different kinds of 7acco,nts7 that (i"ht !e "iven, or perhaps several different kinds of description that (i"ht enter into a "eneral acco,nt of intentionality. . +ish to s,""est that +e (ay distin",ish three separate co(ponents that an acco,nt of intentionality (i"ht have: /10 a 7p,re lo"ical analysis7 of intentionality, +hich descri!es the necessary str,ct,res of intentional states, /@0 an a!stract description of the for(al properties of +hat is "iven in the lo"ical analysis, and /#0 an acco,nt of ho+ the properties descri!ed in the voca!,lary of the lo"ical analysis are related to the real( of nat,re. *hese initial descriptions are necessarily a !it ,nclear, !,t +ill !e e1panded ,pon in the follo+in" pa"es.

&E.7.&0 T)e $ure #o*i3al "nalysis o+ Intentionality

*he topic of intentionality has received a "reat deal of attention in the cent,ry or so since Brentano /1&-J0 reintrod,ced it into the ),ropean philosophical (ilie,. 2,ch of this attention /e."., !y +riters s,ch as Brentano, H,sserl, and (ost of the continental tradition, and +riters like Chishol( and Searle in the )n"lish3speakin" +orld0 has !een devoted to the e1a(ination of +hat one (i"ht call the 7lo"ical str,ct,re7 of intentionalityHthat is, of properties that intentional states have 8,st !y virt,e of !ein" intentional states, or !y virt,e of !ein" intentional states of a partic,lar sort /e."., 8,d"(ents, con8ect,res, percept,al "estalts0. 9 n,(!er of s,ch properties stand i((ediately to the fore. 9ll intentional states involve an attit,de3content str,ct,re. )very intentional state is 7directed to+ards7 so(ethin"Hits 7intentional o!8ect7H+hether anythin" act,ally e1ists correspondin" to that o!8ect or not. )very intentional state is the intentional state of so(e intendin" s,!8ect. .ntentional states can have other intentional states as their intentional o!8ects. 5 #@- 5 )very intentional state presents its o!8ect in so(e fashion or ,nder so(e description /as !ein" thus 0 and ,nder so(e intentional (odality /8,d"in", hopin", desirin", etc.0. )very intentional state has properties that deter(ine its 7conditions of satisfaction7Hthat is, that deter(ine +hat +o,ld have to !e tr,e of the +orld in order for that state to !e felicito,s. 9nd so on. 'eat,res s,ch as these are feat,res of intentionality per se, and not feat,res of intentionality that accr,e to it specifically as it occ,rs in so(e partic,lar kind of !ein". So +hereas, for e1a(ple, the clai( that all desires are reali*ed in brains is at !est a contin"ent tr,th /it see(s lo"ically possi!le that thin"s +ith different !odiesHor perhaps even no !odiesHco,ld have desires0, it is a necessary /and indeed analytic0 tr,th a!o,t desire that every desire is a desire for so(ethin". *he process of clarifyin" s,ch feat,res see(s to !e (ore a kind of analysis than e(pirical in=,iry, and see(s to !e in lar"e (eas,re concerned +ith +hat (i"ht !e called the 7lo"ical for(7 of intentional statesHthat is, the fact that they

have an attit,de3content str,ct,re, the fact that they posit an o!8ect or state of affairs ,nder so(e description, and so on. *hese 7lo"ical7 properties of intentionality +ere "iven so(e attention !y Brentano, and have !een (ore caref,lly developed !y +riters like Goderick Chishol( /19%-, 196&, 19&J!0, Aohn Searle /19&#0, and partic,larly )d(,nd H,sserl /19$$, 191#0, +ho devotes several vol,(es to the e1plication of intentionality.L1$M .t (i"ht !e appropriate to call this kind of description of intentionality 7p,re lo"ical analysis7 of intentionality. H,sserl?s e1pression 7p,re pheno(enolo"y7 is also appropriate, tho,"h it (ay prove (isleadin" to readers +ho associate the +ord ?pheno(enolo"y? +ith thin"s havin" to do +ith =,alitative feels and not +ith intentional states. What is properly s,""ested !y the ter( involves the clai(s that /10 /occ,rrent0 intentional states are thin"s +e e1perience, /@0 they can also !eco(e the o!8ects of o,r in=,iry and analysis, /#0 s,ch intentional states 7have a pheno(enolo"y7 in the sense that feat,res s,ch as the attit,de3content str,ct,re of intentional states are part of the 7+hat3it?s3like7 /see 6a"el 19-J0 of intentional states, and /J0 these feat,res can !e discovered !y pheno(enolo"ical reflection. *he 7+hat3it?slike,7 of co,rse, is not a qualitati"e 7+hat3it?s3like7 /a 7+hat3it3feels 3like70 !,t a logical 7+hat3it?s3like7 /a 7+hat3for(3it3has70. Chishol(?s lin",istically !ased approach to intentionality is an atte(pt to attain "reater clarity a!o,t (ental states !y attendin" to the lo"ical for(s of sentences ,sed to report the(. /Pop,lar (yths to the contrary not+ith3 5 #@& 5 standin", the foc,s of Chishol(?s interest is the intentionality of (ental states, and he approaches the( thro,"h an analysis of the sentences ,sed to report the( !eca,se of the diffic,lty of addressin" the topic of (ental states directly. Chishol(, like H,sserl, thinks that pheno(enolo"y is diffic,lt and el,sive.0 .n addition to the analysis of feat,res co((on to all intentional states, this kind of p,re analysis co,ld reveal feat,res pec,liar to particular inds of intentional states. .t is part of the very nat,re of P)GC)P*U9> e1periences that they set conditions of f,lfill(ent involvin" a state of affairs in +hich so(ethin" correspondin" to the intentional o!8ect act,ally ca,sed the state. .t is part of the essence of states havin" the (odality of G)CE>>)C*.E6 /thin"s that present the(selves as (e(ories0 that they !e fo,nded ,pon previo,sly e1perienced i((ediate e1periences of P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 or so(e other intentional (odality, and so on. *his kind of analysis of intentionality stands in so(e +ays prior to the kind of investi"ation of the (ind ,ndertaken !y co(p,tational psycholo"y and BC*2. Co(p,ter (odelin" and artificial intelli"ence (i"ht, of co,rse, provide very ,sef,l tools in p,rs,in" s,ch an analysis, as co(p,ter science provides +ays of talkin" a!o,t inference and data str,ct,res that can "reatly enrich one?s a!ility to talk a!o,t lo"ical for( and concept,al relationships. .t (ay also !e that certain ideas that have e(er"ed o,t of co(p,ter science /proced,ral representation, to na(e one nota!le e1a(ple0 (ay provide tools for the lo"ical analysis of intentionality that +o,ld not other+ise have !een availa!le. B,t !y and lar"e, it is o,r int,itions a!o,t o,r (ental states that constrain o,r co(p,tational descriptions, and not vice versa. .f co(p,tational description is ,sef,l, it is ,sef,l in f,rtherin" a pro8ect to +hich +e are already co((itted +hen +e ,ndertake the analysis of intentionality.

&E.7.20 T)e !ormal ,es3ription o+ Intentionality

*here is, ho+ever, a second level of description at +hich co(p,tational description (i"ht really add so(ethin" ne+ to an acco,nt of intentionality. 'or +hile traditional lo"ical analyses yield n,(ero,s essential insi"hts into intentionality, they tend to do very little to "ive an overarchin" (odel of ho+ these insi"hts fit to"ether, and in partic,lar they do not "ive the kind of (odel that +o,ld see( to !e of (,ch ,se in the pro8ect of !,ildin" an e(pirical theory. Here the reso,rces of co(p,ter sci3 5 #@9 5 ence (ay !e of so(e ,se precisely in their a!ility to s,pply descriptions of the for(al properties of certain kinds of syste(s. 9nd the insi"hts "ained thro,"h lo"ical and pheno(enolo"ical analysis (i"ht !e interpreta!le as for(al constraints placed on a (athe(atical description of the 7for(7 of intentional states and processes. *his line of tho,"ht has !een p,rs,ed !y +riters like ;reyf,s and Hall /19&J0 and Ha,"eland /19-&, 19&1, 19&%0, +ho have seen a certain contin,ity !et+een the H,sserlian approach to intentionality and co(p,ter (odelin". . shall not "o into detail a!o,t +here . a"ree and disa"ree +ith the analysis presented !y these +riters !,t shall s,pply a fe+ e1a(ples of ho+ . think this sort of int,ition (i"ht !e fleshed o,t. /10 Ene insi"ht to !e "ained fro( the lo"ical analysis of intentionality is that intentional states can !e a!o,t other intentional states. . can, for e1a(ple, +ish . co,ld !elieve that (y nei"h!or +as tr,st+orthy /W.SH LB)>.)' L(y nei"h!or is tr,st+orthyMM0, or re(e(!er once havin" !elieved in the lost continent of 9tlantis /G)CE>>)C*.E6 LB)>.)' L9tlantis e1istsMM0. 9nd s,ch an insi"ht is all very +ell and "ood, not to (ention tr,e. *his sa(e insi"ht, ho+ever, can also !e cashed o,t as a (ore interestin" clai( a!o,t the possi!le str,ct,res of intentional states: na(ely, that the str,ct,re per(its of rec,rsion. Er, to p,t it differently, if +e +ere to "ive a for(al description of the for( of intentional states, it +o,ld have to involve a r,le that allo+ed for rec,rsion !y e(!eddin" reference to one intentional state +ithin the content of another. 9nd since +e have for(al +ays of talkin" a!o,t rec,rsion, +e have no+ taken a s(all step to+ards !ein" a!le to say so(ethin" a!o,t the a!stract for(al properties of intentionality. S,ch an insi"ht (i"ht also provide the !asis for other hypothesesH s,ch as that the distinction !et+een co(petence and perfor(ance can !e applied to this e(!eddin" of intentional states, and that there (i"ht !e "eneral r,les "overnin" +hat intentional states can take partic,lar other intentional states as ar",(ents. /@0 So(e insi"hts "ained fro( lo"ical analysis take the for( of either nor(ative or prod,ctive r,les concernin" intentional states. 'or e1a(ple, an analysis of the intentional (odality of recollection reveals that it presents its o!8ect as havin" !een previo,sly e1perienced in so(e other intentional (ode /e."., perception0. *his sets nor(ative constraints on the satisfaction of s,ch a state: yo, cannot felicitously re(e(!er seein" 8 ,nless yo, have at so(e previo,s ti(e had a percept,al "estalt of 8 . Po, can, ho+ever, e1perience a state +hose intentional (odality is G)CE>>)C*.E6 and +hose content is that of oneself havin" seen 8 +itho,t act,ally havin" had a percept,al "estalt of 8 in the past. /*here are false 5 ##$ 5 (e(ories, after all.0 So +e +o,ld +ish to descri!e o,r intentional processes in s,ch a fashion that /10 it is possi!le to e1perience G)CE>>)C*.E6 Lself havin" seen 8 M +itho,t havin" previo,sly e1perienced P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9*.E6 L8 M, !,t

/@0 the satisfaction conditions for G)CE>>)C*.E6 Lself havin" seen 8 M cannot !e f,lfilled ,nless P)GC)P*U9> PG)S)6*9.E6 L8 M has previo,sly !een e1perienced.L11M S,ch r,les can, of co,rse, !e characteriDed in ter(s of p,rely for(al relationships e1pressed in the for( of nor(ative licensin" r,les /+hich set constraints on satisfaction conditions0 and prod,ctive r,les +hich descri!e +hat co(!inations of intentional states act,ally res,lt in the "eneration of partic,lar ne+ intentional states. /#0 *o take a so(e+hat different e1a(ple, the analysis of intentionality (ay sho+ ,s ho+ to separate the iss,e of 7!ein" a!o,t so(ethin"7 in the sense conveyed !y the opa=,e constr,al of intentional ver!s fro( the iss,e of the f,lfill(ent of s,ch states in veridical intentional states. *here is, . think, a "ood case to !e (ade to the effect that, once this is done, +e already have a (athe(atical for(at for talkin" a!o,t the fidelity of at least so(e intentional states /e."., the percept,al ones0: na(ely, the 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication /2*C0. )ven if one is +ary of the clai(s (ade !y Sayre /19&60 that one can !,ild se(antic content o,t of the technical notion of infor(ation e(ployed in 2*C, it nonetheless see(s that 2*C (i"ht !e tellin" a perspic,o,s story a!o,t the difference !et+een veridical perception and percept,al "estalts that res,lt fro( ill,sions, hall,cinations, and the like. 6o+ it is i(portant to see ho+ this story differs fro( so(e other stories a!o,t co(p,ters and the (ind. *he point here is not that intentional states are 8,st f,nctional relationships to sy(!ols and hence precisely analo"o,s to co(p,tin" (achines. *he point, rather, is that there is a system of abstract properties to !e fo,nd in the syste( of intentional states and processes, and these (i"ht very +ell !e the sa(e a!stract properties that are !ein" e1plored in co(p,ter science, in (,ch the sa(e sense that the calc,l,s provided an appropriate set of (athe(atical for(s for pro!le(s in classical (echanics. *he =,estion is that of findin" the ri"ht description for the for(al feat,res of intentionality, and not that of +hether anythin" sharin" those for(al feat,res +o,ld there!y have intentionality as +ell. *he ans+er to that latter =,estion is s,rely no: there 5 ##1 5 +ill al+ays !e p,rely a!stract o!8ects havin" any "iven for(al str,ct,re, and these do not have intentionality. 9nd in "eneral +e sho,ld not e1pect any t+o iso(orphic syste(s to !e identical in all properties: for e1a(ple, ther(odyna(ics and 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication share a for(alis(, !,t have different s,!8ect (atters. *he 7intentionality7 of sy(!ols in co(p,ters (ay see( to track the intentionality of (ental states, !,t only !eca,se sy(!ols in co(p,ters are representations that have se(iotic3(eanin"s and hence are desi"ned to e1press the (ental3(eanin"s of (ental states. *o p,t (atters so(e+hat differently, if +e start +ith an analysis of intentionality and add the reso,rces of co(p,ter science, +e (i"ht end ,p +ith a ,sef,l set of for(al constraints ,pon the shape intentional syste(s can take. En the other hand, if +e (erely start +ith for(al properties, +e +ill never develop notions s,ch as (ental3(eanin" o,t of those, and hence +ill never "et intentionality as opposed to "ettin" the for(al shape shared !y intentionality and perhaps any n,(!er of other thin"s. 2oreover, +e need to start +ith o,r int,itions a!o,t intentionality to kno+ +hich for(al properties are relevant. *here are (any possi!le for(al descriptions +hich (i"ht !e interestin" !,t are not via!le as descriptions of co"nition. *he only +ay to "et a for(al description of intentionality is to start top3do+n fro( o,r int,itions a!o,t the intentional states +e already kno+ a!o,tHna(ely, o,r o+nHand st,dy their for(al 7shape7 !y a process of a!straction.

&E.7.40 Intentionality and t)e Realm o+ Nature

We have th,s far disc,ssed t+o possi!le co(ponents of an acco,nt of intentionality: a p,re lo"ical analysis and a (ore (athe(atically perspic,o,s description of the for(al relations revealed in the lo"ical analysis. *he re(ainin" portion of s,ch an acco,ntHand the portion that has see(ed to !e of "reatest interest to +riters in the philosophy of co"nitive scienceHis an acco,nt of ho+ intentional pheno(ena relate to the nat,ral +orld. Ef co,rse, +hat (any people really +ant is a +ay to see intentionality as itself !ein" a nat,ral pheno(enonC !,t as +e do not at this point kno+ +hether that is possi!le, it see(s a !it stron" a desiderat,( to set for an acco,nt of intentionality. .t see(s a (ore so!er approach to !e"in !y askin" +hat can !e done to relate intentionality to nat,ral cate"ories and then assess the relation !et+een o,r concl,sions and o,r previo,s (etaphysical and (ethodolo"ical co((it(ents. .t is, . think, a"reed !y al(ost everyone +ho !elieves in (ental states 5 ##@ 5 at all that there is some sort of special and inti(ate relationship !et+een (ental states and partic,lar kinds of !odily states. What is open to investi"ation and disp,te are the follo+in" three =,estions: /10 What is the ri"ht inventory of (ental statesK /*o +hat e1tent is o,r co((on3sense inventory acc,rateK 9re there 7states7 called 7!eliefs7K Was co((on3sense e1planation ever intended to i(ply that there +ere, or is this an error of philosophical analysis, as i(plied !y Witt"enstein and so(e in the continental ca(p K0 /@0 What !odily states are th,s 7specially related7 to partic,lar (ental statesK 9nd /#0 +hat, precisely, does this 7special relationship7 consist inK . shall say very little a!o,t the first =,estion here. >et the reader si(ply consider the re(ainin" =,estions +ith re"ard to those (ental states she does feel co((itted to. 6o+ the =,estion of +hat !odily states partic,lar (ental states are 7specially related7 to see(s to present a reasona!le a"enda for e(pirical psycholo"y +itho,t shacklin" the psycholo"ist to a !,rden of (etaphysical proof. )(pirical psycholo"y can sho+ s,ch thin"s as that there is a special relationship !et+een C3fi!er firin"s and the e1perience of pain. .t cannot derive the =,alitative state fro( a description of the physiolo"y of C3fi!ers, nor fro( a description of ho+ they interact +ith the rest of the !ody. 9nd the res,lt that C3fi!er firin"s are 7the physiolo"ical side of pain7 is a"reea!le to philosophers +ho fall into very different (etaphysical ca(ps. Where they differ is on +hat to say a!o,t the precise nat,re of the relationship !et+een C3fi!er firin"s and the e1perience of pain: +hether they are contin"ently identical, or that one s,pervenes on the other, or one ca,ses the other, or that they are ca,sally ,nrelated !,t perfectly coordinated !y so(e preesta!lished har(ony, and so on. 9nd it see(s =,ite clear /a 0 that scientists do not, !y and lar"e, care a!o,t these f,rther iss,es, and /b 0 that, =,a scientists, they are ri"ht not to care. /Consider +hat a !,rden ,pon science it +o,ld !e if scientists +aited ,ntil all the (etaphysical disp,tes co,ld !e resolvedN0 9nd +hile the opacity of =,alia to scientific analysis /i.e., the fact that yo, cannot 7derive7 =,alitative states fro( ne,roscience !y +ay of so(ethin" like an instantiation analysis0 (ay see( a distressin" ano(aly to so(e, it is an ano(aly that philosophers are, !y and lar"e, decidin" that +e have to live +ith. . think the sit,ation is very (,ch the sa(e +ith respect to intentionality. *o spell (atters o,t (ore e1plicitly: /10 .ntentional states have a pheno(enolo"y, a 7+hat3it?s3like,7 tho,"h it is not a qualitati"e 7+hatit?s3like7 !,t a logical and semantical 7+hat3it?s3like.7 /@0 Psycholo"y (i"ht, in principle, !e a!le to identify !odily states that are 7specially

5 ### 5 related7 to intentional states s,ch as occ,rrent 8,d"(ents or percept,al "estalts. /#0 .f it can do this at all, it can do so in a scientifically respecta!le +ay +itho,t settlin" =,estions a!o,t ontolo"y. /J0 9s ar",ed in the previo,s chapter, the pheno(enolo"ical ele(ent of intentional states is not s,!8ect to the kind of 7stron" nat,raliDation7 involvin" an instantiation analysis. 9nd, hence, /%0 intentionality is not s,!8ect to stron" nat,raliDation. *here are, of co,rse, i(portant differences !et+een =,alia like pain and intentional states. 'irst, intentionality has a rich lo"ical str,ct,re that pain lacks. 9nd it is for this reason that a si(ple =,ality s,ch as pain can !e realiDed !y a physiolo"ical (echanis( +ith so fe+ di(ensions of freedo( as the firin"s of certain kinds of nerve cells. 9 pheno(enon s,ch as 8,d"(ent co,ld not, even in principle, !e realiDed thro,"h the firin"s of partic,lar cells, !eca,se the physiolo"ical pheno(enon involved does not have the ri"ht lo"ical str,ct,re to s,pport the lo"ical str,ct,re of 8,d"(ent. 9nd here +e have an i(portant link !et+een the for(al analysis of intentionality and any acco,nt +e (i"ht "ive of its realiDation: na(ely, that the analysis of intentionality places formal and in some cases causal constraints upon the inds of mechanisms through 'hich intentional states can be reali*ed . *his is the sort of iss,e that +as !ein" e1plored thro,"h the +ork done in 7kno+led"e representation7 !y artificial intelli"ence researchers d,rin" the 19-$s. .t is also of f,nda(ental i(portance to psycholo"y, for the (athe(atical description of the (echanis(s !oth specifies the f,nctional properties that constit,te it as a (echanis( /and not an accidental !y3prod,ct0 and "ives an i(portant cl,e to identifyin" the tiss,e in +hich it is realiDed and the kinds of activity in that tiss,e that are of interest. /*here can, or co,rse, !e other cl,es, s,ch as evidence of activation thro,"h (a"netic resonance scannin" and the topolo"y of ne,ral connections.0 9nd here too co(p,ter (odelin" /!oth conventional and connectionist0 can !e of cr,cial i(portance in deter(inin" +hether a "iven architect,re can s,pport the for(al feat,res necessary to a partic,lar kind of state or process.

&E.7.60 -CT1 and "33ountin* +or Intentionality

4iven the fore"oin" analysis, +hat can BC*2 and co(p,tational psycholo"y do !y +ay of providin" an 7acco,nt7 of intentionalityK *he first thin" they (i"ht !e a!le to do is to s,pply a +ay of takin" a p,re lo"ical analysis of intentionality of the sort offered !y Brentano, Chishol(, H,sserl, or Searle and teasin" o,t a (ore ri"oro,s description of the 5 ##J 5 for(al properties of intentionality. *his +o,ld !e the kind of pro8ect that +o,ld (ove /intentional0 psycholo"y to+ards (athe(atical (at,rity. *his, ho+ever, holds a f,rther possi!ility: the analysis of intentionality places constraints ,pon the for(al and ca,sal feat,res that a physical syste( (,st have in order to realiDe intentional states, and this (i"ht !e of ,se in the pro8ect of providin" a realiDation acco,nt for intentional states, there!y providin" a (eas,re of connective (at,rity for psycholo"y as +ell. Ef co,rse, +hether this connective (at,rity co,ld actually accrue to psycholo"y is an e(pirical =,estion. 'or a for(al specification of intentionality +o,ld open the doors to a n,(!er of alternative possi!ilities. .t see(s to (e that any of the follo+in" co,ld t,rn o,t to !e the case: /10 .ntentionality has for(al properties that can !e physically realiDed, and +e can find (echanis(s in the !ody that share those properties and +hose activation is correlated +ith the e1perience of the

correspondin" intentional states. /@0 .ntentionality has for(al properties that cannot !e realiDed !y any physical syste(. /#0 .ntentionality has for(al properties that can !e physically realiDed, !,t not !y a di"ital (achine /hence +e need a nonco(p,tational psycholo"y if +e are to provide a realiDation acco,nt for intentionality0. /J0 .ntentionality has for(al properties that are not in fact shared !y any (echanis(s in the !ody, and hence at least so(e intentional states are not realiDed thro,"h !odily states. /%0 .ntentional states are individ,ally (atched +ith physiolo"ical states sharin" their for(al properties, !,t this typin" of states is not relevant to ca,sal re",larities. . s,spect that there are a n,(!er of other possi!ilities as +ell. B,t this selection sho,ld !e s,fficient to sho+ that e(pirical st,dy of intentionality co,ld have some ra(ifications for (etaphysics, al!eit not definitive ones. .f intentional states and physiolo"ical states are nicely correlated in a +ay that preserves ca,sal re",larities, a "reat n,(!er of ontolo"ical possi!ilities re(ain open. .f intentionality has for(al properties that cannot !e realiDed !y any physical syste(, intentionality and (aterialis( are inco(pati!le, and (ost d,alists are likely to !e s,rprised as +ell. /Perhaps Platonists or Bantians +o,ld find this possi!ility less 8arrin"C . 5 ##% 5 a( not s,re.0 .t (i"ht !e the case that so(ethin" like the fra(e pro!le( co,ld !e (ade to pose a case for so(ethin" like /#0, in +hich case +e need so(e nonco(p,tational approach to psycholo"y. Possi!ility /J0, a"ain, opposes intentional realis( and (aterialis(, tho,"h a"ain it (i"ht s,rprise d,alists as +ell. 9nd /%0 (i"ht +ell !e very +elco(e to !oth interactionists /+ho (i"ht +ant individ,al tho,"hts to have physical correlates thro,"h +hich the !ody is infl,enced +hile reservin" the ca,sal re",larities for the non(aterial so,l0 and epipheno(enalists. *he kind of analysis . s,""est th,s does so(e li(ited (etaphysical +ork, !,t not in a +ay that is =,estion3!e""in" and ideolo"ical: it is only !y "ettin" the !est analysis of intentionality +e can "et, and seein" ho+ it (i"ht (atch ,p +ith nat,ral pheno(ena, that +e really kno+ +hat is at stake (etaphysically in an acco,nt of intentionality. *he research pro"ra((e associated +ith BC*2 th,s (i"ht do so(ethin" very si"nificant !y +ay of providin" an 7acco,nt7 of intentionality: it (i"ht render the lo"ical analysis of intentionality for(ally perspic,o,s, and it (i"ht provide the key to a realiDation acco,nt of intentionality as +ell. What it does not do, of co,rse, is prod,ce an acco,nt of the nature of intentionalityHof +hat it is to !e an intentional stateHin ter(s of so(e other kinds of cate"ories /for instance, nat,ralistic ones0. *he key notions of 7a!o,tness7 and 7/(ental30(eanin"7 are left ,ne1plained even if there sho,ld t,rn o,t to !e so(e partic,lar nat,ralistic relationships thro,"h +hich they are realiDed.

&E.(0 " Reorientation in t)e $)ilosop)y o+ Co*nitive S3ien3e

.t is (y !elief that the th,(!nail sketch of co(p,tational psycholo"y presented a!ove presents an interestin" scientific research pro"ra((e that (i"ht t,rn o,t to prod,ce theories +ith the t+o i(portant scientific 7"ood3(akin"7 =,alities that . have descri!ed. *he precedin" sections sho,ld, . think, (ake it clear that it (i"ht endo+ psycholo"y +ith these virt,es even 'ithout providin" a stron" nat,raliDation of the (ental. 2athe(atiDation distills the for( of a process !y a!stractin" fro( the nat,re of the thin"s that are related, and hence the (athe(atically red,ced description does not provide s,fficient conditions for the properties and o!8ects it relates. 2oreover, (athe(atiDation is

(ethodolo"ically dependent ,pon the prior ass,(ption of the pheno(ena to !e related !y the (athe(atical descriptions. .t is like+ise possi!le to for( linka"es !et+een do(ains of disco,rse 5 ##6 5 that fall short of (etaphysical s,fficiency and concept,al ade=,acy. We can accept the +ave3particle d,ality of (atter +itho,t !ein" a!le to derive one fro( the other, and +e can accept that the detection of oriented lines is realiDed thro,"h col,(ns in the :1 re"ion of the vis,al corte1 +itho,t !ein" a!le to derive pheno(enolo"ical properties fro( ne,ral states, or vice versa. S,ch a sit,ation leaves =,estions open, of co,rse, and they are na""in" =,estions. B,t /10 it is not clear at the o,tset +hether they are really scientific =,estions or philosophical =,estions that ,lti(ately t,rn ,pon the +ay +e have (isconstr,ed the pro!le(, and /@0 in the (eanti(e, the e1istence of these =,estions does not i(p,"n the pro"ress that has !een (ade alon" the +ay. *he !i" point here is that the needs of the philosopher and those of the empirical scientist di"erge in important 'ays /see Horst 199@0. 9nd this is reflected in the +ays +e tend to re"ard one another?s pro8ects. .n (y e1perience, scientists tend to !e ,tterly (ystified at +hat philosophers co,ld desire !eyond /a 0 a "ood (odel of (ental processes, and /b 0 localiDation of the f,nctional ,nits of the (odel in the nervo,s syste(. *o the(, the iss,e of +hether the connections fo,nd are red,ctions, or s,pervenience relations, or (erely e(pirically ade=,ate "eneraliDations is virt,ally ,nintelli"i!le, and s,rely of no interest for the practice of science. . think they are right to think this +ay so long as the issue is one of empirical science . )(pirical science ai(s at findin" the re",larities and connections that are there to !e fo,nd, and seeks as stron" an e1planatory relation as it can ,ncover. Science is !lind to distinctions !eyond e(pirical ade=,acy, as s,ch distinctions cannot !e decided !y e1peri(ent. 9nd fro( the e(pirical perspective, it co,nts as pro"ress to assert +hat yo, have fo,nd, even if yo, think yo, sho,ld have fo,nd so(ethin" (ore. B,t fro( the e(pirical standpoint, it is also tr,e that theoretical ideolo"ies /say, that +e must have a certain ind of e1planation, or a certain vie+ of the +orld0 stand in the dock a"ainst the evidence of data and s,ccessf,l theories, and not 8,st the other +ay aro,nd. *he Cartesian vie+ of the essence of (atter as e1tension i(plied that there must !e a (echanical e1planation of li"ht and "ravitation, and indeed of all (aterial pheno(ena. B,t !etter e1peri(entation and !etter theories forced ,s to a!andon Cartesian physics. >ike+ise, field theories no+ stand alon"side theories of contact interactions. 9nd teleolo"ical cate"ories in !iolo"y are !ein" accepted a"ainst an older (echanistic ideolo"y. 9 psycholo"y +ith s,fficient internal "ood3(akin" =,alities that +as not a stron" nat,raliDation +o,ld itself call the need for stron" nat,raliDation into =,estion. . therefore think that philosophers have !een +ron" to yoke the sci 3 5 ##- 5 entific i(portance of co(p,tational psycholo"y to its potential philosophical !enefits. /9nd hence the fail,re of C*2 to prod,ce those philosophical res,lts need not i(p,"n co(p,tational psycholo"y as an e(pirical research pro"ra((e.0 2y alternative s,""estion is that +e look at +hat co(p,tational psycholo"y (i"ht provide in the +ay of "ood3(akin" =,alities internal to scientific practice, and that (athe(atical and connective (at,rity stand o,t in this re"ard. *his alternative has i(plications for ho+ +e o,"ht to "o a!o,t the philosophical st,dy of co"nitive science. 'or e1a(ple, if this approach is the ri"ht approach, the !est +ay to st,dy co"nitive science as science +o,ld !e thro,"h caref,l case

st,dies and co(parisons !et+een different theories /(,ch the +ay one st,dies the history of any other science0. S,ch an endeavor lies o,tside the scope of this !ook. B,t it is possi!le !riefly to assess so(e of the co(parative (erits of (y alternative constr,al of the i(portance of co(p,tational psycholo"y +ith approaches that !ind science and (etaphysics in a ti"hter yoke. Here are several advanta"es that . think (y alternative approach en8oys.

&E.(.&0 " -etter ,es3ription o+ S3ienti+i3 $ra3ti3e

'irst, the alternative approach is in closer accordance +ith the facts of scientific practice. *he kinds of (etaphysical and episte(ic constraints re=,ired for stron" nat,raliDation are often (issin" in paradi"( e1a(ples of "ood theories in other sciences. Scientific pro"ress has often co(e, for e1a(ple, in the for( of la+s relatin" several varia!les in the a!sence of any (etaphysical necessity or concept,al ade=,acy relatin" those varia!les, and also in the a!sence of any (icroe1planation of +hy the la+ sho,ld hold. 2ost la+s, +hen they +ere discovered at least, e1pressed relationships that +ere (etaphysically contin"ent and episte(ically opa=,e. .f this is "ood eno,"h for, say, 6e+ton?s la+s, +hy sho,ld +e hold psycholo"y to a (ore strin"ent standardK .t is also plainly the case that, say, e1peri(ental psycholo"ists and psychophysicists do not see( to feel a need to vindicate the pheno(ena they st,dy /at any rate, no (ore than do practitioners of any other sciences0, and that pheno(enolo"ical and intentional description often play i(portant roles in the initial description of pro!le(s that it is the 8o! of theoretical psycholo"y to solve. 9nd the kind of 7e1planation7 of, say, 7seein" a red s=,are7 that is so,"ht !y a vision theorist does not re=,ire anythin" like (etaphysically s,fficient conditions. 'inally, one can point to anecdotal evidence fro( 8oint (eetin"s in +hich psycholo"ists are fr,strated and !affled !y the pro!le(s that divide 5 ##& 5 philosophers. 2y e1perience th,s far has !een that the characteriDation . have presented of +here psycholo"ical concerns end and p,rely philosophical ones !e"in has !een al(ost ,niversally +ell received !y psycholo"ists, (odelers, and ne,roscientists, tho,"h often (ore controversial a(on" philosophers.

&E.(.20 Ideolo*y and T)eory0-ad $re3edents

Second, one can hardly !e opti(istic a!o,t the precedents for holdin" scientific theories to the lit(,s of a partic,lar (etaphysical or (ethodolo"ical ideolo"y. Cartesian (echanis(, H,(ean vie+s on ind,ction and ca,sation, lo"ical positivis(, !ehavioris(Hthese stand as 8,st a fe+ pro(inent e1a(ples of research pro"ra((es that +ere !ased on (etaphysical or (ethodolo"ical vie+s +ith heavy theoretical i(plications. 9ll of the( see(ed very co(pellin" in their ti(e, as they canoniDed (etaphysical vie+s or for(s of e1planation that held a fir( "rip on the i(a"inations of their day. B,t each +as event,ally eroded !y s,ccessf,l scientific +ork that !elied their (etatheoretic ass,(ptions. .t is one thin" to st,dy the (,t,al infl,ence of scientific theory and (etaphysics or theories of scientific (ethod. .t is =,ite another to take a vie+ like stron" nat,ralis( and ,se it as a test for scientific le"iti(acy. *his kind of (ove has a poor track record. Better to look at the kinds of e1planations that psycholo"ical theory does provide and dra+ one?s concl,sions fro( there.

&E.(.40 S3ienti+i3 $ro*ress >it)out Naturali8ation

*hird, as ar",ed a!ove, it is possi!le to have i(portant kinds of scientific pro"ress +itho,t also achievin" interestin" (etaphysical res,lts or solvin" traditional philosophical pro!le(s. 9 philosophy of co"nitive science that is tied do+n to partic,lar (etaphysical "oals is not free to assess the kind of "ood3(akin" =,alities that psycholo"ical theories (ay en8oy /and +hich perhaps so(e already do0 that fall short of these "oals. 2y approach, in contrast, e(phasiDes s,ch achieve(ents, +hile re(ainin" open to the investi"ation of res,lts +ith (ore (etaphysical !ite sho,ld they arise.

&E.(.60 Comparisons >it) ot)er Resear3) $ro*rammes

'inally, (y alternative approach yields a strate"y for co(parin" 7traditional7 co(p,tational approaches to psycholo"y that center on notions 5 ##9 5 of 7r,les7 and 7representations7 +ith rival approaches arisin" fro( other so,rces s,ch as ne,roscience and ne,ral net+ork theories. 'or (ost of the ti(e that the co(p,ter (etaphor has !een e1ploited in psycholo"y, other approaches have also !een e1plored, even if they have only recently !een !ro,"ht to the a+areness of a !road a,dience of philosophers. 'or e1a(ple, the 2athe(atical *heory of Co((,nication of Shannon and Weaver /19J90 has !een e1plored !y Sayre /1969, 19-6, 19&60 as an alternative !asis for characteriDin" (ental processes fro( the early 196$s to the present, and 7ne,ral net+ork7 approaches !ased on atte(pts to provide a (athe(atical characteriDation of the interactions of lar"e n,(!ers of cells in the !rain +ere pioneered !y 2cC,lloch and Pitts /19J#0 and have !een developed over the space of (ore than three decades !y researchers s,ch as 4ross!er" /19&@0 and 9nderson /19-#0, as +ell as (ore recent researchers !etter kno+n to philosophers s,ch as G,(elhart and 2cClelland /19&60 and S(olensky /19&&0. )ach of these approaches has its o+n preferred (athe(atical tools /so(eti(es incl,din" ne+ (athe(atical (achinery developed to solve partic,lar pro!le(s0 and its characteristic for(ally e1act (odels of processes ,nderlyin" co"nition. 2,ch of the de!ate !et+een proponents of different (odels centers ,pon the feat,res "ained and lost !y different kinds of (athe(atical apparat,s: for e1a(ple, the ,se of differential vers,s difference e=,ations, or additive vers,s (,ltiplicative sh,ntin". /9 "ood s,rvey of (athe(atical differences in ne,ral (odelin" is fo,nd in >evine L1991M.0 9 second area of difference, !oth +ithin the ne,ral net+ork ca(p and !et+een its (e(!ers and traditional artificial intelli"ence co(es in the relationships ass,(ed !et+een the pro8ect of (athe(atical (odelin" and the pro8ect of connectin" the (odel ,p+ards to the data s,pplied !y psychophysics and do+n+ard to that s,pplied !y ne,roscience. So(e (odels are desi"ned only to fit partic,lar data c,rves, +hile others are intended additionally to !e ne,rolo"ically pla,si!le. .n short, there is a "reat deal to !e ,nderstood a!o,t the (a8or research pro"ra((es in this area !y lookin" at their (athe(atics, lookin" at their co((it(ents to for(in" ties to other do(ains, and lookin" at their strate"ies for doin" so. *his kind of approach has so(e hope of shinin" li"ht on individ,al theories, and also of clarifyin" the real differences !et+een the(. By contrast, (ost of +hat has co(e o,t of the philosophy of psycholo"y +ith respect to ne,ral net+orks so far has !een centered on one of t+o iss,es: /10 +hether connectionist theories are really the sa(e as /or co(pati!le +ith, or red,ci!le to, or i(ple(enta!le

5 #J$ 5 thro,"h0 co(p,tational theories /and vice versa0, and /@0 ho+ the availa!ility of connectionist (odels vitiates 'odor?s 7only "a(e in to+n7 ar",(ent to the effect that +e need intentional states !eca,se the only (odels +e have to e1plain !ehavior re=,ire the( as theoretical posits. :ery little has !een said of a philosophical nat,re a!o,t ne,ral net+ork theories in their o+n ri"ht, as opposed to ho+ they co(pare to the kind of vie+ espo,sed in C*2. Since . have ar",ed that C*2 does not in fact !ear any philosophical fr,it after all, . find co(parisons +ith ne,ral net+orks alon" that a1is to !e pretty (,ch !eside the point. >ookin" in detail at their (athe(atical repertoires and their co((it(ents to kinds of interdo(ain connections in vario,s directions, !y contrast, "ives ,s a concrete pro8ect in philosophy of science that +e can sink o,r teeth into.

&E.;0 Computation and Its Competition

*his (ention of co(petin" research pro"ra((es provides a nat,ral transition to a final point to !e (ade in this chapter. What . have tried to provide here is an alternative approach to assessin" the i(portance of the co(p,tational paradi"( in psycholo"yHa +ay of lookin" at the =,estion, 7.f co(p,tational psycholo"y is a s,ccessf,l research pro"ra((e, +hat is it that it +ill have contri!,ted to psycholo"yK7 2y ans+er has !een that co(p,tational psycholo"y tries to endo+ psycholo"y +ith t+o "ood3(akin" =,alities that have often !een vie+ed as hi"hly /even cr,cially0 i(portant to the (at,ration of sciences: na(ely, (athe(atical and connective (at,rity. B,t +e sho,ld note that !oth the =,estion and the ans+er are hi"hly conditional: they concern +hat co(p,tational psycholo"y 'ould do if carried o,t s,ccessf,lly. Ef co,rse it is an open =,estion +hether it can or 'ill !e carried o,t s,ccessf,lly, so none of the precedin" is (eant as an endorse(ent of the co(p,tational approach to psycholo"y as the right approach. .t is an approach that is on the ta!le, and as philosophers of science +e are o!li"ed to assess its pro(ise. 9t the sa(e ti(e, it is i(portant to ackno+led"e that there are serio,s iss,es concernin" the via!ility and prospects of the research pro"ra((e. 'irst, like any research pro"ra((e, it (ay si(ply not s,cceed even on its o+n ter(s !y failin" to achieve any f,nda(ental e1planatory s,ccesses. Second, there have !een serio,s ar",(ents raised !y +riters like ;reyf,s /19-@0 and Wino"rad and 'lores /19&60 to the effect that there are properties of the (ind that sy(!ol3(anip,latin" syste(s cannot d,plicate, and even (ore f,nda(ental o!8ections !y +riters like Gyle 5 #J1 5 /19J90, Witt"enstein /19%&0, and the @erstehen tradition to the interpretation of psycholo"ical ascriptions no+ called the 7theory3theory.7 . think these are all serio,s iss,es, and any one of the( co,ld t,rn o,t to have serio,s i(plications for the possi!le applications of rival (odels of the (ind. 'inally, any s,ccesses of the co(p,tational approach to the (ind in accordance +ith BC*2 +o,ld also have to !e assessed !y co(parison +ith the s,ccesses of rival research pro8ects s,ch as those arisin" o,t of ne,ral net+ork approaches or infor(ation theory. 9 !rief list of iss,es (i"ht incl,de !,t not !e li(ited to: *he availa!ility of e1act (athe(atical descriptions for a +ide variety of psycholo"ical pheno(ena. *he 7nat,ralness7 of these descriptions to their s,!8ect (atter. /'or e1a(ple, the classical

co(p,tational approach see(s to have a nat,ral +ay of approachin" the attit,de3content str,ct,re of intentional states. ;o other approaches have an e=,ally int,itive +ay of reflectin" this feat,re in their (odelsK >ike+ise, connectionist (odels see( nat,rally s,ited to (odelin" the !ehavior of fields of ne,rons, and infor(ation theory see(s to have a nat,ral +ay of talkin" a!o,t fidelity of intentional states.0 *he co(parative ele"ance of the (odels. /Can one approach s,pply strai"htfor+ard descriptions and e1planations +here another re=,ires a (ass of ,"ly kl,d"esK0 *he tradeoffs !et+een havin" a "eneral fra(e+ork /s,ch as r,le3confor(in" co,nter transfor(ations or the technical notion of infor(ation0 and havin" the freedo( to e(ploy an eclectic !atch of (athe(atical tools. *he +ays in +hich alternative research pro"ra((es are really co(petitors, and the e1tent to +hich they are ,lti(ately co(pati!leH!eca,se their for(alis(s t,rn o,t to !e e=,ivalent, for e1a(ple, or !eca,se they are really en"a"ed +ith different aspects of co"nition or different =,estions a!o,t the (ind. *he investi"ation of these =,estions +ill constit,te a serio,s philosophical research pro"ra((e in its o+n ri"ht, and +ill not !e ,ndertaken here. Ho+ever, one i(portant res,lt of the disc,ssion that has preceded in this !ook is the follo+in": one (i"ht have tho,"ht that the approach to the (ind fo,nd in C*2 sho,ld en8oy pride of place over so(e of its 5 #J@ 5 co(petitors !eca,se it solves certain philosophical pro!le(s /e1plainin" intentionality and vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y0 that its co(petitors have no strate"ies for solvin". B,t . have tried to ar",e that it fails to solve these pro!le(s, and that its tr,e !enefits lie in ho+ it (i"ht provide virt,es +holly internal to the science of psycholo"y. B,t +itho,t the philosophical clai(s to confer pride of place ,pon C*2, there is a level playin" field. We (ay no+ assess the co(parative (erits of C*2, connectionis(, and ne,roscience on +holly scientific "ro,nds as scientific research pro"ra((es. *his, . !elieve, effectively separates a set of =,estions a!o,t the philosophy of (ind /s,ch as the (ind3!ody pro!le( and the =,estion of the precise (etaphysical relationship !et+een (ental states and the !odily states thro,"h +hich they are realiDed0 fro( =,estions a!o,t the science of the (ind /s,ch as +hat the i(portant "ood(akin" =,alities are for s,ch a science0. 9nd this, . !elieve, is pro"ress. 5 #J# 5

C)apter Eleven0 Intentionality Wit)out Vindi3ation, $sy3)olo*y Wit)out Naturali8ation

*he ar",(ent th,s far in the !ook (ay !e s,((ariDed !riefly as follo+s: /10 9dvocates of C*2 have clai(ed that vie+in" the (ind as a co(p,ter allo+s ,s not only to (ake advances in e(pirical psycholo"y, !,t also to satisfy the (ore specifically philosophical desiderata of s,pplyin" a /nat,ralistic0 acco,nt of intentionality and vindicatin" intentional psycholo"y !y de(onstratin" its co(pati!ility +ith ca,sal3no(olo"ical psycholo"ical e1planation, (aterialis(, and the "enerality of physics. /@0 C*2 fails to (ake "ood on its clai(s to prod,ce these philosophical res,lts. B,t /#0 a

7!o+dleriDed7 version of C*2 can nonetheless provide a fra(e+ork for an interestin" e(pirical research pro"ra((e in co(p,tational psycholo"y, !eca,se +hat is needed for the 7"ood3(akin"7 =,alities internal to a science is (,ch +eaker than +hat is needed for stron" nat,raliDation or vindication. Psycholo"y co,ld attain a si"nificant de"ree of internal (athe(atical (at,rity +itho,t any de(onstra!le connections !et+een psycholo"ical cate"ories and the cate"ories of the physical sciences. 9nd it co,ld attain a "reat deal of connective (at,rity thro,"h localiDations that +ere e(pirically ade=,ate yet (etaphysically contin"ent and episte(ically opa=,e. )(pirical science is lar"ely !lind to (etaphysical (odalities stron"er than e(pirical ade=,acy, +hile =,estions a!o,t the (etaphysical nat,re of (ind3!ody relations are precisely the sorts of thin"s that are of i(portance for stron" nat,raliDation and vindication. .n short, science and (etaphysics en8oy a s,!stantial de"ree of (,t,al a,tono(y. B,t if s,ch iss,es are not the practicin" scientist?s concern, they cer3 5 #JJ 5 tainly are the concern of philosophers. Er, (ore precisely, +hile there is an i(portant kind of philosophy of science that e1a(ines precisely +hat partic,lar sciences are a!o,t, there are also !roader philosophical =,estions of a (etaphysical !ent as +ell. 9nd neither the le"iti(acy nor the i(portance of the (etaphysical =,estions is ,nderc,t !y the fact that they are not =,estions for the e(pirical scientist. *he reason that C*2 +as initially of interest +as that it see(ed to offer sol,tions to so(e pro!le(s that (any philosophers in this cent,ry have re"arded as diffic,lt and i(portant ones. )ven if +e can do "ood science +itho,t ans+ers to the =,estions, it nonetheless !ehooves ,s as philosophers to see +here +e are left if o,r !o+dleriDed interpretation of co(p,tational psycholo"y leaves the( ,nresolved. *he reader +ill recall that there +ere t+o (ain iss,es that C*2 so,"ht to address. *he first +as to provide an acco,nt of the int