THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT TOWARD CUBA, MEXICO OR VENEZUELA.

1AC

Definitions:
1. Daniel Oran, (Assistant Dir., National Paralegal Institute & J.D., Yale Law School), ORANS DICTIONARY OF THE LAW, 4th Ed., 2008, 206. Federal government: The U.S. federal government is the national, as opposed to state, government. 2. Carol-June Cassidy, (Editor), CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH, 2nd Ed., 2008, 873. Substantially: large in size, value, or importance 3. Elizabeth Jewell, (Editor), THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2nd Ed., 2007, 415. Increase: Build up, enlarge, amplify, expand 4. Maurice Waite, (Editor), OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2007, 322. Economic: Relating to economics or the economy of a country or region. 5. Maurice Waite, (Editor), OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 2007, 337. Engagement: The state of being involved in something.

Inherency
Contention 1 is inherency 1. The embargo fails to achieve any of its announced objectives in the status quo
a. The Cuba Embargo has completely failed. i. Jess Hunter-Bowman, (Associate Dir., Witness for Peace), PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, April 25, 2012, 7. The embargo began in 1960, soon after the successful revolution led by Fidel Castro ousted dictator Fulgencio Batista and nationalized a lot of property belonging to U.S. corporations and citizens. Washington has amended and tightened the embargo, even expanding it to punitive steps against foreign companies doing business with Cuba, many times in its half-century of failure. The embargo certainly hasnt weakened Cubas regime. Nor has it changed its political or economic systems. In fact, the embargo may have helped brothers Fidel and Raul Castro retain power by offering a ready-made excuse to point to when things go poorly in the country. While leaving the government unscathed, the embargo has had a punishing impact on the Cuban people. From restricting the availability of needed medication to limiting access to high technology, it has caused widespread hardship. ii. Paolo Spadoni, (Prof., Political Science, Augusta State U.), FAILED SANCTIONS: WHY THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA COULD NEVER WOR, 2010, 181. The crucial lesson to be drawn from the past is that the embargo has proved rather ineffective in exercising enough economical strain to significantly alter the behavior of the Castro government, let alone to hasten its collapse. [The U.S.s] President Bushs all-or nothing approach on Cuba, centered on preconditions for rapprochement such as Havanas commitment to hold free and fair elections, respect human rights, release political prisoners, permit the creation of independent organizations, and adopt a market-oriented economic system, achieved nothing. b. Sanctions are an ineffective tool of foreign policy i. White 2013
(Robert E. White, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, was the United States ambassador to Paraguay from 1977 to 1979 and to El Salvador from 1980 to 1981, published March 7, 2013. New York Times: The Opinion Pages, After Chvez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-goodneighbors-in-latin-america.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1&; CO)
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century, our

policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral, Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming

powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas
ii. Paolo Spadoni, (Prof., Political Science, Augusta State U.), FAILED SANCTIONS: WHY THE U.S. EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA COULD NEVER WORK, 2010, 11. In 2001, more than half of the worlds population in seventy-eight countries, for the most part developing ones, was subject to some forms of U.S. unilateral coercive economic measures. According to the United Nations General Assembly, the use of unilateral sanctions adversely affects the economy and development efforts of developing countries and has a general negative impact on international economic cooperation and on worldwide efforts to move towards a non-discriminatory and open multilateral trading system. iii. David Seaman, (Prof., Social Science, U. ns to date,Osnabruck, Germany), U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: THE CASE OF CUB, 2010, 46. Much existing literature on economic sanctions has addressed the question of whether sanctions are an efficient tool in achieving foreign policy goals. The results have been mixed. In one of the most comprehensive studies on the efficacy of economic sanctions to date, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott analyzed the outcome of 103 economic sanctions episodes between the years 1915 and 1984 and drew the conclusion that in most cases, sanctions do not contribute very much to the achievement of foreign policy goals. In accordance with their criteria for success, the authors found that in only 36% of the cases overall did economic sanctions have an impact on reaching the policy objective sought by the sender. iv. Miroslav Nincik, (Prof., Political Science University of California, Davis), THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT, 2011, 17. Since the rationale behind economic sanctions appears sensible, and since they are so extensively used, it is surprising to find such a strong consensus on their ineffectiveness. Few studies or none praise their performance. Richard Haas, former foreign policy official and currently head of the Council on Foreign Relations, has estimated that with a few exceptions, the growing use of economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable the problem with economic sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counterproductive.

Plan
The U.S. federal government should lift the Cuba Embargo.

1AC Cuba Relations Advantage

1. The U.S. has every reason to normalize relations with Cuba. a. Cuba has responded in a conciliatory way to U.S. overtures. i. William Marcy, (Prof., History, St. Martins U.), THE POLITICS OF COCAINE: HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY HAS CREATED A THRIVING DRUG INDUSTRY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA, 2010, 251. Since 2000, Cuba has given the appearance of wishing to cooperate more openly with the United States. The U.S. government has remained uneasy, concerned that Cuba has become a refuge for Colombian guerillas, that commerce with Venezuela has increased the flow of drugs through Cuba, and that tourism expanded drug smuggling via Cuba to Europe. ii. Roger Ricardo, (Cuban Journalist), GUANTANAMO: WHY THE ILLEGAL U.S. BASE SHOULD BE RETURNED TO CUBA, 2011, 89. As a matter of principle, Cuba is not opposed to a policy of peaceful coexistence, and Fidel Castro has stated that, if the US authorities lift the economic blockade and stop their threats, campaigns and war against Cuba, another form of political leadership in the country could be considered, both in theory and in practice. b. Cuba is willing to negotiate with the U.S. i. Alexander Frye, (Research Associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 10, 2012. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2012 from Nexis. Cuba is less ideologically motivated today than at any point in recent history, and the Castro brothers have repeatedly stated their desire to achieve reconciliation with the United States. Yet Washington, for its part, continues its irrational and imprudent support of a policy which over the past five decades has proven itself an unequivocal failure. The Castros are still in power, and Cuba is still militantly socialist- though no more so than China or Vietnam, with which the United States maintains relatively healthy diplomatic and economic ties. Havanas record on human rights remains lackluster-but so, too, does Beijings and a score of other U.S. trading partners. ii. Alexander Frye, (Research Associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs), STATES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 10, 2012. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2012 from Nexis. And Cubans still do not enjoy fully free electionsbut neither do the Saudis or Russians, and U.S. has no compunction about dealing with them. Washington routinely associates with nations more oppressive and less democratic than its Caribbean neighbor, and yet with Cuba, it balks. Such a[n] towering inconsistency, in light of the productive relationships the U.S. pursues with other questionably democratic societies and the wholly unproductive nature of its Cuba policy.

c. The political leanings of U.S. voters, and even the Cuban-American population, are changing to favor lifting the embargo.

i. Marifeli Perez-Stable, (Prof., Sociology, Florida International U.), THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: INTIMATE ENEMIES, 2011, 117-118. Simply put, Cuban Miami was changing. [Based on] A Cuba/U.S. Transition Poll released in December 2008, further highlighted the community's evolving views: 67 percent favored unrestricted travel to Cuba and 55 percent opposed the U.S. embargo. A poll conducted after the Obama administration lifted all restrictions on family related travel and remittances underscored ongoing trends. Some 64 percent favored the measures; nearly three-quarters of those between the ages of 18 and 49 did so while those arriving in the 1980s and 1990s (82 percent) and after 2000 (91 percent) overwhelmingly applauded the change. In all questions, responses by age and arrival decade were similarly lopsided toward openness. When asked whether they favored or opposed allowing all U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba, 67 percent responded in favor of ending the travel ban. On the U.S. embargo, there was a virtual tie: 42 percent for continuing it, 43 percent for ending it, with 15 percent answering don't know or saying nothing at all. ii. Marifeli Perez-Stable, (Prof., Political Science, Florida International U.), CONTEMPORARY U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS, 2010, 55-56. U.S. policy toward Cuba cannot change without some support in the Cuban American community. Since 1991, Florida International University has polled Cuban Americans in South Florida. In the 2007 Cuba poll, 55.2 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, "The United States should allow unrestricted travel to Cuba." About 50 percent also agreed with ongoing U.S. sales of medicines and food to Cuba. Forty-two percent opposed the embargo outright, an increase of eight percentage points since the last survey in 2004 [survey]. Cuban American public opinion is clearly shifting toward easing travel restrictions, with a hefty minority embracing the end of the embargo altogether. iii. Vicki Huddleston, (Co-Director, Brookings Institution Project on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba in Transition & now, Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State), LEARNING TO SALSA: NEW STEPS IN U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, 2010, 229. FIU began polling the Cuban American community in 1991. In 2008, for the first time, the poll found that a majority of participants, 55 percent, favor ending the U.S. embargo against Cuba. This figure has been steadily rising over the past decade: in 1997 only 22 percent of Cuban Americans favored ending the embargo, but by 2004 the percentage had risen to 34 percent; since then the naysayers have slowly given way to this year's majority. With this shift in attitudes, the deeply rooted symbolic construct of the embargo is slowly breaking down and making space for a more realistic and pragmatic approach to crafting an effective policy toward Cuba. iv. Miroslav Nincik, (Prof., Political Science University of California, Davis), THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT, 2011, 113. Engagement would encounter domestic political resistance within the United States, but less so than in the past. Most Americans realize that coercion has failed, and generational changes within the Cuban-American community have diminished the strident voice of those who fled Cuba. According to a poll conducted in April 2009 by Bendixen and Associates, 67 percent of Cuban Americans now support removing

all restrictions on travel to Cuba. Nationally, too, popular sentiment has swung in favor of reengagement. In a 2009 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, 70 percent favored lifting the travel ban, 69 percent supported reestablishing diplomatic relations, while 71 percent agreed that increased trade and travel are more likely to lead Cuba toward openness and democracy than to strengthen the Communist regime. Even the conservative Weekly Standard has published an article arguing that "the U.S. government should be negotiating for incremental transition, because even the smallest reforms will fuel popular expectations for more change." v. Vicki Huddleston, (Co-Director, Brookings Institution Project on U.S. Policy Toward Cuba in Transition & now, Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State), LEARNING TO SALSA: NEW STEPS IN U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, 2010, viii. The possibility of genuine change in Cuba is resonating with changing attitudes in the Miami area, home to 800,000 Cuban Americans and the capital of the Cuban American community. The rise of a new generation of leaders within the community brought with it an ideological shift. Frustrated with the U.S. embargo on Cuba, in place for almost five decades, prominent Cuban Americans are looking for an alternative approach that would focus less on isolating the Cuban government and more on supporting the well-being and political rights of the Cuban people.

1AC US Political Advantage

1. Normalization of relations with Cuba will best promote strategic U.S. interests in Latin America. a. Improved treatment of Cuba is key to improving the U.S. image. i. David Perez, (J.D., Yale Law School), HARVARD LATINO LAW REVIEW, Spr. 2010, 190. In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." ii. David Perez, (J.D., Yale Law School), HARVARD LATINO LAW REVIEW, Spr. 2010, 193. One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, as well as Venezuela and Bolivia. The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." iii. David Perez, (J.D., Yale Law School), HARVARD LATINO LAW REVIEW, Spr. 2010, 193. Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. iv. Miguel Vivanco, (Dir., Human Rights Watch), HEARING TO REVIEW U.S. AGRICULTURAL SALES TO CUBA, House Hearing, Mar. 11, 2010, 72. Efforts by the U.S. Government to press for change by imposing a sweeping ban on trade and travel have proven to be a costly and misguided failure. The embargo has done nothing to improve the situation of human rights in Cuba, and imposes indiscriminate hardship on the Cuban population as a whole. It has provided the Cuban Government with an excuse for its problems and pretext for its abuses. Rather than isolating Cuba, the policy has isolated the United States, enabling the Castro Government to garner sympathy abroad while simultaneously alienating Washington's potential allies. v. Doug Bandow, (Sr. Fellow, Cato Institute), TIME TO END THE CUBAN EMBARGO, Dec. 11, 2012. Retrieved Jan. 30, 2012 from http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo. There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana. Spains

Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. vi. DeWayne Wickham, (Staff), USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2010, 9A. More than a diplomatic annoyance, this nation's nearly half-century-old effort to strangle the life out of Cuba's communist government infects its relationship with much of the rest of the world. In 2009, for the 18th consecutive year, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for an end to the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. The measure was backed by 187 countries, including all of America's European allies. Iraq and Afghanistan, two governments that owe their very existence to the U.S., also voted for it. Only three countries (the U.S., Israel and Palau) voted against the resolution.Two others abstained. b. The embargo hurts the U.S. diplomatically i. Marifeli Perez-Stable, (Prof., Sociology, Florida International U.), THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: INTIMATE ENEMIES, 2011, 129. Except for the United States, all countries in the region now have normal relations with Cuba. In 2009, ten Latin-American presidents traveled to Cuba on official visits. Without Obama's proclamation of "a new beginning," however, rescinding Cuba's OAS exclusion would have been unthinkable. ii. Ernesto Zedillo, (Analyst, Brookings Institution), TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 235. U.S.Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward Cuba have affected the United States' image in the region and have hindered Washington's ability to work constructively with other countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course. iii. Louis Perez, (Prof., History, U. North Carolina), CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION, 2011, 333-334. The implications of U.S. policy had expanded far beyond the issue of bilateral relations. The matter of Cuba had developed into a deeper source of contention between the United States and many other Latin American countries. Deteriorating relations during the early 2000s with a host of new populist and progressive governments in the region -- including Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile -- made improved U.S. relations with Cuba something of a condition for improved U.S. relations with Latin America at large.

1AC US Human Rights Advantage

1. Normalization of relations will be of assistance to the Cubans and their human rights. a. The embargo hurts the Cuban people. i.

Embargo violates HR
The embargo is destroying human rights in Cuba denies people access to basic needs, services, and universally agreed upon rights.
Coll 2007
Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of Law [Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall, 2007, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 199]

The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted areas of Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits virtually all American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a few narrow exceptions.
Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S. administrations have worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to pressure as many countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive extraterritorial reach and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's weakness as a small Caribbean island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90 miles from the United States, and the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence. As

currently structured, the embargo has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on the economic, social, and family conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely recognized human rights norms as well as the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions imposed for the sake of promoting human rights do not have the opposite effect of harming the human rights of innocent people . n259Apologists for the embargo point out that the embargo has only a limited impact on the Cuban economy because Cuba is free to trade with virtually every other country in the world. n260 This argument overlooks two key [*236] issues. First, the U.S. government has not contented itself with denying the benefits of trade and investment to Cuba. Instead, throughout most of the embargo's history, U.S. administrations have exerted enormous pressures on foreign governments and companies to discourage all economic contact with Cuba. A typical example occurred in the early 1990s when Cuba, then in the midst of a severe economic depression caused
by the collapse of its ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to modernize its antiquated 40-year old telephone network. Grupos Domo, a Mexican-based conglomerate with substantial economic ties to the United States, began negotiations with Cuba over what would have been a multi-billion dollar deal but eventually withdrew from negotiations as a result of enormous pressure by the U.S. government. n261 Ultimately, Cuba found a group of willing international investor partners, most of whom insisted on anonymity in order to avoid possible American retaliation. Thus, the reach

Second, since Congress embargo has sharply increased its extraterritorial reach. Thousands of foreign companies that could trade with Cuba before 1992 are no longer allowed to do so by virtue of being subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Although the European Union and other U.S. allies responded to the Helms-Burton Act by enacting "blocking statutes" and "claw-back" provisions n262, HelmsBurton has nonetheless had a [*237] chilling effect on trade and investment with Cuba. n263 Thus, the embargo's economic
of the U.S. embargo extends significantly beyond U.S.-Cuba trade relations, and negatively impacts Cuba's relations with other countries as well.

passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the

impact must be measured not only in terms of the way it has isolated Cuba from U.S. markets but also by its effect on the willingness of many private international entities to do business with Cuba. Because the

embargo[s] has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching , encompassing such areas as public health, nutrition, education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions affect education in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads to the deterioration of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the
embargo has cost Cuba an estimated average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite conservative in light of several factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and affects every area of Cuba's economic life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies of scale and geographical advantages associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the international currency of choice, the preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially in the western hemisphere, and the embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to

The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one of the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that: The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous effects of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural
[*238] increase substantially the costs to Cuba of trading with many other countries.

rights of the Cuban people have been denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization ... . n266Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the

embargo has had the opposite

effect of harming human rights.

ii. Daniel Fisk, (Former, Deputy Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs), THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW, Fall 2010, 62. Independent organizations, which struggle to exist despite government repression, are active in calling for more economic opportunities for Cuban citizens. For example, the Latin American Federation of Rural Women (FLAMUR) submitted more than 10,000 signatures to the Cuban National Assembly in support of their Con la Misma Moneda (With the Same Currency) campaign calling on the Cuban government to address issues that stem from the dual currency system. When Cuban citizens are asked what their number one concern is, more than one-half (fifty-two percent) cite worries about low salaries, the high cost of living, and challenges with the island's doublecurrency system. iii.

The Embargo on Cuba is destroying human rights in the country. Lifting the embargo is the best option to solve for the human rights abuses multiple warrants Amash 12
[Brandon Amash, International Relations at UC San Diego; Evaluating the Cuban Embargo, Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/; accessed 23 June 2013; AC] Cuba has a long record of violating the fundamental human rights of freedom of opinion, thought, expression, and the right to dissent; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly protects these rights in Articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Article 21 similarly states that everyone has the right to take pa rt in the government of his country [] (UDHR). The purpose of this proposal is to provide the United States with an alt ernative foreign policy approach toward Cuba that will improve human rights conditions and foster democracy in the country. Namely, I argue that the embargo policy should be

abandoned and replaced with a policy based on modeling appropriate behavior, providing support and resources to developing democratic systems and encouraging participation in multilateral institutions. In the
following pages, I will describe the historical context of the situation, critique the embargo policy and advocate for the normalization of relations with Cuba as a stronger approach to improving human rights and espousing democracy. It is essential to carefully consider this proposal as a viable policy alternative for promoting democracy and protecting human rights in Cuba because the current embargo policy has proven to be ineffective in advancing these goals. Developing more effective approaches to similar situations of democratization and promotion of ideals has been a foreign policy goal of the United States since before the Cold War. However, despite the vast shifts in the international

climate following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Cuba has not adapted. As such, this proposal
highlights the need for a fresh policy toward our neighbor and bitter rival. 2. Historical Context of the Problem: The United States and Cuba have been on unstable terms since the colonization of both countries by the British and Spanish Empires, respectively. Following Cubas independence from Spain and the ensuing Spanish-American War, Cuban-American relations began to deteriorate: Cubans resented American intervention in their independence, afraid of leaving one empire only to be conquered by another. However, the human rights violations in question did not become a problem until after the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, following the rise of Fidel Castros communist regime. After

the revolution, Cuban laws imposed limits on the freedoms of expression and association, effectively undermining the basic human rights of freedom of opinion and dissent. According to Clark, De Fana and Sanchez,
given the totalitarian nature of the country, in which all communications media are in the hands of the omnipotent State -Party, it is physically impossible to express any dissenting political opinion [] (Clark 65). Threatened by these blatantly antidemocratic policies, America had to do something. The United States placed trade embargoes, economic sanctions, and travel bans on Cuba in an attempt to combat the communist regime and human rights violations (Carter 334). Today, diplomatic relations with Cuba remain extremely strained, although Americas embargo policy has tightened and relaxed in concert with its domestic political climate. Most recently, President Obama has reversed tighter restrictions on Cuban American family travel and remittances, as well as announcing that U.S. telecommunications companies may seek license s to do business in Cuba (Carter 336). However, despite the ever-evolving policy and the fluid international climate, little progress has been made in improving the human rights situation in Cuba, let alone the overall promotion of democratic ideals. The embargo policy is bas ed on the idea that

economic denial will bring about continued economic failure in Cuba, thereby creating popular dissatisfaction with the government while simultaneously weakening the governments ability to repress this popular dissent, leading to the destabilization of the regi me and, ultimately, its collapse (Seaman 39). In the following section, I will explain how these objectives have not been realized. 3. Critique of Policy Options Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity wit h the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards,

in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba. 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on
Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cubas economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could

potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or
improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation. 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castros ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cubas revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emerg ence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United St ates rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The

embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself
(Fontaine 18 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; Americas policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever. 3.3: The current policy may drag the United States into a military conflict wit h Cuba. Military conflict may be inevitable in the future if the embargos explicit goal creating an insurrection in Cuba to overthrow the government is achieved, and the United States may not be ready to step in. As Ratliff and Fontaine detail, Americans are not prepared to commit the military resources [] (Fontaine 57), especially after unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much like Americas current situation with isolated rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, Cubas isolat ion may also lead to war for other reasons, like the American occupation of Guantanamo Bay. These consequences are inherently counterproductive for the democratization of Cuba and the improvement of human rights. 4. Policy Recommendations: Although Americas previous po licies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One

policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States,
the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough. 4.1:

Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations
have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. [] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are

inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation,
normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself. 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote

human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along

with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cubas economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights. 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent. 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This
proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting

democracy and improving

human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society,
along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations. 5. Conclusions: Instead of continued economic sanctions

on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility
between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

Solvency
The embargo is harmful to US relations and public image, hurts the US economy, and detrimental to the Cuban people Hanson, Batten, and Ealey 2013
[Daniel Hanson, Dayne Batten, and Harrison Ealey, January 16, 2013; Its time for the US to end its senseless embargo of Cuba ; Forbes; http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/; accessed 19 June 2013; AC]

At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite
the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims. Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the

sanctions are rather toothless.

The State

Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American

estimates of the sanctions annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real
multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges. Yet, reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent. Whats worse, U.S.

sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores. Repealing the embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were all offered normal trade
relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human

China, a communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of
rights practices. genocide and human trafficking propagated by its military government. Which, of course, begs the question: when will the U.S. see fit to lift the embargo? If Cuba is trending towards democracy and free markets, what litmus test must be passed for the embargo to be rolled back? The

cost of the embargo to the United States is high in both dollar and moral terms, but it is higher for the Cuban people, who are cut off from the supposed champion of liberty in their hemisphere because of an antiquated Cold War dispute. The progress being made in Cuba could be accelerated with the help of American charitable relief, business innovation, and tourism. A perpetual embargo on a developing nation that is moving towards reform makes little sense, especially when Americas allies are openly hostile to the embargo. It keeps a broader discussion about smart reform in Cuba from gaining life, and it makes no economic sense. It is time for the embargo to go.

There is no point in the Embargo it doesnt work, Cuba isnt a security threat, it hurts Cubans, and hurts the US economy Griswold 2002
[Daniel Griswold, May 27, 2002; CATO Institute; No: The Embargo Harms Cubans and Gives Castro an Excuse for the Policy Failures of His Regimes; http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/no-embargo-harms-cubans-gives-castro-excuse-policy-failures-regime; accessed 19 June 2013; AC] Since 1960, Americans have been barred from trading with, investing in or traveling to Cuba. The

embargo had a national-security rationale before 1991, when Castro served as the Soviet Unions proxy in the Western Hemisphere. But all that changed with the fall of Soviet communism. Today, a decade after losing billions in annual economic aid from its former sponsor, Cuba is only a poor, dysfunctional nation of 11 million people that poses no threat to U.S. or regional security. A 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report concluded that, Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the U.S. or to other countries in the region. The report declared Cubas military
forces residual and defensive. Some officials in the Bush administration charge that Castros government may be supplying biologicalweapons material to rogue states and terrorists abroad, but the evidence is not conclusive. And even if it were true, maintaining a

comprehensive trade embargo would be a blunt and ineffective lever for change. The Cuban embargo already is tighter than U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq, even though Iraq is a far greater security threat. If the goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba is to help its people achieve freedom and a better life, the economic embargo has failed completely. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse-off by depriving them of lower-cost food and other goods that could be bought from the United States. It means less independence for Cuban workers and entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from American tourists and fueling private-sector growth. Meanwhile, Castro and his ruling elite enjoy a comfortable, insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced by their captive subjects. Cuban families are not the only victims of the embargo. Many of the dollars Cubans could earn from U.S. tourists would come back to the United States to buy American products, especially farm goods. The American Farm Bureau estimates that Cuba could eventually become a $1 billion agricultural-export market for products of U.S. farmers and ranchers. The embargo stifles another $250 million in potential annual exports of fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and tractors. According to a study last year by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the embargo costs American firms between $684 million and $1.2 billion per year.