Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro G.R. No. L-14078.

March 7, 1919 Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extend over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board, was challenged.

Issue: Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.

Held: No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term nonChristian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
** Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 PHIL 660 (1919)

AO requires Mangyans to live within the reservation provided for them

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the

individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Rubi vs Provincial Board

on December 12, 2011

Political Law Delegation of Powers

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board, was challe nged. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional. HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non -Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of

the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

PEOPLE VS. VERA

G.R. No. L-45685, November 16 1937, 65 Phil. 56 FACTS: Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme

Courtof the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the People of the Philippines is a proper party in this case. HELD: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HSBC vs. JOSE O. VERA 65 Phil 56
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 FACTS: Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al., Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing. Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands (in that Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila) and because section of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. ISSUE: W/N Act no. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

HELD: Section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a roving commission which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC
Posted on June 30, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 FACTS: The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, with the pertinent provisions contain: WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport

modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes; Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; and the MMDA had recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilitieswhich plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project). The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.8 On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila. Chairman Fernando, was poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, o r tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City. The trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management. ISSUE: W/N EO is unconstitutional HELD: YES. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . . The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering

problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a trans portation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.

MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

J. Carpio Morales

Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act. Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the PreTrial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality. Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act. MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.

Issues:

1. Is there a justiciable controversy? 2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?

Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: 1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law. Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents. 2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.

MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.

G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

police power of the state "general welfare" clause

FACTS:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance. Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed HELD: Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill? The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government? In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community. The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power ofthe state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

Is there a cause of action? The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law. "For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."

US v. Pompeya digest A Municipal Ordinance was enacted by the Province of Iloilo pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in themaintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons inthe locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. A complaint was filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo against Pompeya with violation of the said ordinance for failing to renderservice on patrol duty required under the same defendant argued that the municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, whichguarantees the liberty of the citizens ISSUE: whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based is constitutional. HELD: Yes The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional andnot in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby Police power has been defined as the power of the government, inherent in every sovereign, and cannot be limited. Thepower vested in the legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be for the good of the state and its subjects. The power togovern men and things, extending to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protectionof all property within the state. The authority to establish such rules and regulations for the conduct of all persons as may beconducive to the public interest. Blackstone, in his valuable commentaries on the common laws, defines police power as "the defenses, regulations, anddomestic order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state,

like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conformtheir general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, andinoffensive in their respective stations." The police power of the state may be said to embrace the whole system of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not onlyto preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rulesof good manners and good neighborhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent, with a like enjoyment of the rights of others. The police power of the state includesnot only the public health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions, and generally the public's best best interest.It so extensive and all pervading, that the courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its merits It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of the municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1) Theperson called upon to render such services must be an able-bodied male resident of the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55[50], and (3) certain conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons It will not contended that a nonresident of the municipality would be liable for his refusal to obey the call of the president; neither can it belogically contended that one under the age of 18 or over the age of 55 [50] would incur the penalty of the law by his refusal to obey thecommand of the president. Moreover, the persons liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be called upon at the mere whim orcaprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before thepresident can call upon the the persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not apply to all persons. The law does not applyto every condition. The law applies to special persons and special conditions A complaint based upon such a law, in order to be free from objection under a demurrer, must show that the person charged belongs to theclass of persons to which the law is applicable Even admitting all of the facts in the complaint in the present case, the court would be unable to impose the punishment provided for by law, becauseit does not show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18years of age nor over 55 [50]; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the servicesmentioned in the law