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John Rawls in his Theory of Justice argues that utilitarianism conflates . . .

. all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator. Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons (Rawls 2 !" 2#$. %he meaning of the above charge and

its success as a refutation of utilitarianism are the ob&ects of discussion for this paper. ' will argue that Rawls( charge is a successful refutation of utilitarianism given that this lack of distinction in utilitarianism means that the plurality of conceptions of the good inherent in individuals will be ignored. 'nstead of taking seriously the distinction between persons the good and right chosen by one will be imposed on all. )ollowing further from this lack of distinction" people are considered as means rather than ends in themselves in the distribution of goods and rights for the benefit of society. ' will now give Rawls( arguments for why he charges utilitarianism with not taking seriously the distinction between persons. *fter this ' will argue why this is a successful refutation of utilitarianism and give arguments against possible criticisms of my arguments( assumptions. %he conclusion following my arguments will point out areas of further investigation on the matter as well as summari+ing the arguments concisely for the benefit of the reader. Rawls" borrowing from ,idgwick" defines utilitarianism as a theory which finds . . . that society is rightly ordered" and therefore &ust" when its ma&or institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it (Rawls 2 !" 2 $. %he ramifications of this are that the distinction between persons is not taken

seriously. %he first problem with this is that people are all treated as if they have all have the same notion of the good. -y this Rawls means that what is to be pursued as the good is decided by an impartial sympathetic spectator. rather than each person deciding their own conception of the good. %his he argues does not take seriously the fact that people have a plurality of conceptions of the
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/ndowed with ideal powers of sympathy and imagination" the impartial spectator is the perfectly rational individual who identifies with and e0periences the desires of others as if these desires were his own (Rawls 2 !" 2#$

good" which differ from those of an impartial sympathetic spectator concerned to solely to ma0imi+e society(s net satisfaction. Rawls argues that" in contrast to utilitarianism" his principles of &ustice chosen in the original position take seriously the distinction between persons because" among other reasons noted below" they allow for different conceptions of the good. %he plurality of conceptions are constrained only by principles that free and e1ual people in the original position would agree on2. %he other reason why Rawls doesn(t think utilitarianism takes seriously the distinction between persons is that in distributing the benefits and burdens in society" utilitarianism does not" e0cept indirectly" consider the individual (Rawls 2 !" 2!$. )or utilitarianism" the individual does

not matter in terms of &ustice e0cept to the e0tent that her position affects the net satisfaction of society. )or e0ample" in a utilitarian system it could be perfectly &ust to give to one person all the burdens and another all the benefits if this did not have a negative effect on society(s overall satisfaction. 'f there were a negative effect then distributing burdens in this way would not be &ust. Rawls believes the utilitarian &ustification for this une1ual distribution conflates one person with all people (Rawls 2 !" 22$. 3hile one person may suffer a pain now for a benefit later" balancing out

the gains and losses over the entire society as if society were &ust one person does not take seriously the distinction between persons. 'n addition" Rawls argues that some of the social goods (liberties and rights$ that utilitarianism trades are best considered apart from all other social goods (Rawls 2 !" 24526$. 7e

finds that separating the principles of &ustice and ordering them le0ically fits better with considered

%he original position is a theoretical construct that Rawls uses to come up with different principles of &ustice. 'n the original position people are considered e1ual by limiting their knowledge to e0clude knowledge that would pre&udice their choice of principles (knowledge of social class for e0ample$ and by acknowledging that all (or most$ are assumed to have a moral capacity. 7e gives the term veil of ignorance to denote the deprivation of pre&udicial knowledge participants have in the original position.

&udgments we make in reflective e1uilibrium about moral conflicts that arise!. %he le0ical ordering of the principles strengthens in principle the inviolability of our rights Rawls argues is evident in the importance we place on the distinction between persons in our considered &udgments (Rawls 2 !"

!45!6$. Rawls( arguments that utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons seem from their presentation above 1uite strong. 't does not though then follow that this is a successful refutation of utilitarianism. ' will argue however that it is and will then answer some of the criticisms of the assumptions my arguments rely on. Utilitarianism is first refuted as a theory of distributive &ustice by re1uiring an impartial sympathetic spectator who chooses the principles of social &ustice rather than positing e1ual people in the original situation choosing principles they can all agree on. %he result of this is that distinct persons are treated as means for the ends of one person conflated with society rather than ends in themselves. 'f this is something we believe inherently wrong (that people are treated as means to an end created by another$ then the distinction between persons is something that must be protected from the very beginning (before we choose the principals of &ustice$. Rawls convincingly argues that . . . if we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of the thing" and that the plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies we should not e0pect the principles of social choice to be utilitarian (Rawls 2 !" 22$. * corollary noted before is that utilitarianism (as defined above$ only allows one

conception of the good. *s stated before this violates the belief that people should be free to choose their own ends" sub&ect only to restrictions that all as free and e1ual people would agree to in the original position. %he assumption (that people should be treated as ends rather than means$ is held

%he term reflective e1uilibrium denotes a situation in which our broad principles of &ustice and our considered &udgment of a situation of conflict are aligned with one another (the considered &udgment is seen as derived from the principle(s$ rather than in conflict with it$. * considered &udgment is &udgment that we believe is not pre&udicial and made under circumstances that allow us to reflect on the situation. 8e0ical ordering simply means that one principle is to be applied before the other in considering what is or is not &ust.

to be valid if not self5evident and is beyond the scope of this short paper to &ustify. 'f this were not sufficient to refute utilitarianism" Rawls has also demonstrated sufficiently that utilitarianism as defined above would be forced to &ustify situations if the net satisfaction for society would be greater" which we would consider to be un&ust (Rawls 2 !" 24$. 9ur considered

&udgment" for e0ample" is in conflict with utilitarianism if allowing slavery or restricting the rights of others based on ethnicity would bring greater net satisfaction to society. %his misalignment of considered &udgments and the utilitarian principle of social &ustice noted above could be a successful refutation of utilitarianism if we hold the assumption that the concept of reflective e1uilibrium is valid and that our considered &udgments are correct. :iven the unlikelihood of slavery or racism being &ust we can safely presume that our considered &udgments on this matter are correct. 3e are then correct to assume that if the concept of reflective e1uilibrium is valid then utilitarianism is refuted as a theory of social &ustice. %wo critical responses that immediately arise from the above arguments are that utilitarianism could be chosen in the original position and that there need be no alignment between principles of &ustice and our considered &udgments. -oth of these criticisms deserve more space than can be given here and it is hoped the reader will forgive the brevity of the replies. %o the first charge ' respond by reiterating Rawls( claim that free and e1ual people in the original position are unlikely to choose principles" which could possible restrict their liberty to a greater e0tent than necessary. 't is further doubtful that people in the original position would choose a system" which they might not be able to comply with because its e0cessive demands go against their considered &udgments of what is &ust. %his leads to a consideration of the validity of aligning in reflective e1uilibrium the principles of &ustice derived in the original position with our considered &udgments. %here can be either a political or innate &ustification for believing considered &udgments should be aligned with #

the principles of &ustice. ;iewed as a political problem a misalignment of our considered &udgments and the principles of &ustice governing institutions will not lead to a well5ordered society (Rawls 2 !" #$ and may cause considerable instability depending on the gap between the two. %his will

most likely decrease the net satisfaction of society and thus undermine the basis for utilitarianism#. Regardless" it will allow for some to feel society(s institutions are &ust while others will think them un&ust with no foreseeable way to reconcile the two. * universal theory of &ustice that is to be accepted and followed by all must take seriously considered &udgments. 'f we were to consider the correct principles of &ustice to be innate then it would follow that the correct considered &udgments (those that we would learn and carry out in an environment conducive to that endeavor$ are the manifestations of these innate principles. 3hile not arguing e0plicitly for this reading" Rawls does assume it is correct to think that . . . the correct regulative principles for anything depends on the nature of the thing . . . (Rawls 2 !" 22$ and mentions a

similarity between syntactic principles and parameters (which are considered by most linguists to be innate$ and principles of &ustice (Rawls 2 !" #.5#2$. 'f we assume our considered &udgments are

correct (which in the case of the in&ustice of allowing slavery or racism ' think we can$ and are derived from innate principles of distributive &ustice then utilitarianism cannot be the correct principle of distributive &ustice because it clashes with the considered &udgments of distinct persons in some situations to ma0imi+e the net satisfaction of society. 't could be argued that considered &udgments instead of having any tie to innate principles are a result solely of cultural learning and that criticism of utilitarianism on the grounds that they differ from considered &udgments is meaningless. 't could further be argued that any principles of &ustice are not innate and their sole &ustification is the conse1uences that arise from their adoption. 'f
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9nce there was a decrease in the net satisfaction though a utilitarian would probably argue that the e0isting social structure would be un&ust. Revolution or reforms are possible solutions. *nother is keeping the social structure and eliminating those that were dragging down the satisfaction level (if they were in the negative$. Regardless" a simpler and more intuitive and defendable solution e0ists (Justice as )airness$.

this is the case then the remarks above on political &ustification are sufficient. <lacing aside 1uestions of &ustification for the principle(s$ of &ustice" argument against the innate hypothesis suffers from the same problems as solely behaviourist accounts of language ac1uisition. 'n brief" both moral rules and grammatical rules are comple0 and yet are ac1uired 1uite 1uickly in situations that don(t always e0plicitly demonstrate the connection between considered &udgments. %here is variation in considered &udgments however the variation that e0ists is similar to the variation that e0ists in language and can be accounted for by an impoverished or pre&udicial learning environment. %hough not as strong" as with language despite these variations there are striking similarities that are better accounted for by attributing a relationship between the principles and their manifestations or considered &udgments rather than thinking them separate. %he charge by John Rawls that utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons follows fairly evidently from the definition he uses in his Theory of Justice. *s presented above utilitarianism conflates the conception of the right and the good of one impartial sympathetic spectator with that of all distinct persons. %he plurality of conceptions of the good inherent in humanity is whittled down to one and in the process treating people as means rather than ends in allocating social goods" rights and liberties for the net satisfaction of society. %he &ustification of utilitarianism clashes with our considered &udgments" which place an emphasis on the inviolability of rights and distinctiveness of persons. %his clash refutes utilitarianism as a theory of distributive &ustice whether principles of distributive &ustice are viewed as political or innate.

Reference Rawls" J. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. =ambridge" >assachusetts? 2 !.

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