3

FERNANDO, J.:

G.R. No. L-47772 August 31, 1978

INOCENCIO TUGADE, vs. COURT OF PEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, There is nothing impressive about this petition sinking to justify a review of a decision of respondent Court of Appeals on the ground that instead of relying on what counsel considers applicable rulings of: respondent Court,. the judgment was based, on a case decided by this Tribunal Moreover, counsel for petitioner ignored earlier doctrines of this Court consistently holding that a mishap caused by defective brakes could not be considered as fortuitous in character and thus caged for an acquittal of the driver if subsequently haled to court. This Court, nonetheless, was persuaded to give due course to the petition primarily for clarifying the state of the law and thus hopefully avoid any further lurking doubt on the matter. It is quite evident that the reversal of the decision sought to be reviewed is not justified. The decision of respondent Court, with Justice Julia Agrava as ponente, set forth the relevant facto thus: "At about 9:15 o'clock in the morning of January 4,, 1972, Rodolfo [Rayan- dayan] was driving a Hodlen Kingswood car (the [Holden] car), plate No. 52-19V (L-Rizal '71) owned by the Sta. Ines Corp. and assigned for use of its manager, an Ayala Avenue in Makati, Rizal, going northwards. At the intersection of Ayala Avenue will Mabati Avenue, [Rayan-dayan] was going to turn left on Makati Avenue but he stopped to wait for the left-turn signal and because a jeep in front of him was also at a stop ... While in that sup position, the [Holden] car was bumped from behind by Blue Car Taxi bearing Plate No. 55-71R (TX-QC '71) and by Inocencio [Tugade] causing damage to the [Holden] car, the repairs of which cost P778.10 ... [Tugade] was then charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. He pleaded not guilty and while admitting that the collision was caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab, sought to expeculate himself with an explanation that this fault could not and should not be traced to him. after trial, the lower court held: '[Accordingly], the court finds that accused Inocencio Tugade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and hereby sentences him to pay a [fine of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos], with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised, Penal Code, as amended, to indemnify the Sta. Ines Mining Corporation in the amount of P778.10 by way of actual damages; and to pay the costs.' While [Tugade] admitted the facts of the case as set out above, he, nevertheless, appealed from the judgment reiterating that 'the malfunctioning of the brakes at the time of the accident was due to a mechanical defect which even the exercise of due diligence of a good father of a family cannot have prevented.' As the lower court had found: "this witness ([Tugade]) testified that after the accident, he admitted that his taxicab bumped the car on his front because the brakes of his vehicle malfunctioned; and that the document, ..., is the handwritten statement he prepared to this effect." 1 Respondent Court of Appeals, after stating that upon review of the record, it agreed with the trial court, its decision affirming in toto their judgment appealed from. As noted at the outset, petitioner is not entitled to acquittal. His plea for the reversal of the decision reached by respondent Court is not impressed with merit. At the most, as was likewise previously mentioned, the fine imposed could be reduced. 1. Counsel for petitioner vigorously contends that respondent Court of Appeals ought not to have applied the pronouncement in La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. vs. De Jesus 2 on the ground that it was obiter dictum. That is not the case at all. A little more time and attention in the study of the above decision could have resulted in its correct appraisal He would have realized then that respondent Court acted correctly. This Tribunal passed squarely on the specific issue raised. The opinion penned by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal, is categorical: "Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez V. Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People v. Palapal, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were based on considerations, quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar." The above doctrine is controlling. The reference to the Court of appeals decisions is of no moment. It may be printed out that they were not ignored in the opinion of Justice Agrava, six of its nine pages being devoted to distinguishing them. Even without the La Mallorca ruling then, the decision of respondent Court sought to be reviewed can stand the test of strict scrutiny. It is this Tribunal, not respondent Court of Appeals, that speaks authoritatively. 2. Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera: 5 "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial heirarchy. They have to defer and to submit." 6 The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings." 3. The lack of merit in this petition becomes even more obvious when it is recalled that the La Mallorca decision did not enunciate a new principle. As far back as Lasam v. Smith, promulgated more than half a century ago, in 1924 to be exact, this Court has been committed to such a doctrine. Thus; "As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito." Lasam was cited with approval in the two subsequent cases of Son v. Cebu Autobus Co. and Necesito v. Paras. WHEREFORE, The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of December 15, 1977 is affirmed. No costs.

4 La Mallorca vs. CA
17 SCRA 739 Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their three minor children, namely, Milagros (13), Raquel (4) and Fe (2) boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352 bearing plate TPU No. 757 owned and operated by La Mallorca at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor (half-brother of Beltran) of the bus issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's rules and regulations. After about an hour's trip and after Beltrans family got off, Mariano Beltran went back to the bus to get the baggage he had left under one of the seats near the door while the rest was waiting on a shaded area, he did not notice that Raquel was following him. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off. Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents. Issue: Whether or not La Mallorca is liable for the negligence of its driver and for the death of Beltrans daughter. Held: La Mallorca is liable for damages. It was pointed out that even though, M. Beltrans family already alighted from the bus, th e fact that Beltran went back to the bus to retrieve his bayong, the relation of carrier-passenger relation between La Mallorca and Beltran still subsist. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage. But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the operation of their vehicle. The driver did not exercise utmost diligence required of him; hence, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarly liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.

10 Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. CA

467 SCRA 569

Facts: PASUDECO, sugarcane transporter, requested permission from Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) to pass through NCLEX as the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga were heavily damaged by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. PNCC, franchisee that operates and maintains NCLEX, was furnished with the copy of the request to comment on. Thereafter, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum Agreement wherein PNCC was also furnished with a copy. The latter was allowed to enter and pass through the NLEX provided they abide to the terms and conditions agreed upon. At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX and saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion. Sundin, Ducusin and Pascual requested PASUDECO to clear the area as it was hazardous for the travelers. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari, PASUDECO's equipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very early. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned the traffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. Sendin went to his office in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary report. At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmother's first death anniversary. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Latagan sustained injuries and Arnaiz car was totally wrecked. Issue: Whether or not there was gross negligence on the part of Pasudeco and PNCC and the latter be made to pay for damages. Held: Pasudeco and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable. There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.[31] Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.[32] It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury.[33] The Court declared the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith,[34] viz: In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA: Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway. The records show, and as admitted by the parties, that Arnaiz's car ran over scattered sugarcanes spilled from a hauler truck.[38]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA. PASUDECO's negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan's injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable.

5 JOSE SON

PARAS, C.J.: vs. CEBU AUTOBUS COMPANY

G.R. No. L-6155

April 30, 1954

The plaintiff, Jose Son, instituted in the Court of First Instituted of Cebu Autobus Company, damages in the total sum of P2,660, alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the fact that the defendant's TPU truck No. 312 fell into a canal in the barrio of Macaas, municipality of Catmon, Cebu, on September 18, 1948, due to a defect of its engine or to the negligence of its driver, the plaintiff (then a passenger of the vehicle) having received serious injuries and two of his hogs (loaded therein) having been killed. The defense set up by the defendant is that the accident was caused by events which were unforeseen or, even if foreseen or, even if foreseen, were inevitable. After trial the court rendered a decision, sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,000 as moral damages, and the sum of P286.80 as plaintiff's actual expenses, together with his loss and unrealized profit in connection with the seven hogs loaded by the plaintiff in defendant's truck. From this decision the defendant has appealed. As the defendant has elevated the case directly to this Court on questions of law, we are bound by the findings of fact contained in the appealed decision. We quote hereunder the conclusions pertinent to and decisive of the present appeal: The evidence adduced conclusively shows that TPU-Truck No. 312 of the defendant Cebu Autobus Company left Cebu City on September 17, 1948, at about 10:00 a.m. bound for Maya, municipality of Daan Bantayan, Cebu Province, arriving in the latter place at about 5:00 p.m. of the same day. it passed the night in Maya. It left Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, on its return trip to Cebu City at about 4:00 a.m. September 18, 1948, without having been inspected or examined by the mechanic. The plaintiff boarded defendant's truck in barrio Maya. Daan Bantayan, Cebu, and loaded seven hogs for his home at Yati Liloan, Cebu, paying the usual fare and freight. The plaintiff did not reach his destination safely, because the truck of the defendant fell into a canal at kilometer. No. 56, barrio of Macaas, municipality of Catmon, Cebu. He was pinned down or pressed by the truck on September 18, 1948, and, as a consequence, he suffered complete fractures on his pelvic bone. Because of the shock and pain he lost his consciousness for sometime. He was brought to his house at Yati, municipality of Liloan, Cebu, unconscious on board another truck. Later, on the same day, he was brought in a special wagon to the City of Cebu, and was confined in the Velez Clinic for fourteen days, from September 18, 1948, to October 2, 1948. On October 2, 1948, the plaintiff went out of the Velez Clinic, but according to Dr. Jacinto Velez, physician and proprietor of the Velez Clinic, the plaintiff needed 60 days more of treatment and rest before he could resume his former habitual work, inasmuch as he suffered complete fractures on his pelvic bone. The evidence further shows that two hogs of the plaintiff loaded on TPU truck No. 312 of the defendant on September 18, 1948 died when the said truck fell into a canal at Macaas, Catmon, Cebu. The theory of the defendant is that the accident was unforeseen, or even if foreseen, was inevitable. This theory cannot be sustained. Whether the accident was caused by the defect of the engine of the truck of the defendant, or by the negligence of the driver, or by the breakage of the drag-link spring, the defendant is civilly liable to the plaintiff for the damages suffered by him. The evidence shows the draglink spring of the truck in question was not inspected or examined when it left Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, on September 1, 1948, for Cebu City. If it were inspected or examined, the accident might have been avoided. The plaintiff had no means of avoiding the danger or escaping the injury. When he boarded at dawn of September 18, 1948, in Maya, Daan Bantayan. Cebu, defendant's TPU Truck No. 312, bound for his home at Yati Liloan, Cebu, and loaded on said truck seven hogs, he had every right to presume the truck perfectly in good condition which could transport him safely and securely to his destination. He paid the regular fare and the freight of the seven hogs. The plaintiff is suing the defendant upon its contract of carriage which the latter had failed to perform by virtue of its failure to safely carry the plaintiff to his destination at the barrio of Yati, Liloan, Cebu, as distinguished from an action based on culpa acquiliana under which it is necessary, in order to recover damages, to prove fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. The trial court based its decision in favor of the plaintiff upon the finding that the defendant had defaulted in its contract of carriage due to the accident, regardless of whether it was caused by a defect of the engine of the defendant's truck, by the negligence of its driver, or by the breakage of the drag-link spring; the evidence showing that the said drag-link spring was not inspected or examined when the vehicle left Maya, Daan Bantayan, Cebu, for Cebu City. In other words, the trial court overruled the defense interposed by the defendant that the accident was due to an event (unexpected breakage of the drag-link spring) which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, was inevitable. In our opinion, the trial court was correct. Its express finding as to the cause of the accident in effect blames the defendant for it and logically rejects the defendant's theory that the cause emanated from an unforeseen or inevitable event. In essence, the trial court held that the drag-link spring of the truck in question was defective. In the case of Lazam vs. Smith, 45 Phil., 660, it was already held that an accident cause either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. The conclusion of the trial court with respect to the amount of damages sustained by and award in favor of the plaintiff, is being factual, conclusive herein, since, as hereinbefore noted, the defendant has appealed directly to this court solely on questions of law. Upon the other hand, plaintiff's claim that the amount of moral damages awarded to him by the trial court should be raised to P300, cannot be sustained, because no appeal was taken by him from the decision a quo. Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed and it is so o rdered with costs against the defendant-appellant..

6 RAFAEL O. RAMOS, administrator of the intestate estate of the spouses Jose Ramos Silva and Margarita Tanate, v. TOMAS LEDESMA

[G.R. No. 4717. February 1, 1909. ]

1. DEBTS AND DEBTORS; PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT; POSSESSION OF THE DOCUMENT OF CREDIT. The existence of a document of credit in the hands of the creditor, is evidence that the debt has not yet been settled, inasmuch as an obligation can only be presumed to have been paid when the said document has been delivered up to the debtor. (Sec. 334, par. 8, Code of Civil Procedure.) 2. ID.; EXTINCTION; OF DEBT BY FULL PAYMENT. It is a rule of law that debts are extinguished by their payment, and a debt shall only be considered as paid when the full amount has been delivered, or the service of which the obligation consisted has been rendered. (Arts. 1156, 1157, Civil Code.) 3. ID.; PROOF OF PAYMENT; ERROR OF COURT. When the debt for which action is brought arises from an obligation other than that appearing as paid in the receipt by which it is intended to prove payment, a judicial decision holding that said debt in paid would, according to the decision of the supreme court of Spain of February 9, 1898, be in violation of article 1162 of the Civil Code. On the 25th of July, 1907, counsel representing Rafael O. Ramos, administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Ramos Silva and his wife Margarita Tanate, deceased, filed a written complaint against Tomas Ledesma, a resident of Cabancalan, of the town of Ilog, Occidental Negros, claiming payment of the sum of P2,450.09 and legal interest thereon from the said date, which sum, according to a private document dated May 13, 1902, he owed the late Jose Ramos, and was due and payable on March 15, 1903; that the debtor, in order to guarantee payment, mortgaged to the creditor certain lands owned by him situated in a place called Calasa, in the barrio of Cabancalan, the area of which appears in title No. 6750, recorded at the Inspeccion General de Montes, and entered in the registry of property of the said province under No. 144, letter A; and that, notwithstanding the demands made by the creditor the defendant debtor had not satisfied his debt, for which reason he prayed that judgment be rendered against the same, sentencing him to pay the aforesaid sum with legal interest thereon and costs, together with any other just and equitable remedy. The defendant appeared by his counsel and answered the complaint, denying each and everyone of the paragraphs of the same, but three months after filing, another attorney amended the answer by a writing dated November 26, 1907, setting forth: That he denied each and everyone of the allegations contained in the aforesaid complaint with the exception of those which he admits as true in his amended answer, and which are as follows: That the defendant owed the late Jose Ramos a certain sum of money, apparently the same as that claimed in the complaint, for which he gave his promissory note; that this note appears to be the one referred to in the second paragraph of the complaint; that after the execution of the promissory note, that is to say, on the 1st of May, 1905, the defendant paid the plaintiff the sum of P1,701.69 on account of his indebtedness, and that the defendant has not refused, nor does he now refuse to pay the actual amount that he owes, and therefore, he prayed the court below to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the total value of the said promissory note, that by reason of said last payment, the said document was renewed by novation and that the defendant be finally absolved from payment of the excess that appears from the complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff. As the defendant did not appear at the trial, the court below entered judgment by default on the 23d of January, 1908, and sentenced the defendant to pay the amount claimed with the legal interest thereon from the 26th of July, 1907, and costs. On the 24th of said month, counsel for the defendant requested the court, in view of the facts alleged in his petition, to vacate the judgment in default entered against the defendant, and grant him an opportunity to produce evidence and to contest the complaint; on the 25th of the same month the court below set aside the previous judgment entered in default, and ordered the trial to be continued. At the trial, evidence was adduced by both parties, and the documents exhibited by them were made of record; on February 11, 1908, the court below, sustaining its previous decision of January 23, sentenced the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,450.09, and legal interest thereon from July 26, 1907, and costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment and moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the evidence adduced at the trial and to the law; his motion was overruled, to which the petitioner excepted, and presented the corresponding bill of exceptions which was approved and submitted to this court. As the plaintiff claims payment of the sum of P2,450.09, set out in the promissory note offered by him in evidence at the trial as Exhibit 1, the real point to be determined in this case, as the defendant says in his brief, is whether or not he has paid, on account of his debt, the sum of P1,701.69, as he alleged in his answer. From the documents offered in evidence by both parties and from the affidavit of the defendant, Tomas Ledesma, it is inferred that between the years 1894 and 1902, the latter contracted various debts, firstly with Jose Ramos Silva, now deceased, and afterwards with his brother, Martin Ramos, administrator of the estate of the deceased creditor, and though some of said debts have been duly paid, as proven by the documents returned by the creditor or by the administrator of the estate to the defendant debtor, who produced them at the trial, it does not appear, however, that the debt of P2,450.09 set out in the promissory note No. 1, presented by the plaintiff, has been paid either in part or in whole by the defendant debtor. The latter alleges that he paid the plaintiff, on account of the debt appearing in said promissory note No. 1, the sum of P1,701.69, and to prove his assertion he submitted, together with other documents, those lettered A and D. The latter document is literally as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"For the sum of $1,701.69. I hereby promise to pay Seor Martin Ramos, as administrator of the estate of his deceased brother Seor Jose Ramos, on the 15th day of March, 1901, the sum of one thousand seven hundred and one and sixty-nine cents ($1,701.69), and to secure the payment of this sum I hereby mortgage certain lands owned by me situated in the sitio of Calasa with an area of 41 hectares, 74 ares and 78 centares within the l imits of this town, according to the title No. 6750 registered at the Inspeccion General de Montes, No. 1591, recorded in the registry of property under No. 144, letter A, which land is free from all encumbrances. And in witness thereof I sign these presents in Cabancalan on the 29th day of June, 1900. (Signed) Tomas Ledesma."cralaw virtua1aw library The document lettered A and cited above, "I have received from Sr. Tomas Ledesma, resident of Cabancalan, the sum of one thousand seven hundred pesos sixty-nine cents, in paper money of the Banco Espaol-Filipino and gold and silver Conant money, which sum be pays in settlement of his debt to my deceased brother D. Jose Ramos under guaranty of his land situated in the sitio of Calasa within the limits of the town of Cabancalan according to a private document which I this day return to the interested party, with the exception of his titulo real and the promissory note for two thousand four hundred and fifty-nine pesos and sixty-nine cents, which are in the hands of Sr. Timoteo Gayco, son-in-law of the said deceased. In witness whereof and for the security of the interested party I issue the present in Jimamaylan on this the first day of May, nineteen hundred and five. (Signed) M. Ramos."cralaw virtua1aw library A simple perusal of this last document demonstrates in an unquestionable manner that Martin Ramos, administrator of the estate of Jose Ramos and wife, upon receiving from the debtor Tomas Ledesma the sum of P1,701.69, gave him the foregoing receipt marked A, and in addition thereto returned the document or promissory note marked D in which the debt paid by the defendant is set out. In the aforesaid Exhibit A it does not appear that the sum of P1,701.69, paid in by the debtor Ledesma was received by Martin Ramos in part payment of a larger sum, separate and distinct from that evidenced by the promissory note D, this note was returned to him on the spot because the debt which it represented was thereby paid; therefore, judging from the essential part of the contents of the said Exhibit A, the amount therein stated as received was in payment of the debt contained in the promissory note D; not as part payment of a larger sum contained in the other promissory note, No. 1, the collection of which is the object of this litigation. The rest of the statements of Martin Ramos, who made out the receipt, that the titulo real and the larger promissory note were not returned, is no proof that the payment of the debt set out in the promissory note D was made on account of the promissory note No. 1, which calls for another separate debt of P2,450.09. It is only by the tergiversation of the natural sense and meaning of each one of the three documents mentioned that it could be held that the said P1,701.69 were paid and received on account of the debt claimed. It is incontestable that the amount expressed in the promissory note marked D, dated June 29, 1900, and that contained in note No. 1 of May 13, 1902, are two distinct debts, and even though Ledesma avers that he mortgaged his land, situated in a place called "Calasa," as security for both, the circumstance that one piece of property was given as security for the payment of both debts does not prove that the latter constituted one sole obligation, nor that the payment of the smaller amount should be understood to be in part payment of the larger. This would be absurd, it being proven that prior to May 1, 190a, the defendant Ledesma was indebted to the estate of Jose Ramos and wife for two sums which had not been settled, so that the payment of the amount stated in promissory note D can in no manner be considered to have been made in part payment of note No. 1. The fact that said document was in the hands of the creditor at the time when the complaint was filed proves that the amount therein stated had not yet been satisfied, since it can only be assumed that an obligation has been paid when the evidence of its existence has been returned to the debtor. (Art. 334, No. 8, Code of Civil Procedure.) It is true that the defendant avers that he made a partial payment on account of the debt claimed herein, and it might be said that for this reason the promissory note No. 1 was not returned to the debtor; but it is none the less true that the receipt marked A given by the administrator, Martin Ramos, sets out the payment of P1,701.69 by the debtor, Ledesma, which sum he owed the late Jose Ramos according to the document or promissory note marked D; that note was at once returned to him, and it contained no statement or indication that such payment was on account of the P2,450.09 to which promissory note No. 1 refers, and furthermore there is no proof of such circumstance in the record, or that the debt evidenced by the aforesaid promissory note D was included in the other note, marked No. 1, and which evidences a different debt and for which action is brought for lack of payment. Article 1156 of the Civil Code says that obligations are extinguished by their payment or fulfillment; a debt shall only be considered as paid when the full amount of the thing has been delivered, or the prestation of which the obligation consisted has been made. (Art. 1157.) The supreme court of Spain, taking into consideration the precept of article 1162 of said code in its decision of February 9, 1898, established the following rule: "When the debt for which action is brought arises from obligations other than those appearing as paid in the receipt by which it is intended to prove payment, a judgment finding that said debt is paid is in violation of the said article 1162."cralaw virtua1aw library In view of the above-quoted legal precepts and the doctrine laid down in the said judgment in harmony therewith, the payment proven by the receipt marked A, for the sum due on the promissory note marked D, can not be considered as part payment of the sum claimed by the plaintiff under the promissory note No. 1, for the reason that they constitute two different debts, arising from different obligations of the defendant. For the foregoing considerations and those set forth in the judgment appealed from, so far as they agree with this decision, the said judgment is hereby affirmed with costs.

7 Filpino Pipe and Foundry Corporation (FPFC) v. National Waterworks and Sewage Authority (NAWSA)
The Case: An appeal by FPFC of the dismissal of its complaint against NAWASA. G.R. No. L-43446 May 3, 1988

Facts: On June 12, 1961, NAWASA entered into a contract with the plaintiff FPFC for the latter to supply it with iron pressure pipes worth P270, 187.50. NAWASA paid in installments on various dates, leaving a balance of P135, 500.50 excluding interest. After completing the delivery of the pipes, FPFC demanded payment of the remaining balance and interest. When NAWASA failed to pay the balance of its account, the FPFC filed a collection suit on March 16, 1967. Trial Court Ruling (Nov. 23, 1967): Ordered the defendant to pay the unpaid balance of P135, 507.50 in NAWASA negotiable bonds, redeemable after ten years from their issuance with interest at 6% per annum, P40, 944.73 as interest up to March 15, 1966 and the interest accruing thereafter to the issuance of the bonds at 6% per annum and the costs. Defendant, however, failed to satisfy the decision. FPFC filed another complaint seeking adjustment of the unpaid balance in accordance with the value of the Philippine peso. NAWASA filed a motion to dismiss on ground of prior judgment but was denied by the trial court. Issue: (1) Whether the economic conditions then, and still prevailing, would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code (2)Whether, on the basis of the continously spiralling[sic] price index indisputably shown by the plaintiff, there exists an extraordinary inflation of the currency justifying an adjustment of NAWASAs unpaid judgment obligation to the FPFC. Ruling: (1) There is no denying that the price index of commodities, which is the usual evidence of the value of the currency has been rising. The trial court pointed out, however, than this is a worldwide occurence, but hardly proof that the inflation is extraordinary in the sense contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code, which was adopted by the Code Commission to provide "a just solution" to the "uncertainty and confusion as a result of Malabanan contracts entered into or payments made during the last war." (Report of the Code Commission, 132-133.) (2) Extraordinary inflation exists "when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value said currency, and such decrease or increase could not have reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond contemplation the the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. (Tolentino Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code Vol. IV, p. 284.) While appellant's voluminous records and statistics proved that there has been a decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine peso, this downward fall of the currency cannot be considered "extraordinary." It is simply a universal trend that has not spared our country. Article 1250 of the Civil Code provides: In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary..

8 PAULINO GULLAS,

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

G.R. No. L-43191

November 13, 1935

FACTS: The Treasurer of the US for the US Veterans Bureau issued a Warrant payable to the order of Francisco Sabectoria Baocs. Petitioner signed as endorsers of this check. It was cashed by the respondent, however, it was dishonored by the Insular Treasurer. Based on the books of the bank, the outstanding balance of petitioner was P509. Notwithstanding the balance, he had issued checks. Upon learning of the bank of the dishonor of the treasury warrant, respondent sent notices to Gullas. However, it was not delivered to him because he left his residence. Upon returning, the notice informed him that PNB have applied the outstanding balances of his current accounts to the latter for the part payment of the check. Upon returning, notice of dishonor was received and the unpaid balance of the United States Treasury warrant was immediately paid by him. With these happenings, it brought inconvenience to Atty. Gullas. He questioned the right of the PNB to apply a deposit to the debt of the depositor to the bank. ISSUE: WON the PNB has the right to apply a deposit to the debt of the depositor to the bank. HELD: The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation and deposit. The portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other (Civil Code, article 1195). In his connection, it has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor. As to a depositor who has funds sufficient to meet payment of a check drawn by him in favor of a third party, it has been held that he has a right of action against the bank for its refusal to pay such a check in the absence of notice to him that the bank has applied the funds so deposited in extinguishment of past due claims held against him. It would seem that notice is not necessary to a maker because the right is based on the doctrine that the relationship is that of creditor and debtor. However this may be, as to an indorser the situation is different, and notice should actually have been given him in order that he might protect his interests. Thus, the action of the bank was prejudicial to Gullas.

9 JOSE DE LEON, CECILIO DE LEON, in their individual capacity, and JOSE DE LEON and CECILIO DE LEON, as administrators of the
intestate estate of Felix de Leon vs. ASUNCION SORIANO, G.R. No. L-2724 August 24, 1950
This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Jose de Leon, Cecilio de Leon and Albina de Leon, petitioners herein and defendants in the court below, were natural children of Felix de Leon, deceased, while Asuncion Soriano, respondent herein and plaintiff below, is his widow. In the administration and settlement of the decedent's estate then pending in the Court of First Instance, the said widow, on the one hand, and the natural children, on the other, reached on March 23, 1943 an agreement, approved by the probate court, whereby the natural children obligated themselves, among other things, as follows: 2. At the end of each of agricultural year, by which shall understood for the purposes of this agreement the month of March of every year, the following amounts of palay shall be given to the party of the FIRST PART (Asuncion Soriano) by the parties of the SECOND PART (De Leons): in the month of March of the current year 1943; one thousand two hundred (1,200) cavanes of palay (macan); in the month of March 1944, one thousand four hundred (1,400) cavanes of palay (macan); in the month March of 1945, one thousand five hundred (1,500) cavanes of palay (macan); and in the month of March 1946 and every succeeding year thereafter, one thousand six hundred (1,600) cavanes of palay (macan). Delivery of the palay shall be made in the warehouse required by the government, or if there be none such, at the warehouse to be selected by the party of the FIRST PART, in San Miguel, Bulacan, free from the cost of hauling, transportation, and from any all taxes or charges. It is expressly stipulated that this annual payment of palay shall cease upon the death of the party of the FIRST PART and shall not be transmissible to her heirs or to any other person, but during her lifetime this obligation for the annual payment of the palay hereinabove mentioned shall constitute a first lien upon all the rice lands of the estate of Dr. Felix de Leon in San Miguel, Bulacan. The defendants made deliveries to the plaintiff of 1,200 cavanes of palay in 1934, 700 in 1944, 200 in 1945, and another 200 in 1946, a total of 2,300 cavanes which was 3,400 cavanes short of the 5,700 cavanes which should have been delivered up to and including 1946. It was to recover this shortage or its value that this action was commenced. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff for 3,400 cavanes of palay or its equivalent in cash, which was found to be 24,900, and legal interest. As above stated, that judgment was affirmed by the appellate court. Article 1182 of the Civil Code which was in force at the time agreement in question was entered into, provide that "Any obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if such thing should be lost or destroyed without fault on the part of the debtor and before he is in default. Inversely, the obligation is not extinguished if the thing that perishes is indeterminate. Manresa explains the distinction between determinate and generic thing in his comment on article 1096 of the Civil Code of Spain, saying that the first is a concrete, particularized object, indicated by its own individuality, while a generic thing is one of whose determination is confined to that of its nature, to the genus (genero) to which it pertains, such as a horse, a chair. These definitions are in accord with the popular meaning of the terms defined. Except as to quality and quantity, the first of which is itself generic, the contract sets no bounds or limits to the palay to be paid, nor was there even any stipulation that the cereal was to be the produce of any particular land. Any palay of the quality stipulated regardless of origin on however acquired (lawfully) would be obligatory on the part of the obligee to receive and would discharge the obligation. It seems therefore plain that the alleged failure of crops through alleged fortuitous cause did not excuse performance. In the more recent decision of this Court, in the case of Reyes vs. Caltex (Phil.) Inc. (47 Off. Gaz., 1193; 84 Phil., 654), a question similar to that at bar arose. There, we ruled that the inability of the lessee of a commercial property to pay the stipulated rent because of war and because the premises had been occupied by Japanese forces did not affect the lessee's liability to fulfill its commitments. Shifting to American authorities, we cited Pollard vs. Shaefer (1 Dall. [Pa.], 210), where the Court said that, "since by the lease, the lessee was to have the advantage of casual profits of the leased premises, he should run the hazard of casual losses during the term and not lay the whole burden of them upon the lessor." This court went on to say: The general rule on performance of contracts is graphically set forth in American treatises, which is also the rule, in our opinion, obtaining under the Civil Code. Where a person by a contract charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must perform it, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, by the law, or by the other party, it being the rule that in case the party desires to be excused from performance in the event of contingencies arising, it is his duty to provide therefor in his contract. Hence, performance is not excused by subsequent" inability to perform, by unforseen difficulties, by unusual or unexpected expenses, by danger, by inevitable accident, by the breaking of machinery, by strikes, by sickness, by failure of a party to avail himself of the benefits to be had under the contract, by weather conditions, by financial stringency, or by stagnation of business. Neither is performance excused by the fact that the contract turns out to be hard and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, ill advised, or even foolish, or less profitable, or unexpectedly burdensome. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, conditions arising from a state of war in which the country is engaged, will not ordinarily constitute an excuse for non-performance of contract; and impossibility of performance arising from the acts of the legislature and the executive branch of government in war time does not, without more, constitute an excuse for non-performance. (17 C.J.S., 953, 954.) A few words are in order to straighten out the apparent confusion (of ideas) that exists regarding the influence of fortuitous events in contracts; when they excuse performance and when not. In considering the effect of impossibility of performance on the rights of the parties, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between: (1) Natural impossibility preventing performance from the nature of the things and (2) impossibility in fact, in the absence of inherent impossibility in the nature of the thing stipulated to be performed. (17 C.J.S., 951.) In the words of one Court impossibility must consist in the nature of thing to be done and not in the inability of the party to do it. (City of Montpelier vs. National Surety Co., 122 A., 484; 97 Vt., Ill; 33 A.L.R., 489.) As others have put it, to bring the case within the rule of impossibility, it must appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means be accomplished, for if it is only improbable or out of the power of the obligor, it is not in law deemed impossible. (17 C.J.S., 442). The first class of impossibility goes to the consideration and renders the contract void. The second, which is the class of impossibility that we have to do here, does not. (17 C.J.S., 951, 952.) Summoning the above principles to our aid, and by way of hypothesis the defendant-appellee here would be relieved from the obligation to pay rent if the subject matter of the lease, were this possible had disappeared, for the personal occupation of the premises is the foundation of the contract, the consideration that induced it (lessee) to enter into the agreement. But a mere trespass with which the landlord had nothing to do is a casual disturbance not going to the essence of the undertaking. It is a collateral incident which might have been provided for by a proper stipulation.

10 YAP KIM CHUAN

vs.

ALFONSO M .TIAOQUI

G.R. No. 10006

September 18, 1915

This is an appeal filed through a bill of exceptions by counsel for the defendant from the judgment of March 20, 1914, whereby the Honorable A.S. Crossfield, judge, sentenced him to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,019 with legal interest at the rate of 6 per cent a year, from August 4, 1903, and the costs. Under the rate of August 4, 1913, counsel for the plaintiff filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging as his first cause of action that on March 15, 1913, plaintiff leased the building at No. 218 Calle Rosario, owned by the defendant, up to December 31 of the same year, undertaking to pay therefor the sum of P310 from said March 15 to June 30, 1913, and P315 from the subsequent first of July until the termination of the lease; and that on April 14, 1913, because of the leaks in the roof of the storeroom of said building, without fault or negligence on the plaintiff's part, some of his merchandise stored in said storeroom was so wet and damaged as to cause him a loss amounting to P1,169. He set forth as his second cause of action that subsequent to this occurrence, to wit, on April 15, 1913, a list of the damaged goods was made out in the presence of the plaintiff, the defendant and a notary public; that afterwards the defendant expressly authorized the plaintiff to sell he damaged goods at any price, promising to pay the difference between the selling price and the regular price of the articles in good condition; that by virtue of said authorization and promise, plaintiff accordingly disposed of all the damaged goods that could be sold, at a loss of P1,169; and that notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon him to pay this amount, according to promise, said defendant had refused and refuses to pay. Therefore, judgment is prayed against the defendant, sentencing him to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,169 with legal interest, and the costs. On September 3, 1913, defendant filed his answer in writing, admitting certain paragraphs of the foregoing complaint but specifically denying the rest, and alleging as a special defense that the building the plaintiff occupies had been recently finished, the construction thereof having been under the direction and inspection of an engineer, after approval of the plans and specifications by the engineering and sanitation departments of the city of Manila; that it was opened for use after acceptation of the work by the city engineer and approval by the said departments of engineering and sanitation; that about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of April 14, 1913, there fell over the city of Manila a torrential rain the heaviest from the month of January of that year; that because of the large amount of water and the extraordinary violence of the downpour many buildings in the Escolta and adjacent business sections, not only many buildings of wood merely, but even those of reinforced concrete, were flooded by the overflowing of the drains, gutters, and by filtrations, because the gutters of the eaves and roofs were inadequate for holding the extraordinarily excessive rainfall on that occasion; that the wetting the plaintiff's merchandise sustained from that rainfall was not caused wholly by the leaks and drips but was in large part due to the improper situation or location of said merchandise inside the building; that in neither case was there fault of negligence on defendant's part, said occurrence having been unforeseen, or, even being foreseen, unavoidable; that it is true an inventory of the plaintiff's damaged goods was made in the presence of the interested parties before a notary public; that said plaintiff presented to the defendant his claim for the damages sustained, asking the latter to pay them; that the truth is that the defendant never authorized plaintiff to sell the said merchandise inventoried, as set forth in the complaint; that it is not the truth the defendant promised, either expressly or tacitly, to make good to the plaintiff any loss sustained through the difference between the price of the articles in good condition and the price thereof after being damaged, for, as recorded in the document drawn up on April 15, 1913, signed by the plaintiff, the defendant's intervention therein did not signify a tacit acceptance of any liability for the alleged loss sustained by the plaintiff, but was merely to determine the cause thereof and the manner in which the water got into the building. As another special defense he alleged that on August 2, 1913, defendant transferred all his own rights, claims, and obligations in the lease, as well as the absolute ownership of the building occupied by plaintiff's store, to Seoras Romana, Cecilia, Luisa, and Maria, of the surname Tantungco y Guepangco who, by agreement set down in the instrument of transfer, took over all the premises covered by the lease made by the defendant to the plaintiff from the date thereof, to wit, March 15, 1913, and subsequently they were parties directly interested in the present suit. ISSUE: The question raised in this case No. 10006, and in two others of the same nature, Nos. 10007 and 10008, is whether the owner of a tenement occupied by each of the defendants in the three cases cited, each in his respective rooms or apartment, is responsible for the deterioration through the wetting of the cloth and other goods that said plaintiffs as tenants had in same and its storerooms, as a result of the torrential and extraordinary rain which fell upon the city for nearly an hour in the afternoon of April 14, 1913. The principal rights and obligations of lessor and lessee are comprised in the two following articles of the Civil Code ."ART. 1554. The lessee is obliged: 1. To deliver to the lessee the thing which is the object of the contract. 2. To make thereon, during the lease, all the necessary repairs in order to preserve it in condition to serve for the purpose to which it was destined. 3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease during all the time of the contract. ART. 1555. The lessee is obliged: 1. To pay the price of the lease in the manner agreed upon. 2. To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family would, applying the same to the use agreed upon; and, in the absence of an agreement, to the use which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased according to the custom of the land. 3. To pay the expenses arising from the instrument constituting the contract. ART. 1556. If the lessor or lessee should not comply with the obligations mentioned in the preceding articles, they may request the rescission of the contract and indemnity for losses and damages, or only the latter, leaving the contract in force." Did the defendant owner of the building in question fail to carry out any obligation imposed by the law in the foregoing articles, or at least some obligation imposed in the lease? There is no evidence in the case that he failed in the performance of the obligations he assumed in executing the lease, nor does there appear to have been stipulated therein the liability now imputed to him. Article 1562 of the same code reads: "If, at the time of the lease of the estate, the condition of the same was not mentioned, the law presumes that the lessee received it in good condition, unless there be proof to the contrary.". Article 1105 of the same Code prescribes: "No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which having been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or those in which the obligation so declares." The wetting sustained by the goods and merchandise of the plaintiffs as a consequence of the heavy torrential rainfall on the afternoon mentioned, which caused leaks in the building and flooded the yard, is not a case expressly mentioned by the law for which the owner of the premises is responsible, and further it does not appear to have been provided against in the lease to be seen in folio 15, letter A, by virtue whereof the lessor would be liable to an indemnity for the damages and losses cause his tenants by that rainfall; and so, in accordance with the provisions of the article quoted above, the defendant is not responsible for the results of the torrential rainfall that has been described. A fortuitous event is an accident independent of the obligor's will to carry out some stipulation and it is plain that for him to escape the imputation of not performing his obligation he must be placed in a situation arising from an unforeseen event, or in one where, even if he had foreseen it, still he could not have avoided it, by reason of the fact that its unexpectedness and inevitability places it beyond human control.

It was not stipulated in the lease executed between the defendant and the plaintiffs that, if the goods and merchandise the defendant-tenants might have on the premises should get wet, the defendant would as lessor thereof be liable to indemnity , nor have the plaintiffs been able to allege such liability in their claim; and we do not know of any article of the Civil Code included in the chapter which deals with leasing of urban property that makes any provision for such liability on the part of the owner of the property. If, on the said afternoon of April 14, it rained so heavily and so abundantly that the proof of the building occupied by the plaintiffs, even though in good condition, according to the municipal architect's certificate, leaked, and if as a consequence of that torrential rainfall said merchandise of the plaintiffs got wet, the occurrence is not imputable to the lessor owner of the building, nor according to any evidence in the case to the lessor's fault. Being evidently a fortuitous event, unforeseeable by any of the litigating parties, inevitable on account of force majeure, the case discloses no proof of any kind that the defendant Tiaoqui knew that the roof of the building leased to the plaintiffs had cracks or defects in it that would cause leakages, just as the plaintiff-tenants did not know that fact themselves, for otherwise they would have notified the defendant-lessor in due season and demanded repair thereof so as to avoid injury to their interests. Nobody, neither the defendant nor the plaintiffs, could have been foreseen that on the said afternoon of April 14 it was going to rain in torrents and in an extraordinary manner, wherefore it is neither right nor proper to ascribe the wetting of the merchandise of the plaintiff-tenants to negligence, carelessness, or fault on the defendant's part. It was a case of accident and force majeure which could not have been foreseen and which nobody could have prevented, and the fact that the defendant repaired and fixed the leaks in the roof the next day cannot be taken as proof of his liability, for he did not know and could not have foreseen that it was going to rain in torrents the said afternoon and that the roof of the building would leak and show defects. It would be an absurdity which the law cannot authorize for said tenant to be entitled to claim damages from the owner because the roof a building leaked and some of the tenant's good got wet, for no provision of the law relating to leases of urban property places any such obligation on the owner to pay indemnity for damages, when he himself did not know that there was any defect to accuse such damages. For proper understanding of the provisions of articles 1484 and 1485 of the Civil Code dealing with warranty it is necessary to remember that under their provisions the lessor is liable for the warranty of the thing leased against any hidden defects this liability for warranty of the thing leased does not amount to an obligation to indemnify the tenant for damages, which is only to be allowed when there is proof that the lessor acted with fraud and in bad faith by concealing to the lessee. It must be kept in mind that the foregoing article and the two previously quoted appear in the title on contracts of purchase and sale and are in every way applicable, according to article 1553 of the same code, to leases. Hence, while the lessor is obligated by the general rule to warranty of the thing leased, whether or not he may know of the existence therein of defects that render it inadequate for the use the tenant intends, he is only liable for an indemnity for damages in addition to the warranty when he knew of the defects in the thing leased and had not revealed them to the lessee, a procedure which induces the presumption that he acted with fraud and in bad faith; but in order to hold him responsible for the damages and losses caused by such defects there must be the express condition that the lessee should choose rescission of the contract, according to the prescription of the second paragraph of the article quoted above, whence it is inferred that, should the lessee insist upon continuing the contract by occupying the property, he must be understood to have waived the indemnity. As for the rest, article 1101 of the Civil Code reads: Those who in fulfilling their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner whatsoever act in contravention of the stipulations of the same, shall be subject to indemnity for the losses and damages caused thereby. It has not been demonstrated in the that the defendant lessor failed to fulfill the conditions of the lease or that he acted with fraud, negligence or delay in the fulfillment of said conditions. (Arts. 1102-1104, Civil Code.). It has not been duly proven in the case that the lessor Tiaoqui admitted, or agreed to pay, the amount of the losses and damages sustained by the plaintiffs because they sold the merchandise, wet by the rainfall that afternoon, for a lower price than it was really worth. In fact, the record reveals that the defendant Tiaoqui denied in a sworn statement (folios 25 and 28) that he had agreed to pay damages to the plaintiffs and alleged that, not only did he make plain that his intervention in the notarial instrument drawn up the day after the disaster did not signify that he tacitly accepted any responsibility arising from the alleged losses in the merchandise, but furthermore, when demand was made by two of them that he pay the amount averred as the extent of said respective losses, he replied that he could not pay it; and he added that, when for the second time the plaintiffs saw him for the purpose he would investigate whether there were defects in the roof of the building to cause leaks, in which case he would collect from the contractor Machuca and that the sum the latter might pay he would deliver to the plaintiffs to cover said losses and damages, but that if said contractor did not pay up or if the leaks had resulted from the torrential rain which fell over Manila he would not pay them a cent. The promise contained in the first part of the defendant's answer plainly has a condition attached to it, and there is no record that the plaintiffs accepted it or that they agreed to the condition mentioned, and therefore it cannot serve as ground for an adverse finding. Summing up, the record fully demonstrates that the defendant Alfonso M. Tiaoqui is not liable under the law to pay indemnity for losses and damages because of the wetting of the goods and merchandise of Yap Kim Chuan, plaintiff in case No. 10006; of Marciano Ong Qui Sing plaintiff in case No. 10007; and Tan Tiap, plaintiff in case No. 10008; and that on the other hand these cases do not reveal satisfactory and conclusive evidence that the defendant lessor Tiaoqui to make up all or part of the loss or depreciation on the sale of the goods and merchandise that was wet. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from, as rendered in this case No. 10006, must be reversed, and the defendant Alfonso M. Tiaoqui absolved, as we do absolve him, from the complaint filed by Yap Kim Chuan, without special finding as to costs in both instances. So ordered.