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A THEORY OF COMPLEXES *

It is vain to do with more What can be done with fewer. Entities must not be multiplied Beyond necessity. --William of Occam

It is vain to try to do with fewer What requires more. Entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy. --Karl Menger

ABSTRACT: In ‘A Theory of Complexes’, the simple form of the pure theory of identity found in logic books is subordinated to a complex form of the theory whose background ontology is one of structured individuals, or complexes. In the complex form:

The axioms of the simple form proceed from principles more basic.structured individuals, or complexes . In the complex form: The semantic difference between ‘ a =

The semantic difference between ‘a = b ’ and ‘ a = a ’ supervenes on features of a a = b’ and ‘a = a’ supervenes on features of a and b. 1

Identicals such as nine and the number of planets differ in their modal properties and relations. 2 2

'A Theory of Complexes' puts into question: the privileging of FOL individuals, the expressive completeness of FOL, and ontology-free logic.

* Epistemologia 19.1 (1996): 85-112 1 See "The Paradox of Identity." Epistemologia 19.2 (1996): 207-226. 2 “Let X = X But Not Necessarily,” unpublished ms.

1

1.1 Introduction 3

In his review of Errol Harris's An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, 4 John E. Smith highlights what is mainly at issue between the Hegelian conception of logic and the formalist conception favored by modern empiricism and many forms of analytic philosophy. The Hegelian holds logic to be "internally related at every level to the real content it articulates" (463). In contrast, the formalist pegs logic as neutral--both with respect to "the nature of things" and to "what there is" (ibid.).

How fares the logic of identity in this dispute? Is identity neutral, both to "the nature of things" and to "what there is"? Or is the complexity of this relation a legacy of its terms?

From a formalist standpoint, the identity-relation is indifferent to the nature of its terms: what a particular is (qua value of a variable) has no bearing on its relation to itself. Unrelated to the things it relates, identity thus has its nature imposed from without--by classical axioms which appear in the guise of empirical observations or arbitrary stipulations, or as the inexpugnable avatars of a Self-Certifying Logical Truth. In contrast, from the (broadly) Hegelian standpoint of 'A Theory of Complexes', the properties of identity have their source in the kind of entity over which individual variables range: a particular--the particular-cum-complex--which, unlike the denatured simple of Russell, Bergmann, Allaire, et al., 5 is ontologically differentiated and logically complex. The intrinsic features of this particular ground a minimal identity relation, 6 which ramifies classically and non-classically. 7 These features also ground a difference between formal and material identity which sets 'a = a' and 'a = b' apart in cognitive content. Such properties of identity are thus not external to its terms, as in formalist treat- ments. Here they are engendered instead by features of the entity which identity self-relates.

3 I am grateful to Paul Schachter, John Olney, and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper--and to the College of Humanities of the University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras for reductions in load which helped make completion of this paper possible.

4 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, V. 36, No. 4, Dec. 1985: 459-465.

5 Such a particular is as portrayed by John Baker, in “Particulars: Bare, Naked, and Nude,” (Nous, V. 1, No. 2, May 1967: 211-212):

Particulars are nude in that they have no natures, that is, they are not necessarily connected to any specific property or set of properties. A nude particular has no nature, and is to be distinguished from the naked particular which has no properties. Those who claim that there are bare particulars, Russell, Bergmann,

Allaire, et al., claim that they are nude of natures

(211)

6 By a minimal identity-relation I understand one whose properties--symmetry, transitivity, weak reflexivity, indiscernibility for identicals and identity for self-idenical indiscernibles--are criterial for identity.

7 The classical relation being strongly reflexive, indiscernibles are identical. In contrast, in the non-classical relation identity is partially irreflexive, and so some indiscernibles are not identical.

2

A theory of the particular-cum-complex encapsulates a theory of its constituents: haecceities 8 and

individuals. 9 To HI,

a theory of haecceities and individuals, I now turn.

1.2.0 The Language of HI

HI is developed within a first-order, multi-sorted language L. Among its primitive signs, L counts two predicate constants,

(1.1) "ex" for exemplification

(1.2) "=" for identity

three sorts of variables,

(2.1) variables for individuals: u, v, w, x, y, z, u 1 , u 2 ,

,

u i ,

(2.2) variables for haecceities: U, V, W, X, Y, Z, U 1 , U 2 ,

(2.3) variables for particulars: u, v, w, x, y, z, u 1 , u 2 ,

the usual sentential connectives,

(3.1) ¬,

, u 2 , the usual sentential connectives, ( 3.1 ) ¬, , &, v, ,u

, &, v,

, the usual sentential connectives, ( 3.1 ) ¬, , &, v, ,u i , ,

,u

i

,

,

U

i ,

and the universal and existential quantifiers.

(3.2)

,
,

In the metalanguage of L, t 1 , t 2 ,

t 1 , t 2 ,

,

t i range over individual variables; T 1 , T 2 ,

over expressions.

, t i over particular variables; and α, β, γ,

,

T i over haecceity variables;

A formula of L is any expression provided for by the following conditions:

(4.1) t i ex T j , t i = t j and T i = T j are atomic formulas.

(5.1) Every atomic formula is a formula.

(5.2) If α is a formula, ¬α is a formula.

8 Pick any particular. Corresponding to your particular is a property that, as established by T46 (see section 1.4.6.1), only your particular has if anything does. This property is a haecceity. My notion of a haecceity and Adams's (1979, 1981) notion of a thisness are compared in note 24.

9 A haecceity needs a support, or substratum, if it is to belong to an actual thing. An entity which can be such a support, or substratum, is an individual.

3

(5.3)

If α and β are formulas,

(5.4) If β is a formula,

and β are formulas, (α ( 5.4 ) If β is a formula, t i β

t i β and

1.2.1 Variable-binding in L 11

β), (α v β) , (α & β) , (α v β), (α & β)

in L 1 1 β) , (α v β) , (α & β) t i β

t i β are formulas. 10

and

, (α & β) t i β are formulas. 1 0 and (α β) are formulas.

β) are formulas.

The logic of L departs from that of conventional, single-sorted, first-order languages in its definition of variable-binding and formulation of the Quantifier Rules. An occurrence of a variable t i /t i /T i within a formula φ is a bound occurrence of t i /t i /T i in φ if, and only if, it occurs within some part of φ which is a

formula of the form

φ. If a formula

that occurrence of the quantifier

t i β or
t i β or

t i β or of the form

of the quantifier t i β or t i β or of the form t i

t i β. Otherwise, that occurrence is a free occurrence of t i /t i /T i in

t i β occurs within a formula φ (or is the formula φ itself), then the scope in φ of

(or is the formula φ itself), then the scope in φ of t i or t

t i or

t i is the formula i is the formula

then the scope in φ of t i or t i is the formula t i

t i β or

in φ of t i or t i is the formula t i β or t

t i β itself.

1.2.2 Quantifier Rules in L

The rule of Universal Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula:

(1)

Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula: (1) t i Π( t i /t i /T

t i Π(

t i /t i /T i

to a formula:

(2) Π(

t j /t j /T j

)

)

12

where (2) results from replacing every occurrence of t i /t i /T i free in:

(3) Π(

t i /t i /T i

)

by occurrences of t j /t j /T j free in (2). UI thus sanctions the move from:

to:

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

u
u

v(v ex U

sanctions the move from: to: (4) (5) (6) (7) u v (v ex U u ex

u ex U)

v(v ex U (v ex U

move from: to: (4) (5) (6) (7) u v (v ex U u ex U) v

v(v ex W

to: (4) (5) (6) (7) u v (v ex U u ex U) v (v ex

v(v ex X

(6) (7) u v (v ex U u ex U) v (v ex U v (v

u ex U)

w ex W)u v (v ex U u ex U) v (v ex U v (v ex W

ex U u ex U) v (v ex U v (v ex W v (v ex

x ex X)

10

In L, the particular variables u, v, w, x, y, z, u 1 , u 2 ,

,

occur only in quantifier expressions, binding

, individual and haecceity variables as indicated in (1.2.1).

11 My treatment of variable-binding in L is an adaptation of the treatment of variable-binding for first-order predicate logic in Rogers (1971).

12 Π is possibly null.

u

i ,

4

in each of which generically identical, individual and haecceity variables u/U free in,

(8)

individual and haecceity variables u/U free in, (8) v (v ex U u ex U) have

v(v ex U

and haecceity variables u/U free in, (8) v (v ex U u ex U) have been

u ex U)

have been replaced by other, or perhaps the same, generically identical, individual and haecceity variables t i /T i free in:

(9)

and haecceity variables t i /T i free in: (9) v (v ex T i t

v(v ex T i

variables t i /T i free in: (9) v (v ex T i t i ex

t i ex T i )

UI does not, however, sanction the move from (4) to

(10)

) UI does not, however, sanction the move from (4) to (10) v (v ex W

v(v ex W

not, however, sanction the move from (4) to (10) v (v ex W x ex W),

x ex W),

for (10) results from replacing generically identical, individual and haecceity variables u and U in (5), by the generically distinct x and W in (10).

The rule of Existential Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula:

(11)

Instantiation sanctions the move from a formula: (11) t i Π( to a formula: t i

t i Π(

to a formula:

t i /t i /T i

(12) Π(

t j /t j /T j

)

)

where (12) results from replacing every occurrence of t i /t i /T i free in:

(13) Π(

t i /t i /T i

)

by occurrences of t j /t j /T j free in (12), which do not occur free in any earlier line of a proof.

1.2.3

The

Postulates of HI

P1-P3 describe the relations of haecceities and individuals which determine the properties of identity in the realm of individuals.

P1

the properties of identity in the realm of individuals. P1 wxyz ((w ex Y & x

wxyz((w ex Y & x ex Y)

in the realm of individuals. P1 wxyz ((w ex Y & x ex Y) (w ex

(w ex Z

realm of individuals. P1 wxyz ((w ex Y & x ex Y) (w ex Z x

x ex Z))

(If individuals co-exemplify any haecceity, they exemplify the same haecceities.)

P2

any haecceity, they exemplify the same haecceities. ) P2 xy (x = y z (x ex

xy(x = y

they exemplify the same haecceities. ) P2 xy (x = y z (x ex Z &

z(x ex Z & y ex Z))

(Individuals are identical just in case they co-exemplify some haecceity.)

5

P3

P3 xy (x ex Y y ex Y) ( If x exemplifies Y, y exemplifies Y.

xy(x ex Y

y ex Y)P3 xy (x ex Y ( If x exemplifies Y, y exemplifies Y. ) P4 -

(If x exemplifies Y, y exemplifies Y.)

P4-P6 describe relations of individuals and haecceities which determine the properties of identity in the realm of haecceities.

P4

wxyz ((y ex W & y ex X) (z ex W z ex X)) (

wxyz((y ex W & y ex X)

wxyz ((y ex W & y ex X) (z ex W z ex X)) ( If

(z ex W

wxyz ((y ex W & y ex X) (z ex W z ex X)) ( If

z ex X))

(If haecceities are co-exemplified by any individual, they are exemplified by the same individuals.)

P5

P6

xy (X = Y z (z ex X & z ex Y)) (H aecceities are

xy(X = Y

xy (X = Y z (z ex X & z ex Y)) (H aecceities are identical

z(z ex X & z ex Y))

(Haecceities are identical just in case they are co-exemplified by some individual.)

X & z ex Y)) (H aecceities are identical just in case they are co-exemplified by

xy(x ex Y

X & z ex Y)) (H aecceities are identical just in case they are co-exemplified by

x ex X)

(If x exemplifies Y, x exemplifies X.)

1.2.4

Identity

in HI

P1-P6 found an identity relation which is weakly reflexive, symmetric, and transitive;

T1*

x(
x(
x( y (x = y) (x = x)) 1 3 ( Identity is weakly reflexive. )

y(x = y)

x( y (x = y) (x = x)) 1 3 ( Identity is weakly reflexive. )

(x = x)) 13

(Identity is weakly reflexive.)

T2*

T3*

xy (x = y y = x) ( Identity is symmetric .) xyz ((x =

xy(x = y

xy (x = y y = x) ( Identity is symmetric .) xyz ((x = y

y = x)

(Identity is symmetric.)

xy (x = y y = x) ( Identity is symmetric .) xyz ((x = y

xyz((x = y & y = z)

xy (x = y y = x) ( Identity is symmetric .) xyz ((x = y

x = z)

(Identity is transitive.)

identicals that are indiscernible; and indiscernibles that are identical if self-identical.

13 Let α(t i ,T j /T i ,t j ) be the result of replacing t i and T j everywhere in α by T i and t j , and then replacing every resultant occurrence of T k ex t l by t l ex T k . The asterisk ("*") will then be understood to indicate that T1(t i ,T j /T i ,t j ), which makes identity weakly reflexive for haecceities, is also a theorem.

6

T4*

T5*

T4* T5* xyz (x = y (x ex Z y ex Z)) ( Identicals are indiscernible

xyz(x = y

T4* T5* xyz (x = y (x ex Z y ex Z)) ( Identicals are indiscernible

(x ex Z

T4* T5* xyz (x = y (x ex Z y ex Z)) ( Identicals are indiscernible

y ex Z))

(Identicals are indiscernible.)

xy((x = x & y = y) ((x = x & y = y)

(
(

z(x ex Z

are indiscernible .) xy ((x = x & y = y) ( z (x ex Z

y ex Z)

indiscernible .) xy ((x = x & y = y) ( z (x ex Z y

x = y))

(Self-identical indiscernibles are identical.)

P1-P6 thus found a minimal identity relation. 14

From P2 it follows that an individual is self-identical just in case there is some haecceity it exemplifies; and from P5, that a haecceity is self-identical just in case there is some individual it is exemplified by.

T6*

in case there is some individual it is exemplified by. T6* x (x = x y

x(x = x

there is some individual it is exemplified by. T6* x (x = x y (x ex

y(x ex Y))

Hence, every individual is self-identical just in case every individual exemplifies; and every haecceity is self-identical just in case every haecceity is exemplified.

T7*

just in case every haecceity is exemplified. T7* x (x = x) y (x ex Y)

x(x = x)

y(x ex Y) (x ex Y)

From T5*-T7*, it also follows, moreover, that indiscernibles are identical just in case every individual exemplifies and every haecceity is exemplified.

T8*

exemplifies and every haecceity is exemplified. T8* xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z)

xy(

exemplifies and every haecceity is exemplified. T8* xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z)

z(x ex Z

y ex Z)and every haecceity is exemplified. T8* xy ( z (x ex Z x = y) x

every haecceity is exemplified. T8* xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z) x =

x = y)

x
x

y(x ex Y)

The ontological scaffolding provided by P1-P6 thus lends itself to further specification. Is every haecceity exemplified? Does every individual exemplify? In view of T9*, 15 we have here not two ques- tions but one.

T9*

T9* , 1 5 we have here not two ques- tions but one. T9* x y

x y(y ex X)

x
x

y(x ex Y)

(If every haecceity is exemplified, every individual exemplifies.)

1.2.5 Extending HI

1.2.5.1 HI+

A world in which every individual exemplifies--and every haecceity is exemplified--is described by adding P10 to the postulates of HI, yielding the theory HI+.

P10

to the postulates of HI , yielding the theory HI +. P10 x y (y ex

x y(y ex X)

14 By a minimal identity relation, I understand an identity relation whose properties are criterial for identity.

15 T9(t i ,T j /T i ,t j ) specifies that every individual exemplifies only if every haecceity is exemplified.

7

(All haecceities are exemplified.)

In HI+, identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical, and so HI+ is a classical extension of HI.

T10*

and so HI + is a classical extension of HI . T10* x (x = x)

x(x = x)

(Identity is totally reflexive.)

T11*

xy( (

T10* x (x = x) ( Identity is totally reflexive. ) T11* xy ( z (x

z(x ex Z

= x) ( Identity is totally reflexive. ) T11* xy ( z (x ex Z y

y ex Z)

Identity is totally reflexive. ) T11* xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z) x

x = y)

(Indiscernibles are identical.)

1.2.5.2 HI-

In contrast, a world in which not every individual exemplifies--and not every haecceity is exemplified--is described by adding P10' 16 to the postulates of HI.

P10' ¬

P10' 1 6 to the postulates of HI . P10' ¬ x y (y ex X)

x y(y ex X)

(Some haecceity is not exemplified.)

In the resulting theory HI-, identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. HI- is thus a non-classical extension of HI.

T10'* ¬

is thus a non-classical extension of HI . T10'* ¬ x (x = x) ( Identity

x(x = x)

(Identity is partially irreflexive.)

T11'* ¬

xy( (

x) ( Identity is partially irreflexive .) T11'* ¬ xy ( z (x ex Z y

z(x ex Z

is partially irreflexive .) T11'* ¬ xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z) x

y ex Z)

partially irreflexive .) T11'* ¬ xy ( z (x ex Z y ex Z) x =

x = y)

(Not all indiscernibles are identical.)

1.2.6 The ontological significance of HI, HI+, and HI-

The reciprocal connections of individuals and haecceities in HI scaffold properties of identity which, perhaps because they resist analysis in classical terms, have generally been taken to be self-evident--and ontology-free. In HI, however, that identity is weakly reflexive, identicals indiscernible, and indiscer- nibles identical if self-identical are propositions which rest upon yet more basic ontological principles. Thus, the notoriously "self-evident" dictum that everything is what it is divulges, upon analysis, ontologi- cal conditions whose satisfaction depends not on a logician's fiat but on the way the world is. These

16 α' is the contradictory negation of α.

8

conditions hold in HI+, in which every haecceity is exemplified and every individual exemplifies, so that identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical. HI- posits, in contrast, a world populated by unexemplified haecceities and non-exemplifying individuals, in which identity is not totally reflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. Which of these worlds is ours? Ask not Logic, for Logic will not decide.

But I promised an account of the properties of the identity relation as this applies to particulars. So far we have seen nought but individuals and haecceities. The road to particulars is from individuals and haecceities by way of complexes. To a theory of complexes I now turn.

9

 

HI

HI +

HI-

Identity is weakly reflexive: T1*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identity is symmetric: T2*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identity is transitive: T3*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identicals are indiscernible: T4*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Indiscernibles are identical if self-identical: T5*

Yes

Yes

Yes

There are unexemplified haecceities.

---

No

Yes

P10

P10'

There are 'bare' individuals.

---

No

Yes

P10

P10'

Identity is totally reflexive.

---

Yes

No

T10*

T10'*

Indiscernibles are identical.

 

--

Yes

No

-

T11*

T11'*

IMPORTANT THEOREMS

1.3

A

Theory of Complexes

1.3.1 The Language L'

The theory C of complexes is developed within L', a first-order language which contains L. In addition to the relational constants and variables of L, the symbols of L' include:

(1.3) "emb" for embodiment 17 and "cont" for containment. 18

(1.4) an operation symbol: .

(2.4) variables for complexes, as specified by the rule: if t i is an individual variable and T j a haecceity variable, t i .T j is a complex variable.

In addition to the atomic formulas of L, L' also includes atomic formulas, as provided for by:

(4.2) t i .T j emb T k , t i .T j cont t k , and t i .T j = t k .T l are atomic formulas.

The definition of variable-binding and formulation of Quantifier Rules in L' is as in L.

1.3.2

The

Theory C

To the postulates of HI, C subjoins P7-P9.

P7

wxyz (w.X = y.Z (w ex X & w ex Z & y ex X))

wxyz(w.X = y.Z

wxyz (w.X = y.Z (w ex X & w ex Z & y ex X)) (

(w ex X & w ex Z & y ex X))

(w.X and y.Z are identical iff w exemplifies X and Z, and y exemplifies X.)

P8

P9

xyz (x.Y emb Z (x ex Y & x ex Z)) ( x.Y embodies Z

xyz(x.Y emb Z

xyz (x.Y emb Z (x ex Y & x ex Z)) ( x.Y embodies Z iff

(x ex Y & x ex Z))

(x.Y embodies Z iff x exemplifies Y and Z.)

xyz (x.Y emb Z (x ex Y & x ex Z)) ( x.Y embodies Z iff

xyz(x.Y cont z

xyz (x.Y emb Z (x ex Y & x ex Z)) ( x.Y embodies Z iff

(x ex Y & z ex Y))

(x.Y contains z iff x and z exemplify Y.)

P7 determines when complexes are identical; P8, when a complex embodies a haecceity; and P9, when a complex contains an individual. In so doing, P7-P9 determine, together with P1-P6, the properties of identity as this relation applies to complexes.

17 Embodiment relates a particular to an haecceity just in case there is some complex to which the haecceity and constituents of the particular belong (see T48, section 1.4.6.2).

18 Containment relates a particular and an individual just in case there is some complex to which the individual and constituents of the particular belong (see T49, section 1.4.6.2).

10

1.3.3

Identity in C

Identity in C is weakly reflexive, symmetric, and transitive for individuals and haecceities (T1*-T3*) and complexes (T12-T14); identicals are indiscernible (T4*, T15#); and indiscernibles are identical if self- identical (T5*, T16#). C thus grounds a minimal identity relation.

T12

wx ( yz (w.X = y.Z) w.X = w.X) ( Identity is weakly reflexive for
wx ( yz (w.X = y.Z) w.X = w.X) ( Identity is weakly reflexive for

wx( yz(w.X = y.Z)

wx ( yz (w.X = y.Z) w.X = w.X) ( Identity is weakly reflexive for complexes.

w.X = w.X)

(Identity is weakly reflexive for complexes.)

T13

T14

wxyz (w.X = y.Z y.Z = w.X) ( Identity is symmetric for complexes. ) uvwxyz

wxyz(w.X = y.Z

wxyz (w.X = y.Z y.Z = w.X) ( Identity is symmetric for complexes. ) uvwxyz ((u.V

y.Z = w.X)

(Identity is symmetric for complexes.)

wxyz (w.X = y.Z y.Z = w.X) ( Identity is symmetric for complexes. ) uvwxyz ((u.V

uvwxyz((u.V = w.X & w.X = y.Z)

wxyz (w.X = y.Z y.Z = w.X) ( Identity is symmetric for complexes. ) uvwxyz ((u.V

u.V = y.Z)

(Identity is transitive for complexes.)

T15#

uvwxy(u.V = w.X (u.V = w.X

is transitive for complexes. ) T15# uvwxy (u.V = w.X (u.V emb Y w.X emb Y))

(u.V emb Y

w.X emb Y)) 1 9 19

(Identical complexes are indiscernible.)

T16#

uvwx((u.V = u.V & w.X = w.X) ((u.V = u.V & w.X = w.X)

y(u.V emb Y (u.V emb Y

) T 16# uvwx ((u.V = u.V & w.X = w.X) y (u.V emb Y w.X

w.X emb Y)

uvwx ((u.V = u.V & w.X = w.X) y (u.V emb Y w.X emb Y) u.V

u.V = w.X))

(Self-identical complexes are identical if indiscernible.) 20

1.3.4 Reflexivity and Complexes

In HI+, obtained by subjoining P10 to the postulates of HI, identity was totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities. However, subjoining P10 to the postulates of C does not suffice to make identity totally reflexive for complexes. Thus, from P7 it follows that any complex is self-identical just in case the individual and haecceity which constitute it are such that the individual exemplifies the haecceity:

T18

are such that the individual exemplifies the haecceity: T18 xy (x.Y = x.Y x ex Y)

xy(x.Y = x.Y

the individual exemplifies the haecceity: T18 xy (x.Y = x.Y x ex Y) 1 9 Let

x ex Y)

19 Let α(t i ,T j //T i, t j ) be obtained from α by simultaneously replacing t i and T j everywhere in α by T i and t j , "cont" and "emb" by "emb" and "cont", and then T k .t l by t l .T k . The symbol "#" will then be understood to indicate that T15(t i ,T j //T i ,t j ), which makes complexes indiscernible in respect of the individuals they contain, is also a theorem.

20 From T16# it follows that every pair of indiscernible complexes is identical just in case every complex is self- identical,

T17#

just in case every complex is self- identical, T17# uvwx ( y (u.V emb Y w.X

uvwx(

y(u.V emb Y (u.V emb Y

w.X emb Y)every complex is self- identical, T17# uvwx ( y (u.V emb Y u.V = w.X) uv

is self- identical, T17# uvwx ( y (u.V emb Y w.X emb Y) u.V = w.X)

u.V = w.X)

identical, T17# uvwx ( y (u.V emb Y w.X emb Y) u.V = w.X) uv (u.V

uv(u.V = u.V)

a principle which, in view of T5*, holds as well for individuals and haecceities.

11

Hence every complex is self-identical just in case every individual exemplifies every haecceity:

T19

in case every individual exemplifies every haecceity: T19 xy (x.Y = x.Y) xy (x ex Y)

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

xy(x ex Y) (x ex Y)

Moreover, it follows--from P2, P6 and T4*--that every individual exemplifies every haecceity just in case some haecceity is such that every individual exemplifies it:

T20

xy(x ex Y) (x ex Y)

x
x

y(y ex X)

Therefore, for identity to be totally reflexive for complexes, not only must every haecceity be exem- plified, but some haecceity must be universally exemplified:

T21

but some haecceity must be universally exemplified: T21 xy (x.Y = x.Y) y (y ex X)

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

y(y ex X) (y ex X)

Identity in C is thus not totally reflexive for complexes unless no two complexes are distinct.

T22

for complexes unless no two complexes are distinct. T22 wx (w.X = w.X) wxyz (w.X =

wx(w.X = w.X)

unless no two complexes are distinct. T22 wx (w.X = w.X) wxyz (w.X = y.Z) P10

wxyz(w.X = y.Z)

P10 thus fails to make identity totally reflexive for complexes generally (although it does make identity totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities). But P10 does make identity totally reflexive for

complexes w.W, x.X, y.Y, z.Z,

,

whose constituents correspond.

T23

w.W, x.X, y.Y, z.Z, , whose constituents correspond . T23 x ( y (y ex X)
w.W, x.X, y.Y, z.Z, , whose constituents correspond . T23 x ( y (y ex X)

x( y(y ex X)

z.Z, , whose constituents correspond . T23 x ( y (y ex X) x.X = x.X)

x.X = x.X)

T24

correspond . T23 x ( y (y ex X) x.X = x.X) T24 x y (y

x y(y ex X)

correspond . T23 x ( y (y ex X) x.X = x.X) T24 x y (y

x(x.X = x.X)

I will refer to these as C-complexes.

1.3.5 Extending C

1.3.5.1 C+

The theory C+ is obtained by subjoining P10 to the deductive apparatus of C. In C+, identity is partially reflexive for complexes,

T25

In C+ , identity is partially reflexive for complexes, T25 xy (x.Y = x.Y ) but

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

but totally reflexive for individuals and haecceities (T10*), and for C-complexes:

T26

and haecceities ( T10* ), and for C -complexes: T26 x (x.X = x.X) Therefore, in

x(x.X = x.X)

Therefore, in C+ individuals and haecceities (T11*) and C-complexes are identical if indiscernible:

T27#

and haecceities ( T11* ) and C -complexes are identical if indiscernible: T27# xy ( z

xy(

and haecceities ( T11* ) and C -complexes are identical if indiscernible: T27# xy ( z

z(x.X emb Z

y.Y emb Z)and haecceities ( T11* ) and C -complexes are identical if indiscernible: T27# xy ( z

and haecceities ( T11* ) and C -complexes are identical if indiscernible: T27# xy ( z

x.X = y.Y)

12

1.3.5.2 C-

In C-, obtained by subjoining P10' to the deductive apparatus of C, identity is partially irreflexive for individuals and haecceities (T10'*), and for C-complexes and complexes.

T26' ¬

T28' ¬

and for C -complexes and complexes. T26' ¬ T28' ¬ x (x.X = x.X) xy (x.Y

and for C -complexes and complexes. T26' ¬ T28' ¬ x (x.X = x.X) xy (x.Y

x(x.X = x.X)

xy(x.Y = x.Y) 21

Consequently, in C- not all individuals and haecceities (T11'*), or C-complexes and complexes, are identical if indiscernible.

T27'# ¬

T29'# ¬

xy( (

identical if indiscernible. T27'# ¬ T29'# ¬ xy ( z (x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z)

z(x.X emb Z

indiscernible. T27'# ¬ T29'# ¬ xy ( z (x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X =

y.Y emb Z)

T27'# ¬ T29'# ¬ xy ( z (x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y)

x.X = y.Y)

wxyz( (

T29'# ¬ xy ( z (x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y) wxyz (

v(w.X emb V

xy ( z (x.X emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y) wxyz ( v (w.X

y.Z emb V)

emb Z y.Y emb Z) x.X = y.Y) wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb

w.X = y.Z)

21 The following is also a theorem of C:

w.X = y.Z ) 2 1 The following is also a theorem of C : xy

xy(¬(x.Y = x.Y)

The following is also a theorem of C : xy (¬(x.Y = x.Y) wz ¬(x.Y =

wz¬(x.Y = w.Z))

A complex which is not self-identical is thus diverse from every complex.

13

 

C

C+

C-

Identity is weakly reflexive: T1*/T12

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identity is symmetric: T2*/T13

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identity is transitive: T3*/T14

Yes

Yes

Yes

Identicals are indiscernible: T4*/T15#

Yes

Yes

Yes

Self-identical indiscernibles are identi- cal: T5*/T16#

Yes

Yes

Yes

 

Individuals

---

Yes

No

T10*

T10'*

Identity is totally reflexive.

Haecceities

---

Yes

No

T10*

T10'*

 

C-complexes

---

Yes

No T26'

T26

Complexes

---

---

No T28'

 

Individuals

---

Yes

No

T11*

T11'*

Indiscernibles are identical.

Haecceities

---

Yes

No

T11*

T11'*

 

C-complexes

---

Yes

No

T27#

T27'#

Complexes

---

---

No

T29'#

IMPORTANT THEOREMS

1.4

C-complexes and Particulars

In classical identity theory, identity is totally reflexive, symmetric and transitive, identicals are indiscernible, and indiscernibles identical. Two other theories suggest themselves here, a restriction of the classical theory, minimal identity theory, in which it cannot be established that identity is totally reflexive or that indiscernibles are identical; and a deviation of the classical theory, which I shall refer to as non-classical identity theory, in which identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical.

Classical and non-classical identity theory both include and extend the minimal theory. They include it because every thesis of the minimal theory is also a thesis of the classical and non-classical theories: in the minimal, classical and non-classical theories, identity is symmetric, transitive, and weakly reflexive; identicals are indiscernible, and self-identical indiscernibles are identical. They extend it because the classical and non-classical theories each have theses that are not theses of the minimal theory. In the classical but not the minimal theory, identity is totally reflexive and indiscernibles are identical; in the non-classical but not the minimal theory, identity is partially irreflexive and not all indiscernibles are identical. 22

C-complexes in C provide a model for minimal identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric (T13), transitive (T14), and weakly reflexive (T12), identicals are indiscernible (T15#), and self-identical indiscernibles are identical (T16#).

C-complexes in C+ provide a model for classical identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric, transitive, and totally reflexive (T26), identicals are indiscernible, and indiscernibles are identical (T27#). Finally, C-complexes in C- provide a model for non-classical identity theory: a domain in which identity is symmetric, transitive, and partially irreflexive (T26'), identicals are indiscernible, but not all indiscernibles are identical (T27'#). C-complexes may thus be taken as the values of particular variables in each of the aforementioned theories, 23 and C, C+ and C- may be enriched, as in the theory P and its extensions, by treating C-complexes as particulars. 24

22 The class of wffs of the classical theory and the non-classical theory coincide. However, the theorems of these theories differ, the Reflexive Law of Equality and logically equivalent principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles being provable in the former, while their contradictory negations are provable in the latter. Non-classical identity theory is thus a deviation, as Susan Haack defines "deviation" in her (1974), of classical identity theory.

23 The individual variables of classical identity theory I refer to as particular variables, a particular being construed here as an entity whose constituents are individuals and haecceities.

24 C-complexes in C, C+ and C- are intended both as realizations of minimal, classical and non-classical identity theory, and as schematizations of contrasting systems of real relations of particulars and their constituents. C- complexes thus constitute a model in both senses Jean Ladrière distinguishes for this term in his (1979). For Ladrière, a model is:

construction idéale, intermédiaire entre une théorie au sens strict (considerée comme ensemble de

une

14

1.4.1

The Language of P

P is developed within L*, a first-order language obtained by adding to the formation rules of L' the clause

(4.3).

(4.3) t i emb T j , t i cont t j , t i = t j , t i = t j .T k and t j .T k = t i are atomic formulas.

The definition of variable-binding and formulation of the Quantifier Rules in L* is as in L' and L.

1.4.2 The Deductive Apparatus of P

P augments the deductive apparatus of C by the inference rules I1 and I2.

I1: From φ to infer ψ, where ψ results from φ by substituting t for t.T at one or more places of its occurrence.

I2: From φ to infer ψ, where ψ results from φ by substituting t.T for t at one or more places of its occurrence.

I1 and I2 license the translation of an assertion about t.T/t into one about t/t.T. The warrant for I1 and I2 is that the C-complex t.T and particular t are one and the same entity.

In HI, the properties of identity are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals and haecceities. In C, the properties of identity are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals, haecceities and complexes. In P, particulars are C-complexes, and so the properties of identity (as this applies to particu- lars) are determined by the reciprocal relations of individuals, haecceities, and C-complexes.

1.4.3

Identity

in P

For particulars in P, as for individuals and haecceities in HI and complexes in C, identity is weakly reflexive (T30), symmetric (T31) and transitive (T32); identicals are indiscernible (T33#); and self-identi- cal indiscernibles identical (T34#).

T30

T31

T32

x(
x(
cal indiscernibles identical ( T34# ). T30 T31 T32 x( y ( x = y )

y(x = y)

identical ( T34# ). T30 T31 T32 x( y ( x = y ) x =

x = x)

xy( x = y (x = y

T34# ). T30 T31 T32 x( y ( x = y ) x = x )

y = x)

T31 T32 x( y ( x = y ) x = x ) xy ( x

xyz((x = y & y = z)

x ) xy ( x = y y = x ) xyz (( x = y

x = z)

propositions munie d'une structure déductive) et un domaine concret dont il s'agit d'analyser le fonction-

nement

(p. 183)

15

T33#

T34#

xyz( x = y (x = y

T33# T34# xyz ( x = y ( x emb Z y emb Z)) xy ((

(x emb Z

T33# T34# xyz ( x = y ( x emb Z y emb Z)) xy ((

y emb Z))

xy(( x = x & y = y ) ((x = x & y = y)

(
(

z(x emb Z

Z y emb Z)) xy (( x = x & y = y ) ( z

y emb Z)

Z)) xy (( x = x & y = y ) ( z ( x emb

x = y))

As in HI and C, moreover, in P it cannot be established whether identity is reflexive or indiscernibles are identical. For the self-identity of a particular is bound up in P with the unity of the individual and haecceity which constitute it.

T35

of the individual and haecceity which constitute it. T35 x ( x = x x ex

x(x = x

and haecceity which constitute it. T35 x ( x = x x ex X) This unity

x ex X)

This unity depends in turn upon a haecceity's being exemplified,

T36

in turn upon a haecceity's being exemplified, T36 x (x ex X y (y ex X)

x(x ex X

turn upon a haecceity's being exemplified, T36 x (x ex X y (y ex X) )

y(y ex X))

so that every particular is self-identical, and identity totally reflexive if, and only if, every haecceity is exemplified.

T37

if, and only if, every haecceity is exemplified. T37 x ( x = x ) x

x(x = x)

x y(y ex X) (y ex X)

However, whether every, or any, haecceity is exemplified is not specified in P, for P specifies just those relations of indivi-duals and haecceities which ground properties that are criterial for identity. Consequently, whether identity is totally or partially reflexive--or indiscernibles are identical--cannot be established in P. For these properties differentiate species within a genus without being relevant to the genus itself.

1.4.4 Extending P

In discussing the different species of identity, it will be useful to distinguish classical particu- lars/individuals/haec- ceities/complexes from non-classical ones.

Definition 1: t i /t i /T i is classical iff

Definition 1 : t i /t i /T i is classical iff t j ( t

t j (t i /t i /T i = t j /t j /T j )

Definition 2: t i .T j is classical iff

j ) Definition 2 : t i .T j is classical iff t k t i

t k t i (t i .T j = t k .T i )

iff t k t i (t i .T j = t k .T i ) Definition

Definition 3: t i /t i /T i is non-classical iff ¬ t j (t i /t i /T i = t j /t j /T j )

( t i /t i /T i = t j /t j /T j ) Definition

Definition 4: t i .T j is non-classical iff ¬ t k t i (t i .T j = t k .T i )

From the foregoing it follows that every particular/individual/haecceity/complex is either classical or non- classical, and that none is both.

1.4.4.1 P+

P+ is obtained by subjoining P10 to the postulates of P.

16

P10

P10 x y (y ex X ) ( Every haecceity is exemplified .) Theorems of P+

x y(y ex X)

(Every haecceity is exemplified.)

Theorems of P+ include:

T38

haecceity is exemplified .) Theorems of P+ include: T38 x ( x = x ) (

x(x = x)

(Identity is totally reflexive for particulars.)

T39#

x ) ( Identity is totally reflexive for particulars .) T39# xy ( z ( x

xy(

( Identity is totally reflexive for particulars .) T39# xy ( z ( x emb Z

z(x emb Z

totally reflexive for particulars .) T39# xy ( z ( x emb Z y emb Z)

y emb Z)

for particulars .) T39# xy ( z ( x emb Z y emb Z) x =

x = y)

(Indiscernible particulars are identical.)

T40

x
x

y(x = y)

(Every particular is classical.)

T41

xywz (x.Y = w.Z)

xywz(x.Y = w.Z)

(Some complex is classical.) 25

25 A comparison of P-- and P-+ may here be of interest. In P--, no haecceity is exemplified (see P10'*). As a result, there are no classical individuals or haecceities. Therefore, in view of P7 there are no self-identical complexes--and hence, because identity is weakly reflexive--no classical complexes. Moreover, every complex in P-- is non- classical for the same reason: its constituents are non-classical. However, this is not the case in P-+, where a complex can be non-classical for either of two reasons. A complex is non-classical, by P7, if one--or both--of its constituents are non-classical. Non-classical constituents are thus sufficient to make a complex non-classical. But non-classical constituents are not a necessary feature of a non-classical complex.

Consider the particulars Saul Kripke and the author of Waverley. The constituents of Saul Kripke include an individual, saul kripke, and a haecceity, SAUL KRIPKE; and the constituents of the author of Waverley include the author of waverley and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY. Now saul kripke exemplifies SAUL KRIPKE, and the author of waverley exemplifies THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY. Therefore, saul kripke and SAUL KRIPKE, and the author of waverley and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are classical. However, saul kripke does not exemplify THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY, for saul kripke and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are not one in substance. Therefore, although saul kripke and THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY are classical--that is, exist; the complex saul kripke.THE AUTHOR OF WAVERLEY is non-classical--that is, does not exist. Although non-classical constituents are sufficient to make a complex non-classical, they are thus not necessary.

17

1.4.4.2

P-

P- is obtained by subjoining P10' to the postulates of P.

P10' ¬

subjoining P10' to the postulates of P . P10' ¬ x y (y ex X) (

x y(y ex X)

(Not every haecceity is exemplified.)

Theorems of P- include:

T38' ¬

is exemplified .) Theorems of P- include: T38' ¬ x ( x = x ) (

x(x = x)

(Identity is partially irreflexive for particulars.)

T39'# ¬

is partially irreflexive for particulars .) T39'# ¬ xy ( z ( x emb Z y

xy(

z( x emb Z (x emb Z

for particulars .) T39'# ¬ xy ( z ( x emb Z y emb Z) x

y emb Z)

for particulars .) T39'# ¬ xy ( z ( x emb Z y emb Z) x

x = y)

(Not all indiscernible particulars are identical.)

T40'

¬

x
x

y(x = y)

(Some particular is non-classical.)

T42'

¬

xy wz (x.Y = w.Z)
xy wz (x.Y = w.Z)

xy wz(x.Y = w.Z)

(Some complex is non-classical.)

1.4.5 Extending P+ and P-

1.4.5.1 P++

P++ is obtained by subjoining P10* to the postulates of P.

P10*

x
x

y(y ex X)

(Some haecceity is such that every individual exemplifies it.)

Theorems of P++ include:

T28

individual exemplifies it .) Theorems of P++ include: T28 xy (x.Y = x.Y) ( Identity is

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

(Identity is totally reflexive for complexes.)

T29#

= x.Y) ( Identity is totally reflexive for complexes. ) T29# wxyz ( v (w.X emb

wxyz(

v(w.X emb V (w.X emb V

totally reflexive for complexes. ) T29# wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X

y.Z emb V)

reflexive for complexes. ) T29# wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X =

w.X = y.Z)

(Indiscernible complexes are identical.)

18

T42

T42 xy wz (x.Y = w.Z) ( Every complex is classical .) 1.4.5.2 P-- P-- is
T42 xy wz (x.Y = w.Z) ( Every complex is classical .) 1.4.5.2 P-- P-- is

xy wz(x.Y = w.Z)

(Every complex is classical.)

1.4.5.2 P--

P-- is obtained by subjoining P10'* to the postulates of P.

P10'*

subjoining P10'* to the postulates of P . P10'* x ¬ y (y ex X )
subjoining P10'* to the postulates of P . P10'* x ¬ y (y ex X )

x¬ y(y ex X)

(No haecceity is exemplified.)

Theorems of P-- include:

T43' ¬

is exemplified .) Theorems of P-- include: T43' ¬ x ( x = x ) (

x(x = x)

(Identity is totally irreflexive for particulars.)

= x ) ( Identity is totally irreflexive for particulars .) T25' ¬ xy (x.Y =

T25' ¬ xy(x.Y = x.Y)

(Identity is totally irreflexive for complexes.)

T44' ¬

Identity is totally irreflexive for complexes .) T44' ¬ xy ( x = y ) (

xy(x = y)

(There are no classical particulars.)

¬ xy ( x = y ) ( There are no classical particulars .) T41' ¬

T41' ¬ xywz(x.Y = w.Z)

(There are no classical complexes.)

1.4.5.3 P-+

P-+ is obtained by subjoining P10'*' to the postulates of P-.

P10'*' ¬

P10'*' to the postulates of P- . P10'*' ¬ x ¬ y (y ex X )
P10'*' to the postulates of P- . P10'*' ¬ x ¬ y (y ex X )

x¬ y(y ex X)

(Some haecceity is exemplified.)

Theorems of P-+ include:

T43

haecceity is exemplified .) Theorems of P-+ include: T43 x ( x = x ) (

x(x = x)

(Identity is partially reflexive for particulars.)

T25

T25 xy (x.Y = x.Y ) ( Identity is partially reflexive for complexes .) T44 xy

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

(Identity is partially reflexive for complexes.)

T44

x.Y ) ( Identity is partially reflexive for complexes .) T44 xy ( x = y

xy(x = y)

(Some particular is classical.)

T41

.) T44 xy ( x = y ) ( Some particular is classical .) T41 xywz

xywz(x.Y = w.Z)

(Some complex is classical.)

1.4.5.4 P+-

P+- is obtained by subjoining P10*' to the postulates of P+.

P10*' ¬ x

P10*' to the postulates of P+ . P10*' ¬ x y (y ex X) ( No

y(y ex X)

(No haecceity is exemplified by every individual.)

Theorems of P+- include:

T28'

¬

every individual .) Theorems of P+- include: T28' ¬ xy (x.Y = x.Y ) ( Identity

xy(x.Y = x.Y)

(Identity is partially irreflexive for complexes.)

T29'# ¬

is partially irreflexive for complexes .) T29'# ¬ wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb

wxyz(

partially irreflexive for complexes .) T29'# ¬ wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb V)

v(w.X emb V

for complexes .) T29'# ¬ wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X =

y.Z emb V)

for complexes .) T29'# ¬ wxyz ( v (w.X emb V y.Z emb V) w.X =

w.X = y.Z)

(Not all indiscernible complexes are identical.)

T42' ¬

Not all indiscernible complexes are identical .) T42' ¬ xy wz (x.Y = w.Z) ( Some
Not all indiscernible complexes are identical .) T42' ¬ xy wz (x.Y = w.Z) ( Some

xy wz(x.Y = w.Z)

(Some complex is non-classical.)

1.4.6 The

Primitive Notions and Relations of P

1.4.6.1 Haecceities

and Individuals

P1-P9 specify conditions that every individual, haecceity and complex must satisfy. These conditions make haecceities identity properties, 26 for from P1-P9 it follows that embodying Y is necessary and

26 Between my haecceity and Robert Adams's (1979, 1981) thisness there are two key differences. First, a thisness depends for its features upon Adams's conception of what a thisness is. In contrast, every feature of a haecceity-- including its being an identity property--is engendered by the mutual relations of complexes and their constituents.

20

sufficient for identity-with-y:

T46

sufficient for identity-with- y : T46 xy ( x emb Y x = y ) Just

xy(x emb Y

sufficient for identity-with- y : T46 xy ( x emb Y x = y ) Just

x = y)

Just as it follows from P1-P9 that embodying Y is necessary and sufficient for identity with-y, it also follows that containing y is necessary and sufficient for identity-with-y:

T47

y is necessary and sufficient for identity-with- y : T47 xy ( x cont y x

xy(x cont y

and sufficient for identity-with- y : T47 xy ( x cont y x = y )

x = y)

Haecceities and individuals, and embodiment and containment, are thus dual with respect to T46 and T47.

1.4.6.2 Embodiment and Containment

A particular embodies a haecceity just in case there is some complex to which the haecceity and constituents of the particular belong:

T48

the haecceity and constituents of the particular belong: T48 xy ( x emb Y wz (w.Z

xy(x emb Y

wz(w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z emb Y)) (w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z emb Y))

Likewise, a particular contains an individual just in case there is some complex to which the individual and constituents of the particular belong.

T49

individual and constituents of the particular belong. T49 xy ( x cont y wz (w.Z emb

xy(x cont y

wz(w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z cont y) ) (w.Z emb X & w.Z cont x & w.Z cont y))

1.5 Concluding Remarks

The theory of the particular-cum-complex puts in question: (a) ontology-free thematizations of the identity relation, (b) the Reflexive Law of Equality (hereafter RLE), 27 and (c) set-theoretic monist restrictions on the interpretation of the individual variables of classical identity theory.

(a) The truths of classical identity theory are here engendered by an entity which appropriates for logic the essence of the particularity of particular things. Every particular thing is both a that and a

While the features of a thisness are thus the artefacts of arbitrary legislative postulation, the features of a haecceity are conferred upon it by the role it plays in the system of complexes.

Second, Adams makes it clear that a thisness is not "a special sort of metaphysical component of [a particular]":

I am not proposing to revive this aspect of [Scotus'] conception of a haecceity, because I am not committed to regarding properties as components of [particulars]. (1979: 7) But a haecceity retains this feature of its Scotian progenitor, for any haecceity and individual constitute a complex-- the existence of which, but not whose being, depends upon the individual and haecceity being one in substance:

T45

the individual and haecceity being one in substance: T45 xy ( wz (x.Y = w.Z) x
the individual and haecceity being one in substance: T45 xy ( wz (x.Y = w.Z) x

xy( wz(x.Y = w.Z)

haecceity being one in substance: T45 xy ( wz (x.Y = w.Z) x ex Y) 2

x ex Y)

27 And therewith, the logically equivalent principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.

21

what, an existence and a content. And every particular thing manifests both the individual and the universal. So every particular thing suggests the particular-cum-complex as a(n) (onto)logically proper simulacrum for its particularity. But the unity and interconnection of the logically pertinent elements of every particular's particularity, as embodied in the mutual relations of a particular-cum- complex, are irretrievably lost to ontology-free thematizations of the identity relation. For the point of departure for such thematizations is the supposition that the nature of a particular is not to have a nature. 28

(b) From individuals and haecceities one can construct

(i) a classical particular-cum-complex, which demonstrably satisfies the usual axioms of classical identity theory, including RLE;

and,

x( x = x ) (x = x)

(ii) a non-classical particular-cum-complex, which demonstrably satisfies the other classical axioms, 29 together with a weak reflexivity principle,

x(
x(
2 9 together with a weak reflexivity principle, x( y ( x = y ) (

y(x = y)

together with a weak reflexivity principle, x( y ( x = y ) ( x =

(x = x))

and the contradictory negation of RLE:

¬

) ( x = x ) ) and the contradictory negation of RLE : ¬ x

x(x = x)

But the validity of RLE depends on its applicability to classical and non-classical objects. So RLE is not valid.

REMARK. For

come out true under every interpretation. 30 Consequently,

out true under every interpretation. 3 0 Consequently, bA --where b is an individual variable of

bA--where b is an individual variable of classical quantification theory-

(1) "

variable of classical quantification theory- (1) " x(x = x) " is valid iff " x

x(x = x)" is valid iff "x = x" is valid.

-to be valid, A must

For A to be satisfiable, A must come out true under at least one interpretation. Consequently,

28 The conception of a natured particular clashes with a fundamental trait, according to André Lichnerowicz (1972), of contemporary mathematical thought: "l'absence de toute métaphysique de l'identité et de la chose en soi" (p. 1502). A kindred anti-metaphysical strain in neo-positivist philosophy of logic has perhaps been responsible for the reluctance of linguistically-oriented analytical philosophers to posit a logical nature for particulars, these tending to be regarded, as Manuel Sacristán points out (1984), as "individuos puntuales sin intrincación ontológica" (p. 249).

29 Except for the strongly classical principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, to which RLE is logically equivalent.

30 This and the ensuing remarks are based on section 48.0 of Gerald Massey's (1970).

22

(2) "x = x" is valid iff "¬(x = x)" is not satisfiable.

Therefore,

(3) "

x(x = x)" is valid iff " ¬(x = x) " is not satisfiable. " is valid iff "¬(x = x)" is not satisfiable.

But A is satisfiable iff for some domain D, A is satisfiable in D. Moreover, for any

satisfiable in D iff there is a true interpretation of A wherein D is the Universe of Discourse. Consequently,

domain D, A is

(4) "

Universe of Discourse.

x(x = x)" is valid iff for no domain D is there a true inter-pretation of " " is valid iff for no domain D is there a true inter-pretation of "¬(x = x)" wherein D is the

But the entities which realize P-- constitute just such a domain; and with respect to this domain--on classical

assumptions, the "empty" domain--there is a true interpretation

classical predicate logic with identity goes by the board, for the contradictory negation of the Reflexive Law of

Equality is satisfiable by means of a construction from individuals and haecceities, of whose mathematical existence there can be little doubt. 31

of "¬(x = x)". So the vaunted 'soundness' of

(c) Set-theoretic restrictions on the interpretation of particular variables exclude objects which do not satisfy RLE, among them non-classical particulars and other such complexes. But these objects are consistently thinkable. Moreover, they play, as I will show in sequels to this paper, 32 an indispens- able role in the unification of identity theory. Complexes thus challenge set-theoretic restrictions on the interpretation of particular variables which have held logical semantics in thrall for half a hundred years. 33

31 The mathematical existence of such entities I take to turn upon the following stipulations of Hilbert (as stated by O. Becker (1927) and cited by Fernando Gil (1971)):

Déf. 1: on appelle mathématiquement existants les objectités dont on fait le thème ("Thema") d'une théorie mathématique et qui peuvent fonctionner sans contradiction dans cette théorie. Déf. 2: on appelle mathématiquement existants les objets qu'avec des moyens déterminés avec précision peuvent être construits à partir de points de départ fondés.

32 The particular-cum-complex will there be shown to make sense of contingent identity and modal discernibility, and provide an ontological foundation for existence and non-existence as modes of being of particulars.

33 The only argument of which I am aware for these restrictions is Georg Kreisel's argument in his (1969, 1971) that "true in all models" and "true in all set-theoretic models" are extensionally equivalent. But Kreisel's argument rests on the "intuitive validity" of the axioms of predicate logic with identity; and as I suggest here, RLE is not valid. For Tory restatements of Kreisel's argument, see John Etchemendy (1990: 144 f) and Daniel Quesada (1985: 154 f). For a contrasting view, see 'The Paradox of Identity,' Appendix One (forthcoming, this journal).

23

 

P+

P++

P+ -

P

-

P

--

P

-+

Identity is

Particulars

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

No

(No)

(No)

totally re-

T38

T38'

flexive.

Complexes

---

Yes

No

No

(No)

(No)

T28

T28'

T28'

Identity is

Particulars

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

---

No

Yes

partially

T38

T43'

T43

reflexive.

Complexes

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

---

No

Yes

T25

T25'

T25

Identity is partially irreflexive.

Particulars

No

(No)

(No)

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

T38

T38'

 

Complexes

---

No

Yes

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

T28

T28'

T28'

Identity is

Particulars

No

(No)

(No)

---

Yes

No

totally ir-

T38

T43'

T43

reflexive.

Complexes

No

(No)

(No)

---

Yes

No

T25

T25'

T25

Indiscern-

Particulars

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

No

(No)

(No)

ible

T39#

T39'#

are

identical.

Complexes

---

Yes

No

No

(No)

(No)

T29#

T29'#

T29'#

Every

Particular

Yes

(Yes)

(Yes)

No

(No)

(No)

is classi-

T40

T40'

cal.

Complex

---

Yes

No

No

(No)

(No)

T42

T42'

T42'

Every

Particular

No

(No)

(No)

---

Yes

No

is non-

T40

T44'

T44

classical.

Complex

No

(No)

(No)

---

Yes

No

T41

T41'

T41

IMPORTANT THEOREMS

BE GLAD IT'S NOT DEVIANT

Mephisto. Thomas.

Thomas. Yes?

Mephisto. Bet you a quarter meaning is reference.

Thomas. Meaning is not reference. If it were, the cognitive value of 'a = a' would become essentially that of 'a =b', provided 'a = b' were true. What sets (true) 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart is not the reference of 'a' and 'b'--that is the same--but their sense. Extends hand. Gimme the quarter.

Mephisto, puzzled. What is sense?

Thomas.

content.

Sense

sense

is

whatever

Mephisto. And what's that?

Thomas, truculent. It's

it's sense!

it is about 'a' and 'b'

that sets 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart in cognitive

Mephisto, agitated. I know, I know, I know! I know what sense is! I know what sets true 'a = b' and 'a = a' apart! Thomas rolls eyes.

Mephisto. I do, I do, I do! What sets them apart is they assert different things!

Thomas, incredulous. Assert different things? Sacré Leibniz! How can they?

Mephisto. If they do, they can. Right?