Criminal Justice and Behavior

http://cjb.sagepub.com/ Attitudes Toward Battered Women Who Kill : Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability
Brenda L. Russell and Linda S. Melillo Criminal Justice and Behavior 2006 33: 219 DOI: 10.1177/0093854805284412 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/33/2/219

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10.1177/0093854805284412 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR Russell, Melillo / ATTITUDES TOWARD BATTERED WOMEN

ATTITUDES TOWARD BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL Defendant Typicality and Judgments of Culpability
BRENDA L. RUSSELL LINDA S. MELILLO
Castleton State College

Battered womans syndrome has become highly controversial, particularly when used as a defense in cases of homicide. According to legal scholars and social scientists, the characteristics associated with the syndrome constitute a standard that jurors use to evaluate battered women. This study evaluated the hypothesis that jurors use prototypical standards of battered women to reach conclusions about defendants in these cases. Results supported the hypotheses that verdicts are directly influenced by typicality and response history (passive vs. active) of the defendant. Defendants portrayed as atypical with an active response history received more guilty verdicts and were less credible. Conversely, typical defendants with passive response histories were most likely to receive verdicts of not guilty and found to be more credible. Traditional gender effects showed men were more likely than women to render guilty verdicts in all conditions. Keywords: battered womans syndrome; prototypes; jury decision making; self-defense

or the past 25 years, battered womans syndrome (BWS) has remained the most sophisticated theory to capture the plight of

AUTHORS NOTE: The authors would like to thank Dr. Richard Wiener, Dr. Curt Bartol, and Elizabeth Wall for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this research. Thanks to Gerri-Ann and Joe Brandt for their assistance in data collection and Krista Richard and Bryanna Gile for their assistance in data entry. Correspondence concerning this article should be directed to Brenda Russell, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Castleton State College, Castleton, VT 05735; e-mail: Brenda.Russell@castleton.edu.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR, Vol. 33 No. 2, April 2006 219-241 DOI: 10.1177/0093854805284412 2006 American Association for Correctional and Forensic Psychology

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women who are assaulted by their intimate partners. Although BWS has served to educate both clinicians and the general public, it has also inspired controversy concerning its effectiveness in legal decision making, particularly when battered women turn to homicide in response to a partners aggression or threat (Faigman, 1987; Schneider, 2000; Schuller & Hastings, 1996). The most common defense plea for the murder or manslaughter of an abusive partner is self-defense (Faigman, 1987; Kasian, Spanos, Terrance, & Peebles, 1993; Pagelow, 1992; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). A not-guilty verdict based on self-defense rests on the belief that individuals may take reasonable steps to defend themselves from physical harm (Farr, 2002; LaFave & Scott, 1972; Walker, 1993). The legal standard for self-defense and the typical circumstances surrounding homicide in these cases are, however, very different (Gagne, 1998; Schneider, 2000). In most cases, the defendants experience a recent battering incident that they believe will continue at a later time and result in their death (Gagne, 1998; Schneider, 2000; Walker, 1979). Based on this assessment, they do not kill their partner during the battering incident but some time later, while he is incapacitated (Gagne, 1998; Schneider, 2000). Therefore, a not-guilty verdict based on self-defense requires the trier of fact to decide if the person who used deadly force reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Furthermore, that a reasonable person would have found it necessary to resort to deadly force to avoid that danger, even in nonconfrontational cases (Ewing, 1990; Farr, 2002; Kinports, 1988; LaFave & Scott, 1972). Expert testimony regarding BWS is typically used to explain the unique psychological distress battered women endure (Kasian et al., 1993; Schuller, 1992). Experts explain how psychological states contribute to the reasoning of battered women and why they perceive themselves to be in imminent danger as well as their inability to perceive alternatives to homicide. The intended purpose of the testimony is to address common myths or misconceptions regarding battered women (Hocking, 1999; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). A number of studies have found that the public generally embraces a number of misconceptions regarding battered women. For example, Dodge and Greene (1991) found that compared to experts, laypersons were less likely to believe that battered women could be persuaded to

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stay in the relationship by an abusers promises to reform. Furthermore, laypersons were more likely to believe that battered women were passive and dependent, were probably abused because of their emotional instability, and provoked their own beatings (Russell, 1999). In addition, gender and age effects have found that the beliefs of men and older individuals are even further from those of experts. Expert testimony relies heavily on the work of Walker (1979, 1993; Walker, Thyfault, & Browne, 1982) and her three-stage battering cycle. Walkers (1979) original research found that battered women often blame themselves for the abuse and are unable to leave an abusive situation because of low self-esteem, powerlessness, financial dependence, social isolation, and fear of retaliation. Walkers theory also uses Seligmans (1975) theory of learned helplessness to explain why a woman might remain with a batterer and would be unable to acknowledge alternatives to her situation. Shortly following the introduction of BWS into the courtroom, scholars noted the testimonys potential limitations (Crocker, 1985; Hocking, 1999; Kasian et al., 1993; Schneider, 1986; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). A full-fledged controversy has since ensued regarding the informational value and potential impact of BWS evidence on the trial process and outcomes (Blackmun, 1989; Crocker, 1985; Easteal, 1992; Hocking, 1999; Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider, 1986; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). Specifically, major concerns have been raised regarding the testimonys inability to address the apparent contradiction between the womans use of force and the characteristics associated with the syndrome (e.g., learned helplessness, passivity, etc.). Thus, the difficulties originate largely from the testimonys focus on incapacity and learned helplessness, characteristics often at odds with perceptions of reasonableness (Dowd, 1992; Karmen, 2001; Schuller, 1994). Scholars (Dutton, 1993; Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider, 1986; Terrance & Matheson, 2003) have argued that the term syndrome promotes images of mental instability. The implications are that rather than viewing the battered womans actions as a reasonable response to her abusive situation, jurors may interpret the womans actions within the context of her psychological (dys)functioning (Stubbs, 1992, p. 360). As a result, the use of BWS may be seen as an excuse, rather than a justification for self-defense (Schneider, 2000;

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Schuller & Hastings, 1996). Those who advocate the use of syndrome evidence acknowledge that not all women conform to the symptomatology of the syndrome or the pattern of abuse (Blackmun, 1989; Dutton, 1992; Schneider, 2000; Walker, 1984, 1992, 1993). The application of these standards may leave battered women defendants who attempt to explain their behaviors based on BWS at a disadvantage when their characteristics or experiences deviate from any one of these standards (Blackmun, 1990; Kasian et al., 1993; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). This leads us to inquire about the outcome when a defendant on trial is atypical or exceptional with regard to the characteristics of the syndrome. To date, few studies have examined juror responses to expert testimony when the defendant on trial did not display typical characteristics of the syndrome. A recent study by Terrance and Matheson (2003) found that the further the defendant moved away from jurors beliefs of what a battered woman should be, the harsher their verdicts became. Schuller and Hastings (1996) investigated the controversial nature of a defendants passivity. Expert testimony typically portrays women who have been battered as weak and helpless. When a defendant deviates from these characteristics, her motives are intensely scrutinized. Schuller and Hastings directly assessed this dilemma through scenarios in which the defendants prior history of response to abuse as either active (e.g., fighting back) or passive was manipulated. In addition, the content of expert testimony was manipulated to reflect BWS with reference to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and learned helplessness, social agency (which made no reference to PTSD or learned helplessness), and a no-expert control group. Their results found both forms of expert testimony provided more favorable evaluations of the defendants claim of self-defense compared to a noexpert control group. Surprisingly, the womans prior response history seemed to have little effect on the decision process, suggesting that the defendants testimony had no detrimental effects when response histories were active. Social psychological factors involved in jury decision making suggest that jurors evaluate typical and atypical cases differently. Although both are evaluated against the backdrop of prevailing stereotypes (Terrance & Matheson, 2003), the degree to which a defendant is typical plays an important role in juror decision making. Typicality,

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derived from prototype theory (Rosch, 1973, 1975, 1978; E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981), refers to the degree of fit with prototype characteristics (Casey, 1992). The greater the number of prototypical features that are present, the greater the perceived fit (V. L. Smith, 1991). Juror responses may also differ depending on the typicality of the defendants. However, although prior studies offer insight, it is evident that research is needed to better understand what information is used by jurors. Cases that deviate only slightly from the stereotyped category are readily filled in with stereotypical imagery and often pose little problem for decision makers (Farrell & Holmes, 1991). Typicality may help explain the lack of findings in both Greene, Raitz, and Linblads (1989) and Schuller and Hastingss (1996) studies, as only one or two exceptional features were manipulated. One purpose of the current study was to examine these issues and extend the current research as it applies to battered women defendants. The present research used shared prototypes (Russell, 1999) in case scenarios in which the defendant was accused of murdering her partner. Defendants were presented with either typical attributes (attributes conforming to the battered woman prototype) or atypical attributes. Prior research has identified several characteristics that laypersons share of the prototypical battered woman (Russell, 1999). If these features truly constitute defining characteristics for battered women defendants in the minds of jurors, then the presence or absence of those characteristics should impact verdicts. Thus, it follows that these representations should influence judgments of culpability, particularly when a standard form of expert testimony is used as a basis of comparison. In this study, actual case summaries were presented that included standard forms of expert testimony modeled after BWS evidence. The expert offered explanations about why a battered woman may not leave the batterer, focusing on her fear of retaliation, the dangers of separation, and the batterers control, components typically discussed by experts (Schneider, 2000; Schuller & Hastings, 1996). It was predicted that as respondents were provided with expert testimony, they would be less likely to convict when the facts of the case or characteristics of the defendant closely matched the shared prototype of a battered woman (Russell, 1999). For example, it was expected that com-

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pared to the atypical case scenarios, defendants portrayed as typical/ passive would meet the legal requirements of not guilty based on selfdefense, and the defendants claims would be perceived as credible. Therefore, it was believed that main effects would reveal that participants in conditions illustrating a typical/passive battered woman would be more likely to justify the womans actions. Expanding research by Schuller and Hastings (1996), the womans response historyspecifically, her degree of passivitywas also investigated. It seemed likely that when a defendant was portrayed with an active response history (i.e., provoking violence, fighting back on previous occasions), then the BWS evidence would contradict the womans actions and challenge her status as a battered woman. We predicted that a defendant with an active history, who displayed additional atypical attributes, would be more likely to receive guilty verdicts than would participants in all other conditions. In contrast, a defendant with a passive history toward her abuser, compounded with typical attribute features of a battered woman, would invoke the most judgments of not guilty.

METHOD

The goal of this study was to examine the effects of prototypes and defendant typicality in the courtroom. Prototypes were assessed by examining typicality (typical vs. atypical) and response history (active vs. passive) of the defendant in relation to dependent variables of interest including verdict, ratings of legal requirements for selfdefense, and credibility of the defendants claim. Results were expected to help establish the role of prototype theory in verdicts of battered women.
PARTICIPANTS

Six hundred and eighteen (410 female and 208 male) undergraduate students were recruited from two St. Louis Universities. Two universities were included to increase the overall number of participants. Procedures were identical at both sites. Participants were recruited

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during class sessions. The mean age of the respondents was M = 20.28, SD = 4.02.1
DESIGN, PROCEDURE, AND MATERIALS

The design was a 2 (defendant typicality: typical vs. atypical) 2 (response history: active vs. passive) 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs. Goforth) 2 (respondent gender) between subjects factorial design. Defendant typicality, response history, and case type were the experimentally manipulated variables of interest. Dependent variables of interest included the extent to which the defendant met the requirement of self-defense as defined by law, perceived options available to the defendant, the extent to which the defendant fit the typology of a battered woman, the mental state of the defendant, and the verdict.2
DEFENDANT TYPICALITY

Variables chosen to portray the typical and atypical defendant included shared characteristics identified in previous research (Russell, 1999). Physical, social, behavioral, and psychological characteristics most frequently mentioned by participants that demonstrated the highest effect sizes as typical characteristics and their respective opposite as atypical (Russell, 1999) were used in the current study to depict defendant typicality. The manipulated variables of interest were described identically across cases and placed in the same area of the case (either in the case summary or generally within defense statements mentioning typical characteristics and prosecution statements mentioning atypical characteristics). Variables depicting the typical defendant included physical characteristics of being young (age 26 vs. age 60), frayed and weary (vs. rested and refreshed), and physically fragile (135 lbs. vs. 190 lbs., physically strong vs. fragile). Social attributes depicted a typical defendant as having little or no social interaction versus an atypical defendant portrayed as socializing with coworkers. In addition, the typical defendant was depicted as having two children and being financially dependent on her partner versus the atypical defendant who was not financially dependent on

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her partner, was employed as a loan advisor at a bank, held primary responsibilities for finances, and had no children. Typical behavior included hiding signs of her abuse versus the atypical defendant who did not hide signs of abuse. In addition, the typical defendant made excuses for her partners behavior and tried to please her partner versus the atypical defendant who said her husbands behavior was inexcusable and arguments were his fault. Typical psychological attributes included a guilt-ridden, confused, depressed, and fearful defendant. Psychological attributes within the atypical scenario described the defendant as not feeling guilty for relationship problems, clear-headed, happy, rested, refreshed, and not appearing fearful.
CASE SCENARIO FACT PATTERNS

Participants were presented with general instructions and provided with one of two case summaries describing fact patterns that make up two homicide cases in which the defendants claimed to be battered women. These court cases, People v. Evans (1994) and State v. Goforth (1986),3 illustrated instances of confrontational and nonconfrontational situations of homicide. A confrontational situation of homicide may be represented as a case in which the defendant and victim were actively engaged in direct conflict. Nonconfrontational situations suggest that the defendant was not directly engaged in conflict at the time of the event (the victim was not directly confronting the perpetrator; e.g., the victim was sleeping or incapacitated). In People v. Evans (1994), an example of confrontational homicide, Evans was charged and convicted of first-degree murder in the state of Illinois for the killing of her husband. Evans claimed she stabbed her husband in the midst of a domestic dispute in fear that her husband would kill her. Although the initial trial did not present Evans as a battered woman, the facts that established her abuse were included in her defense. The prosecution countered with evidence that Evans killed in a jealous rage after discovering that her husband was having an affair. Evans was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison. On appeal, however, the court reversed the conviction. The Appellate judges cited her history of abuse as a clear indication of BWS. Judge Rizzi ruled that not only should the trial judge have weighed the evidence of abuse

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against the motives suggested by the prosecution but also that this particular case illustrated the need for changes in the statutes defining self-defense. The second case summary was illustrative of a nonconfrontational homicide. In State v. Goforth (1986), the defendant, a self-proclaimed battered spouse, was charged with second-degree murder for the killing of her husband and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. In this case, Goforth shot her husband because he threatened to kill her and her son. At the time of the killing, her husband was arguing with their teenage son in the kitchen. The defendant stood in the hallway and told her husband to stop. The husband then turned toward Goforth and she shot him. The prosecution countered this evidence with facts suggesting that Goforth had just recently filed for a divorce and was looking for a way out of the relationship. In addition, although she and her son testified that abuse had occurred in the home, there was no medical evidence or other witnesses to substantiate her claim that her husband abused her. Although Goforth appealed, her conviction was upheld by the state of Missouri.
EXPERT TESTIMONY

In each case, the same form of expert testimony of BWS was provided. In both cases, a psychologist (a woman) explained that battered women are not masochists nor do they suffer from some personality defect. Rather, the abuse should be understood in the context of the batterers domination and control (Schuller & Hastings, 1996). This testimony gave reference to BWS, PTSD, and learned helplessness. The testimony also explained that battered women experience a set of emotional and psychological responses referred to as BWS. Symptoms of PTSD were described, along with symptoms of learned helplessness and the cyclical nature of domestic abuse. This expert testimony appeared in both cases to provide an explanation for the defendants behavior and offer a frame of reference for respondents.
RESPONSE HISTORY

To further assess typicality and expand on the work of Schuller and Hastings (1996), the defendants response history was varied. Thus,

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two history levels (passive and active) were produced. This was achieved primarily through the testimony provided by the prosecution or defense. In the active-response-history conditions, the prosecution described the defendant as a woman who fought back against her abuser on previous occasions, wherein the passive defendant was recognized by the defense as never aggressing against her abuser and only trying to placate him.
MEASURES

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. All participants were instructed to assume the role of a juror, to read the case scenario, and then complete a questionnaire packet (approximately 60 minutes). The packet included a Verdict questionnaire and the Elements of the Law of Self-Defense, Defendant Believability and Psychological Stability questionnaire developed by Schuller and Hastings (1996). Some modifications were made to address the law of self-defense as defined in the state of Missouri. All Cronbachs alphas reported in the following analyses represent the current data that are consistent with alphas reported by Schuller and Hastings. With the exception of Verdict, 9-point Likerttype scales (from 1 = not at all to 9 = extremely likely) were used to assess dependent measures. Verdicts. Verdict was categorical in nature. Participants were asked to select one of three possible verdicts, either second-degree murder, manslaughter, or not guilty based on self-defense. Self-defense claims. Questions pertaining to the laws of selfdefense consisted of eight items (a = .85). These measures assessed issues pertaining to the claim of self-defense. All questions addressed elements of self-defense, elements of imminent danger, whether the defendant provoked the incident, the use of deadly force, and the reasonableness of the defendants actions. Options available to the defendant. This measure consisted of three items designed to assess the extent to which jurors thought other options were available to the defendant (a = .72): For example, To

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what extent do you think options other than killing her husband were available to the defendant? Defendant typology. This measure assessed how well the defendant fit the typology of the battered woman as described in the expert testimony as well as the respondents own perceptions. This measure consists of five items (a = .86) such as To what extent does the battered woman syndrome apply to the defendant? and To what extent did she perceive herself as helpless in the relationship? Mental state of the defendant. Comprised of three questions, this measure was designed to tap the mental state of the defendant (a = .75; e.g., To what extent do you believe her actions were under her control?).

RESULTS
VERDICT DECISIONS

Overall, juror verdicts were somewhat evenly distributed across guilty of manslaughter (n = 287, 46.5%) and not guilty (n = 236, 38%). Approximately 15% (n = 94) of respondents rendered a verdict of second-degree murder. Chi-square analyses were conducted because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable verdict. Analyses found a verdict by gender difference (see Figure 1), c2(2, N = 617) = 12.47, p = .002, where a lower percentage of women (n = 49, 12.0%) rendered a verdict of second-degree murder than men (n = 45, 21.7%). No significant gender difference was found for manslaughter as 46% (n = 190) of women rendered a verdict of manslaughter compared to 47% (n = 97) of men. Last, more women (n = 171, 41.7%) than men (n = 65, 31.4%) rendered a verdict decision of not guilty based on selfdefense. Conditions were then collapsed into four scenario conditions (atypical/passive, atypical/active, typical/passive, and typical/active). Chi-square analyses investigating the four scenarios and three verdict possibilities indicated a verdict by scenario difference (see Figure 2), c2(6, N = 617) = 38.23, p = .001. Results showed respondents in atypi-

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50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 female male
Figure 1: Verdict Decisions as a Function of Gender Note. c2(2, N = 617) = 12.47, p = .002.

2nd degree manslaughter not guilty

cal scenarios (atypical/active, n = 35, 37.2%; atypical/passive, n = 26, 27.7%) rendered more judgments of second-degree murder than respondents in typical scenario conditions (typical/active, n = 18, 19.1%; typical/passive, n = 15, 16%). Results for manslaughter verdicts found that respondents in atypical/active (n = 83, 28.9%) and atypical/passive (n = 83, 28.9%) conditions were most likely to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. Participants in typical/active scenarios were almost as likely to render verdicts of manslaughter (n = 70, 24.4%), whereas respondents in typical/passive conditions were least likely to give a verdict of manslaughter (n = 51, 17.8%). A converse pattern was identified for judgments of not guilty on the basis of self-defense. Participants in typical/passive scenarios assigned the highest rates of self-defense (n = 86, 36.4%), followed by the typical/active scenario conditions (n = 58, 24.6%). As expected, the lowest number of not-guilty verdicts were found in atypical scenarios such as atypical/active (n = 40, 17.0%), and atypical/passive (n = 52, 22.0%). Gender differences with regard to condition and guilt were evident only within the atypical/active scenario condition, c2(1, N = 158) = 6.18, p = .013. Collapsing across guilt groups (second-

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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4

2nd degree manslaughter self defense

Figure 2: Verdict Decisions as a Function of Scenario Type Note. 1 = atypical/active condition, 2 = atypical/passive condition, 3 = typical/active condition, 4 = typical/passive condition. c2(6, N = 617) = 38.23, p = .01.

degree murder and manslaughter = guilty, not guilty) females in atypical/active scenarios (n = 72, 68.6%) were less likely to render a guilty verdict than men in that scenario (n = 46, 86.8%). In fact, 13.2% (n = 7) of men voted not guilty compared to 31.4% of women (n = 33) in the atypical/active condition. No significant differences were found for the typical/active, typical/passive, or atypical/passive conditions.
JUDGMENTS OF CULPABILITY

To investigate the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables related to judgments of culpability and legal requirements, a 2 (defendant typicality: typical vs. atypical) 2 (response history: active vs. passive) 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs. Goforth cases) 2 (respondent gender) MANOVA was conducted4 using the extent to which legal requirements for self-defense were met, perceived options available to the defendant, extent to which the defendant fit the typology of the battered woman, and the defendants mental state at the time of the crime as dependent variables. Results revealed multivariate main effects for typicality, F(4, 584) = 15.45, p = .001, c2 = .10, and gender F(4, 584) = 4.08, p = .003, c2 = .027. A significant case by response history interaction was also found, F(4, 584) = 2.80, p = .03, c2 = .02. Follow-up univariate analy-

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ses were then conducted. For the sake of clarity, results are organized by dependent variables. Extent to which the defendant met the legal requirements of selfdefense. Follow-up univariate tests were conducted on scale scores representing the extent to which the defendant met the requirements of self-defense. Main effects were found for typicality, F(1, 584) = 26.13, p = .001, indicating respondents in the typical conditions reported that the defendant met the requirements of self-defense (M = 6.18, SD = 1.50) significantly more often than did respondents in atypical conditions (M = 5.51, SD = 1.52). In addition, a main effect for gender, F(1, 584) = 13.69, p = .003, revealed that across conditions, women were more likely to rate the defendant as meeting the legal requirements for self-defense (M = 5.99, SD = 1.52) more often than were men (M = 5.52, SD = 1.57). A response history by case interaction was significant, F(1, 584) = 10.70, p = .001, for self-defense. The difference in legal requirements met between passive and active response histories was not significant in the Goforth case; however, respondents in the Evans (confrontational) case were more likely to believe that the defendant met the requirements of self-defense when she was portrayed as passive (M = 6.36, SD = 1.36) as opposed to active (M = 5.48, SD = 1.56). Perceived options available to the defendant. A main effect for typicality, F(1, 584) = 12.06, p = .001, showed that participants in atypical conditions believed the defendant had more options available that should have been considered than did respondents in the typical conditions (M = 6.55, SD = 1.73 vs. M = 5.98, SD = 1.75, respectively). A significant main effect for gender was also found, F(1, 584) = 11.86, p = .001, suggesting that men perceived the defendant to have more options to killing (M = 6.50, SD = 1.73) than did women (M = 5.98, SD = 1.75). Finally, a case by response history interaction was found, F(1, 584) = 3.85, p = .05, which revealed that when the defendant was portrayed with an active history, she was perceived as having significantly more options to killing (M = 6.49, SD = 1.52) than when she was portrayed with a passive response history (M = 5.30, SD = 1.77), but only in the Evans case.

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Typology of the defendant. Main effects for typology, F(1, 584) = 60.79, p = .001, found that respondents rated the defendant as more likely to fit the typology of a battered woman when she was portrayed as typical (M = 6.49, SD = 1.52) as opposed to atypical (M = 5.30, SD = 1.77). A main effect for gender, F(1, 584) = 7.57, p = .006, found that men were less likely to believe the defendant fit the typology of a battered woman than were women (M = 5.65, SD = 1.71 vs. M = 5.99, SD = 1.77, respectively). A response history by case interaction was evident for typology, F(1, 584) = 6.44, p = .011, indicating that respondents in the confrontational case were more likely to report the defendant fit the typology of a battered woman when the defendant was portrayed with a passive response history, (M = 6.22, SD = 1.75) as opposed to an active response history (M = 5.41, SD = 1.69). Mental state of the defendant. A main effect for gender, F(1, 584) = 6.61, p = .010, showed that men believed the defendant was more in control of her behavior (M = 5.89, SD = 1.62) than did women (M = 5.56, SD = 1.90). Main effects for typicality, F(1, 584) = 14.54, p = .001, found that participants rated the defendants mental state as significantly less in her control in typical conditions (M = 5.36, SD = 1.84) than defendants in atypical conditions ( M = 5.97, SD = 1.74). Finally, a significant case by response history interaction, F(1, 584) = 5.06, p = .025, found that when the defendant in the confrontational case was portrayed as passive, respondents were more likely to rate the defendant as having significantly less control of her mental capacities (M = 5.18, SD = 1.87) than if she was portrayed with an active response history (M = 5.73, SD = 1.76).

DISCUSSION

This study sought to empirically test the assumptions of prototype theory, which suggest that prototypical defendant attributes would affect judgments of culpability. Main effects were predicted for typicality and response history on verdict decisions and elements of legal decision making, with participants in the atypical/active condition finding the most evidence of second-degree murder. Conversely, participants in conditions illustrating a typical/passive defendant would

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be more likely to justify the womans actions as self-defense. Although case effects were not expected, it was hypothesized that if case effects should occur, they would most likely surface in the Evans case, an example of a direct confrontational case. Last, traditional gender effects were expected, suggesting that men would be less likely than women to believe that the defendant met the requirements of selfdefense and would, therefore, be more likely to assign more guilty verdicts than women. The results clearly support the additive effects of typicality and response history on judgments of culpability. As expected, participants in atypical/active conditions were more likely to assign judgments of second-degree murder, whereas those in typical/passive conditions most often rendered not-guilty verdicts. Atypical defendants were perceived to have more options available, and respondents were less likely to believe the defendants version of events. In contrast, respondents rated typical defendants as more likely to meet the requirements of self-defense. Respondents in passive conditions also perceived the defendant as having fewer options to killing and were most likely to find a fit with the typology of a battered woman. Respondents in typical/passive conditions rated the defendants version of events as significantly more plausible and believed that the defendant had less control over her actions at the time of the crime. Typicality and response history also resulted in case effects. Respondents in passive conditions found the defendant was more likely to meet the requirements of self-defense, was more likely to fit the typology of a battered woman, and had less control of her actions in the Evans (confrontational) case. This interaction pattern between typicality and response history provides strong support for the contention that defendants are more likely to have multiple attributes, and as such, the combination of factors can profoundly influence judgments of culpability. The importance of gender in evaluating judgments of culpability was evident. Although women were less likely to assign a verdict of second-degree murder, an equivalent number of men and women rendered verdicts of manslaughter. Women, however, rendered a verdict of not guilty significantly more often than did men. This supports the hypothesis that men are more likely to assign guilty verdicts than are women.

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Gender differences also had significant ramifications for judgments of culpability. That is, across conditions, women rated the defendant as more likely to meet the requirements of self-defense. Men perceived more options available to the defendant other than killing, were less likely to believe that the defendants fit the typology of a battered woman, and thought that both women were more in control of their behavior and emotions at the time of the killing. The present research is consistent with previous studies that have found men tend to assign harsher judgments to battered women defendants (Aubrey & Ewing, 1989; Dodge & Greene, 1991; Schneider, 2000; Schuller, Smith, & Olson, 1994; Terrance & Matheson, 2003; Terrance, Matheson, & Spanos, 2000). Researchers and theorists (Blackmun, 1989; Crocker, 1985; Jenkins & Davidson, 1990; Schneider, 2000; Terrance & Matheson, 2003) have asserted that BWS has created a stereotypical view of a battered woman to which defendants may be compared. Of crucial interest is whether defendants who claim to be battered are at a disadvantage when their experiences and behaviors deviate from the standard. The present research has investigated this belief by examining whether or not prototypical attributes would affect judgments of culpability. The present research provides persuasive evidence that judgments of culpability are indeed influenced by the extent to which the defendant fits or does not fit the typology of a battered woman. When Dodge and Greene (1991) compared the views of experts to those of laypersons, there was much disagreement. For instance, although experts believed that battered women thought it was impossible to leave their abusers, blamed themselves for the abuse, and displayed both anxiety and depression, laypersons were more likely to believe that battered women were dependent, passive, provoked their own beatings, and remained in the relationships because of emotional instability and/or masochism. The current research suggests laypersons prototypes are much richer in detail and somewhat more in concordance with experts. Moreover, these findings suggest that not only are prototypes the product of general knowledge of the syndrome but also these prototypes reflect changes in attitude over time. The present study suggests that in the context of evaluating criminal defense claims, research participants rely on their own expectations of what constitutes a battered woman. This is consistent with

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previous research, which has found that the prototypes jurors bring to the courtroom act as filters through which trial information and culpability are evaluated (Schneider, 2000; Schuller & Vidmar, 1992; V. L. Smith, 1991, 1993; Terrance & Matheson, 2003). Prototype theory offers an explanation for the failures of previous studies (e.g., Greene et al., 1989; Schuller & Hastings, 1996) that manipulate one or two attributes of battered women to find links with verdicts. Defendants are more likely to possess multiple attributes that either match or do not match those in the typology associated with the battered woman. By manipulating various attributes, the current study supports the belief that decision strategies reflect a graded structure of the category of battered women (V. L. Smith, 1991, 1993). People determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant by comparing the characteristics of the defendant with the features of the prototype. If sufficient feature overlap exists, then not-guilty verdicts should result. The results of this research are in accordance with this claim. As expected, second-degree murder verdicts were most often found when the defendant was portrayed as atypical with an active response history. Guilty verdicts were more likely when respondents were male. Other gender effects were apparent that were consistent with previous research (Aubrey & Ewing, 1989; Dodge & Greene, 1991; Schuller et al., 1994; Terrance & Matheson, 2003; Terrance et al., 2000). Theorists speculate that these differences may be because of the possibility that men do not have similar representations of battered women as women do. An alternative explanation can be taken from a social referencing perspective, wherein both men and women may simply use themselves as a reference point from which to make decisions. The study found more case effects in the confrontational case scenarios. For instance, when the defendant was passive, participants in the Evans case rated the defendant as meeting the requirements of self-defense and perceived fewer options available to the defendant. The interaction effects suggest that typicality and response history may be context dependent and more pronounced in direct confrontational cases. This lends support to the suggestion that defendants in nonconfrontational cases have a significantly more difficult time convincing jurors that their actions were truly self-defense. There are two possible explanations for the current findings. First, ifas our results

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Russell, Melillo / ATTITUDES TOWARD BATTERED WOMEN 237

suggestmock jurors rely on prototypes to guide their legal decision making, it makes sense that typicality and response history played relevant roles in this research. On the other hand, it is possible that nonconfrontational cases do not activate prototypical comparisons in the minds of jurors.
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The current study represents only a first attempt to assess whether a shared standard held by laypersons exists for battered women and the extent to which battered women defendants are compared to that standard. Typicality and atypicality were assessed by using multiple attributes previously found to be associated with battered women. Although this may not be the best portrayal of typical/atypical features, it is intended to serve as a starting point. Therefore, a number of questions remain unanswered. Although this research demonstrates an additive effect of typicality and response history, the data could not address the extent to which, and how many particular prototypes are enough to portray a typical or atypical battered woman defendant. In other words, at what point would there be too few prototypical features to find similar effects? Future research can examine this issue by manipulating the number of attribute features within case scenarios. Another pressing issue is the extent to which participants relied on the expert testimony in which to make their comparison judgments. Would the results be the same had no expert testimony been used? Would results differ in conjunction with different types of expert testimony designed to address the atypical defendant? For example, further research should determine whether effects would be found if expert testimony gave reference to whether the defendant fit the typology of a battered woman. In defense of the current research, this study modeled the law of self-defense for battered women in the state of Missouri. The Missouri statute took the decision of whether to admit expert testimony on the BWS out of the trial judges hands. According to Missouri statute (Revised Missouri Statutes, 563.033, 1987, 1990, 1996) when selfdefense is an issue in the case, the defendant may offer evidence regarding the battered spouse syndrome. In essence, expert testimony in a battered spouse case will automatically be allowed in court when the

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defendant injects the issue and makes a prima facie case showing elements of self-defense. Several limitations within this research should be addressed. For instance, the current study used college students as mock jurors. Research has found that college students are not necessarily representative of juries. Researchers (Aubrey & Ewing, 1989; Schuller & Cripps, 1998) have found that students hold fewer stereotypes regarding battered women than do voter samples. Gender effects are also less likely in the student samples as compared to voter samples. Therefore, the results of this study must be evaluated in context to the college sample used. Previous research (Schuller & Vidmar, 1992) has demonstrated that those with higher levels of education and younger people are also more informed regarding abusive situations. This would suggest that older, less informed, and less educated participants may hold different prototypes of battered women. Therefore, the results of this research should be replicated with different populations to discover whether prototypes are different within different populations and whether verdict decisions would be similarly affected by the experimental procedure. Generalizations from the study are also limited by the use of stimulus materials. Materials used in the present study were written text. A more sophisticated approach might include a videotaped version of events. The current study had participants complete the experiment individually. The results may be affected if respondents were to deliberate in a group format. Furthermore, mean scores tended to hover amid the midpoint of the Likert-type scales. This may be a remnant of stimulus materials used. Last, and most important, is the lack of an appropriate control group. Fashioned after a study conducted by Schuller and Hastings (1996), we sought to investigate the additive effects of prototypes. Experimentally, the design would call for a minimum of four additional conditions, making the design unwieldy. However, future research should investigate the extent to which findings may differ according to control conditions. Despite these limitations, results from this research have several important practical implications. First, this study provides persuasive evidence that a prototypical standard does indeed exist for battered women and verdict decisions appear to be dependent on this standard.

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Defendants who deviate from this shared prototype may be adversely affected when it comes to judgments of culpability, whereas those who fit the typical/passive portrayal of a battered woman may be more likely to have their claims of self-defense accepted. This advances our knowledge regarding the extent to which battered women defendants characteristics and actions affect legal decision making. If the defendant does not depict the typical/passive battered woman, then the defendants use of expert testimony regarding the syndrome may not be a successful strategy.

NOTES
1. Of participants, 5.8% of men (n = 12) and 10.6% of women (n = 43) reported having been a victim of domestic violence. Twenty-one percent (n = 44) of men and 18.8% of women (n = 78) had witnessed domestic violence in their household while growing up. Sixty percent of men (n = 125) and 75% of women (n = 302) had heard of BWS before reading the summary case. 2. Manipulation checks used a series of univariate analyses. Two (defendant typicality: typical vs. atypical) 2 (response history: active vs. passive) 2 (case fact pattern: Evans vs. Goforth cases) 2 (respondent gender) analyses of variance investigated the extent to which respondents believed the defendant displayed an active or passive response history and the extent to which the defendant fit the typology of a battered woman according to their own perceptions and the expert testimony provided. All expected manipulations were significant below the .05 level. 3. The Goforth case was referred to as the Jones case in the stimuli materials to prevent recognition by the participants. 4. All analyses were performed using a unique sums of squares because of unequal cell sizes.

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