PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

MANUALS

INSTRUMENTATION OF DEPRESSURISING SYSTEMS

PTS 32.45.10.10 NOVEMBER 2009

2010 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS) All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the permission of the copyright owner.

PTS Circular 2009 - 007

PTS No: Publication Title: Base PTS Version: 32.45.10.10 Instrumentation of Depressurising Systems <Release 13>

This revision of PTS 32.45.10.10 Instrumentation of Depressurising Systems has been updated incorporating PETRONAS Lessons Learnt, Best Practice and new information issued by relevant industry code and standards. All updates in the document are highlighted in italic font. The previous version of this PTS (November 2003) will be removed from PTS binder/ e-repository from herein onwards.

Document Approval
Name Designation Date Signature

Initiator

Yusof b Hj Siraj

Custodian Engineer, Instrument & Control (Upstream), PCSB PTS SKG14 Challenge Session 1 (July 2009) and Final Circulation (End October 2009) Custodian Engineer, Instrument & Control, PA&O, GTS Senior Manager, PA&O Engineering GTS General Manager, Engineering - GTS Acting, Senior General Manager, GTS

Reviewed

SKG14 TPs

Approved

V. R. Harindran

Verified

Saifol Mualim b Ahmad Yahaya Pau Kiew Huai Pau Kiew Huai

Verified Endorsed

Revision History
Date Version Description of Updates Author

SUMMARY OF CHANGES Section 2. GENERAL Description of Changes Added following clause in Para 2 On Exploration and Production facilities, high rate emergency depressuring system should consist of an on/off actuated ball valve (ABV). For a process system where its components are sensitive to the depressuring rate and/or high noise level exceeding local authority requirements, a restriction orifice (RO) may be used as a rate adjusting device. In the event that the noise level still exceeds local authority requirements with ABV and RO, a control valve should be considered, subject to the approval of the Principal. Added following clause in Para 4 (bold) The implementations for high-rate emergency depressurising systems are primarily distinguished by the use of normally energised or normally deenergised solenoid valves. Normally de-energised solenoids are preferred for depressurizing valves to prevent inadvertent depressurizing, in event of solenoid failure. 3.2.2 Valve requirements Rephrase item 2 (bold) 2) The valve should have a metal seat and shall be tight shut-off in the forward flow direction in accordance with IEC 60534-4 leakage class V; (the requirement of fire safe valves subject to the approval of the Principal). 4.1.1 System requirements Rephrase as follows (bold): (1) Starting at the maximum upstream process pressure and the minimum downstream process pressure, the depressurising valve shall stroke from fully closed to fully open and vice versa within 30 s from initiation, when operated from the pneumatic manual station and within 20 s from initiation when electrically operated (2) The manual control station shall be located at a safe and remote location (usually the control room); 6.4 SIGNAL SEGREGATION Rephrase as follows (bold): Redundant IPS inputs from the depressurising initiating device shall not share the same power supply units, input cards, racks and field and/or system cabling in order to minimise common mode failure. 6.5 SIA BUFFER VESSEL Following note were removed: Note 2. Air buffer vessels may require a safety relief device, if located in a so-called fire area. (Depending on the size of the buffer vessel it may need ASME certificate to operate as a pressure vessel this is a DOSH requirements)

APPENDIX 1

Added and/or rephrase note 7, 11 and 12 as follows (changes bold): 7. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a socalled fire area or when stipulated by local authority requirement eg DOSH. 11. To improve reliability, followings are options: a) use of dual NE solenoid valves in series using separately routed cable, and segregated outputs from IPS to minimize common mode failure. However, this must be installed with a test panel to execute regular on-

Section

Description of Changes line testing to ensure zero solenoid failure on demand. use of solenoid valves with dual coils.

b)

12. The depressuring valve(s) shall be provided with two limit switches, one for fully open position and one for fully closed position. SIL Class for the limit switches as the initiators for trip function (if any), shall be done to determine the final configuration (1001, 2003 etc). APPENDIX 2 Added and/or rephrase note 7, 12 and 14 as follows (changes bold): NOTES: 7. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a socalled fire area or when stipulated by local authority requirement eg DOSH. 12. Input and output circuit fault alarms shall be equipped with line monitoring facilities and be able to distinguish between open circuits, short circuits and earth faults. The depressuring valve(s) shall be provided with two limit switches , one for fully open position and one for fully closed position. SIL Class for the limit switches as the initiators for trip function (if any), shall be done to determine the final configuration (1001, 2003 etc).

14.

APPENDIX 4

Rephrase Note 7 7. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a socalled fire areaor when stipulated by local authority requirement eg (DOSH

PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication,of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions. They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction, operation and maintenance of processing units and facilities. Where appropriate they are based on, or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice. The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by PETRONAS' OPUs in oil and gas production facilities, refineries, gas processing plants, chemical plants, marketing facilities or any other such facility, and thereby to achieve maximum technical and economic benefit from standardisation. The information set forth in these publications is provided to users for their consideration and decision to implement. This is of particular importance where PTS may not cover every requirement or diversity of condition at each locality. The system of PTS is expected to be sufficiently flexible to allow individual operating units to adapt the information set forth in PTS to their own environment and requirements. When Contractors or Manufacturers/Suppliers use PTS they shall be solely responsible for the quality of work and the attainment of the required design and engineering standards. In particular, for those requirements not specifically covered, it is expected of them to follow those design and engineering practices which will achieve the same level of integrity as reflected in the PTS. If in doubt, the Contractor or Manufacturer/Supplier shall, without detracting from his own responsibility, consult the owner. The right to use PTS rests with three categories of users: 1) PETRONAS and its affiliates. 2) Other parties who are authorised to use PTS subject to appropriate contractual arrangements. 3) Contractors/subcontractors and Manufacturers/Suppliers under a contract with users referred to under 1) and 2) which requires that tenders for projects, materials supplied or - generally - work performed on behalf of the said users comply with the relevant standards. Subject to any particular terms and conditions as may be set forth in specific agreements with users, PETRONAS disclaims any liability of whatsoever nature for any damage (including injury or death) suffered by any company or person whomsoever as a result of or in connection with the use, application or implementation of any PTS, combination of PTS or any part thereof. The benefit of this disclaimer shall inure in all respects to PETRONAS and/or any company affiliated to PETRONAS that may issue PTS or require the use of PTS. Without prejudice to any specific terms in respect of confidentiality under relevant contractual arrangements, PTS shall not, without the prior written consent of PETRONAS, be disclosed by users to any company or person whomsoever and the PTS shall be used exclusively for the purpose they have been provided to the user. They shall be returned after use, including any copies which shall only be made by users with the express prior written consent of PETRONAS. The copyright of PTS vests in PETRONAS. Users shall arrange for PTS to be held in safe custody and PETRONAS may at any time require information satisfactory to PETRONAS in order to ascertain how users implement this requirement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2. 3. 3.1 3.2 4. 4.1 4.2 5. 6. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 7. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1 SCOPE........................................................................................................................1 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS .........1 DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................1 ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................2 CROSS-REFERENCES .............................................................................................2 GENERAL ...................................................................................................................3 HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING.......................................................4 GUIDANCE ON THE SELECTION OF SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION......................4 HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM.......................................4 LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING.....................................................6 LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM .....................................6 LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH ADDITIONAL ..............................................................................................................7 DEPRESSURISING VALVE CALCULATIONS ..........................................................9 SPECIFIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................10 VALVES ....................................................................................................................10 FIRE PROOFING......................................................................................................10 LINE MONITORING..................................................................................................10 SIGNAL SEGREGATION .........................................................................................11 SIA BUFFER VESSEL..............................................................................................11 TESTING...................................................................................................................12 REFERENCES .........................................................................................................13 APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH AIR FAILURE OPEN VALVE (NORMALLY ENERGISED)................................................................................1 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH AIR FAILURE OPEN VALVE (NORMALLY DE-ENERGISED)..........................................................................2 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM ............................................................................1 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH ADDITIONAL PROTECTIVE FUNCTION 2

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3 APPENDIX 4

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 1 1. 1.1 INTRODUCTION SCOPE This PTS specifies requirements and gives recommendations for the instrumentation of depressurising systems, taking into consideration high-rate emergency depressurising and low-rate operational depressurising. IPF classification according to PTS 32.80.10.10 defines the implementation and testing requirements for instrumented protective functions, including depressurising systems. Where IPF classification results in more stringent requirements than the typical design arrangements specified in this PTS, the design shall be modified accordingly. This PTS is a revision of the PTS of the same title and number dated December 1994 and shall be used in conjunction with other PTS documents, particularly PTS 32.31.00.32, PTS 32.36.01.17 and PTS 32.80.10.10.

1.2

DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS Unless otherwise authorised by PETRONAS, the distribution of this document is confined to companies forming part of or managed by PETRONAS, and to Contractors nominated by them. This PTS is intended for use in oil refineries, chemical plants, gas plants, supply/marketing installations and in exploration and production facilities. If national and/or local regulations exist in which some of the requirements may be more stringent than in this PTS, the Contractor shall determine by careful scrutiny which of the requirements are the more stringent and which combination of requirements will be acceptable as regards safety, environmental, economic and legal aspects. In all cases the Contractor shall inform the Principal of any deviation from the requirements of this PTS which is considered to be necessary in order to comply with national and/or local regulations. The Principal may then negotiate with the Authorities concerned with the object of obtaining agreement to follow this PTS as closely as possible.

1.3 1.3.1

DEFINITIONS General definitions The Principal is the party that initiates the project and ultimately pays for its design and construction. The Principal will generally specify the technical requirements. The Principal may also include an agent or consultant, authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the Principal. The Contractor is the party which carries out all or part of the design, engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a project or operation of a facility. The Principal may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor. The Principal may sometimes undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor. The Manufacturer/Supplier is the party which manufactures or supplies equipment and services to perform the duties specified by the Contractor. The word shall indicate a requirement. The word should indicate a recommendation.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 2 1.3.2 Specific definitions Depressurising Reducing the pressure in process equipment at a controlled rate either due to emergency conditions or for operational purposes. Instrumented Protective Function (IPF) A function comprising the initiator function, logic solver function and final element function for the purpose of preventing or mitigating hazardous situations. Instrumented Protective System (IPS) The (electrical and/or electronic and/or programmable electronic) logic solver component of the Instrumented Protective Function complete with input and output equipment. Probability of Failure on Demand The probability of the IPF failing to respond to a demand. Dimensionless. Safe Failure A failure whose occurrence does not have the potential to place an IPF in a dangerous state. Formerly known as revealed failure.

1.4

ABBREVIATIONS Cv DCS DN ESD HAZOP HSE IA IEC IPF IPS NDE NE PFD SIA SIL TSO Control valve (flow) capacity, as defined in IEC 60534-1. Distributed Control System Diameter Nominal, the size being indicated in millimetres, e.g. DN 15 (which is the metric equivalent of inch nominal size). Emergency Shutdown Hazard and Operability study Health, Safety and Environment Instrument Air International Electro-technical Commission Instrumented Protective Function Instrumented Protective System Normally de-energised Normally energised Probability of Failure on Demand Secure Instrument Air Safety Integrity Level according to IEC 61508 & IEC 61511 Tight shut-off (to Class V or Class VI, in accordance with IEC 60534-4)

1.5

CROSS-REFERENCES Where cross-references are made, the number of the section or sub-section referred to is shown in brackets. All publications referred to in this PTS are listed in (7).

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 3 2. GENERAL High-rate emergency depressurising of plant facilities is typically used in order to immediately and quickly evacuate equipment inventory in an emergency. On Exploration and Production facilities, high rate emergency depressuring system should consist of an on/off actuated ball valve (ABV). For a process system where its components are sensitive to the depressuring rate and/or high noise level exceeding local authority requirements, a restriction orifice (RO) may be used as a rate adjusting device. In the event that the noise level still exceeds local authority requirements with ABV and RO, a control valve should be considered, subject to the approval of the Principal. High-rate emergency depressurising can be initiated automatically and/or manually, depending on the type of plant or emergency and the safeguarding strategy. The implementations for high-rate emergency depressurising systems are primarily distinguished by the use of normally energised or normally de-energised solenoid valves. Normally de-energised solenoids are preferred for depressurizing valves to prevent inadvertent depressurizing, in event of solenoid failure. The consequences of failure on demand and unintended depressurisation (safe failure) define the acceptable implementation(s).
NOTE: In addition to failure on demand assessment, the IPF classification methodology includes the probability of inadvertent opening and its consequences (e.g. environmental damage, production loss, damage to plant equipment, such as reactor internals or cladding, disturbance to reactor beds).

For additional requirements for emergency depressuring, refer to PTS 80.45.10.10. Low-rate operational depressurising of plant facilities is typically used for process control or other operational reasons. It is initiated automatically and/or manually. Low-rate operational depressurising systems shall be equipped with air failure closed valves to minimise the risk of inadvertent depressurising. In most applications, a low-rate operational depressurising valve is required in parallel with a high-rate emergency depressurising valve. Where simultaneous opening of both valves would cause the acceptable blowdown rate (typically limited by rate-of-depressurising and by flare capacity) to be exceeded, the low-rate operational depressurising valve shall be automatically closed upon opening of the high-rate emergency depressurising valve. Where multiple high-rate emergency depressurising systems and/or multiple low-rate operational depressurising systems are installed, simultaneous opening of these valves might cause the acceptable flare capacity to be exceeded. Such cases might require process sectioning as described in PTS 80.45.10.10 and need to be addressed separately by a risk assessment (e.g. QRA, Hazop and/or Technical Desk HSE review). Measures to prevent flare capacity being exceeded are not covered by these PTS.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 4 3. 3.1 HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING GUIDANCE ON THE SELECTION OF SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION IPF classification in accordance with PTS 32.80.10.10 will ultimately define the acceptable arrangement(s).

3.2 3.2.1

HIGH-RATE EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM System requirements The minimum system requirements for an air failure open high-rate emergency depressurising system are: 1. Instrument air supply to the depressurising valve shall be assured by the use of an SIA buffer vessel 2. Starting at the maximum upstream process pressure, the minimum downstream process pressure and with the actuator loaded at the upper design pressure of the SIA system, the depressurising valve shall be fully open within 20 s from initiation. 3. Initiation and reset shall be possible from a safe and remote location, usually the control room. 4. Electrical power shall be supplied from the vital power supply system. 5. Design requirements as detailed in (6). (Appendix 1) shows a typical arrangement of a high-rate emergency depressurising system with an air failure open valve and one normally energised solenoid valve.
NOTE: A normally energised solenoid valve means in this context that the solenoid is energised under normal operating conditions, i.e. with the depressurising valve closed.

(Appendix 2) shows a typical arrangement of a high-rate emergency depressurising system with an air failure open valve and two normally de-energised solenoid valves in series.
NOTE: Normally de-energised solenoid valves mean in this context that the solenoids are de-energised under normal operating conditions, i.e. with the depressurising valve closed.

3.2.2

Valve requirements The minimum requirements for a high-rate, air failure open emergency depressurising valve are: 1) 2) The body nominal size should not be less than DN 50; The valve should have a metal seat and shall be tight shut-off in the forward flow direction in accordance with IEC 60534-4 leakage class V; (the requirement of fire safe valves subject to the approval of the Principal);
NOTES: 1. 2. The TSO requirement is an economic environmental consideration, and is not safety related if the valve discharges into a closed relief system; The frequency of testing the TSO performance of the depressurising valve is established on environmental and economic grounds and is not related to the test requirements for meeting the SIL classification. The demand rate used for the IPF classification of the valve does not apply to the TSO requirement because there is a permanent requirement for the valve to be TSO.

3)

The actual capacity (Cv factor) of the valve should not be less than the calculated value, nor should it exceed this value by more than 10 %, refer to (5). This may result in a non-standard trim size or a special construction. In this case the actual valve Cv shall be demonstrated by a test in accordance with the control valve capacity test procedure of IEC 60534-2-3;

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 5 4) 5) The Mach number in the valve body outlet shall not exceed 0.7; The noise generated by the depressurising valve shall comply with the criteria for the absolute noise limit (sound power level) defined in PTS 31.10.00.31; If a 'low-noise' valve design is applied, it shall be verified to ensure that fouling will not cause the valve to plug; To prevent plugging, no filter shall be installed upstream and no low-noise restriction plate or silencer downstream of the depressurising valve; 6) The valve actuator shall be of the single-acting, spring-to-open type, preferably with multiple springs (for redundancy). Double-acting piston actuators shall not be used; For actuator requirements and sizing, see PTS 32.36.01.17; High rate emergency depressurising devices require periodic testing and hence the depressurising valve with its accessories should be located to allow easy access; The valve actuator shall be sized for travelling from the fully closed to the fully open position and vice versa at the maximum upstream process pressure, the minimum downstream process pressure and the minimum SIA pressure. The Manufacturer shall submit the actuator sizing calculation to the Principal for approval.
NOTES: 1. The maximum upstream process pressure is the set pressure of the upstream system relief valve. The upper design pressure of the SIA system shall equal at least the upper design pressure of the IA header. To prevent excessive instrument air consumption, no instrument air pressure regulators shall be installed downstream of the non-return valves.

7) 8)

9)

2.

3.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 6 4. 4.1 4.1.1 LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM System requirements In certain applications, such as in smaller Exploration and Production facilities, low-rate operational depressurising is initiated by manually opening the valves. The minimum system requirements are: (1) Starting at the maximum upstream process pressure and the minimum downstream process pressure, the depressurising valve shall stroke from fully closed to fully open and vice versa within 30 s from initiation, when operated from the pneumatic manual station and within 20 s from initiation when electrically operated (2) The manual control station shall be located at a safe and remote location (usually the control room); Design requirements as detailed in (6). (Appendix 3) shows a typical arrangement of a low-rate operational depressurising system with an air failure close valve with positioner and one normally energised solenoid valve.
Note: A normally energised solenoid valve means in this context that the solenoid is energised under normal operating conditions, i.e. the valve position is controlled from the manual control station via the valve positioner.

4.1.2

Valve requirements The minimum requirements for a low-rate operational depressurising valve are: 1) 2) The valve body nominal size should not be less than DN 50; The valve should have a metal seat and shall be tight shut-off in the forward flow direction as per IEC 60534-4 leakage class V; fire safe valve.
NOTES: 1. 2. The TSO requirement is an economic/environmental consideration, and is not safety related when released to a closed relief system; The frequency of testing the TSO performance of the depressurising valve is established on economic grounds and is not related to the test requirements for meeting the SIL classification. The demand rate used for the IPF classification of the valve does not apply to the TSO requirement because there is a permanent requirement for the valve to be TSO.

3)

The actual capacity (Cv factor) of the valve should not be less than the calculated value, nor exceed this value by more than 10%, refer to (5). This may result in a nonstandard trim size or a special construction. In this case the actual valve Cv shall be demonstrated by a test in accordance with the control valve capacity test procedure of IEC 60534-2-3;
NOTE: The application of a mechanical maximum limit stop adjustment to limit the actual Cv of the valve requires the written approval of the Principal.

4)

The Mach number in the valve body outlet shall not exceed 0.7. For applications where the valve will be used more than 10 times per year, the Mach number shall not exceed 0.3;

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 7 5) The noise generated by the depressurising valve shall comply with PTS 31.10.00.31; If a low-noise valve design is applied, it shall be verified to ensure that fouling will not cause the valve to plug; To prevent plugging, no filter shall be installed upstream and no low-noise restriction plate or silencer downstream of the depressurising valve; 6) The valve actuator shall be of the single-acting, spring-to-close type. Double-acting piston actuators shall not be used; For actuator requirements and sizing, see PTS 32.36.01.17; As indicated in (Appendix 3), the solenoid valve shall be installed between the positioner and the valve actuator so that when high-rate emergency depressurising is initiated, the low-rate operational depressurising valve closes irrespective of the output of the manual control station.

7) 8)

4.2

LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL AUTOMATIC INITIATION System requirements

DEPRESSURISING

SYSTEM

WITH

ADDITIONAL

4.2.1

This low-rate operational depressurising system is in the operational safeguarding of plant units, such as platformers, hydrotreaters and hydrocrackers, where automatic initiation from the process is required. The minimum system requirements are: 1) Instrument air supply to the depressurising valve shall be assured by the use of an SIA buffer vessel;

2) Starting at the maximum upstream process pressure and the minimum downstream process pressure, the depressurising valve shall stroke from fully closed to fully open and vice versa within 30 s from initiation, when operated from the manual station; 3) Starting at the maximum upstream process pressure, the minimum downstream process pressure and with the actuator fully unloaded, the depressurising valve shall be fully open within 20 s from initiation via any of the solenoid valves; The manual control station shall be located at a safe and remote location, usually the control room;

4)

Design requirements as detailed in (6). (Appendix 4) shows a typical arrangement of a low-rate operational depressurising system with an air failure close valve with positioner, one normally energised solenoid valve and one normally de-energised solenoid valve.
Note: Refer to Appendix 4: One normally energised (110UZV-121) and one de-energised solenoid valve (110UZV-102) means in this context that 110UZV-121 is energised and 110UZV-102 is de-energised under normal operating conditions, i.e. the valve position is controlled from the manual control station via the valve positioner.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 8 4.2.2 Valve requirements The minimum requirements for the low-rate operational depressurising valve for this arrangement shall be as defined in (4.1.2), with the following exception: 1) As indicated in (Appendix 4), the NDE solenoid valve shall be installed between the NE solenoid and the valve actuator and the NE solenoid shall be installed between the positioner and the NDE solenoid to create the following command hierarchy: High-rate emergency depressurising closes the valve - other instrumented protective functions open the valve - manual control allows operator manipulation. The valve actuator shall be sized for travelling from the fully open to the fully closed position and vice versa at the maximum upstream process pressure, the minimum downstream process pressure and the minimum SIA pressure. To prevent instrument air consumption, no instrument air pressure regulator shall be installed downstream of the non-return valves.

2)

3)

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 9 5. DEPRESSURISING VALVE CALCULATIONS Considerations for determining flow rates and depressurising rates for high-rate emergency depressurising systems are given in PTS 80.45.10.10. Flow rates and depressurising rates for low-rate operational depressurising systems are dictated by the operational or maintenance requirements. For valve calculations, refer to PTS 32.36.01.17. The Cv of the selected valve, when fully open, shall be equal to the calculated Cv within 0 % and plus 10 %. For high-rate emergency depressurising valves, the flow rate, inlet pressure, temperature and molecular weight shall be plotted against time, based on the actual Cv of the selected valve. This plot and the Cv calculations require the approval of the Principal. It shall be verified, either by calculation and/or by testing in the field, that high-rate emergency depressurising takes place within the specified time.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 10 6. 6.1 SPECIFIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS VALVES Special attention shall be paid to depressurising valves in which the differential pressure across the valve results in a temperature drop which causes freezing of the stuffing box and ice formation on the stem. Valves shall be provided with an extended bonnet for this condition. Low-rate operational depressurising valves, unless designed to be locally operated manually, shall be supplied without handwheel and without mounting facilities for a handwheel, such as brackets or threaded holes. For remote valve status display, a high-rate emergency depressurising valve shall be provided with a limit switch for the both fully closed position and fully open position. SIL Class for the initiators (limit switch) if require to trip the unit shall determine the final limit switches configuration (either 1oo1, 2oo3 etc).

6.2

FIRE PROOFING In normally de-energised high-rate emergency depressurising systems, the valve, the secure instrument air supply buffer vessel and all associated accessories shall be of fire resistant construction. The fire resistance duration shall, as a minimum, enable the system to perform its function within the time required for depressurising. Above ground signal cable in the field shall be of fireproof construction, in accordance with IEC-60331-21, i.e. able to withstand temperatures of at least 750 C for a period of 90 min.
NOTE: If the depressurising system is located outside the fire risk area, the above fire resistant requirements may be relaxed subject to the approval of the Principal.

In normally energised systems, fire proofing and/or protection is optional due to the 'fail safe' nature of the system. For all systems, the above-ground instrument air supply lines downstream of the isolation valve on the main instrument air header and pneumatic signal lines shall be made up of stainless steel tubing and compression fittings.

6.3

LINE MONITORING For normally de-energised high-rate emergency depressurising systems, the IPS input circuits from the depressurising initiating device and the IPS outputs circuits to the solenoid valves shall be permanently monitored for open circuits, short circuits and earth faults. These faults shall generate alarms, but shall not result in opening of the high-rate emergency depressurising valve. The method of circuit monitoring and alarming requires the approval of the Principal. The line monitoring circuit shall use encapsulated resistors in parallel with values suitable intended use.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 11 6.4 SIGNAL SEGREGATION Redundant IPS inputs from the depressurising initiating device shall not share the same power supply units, input cards, racks and field and/or system cabling in order to minimise common mode failure. For a high-rate emergency depressurising system employing two solenoid valves, the signal wiring and cabling in the control/auxiliary room and in the field shall run via separate routes. Each output shall be initiated via separate power supply units, output cards, racks and field and/or system cabling. The Principal shall approve the philosophy of separation. All redundant inputs/outputs of depressurizing systems shall be segregated from the nonredundant inputs/outputs of other DCS/IPS. The Principal shall approve the philosophy of segregation.

6.5

SIA BUFFER VESSEL Upon instrument air supply failure, the SIA system shall maintain sufficient pressure in the buffer vessel to allow for at least three valve strokes. Unless otherwise specified, the size of the buffer vessel shall be based on a minimum instrument air header pressure of 4.2 bar (ga).
NOTES: 1. One stroke of a valve is a movement from the fully open position to the fully closed position or vice versa, i.e. three strokes starting from the closed position means: closed > open, open > closed and closed > open;

The air charges required for three valve strokes of a single-acting emergency depressurising valve are as indicated below:

Table 1 Valve fail-action

Number of air charges of a single-acting emergency depressurising valve for three strokes Applicable Air consumption Factor b Appendices stroke 1 close to open None 1 charge stroke 2 open to close 1 charge None stroke 3 close to open None 1 charge number of air charges for three strokes 1 2

Fail-open Fail-closed

1,2 4

The following formula can be used to determine the required air buffer vessel volume:

Vvessel = a *

(P

act min

+ 1 * b * Vactuator

PIAmin 2 * PNRV p actmin

where: Vvessel a = = Minimum required net volume of the SIA buffer vessel. Safety factor, use 1.2 unless instructed otherwise; this factor compensates for additional volume of the piping/tubing, not covered by the above formula. Minimum required air pressure for the actuator to stroke the valve at maximum upstream process pressure and minimum downstream process pressure, in bar (ga). Number of air charges for the required number of valve strokes (see Table 1), starting from the closed valve position.

Pact

min

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 12 Vactuator = = Volume of air required for one full actuator stroke against the spring force. Volume to be expressed in the same unit as Vvessel. Minimum pressure in the IA header in bar (ga). Differential pressure required to open one non-return valve upstream of the buffer vessel, in bar.

IA min

PNRV
EXAMPLE:

A single-acting, air failure open, high-rate emergency depressurising valve is installed as shown in (Appendix 2) and the following figures apply: ( Pact min ) = 2.8 bar (ga); (Vactuator ) = 25 litres; ( P IAmin ) = 4.2 bar (ga); ( PNRV ) = 0.2 bar. For three valve strokes, the actuator needs to be filled with air only once (when stroking from open > close), so (b) = 1. With a safety factor (a) of 1.2, the minimum required net volume of the buffer vessel is:

Vvessel = a

(P

actmin

+ 1) b Vactuator

PIAmin 2 PNRV pactmin

= 1.2

(2.8 + 1) 1 25
4.2 2 0.2 2.8

= 114 litres

For each application, the sizing calculations for the capacity of the SIA buffer vessel shall be submitted to the Principal for approval. Each depressurising valve that needs an SIA system shall be provided with a dedicated SIA buffer vessel and a dedicated IA header branch.

6.6

TESTING IPF calculations define the required test intervals and the test procedure to meet the PFD of the SIL. Depending on the required test intervals, facilities may be required to test the solenoid valves by initiating them individually (i.e. one-by-one for implementations with two solenoid valves). Furthermore, a locked-open manually operated valve downstream of the emergency depressurising valve may be required to allow testing (i.e. opening) of the depressurising valve while the process pressure is present. A locked open upstream valve with a downstream vent valve should be provided if the replacement of the depressurising valve is required during normal operation. The need for such requirements is covered by PTS 32.80.10.10. The test plan and test facilities require the approval of the Principal.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Page 13 7. REFERENCES In this PTS, reference is made to the following publications:
NOTES: 1. Unless specifically designated by date, the latest edition of each publication shall be used, together with any amendments/supplements/revisions thereto. 2. The PTS and most referenced external standards are available to PETRONAS users.

PETRONAS STANDARDS Noise control Instrument air supply Instruments for measurement and control Control valves - Selection, sizing and specification Classification and Implementation of instrumented protective functions Pressure relief, emergency depressurising, flare and vent systems INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS Industrial process control valves: Part 1: Control valve terminology and general considerations. Part 2-3: Flow capacity - Test procedures Part 4: Inspection and routine testing IEC 60534-1 PTS 31.10.00.31 PTS 31.37.00.11 PTS 32.31.00.32 PTS 32.36.01.17 PTS 32.80.10.10 PTS 80.45.10.10

IEC 60534-2-3 IEC 60534-4 IEC 60331-21

Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit Integrity: Part 21: Procedures and requirements - Cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safetyrelated systems, Parts 1 to 7
Issued by: Central Office of the IEC 3, Rue de Varemb CH 1211 Geneva 20 Switzerland Copies can also be obtained from national standards organizations

IEC 61508-1 to -7

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Appendix 1 APPENDIX 1 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR HIGH-RATE DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH AIR FAILURE (NORMALLY ENERGISED) EMERGENCY OPEN VALVE

NOTES: 1. Equipment and tag numbers are shown for reference. 2. 3. 4. 5. IPF classification shall define the safety integrity level. The non-return valves shall be of the ball or poppet type. LO (locked open) valve shall be provided for maintenance purposes. The alarm setting of 110PIA-101 shall equal the minimum pressure required for three strokes of the depressurising valve. This corresponds with P IA min -2 * P NRV, see (6). For a minimum instrument air pressure of 4.2 bar (ga) and a differential pressure required to open each of the non-return valves of 0.2 bar, the alarm setting of 110PIA-101 shall be 4.2 - 2 * 0.2 = 3.8 bar(ga). A normally closed drain valve shall be located at the lowest point. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a so-called fire area or when stipulated by local authority requirement eg DOSH. To prevent instrument air consumption, no instrument air pressure regulator shall be installed downstream of the non-return valves. IPF and leak test facilities may be required, but are not shown. Upon initiation of the high-rate emergency depressurising from 110HZA-101, the low rate operational depressurising valve (if installed) shall be closed. To improve reliability, followings are options: a) use of dual NE solenoid valves in series using separately routed cable, and segregated outputs from IPS to minimize common mode failure. However, this must be installed with a test panel to execute regular on-line testing to ensure zero solenoid failure on demand. b) use of solenoid valves with dual coils 12. The depressuring valve(s) shall be provided with two limit switches, one for fully open position and one for fully closed position. SIL Class for the limit switches as the initiators for trip function (if any), shall be done to determine the final configuration (1001, 2003 etc).

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Appendix 2 APPENDIX 2 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR HIGH-RATE DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH AIR FAILURE (NORMALLY DE-ENERGISED)
Input circuit fault (note 11) 110 XA 101 110 UZV101 110 GB 101 C (NDE) L.O. 110UZV-101 SIL .... TSO (V/-) L.O. L.C. 110 UZV111 (NDE) (note 9) (note 9) Output circuit fault (note 11) 110 XA 102 110 HZA 101 1oo2 SIL .... 110UZ-100 (note 9) (Circuit A) (note 10) 110UZ-110 (Circuit B) (note 10) (note 9)

EMERGENCY OPEN VALVE

110 XA 111 Input circuit fault (note 11)

110 XA 112 Output circuit fault (note 11)

To the low rate depressuring valve (if applicable) (note 12)

High-rate emergency depressuring valve

(note 8) XX ABC 110 RV101 V-1108 SIA buffer vessel

L.O. 110 PIA 101 L (note 5)

(note 7)

IA header

L.C. (note 6)

L.O. (note 4) Non-return valves (note 3)

Air filter

NOTES: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Equipment and tag numbers are shown for reference. IPF classification shall define the safety integrity level. The non-return valves shall be of the ball or poppet type. LO (locked open) valve shall be provided for maintenance purposes. The alarm setting of 110PIA-101 shall equal the minimum pressure required for three strokes of the depressurising valve. This corresponds with P IA min -2 * P NRV, see (6). For a minimum instrument air pressure of 4.2 bar (ga) and a differential pressure required to open each of the non-return valves of 0.2 bar, the alarm setting of 110PIA-101 shall be 4.2 - 2 * 0.2 = 3.8 bar(ga). 6. 7. 8. 9. A normally closed drain valve shall be located at the lowest point. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a so-called fire area or when stipulated by local authority requirement eg DOSH. To prevent instrument air consumption, no instrument air pressure regulator shall be installed downstream of the non-return valves. The input from 110HZA-101 to 110UZ-100 and the output from 110UZ-100 to solenoid valve 110UZV-101 shall not share the same cabling, plugs & sockets, input cards, racks and power supply units with those of 110UZ-110. The signal wiring and cabling in the control/auxiliary room and in the field shall run via separate routes. Above ground signal cable in the field shall be of fireproof construction. Cable shall be laid in separate route and shall be fire resistance cable in accordance to IEC 331. IPF and leak test facilities may be required, but are not shown. Input and output circuit fault alarms shall be equipped with line monitoring facilities and be able to distinguish between open circuits, short circuits and earth faults. Upon initiation of the high-rate emergency depressurising from 110HZA-101, the low rate operational depressurising valve (if installed) shall be closed. The depressuring valve(s) shall be provided with two limit switches , one for fully open position and one for fully closed position. SIL Class for the limit switches as the initiators for trip function (if any), shall be done to determine the final configuration (1001, 2003 etc).

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

PTS 32.45.10.10 Novenber 2009 Appendix 3 APPENDIX 3 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM FOR LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL

From high-rate depressuring system (if applicable) (note 3) 110 UZV102

(NE) Valve positioner 110 HC 121 Manual control station

Instrument air L.O. 110HCV-121 SIL .... TSO (V/-) L.O. L.C.

Low-rate operational depressuring valve

NOTES: 1. 2. 3. Tag numbers are shown for reference. IPF classification shall define the safety integrity level. Upon initiation of the high-rate emergency depressurising, the low rate operational depressurising valve shall be closed. An air pressure regulator of the reducing-relief valve type may be required, but is not shown.

4.

PTS 32.45.10.10 November 2009 Appendix 4 APPENDIX 4 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT FOR LOW-RATE OPERATIONAL DEPRESSURISING SYSTEM WITH ADDITIONAL PROTECTIVE FUNCTION
From high-rate depressuring system (if applicable) (note 12)

110 UZV 102

110UZ-120 (NDE) (NE)

From low-rate depressuring system 110 UZV121 Valve positioner 110 HC 121 Manual control station

Instrument air L.O. 110HCV-121 SIL .... TSO (V/-) Low-rate operational depressuring valve L.O. L.C.

(note 8) V-1108 SIA buffer vessel

XX ABC

110 RV101

L.O. 110 PIA 101 L (note 5)

(note 7)

IA header

L.C. (note 6)

L.O. (note 4) Non-return valves (note 3)

Air filter

NOTES: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Equipment and tag numbers are shown for reference. IPF classification shall define the safety integrity level. The non-return valves shall be of the ball or poppet type. LO (locked open) valve shall be provided for maintenance purposes. The alarm setting of 110PIA-121 shall equal the minimum pressure required for three strokes of the depressurising valve. This corresponds with P IA min -2 * P NRV, see (6). For a minimum instrument air pressure of 4.2 bar (ga) and a differential pressure required to open each of the non-return valves of 0.2 bar, the alarm setting of 110PIA-101 shall be 4.2 - 2 * 0.2 = 3.8 bar(ga). 6. 7. A normally closed drain valve shall be located at the lowest point. A relief valve on the SIA buffer vessel is only required if located in a so-called fire areaor when stipulated by local authority requirement e.g. DOSH. To prevent instrument air consumption, no instrument air pressure regulator shall be installed downstream of the non-return valves. IPF and leak test facilities may be required, but are not shown.

8.

9.

10. Upon initiation of the high-rate emergency depressurising (if applicable), the low rate operational depressurising valve shall be closed.

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