Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Establishment Clause
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ
FACTS:
Religious Freedom:
Justice Laurel
1937
PRESENT CASE:
Batch 2008A.
International
Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.
What is emphasized
is not the Congress
but
Manila,
the
capital
of
the
Philippines, as the
seat
of
that
congress.
The propaganda resulting from the
issuance and sale of the staff might
redound to the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church but this was not
the intention and is only incidental
to the original purpose.
Batch 2008A.
RATIO
In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman,
was notified of the sessions of the barangay council
to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not
able to attend those sessions because he was
working with a construction company based at Ipil,
Ormoc City. Maago's absence from the sessions of
the barangay council did not render the said
resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said
resolutions were passed.
2)
Ratio
The wooden image was purchased in connection
with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the
patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with
religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the
mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint
had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition
and display of his image) cannot be branded as
illegal.
Batch 2008A.
2)
3)
the
3)
quality
of
nonpublic
sponsorship
financial support
active involvement
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(1968)
Justice White
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
3.
4.
5.
ISSUE:
WoN the statute is a "law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1st and
14th Amendments to the Constitution, because it
authorizes the loan of textbooks to students
attending parochial schools.
DECISION:
The law
Constitution.
is
not
in
violation
of
the
RATIO:
1.
2.
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Respondents
(the
Greater
Pittsburgh
Chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking
permanently to enjoin the county from
displaying the menorah on the ground that
the displays violated the Establishment
Clause of the 1st Amendment.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
WON
display
of
crche
Establishment clause. YES
WON display of menorah
Establishment clause. NO
1.
ON CRECHE
There is no doubt that the crche itself is
capable of communicating a religious message.
The angel in the crche endorses a patently
Christian message:
Glory to God in the
Highest
violates
violates
RATIO:
LYNCH V DONNELLY
Batch 2008A.
2.
ON MENORAH
The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol.
But its message is not exclusively religious. It is
the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like
Christmas, has both religious and secular
dimensions.
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HELD:
Yes.
-
RATIO:
I.
II.
IV.
Minor
v.
Board
of
Education
of
Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the
court has decisively settled the First
Amendments mandate that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof has been made wholly applicable to
the States under the 14th amendment.
Second,
this
Court
has
rejected
unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment
Clause
forbids
only
governmental preference of one religion over
the other.
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RATIO:
(a) A government aid program is not readily subject
to challenge under the Establishment Clause if it is
neutral with respect to religion and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who,
in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice. Under such a program,
government aid reaches religious institutions only by
way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual
recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
aid recipients not the government, whose role ends
with the disbursement of benefits.
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ISSUES/HELD:
1.
2.
RATIO:
1.
2.
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ISSUES:
1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a
justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action?
Did respondent have any legal standing to file the
Petition for Declaratory Relief?
2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and
substance required by the Constitution, the law and
the Rules of Court?
3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike
Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for
public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from
campaigning against said candidates?"
HELD & RATIO:
1. NO. SJS miserably failed to allege an existing
controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the
respondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently
state what specific legal right of the SJS was violated by
the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter
were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which it relies on its pleading for its claim. SJS
merely speculated or anticipated without factual
moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below
had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or
candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or
threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men
to public office who would in turn be forever beholden to
their leaders, enabling them to control the government"
& "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion
of the peoples faith in the electoral process; &
reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine
the ultimate result of elections," which would then be
violative of the separation clause.
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Endorsement
of
FACTS:
o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit
religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through
its Philippines agency established in November
of 1898
o the defendant appellee is a municipal
corporation with powers that are to be
excercised in conformity with the provisions of
R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the
city of manila
o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and gospel porionms thereof
throughout the Philippines
o the acting city treasurer nformed plaintiff that it
was
conducting
business
of
general
merchandise, without providing itself with the
necessary mayors permit and municipal license,
in violation of various ordinances, and asked the
plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the
corresponding license and fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the
sum of Php 5,821
o plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the license
fees but at the same time filed a complaint to the
courts
o plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt
from real estate taxes; and that it was never
required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee
before the war, nor does the American bible
society in the U.S pay license fee or sales tax for
the sale of the bible.
o however a witness for the appellees was able to
prove that the American bibler society in fact
does profit from the sale of the Bible.
ISSUES:
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HELD:
Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order
non-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional
RATIONALE:
The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but
it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then
the former must yield.
What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain
that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol
of Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious
symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious
ceremony. The determination whether a ceremony is
religious or not is left to the courts not to any
religious group.
Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand
during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag
during boy scout activities. Their objection then
rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of
pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely
secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag
or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It
talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting
to force, military service, or duty to defend the
country.
There was no compulsion involved in the
enforcement of the flag salute. They were not
criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they
chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely
lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave
it.
Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were
members of Methodist Episcopal Church who
believed that war and preparations for war are gainst
God's wishes. They did not take required military
service training which was requirement to graduate.
Court said that they were not being drafted to attend
university. University did not violate due process
when it required the mil service.
Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs
Witness children were expelled from school for
refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation
of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due
process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs.
Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided
court.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are
members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public
and private) for refusing, on account of their
religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony.
RATIO:
It has been held previously in the case of
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a
system of complete separation between church and
state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance and therefore saluting it is not a
religious ceremony. The requirement of the flag
ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the
flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to students and
teachers regardless of their religion.
While the necessity to develop such respect
for the flag and respect for the country still persists
until today, there is recognition that religious
freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to
the highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in
German vs. Barangan)
Two-fold aspect of religious profession:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ISSUES:
WON the added phrase under God constitutes a
violation
of
the
U.S.
Consti?
HELD:
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2)
(Reversed and Remanded)
ANUCENSION vs. NLU
FACTS:
In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Hacienda Luisita and the United Luisita Workers
Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for
those who were members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the
time of the agreement, all employees would be
required to join the Union and must stay in the
Union to be able to retain employment in the
Hacienda.
In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni
Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant
to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting
any of their members from joining any outside
association or organization. Members of Inglesia
were told that they would not lose their jobs
pursuant to RA 3350, that says that members of
religious sects that prohibit affiliation may not be
laid off simply on grounds of their non-affiliation
with any workers union.
Later this number went down to 115 due to 2 of
them having already been deceased and 27 not
having been in the Union to begin with. The Union
then infomed the Hacienda that the 115 members
have resigned and demanded for their immediate
lay-off due to the stipulations of the CBA. The Union
even proceeded to go on strike until the 115 workers
were laid off.
Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of
RA 3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations
struck down the statute. Petitioners here have
appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1)
2)
HELD:
1)
2)
RATIO:
1)
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temporal,
not
spiritual
or
religious or holy and eternal. It
was intended to serve the
secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion.
D) The Court here discussed on
equal protection, not being a
guaranty of equality. It allows
classification. Here we see that
the classification is based on
real and important differences,
as religious beliefs are not mere
beliefs or ideas, bit are motives
of certain rules of human
conduct. Such classification is
therefore valid.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
RATIO:
Issue 1.
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Issue No. 2
Batch 2008A.
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Ponente: CJ Burger
FACTS:
McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church
in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for
delegate to the constitutional convention. An
opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued
in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment
that McDaniel was isqualified from serving as a
delegate by a Tennessee statutory provision
establishing the qualifications of constitutional
convention delegates to be the same as those for
membership in the State House of Representatives,
thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision
barring ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any
denomination whatever."
That court held that the statutory provision violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. and for a
judgment striking his name from the ballot.
Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that 4
of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution and
declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate.
Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on the
ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by
a vote almost equal to that of three opposing
candidates.
After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the
disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon
"religious belief" and restricted "religious action . . .
[only] in the lawmaking process of government where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the
establishment clause . . . ."The state interests in
preventing the establishment of religion and in
avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel
political activity along religious lines, resulting from
clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed
by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the
disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of
the Free Exercise Clause.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of
the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever
from serving as delegates to the State's limited
constitutional convention deprived appellant of the
right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by
the First Amendment. YES
RATIO:
The disqualification of ministers from legislative
office was a practice carried from England by seven
of the original States; later six new States similarly
excluded clergymen from some political offices. The
purpose of the several States in providing for
disqualification was primarily to assure the success
of a new political experiment, the separation of
church and state. Prior to 1776, most of the 13
Colonies had some form of an established, or
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FACTS:
On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees and
who were members of the August Twenty-One
Movement (ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street,
Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St.
Jude Chapel, which adjoins the Malacaang
grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow tshirts, they marched down said street with raised
clenched fists and shouts of anti-government
invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred
by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of
his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the
Malacaang security area. When their efforts to
enter the church became apparently futile, they
opted to stay outside, kneeling on the sidewalk in
front of the barricades and prayed the Holy Rosary.
Afterwards, they sang Bayan ko with clenched fists
of protest against the violation of their rights and
thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because of the
alleged warning given them by respondent Major
Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to
enter the church in the future would likewise be
prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.
ISSUE HELD:
1. WON petitioners constitutionally protected
freedom to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the
1973 Consti) was violated NO
2. WON petitioners freedom of locomotion was
violated (Sec 5, Art IV of the 1973 Consti) NO
RATIO:
1.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P.
Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude
church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents
assured petitioners and the Court that they have
never restricted, and will never restrict, any person
or persons from entering and worshipping at said
church. They maintain, however, that petitioners'
intention was not really to perform an act of
religious worship, but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration at a place close to
the very residence and offices of the President of
the
Republic.
Respondents
further
lament
petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive
with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy
Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow tshirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised
clenched fists, and chants of anti-government
slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents
allegation.
These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on
the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious
worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate
that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable
right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and
of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be
done in good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code
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2.
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the
use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and
reasonableness of which have already been
discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law,
the same having been established in the interest of
national security.
Petition dismissed.
Teehankee, dissenting:
I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the
right of free worship and movement is a preferred
right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not
subject to prior restraint except where there exists
the clear and present danger of a substantive evil
sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly
no such danger in this case.
1. The right to freely exercise one's religion is
guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights.
Freedom of worship, alongside freedom of expression
and speech and peaceable assembly, along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciaryeven more
so than on the other departmentsrests the grave
and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for
and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course,
dispense with what has been so felicitously termed
by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side
of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy."
2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there
is to be no prior restraint although there may be
subsequent punishment of any illegal acts
committed during the exercise of such basic rights.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or
limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health
or any other legitimate public interest, that the
State has a right (and duty) to prevent.
3. The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify prior restraint
and bar a group of persons from entering the church
of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the
military or police officials who would so physically
restrain them. Indeed, there is no precedent in this
time and age where churchgoers whose right of free
exercise of their religion is recognized have been
physically prevented from entering their church on
grounds of national security. On the other hand, it
does not lie within the competence or authority of
such officials to demand of churchgoers that they
show and establish their "sincerity and good faith
in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of religious worship and of locomotion" as a precondition, as seems to be the thrust of the majority
decision.
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ISSUES:
WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to
provide medical services to a child. - YES
Sec.1
reads:
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FACTS:
Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish
religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite
Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a
child's school attendance until age 16) by declining
to send their children to public or private school
after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The
evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing
informal vocational education to their children
designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish
community (children ages 14 and 15). The evidence
also showed that respondents sincerely believed that
high school attendance was contrary to the Amish
religion and way of life and that they would
endanger their own salvation and that of their
children by complying with the law.
ISSUE:
WON the compulsory-attendance law violated their
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC
upheld their decision naman)
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Misrepresentations:
o
Batch 2008A.
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ISSUE:
of
the
Misrepresentations
Supreme Court:
o
Court
of
ascertained
Appeals
by
the
Batch 2008A.
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ISSUES:
W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them
from induction in U.S military training?
HELD:
Seager
Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.'
He did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a
Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic
order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.'
He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man
must pay for his willingness to destroy human life.
In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity
with which he held them, we think the Board, had it
applied the test we propose today, would have
granted him the exemption. We think it clear that
the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the
same place in his life as the belief in a traditional
deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.
We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts:
'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for
you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life,
of the source of your being, or your ultimate
concern, of what you take seriously without any
reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must
forget everything traditional that you have learned
about God * * *'. Tillich, The Shaking of the
Foundations.
It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate
what his beliefs were with regard to the usual
understanding of the term 'Supreme Being.' But as
we have said Congress did not intend that to be the
test. We therefore affirm the judgment.
Peter
It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged 'some
power manifest in
nature * * * the supreme
expression' that helps man in ordering his life. As to
whether he would call that belief in a Supreme
Being, he replied, 'you could call that a belief in the
Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to
be the words I use.' We think that under the test we
establish here the Board would grant the exemption
to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in
No. 29
Jakobson
The Court of Appeals found that the registrant
demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war
was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm
that judgment.
(1971)
Per curiam
FACTS:
Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War.
To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a
conscientious objector. The local draft board turned
down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still
classified him as eligible for unrestricted service then
passed it on to Justice Dept. FBI made an inquiry.
Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a
conscientious objector because of testimony from
inquiry of petitioner, parents, attorney and religious
minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless
Justice Dept advised denial of request. Appeal Board
denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim.
Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIONALE:
In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a
registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show
1) that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form;
2) that this opposition is based upon religious training
and belief;
3) and that this objection is sincere.
In applying the test, the Selective Service System must
be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not
with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious
sect, if any, to which he may belong.
Justice Dept believed that Clay did not satisfy any
requirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any
form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces.
He objects to certain types of war in certain
circumstances, rather than a general scruple against
participation in war in any form. 2) Clays religion did not
preclude fighting for the US because of political and
racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to
participate in war in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious
objector only surfaced when drafting was imminent. He
has not shown overt manifestation of his opposition.
However, in this Court, the govt has conceded that
petitioners belief are based on religious training. His
beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on
the tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands
them. The govt also conceded that it no longer questions
the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer who
decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from
FBI inquiry was convinced of his sincerity and
recommended his classification as a conscientious
objector. Justice dept was wrong to disregard such a
finding.
Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying
Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not
pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is
clear that the dept was wrong.
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INTRODUCTION
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Douglas, concurs:
Sicurella vs US: Congress couldnt possibly mean
conscientious objector must go to participation in
war in any form.
Negre v Larsen: Petitioners church did not oppose
war in Vietnam but provided guidelines for unjust
wars. His conscience did not allow him to go to
Vietnam. Court said screw his conscience, go and
fight!
Clay is different. As a Muslim he follows Koran.
Koran proclaims jihad by believers against nonbelievers. All other wars are unjust. Clays believes
only in war sanctioned by the Koran. Therefore, it
becomes a matter of belief, of conscience, of religious
principle.
Harlan, concurs in the result:
Justice dept gives bad advice. Not all conscientious
objectors are weasels trying to get out of fighting in
Vietnam.
Academic Freedom
Academic Speech
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B.
A.
THE
AMERICAN
TRADITION
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Early History and Structure
OF
B.
C.
Development
Freedom
of
the
Concept
of
Academic
D.
E.
Professional
Standard
Competence
as
Regulatory
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IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOM AND THE
SCHOLAR
ACADEMIC
INDIVIDUAL
A.
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Academic Abstention
It describes the traditional refusal of courts to
extend common law rules of liability to colleges
where doing so would interfere with the college
administration's good faith performance of its core
functions. The recognition of authority over internal
affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go
hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree
of common law autonomy.
Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as
academic abstention raised to constitutional status,
so that judges can consider whether statutes or
regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the
special needs or prerogatives of the academic
community.
State Constitutional Law
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state
universities seems to have contributed to the
development of the federal right of institutional
academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the
persistence of the view, inherent in academic
abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the
special needs and values of universities, even when
erected and supported by the state.
Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best
be seen as a principle that regulation should not
proceed so far as to deprive the university of control
over its academic destiny. This principle has been
fashioned by courts, explaining why they restrain
themselves from imposing farreaching constitutional
or common law duties on the university. As such, it
represents academic abstention raised to a
constitutional level.
Institutional Academic Freedom and the
First Amendment
CONCLUSION
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The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus
with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for their admission.
After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction,
the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of
fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination
required in any college of the University is within the
authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding
the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved
finally by the University Council of the autonomous
campus."
In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned before
the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, which
was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the
UPCM and passed three years in the college.
Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students,
upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with
"three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the
College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a
letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that
they never intended to question the Faculty's right to
academic freedom; that they believed the issue was
simply on the question of observance of the proper
procedure in implementing admission requirements; that
they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue
the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the
determination of humanitarian consideration of their
case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and
that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in
the college.
The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and
attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC
dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this
development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency
meeting where it denied the appeal of the students by a
vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for
admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC
a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The RTC
issued an order for the admission of the students to the
college.
The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the
admission of the students in the interest of justice and
equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the
CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to
follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President
issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against
them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive
Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the
Batch 2008A.
39
ISSUE:
WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the
petitioners.
NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to
admit the students to the college of medicine.
RATIO:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Batch 2008A.
40
2.
Procedural crap:
Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint for
damages and declaratory relief against the UP
professors stating the above causes of action. UP
filed a motion to intervene, stating that the UP profs
were under their supervision. Salazar and Bailen
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. With
the MFR denied in the lower court, they filed a
petition for certiorari for gadalej, which was
dismissed by the SC. Meanwhile, UP filed a motion
to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck off
the record. In the CA, everything else was denied,
because petitioners allegations were not stated in
the complaint. Hence, this instant petition.
2. Academic Freedom
UP has no cause of action because there are insufficient
allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the
same allegations in its original complaint because that
has been previously struck off the record by the lower
court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not
allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is
affected by the complaint simply because it was not an
original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower
court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner
authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a study on the
Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to
Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned
or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the
motion to dismiss the complaint against Salazar and
Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which
amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a
ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the
allegations of the complaint.
ISSUE HELD:
1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of
the UP profs petition for certiorari NO
2. WON the UP professors are covered by the
protective mantle of Academic Freedom YES,
but UP should have defended its profs in the
course of the trial case, instead of trying to
terminate the proceedings prematurely
Hence, the CAs denial of the profs motion to
dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded.
RATIO:
1. Super daming procedural crap nakakahilo.
While it is true that the instant petition and the
previous case revolve around the issue of WON the
lower court correctly denied the motion to of the UP
profs, there is an aspect of the case which takes it
out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final
judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent
litigation involving the same cause of action). The
said principle applies when there is, among others,
identity of parties and subject matter in two cases.
Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here
while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in the
previous case is not a hindrance to the application of
res judicata because the situation is akin to the
adding of other parties to a case which had been
Batch 2008A.
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a.
b.
Batch 2008A.
42
- San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that
there are other people who are more prepared than
him, considering the crowded medical schools that
we have today.
3.
b.
c.
d.
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44
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2.
petitioners
involved
were
found
to
be
academically deficient & the teachers are found
to have committed various acts of misconduct.
Batch 2008A.
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Batch 2008A.
48
judgment
of
Minn
SC
Batch 2008A.
49
1.
2.
J. Santos (1979)
FACTS:
xxx
ISSUES:
1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of
police power
2. WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede
the contractual obligations assumed by defendants
HELD & RATIO:
Batch 2008A.
Auditor
essential
contracts
only are
50
JUAREZ vs. CA
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Lot 502 (hereafter known as The Lot) was leased in
early 1900s to Serviliano Ocampo who built a house
therein and lived there w/ his parents and sister
Angela. When he died in March 1956, Angela took
over the lease and stayed there with her children
(including Virginia). In 1976, she moved to Virginias
house and leased the lot to Roberto Capuchino.
Meantime, Aranetas sold it to Susanna Realty. Inc.
which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Devt Corp. After
acquiring it, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment
against petitioner on the ground that she violated
BP877 by subleasing The Lot w/o its consent.
When in the contract of lease of thing there is no express prohibition, the lessee may
subject the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for
the performance of the contract toward the lessor.
2
Respondents:
CA ruled that BP 877 (effective on June 12, 1985)
was applicable because the origl contract of lease
didnt specify a fixed term and payment of the rental
was made on a monthly basis. Contract was deemed
terminated from month to month. Hence, when it
If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year,
if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to
week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However,
even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts
may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over
one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after
the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts
may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one
month.
3
Batch 2008A.
51
FACTS:
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1. The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of
Duellome vs. Gotico where this court ruled that the lease
of a building naturally leases the lot therein, and the
rentals of the building includes those of the lot.
2. The objective of B.P 25 is to remedy the plight of the
lessees, but such objective is not subject to the
exploitation of lessees for whose benefit the law was
enacted. Thus the prohibition provided for in the law
against the sublease of the premises without the consent
of the owner.
It must be remembered that the social
justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
the property owner, who under our constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated in our constitution was not
intended to take away the rights from a person to
give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
B. Involuntary Servitude
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E. Manguianes
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ISSUES:
1. WON there was Section 2145 involved an
undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial board of Mindoro.
- NO. Judge Ranney declared that the true
distinction therefore is between the [1] delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made. Section 2145 was issued under the
second mode of delegation.
- Section 2145 falls under the exception to the
general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The
central legislative body is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro.
- The reason is that provincial officers are better
fitted to select sites for reservations.
2. WON there was religions discrimination
against non-Christian tribes under Section
2145.
- NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that
non-Christian tribes refers to natives of low grade
of civilization and does not discriminate on account
of religious differences.
3. WON the protection afforded by President
MacKinleys Instructions, the Philippine Bill and
the Jones Law providing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law extends to members of nonChristian tribes.
- NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that
measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
civilized community. It is a legal and refined idea,
the offspring of high civilization. Considering the
that the Manguianes do not have a civilized
conception of liberty, they cannot claim the they
were deprived of it. Furthermore, Section 2145 is
applicable to all of a class. The classification based
on degree of civilization is not arbitrary.
Batch 2008A.
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55
FACTS:
The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979,
is the sole issue presented by the petitions for
decision.
o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is
knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It
creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge when the check is dishonored by the
bank if presented within 90 days from the date on
the check.
Batch 2008A.
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In
Escriche's
Jurisprudence:
FACTS:
The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de
Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged
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Dictionary
of
Legislation
and
57
Batch 2008A.
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ISSUE:
WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be
examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
HELD:
No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for is
denied.
RATIO:
The court here acknowledged that there are a number of
authorities that deal with the subject, though many are
conflicting.
however,
looks
to
more
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59
2.
3.
4.
ISSUE:
PERTINENT PROVISIONS:
Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in
pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and
intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of
Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given
without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are
the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.
FACTS:
1.
RATIO:
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60
OBITER:
At all events, even if accused-appellant was
truthful
and
his
assailed
confessions
are
inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already
shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses
presented a mosaic of circumstances showing
accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out
the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of
some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been
shown to have been motivated by ill will against
accused-appellant.
Batch 2008A.
61
RATIO:
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case,
testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on
cross-examination but compelled to write in open
court in order that the jury may be able to compare
his handwriting with the one in question. It was so
held in the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse
vs. Com. However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com.,
the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case
particularly
because
the
court
there
gave
prominence to the defendant's right to decline to
write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In
this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for
it does not appear that any information was filed
against the petitioner for the supposed falsification,
and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial
testifying and under cross-examination. This is only
an investigation prior to the information and with a
view to filing it.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or
the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish
a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the
petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
Except that it is more serious, we believe the present
case is similar to that of producing documents of
chattels in one's possession. For the purposes of the
constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
one who is compelled to produce a document, and
one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious
than that of compelling the production of documents
or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to
write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may
identify him as the falsifier.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a
municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen
or specimens without resorting to the means
complained of herein, that is not reason for
trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of
justice, but such cases are accidental and do not
constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
innocent persons.
With respect to the judgments rendered by this court
and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be
remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48
Batch 2008A.
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4.
RATIO:
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Batch 2008A.
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ISSUE #2
The ruling in Moncado v. Peoples court relied upon by
respondents that illegally seized documents, papers
and things are admissible in evidence must be
abandoned. This ruling
is in line with American
common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free just because the constable has blundered
upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected
by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against
searching officer).
Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary
rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same
authority, inadmissible.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence,
no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But
then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Batch 2008A.
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Batch 2008A.
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ISSUES:
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on
the following grounds:
1. There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration
Act og 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised
Batch 2008A.
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Batch 2008A.
74
2.
Disposition:
Denied petition. Lifting of TRO on deportation
procedure.
Batch 2008A.
75
renunciation
allegiance.
of
"all
other
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the
Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America. On January 27, he submitted a Certificate by
then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that
Osmea is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the
votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc
ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation.
Petitioners evidence to show Osmea is a US
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of
the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration
Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
Batch 2008A.
76
B. Juridical Persons
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra)
1.
Batch 2008A.
77
2.
organization and have signed the preincorporation papers with the exclusive
right to vote and be voted for ; (b)
participating members with "no right to
vote or be voted for" to which category all
other members belong; except (c) honorary
members, so made by the board of trustees,
"at the exclusive discretion" thereof due
to "assistance, honor, prestige or help
extended in the propagation" of the
objectives of the Organization without any
pecuniary expenses on the part of said
honorary members.
On February 14, 1962, the legal department
of the Central Bank of the Philippines
hereinafter referred to as the Bank
rendered an opinion to the effect that the
Organization and others of similar nature
are banking institutions, falling within the
purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on
April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be
published in the newspapers the following:
6.
3.
4.
5.
7.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it
unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ?
HELD:
No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
Judge Morfe annulled. Writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the SC made permanent with costs against
the organization.
RATIO:
it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or
imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much
the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations.
-
Batch 2008A.
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Batch 2008A.
79
proscribes
The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI
did not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere
observation is not a search. The search was conducted
merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins:
where the search was initially made by the owner there
is no unreasonable search and seizure...
The Court here again stressed that the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals and this is seen in the intention of the
framers as Bernas states that they are a protection
against the State.
In this case we see that the search and seizure was done
by Job Reyes, a private individual. As such, the
Constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked by the
appellant.
Other issues
1)
No it did not.
RATIO:
2)
Cases cited:
FACTS:
only
Presence of NBI
HELD:
amendment
1.
2.
Batch 2008A.
80
5.
6.
4.
5.
6.
7.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was
guilty of libel. NO.
RATIO:
1.
2.
Batch 2008A.
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8.
9.
Batch 2008A.
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