Rapid Reaction Force RRF AFFIRMATIVE INDEX IAC (version one) 1-21 JAC (version two) 22-30 L A 314i ide Advant = Genocide will happen 42.43 Genocide impacts 44-53 RRF solves genocide 54-56 Slow response = conflict escalation 57-59 Escalation= dehumanization 60 War= disease spread 6 RRF solves conflict escalation 62-65 Unilat now 66-67 Link XT 68-72 Muttilat good (general) 73-16 Muilat solves terorista 778 ‘Terrorism impacts 82-84 Multilat key to soft power 85.87 Soft power good 88 Maltilat key to heg 39-90 Hg good 91 UN Credibility Advantage: RRF key to UN credibility 92-94 UN cred on the brink 9s UN not credible 96-97 UN key to peace 98 UN key to Sudan 99 UN key to human rights 100 Aw Bab ‘Solvency XT: RRF solves 101-106 RRF key to deterrence 107-109 Deterrence solves 10-112 US key n3-115 RRF belps PKOs 116-118 Training key 119-120 RRF solves relief operations 121 RF solves fast 12 RF decreases UN dependence 123-124 yers to: RRF saves money 125-127 AT: Politics DA 128 ‘AT: Readiness/Overstrech 129 Imperialism 130-132 Kritiks 133 AT: Unilateral CP No support/violate UN charter 134 138-137a IRC | —_— Rapid Reaction Force SD1 2004 Observers One | “Tniwres*Y ‘New threats and challenges are arising and the UN's current system of dealing with threats is ineffective and slow. Dr. H. Peter Langille, 2002 Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: A review of existing arrangements and options for enhancing UN rapid deployment. http://www unreformeenter.org/New_Folder/PDFs/Langille%20Exec%20Sum%20S mall.pdf ‘With new challenges and risks, the United Nations will be frequently called upon to serve as an international police and global emergency service. Complex conflicts will continue to generate demands for additional operations and assistance. Such diverse emergencies often require rapid deployments, but in this respect, the UN has struggled = without the necessary mechanisms or adequate support from its member states. The results are quite predictable: rather than rapid deployment, routine delays of four-to-six months remain the norm, with responses that are frequently ‘too little’, ‘too late’ and ‘too lame’. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan conceded in the summer of 2000: Our system for launching United Nations peace operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find : fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military. Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly. Clearly, the current system is untenable. There is a need for substantive change at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. Yet, recent efforts have focused primarily on implementing the technical and administrative reforms identified by the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi report) and the subsequent ‘comprehensive review’. For example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is undergoing a sweeping overhaul and a much-needed expansion of personnel and offices, to facilitate planning, management and support. In addition, by April 2002, seventy- three member states had renewed their support for the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS). To ensure the system can be used in a more active manner for rapid deployment, the Secretariat is attempting to clarify the conditional commitments and verify the quality and quantity of personnel and equipment that might be made available.Plan: ‘The United States Federal Government should establish a foreign policy substantially increasing its support for United Nations peacekeeping operations by providing the technical, logistical and financial assistance necessary for the development of a permanent United Nations rapid reaction force. Ls