Karl Popper

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/#GroHumKno
First published Thu Nov 13, 1997; substantive revision Mon Feb 9, 2009

Karl Popper is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century. He was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a self-professed critical-rationalist, a dedicated opponent of all forms of scepticism, con entionalism, and relati ism in science and in human affairs generally, a committed ad ocate and staunch defender of the !pen "ociety, and an implacable critic of totalitarianism in all of its forms. !ne of the many remar#able features of Popper$s thought is the scope of his intellectual influence. %n the modern technological and highly-specialised world scientists are rarely aware of the wor# of philosophers& it is irtually unprecedented to find them 'ueuing up, as they ha e done in Popper$s case, to testify to the enormously practical beneficial impact which that philosophical wor# has had upon their own. (ut notwithstanding the fact that he wrote on e en the most technical matters with consummate clarity, the scope of Popper$s wor# is such that it is commonplace by now to find that commentators tend to deal with the epistemological, scientific and social elements of his thought as if they were 'uite disparate and unconnected, and thus the fundamental unity of his philosophical ision and method has to a large degree been dissipated. Here we will try to trace the threads which interconnect the arious elements of his philosophy, and which gi e it its fundamental unity.

). *ife 2. (ac#drop to his +hought ,. +he Problem of -emarcation .. +he /rowth of Human Knowledge 0. Probability, Knowledge and 1erisimilitude 2. "ocial and Political +hought3+he 4riti'ue of Historicism and Holism 5. "cientific Knowledge, History, and Prediction 6. %mmutable *aws and 4ontingent +rends 7. 4ritical 8 aluation (ibliography o 9or#s (y Popper o 9or#s by !ther :uthors !ther %nternet ;esources ;elated 8ntries

1. Life
Karl ;aimund Popper was born on 26 <uly )702 in 1ienna, which at that time could ma#e some claim to be the cultural epicentre of the western world. His parents, who were of <ewish origin, brought him up in an atmosphere which he was later to describe as decidedly boo#ish. His father was a lawyer by profession, but he also too# a #een interest in the classics and in philosophy, and communicated to his son an interest in social and political issues which he was to ne er lose. His mother inculcated in him such a passion for music that for a time he seriously contemplated ta#ing it up as a career, and indeed he initially chose the history of music as a
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second sub=ect for his Ph.- e>amination. "ubse'uently, his lo e for music became one of the inspirational forces in the de elopment of his thought, and manifested itself in his highly original interpretation of the relationship between dogmatic and critical thin#ing, in his account of the distinction between ob=ecti ity and sub=ecti ity, and, most importantly, in the growth of his hostility towards all forms of historicism, including historicist ideas about the nature of the progressi e in music. +he young Karl attended the local Realgy nasiu , where he was unhappy with the standards of the teaching, and, after an illness which #ept him at home for a number of months, he left to attend the ?ni ersity of 1ienna in )7)6. Howe er, he did not formally enrol at the ?ni ersity by ta#ing the matriculation e>amination for another four years. )7)7 was in many respects the most important formati e year of his intellectual life. %n that year he became hea ily in ol ed in left-wing politics, =oined the :ssociation of "ocialist "chool "tudents, and became for a time a @ar>ist. Howe er, he was 'uic#ly disillusioned with the doctrinaire character of the latter, and soon abandoned it entirely. He also disco ered the psychoanalytic theories of Areud and :dler Bunder whose aegis he engaged briefly in social wor# with depri ed childrenC, and listened entranced to a lecture which 8instein ga e in 1ienna on relati ity theory. +he dominance of the critical spirit in 8instein, and its total absence in @ar>, Areud and :dler, struc# Popper as being of fundamental importanceD the latter, he came to thin#, couched their theories in terms which made them amenable only to confirmation, while 8instein$s theory, crucially, had testable implications which, if false, would ha e falsified the theory itself. Popper obtained a primary school teaching diploma in )720, too# a Ph.-. in philosophy in )726, and 'ualified to teach mathematics and physics in secondary school in )727. +he dominant philosophical group in 1ienna at the time was the !iener "reis, the circle of scientificallyminded intellectuals focused around @oritE "chlic#, who had been appointed Professor of the philosophy of the inducti e sciences at 1ienna ?ni ersity in )722. +his included ;udolf 4arnap, !tto Feurath, 1i#tor Kraft, Hans Hahn and Herbert Aeigl. +he principal ob=ecti e of the members of the 4ircle was to unify the sciences, which carried with it, in their iew, the need to eliminate metaphysics once and for all by showing that metaphysical propositions are meaningless3a pro=ect which "chlic# in particular saw as deri ing from the account of the proposition gi en in 9ittgenstein$s Tra#tatus. :lthough he was friendly with some of the 4ircle$s members and shared their esteem for science, Popper$s hostility towards 9ittgenstein alienated "chlic#, and he was ne er in ited to become a member of the group. Aor his part, Popper became increasingly critical of the main tenets of logical positi ism, especially of what he considered to be its misplaced focus on the theory of meaning in philosophy and upon erification in scientific methodology, and re eled in the title the official opposition which was bestowed upon him by Feurath. He articulated his own iew of science, and his criticisms of the positi ists, in his first wor#, published under the title $ogi% der Fors#hung in )7,.. +he boo#3which he was later to claim rang the death #nell for positi ism3attracted more attention than Popper had anticipated, and he was in ited to lecture in 8ngland in )7,0. He spent the ne>t few years wor#ing producti ely on science and philosophy, but storm clouds were gathering3 the growth of FaEism in /ermany and :ustria compelled him, li#e many other intellectuals who shared his <ewish origins, to lea e his nati e country. %n )7,5 Popper too# up a position teaching philosophy at the ?ni ersity of 4anterbury in Few Gealand, where he was to remain for the duration of the "econd 9orld 9ar. +he anne>ation of :ustria in )7,6 became the catalyst which prompted him to refocus his writings on social and
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political philosophy. %n )7.2 he mo ed to 8ngland to teach at the *ondon "chool of 8conomics, and became professor of logic and scientific method at the ?ni ersity of *ondon in )7.7. Arom this point on Popper$s reputation and stature as a philosopher of science and social thin#er grew enormously, and he continued to write prolifically3a number of his wor#s, particularly The $ogi# o& '#ienti&i# (is#overy B)707C, are now uni ersally recognised as classics in the field. He was #nighted in )720, and retired from the ?ni ersity of *ondon in )727, though he remained acti e as a writer, broadcaster and lecturer until his death in )77.. BAor more detail on Popper$s life, cf. his )nended *uestC.

2. Backdrop to his Thought

: number of biographical features may be identified as ha ing a particular influence upon Popper$s thought. %n the first place, his teenage flirtation with @ar>ism left him thoroughly familiar with the @ar>ist iew of economics, class-war, and history. "econdly, he was appalled by the failure of the democratic parties to stem the rising tide of fascism in his nati e :ustria in the )720s and )7,0s, and the effecti e welcome e>tended to it by the @ar>ists. +he latter acted on the ideological grounds that it constituted what they belie ed to be a necessary dialectical step towards the implosion of capitalism and the ultimate re olutionary ictory of communism. +his was one factor which led to the much feared +ns#hluss, the anne>ation of :ustria by the /erman ;eich, the anticipation of which forced Popper into permanent e>ile from his nati e country. The ,overty o& -istori#is B)7..C and The .pen 'o#iety and /ts 0ne ies B)7.0C, his most impassioned and brilliant social wor#s, are as a conse'uence a powerful defence of democratic liberalism as a social and political philosophy, and a de astating criti'ue of the principal philosophical presuppositions underpinning all forms of totalitarianism. +hirdly, as we ha e seen, Popper was profoundly impressed by the differences between the allegedly scientific theories of Areud and :dler and the re olution effected by 8instein$s theory of relati ity in physics in the first two decades of this century. +he main difference between them, as Popper saw it, was that while 8instein$s theory was highly ris#y, in the sense that it was possible to deduce conse'uences from it which were, in the light of the then dominant Fewtonian physics, highly improbable Be.g., that light is deflected towards solid bodies3 confirmed by 8ddington$s e>periments in )7)7C, and which would, if they turned out to be false, falsify the whole theory, nothing could, e en in prin#iple, falsify psychoanalytic theories. +hese latter, Popper came to feel, ha e more in common with primiti e myths than with genuine science. +hat is to say, he saw that what is apparently the chief source of strength of psychoanalysis, and the principal basis on which its claim to scientific status is grounded, iE. its capability to accommodate, and e>plain, e ery possible form of human beha iour, is in fact a critical wea#ness, for it entails that it is not, and could not be, genuinely predicti e. Psychoanalytic theories by their nature are insufficiently precise to ha e negati e implications, and so are immunised from e>periential falsification. +he @ar>ist account of history too, Popper held, is not scientific, although it differs in certain crucial respects from psychoanalysis. Aor @ar>ism, Popper belie ed, had been initially scientific, in that @ar> had postulated a theory which was genuinely predicti e. Howe er, when these predictions were not in fact borne out, the theory was sa ed from falsification by the addition of ad ho# hypotheses which made it compatible with the facts. (y this means, Popper asserted, a theory which was initially genuinely scientific degenerated into pseudo-scientific dogma.
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+hese factors combined to ma#e Popper ta#e &alsi&iability as his criterion for demarcating science from non-scienceD if a theory is incompatible with possible empirical obser ations it is scientific& con ersely, a theory which is compatible with all such obser ations, either because, as in the case of @ar>ism, it has been modified solely to accommodate such obser ations, or because, as in the case of psychoanalytic theories, it is consistent with all possible obser ations, is unscientific. Aor Popper, howe er, to assert that a theory is unscientific, is not necessarily to hold that it is unenlightening, still less that it is meaningless, for it sometimes happens that a theory which is unscientific Bbecause it is unfalsifiableC at a gi en time may become falsifiable, and thus scientific, with the de elopment of technology, or with the further articulation and refinement of the theory. Aurther, e en purely mythogenic e>planations ha e performed a aluable function in the past in e>pediting our understanding of the nature of reality.

3. The Problem of Demarcation

:s Popper represents it, the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms non-science, under which heading he ran#s, amongst others, logic, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, and :dler$s indi idual psychology. Popper is unusual amongst contemporary philosophers in that he a##epts the alidity of the Humean criti'ue of induction, and indeed, goes beyond it in arguing that induction is ne er actually used by the scientist. Howe er, he does not concede that this entails the scepticism which is associated with Hume, and argues that the (aconianHFewtonian insistence on the primacy of pure obser ation, as the initial step in the formation of theories, is completely misguidedD all obser ation is selecti e and theory-laden3there are no pure or theory-free obser ations. %n this way he destabilises the traditional iew that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inducti e methodology& in contradistinction to this, Popper holds that there is no uni'ue methodology specific to science. "cience, li#e irtually e ery other human, and indeed organic, acti ity, Popper belie es, consists largely of problem-sol ing. Popper, then, repudiates induction, and re=ects the iew that it is the characteristic method of scientific in estigation and inference, and substitutes &alsi&iability in its place. %t is easy, he argues, to obtain e idence in fa our of irtually any theory, and he conse'uently holds that such corroboration, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positi e result of a genuinely ris#y prediction, which might concei ably ha e been false. Aor Popper, a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a concei able e ent. 8 ery genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory. %n a critical sense, Popper$s theory of demarcation is based upon his perception of the logical asymmetry which holds between erification and falsificationD it is logically impossible to conclusi ely erify a uni ersal proposition by reference to e>perience Bas Hume saw clearlyC, but a single counter-instance conclusi ely falsifies the corresponding uni ersal law. %n a word, an e>ception, far from pro ing a rule, conclusi ely refutes it. 8 ery genuine scientific theory then, in Popper$s iew, is prohibitive, in the sense that it forbids, by implication, particular e ents or occurrences. :s such it can be tested and falsified, but ne er logically erified. +hus Popper stresses that it should not be inferred from the fact that a theory has withstood the most rigorous testing, for howe er long a period of time, that it has been erified& rather we should recognise that such a theory has recei ed a high measure of corroboration. and may be pro isionally retained as the best a ailable theory until it is finally falsified Bif indeed it is e er falsifiedC, andHor is superseded by a better theory.
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Popper has always drawn a clear distinction between the logi# of falsifiability and its applied ethodology. +he logic of his theory is utterly simpleD if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields. *ogically spea#ing, a scientific law is conclusi ely falsifiable although it is not conclusi ely erifiable. @ethodologically, howe er, the situation is much more comple>D no obser ation is free from the possibility of error3conse'uently we may 'uestion whether our e>perimental result was what it appeared to be. +hus, while ad ocating falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, Popper e>plicitly allows for the fact that in practice a single conflicting or counter-instance is ne er sufficient methodologically to falsify a theory, and that scientific theories are often retained e en though much of the a ailable e idence conflicts with them, or is anomalous with respect to them. "cientific theories may, and do, arise genetically in many different ways, and the manner in which a particular scientist comes to formulate a particular theory may be of biographical interest, but it is of no conse'uence as far as the philosophy of science is concerned. Popper stresses in particular that there is no uni'ue way, no single method such as induction, which functions as the route to scientific theory, a iew which 8instein personally endorsed with his affirmation that +here is no logical path leading to Ithe highly uni ersal laws of scienceJ. +hey can only be reached by intuition, based upon something li#e an intellectual lo e of the ob=ects of e>perience. "cience, in Popper$s iew, starts with problems rather than with obser ations3it is, indeed, precisely in the conte>t of grappling with a problem that the scientist ma#es obser ations in the first instanceD his obser ations are selecti ely designed to test the e>tent to which a gi en theory functions as a satisfactory solution to a gi en problem. !n this criterion of demarcation physics, chemistry, and Bnon-introspecti eC psychology, amongst others, are sciences, psychoanalysis is a pre-science Bi.e., it undoubtedly contains useful and informati e truths, but until such time as psychoanalytical theories can be formulated in such a manner as to be falsifiable, they will not attain the status of scientific theoriesC, and astrology and phrenology are pseudo-sciences. Aormally, then, Popper$s theory of demarcation may be articulated as followsD where a basic statement is to be understood as a particular obser ation-report, then we may say that a theory is scientific if and only if it di ides the class of basic statements into the following two non-empty sub-classesD BaC the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent, or which it prohibits3this is the class of its potential &alsi&iers Bi.e., those statements which, if true, falsify the whole theoryC, and BbC the class of those basic statements with which it is consistent, or which it permits Bi.e., those statements which, if true, corroborate it, or bear it outC.

4. The

ro!th of "uman Kno!ledge

Aor Popper accordingly, the growth of human #nowledge proceeds from our problems and from our attempts to sol e them. +hese attempts in ol e the formulation of theories which, if they are to e>plain anomalies which e>ist with respect to earlier theories, must go beyond e>isting #nowledge and therefore re'uire a leap of the imagination. Aor this reason, Popper places special emphasis on the role played by the independent creati e imagination in the formulation of theory. +he centrality and priority of proble s in Popper$s account of science is paramount, and it is this which leads him to characterise scientists as problem-sol ers. Aurther, since the scientist begins with problems rather than with obser ations or bare facts, Popper argues that the only logical techni'ue which is an integral part of scientific method is that of the deducti e
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testing of theories which are not themsel es the product of any logical operation. %n this deducti e procedure conclusions are inferred from a tentati e hypothesis. +hese conclusions are then compared with one another and with other rele ant statements to determine whether they falsify or corroborate the hypothesis. "uch conclusions are not directly compared with the facts, Popper stresses, simply because there are no pure facts a ailable& all obser ation-statements are theory-laden, and are as much a function of purely sub=ecti e factors Binterests, e>pectations, wishes, etc.C as they are a function of what is ob=ecti ely real. How then does the deducti e procedure wor#K Popper specifies four stepsD BaC +he first is &or al, a testing of the internal consistency of the theoretical system to see if it in ol es any contradictions. BbC +he second step is se i1&or al, the a>iomatising of the theory to distinguish between its empirical and its logical elements. %n performing this step the scientist ma#es the logical form of the theory e>plicit. Aailure to do this can lead to category-mista#es3the scientist ends up as#ing the wrong 'uestions, and searches for empirical data where none are a ailable. @ost scientific theories contain analytic Bi.e., a prioriC and synthetic elements, and it is necessary to a>iomatise them in order to distinguish the two clearly. BcC +he third step is the comparing of the new theory with e>isting ones to determine whether it constitutes an ad ance upon them. %f it does not constitute such an ad ance, it will not be adopted. %f, on the other hand, its e>planatory success matches that of the e>isting theories, and additionally, it e>plains some hitherto anomalous phenomenon, or sol es some hitherto unsol able problems, it will be deemed to constitute an ad ance upon the e>isting theories, and will be adopted. +hus science in ol es theoretical progress. Howe er, Popper stresses that we ascertain whether one theory is better than another by deducti ely testing both theories, rather than by induction. Aor this reason, he argues that a theory is deemed to be better than another if Bwhile unfalsifiedC it has greater empirical content, and therefore greater predicti e power than its ri al. +he classic illustration of this in physics was the replacement of Fewton$s theory of uni ersal gra itation by 8instein$s theory of relati ity. +his elucidates the nature of science as Popper sees itD at any gi en time there will be a number of conflicting theories or con=ectures, some of which will e>plain more than others. +he latter will conse'uently be pro isionally adopted. %n short, for Popper any theory 2 is better than a ri al theory 3 if 2 has greater e piri#al #ontent, and hence greater predi#tive po4er, than L. BdC +he fourth and final step is the testing of a theory by the empirical application of the conclusions deri ed from it. %f such conclusions are shown to be true, the theory is corroborated Bbut ne er erifiedC. %f the conclusion is shown to be false, then this is ta#en as a signal that the theory cannot be completely correct Blogically the theory is falsifiedC, and the scientist begins his 'uest for a better theory. He does not, howe er, abandon the present theory until such time as he has a better one to substitute for it. @ore precisely, the method of theory-testing is as followsD certain singular propositions are deduced from the new theory3these are predictions, and of special interest are those predictions which are ris#y Bin the sense of being intuiti ely implausible or of being startlingly no elC and e>perimentally testable. Arom amongst the latter the scientist ne>t selects those which are not deri able from the current or e>isting theory3of particular importance are those which contradict the current or e>isting theory. He then see#s a decision as regards these and other deri ed statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications and e>perimentation. %f the new predictions are borne out, then the new theory is#orroborated Band the old one falsifiedC, and is adopted as a wor#ing hypothesis. %f the
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predictions are not borne out, then they falsify the theory from which they are deri ed. +hus Popper retains an element of empiricismD for him scientific method does in ol e ma#ing an appeal to e>perience. (ut unli#e traditional empiricists, Popper holds that e>perience cannot deter ine theory Bi.e., we do not argue or infer from obser ation to theoryC, it rather deli its itD it shows which theories are false, not which theories are true. @oreo er, Popper also re=ects the empiricist doctrine that empirical obser ations are, or can be, infallible, in iew of the fact that they are themsel es theory-laden. +he general picture of Popper$s philosophy of science, then is thisD Hume$s philosophy demonstrates that there is a contradiction implicit in traditional empiricism, which holds both that all #nowledge is deri ed from e>perience and that uni ersal propositions Bincluding scientific lawsC are erifiable by reference to e>perience. +he contradiction, which Hume himself saw clearly, deri es from the attempt to show that, notwithstanding the open-ended nature of e>perience, scientific laws may be construed as empirical generalisations which are in some way finally confirmable by a positi e e>perience. Popper eliminates the contradiction by re=ecting the first of these principles and remo ing the demand for empirical erification in fa our of empirical falsification in the second. "cientific theories, for him, are not inducti ely inferred from e>perience, nor is scientific e>perimentation carried out with a iew to erifying or finally establishing the truth of theories& rather, all %no4ledge is provisional, #on5e#tural, hypotheti#al3we can ne er finally pro e our scientific theories, we can merely Bpro isionallyC confirm or Bconclusi elyC refute them& hence at any gi en time we ha e to choose between the potentially infinite number of theories which will e>plain the set of phenomena under in estigation. Aaced with this choice, we can only eliminate those theories which are demonstrably false, and rationally choose between the remaining, unfalsified theories. Hence Popper$s emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit to science3for him critical thin#ing is the ery essence of rationality. Aor it is only by critical thought that we can eliminate false theories, and determine which of the remaining theories is the best a ailable one, in the sense of possessing the highest le el of e>planatory force and predicti e power. %t is precisely this #ind of critical thin#ing which is conspicuous by its absence in contemporary @ar>ism and in psychoanalysis.

#. Probabilit$% Kno!ledge and &erisimilitude

%n the iew of many social scientists, the more probable a theory is, the better it is, and if we ha e to choose between two theories which are e'ually strong in terms of their e>planatory power, and differ only in that one is probable and the other is improbable, then we should choose the former. Popper re=ects this. "cience, or to be precise, the wor#ing scientist, is interested, in Popper$s iew, in theories with a high informati e content, because such theories possess a high predicti e power and are conse'uently highly testable. (ut if this is true, Popper argues, then, parado>ical as it may sound, the more i probable a theory is the better it is scientifically, because the probability and informati e content of a theory ary in ersely3the higher the informati e content of a theory the lower will be its probability, for the more information a statement contains, the greater will be the number of ways in which it may turn out to be false. +hus the statements which are of special interest to the scientist are those with a high informati e content and Bconse'uentiallyC a low probability, which ne ertheless come close to the truth. %nformati e content, which is in in erse proportion to probability, is in direct proportion to testability. 4onse'uently the se erity of the test to which a theory can be sub=ected, and by means of which it is falsified or corroborated, is all-important.
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Aor Popper, all scientific criticism must be piecemeal, i.e., he holds that it is not possible to 'uestion e ery aspect of a theory at once. @ore precisely, while attempting to resol e a particular problem a scientist of necessity accepts all #inds of things as unproblematic. +hese things constitute what Popper terms the bac#ground #nowledge. Howe er, he stresses that the bac#ground #nowledge is not #nowledge in the sense of being conclusi ely established& it may be challenged at any time, especially if it is suspected that its uncritical acceptance may be responsible for difficulties which are subse'uently encountered. Fe ertheless, it is clearly not possible to 'uestion both the theory and the bac#ground #nowledge at the same time Be.g., in conducting an e>periment the scientist of necessity assumes that the apparatus used is in wor#ing orderC. How then can one be certain that one is 'uestioning the right thingK +he Popperian answer is that we cannot ha e absolute certainty here, but repeated tests usually show where the trouble lies. 8 en obser ation statements, Popper maintains, are fallible, and science in his iew is not a 'uest for certain #nowledge, but an e olutionary process in which hypotheses or con=ectures are imaginati ely proposed and tested in order to e>plain facts or to sol e problems. Popper emphasises both the importance of 'uestioning the bac#ground #nowledge when the need arises, and the significance of the fact that obser ation-statements are theory-laden, and hence fallible. Aor while falsifiability is simple as a logical principle, in practice it is e>ceedingly complicated 3no single obser ation can e er be ta#en to falsify a theory, for there is always the possibility BaC that the obser ation itself is mista#en, or BbC that the assumed bac#ground #nowledge is faulty or defecti e. Popper was initially uneasy with the concept of truth, and in his earliest writings he a oided asserting that a theory which is corroborated is true3for clearly if e ery theory is an openended hypothesis, as he maintains, then ipso &a#to it has to be at least potentially false. Aor this reason Popper restricted himself to the contention that a theory which is falsified is false and is #nown to be such, and that a theory which replaces a falsified theory Bbecause it has a higher empirical content than the latter, and e>plains what has falsified itC is a better theory than its predecessor. Howe er, he came to accept +ars#i$s reformulation of the correspondence theory of truth, and in 6on5e#tures and Re&utations B)72,C he integrated the concepts of truth and content to frame the metalogical concept of truthli#eness or verisi ilitude. : good scientific theory, Popper thus argued, has a higher le el of erisimilitude than its ri als, and he e>plicated this concept by reference to the logical conse'uences of theories. : theory$s content is the totality of its logical conse'uences, which can be di ided into two classesD there is the truth1 #ontent of a theory, which is the class of true propositions which may be deri ed from it, on the one hand, and the &alsity1#ontent of a theory, on the other hand, which is the class of the theory$s false conse'uences Bthis latter class may of course be empty, and in the case of a theory which is true is necessarily emptyC. Popper offered two methods of comparing theories in terms of erisimilitude, the 'ualitati e and 'uantitati e definitions. !n the 'ualitati e account, Popper assertedD :ssuming that the truth-content and the falsity-content of two theories t) and t2 are comparable, we can say that t2 is more closely similar to the truth, or corresponds better to the facts, than t), if and only if eitherD BaC the truth-content but not the falsity-content of t2 e>ceeds that of t), or
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BbC the falsity-content of t), but not its truth-content, e>ceeds that of t2. B6on5e#tures and Re&utations, 2,,C. Here, erisimilitude is defined in terms of subclass relationshipsD t2 has a higher le el of erisimilitude than t) if and only if their truth- and falsity-contents are comparable through subclass relationships, and either BaC t2$s truth-content includes t)$s and t2$s falsity-content, if it e>ists, is included in, or is the same as, t)$s, or BbC t2$s truth-content includes or is the same as t)$s and t2$s falsity-content, if it e>ists, is included in t)$s. !n the 'uantitati e account, erisimilitude is defined by assigning 'uantities to contents, where the inde> of the content of a gi en theory is its logical improbability Bgi en again that content and probability ary in erselyC. Aormally, then, Popper defines the 'uantitati e erisimilitude which a statement a possesses by means of a formulaD 7sBaC M 6tTBaC N 6tFBaC, where 7sBaC represents the erisimilitude of a, 6tTBaC is a measure of the truth-content of a, and 6tFBaC is a measure of its falsity-content. +he utilisation of either method of computing erisimilitude shows, Popper held, that e en if a theory t2 with a higher content than a ri al theory t) is subse'uently falsified, it can still legitimately be regarded as a better theory than t), and better is here now understood to mean t2 is #loser to the truth than t). +hus scientific progress in ol es, on this iew, the abandonment of partially true, but falsified, theories, for theories with a higher le el of erisimilitude, i.e., which approach more closely to the truth. %n this way, erisimilitude allowed Popper to mitigate what many saw as the pessimism of an anti-inducti ist philosophy of science which held that most, if not all scientific theories are false, and that a true theory, e en if disco ered, could not be %no4n to be such. 9ith the introduction of the new concept, Popper was able to represent this as an essentially optimistic position in terms of which we can legitimately be said to ha e reason to belie e that science ma#es progress towards the truth through the falsification and corroboration of theories. "cientific progress, in other words, could now be represented as progress to4ards the truth, and e>perimental corroboration could be seen an indi#ator of erisimilitude. Howe er, in the )750$s a series of papers published by researchers such as @iller, +ichO, and /rPnbaum in particular re ealed fundamental defects in Popper$s formal definitions of erisimilitude. +he significance of this wor# was that erisimilitude is largely important in Popper$s system because of its application to theories which are #nown to be &alse. %n this connection, Popper had writtenD ?ltimately, the idea of erisimilitude is most important in cases where we #now that we ha e to wor# with theories which are at best appro>imations3that is to say, theories of which we #now that they cannot be true. B+his is often the case in the social sciencesC. %n these cases we can still spea# of better or worse appro>imations to the truth Band we therefore do not need to interpret these cases in an instrumentalist senseC. B 6on5e#tures and Re&utations, 2,0C. Aor these reasons, the deficiencies disco ered by the critics in Popper$s formal definitions were seen by many as de astating, precisely because the most significant of these related to the le els
9

of erisimilitude of &alse theories. %n )75., @iller and +ichO, wor#ing independently of each other, demonstrated that the conditions specified by Popper in his accounts of both 'ualitati e and 'uantitati e erisimilitude for comparing the truth- and falsity-contents of theories can be satisfied only when the theories are true. %n the crucially important case of false theories, howe er, Popper$s definitions are formally defecti e. Aor while Popper had belie ed that erisimilitude intersected positi ely with his account of corroboration, in the sense that he iewed an improbable theory which had withstood critical testing as one the truth-content of which is great relati e to ri al theories, while its falsity-content Bif it e>istsC would be relati ely low, @iller and +ichO pro ed, on the contrary, that in the case of a false theory t2 which has e>cess content o er a ri al theory false t) both the truth-content and the falsity-content of t2 will e>ceed that of t). 9ith respect to theories which are false, therefore, Popper$s conditions for comparing le els of erisimilitude, whether in 'uantitati e and 'ualitati e terms, can ne er be met. 4ommentators on Popper, with few e>ceptions, had initially attached little importance to his theory of erisimilitude. Howe er, after the failure of Popper$s definitions in )75., some critics came to see it as central to his philosophy of science, and conse'uentially held that the whole edifice of the latter had been sub erted. Aor his part, Popper$s response was two-fold. %n the first place, while ac#nowledging the deficiencies in his own formal account BQmy main mista#e was my failure to see at once that R if the content of a false statement ae>ceeds that of a statement b, then the truth-content of a e>ceeds the truth-content of b, and the same holds of their falsity-contentsQ, .b5e#tive "no4ledge, ,5)C, Popper argued that Q% do thin# that we should not conclude from the failure of my attempts to sol e the problem Iof defining erisimilitudeJ that the problem cannot be sol edQ B.b5e#tive "no4ledge, ,52C, a point of iew which was to precipitate more than two decades of important technical research in this field. :t another, more fundamental le el, he mo ed the tas# of formally defining the concept from centre-stage in his philosophy of science, by protesting that he had ne er intended to imply Qthat degrees of erisimilitude R can e er be numerically determined, e>cept in certain limiting casesQ B.b5e#tive "no4ledge, 07C, and arguing instead that the chief alue of the concept is heuristic and intuiti e, in which the absence of an ade'uate formal definition is not an insuperable impediment to its utilisation in the actual appraisal of theories relati ised to problems in which we ha e an interest. +he thrust of the latter strategy seems to many to genuinely reflect the significance of the concept of erisimilitude in Popper$s system, but it has not satisfied all of his critics.

'. (ocial and Political Thought)The *riti+ue of "istoricism and "olism

/i en Popper$s personal history and bac#ground, it is hardly surprising that he de eloped a deep and abiding interest in social and political philosophy. Howe er, it is worth emphasising that his angle of approach to these fields is through a consideration of the nature of the social sciences which see# to describe and e>plicate them systematically, particularly history. %t is in this conte>t that he offers an account of the nature of scientific prediction, which in turn allows him a point of departure for his attac# upon totalitarianism and all its intellectual supports, especially holism and historicism. %n this conte>t holism is to be understood as the iew that human social groupings are greater than the sum of their members, that such groupings are organic entities in their own right, that they act on their human members and shape their destinies, and that they are sub=ect to their own independent laws of de elopment. Historicism, which is closely associated with holism, is the belief that history de elops ine>orably and necessarily according
1

to certain principles or rules towards a determinate end Bas for e>ample in the dialectic of Hegel, which was adopted and implemented by @ar>C. +he lin# between holism and historicism is that the holist belie es that indi iduals are essentially formed by the social groupings to which they belong, while the historicist3who is usually also a holist3holds that we can understand such a social grouping only in terms of the internal principles which determine its de elopment. +hese beliefs lead to what Popper calls +he Historicist -octrine of the "ocial "ciences, the iews BaC that the principal tas# of the social sciences is to ma#e predictions about the social and political de elopment of man, and BbC that the tas# of politics, once the #ey predictions ha e been made, is, in @ar>$s words, to lessen the birth pangs of future social and political de elopments. Popper thin#s that this iew of the social sciences is both theoretically misconcei ed Bin the sense of being based upon a iew of natural science and its methodology which is totally wrongC, and socially dangerous, as it leads ine itably to totalitarianism and authoritarianism3to centralised go ernmental control of the indi idual and the attempted imposition of large-scale social planning. :gainst this Popper strongly ad ances the iew that any human social grouping is no more Bor lessC than the sum of its indi idual members, that what happens in history is the Blargely unplanned and unforeseeableC result of the actions of such indi iduals, and that large scale social planning to an antecedently concei ed blueprint is inherently misconcei ed3and ine itably disastrous3precisely because human actions ha e conse'uences which cannot be foreseen. Popper, then, is an historical indeter inist, insofar as he holds that history does not e ol e in accordance with intrinsic laws or principles, that in the absence of such laws and principles unconditional prediction in the social sciences is an impossibility, and that there is no such thing as historical necessity. +he lin# between Popper$s theory of #nowledge and his social philosophy is his fallibilism3=ust as we ma#e theoretical progress in science by deliberately sub=ecting our theories to critical scrutiny, and abandoning those which ha e been falsified, so too, Popper holds, the critical spirit can and should be sustained at the social le el. @ore specifically, the open society can be brought about only if it is possible for the indi idual citiEen to e aluate critically the conse'uences of the implementation of go ernment policies, which can then be abandoned or modified in the light of such critical scrutiny3in such a society, the rights of the indi idual to criticise administrati e policies will be formally safeguarded and upheld, undesirable policies will be eliminated in a manner analogous to the elimination of falsified scientific theories, and differences between people on social policy will be resol ed by critical discussion and argument rather than by force. +he open society as thus concei ed of by Popper may be defined as an association of free indi iduals respecting each other$s rights within the framewor# of mutual protection supplied by the state, and achie ing, through the ma#ing of responsible, rational decisions, a growing measure of humane and enlightened life B*e inson, ;.(. /n (e&ense o& ,lato, )5C. :s such, Popper holds, it is not a utopian ideal, but an empirically realised form of social organisation which, he argues, is in e ery respect superior to its Breal or potentialC totalitarian ri als. (ut he does not engage in a moral defence of the ideology of liberalism& rather his strategy is the much deeper one of showing that totalitarianism is typically based upon historicist and holist presuppositions, and of demonstrating that these presuppositions are fundamentally incoherent.

,. (cientific Kno!ledge% "istor$% and Prediction

11

:t a ery general le el, Popper argues that historicism and holism ha e their origins in what he terms one of the oldest dreams of man#ind3the dream of prophecy, the idea that we can #now what the future has in store for us, and that we can profit from such #nowledge by ad=usting our policy to it. B6on5e#tures and Re&utations, ,,6C. +his dream was gi en further impetus, he speculates, by the emergence of a genuine predicti e capability regarding such e ents as solar and lunar eclipses at an early stage in human ci ilisation, which has of course become increasingly refined with the de elopment of the natural sciences and their concomitant technologies. +he #ind of reasoning which has made, and continues to ma#e, historicism plausible may, on this account, be reconstructed as followsD if the application of the laws of the natural sciences can lead to the successful prediction of such future e ents as eclipses, then surely it is reasonable to infer that #nowledge of the laws of history as yielded by a social science or sciences Bassuming that such laws e>istC would lead to the successful prediction of such future social phenomena as re olutionsK 9hy should it be possible to predict an eclipse, but not a re olutionK 9hy can we not concei e of a social science which could and would function as the theoretical natural sciences function, and yield precise unconditional predictions in the appropriate sphere of applicationK +hese are amongst the 'uestions which Popper see#s to answer, and in doing so, to show that they are based upon a series of misconceptions about the nature of science, and about the relationship between scientific laws and scientific prediction. His first argument may be summarised as followsD in relation to the critically important concept of prediction, Popper ma#es a distinction between what he terms conditional scientific predictions, which ha e the form %f 2 ta#es place, then 3 will ta#e place, and unconditional scientific prophecies, which ha e the form 3 will ta#e place. 4ontrary to popular belief, it is the former rather than the latter which are typical of the natural sciences, which means that typically prediction in natural science is conditional and limited in scope3it ta#es the form of hypothetical assertions stating that certain specified changes will come about if particular specified e ents antecedently ta#e place. +his is not to deny that unconditional scientific prophecies, such as the prediction of eclipses, for e>ample, do ta#e place in science, and that the theoretical natural sciences ma#e them possible. Howe er, Popper argues that BaC these unconditional prophecies are not #hara#teristi# of the natural sciences, and BbC that the mechanism whereby they occur, in the ery limited way in which they do, is not understood by the historicist. 9hat is the mechanism which ma#es unconditional scientific prophecies possibleK +he answer is that such prophecies can sometimes be deri ed from a combination of conditional predictions Bthemsel es deri ed from scientific lawsC and e>istential statements specifying that the conditions in relation to the system being in estigated are fulfilled. "chematically, this can be represented as followsD I4.P. S 8.".JM?.P. where 4.P. M 4onditional Prediction& 8.". M 8>istential "tatement& ?.P. M ?nconditional Prophecy. +he most common e>amples of unconditional scientific prophecies in science relate to the prediction of such phenomena as lunar and solar eclipses and comets. /i en, then, that this is the mechanism which generates unconditional scientific prophecies, Popper ma#es two related claims about historicismD BaC +hat the historicist does not in fact deri e his unconditional scientific prophecies in this manner from conditional predictions, and
12

BbC the historicist #annot do so because long-term unconditional scientific prophecies can be deri ed from conditional predictions only if they apply to systems which are well-isolated, stationary, and recurrent Bli#e our solar systemC. "uch systems are 'uite rare in nature, and human society is most emphatically not one of them. +his, then, Popper argues, is the reason why it is a fundamental mista#e for the historicist to ta#e the unconditional scientific prophecies of eclipses as being typical and characteristic of the predictions of natural science3in fact such predictions are possible only because our solar system is a stationary and repetiti e system which is isolated from other such systems by immense e>panses of empty space. +he solar system aside, there are ery few such systems around for scientific in estigation3most of the others are confined to the field of biology, where unconditional prophecies about the life-cycles of organisms are made possible by the e>istence of precisely the same factors. +hus one of the fallacies committed by the historicist is to ta#e the Brelati ely rareC instances of unconditional prophecies in the natural science as constituting the essence of what scientific prediction is, to fail to see that such prophecies apply only to systems which are isolated, stationary, and repetiti e, and to see# to apply the method of scientific prophecy to human society and human history. +he latter, of course, is not an isolated system Bin fact it$s not a system at allC, it is constantly changing, and it continually undergoes rapid, non-repetiti e de elopment. %n the most fundamental sense possible, e ery e ent in human history is discrete, no el, 'uite uni'ue, and ontologically distinct from e ery other historical e ent. Aor this reason, it is impossible in principle that unconditional scientific prophecies could be made in relation to human history3the idea that the successful unconditional prediction of eclipses pro ides us with reasonable grounds for the hope of successful unconditional prediction regarding the e olution of human history turns out to be based upon a gross misconception, and is 'uite false. :s Popper himself concludes, Q+he fact that we predict eclipses does not, therefore, pro ide a alid reason for e>pecting that we can predict re olutions.Q B6on5e#tures and Re&utations, ,.0C.

-. .mmutable La!s and *ontingent Trends

+his argument is one of the strongest that has e er been brought against historicism, cutting, as it does, right to the heart of one of its main theoretical presuppositions. Howe er, it is not Popper$s only argument against it. :n additional mista#e which he detects in historicism is the failure of the historicist to distinguish between scientific la4s and trends, which is also fre'uently accompanied by a simple logical fallacy. +he fallacy is that of inferring from the fact that our understanding of any BpastC historical e ent3such as, for e>ample, the Arench ;e olution3is in direct proportion to our #nowledge of the antecedent conditions which led to that e ent, that #nowledge of all the antecedent conditions of some future e ent is possible, and that such #nowledge would ma#e that future e ent precisely predictable. Aor the truth is that the number of factors which predate and lead to the occurrence of any e ent, past, present, or future, is indefinitely large, and therefore #nowledge of all of these factors is impossible, e en in principle. 9hat gi es rise to the fallacy is the manner in which the historian BnecessarilyC selecti ely isolates a finite number of the antecedent conditions of some past e ent as being of particular importance, which are then somewhat misleadingly termed the causes of that e ent, when in fact what this means is that they are the specific conditions which a particular historian or group of historians ta#e to be more relevant than any other of the indefinitely large number of such conditions Bfor this reason, most historical debates range o er the 'uestion as to whether the conditions thus specified are the right onesC. 9hile this #ind of selecti ity may be =ustifiable
13

in relation to the treatment of any past e ent, it has no basis whatsoe er in relation to the future 3if we now select, as @ar> did, the rele ant antecedent conditions for some future e ent, the li#elihood is that we will select wrongly. +he historicist$s failure to distinguish between scientific laws and trends is e'ually destructi e of his cause. +his failure ma#es him thin# it possible to e>plain change by disco ering trends running through past history, and to anticipate and predict future occurrences on the basis of such obser ations. Here Popper points out that there is a critical difference between a trend and a scientific law, the failure to obser e which is fatal. Aor a scientific law is uni ersal in form, while a trend can be e>pressed only as a singular e>istential statement. +his logical difference is crucial because unconditional predictions, as we ha e already seen, can be based only upon conditional ones, which themsel es must be deri ed from scientific laws. Feither conditional nor unconditional predictions can be based upon trends, because these may change or be re ersed with a change in the conditions which ga e rise to them in the first instance. :s Popper puts it, there can be no doubt that Qthe habit of confusing trends with laws, together with the intuiti e obser ation of trends such as technical progress, inspired the central doctrines of R historicism.Q BThe ,overty o& -istori#is , ))2C. Popper does not, of course, dispute the e>istence of trends, nor does he deny that the obser ation of trends can be of practical utility alue3but the essential point is that a trend is something which itsel& ultimately stands in need of scientific e>planation, and it cannot therefore function as the frame of reference in terms of which anything else can be scientifically e>plained or predicted. : point which connects with this has to do with the role which the e olution of human #nowledge has played in the historical de elopment of human society. %t is incontestable that, as @ar> himself obser ed, there has been a causal lin# between the two, in the sense that ad ances in scientific and technological #nowledge ha e gi en rise to widespread global changes in patterns of human social organisation and social interaction, which in turn ha e led to social structures Be.g. educational systemsC which further growth in human #nowledge. %n short, the e olution of human history has been strongly influenced by the gro4th o& hu an %no4ledge, and it is e>tremely li#ely that this will continue to be the case3all the empirical e idence suggests that the lin# between the two is progressi ely consolidating. Howe er, this gi es rise to further problems for the historicist. %n the first place, the statement that if there is such a thing as growing human #nowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall #now only tomorrow is, Popper holds, intuiti ely highly plausible. @oreo er, he argues, it is logically demonstrable by a consideration of the implications of the fact that no scientific predictor, human or otherwise, can possibly predict, by scientific methods, its own future results. Arom this it follows, he holds, that no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of #nowledge. BThe ,overty o& -istori#is , iiC. +hus, while the future e olution of human history is e>tremely li#ely to be influenced by new de elopments in human #nowledge, as it always has in the past, we cannot now scientifically determine what such #nowledge will be. Arom this it follows that if the future holds any new disco eries or any new de elopments in the growth of our #nowledge Band gi en the fallible nature of the latter, it is inconcei able that it does notC, then it is impossible for us to predict them now, and it is therefore impossible for us to predict the future de elopment of human history now, gi en that the latter will, at least in part, be determined by the future growth of our #nowledge. +hus once again historicism collapses3the dream of a theoretical, predicti e science of history is unrealisable, because it is an impossible dream.
14

Popper$s arguments against holism, and in particular his arguments against the propriety of large-scale planning of social structures, are interconnected with his demonstration of the logical shortcomings of the presuppositions of historicism. "uch planning Bwhich actually too# place, of course, in the ?"";, in 4hina, and in 4ambodia, for e>ample, under totalitarian regimes which accepted forms of historicism and holismC, Popper points out, is necessarily structured in the light of the predictions which ha e been made about future history on the basis of the so-called laws which historicists such as @ar> and @ao claimed to ha e disco ered in relation to human history. :ccordingly, recognition that there are no such laws, and that unconditional predictions about future history are based, at best, upon nothing more substantial than the obser ation of contingent trends, shows that, from a purely theoretical as well as a practical point of iew, large-scale social planning is indeed a recipe for disaster. %n summary, unconditional large-scale planning for the future is theoretically as well as practically misguided, because, again, part of what we are planning for is our future #nowledge, and our future #nowledge is not something which we can in principle now possess3we cannot ade'uately plan for une>pected ad ances in our future #nowledge, or for the effects which such ad ances will ha e upon society as a whole. +he acceptance of historical indeterminism, then, as the only philosophy of history which is commensurate with a proper understanding of the nature of scientific #nowledge, fatally undermines both historicism and holism. Popper$s criti'ue of both historicism and holism is balanced, on the positi e side, by his affirmation of the ideals of indi idualism and mar#et economics and his strong defence of the open society3the iew, again, that a society is e'ui alent to the sum of its members, that the actions of the members of society ser e to fashion and to shape it, and that the social conse'uences of intentional actions are ery often, and ery largely, unintentional. +his part of his social philosophy was influenced by the economist Ariedrich Haye#, who wor#ed with him at the *ondon "chool of 8conomics and who was a life-long friend. Popper ad ocated what he Brather unfortunatelyC terms piecemeal social engineering as the central mechanism for social planning3for in utilising this mechanism intentional actions are directed to the achie ement of one specific goal at a time, which ma#es it possible to monitor the situation to determine whether ad erse unintended effects of intentional actions occur, in order to correct and read=ust when this pro es necessary. +his, of course, parallels precisely the critical testing of theories in scientific in estigation. +his approach to social planning Bwhich is e>plicitly based upon the premise that we do not, because we cannot, #now what the future will be li#eC encourages attempts to put right what is problematic in society3generally-ac#nowledged social ills3rather than attempts to impose some preconcei ed idea of the good upon society as a whole. Aor this reason, in a genuinely open society piecemeal social engineering goes hand-in-hand for Popper with negative utilitarianism Bthe attempt to minimise the amount of misery, rather than, as with positi e utilitarianism, the attempt to ma>imise the amount of happinessC. +he state, he holds, should concern itself with the tas# of progressi ely formulating and implementing policies designed to deal with the social problems which actually confront it, with the goal of eliminating human misery and suffering to the highest possible degree. +he positi e tas# of increasing social and personal happiness, by contrast, can and should be should be left to indi idual citiEens Bwho may, of course, act collecti ely to this endC, who, unli#e the state, ha e at least a chance of achie ing this goal, but who in a free society are rarely in a position to systematically sub ert the rights of others in the pursuit of idealised ob=ecti es. +hus in the final analysis for Popper the acti ity of problem-sol ing is as definiti e of our humanity at the le el of social and political
15

organisation as it is at the le el of science, and it is this #ey insight which unifies and integrates the broad spectrum of his thought.

/. *ritical 01aluation
9hile it cannot be said that Popper was a modest man, he too# criticism of his theories ery seriously, and spent much of his time in his later years endea ouring to show that such criticisms were either based upon misunderstandings, or that his theories could, without loss of integrity, be made compatible with new and important insights. +he following is a summary of some of the main criticisms which he has had to address. BAor Popper$s responses to critical commentary, see his ;eplies to @y 4ritics, in P.:. "chilpp Bed.C, The ,hilosophy o& "arl ,opper, 1olume 2, and his Realis and the +i o& '#ien#e, edited by 9.9. (artley %%%.C ). Popper professes to be anti-con entionalist, and his commitment to the correspondence theory of truth places him firmly within the realist$s camp. Let, following Kant, he strongly repudiates the positi istHempiricist iew that basic statements Bi.e., present-tense obser ation statements about sense-dataC are infallible, and argues con incingly that such basic statements are not mere reports of passi ely registered sensations. ;ather they are descriptions of what is obser ed as interpreted by the obser er with reference to a determinate theoretical framewor#. +his is why Popper repeatedly emphasises that basic statements are not infallible, and it indicates what he means when he says that they are theory laden3perception itself is an acti e process, in which the mind assimilates data by reference to an assumed theoretical bac#drop. He accordingly asserts that basic statements themsel es are open-ended hypothesesD they ha e a certain causal relationship with e>perience, but they are not deter ined by e>perience, and they cannot be erified or confirmed by e>perience. Howe er, this poses a difficulty regarding the consistency of Popper$s theoryD if a theory 2 is to be genuinely testable Band so scientificC it must be possible to determine whether or not the basic propositions which would, if true, falsify it, are a#tually true or false Bi.e., whether its potential falsifiers are actual falsifiersC. (ut how can this be #nown, if such basic statements cannot be erified by e>perienceK Popper$s answer is that basic statements are not =ustifiable by our immediate e>periences, but are R accepted by an act, a free decision. B$ogi# o& '#ienti&i# (is#overy, )07C. Howe er, and notwithstanding Popper$s claims to the contrary, this itself seems to be a refined form of con entionalism3it implies that it is almost entirely an arbitrary matter whether it is accepted that a potential falsifier is an actual one, and conse'uently that the falsification of a theory is itself the function of a free and arbitrary act. %t also seems ery difficult to reconcile this with Popper$s iew that science progressi ely mo es closer to the truth, concei ed of in terms of the correspondence theory, for this #ind of con entionalism is inimical to this BclassicalC conception of truth. 2. :s *a#atos has pointed out, Popper$s theory of demarcation hinges 'uite fundamentally on the assumption that there are such things as critical tests, which either falsify a theory, or gi e it a strong measure of corroboration. Popper himself is fond of citing, as an e>ample of such a critical test, the resolution, by :dams and *e errier, of the problem which the anomalous orbit of ?ranus posed for nineteenth century astronomers. (oth men independently came to the conclusion that, assuming Fewtonian mechanics to be precisely correct, the obser ed di ergence in the elliptical orbit of ?ranus could be e>plained if the e>istence of a se enth, as yet unobser ed outer planet was posited. Aurther, they were able, again within the framewor# of Fewtonian mechanics, to calculate the precise position of the new planet. +hus when subse'uent research by /alle at the (erlin obser atory re ealed that such a planet BFeptuneC did
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in fact e>ist, and was situated precisely where :dams and *e errier had calculated, this was hailed as by all and sundry as a magnificent triumph for Fewtonian physicsD in Popperian terms, Fewton$s theory had been sub=ected to a critical test, and had passed with flying colours. Popper himself refers to this strong corroboration of Fewtonian physics as the most startling and con incing success of any human intellectual achie ement. Let *a#atos flatly denies that there are critical tests, in the Popperian sense, in science, and argues the point con incingly by turning the abo e e>ample of an alleged critical test on its head. 9hat, he as#s, would ha e happened if /alle had not found the planet FeptuneK 9ould Fewtonian physics ha e been abandoned, or would Fewton$s theory ha e been falsifiedK +he answer is clearly not, for /alle$s failure could ha e been attributed to any number of causes other than the falsity of Fewtonian physics Be.g., the interference of the earth$s atmosphere with the telescope, the e>istence of an asteroid belt which hides the new planet from the earth, etcC. +he point here is that the falsificationHcorroboration dis=unction offered by Popper is far too logically neatD noncorroboration is not ne#essarily falsification, and falsification of a high-le el scientific theory is ne er brought about by an isolated obser ation or set of obser ations. "uch theories are, it is now generally accepted, highly resistant to falsification. +hey are falsified, if at all, *a#atos argues, not by Popperian critical tests, but rather within the elaborate conte>t of the research programmes associated with them gradually grinding to a halt, with the result that an e erwidening gap opens up between the facts to be e>plained, and the research programmes themsel es. B*a#atos, %. The Methodology o& '#ienti&i# Resear#h ,rogra es , passimC. Popper$s distinction between the logic of falsifiability and its applied methodology does not in the end do full =ustice to the fact that all high-le el theories grow and li e despite the e>istence of anomalies Bi.e., e entsHphenomena which are incompatible with the theoriesC. +he e>istence of such anomalies is not usually ta#en by the wor#ing scientist as an indication that the theory in 'uestion is false& on the contrary, he will usually, and necessarily, assume that the au>iliary hypotheses which are associated with the theory can be modified to incorporate, and e>plain, e>isting anomalies. ,. "cientific laws are e>pressed by uni ersal statements Bi.e., they ta#e the logical form :ll +s are 2, or some e'ui alentC which are therefore concealed conditionals3they ha e to be understood as hypothetical statements asserting what would be the case under certain ideal conditions. %n themsel es they are not e8istential in nature. +hus :ll +s are 2 means %f anything is an +, then it is 2. "ince scientific laws are non-e>istential in nature, they logically cannot imply any basic statements, since the latter are e>plicitly e>istential. +he 'uestion arises, then, as to how any basic statement can falsify a scientific law, gi en that basic statements are not deducible from scientific laws in themsel esK Popper answers that scientific laws are always ta#en in #on5un#tion 4ith statements outlining the initial conditions of the system under in estigation& these latter, which are singular e>istential statements, do, when combined with the scientific law, yield hard and fast implications. +hus, the law :ll +s are 2, together with the initial condition statement +here is an + at 3, yields the implication +he+ at 3 is 2, which, if false, falsifies the original law. +his reply is ade'uate only if it is true, as Popper assumes, that singular e>istential statements will always do the wor# of bridging the gap between a uni ersal theory and a prediction. Hilary Putnam in particular has argued that this assumption is false, in that in some cases at least the statements re'uired to bridge this gap Bwhich he calls au>iliary hypothesesC are general rather than particular, and conse'uently that when the prediction turns out to be false we ha e no way
17

of #nowing whether this is due to the falsity of the scientific law or the falsity of the au>iliary hypotheses. +he wor#ing scientist, Putnam argues, always initially assumes that it is the latter, which shows not only that scientific laws are, #ontra Popper, highly resistant to falsification, but also why they are so highly resistant to falsification. Popper$s final position is that he ac#nowledges that it is impossible to discriminate science from non-science on the basis of the falsifiability of the scientific statements alone& he recogniEes that scientific theories are predicti e, and conse'uently prohibiti e, only when ta#en in con=unction with au>iliary hypotheses, and he also recogniEes that read=ustment or modification of the latter is an integral part of scientific practice. Hence his final concern is to outline conditions which indicate when such modification is genuinely scientific, and when it is merely ad ho#. +his is itself clearly a ma=or alteration in his position, and arguably represents a substantial retraction on his partD @ar>ism can no longer be dismissed as unscientific simply because its ad ocates preser ed the theory from falsification by modifying it Bfor in general terms, such a procedure, it now transpires, is perfectly respectable scientific practiceC. %t is now condemned as unscientific by Popper because the only rationale for the modifications which were made to the original theory was to ensure that it e aded falsification, and so such modifications were ad ho#, rather than scientific. +his contention3though not at all implausible3has, to hostile eyes, a somewhat contri ed air about it, and is unli#ely to worry the con inced @ar>ist. !n the other hand, the shift in Popper$s own basic position is ta#en by some critics as an indicator that falsificationism, for all its apparent merits, fares no better in the final analysis than erificationism.

18

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2orks B$ Popper

$ogi% der Fors#hung. <ulius "pringer 1erlag, 1ienna, )7,0. The .pen 'o#iety and /ts 0ne ies. B2 1olsC. ;outledge, *ondon, )7.0. The $ogi# o& '#ienti&i# (is#overy. Btranslation of $ogi% der Fors#hungC. Hutchinson, *ondon, )707. 6on5e#tures and Re&utations9 The :ro4th o& '#ienti&i# "no4ledge . ;outledge, *ondon, )72,. The ,overty o& -istori#is B2nd. edC. ;outledge, *ondon, )72). .b5e#tive "no4ledge9 +n 0volutionary +pproa#h . 4larendon Press, !>ford, )752. )nended *uest; +n /ntelle#tual +utobiography . Aontana, *ondon, )752. : Fote on 1erisimilitude, The ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 2,, )752, ).5-)07. The 'el& and /ts ;rain9 +n +rgu ent &or /ntera#tionis Bwith <.4. 8cclesC. "pringer %nternational, *ondon, )755. The .pen )niverse9 +n +rgu ent &or /ndeter inis . Bed. 9.9. (artley )))C. Hutchinson, *ondon, )762. Realis and the +i o& '#ien#e. Bed. 9.9. (artley %%%C. *ondon, Hutchinson, )76,. The Myth o& the Fra e4or%9 /n (e&en#e o& '#ien#e and Rationality . ;outledge, *ondon, )77.. "no4ledge and the Mind1;ody ,roble 9 /n (e&en#e o& /ntera#tionis . Bed. @.:. FotturnoC. ;outledge, *ondon, )77.. The T4o Funda ental ,roble s o& the Theory o& "no4ledge= . Bed. Hansen, +.8., trans. :. Pic#elC. ;outledge, 2005.

2orks b$ 3ther 4uthors

:c#ermann, ;. The ,hilosophy o& "arl ,opper. ?ni ersity of @assachusetts Press, :mherst, )752. (ambrough, ;. BedC. ,lato, ,opper, and ,oliti#s9 'o e 6ontributions to a Modern 6ontroversy. (arnes and Foble, Few Lor#, )725. (audoin, <. "arl ,opper. P?A, Paris, )767. (rin#, 4. T Heidema, <. : 1erisimilar !rdering of +heories Phrased in a Propositional *anguage, ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 3-, )765, 0,,-0.7. (rin#, 4. 1erisimilitudeD 1iews and ;e iews, -istory and ,hilosophy o& $ogi# 15, )767, )6)-20). (rin#, 4. T (ritE, K. 4omputing 1erisimilitude, Notre (a e <ournal o& For al $ogi# 3', ), )770, ,)-.,. (unge, @. BedC. The 6riti#al +pproa#h to '#ien#e and ,hilosophy . +he Aree Press, *ondon T Few Lor#, )72.. (ur#e, +.8. The ,hilosophy o& ,opper. @anchester ?ni ersity Press, @anchester, )76,. 4arr, 8.H. !hat is -istory> @acmillan, *ondon, )722. 4ornforth, @. The .pen ,hilosophy and the .pen 'o#iety9 + Reply to (r= ,opper?s Re&utations o& Mar8is . *awrence T 9ishart, *ondon, )726.
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4or i, ;. +n /ntrodu#tion to the Thought o& "arl ,opper . Btrans. P. 4amillerC. ;outledge, *ondon T Few Lor#, )775. 4urrie, /. T @usgra e, :. BedsC. ,opper and the -u an '#ien#es. Fi=hoff, -ordrecht, )760. 8dmonds, -. and 8idinow, <. 9ittgenstein?s ,o%er9 The 'tory o& a Ten1Minute +rgu ent ;et4een T4o :reat ,hilosophers= Few Lor#D Harper T 4ollins, 200) Aeyerabend, P. +gainst Method. Few *eft (oo#s, *ondon, )750. /rPnbaum, :. %s the @ethod of (old 4on=ectures and :ttempted ;efutations <ustifiably the @ethod of "cienceK, ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 2,, )752, )00),2. Hume, -. + Treatise o& -u an Nature, in The ,hilosophi#al !or%s Bed. +.H. /reen T +.H. /roseC, . ols Breprint of )662 editionC. "cientia 1erlag :alen, -armstadt, )72.. <acobs, ". '#ien#e and ;ritish $iberalis 9 $o#%e, ;entha , Mill and ,opper . : ebury, :ldershot, )77). <ames, ;. Return to Reason9 ,opper?s Thought in ,ubli# $i&e . !pen (oo#s, "hepton @allet, )760. <ohannson, %. + 6riti@ue o& "arl ,opper?s Methodology. "candina ian ?ni ersity (oo#s, "toc#holm, )750. Ke#es, <. Popper in Perspecti e, Metaphilosophy 6 B)755C, pp. ,2-2). Keuth, H. 1erisimilitude or the :pproach to the 9hole +ruth, ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e )752, ,))-,,2. Kuipers, +. :. A. :pproaching -escripti e and +heoretical +ruth, 0r%enntnis 1-, )762, ,.,-,56. Kuipers, +. :. A., BedC. !hat is 6loser1to1the1Truth>, ;odopi, :msterdam, )765. Kuhn, +.". The 'tru#ture o& '#ienti&i# Revolutions . ?ni ersity of 4hicago Press, 4hicago and *ondon, )722. *a#atos, %. Aalsification and the @ethodology of "cientific ;esearch Programmes, in *a#atos, % T @usgro e, :. BedsC. 6riti#is and the :ro4th o& "no4ledge. 4ambridge ?ni ersity Press, 4ambridge, )750. *a#atos, %. The Methodology o& '#ienti&i# Resear#h ,rogra es , Bed. <. 9orrall T /. 4urrieC. 4ambridge ?ni ersity Press, )756. *a#atos, % T @usgro e, :. BedsC. 6riti#is and the :ro4th o& "no4ledge. 4ambridge ?ni ersity Press, 4ambridge, )750. *audan, *. ,rogress and /ts ,roble s9 To4ards a Theory o& '#ienti&i# :ro4th . ;outledge, *ondon, )755. *e inson, P. Bed.C. /n ,ursuit o& Truth= 0ssays in -onour o& "arl ,opper on the .##asion o& his A0th ;irthday. Humanities Press, :tlantic Highlands, )762. *e inson, ;.(. /n (e&ense o& ,lato. 4ambridge ?ni ersity Press, 4ambridge, )705. @agee, (. ,opper. Aontana, *ondon, )755. @ellor, -.H. +he Popper Phenomenon, ,hilosophy 02 B)755C, pp. )70-202. @iller, -. !n the 4omparison of Aalse +heories by their (ases, The ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 2#, )75., )56-)66. @iller, -. Popper$s Uualitati e +heory of 1erisimilitude, The ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 2#, )75., )22-)55. @iller, -. 6riti#al Rationalis 9 + Restate ent and (e&en#e , !pen 4ourt, 4hicago, )77.. @unE, P. .ur "no4ledge o& the :ro4th o& "no4ledge9 ,opper or !ittgenstein> ;outledge, *ondon, )760.
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Faydler, <. +he Po erty of Popperism, Tho ist .2 B)762C, pp. 72-)05. Fiiniluoto, %. Truthli%eness, ;eidel, -ordrecht, )765. !ddie, /. $i%eness to Truth, ;eidel, -ordrecht, )762. !$Hear, :. "arl ,opper. ;outledge, *ondon, )760. Putnam, H. +he 4orroboration of +heories, in The ,hilosophy o& "arl ,opper Bed. P.:. "chilppC. !pen 4ourt Press, *a "alle, )75.. Uuinton, :. Popper, Karl ;aimund, in 0n#y#lopedia o& ,hilosophy, ol. 2 Bed. P. 8dwardsC. 4ollier @acmillan, Few Lor#, )725. ;adnitE#y, /. T :ndersson, /. BedsC. ,rogress and Rationality in '#ien#e. ;eidel, -ordrecht, )756. ;adnitE#y, /. T (artley, 9.9. BedsC. 0volutionary 0piste ology, Rationality, and the 'o#iology o& "no4ledge. !pen 4ourt, *a "alle, )765. "hearmur, <. ,oliti#al Thought o& "arl ,opper. *ondon T Few Lor#D ;outledge, )772. "im#in, 4. ,opper?s 7ie4s on Natural and 'o#ial '#ien#e . (rill, *eiden, )77,. "to#es, /. ,opper9 ,hilosophy, ,oliti#s and '#ienti&i# Method . Polity Press, )776. "to e, -. ,opper and +&ter9 Four Modern /rrationalists. Pergamon Press, !>ford, )762. "chilpp, P.:. BedC The ,hilosophy o& "arl ,opper. B2 1olsC. !pen 4ourt Press, *a "alle, )75.. +ichO, P. !n Popper$s -efinitions of 1erisimilitude, The ;ritish <ournal &or the ,hilosophy o& '#ien#e 2#, )75., )00-)20 +ichO, P. 1erisimilitude ;e isited, "ynthVse 3-, )756, )50-)72. 1etter, H. : Few 4oncept of 1erisimilitude, Theory and (e#ision -, )755, ,27-,50. 9at#ins, <. '#ien#e and '#epti#is , Princeton ?ni ersity Press and Hutchinson, Princeton and *ondon, )76.. 9at#ins, <. Popperian %deas on Progress and ;ationality in "cience, The 6riti#al Rationalist, 1ol. 2 Fo. 2, <une )775. 9il#ins, (.+. -as -istory +ny Meaning> + 6riti@ue o& ,opper?s ,hilosophy o& -istory . Hassoc#sH4ornell ?ni ersity PressH+he Har ester Press, %thaca, )756. 9illiams, -.8. Truth, -ope and ,o4er9 The Thought o& "arl ,opper . ?ni ersity of +oronto Press, +oronto, )767. 9u#etits, A.@. 6on#epts and +pproa#hes in 0volutionary 0piste ology9 To4ards an 0volutionary Theory o& "no4ledge. ;eidel, -ordrecht, )76..

3ther .nternet 6esources

+he Karl Popper 9eb. !pen ?ni erse of the <apan Popper "ociety. %nstitut 9iener Kreis, website of the "ociety for the :d ancement of the "cientific 9orld 4onception. WPopper, Karl ;aimund,X by Peter @unE in the -ictionary of Few Gealand (iography.

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