Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 19

ALLFORJESUS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS FACTS:

CRIMPRO

RULE126

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH) 1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. MALUM PROHIBITUM When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary. Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum prohibitum 1

October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but no one know. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away. DOCTRINES:ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

ALLFORJESUS Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 ( 1986)

CRIMPRO

RULE126

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioners house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.

RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainants 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same, and only bec. the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicants deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.

It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicants claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be intelligence informers, shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 November 2001] Facts: Both Sanly and Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi products. Solid Triangle acquires its goods from Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with Mitsubishi Corporation. While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming it is a parallel importer (one which imports, distributes, and sells 2

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

genuine products in the market, independently of an exclusive distributorship or agency agreement with the manufacturer), not an unfair competitor. On 28 January 1999, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, upon application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), issued Search Warrant 3324 (99) against Sanly Corporation (Sanly), for violation of Section 168 of RA 8293 (unfair competition). By virtue of Search Warrant, EIIB agents seized 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper from Sanly. Forthwith, Solid Triangle, through Robert Sitchon, its Marketing and Communication Manager, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for unfair competition against the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT Co., Inc. (LWT) [IS 1-99-2870], alleging that ERA Radio and Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated by LWT, is in conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi brand photo paper to the damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle, which claims to be the sole and exclusive distributor thereof, pursuant to an agreement with the Mitsubishi Corporation. On 4 February 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas' sala an urgent ex parte motion for the transfer of custody of the seized Mitsubishi photo color paper stored in the office of EIIB. On 8 February 1999, Sanly, LWT and ERA moved to quash the search warrant which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an order dated 5 March 1999. Sanly, LWT and ERA filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by Judge Bruselas on 18 March 1999, where the latter hekd that there is doubt whether the act complained of (unfair competition) is criminal in nature. Solid Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the quashal of the search warrant is not proper considering the pendency of the preliminary investigation in IS 1-99-2870 for unfair competition wherein the seized items will be used as evidence. On 26 March 1999, Judge Bruselas issued an order denying Solid Triangle's motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on 29 March 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the same Court,

presided by Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo (Civil Case Q-99-37206) for damages and injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and attachment against Sanly, LWT and ERA. On 31 March 1999, Judge Genilo denied Solid Triangle's application for a preliminary attachment on the ground that the application is not supported with an affidavit by the applicant, through its authorized officer, who personally knows the facts. Meanwhile, on 20 April 1999, Judge Bruselas issued an order, directing the (1) EIIB, Sitchon and Solid Triangle to divulge and report to the court the exact location of the warehouse where the goods subject of the proceeding were kept within 72 hours from receipt thereof; (2) Sitchon and Solid Triangle to appear and show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for failure to obey a lawful order of the court at a hearing for the purpose on 12 May 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (3) the Deputy Sheriff of the Court to take custody of the seized goods and cause their delivery to the person from whom the goods were seized without further loss of time. Solid Triangle filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on 26 April 1999, and the latter issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge Bruselas from implementing the Order dated 20 April 1999. On 6 July 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment initially granting certiorari, and held that the quashing of the warrant deprived the prosecution of vital evidence to determine probable cause. Upon motion by Sanly, etc., however, the Court of Appeals reversed itself. In its "Amendatory Decision," the appellate court held that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, and accordingly, held that the evidence obtained by virtue of said warrant was inadmissible in the preliminary investigation. Hence, the petition by Solid Triangle. Issue: Whether the court that issued the warrant may resolve the motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing.

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

Held: The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely independent of each other. One is not bound by the other's finding as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding differs from the other. The first is to determine whether a warrant should issue or be quashed, and the second, whether an information should be filed in court. Section 14, Rule 126, expressly provides that a motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation. Nevertheless, the evidence presented before the trial court does not prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier in Hong Kong. Assuming that the acts of Sanly, etc. to make "it appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines" constitutes a crime, there is no proof to establish such an allegation. The court, thus, ordered Solid Triangle and EIIB to return to Sanly Corporation the 451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of Search Warrant 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 93

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimlas Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized, FIRST DIVISION and the Order[2] dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners, - versus G.R. No. 158467 The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: Promulgated: On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City[3] and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,[4] both for DECISION Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Lagascas request for the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Order[1] dated September 6, Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESAND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, October 16, 2009 Branch 57, Angeles City, Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to seize the following articles/items: Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as SHABU, MARIJUANA, weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters, burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia, all of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended, and are hidden or being kept in said house/premises. [5]

and take possession of the properties subject of the offense and bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law directs.[6]

On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI AntiOrganized Crime Division, namely, SI Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera, Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, Horten Hernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City, searched petitioners house on February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in

Executive Judge Mario Guaria III (Judge Guaria III) examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control, inside their house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City, an undetermined amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known

the morning.[7] They were able to seize cash in the amount of P15,200.00[8]and the following items: 1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape marked RCL-1-2677, (net weight - 915.7 grams); 2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped in a newsprint marked RCL-2-2677 (net weight - 491.5 grams); 3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a newsprint marked RCL-3-2677 (net weight - 127.9 grams); and 4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic bag marked RCL-4-2677 (net weight - 18.2736 grams).[9]

as shabu and marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guaria III issued a search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 022677, which commanded any peace officer to make immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

On February 20, 2002, an Information[10] for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.

signature of NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco (Director Wycoco); (3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G. Lansang with the Signature ofDirector Wycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure [Rules 110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the

On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized[11] on the following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was defective considering the application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco, and that the latters signature in the authorization letter is different from that as appearing in the identification card, and therefore it is not the true and genuine signature of [Dir.] Wycoco.[13]

In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,[14] the Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,[15] which authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and

In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Documentary Evidence,[12] asking the court to admit the following documents: (1) application for Search Warrant No. 022677; (2) authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the

Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. 7

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126 and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI. The NBI also was able to explain that the authority to apply search warrant was personally signed by Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who is authorized to sign and that he was delegated the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director on documents of this like. Deputy Director Fermin Nasol having that authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director, Reynaldo Wycoco, there is, therefore, compliance with the law regarding the issuance of authority to apply search warrant. WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with the views of the prosecution as well as the NBI. And this being so, the Court finds not enough ground to quash the search warrant issued against Spouses Joel and Marietta Marilma. The motion filed by them and their supplement, is therefore denied, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.[19]

On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or Answer to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized.[16] He avers that Judge Guaria III issued Search Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 20-97[17] issued on February 12, 1997. He also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant in the house/premises of petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for violation of R.A. No. 6425.

In an Order[18] dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T. Viola denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as follows: The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges

On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[20] on the ground that the denial of their Motion to

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126 any pronouncement withdrawing and or declaring the same ineffective, hence, until such order is issued, this Court must interpret and rule for its continued validity and applicability.[21] Hence, this petition.

Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized is not in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence. They claim that no evidence was presented by Deputy Director Nasol that he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco.

Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent court on the ground that the issues raised therein were mere reiterations of petitioners arguments that had already been considered and passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. Respondent court added: To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the opinion that the Deputy Director of the NBI possesses the authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI Director requesting for the issuance of a search warrant and nothing in the Administrative Matter 99-10-09 prohibits the delegation of such ministerial act to the Deputy Director who is an alter ego of the NBI Director. It is also quite clear that the NBI Director approved said authorization for SI Ray Lagasca to apply for a search warrant because said document was never recalled or amended by the Office of the Bureau Director up to the present. The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-1009 is still valid, binding and legal by virtue of the fact that not even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make

Petitioners claim that the search warrant was issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal of this petition on the ground that the filing of the said petition directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The OSG argues that while this Court has 9

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals (CA) over petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been filed with the CA. The OSG contends that the petitioners have not shown any compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition directly with this Court. The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.[22] In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.[23] At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the

Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms. The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of property of things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts. The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the applications and the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued. This Resolution is effective immediately and shall continue until further orders from this Court and shall be an exemption to the provisions of 10

Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January 25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically, Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the two issuances below: Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC

ALLFORJESUS Circular No. 13 dated 1 October 1985 and Circular No. 19 dated 4 August 1987. x x x

CRIMPRO

RULE126

RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the

Rule 126

application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b)

SEARCH AND SEIZURE Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant was defective. They aver that the application for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head, Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners

From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the

conclude that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a fatal defect that rendered the application on the questioned search 11

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null and void because the spring cannot rise above its source. [24]

We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. The said provision reads: Chapter 6 POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF BUREAUS AND OFFICES Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates. (1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law. (2) The head of bureau interest of economy, designate act as chief of any division organization, in addition to additional compensation, and or office may, in the the assistant head to or unit within the his duties, without

(3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a subordinate officer or employee from being assigned additional duties by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the performance of the duties imposed by law.

Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols

endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the questioned Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is unassailable.

Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took

12

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law. Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the ViceExecutive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and ViceExecutive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued.

The petitioners contention lacks merit.

A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC

entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And

Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:[25] Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision

13

ALLFORJESUS This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)

CRIMPRO

RULE126

In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guaria III had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the questioned search warrant.

WHEREFORE,

the

petition

for

certiorari

is

hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

14

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the respondent courts Order of 25 January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition irregularly and unreasonably seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are declared inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by the respondent court pursuant to applicable law. SO ORDERED.[1] The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows: On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National Police- Special Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino Toto Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket,[2] the police officers immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber Raven automatic pistol SN930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane packet of methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu from the glove compartment. The police then took private respondent into custody. Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private respondent for violation of P. D. 1866[3] with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Paraaque, Branch 77. Supporting the application were the depositions of two police officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the following unlicensed firearms: Baby armalite M-16;[4] Shotgun, 12 g; pistol 15

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117412. December 8, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 301291. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO i. One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle.[7]

RULE126

cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with corresponding ammunitions (sic)[5] On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No. 92-94 commanding the PNP officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession[6] the personal property subject of the offense described in the warrant. Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special Investigation Group (SIG) team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security officer, went to private respondents residence in Paraaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same date to search said premises. Private respondents wife and their childs nanny were both present during the search, but neither consented to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the seizure of the following unlicensed firearms and ammunition: a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923 b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620 c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449 d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun. e. One hundred eighteen (118) live ammo for pistol cal. 9mm f. Sixteen (16) live ammo. for M16 rifle g. Thirty (30) live ammo. for pistol cal. 45 h. One (1) magazine for pistol cal. 9mm

Private respondents wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and ammunition. On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed and filed by the police with the issuing court. At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondents person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[8] However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Paraaque valid. On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, in Criminal Case No.92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The information alleged: That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923 b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620 c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449 d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun. e. One hundred eighteen (118) rds ammo for pistol cal. 9mm f. Sixteen (16) live ammos (sic). for M16 rifle g. Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45 16

ALLFORJESUS without lawful authority therefore. CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]

CRIMPRO

RULE126 THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT. II

On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the charges against him arising from the illegal search and seizure in Makati also applied to the search conducted in his house in Paraaque. The trial court denied the same. Private respondent moved for reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied. On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the search warrant on the following grounds: (1) that he was not present when his house was searched since he was then detained at Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife; and (3) that the search was conducted in violation of the witness-tosearch rule. The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying his motion to quash search warrant. On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its decision declaring as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94. Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments of error: I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7 RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. III THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO RETURN WAS PREPARED WHEN ANNEX G WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER OF SIG, CISC, CAMP CRAME. IV THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION INVOKED A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. Petitioners grounds for this petition may be reduced to one issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from private respondents house are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search. The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for having been done at an unreasonable time of the evening causing inconvenience to the occupants of private respondents house, especially as there was no showing how long the nighttime search 17

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety & Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (1973), where we invalidated a nighttime search conducted on the basis of a warrant which did not specify the time during which the search was to be made. Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable since the search warrant specified that the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or night. The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 8. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private respondents residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement[10] fixing the maximum time for the execution of a warrant.[11] We have examined the application for search warrant,[12] and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said application,[13] and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126.

The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night. Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not improper.[14] As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1985: e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place ordered to be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrants that it be served at any time of the day or night; But was the time during which the search was effected reasonable? Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement officers.[15] And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about. To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by pursuing such activities only at night.[16] The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public 18

ALLFORJESUS

CRIMPRO

RULE126

from the abrasiveness of official intrusions. [17] A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy.[18] In the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark [19] or that it caused private respondents family such prejudice as to make the execution of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have caused inconvenience for private respondents family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a search.[20] But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted the search notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his household to act as witnesses to the search? The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads: Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondents wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced by the Certification of Orderly Search and the receipt of the property seized signed by respondents wife. We find merit in the petitioners argument that private respondents wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant

of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. There was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by law to be witnesses. In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the circumstances in this case. The unlicensed firearms and ammunition taken from private respondents residence pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94, are admissible in evidence against private respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated September 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 30129 is REVERSED and NULLIFIED. The firearms and ammunition seized from the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be admissible as evidence in proceedings instituted by the State. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

19

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi