THE SECURITY COUNCIL

STUDY GUIDE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction
Ethiopia-Somalialand Border Conflict
Puntland-Somalia Dispute
Civil War in Somalia
Piracy in The Somali Waters

INTRODUCTION
As we all should be aware, the Somalia Crisis is a very vast topic that includes
many aspects in that trouble-rifled country. There are various problems in this
single nation including, the border conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, the
Puntland-Somalia dispute, the civil war in Somalia as well as the piracy in the
Somali Waters. Before reading I must warn all the delegates that this is a
collection of information from many sources including Wikipedia,
crisisgroup.org, and many more. This study guide thus contains a lot of
information regarding the crises themselves, but not the solutions, which is
something you delegates must decide about. Happy reading…
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIALAND BORDER CONFLICT
The Ethiopian-Somali conflict and tension has a background in territorial and
political disputes. Animosity between Ethiopia and Somalis dates back a few
centuries with wars and conflicts. In recent years, those tensions caused two
wars.

A broader perspective shows many incidents of Ethiopian-Somali conflict.

Boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the 1948 settlement when
the land was granted to Ethiopia. Somali disgruntlement with this decision has
led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the hopes of taking control of
the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia. This plan would have reunited the
Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the
Republic of Somalia. Shy of that, ethnic and political tensions have caused
cross-border clashes over the years.
1960-1964 : Border Dispute
1977-1978 : Ogaden War
1982 : August Border Clash
1998-2000 : Cross-border warfare during the chaotic warlord-led era.

Conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia are of course not limited to the 20th-
21st Centuries. Wars between Somalia, or its precursor Islamic states, and
Ethiopia, stretch back to the 16th century. Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a
16th century Islamic leader of Adal popular in Somali culture for his jihad
against the Ethiopians during the rise of the Adal Sultanate (a multi-ethnic
former vassal kingdom of Ethiopia).

Therefore, painful living history, oral and cultural traditions, long-standing

ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay between the two nations and fuel
the conflict.

The first incursion by Ethiopian troops after the fall of the central Somali
government took place in August 1996. In March 1999, Ethiopian troops
reportedly raided the Somali border town of Balanballe in pursuit of members
of the Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya group which has been fighting to unite Ethiopia’s
eastern Ogaden region with Somalia. Later, in April 1999 two Somali leaders,
Ali Mahdi and Hussein Aideed, said in an official protest to the United Nations
Security Council, that heavily-armed Ethiopian troops entered the towns of
Beledhawo and Doollow on Friday, April 9, 1999. They further alleged that the
Ethiopian troops had taken over the local administration and detained officials
in the towns. In May 1999, Ethiopian soldiers, with the help of a pro-Ethiopian
Somali faction occupied the town of Luuq in southwestern Somalia, close to the
borders with Ethiopia and Kenya. In late June 1999, Ethiopian soldiers,
supported by armoured vehicles launched an attack from Luuq that resulted in
the capture of Garba Harre in the Gedo region, which was previously controlled
by the Somali National Front lead by Hussein Aideed. The attack was
apparently aimed at flushing out Ethiopian rebels based in Somalia.

After the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Somalia

in August 2000, Ethiopia at first did not recognize the interim government and
reportedly continued its raids against Al-Ittihad and supporting various warlord
factions, which lead to very strained relations between the Ethiopian
government and the interim Somali government, characterized by accusations,
denials and counter-accusations on both sides.

In January 2001, Somalia’s TNG Prime Minister, Ali Khalif Galaid, strongly
accused Ethiopia of arming factions opposed to the government, occupying
Somali districts and increasing its military presence in the country. He later
claimed that Ethiopian soldiers had occupied towns in Somalia’s southwestern
region, and had detained and intimidated its nationals; the Ethiopian
government denied these charges.

Ethiopia has supported and is alleged to have supported a number of different

Somali factions at one time or another. Among these are the Somali
Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC), Muse Sudi Yalahow, General
Mohammed Said Hirsi Morgan (allied to the Somali Patriotic Movement or SPM),
Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigudud and his Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) and
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (former President of Puntland and current Somali TNG
President). A number of Somali warlord factions have also held meetings and
formed loose alliances in Ethiopia.

Reports in early January, 2002 indicated that around 300 Ethiopian soldiers
were deployed in Garowe (capital of Puntland) with other Ethiopian troops
reportedly moving into the neighbouring Bay region and around Baidoa. The
Ethiopian government denied these reports and accused the interim
government of spreading "malicious lies" about Ethiopia’s policy towards
Somalia.

Ethiopian soldiers again attacked and temporarily captured the border town of
Beledhawo on Wednesday, May 15, 2002 with the help of the SRRC after the
town had been captured by a rival militia. During the raid, the commander of
the rival militia, Colonel Abdirizak Issak Bihi, was captured by the Ethiopian
forces and taken across the border to Ethiopia. After the raid, control of the
town was turned over to the SRRC. Earlier in May, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf
Ahmed had retaken control of Puntland by ousting his rival Jama Ali Jama with
the aid of the Ethiopian army.

In February 2003, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, admitted that

Ethiopian troops were occasionally sent into Somalia to battle the militant
Islamist group, Al-Ittihad and stated that the group was linked to Al-Qaeda. He
also claimed that Ethiopia’s government had lists of Al-Ittihad members who
were, at the time, in the Transitional National Government and parliament of
Somalia; a claim that TNG President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan has consistently
denied. President Hassan has in turn, accused Ethiopia of destabilizing Somalia,
interfering daily in Somali affairs and violating the arms embargo on Somalia by
supplying weapons to warlords opposed to the Transitional Government at the
time; Ethiopia denied these charges.

Although an attempt was made to improve relations between Ethiopia and the
TNG in June 2001, relations only really improved in 2004 when Abdullahi Yusuf
became the TNG President. Then Ethiopia reversed its position and began to
support the interim government, especially against various Islamist militias in
Somalia, most recently the Islamic Courts Union.

Ethiopian involvement in Somalia gained widespread public attention when

Ethiopian troops moved into Somalian territory on July 20, 2006. Somalia's
interim government was then resisting advances by the Islamic Courts Union
forces north to the last unoccupied city of Baidoa.

A Somali Islamist leader has ordered a "jihad" to drive out Ethiopian troops,
after they entered the country to protect the weak interim government,
however, Sharia courts in Ethiopia condemned the ICU's declaration of holy
war. Meles Zenawi has agreed to withdraw Ethiopian forces at arrival of the
African Union. Ethiopia has been a long-term ally of President Abdullahi Yusuf
and in the 1990s helped him defeat an Islamist militia led by Mr Aweys.

Ethiopian troops had reportedly moved into another town in south-western

Somalia, two days after entering the country to protect the weak government.

Eyewitnesses say about 200 Ethiopian soldiers took control of the airstrip
outside Waajid early on Saturday, July 22. Later reports indicate that Ethiopian
soldiers have occupied Bardaale, 60 kilometers 40 miles west of Baidoa, the
day after the ICU seized control of Kismayo on September 21.

An exchange of mortar shells between Union of Islamic Courts and Ethiopian

forces has occurred in Galkayo on November 28, 2006 where both Islamists and
Ethiopian forces are facing off. Ethiopian and Islamist forces in Galkayo,
central Somalia, were less than 5 km away from one another.

On November 30, 2006, an Ethiopian military convoy in Somalia was ambushed

by fighters loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts. It happened on Tuesday 35km
south-west of Baidoa, seat of the weak interim government, who deny it took
place. Eyewitness said a truck was blown up and there was an exchange of fire.
The UIC claim 20 Ethiopians died. Ethiopia's parliament voted the same day to
let the government take "all necessary" steps to rebuff any invasion by
Somalia's Islamists. "Parliament hereby authorizes the government to take all
necessary and legal steps to stave off a declaration of holy war and invasion by
the Union of Islamic Courts against the country," the resolution said.

PUNTLAND-SOMALIA DISPUTE
The Puntland–Somaliland dispute is a territorial dispute over the Somali regions
of Sool, Cayn and Sanaag between the two autonomous Somaliland and
Puntland macro regions of Somalia.

The dispute escalated into armed clashes on October 15, 2007 when a
Somaliland-aligned faction of the Dulbahante clan attacked the ruling
Puntland-aligned faction of the same clan in Las Anod, the capital of the "SSC"
region (Sool, Sanaag and Cayn). The Puntland-aligned administration has ruled
the town since 2003, when the Somaliland-aligned faction was forced out.

Sanaag is a disputed region, claimed as sovereign territory by the two

autonomous Somaliland and Puntland macro regions of Somalia.

The dispute between Somaliland and Puntland stems from 1998, when Puntland
formed and declared the region as part of its territory. Prior to that, it had
been claimed by Somaliland since the 1991 events of the Somali Civil War.

Beginning in 2003, the forces of Puntland entered and occupied the region
based on irredentist desires, due to the large Darod clan population in the
area. Somaliland claimed the territory as part of the original bounds of British
Somaliland. Fighting between the two forces led to casualties and captured
prisoners, who were later exchanged. As a related contention, in 2005 Puntland
tried to sell off mineral rights to foreign investors, including the disputed
territories of Sool and Sanaag.

The dispute with the TFG stems from the passage of the new Charter in
November 2004. However, this was not a pragmatic issue until the military
successes of the government in the 2006–2007 war in Somalia. Assertions of
sovereignty in January 2007 by the TFG leadership sparked riots in Somaliland.

In July 1, 2007, the state of Maakhir was declared on the area. It claims
independence from both Puntland and Somaliland. Maakhir has since been
reincorporated into Puntland.

Sool is a disputed region, claimed as sovereign territory by both the Somaliland

and Puntland administrations. During 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also
incorporated sharia courts in Sool region into their loose alliance, though their
military forces never occupied the region.

Under the government of Siad Barre, Sool was not a separate region, but part
of the larger Nugaal province, with the capital city of Garowe. It was separated
from Nugaal in the 1980s. Since 2003 and until October 2007, Sool has been
under control of Puntland.

The area, centered on the town of Buuhoodle, is also disputed by Somaliland

and Puntland. According to Somaliland, the so-called Ayn area claimed by
Puntland remains part of the Togdheer region. Somaliland disputes the
territorial claims of Puntland, which wrote the claim on the portion of
Togdheere into their 1998 charter.

In October 2007, the conflict mushroomed into a regional conflict over control
of the city of Las Anod, as Somaliland regular army forces mobilized from their
base in the town of Adhicadeeye, west of the city, and entered the conflict.
Puntland was slow to mobilize a counter-attack, as Puntland's weak economy
and overstretched military obligations in Mogadishu prevented a rapid
response. After getting the city under its control, Somaliland moved Sool's
regional administration into Las Anod.

Between 10 and 20 people were reported to be dead. A security official who

tracks Somalia said, "Somaliland troops have captured the entire town and 100
Puntland troops. Somaliland has warned that if Puntland troops try to come
back, they would not mind going deep into Puntland territory,"

There were conflicting reports on whether Somaliland troops advanced further

into Puntland toward its capital Garowe, about 90km to the east. Abdillahi Ali,
Somaliland's defence minister, told that Somaliland troops had control of the
checkpoint on the road to Garowe. A diplomat that tracks Somalia from Nairobi
told Reuters Somaliland had advanced 25km east of Las Anod.

On January 13 2008, heavy fighting erupted after troops from Somaliland

attacked a base where rival clan militias were organizing, local sources said.
The fighting began early in the morning when Somaliland troops raided militias
organizing at Dhabansar, a village southwest of Las Anod, the provincial capital
of disputed Sool region. Somaliland forces captured more than 20 prisoners of
war, including Col. Deyr Abdi. Some 10 people were killed.

Col. Deyr was recently appointed as military commander for the region by Gen.
Adde Muse, leader of the neighboring rival sub-state of Puntland, which also
claims legitimacy over Sool region.

On January 15 2008, the president of Puntland Adde Muse Hersi said that its
government would soon resume control of Las Anod, and recapture it from
Somaliland[14], but Somaliland's forces were still in control in April 2009, when
the conflict flared up once again, as Somaliland troops clashed with Puntland
militia.

CIVIL WAR IN SOMALIA

The Advance of the Islamic Courts Union is the period in the Somali Civil War
that began on May 2006 with the Islamic Courts Union's (ICU) conquest of
Mogadishu from the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (ARPCT) and continued with further ICU expansion in the country.
Following the outbreak of the 2006 Somali War on December 21, 2006, by
December 24, direct Ethiopian intervention in the conflict in support of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was no longer denied by the Ethiopian
government. The Eritrean government denied any involvement despite
Ethiopian claims to the contrary.

The rise of the Islamic Courts in Somalia began in the mid 1990s with the
alliance of a group of Muslim legal scholars and business people led by Hassan
Aweys (former leader of the AIAI) and Sharif Ahmed, with two other powerful
elements: Yusuf Mohammed Siad "Indha'adde" the self-declared governor of
Shabeellaha Hoose, and the militant Islamist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya led by
Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, forming the Islamic Courts Union.

Initially these three distinct elements maintained separate leadership, In July

2006, the Union of Islamic Courts and the AIAI merged to form the Supreme
Islamic Courts Council (SICC). By the end of September Indha'adde's voluntary
annexed his warlordship to the SICC, which created a larger unified
organization.

Against them are posed the Transitional Federal Government, and the
breakaway region of Puntland, plus other individual warlords and tribes.

Until September, the conflict was limited to the Benadir region, and pitted
petty warlord and pirate fiefdoms in a one-sided battle against the Islamic
Courts, often with the local populace supporting the Islamists.

The ICU's capture of Kismayo brought them into an irresolvable conflict with
the newly declared Jubaland and the Juba Valley Alliance forces. The JVA
withdrew in the face of an overwhelming ICU army in the hopes that, when
returning in full force, the JVA would be strong enough to retake Kismayo. In
the ensuing battles outside of Bu'aale and Kismayo however, the JVA proved to
be no match for the ICU, who defeated them easily. JVA forces began to
crumble by November, as JVA militias began defecting to the ICU. By November
14, entire Marehan subclans began defecting to the ICU, setting up courts in
Bardhere and Afmadow.

Puntland entered the conflict on November 12, attacking ICU positions south of
Galkacayo. This led to immediate setbacks for Puntland as they lost several
important pieces of military hardware including two tanks and many technicals.
Puntland stepped up their deployment to the border significantly.
Southwestern Somalia and their military forces, the Rahanweyn Resistance
Army, sat out the conflict entirely other than deploying several hundred troops
in Baidoa to defend the city until December 1st. On December 1st 350 RRA
soldiers defected to the ICU, along with the entire district of Dinsoor. A
division of pro-Government RRA soldiers may still be deployed in support of the
government at Baidoa, but this is unclear, as the overall RRA commander has
opposed the government rather openly since the end of October. The RRA has a
longstanding "wait and see" policy when it comes to involvement outside
Rahanweyn clan territory, so alignment towards the ICU may tip the scales
dramatically in favor of the ICU.

Though the ICU has been somewhat bellicose towards Somaliland, due to their
alleged ill treatment of a respected Jihadist religious leader in Somaliland, and
Somaliland has been quite hostile to the ICU whom they term "false prophets",
Somaliland took no direct role in the conflict. Somaliland is traditionally the
heartland of the AIAI, and support is quite high for the ICU in Somaliland
territory, and conflict may occur in the future.

Ethiopian troops invaded Somalian territory on July 20, 2006. Ethiopia

maintained it was providing military assistance to the transitional government.

Somalia's interim government resisted militant advances by the Islamic Courts

Union (ICU) forces north to the last unoccupied city of Baidoa. The fighting
intensified into direct confrontations on December 8th as ICU and Ethiopian
troops backed by government forces clashed in Dinsoor and near Galkayo.

Both the Transitional Government (TFG) and the Islamic Courts Union had taken
great pains to avoid direct confrontation between ICU and TFG forces,
preferring until December 8th to attack proxy and allied forces.

The ICU invasion of Hiran, Southwestern Somalia and Jubaland technically did
not violate the ceasefire as those forces had not submitted territorial control
to the government, despite ruling the territories in their name, and the TFG
invasion of Burhakaba attacked tribal militias allied to the ICU, but was at that
point not ICU territory. This mutual following of the letter of the peace
agreement, while ignoring the spirit of the peace agreement, increased tension
to a fever pitch, though both sides seemed unwilling to fire the first shot and
be seen as the aggressor.

Differing interpretations of the peace agreement led to a tense situation, as

the opponents viewed their adversaries as not being committed to negotiation.

US interests in Somalia date back to funding and military backing of the regime
of Siad Barre in the 1970s. After the UN interventions of the 1990s, the US has
mainly avoided involvement in the nation.
Officially, the present United States' interest in the Horn of Africa region
comprises desires for stability and peace in Somalia, including support of the
establishment of a new government under the Transitional Federal
Government, passage of the UN Security Council resolution to deploy an
African-led peacekeeping force known as IGASOM, delivery of humanitarian aid,
as well as warnings against the spread of extremist and terrorist groups in the
region, including Al-Qaeda.

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn
of Africa was established in Djibouti. It serves to monitor and check the spread
of terrorism, as well as deal with piracy. It has also undertaken humanitarian
missions in the region, but it has no mandate towards the conflict in Somalia.
The US denies any direct military operations in Somalia, or in neighboring
Kenya, and stated that it has no intention of deploying troops to Somalia.

U.S. sponsorship of a Dec. 6 U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized,

over the Islamists' opposition, the deployment of an African peacekeeping force
but omitted a demand for the withdrawal of the estimated 8,000 Ethiopian
troops. A visit by Army Gen. John Abizaid, head of U.S. Central Command, to
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, last month for talks with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.
The Bush administration's failure to insist publicly on an Ethiopian withdrawal
or to participate directly in efforts to negotiate a cease-fire and power-sharing
agreement between the transitional government and the Islamic Courts.

The McClatchy article went on to cite U.S. politicians have played a part in
American policy surrounding the conflict. Former majority leader in the
Republican Party-run House of Representatives, Dick Armey, has been lobbying
for Ethiopia and working to block a vote on a bipartisan bill (HR 5680) entitled
"Ethiopia Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights Advancement Act of 2006" to
cut U.S. security aid to Ethiopia if it failed to halt political repression. The
Bush administration also opposed the bill.

United States opposition to the formation of an Islamic Somalia led to the CIA
making secret payments to aid Somali warlords in early 2006 organized under
the name Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).
Disclosure of these payments to warlords helped galvanize the ICU's opposition
and created public support for the Islamists amongst Somalis. This led directly
to fueling the Second Battle of Mogadishu, fought between May and June 2006.
The result was the driving of the ARPCT forces from Mogadishu, and the
militant rise of the ICU.

A number of regional and international expressions and efforts, such as by the

UN and EU, have attempted to stem the tide of war. Other efforts, such as by
the ICRC, seek to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and ameliorate the crisis
caused by the conflict.
PIRACY IN THE SOMALI WATERS
Piracy off the Somali coast has been a threat to international shipping since the
beginning of Somalia's civil war in the early 1990s. Since 2005, many
international organizations, including the International Maritime Organization
and the World Food Program, have expressed concern over the rise in acts of
piracy. Piracy has contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the
delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World Food Program's
shipments arrive by sea, and ships have required a military escort. According to
the Kenyan foreign minister, Somali pirates have received over US$150 million
during the 12 months prior to November 2008.

Clashes have been reported between Somalia's Islamist fighters (who are
opposed to the Transitional Federal Government) and the pirates. In August
2008, Combined Task Force 150, a multinational coalition task force, took on
the role of fighting Somali piracy by establishing a Maritime Security Patrol
Area (MSPA) within the Gulf of Aden. The increasing threat posed by piracy also
caused significant concerns in India since most of its shipping trade routes pass
through the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy responded to these concerns by
deploying a warship in the region on October 23, 2008. In September 2008,
Russia announced that it too will soon join international efforts to combat
piracy.

On October 7, 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution

1838 calling on nations with vessels in the area to apply military force to
repress the acts of piracy. At the 101st council of the International Maritime
Organization, India called for a United Nations peacekeeping force under
unified command to tackle piracy off Somalia. (There has been a general and
complete arms embargo against Somalia since 1992.)

In November 2008, Somali pirates began hijacking ships well outside the Gulf of
Aden, perhaps targeting ships headed for the port of Mombasa, Kenya.

There are discussions under way to begin an aggressive covert operation against
the pirates. The CIA has been publicly warning of this potential threat for
months. Per a recent article in the Harpers Magazine, a CIA official stated, "We
need to deal with this problem from the beach side, in concert with the ocean
side, but we don't have an embassy in Somalia and limited, ineffective
intelligence operations. We need to work in Somalia and in Lebanon, where a
lot of the ransom money has changed hands. But our operations in Lebanon are
a joke, and we have no presence at all in Somalia."

During the Siad Barre regime, Somalia received aid from Denmark, Great
Britain, Iraq, Japan, Sweden, USSR, and West Germany to develop its fishing
industry. Cooperatives had fixed prices for their catch, which was often
exported due to the low demand for seafood in Somalia. Aid money improved
the ships and supported the construction of maintenance facilities. After the
fall of the Barre regime, the income from fishing decreased due to the Somali
Civil War.

Also, there was no coast guard to protect against trawlers from other countries
illegally fishing in Somali waters. This led to the erosion of the fish stock. Local
fishermen started to band together to protect the resource. Soon they
discovered that piracy was an easier way to make money. Due to the clan-
based organization of Somali society, the lack of a central government, and the
country's strategic location at the Horn of Africa, conditions were ripe for the
growth of piracy in the early 1990s.

Armed suspected pirates in the Indian Ocean near Somalia. After the picture
was taken, the vessel’s crew members opened fire on U.S. Navy ships and the
ship's crew members returned fire. One suspected pirate was killed and 12
were taken into custody.

Precise data on the current economic situation in Somalia is scarce but with an
estimated per capita GDP of $600 per year, it remains one of the world's
poorest countries. Millions of Somalis depend on food aid and in 2008,
according to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the population lived on a daily
income below $2. These factors and the lucrative success of many hijacking
operations have drawn a number of young men toward gangs of pirates, whose
wealth and strength often make them part of the local social and economic
elite. Abdi Farah Juha who lives in Garoowe (100 miles from the sea) told the
BBC, "They have money; they have power and they are getting stronger by the
day. They wed the most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have
new cars; new guns."

Some pirates are former fishermen, who argue that foreign ships are
threatening their livelihood by illegally fishing in Somali waters. After seeing
the profitability of piracy, since ransoms are usually paid, warlords began to
facilitate pirate activities, splitting the profits with the pirates. In most of the
hijackings, the bandits have not harmed their prisoners. The attackers
generally treat their hostages well in anticipation of a big payday to the point
of hiring caterers on the shores of Somalia to cook spaghetti, grilled fish and
roasted meat that will appeal to a Western palate. They also keep a steady
supply of cigarettes and drinks from the shops on shore.

The Transitional Federal Government has made some efforts to combat piracy,
occasionally allowing foreign naval vessels into Somali territorial
waters.[citation needed] However, more often than not, foreign naval vessels
chasing pirates were forced to break off when the pirates entered Somali
territorial waters. The government of Puntland has made more progress in
combating piracy, evident in recent interventions.
In June 2008, following the letter of the Transitional Federal Government to
the President of the Council asking for assistance from the international
community in its efforts to address acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships off the coast of Somalia the United Nations Security Council unanimously
passed a declaration authorizing nations that have the agreement of the
Transitional Federal Government to enter Somali territorial waters to deal with
pirates. The measure, which was sponsored by France, the United States and
Panama, will last six months. France initially wanted the resolution to include
other regions with pirate problems, such as West Africa, but were opposed by
Vietnam, Libya and most importantly by veto-holding China, who wanted the
sovereignty infringement limited to Somalia.

On November 21, 2008 BBC News reported that the Indian Navy had received
United Nations approval to enter Somali waters to combat piracy.

On April 8, 2009, four Somali pirates seized the Maersk Alabama 240 nautical
miles (440 km; 280 mi) southeast of the Somalia port city of Eyl. The ship was
carrying 17,000 metric tons of cargo, of which 5,000 metric tons were relief
supplies bound for Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. On April 12, 2009, United
States Navy SEALs snipers killed the three pirates that were holding Captain
Richard Phillips hostage aboard a lifeboat from the Maersk Alabama after
determining that Captain Phillips' life was in immediate danger. A fourth
pirate, Abdul Wali Muse, surrendered and was taken into custody.

On April 20, 2009 United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented
on the capture and release of 7 Somali pirates by Dutch Naval forces who were
on a NATO mission. After an attack on the Handytankers Magic, a petroleum
tanker, the Dutch frigate De Zeven Provincien tracked the pirates back to a
pirate "mother ship" and captured them. They confiscated the pirates weapons
and freed 20 Yemeni fishermen who the pirates had kidnapped and who had
been forced to sail the pirate "mother ship". Since the Dutch Naval Forces were
part of NATO but were not part of the EU they lacked legal jurisdiction to keep
the pirates so they released them. Clinton stated that this action "sends the
wrong signal" and that additional coordination was needed among nations.

On April 23, 2009 international donors pledged over $250 million for Somalia
which include $134 million to increase the African Union peacekeeping mission
from 4,350 troops to 8,000 troops and $34 million for Somali security forces.
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told delegates at a donors' conference
sponsored by the U.N. that "Piracy is a symptom of anarchy and insecurity on
the ground," and that "More security on the ground will make less piracy on the
seas." Somali President Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed pledged at the conference
that he would fight piracy and to loud applause said that "It is our duty to
pursue these criminals not only on the high seas, but also on terra firma,". The
Somali government has not gone after pirates because pirate leaders currently
have more power than the government. It has been estimated by piracy experts
that in 2008 the pirates gained about $80 million through ransom payments.

On May 18, 2009, a federal grand jury in New York returned a ten-count
indictment against Abduhl Wal-i-Musi.

Most pirates are aged 20–35 years old and come from the region of Puntland, a
region in northeastern Somalia. The East African Seafarers' Association
estimates that there are at least five pirate gangs and a total of 1,000 armed
men. According to a BBC report, the pirates can be divided into three main
categories:
Local Somali fishermen, considered the brains of the pirates' operations due to
their skill and knowledge of the sea. Ex-militiamen who used to fight for the
local clan warlords, used as the muscle. Technical experts who operate
equipment such as the GPS devices.

According to Globalsecurity.org, there are four main groups operating off the
Somali coast. The "National Volunteer Coast Guard" (NVCG), commanded by
Garaad Mohamed, is said to specialize in intercepting small boats and fishing
vessels around Kismayu on the southern coast. The "Marka group", under the
command of Sheikh Yusuf Mohamed Siad (also known as Yusuf Indha'adde), is
made up of several scattered and less organized groups operating around the
town of Marka. The third significant pirate group is composed of traditional
Somali fishermen operating around Puntland and referred to as the "Puntland
Group". The last set are the "Somali Marines" and reputed to be the most
powerful and sophisticated of the pirate groups with a military structure, a
fleet admiral, admiral, vice admiral and a head of financial operations.

There have been both positive and negative effects of the pirates' economic
success. Local residents have complained that the presence of so many armed
men makes them feel insecure, and that their freespending ways cause wild
fluctuations in the local exchange rate. Others fault them for excessive
consumption of alcoholic beverages and khat.

On the other hand, many other residents appreciate the rejuvenating effect
that the pirates' on-shore spending and re-stocking has had on their
impoverished towns, a presence which has oftentimes provided jobs and
opportunity when there were none. Entire hamlets have in the process been
transformed into veritable boomtowns, with local shop owners and other
residents using their gains to purchase items such as generators -- "allowing full
days of electricity, once an unimaginable luxury."

The pirates get most of their weapons from Yemen, but a significant amount
comes from Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Weapons dealers in the capital
receive a deposit from a hawala dealer on behalf of the pirates and the
weapons are then driven to Puntland where the pirates pay the balance.
Various photographs of pirates in situ indicate that their weapons are
predominantly AKM assault rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers and semi-automatic
pistols such as the TT-30. Additionally, given the particular origin of their
weaponry, they are likely to have hand grenades such as the RGD-5 or F1.

Pirates say ransom money is paid in large denomination US dollar bills. It is

delivered to them in burlap sacks which are either dropped from helicopters or
cased in waterproof suitcases loaded onto tiny skiffs. Ransom money has also
been delivered to pirates via parachute, as happened in January 2009 when an
orange container with $3 million cash inside it was dropped onto the deck of
the supertanker MV Sirius Star to secure the release of ship and crew. To
authenticate the banknotes, pirates use currency-counting machines, the same
technology used at foreign exchange bureaus worldwide. According to one
pirate, these machines are, in turn, purchased from business connections in
Dubai, Djibouti, and other areas. Hostages seized by the pirates usually have to
wait 45 days or more for the ships' owners to pay the ransom and secure their
release, but the pirates' treatment of the hostages is relatively humane, and
their reputation for turning over the ship, cargo and crew over upon receipt of
the demanded ransom has been cited as a reason for their continued success in
having their demands met.

Somali pirates allegedly get help from the Somali diaspora. Somali expatriates,
including reputedly some among the 200,000 Somalis living in Canada, offer
funds, equipment and information.

The UN envoy for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, has stated that "because
there is no (effective) government, there is ... much irregular fishing from
European and Asian countries," and that the UN has "reliable information" that
European and Asian companies are dumping toxic and nuclear waste off the
Somali coastline. However, he stresses that "no government has endorsed this
act, and that private companies and individuals acting alone are responsible."
In addition, Ould-Abdallah told the press that he believes the toxic waste
dumping is "a disaster off the Somali coast, a disaster (for) the Somali
environment, the Somali population," and that what he terms "this illegal
fishing, illegal dumping of waste" helps fuel the civil war in Somalia since the
illegal foreign fishermen pay off corrupt local officials or warlords for
protection or to secure counterfeit licenses. However, Ould-Abdallah noted
that piracy will not prevent waste dumping: "The intentions of these pirates are
not concerned with protecting their environment," and "What is ultimately
needed is a functioning, effective government that will get its act together and
take control of its affairs." These issues have generally not been reported in
international media when reporting on piracy.

Following the massive tsunami of December 2004, there have emerged

allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in the late 1980s,
Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of
toxic waste. The huge waves which battered northern Somalia after the
tsunami are believed to have stirred up tonnes of nuclear and toxic waste that
was illegally dumped in Somali waters by several European firms. The European
Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and
the European Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two
European companies—the Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian
waste broker, Progresso—and representatives of the warlords then in power, to
accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about
£60 million). According to a report by the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) assessment mission, there are far higher than normal cases
of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages
and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the
northeastern towns of Hobbio and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coast—diseases
consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP continues that the current situation
along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only
in Somalia but also in the eastern Africa sub-region.

Under Article 9(1)(d) of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary

Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, it is illegal for "any
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes: that results in
deliberate disposal (e.g. dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in
contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international
law".

According to Nick Nuttall of the United Nations Environmental Programme,

"Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste starting in the
early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there," and "European
companies found it to be very cheap to get rid of the waste, costing as little as
$2.50 a tonne, where waste disposal costs in Europe are something like $1000 a
tonne."

At the same time, illegal trawlers began fishing Somalia's seas with an
estimated $300 million of tuna, shrimp, and lobster being taken each year
depleting stocks previously available to local fishermen. Through interception
with speedboats, Somali fishermen tried to either dissuade the dumpers and
trawlers or levy a "tax" on them as compensation. In an interview, Sugule Ali,
one of the pirate leaders explained "We don't consider ourselves sea bandits.
We consider sea bandits (to be) those who illegally fish and dump in our seas."
Peter Lehr, a Somalia piracy expert at the University of St. Andrews says "It's
almost like a resource swap, Somalis collect up to $100 million a year from
pirate ransoms off their coasts and the Europeans and Asians poach around
$300 million a year in fish from Somali waters."

According to Roger Middleton of Chatham House, "The problem of overfishing

and illegal fishing in Somali waters, is a very serious one, and does affect the
livelihoods of people inside Somalia the dumping of toxic waste on Somalia’s
shores is a very serious issue, which will continue to affect people in Somalia
long after the war has ended, and piracy is resolved." To lure fish to their
traps, foreign trawlers reportedly also use fishing equipment under prohibition
such as nets with very small mesh sizes and sophisticated underwater lighting
systems.

Under Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the Law of the Sea Convention:

"In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has jurisdiction as provided
for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to the protection
and preservation of the marine environment".

Article 57 of the Convention in turn outlines the limit of that jurisdiction:

"The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured".

CLOSING REMARKS
Here we are dealing with 4 crises in the same region simply for the reason that
the crisis includes all these and hence a resolution solving the crisis needs to
resolve all of these. However, the committee will be deemed as not failed even
if only two of these extensive topics are resolved. However, you have 3 days,
excellent debaters, and I expect that you can resolve 3 of these, if not all 4.
Hope you enjoy Jaco-MUN, 2009.

Delegates please keep in mind that you will definitely have to put in a lot of
effort and do a lot more research outside the boundaries of this study guide as
it JUST a basis of your topic and in no way will do justice to the entire scope of
the topic. Please do come prepared with your material and be on the lookout
for study guide updates that will be posted onto the site. (If there are any that
is) You must also form your own bloc positions and we will be in a position to
help you in every way and for every doubt you have. There are just a number
of things to remind you of before you step into committee:
• You do not represent your school or yourself in any way once you step into
committee for you are a representative of your given country.
• For that purpose you must know your countries stand thoroughly and adhere
to it at all times without for a second shifting out of policy or practical sense.
• A good delegate is one who does not create enemies but is diplomatic and
manipulative at the same time and places himself in a position to make others
do what he so wishes to in a very subtle manner. Basically I mean being
cunning is what will get you ahead.