Noscitur a sociis where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction

n may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. to remove doubt refer to the meaning of associated or companion words Buenaseda v. Flavier Statute: Sec. 13(3 , !rt "# of the $onstitution grants %mbudsman power to &'irect the officer concerned to ta(e appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution. &suspension) * is a penalty or punitive measure not preventive +uenaseda v. Secretary ,lavier Case No. 40 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) Chapter III, Page 104, oot!ote No.141 "C#S$ -he .rivate /espondents filed an administrative complaint with the %mbudsman against the .etitioner for the violation of the !nti0graft and $orrupt .ractices !ct. #n response, the %mbudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the .etitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental health. -he /espondent argues that the preventive suspension laid by the %mbudsman under Sec. 12 of /! 3445 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(6 of !rt. 7 of the 1764 $onstitution, while the .etitioner contends that the %mbudsman can only recommend to the 8eads of 'epartments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. ISS%&$ 9:N the %mbudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials wor(ing in other offices other than that of the

%mbudsman pending the administrative complaints.

investigation

of

'&()$ ;es. -he %mbudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3 of the $onstitution refers to &suspension) in its punitive sense, as the same spea(s of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 12 of /! 3445 grants the %mbudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. -his statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. ! preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. <=usdem generis (or the same (ind or species >eneral rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases a(in to, resembling, or of the same (ind or class as those specifically mentioned. .urpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words. .rinciple: based on proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the specific words. .resumption: legislators addressed specifically to the particulari?ation.

@era v. $uevas 75 S$/! 347 (1747 ,: /espondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled mil( products. -hey brought an action in the $,# for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 137 of the -aA $ode. -his provision required that Ball condensed s(immed mil( in whatever form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the .hilippines shall be clearly and legibly mar(ed on its immediate containers with the words: -his mil( is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age. 8<C': Sec. 137 of the -aA $ode has been repealed by /! 322. !t any rate, Sec. 137 applied only to s(immed mil( and not to filled mil(. Sec. 137 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled mil( but not against manufacturers of s(immed mil(, thus denying them the equal protection of the laws. <Apressio unius est eAclusion alterius -he eApress mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the eAclusion of all others. /ule may be eApressed in a number of ways: o Expressum facit cessare tacitum - what is eApressed puts an end to that which is implied where a statute, by its terms, is eApressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be eAtended to other matters. o Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis 0 ! thing not being eAcepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule o Expressio unius est exclusion alterius 0 -he eApression of one or more things of a class implies the eAclusion of all not eApressed, even though all would have been implied had none been eApressedD opposite the doctrine of necessary implication. Sa! Pab*o +a!,-a.t,r/!g Corporat/o! 0s. CIR, G.R. No. 147749, 1,!e 22, 2006 I!terpretat/o! a!2 Co!str,.t/o! /! Re*at/o! to the (a!g,age o- the Stat,te$ &3pres/o %!/,s &3.*,s/o "*ter/,s R,*e 9here the law enumerates the sub=ect or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as eAcluding from its effects all those not eApressly mentioned. <Apressio unius est eAclusio alterius. a.ts$ S.E$ is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and eAporting of coconut oil and other allied products. #t was assessed and ordered to pay by the $ommissioner of #nternal /evenue the total amount of .6,161,161.6F1 representing deficiency millerGs taA and manufacturerGs sales taA, among other deficiency taAes, for taAable year 1764. -he deficiency millerGs taA was imposed on S.E$Hs sales of crude oil to Inited $oconut $hemicals, #nc. (IN#$8<E while the deficiency sales taA was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. S.E$ opposed the assessments but the $ommissioner denied its protest. S.E$ appealed the denial of its protest to the $ourt of -aA !ppeals. -he $-! cancelled S.E$Hs liability for deficiency manufacturerGs taA on the sales of corn and edible oils but upheld the $ommissionerGs assessment for the deficiency millerGs taA. S.E$ elevated the case to the $ourt of !ppeals. -he appellate court dismissed the petition on the principal ground that the verification attached to it was signed merely by S.E$Hs chief financial officer without the corporate secretaryGs certificate, board resolution or power of attorney authori?ing him to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. S.E$ contends that its appeal should have been given due course since it substantially complied with the requirements on verification and certification against forum shopping. #t insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, S.E$ was not liable for the 3J millerGs taA. #t maintains that the crude oil which

it sold to IN#$8<E was actually eAported by IN#$8<E as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerin, hence, not sub=ect to millerGs taA pursuant to Section 136 of the 1764 -aA $ode. Iss,e$ 9hether or not S.E$ is liable for the deficiency millerGs taA. 'e*2$ 4es. -he language of the eAempting clause of Section 136 of the 1764 -aA $ode was .*ear. -he taA eAemption applied only to the eAportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by0products and desiccated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, b5 the propr/etor or operator o- the -a.tor5 or b5 the m/**er h/mse*-. ISS%& P&R#"INING 6 C6%R#$ #6 R%(&S

officers of the corporation, can bind the corporation. S.E$Hs petition in the $ourt of !ppeals did not indicate that the person who signed the verification:certification on non0forum shopping was authori?ed to do so. S.E$ merely relied on the alleged inherent power of its chief financial officer to represent S.E$ in all matters regarding the finances of the corporation including, among others, the filing of suits to defend or protect it from assessments and to recover erroneously paid taAes. S.E$ even admitted that no power of attorney, secretaryGs certificate or board resolution to prove the affiantGs authority was attached to the petition. #h,s, the pet/t/o! 7as !ot proper*5 0er/-/e2. S/!.e the pet/t/o! *a.8e2 proper 0er/-/.at/o!, /t 7as to be treate2 as a! ,!s/g!e2 p*ea2/!g s,b9e.t to 2/sm/ssa*. 'octrine of casus omissus ! person, ob=ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. -he maAim operates only if and when the omission has been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein. <Aception: where legislature did not intend to eAclude the person, thing or ob=ect from the enumeration. #f such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language. Peop*e 0. +a!a!ta! >/ C012117, 31 Kuly 1731 (F S$/! 362 a.ts$ #n an information filed by the .rovincial ,iscal of .angasinan in the $ourt of ,irst #nstance ($,# of that .rovince, >uillermo Eanantan was charged with a violation of Section F2 of the /evised <lection $ode. ! preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the

Iss,e$ 9heteher or not the $ourt of !ppeals err when it dismissed S.E$Hs appeal. 'e*2$ No. Inder /ule 23, Section F of the /ules of $ourt, appeals from the $-! and quasi0=udicial agencies to the $ourt of !ppeals should be verified. ! pleading required to be verified which lac(s proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Eoreover, a petition for review under /ule 23 requires a sworn certification against forum shopping. ,ailure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. ! corporation may eAercise the powers eApressly conferred upon it by the $orporation $ode and those that are implied by or are incidental to its eAistence through its board of directors and:or duly authori?ed officers and agents. 8ence, physical acts, li(e the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authori?ed for the purpose by corporate by0laws or by specific act of the board of directors. #n the absence of authority from the board of directors, no person, not even the

defendant. -hereafter, the trial started upon defendantGs plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as =ustice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section F2 of the /evised <lection $ode. -he lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a =ustice of the peace is within the purview of Section F2. ! second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the $ourt of !ppeals ($! in .eople vs. Eacaraeg, where it was held that a =ustice of the peace is eAcluded from the prohibition of Section F2 of the /evised <lection $ode. !cting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. 8ence, the appeal by the Solicitor >eneral. Iss,e$ 9hether the =ustice of the peace was eAcluded from the coverage of Section F2 of the /evised <lection $ode 'e*2$ Inder the rule of $asus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, ob=ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. -he maAim &casus omisus) can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. -he application of the rule of &casus omisus) does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, ob=ect or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. ,or in its most eAtensive sense the term &=udge) includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including =ustice of the peace, and even =urors, it is said, who are =udges of facts. -he intention of the Cegislature did not eAclude the =ustice of the peace from its operation. #n Section F2, there is no necessity to include the =ustice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 227 of the /evised !dministrative $ode, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term &=udge,) including therein all (inds of =udges, li(e =udges of the courts of ,irst #nstance, =udges of the courts of !grarian

/elations, =udges of the courts of #ndustrial /elations, and =ustices of the peace. -he Supreme $ourt set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. 9here the law does not distinguish Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus - where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. $orollary principle: >eneral words or phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance >eneral term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other to =ustify its eAclusion from operation. $orollary principle: where the law does not ma(e any eAception, courts may not eAcept something therefrom, unless there a compelling reason to =ustify it. !pplication: when legislature laid down a rule for one class, no difference to other class. .resumption: that the legislature made no qualification in the general use of a term. Ram/re: 0s. C" R,*e /!0o*0e2$ Ibi leA non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. 9here the law ma(es no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Iss,e$ 'oes the anti0wiretapping law, /! 2155, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent of all those involvedL ;hat 7as .o!str,e2$ -he word &any) in Sec. 1 of /! 2155: #t shall be unlawful for !N; person, not being authori?ed by all the parties to any private communication or spo(en word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo(en word by using a

device commonly (nown as a 'ictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal(ie0tal(ie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. a.ts o- the .ase: Soccoro /amire? was scolded by <ster >arcia inside >arciaGs office. /amire? taped the conversation and later filed charges against >arcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording. >arcia filed criminal charges against /amire? for violating the anti0wire tapping act, because it was done without her (nowledge and consent. /amire? claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law . -he trial court ruled in favor of /amire?, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the $ourt of !ppeals reversed it. Rat/o$ ,irst, the court noted that the provision ma(es it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a conversation, unless authori?ed by all parties involved. &-he law ma(es no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penali?ed by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.) -he congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation. &-his is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations ta(en without the authori?ation of all the parties,) Sen. -anada said during the deliberations. &-he provision see(s to penali?e even those privy to the private communications. 9here the law ma(es no distinctions, one does not distinguish.) )e./s/o!$ .etition denied. 'ecision of $! affirmed. $osts against /amire?.

'octrine of last antecedent Mualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not those which are distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the conteAt otherwise requires /ule: use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest eAerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent. Florentino v. PNB Iss,e$ whether holders of bac(pay certificates can compel government0 owned ban(s to accept said certificates in payment of the holderGs obligations to the ban(. Stat,te$ &obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to any citi?ens of the .hilippines or to any association or corporation organi?ed under the laws of the .hilippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such settlement) 'e*2$ the court, invo(ing the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase qualify only to its last antecedent namely &any citi?en of the .hilippines or association or corporation organi?ed under the laws of the .hilippines) -he court held that bac(pay certificate holders can compel government0owned ban(s to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations with the ban(. /eddendo singular singuilis @ariation of the doctrine antecedent /eferring each to eachD

of

last

/eferring each phrase or eApression to its appropriate ob=ect, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should be ta(en distributively.

People. v amani #ssue: when to count the 1F0day period within which to appeal a =udgment of conviction of criminal actionNdate of promulgation of =udgment or date of receipt of notice of =udgment. Statute: Sec. 3, /ule 111 of the /ules of $ourt 8eld: Should be from OpromulgationG should be referring to O=udgment,G while notice refer to order. Peop*e 0s. #ama!/ G.R. No. (<22160 a!2 G.R. No. (<22161 (1a!,ar5 21, 1974) "C#S$ -amani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on ,ebruary 12, 1733. Ipon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on Earch 1, 1733, which was denied. -he lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on Kuly 13, 1733 through the counselGs wife. $ounsel filed his appeal only on September 15, 1733, forty0eight days from Kuly 12th, which is the reglementary fifteen0day period for appeal. !ppellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty0eight days late. -hey invo(ed Sec. 3, /ule 111 of the /ules of $ourt which states that an appeal must be ta(en within fifteen (1F days from the promulgation or notice of the =udgment or order appealed from. ISS%&$ 9:N the fifteen0day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. '&()$ ;es. Ising the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word &promulgation) should be construed as referring to &=udgment), while &notice) should be construed as referring to &order). -amaniGs appeal is therefore F6 days

late, not 24, as !ppellees contendD he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on Kuly 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand &to obviate any possible miscarriage of =ustice). 'octrine of necessary implication So0called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced StatCo! r,*e$ to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication 'octrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is eApressed <A necessitate legis * from the necessity of the law <very statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege #n eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus * greater includes the lesser Necessity * o includes such inferences as may be logically be drawn from the purpose or ob=ect of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to have intended, and from the necessity of ma(ing the statute effective and operative o eAcludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or desirable must be consistent with the $onstitution or to eAisting laws an implication which is violative of the law is un=ustified or unwarranted

)epartme!t o- "grar/a! Re-orm 0. Ph/*/pp/!e Comm,!/.at/o!s Sate**/te C6RP. -his is a petition for review on certiorari under /ule 2F of the /ules of $ourt by the 'epartment of !grarian /eform ('!/ see(ing the nullification of the 'ecision and /esolution, dated November 13, 1551 and Earch 4, 1551, respectively, of the $ourt of !ppeals in $!0>./. S. No. F423F, entitled

B.hilippine $ommunications Satellite $orporation (.8#C$%ES!- v. '!/.B -he controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent .8#C$%ES!- situated within the area which had been declared a security ?one under .residential 'ecree (..'. No. 162F, as amended by ..'. No. 1626, entitled B'eclaring the !rea within a /adius of -hree Pilometers surrounding the Satellite <arth Station in +aras, /i?al, a Security Qone.B !ection ". #eclaration of !ecurit$ %one. & 'e entire area surrounding t'e satellite eart' station in !itio !an (iguel, Barrio Pinuga$, (unicipalit$ of Baras, Province of )i*al, +sland of ,u*on, -it'in a radius of t'ree .ilometers, more or less, from t'e main satellite eart' station, t'e metes and bounds of suc' area to be determined b$ t'e (inister of National #efense, is 'ereb$ declared a securit$ *one. For t'is purpose, and in t'e interest of national securit$, ingress to and egress from t'e securit$ *one as -ell as occupanc$ of portions t'ereof s'all be controlled and regulated, -it'out pre/udice to t'e pa$ments of /ust compensation to persons -'ose rig'ts of o-ners'ip ma$ be in/uriousl$ affected t'ereb$ x x x. %n Kanuary 16, 1772, .8#C$%ES!- wrote to '!/ see(ing an eAemption of the sub=ect property from $!/. coverage, insisting that the land will be utili?ed for the eApansion of its operations, and for the following reasons: 1 -he land is being used for national defense in accordance with Section 15 of /epublic !ct (/.!. No. 33F4 which provides: 0!ection "1. Exemptions and Exclusions. ,ands actuall$, directl$ and exclusivel$ used and found necessar$ for par.s, -ildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fis' sanctuaries and breeding grounds, -aters'eds and mangroves, national defense x x x, s'all be exempt from t'e coverage of t'is Act.0 $! >ranted the petition. 8<C':

9e find it not necessary to determine whether or not the sub=ect property is actually, directly, and eAclusively used for national defense, to be eAempted from the coverage of /.!. 33F4. -he law which decreed the areas a security ?one is very clear in its purpose. #t is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specifically designed for the said case must prevail over the other (Capid v. $ourt of !ppeals, 332 S$/! 436 . ;'&R& 6R&, the petition is )&NI&) )ufino ,ope* 2 !ons, +nc. v. 3 A $ourt change the phrase &collector of customs) to &commissioner of customs) to correct an obvious mista(e in law Sec 4 * &commissioner of customs) * grants the $-! =urisdiction to review decisions of the $ommissioner of $ustoms Sec 11 * &collector of customs) * refers to the decision of the $ollector of $ustoms that may be appealed to the taA court &$ommissioner) prevails * $ommissioner of $ustoms has supervision and control over $ollectors of $ustoms and the decisions of the latter are reviewable by the $ommissioner of $ustoms.

In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant, vs. Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and Rosario CORRALES, oppositors-appellees. G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965

FACTS: Pedro Santillon died it!out testa"ent leavin# !is i$e, Per$e%ta &iranda and one son, 'laro. (our )ears a$ter Pedro*s deat!, 'laro $iled a +etition $or letters o$ ad"inistration !i%! as o++osed ,) !is "ot!er and s+ouses -enito &iranda and Rosario 'orrales. .!e %ourt

a++ointed %o""issioners to dra$t a +ro/e%t o$ +artition and distri,ution o$ all +ro+erties o$ Pedro. 'laro t!en $iled a "otion to de%lare s!are o$ !eirs and to resolve %on$li%tin# %lai"s o$ t!e +arties invo0in# 1rt. 892 o$ t!e Ne 'ivil 'ode insistin# t!at a$ter dedu%tin# 2 $ro" t!e %on/u#al +ro+erties 3%on/u#al s!are o$ Per$e%ta4, t!e re"ainin# 2 "ust ,e divided as $ollo s5 6 $or !er and 7 $or !i". 8n t!e ot!er !and, Per$e%ta %lai"ed ,esides !er %on/u#al !al$, s!e as entitled under 1rt. 996 o$ t!e N'' to anot!er 2 o$ t!e re"ainin# !al$. 1$ter due noti%e and !earin#, t!e %ourt !eld t!at Per$e%ta is entitled to 2 s!are and t!e re"ainin# 2 s!are $or 'laro a$ter dedu%tin# t!e s!are o$ t!e ido as %oo ner o$ t!e %on/u#al +ro+erties. 9en%e, t!is a++eal. ISS E: .!e "anner o$ division o$ s!are o$ t!e estate o$ an intestate de%edent !en t!e onl) survivors are t!e s+ouse and one le#iti"ate %!ild. R LIN!: :ntestate +ro%eedin#s in t!e Ne 'ivil 'ode*s %!a+ter on le#al or intestate su%%ession, t!e onl) arti%le a++li%a,le is 1rt. 996. 8ur %on%lusion 3e;ual s!ares4 see"s a lo#i%al in$eren%e $ro" t!e %ir%u"stan%e t!at !ereas 1rti%le 83< o$ t!e S+anis! 'ivil 'ode $or" !i%! 1rt. 996 as ta0en, %ontained t o +ara#ra+!s #overnin# t o %ontin#en%ies, t!e $irst, !ere t!e ido or ido er survives it! le#iti"ate %!ildren 3#eneral rule4, and t!e se%ond, !ere t!e ido or ido er survives it! onl) one %!ild 3e=%e+tion4, 1rt. 996 o"itted to +rovide $or t!e se%ond situation, t!ere,) indi%atin# t!e le#islator*s desire to +ro"ul#ate /ust one #eneral rule a++li%a,le to ,ot! situations.