Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 6


Heidegger mneglected his own earlier

refetions" on science.
14 P. Heelan, who began as a physicist has been
providing critical analyses of sien as herme

tic practice since the 1970s. He engages

Herdegger throughout, but also exlicitly
stats at the After Postodernism Confrence
at the University of Chicago, Noember
1416, 1997 that "Hermeneutic philosophy
refers mostly toM. Heidegger's" (ww .focus
ing.orgapm_aperslheelan.html (Accessed July
17, 2012)).
15 See Marx, Hedegger and te Tradtion
tans. Kisiel and AGeee (Evanston, f:
Northwester University Press, 1971), 139-3
on physis and Anwesen.

@,Heidegger "Neuzitliche Naisseschaft

und modere Tecbnik," Research in
Phenomenology 7 (1977), 1-4, with Im0I0
by]. Sallis.
7 Bretano, On the Several Sense of Being'
in rist
tle, trans. George (Berkely: ,

verstty of Califoria Press, 1975).

Hetdegger confrms that this t drove
m to write Being and Time in
Heidegge. "The Understanding of Time in
Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the
Being-Question," trans. T. Sheehan and
Elliston, Southwest jourl of Philosoph
0.2 {1979), 199-201, 201, and in his

ural address to the Heidelberg

of Sctence, noted in H. Siegfried, ""JO<Iin
Heidegger: A Recollection," Man and
3.1 (1970), 3-, 4.
18 : Heidegge. Ge/assenheit (Pfullingen:
Gunther Neske, 1992), 12 et passim.
John Russon and Ksten Jacobson
experience of "there."
is opposed to "here," to be sure, but
basically "there" is "somewhere," a pri
situating that precedes, makes pas
and contains the opposition of "here'l
"there": "there is" realty, it "takes
"This "taking place" has the dual sense
>f"happetirtg" and "occupying a determi-
location vis-3-vis others in the universal
of appearing": "there" is both the sin
fact of the global happening of reality,
it is the always local specifiCity of things
;jit;uated with respect to other things O
ourselves. This "there" is the "Da" with
Heidegger's investigations throughout
career are preoccupied. We are intrinsi
engaged with that Da: we are Dasein,
,: "there-being."
The Da, the "there," is space, but say
the word "spate" does not suddenly

make transparent the sense of the Da; on

the contrary, reflecting on the phenomenon
of "there" draws our attention to the fun
. damental enigma of space, the enigmatic
way that we fnd ourselves in the midst of
things, thrown into a world that presents
itself simultaneously as embracing us and as
spread away from us into the distance. Late
in his career (1969), in his Zollikon seminars,
Heidegger remarks:
In Being and Time, being- open (Da-sein)
means beng-open (Da-sein). The "Da" is
determined here as "the open." This open
ness has the character of space. Spatiality
belongs to the clearing [Lichtung]. U
belongs to the open in which we sojourn
as existing beings. (GA 89, 283/ZS,
We are Da-sein, which is to say we are open to
a reality that is open to us, and that is a real
ity in which things open onto other things.
Before engaging in any technical reflections
on "space," we must first push ourselves to
notice-and notice the mysterious wonder
of-this fact of the open: we should notice
that there is a "there is" for us. We live as the
witnessing of a clearing in which it is given
to us to notice, it is. given to us that there is
something to notice .
Heidegger's philosophy is fundamentally a
phenomenology, that is, it is a description of
experience as it is lived. To respond mean
ingfully to his philosophy-to understand
it-we must first engage ourselves in the
project of reflecting upon the character of our
own exerience: we must begin by reflect
ing on this, our fundamental exerience of
"being there." Having attuned ourselves to
the mysterious character of the happening
of our experience, we can follow Heidegger's
ever-deepening refections on the nature of
space-the nature of the Da-throughout
his writing.
Heidegger's first and most revolutionary
contribution, and the one that provides the
context for all his subsequent reflections on
space, is the emphasis in Being ad nme on
the primacy of the "ready" [zuhanden] char
acter of the world.2 Though we are intelli
gently, meaningully, and discriminatingly
related to the very specific features of our
surrounding environment, in our everyday
experience we integrate ourselves with them
without making them the explicit objects of
our attention. While one is walking, reaching
into a pocket or grabbing for te telephone,
one will typically be talking with a fiend
about the plans for the_ evening or some other
topic. The explicit, "conspicuous" object o
attention is the evening's events, while the
surrounding world of ground, limbs, pocket,
and telephone whose support we gather up
in our behavior is "inconspicuous"-non
thematic in, though utterly essential to, our
This nonthematic involvement with the
determinaces of our environment is not an
optional or secondary aspect of our experi
ence, but uour primary way of existing. First
and foremost, we" dwell" in the world, which
means we always exprience from a network
of "involvements," a lived inhabitation of the
world, and thus tis world that provides
context and backgound for our lives is
most basic phenomenon of our exeetce
it is what most basically appears, what
"there."3 We are Dasei"being th,re"
frrst in this sense that our ver existence
this being stretched out into the things
make our "home."4
This "exsting as stretched out into
is our spatalit, our being spatial.
not first a characteristic of the object of
experience but is the very character
we exist.5 The close and the distant are
primarily matters of the quantity of
tion between objects, but are matters of
comfortable absorption in or our aliienate
unfmiliarity with our world. What is
is near because we have turned
toward it and taken the thing up into
care. What is far is far because we are
focusing our attention on it or beartse,
lies out of reach of a project we undek
Space, first, is the proximity to or
fom our world that we live.
It is tis "lived spatiality" that Hcidcggt
studies in Being and Time.6 U accoJdai c
with its Being-in-the-world,"
writes, "Dasein always has space presonte
as alceady discovered, though not
cally" (GA 2, 112/BT, 147):even when
as suh has not yet become an explicit
of focal concern for us, we already
space in that we are oriented in our
able involvement with the world in
our felt proximiries and the ways in
we are oriented from this home to
distaot. Heidegger studies these characte
istics of our spatiality under the
"de-severance" [Ent-feng] and
tionality" [Ausrichtung].7
"De-severance" is the way in which
being is always characterized hvfn,;,,.,h;,
at a distance, by having things presented
their separation from us. 8- As I launch
project of writing, the things not con
with this writing slip away and I brirlg
those that enable my writing. The pen
. for example, emerges as a relevant option
takes its place in the heterogeneous net
of papers, surfaces, lights, and limbs
in their separation from me, are the
)oS;ibility of my writing. In engaging with
'region" of writing, these diferentiated
become simultaneously close and
as de-severing, we are always doing
with the "farness" between things and
IS recisely in allowing them tq exist for us
is rclevant differencesidistaoces.' This "male
close" that is de-severing is not reducing
quantity of bodily separation between
body and some thing, but is rather let
"any entity be encountered close by as
entit which it is" (GA 2, 105/BT, 139).
fe-severan: e is the way in which things are
ever far from us on the basis of their
U this description of de-severance, we see
well our "directionality." "Every bringin
" Heidegger writes, "has already taken
advance a direction towards a region out
which what is de-severe brings itself
(GA 2, 143T, 108). We exist as
>dctional insofar as we are always bring
things close to us from out of a region to
these things belong, which is to say, we
not indiferently relate to the things of the
but we are instead always oriente
the world in some meaningful way or
We experience the world as regional,
! as

having locations-the relevant, oriented

: dcmains of our involvement-in which cer
things are gathered together through
our prOjects and, more generally, our care,
and we experience things as belonging to
regions, as coming out of a place to which
they belong.
The world of our experience is not at root
an alienated assemblage of isolated things set
off against each other and against an isolated
knowing subject in space as a uniform and
empty "container," but is, rather the hetero
geneous fabric of availability upon which
we draw to carry out our practices of every
day life, a fabric meaningfully articulated in
determinate regions that provide the context
to which things themselves belong. The sub
ject as an isolate consciousness, things as
isolated individuals and the "empty" space in
which we imagine them to be contained are
derivative realities that emerge fom within
this primordial, lived spatiality, rather than
being the original terms of reality.11
The phenomenological descriptions of
"world" in Being and Time challenged our
typical understanding of the world by com
pelling us t? notice a realm of lived space,
"beneath," so to speak, the objective real
ity of discrete objects situated in empty
space. In "The Origin of the Work of Art,"
Heidegger compels us to sif our atten
tion from the "world" of availability to the
"earth" that is the originary matrix that
is the very possibility of world. Heidegger
describes phenomenologically the experience
of an ancient Greek temple, noting how the
temple, rather han presenting itself as an
object, in fact articulates a world, shaping
for us a perspective on ourselves and nature:
"the temple, in its standing there, first gives
to things their look and to :en their outlook
on themselves" (GA 7, 28/PLT, 42). The art
work is the gesture by which a community
carves out for itself a Weltanschauung-a
"worldview"-but this world is itself the
takng uQC QC88Iblty thal, Qm QC88IbIlIly
dCc8 nCl`Il8cl haVc lhc Ctm C `wCtld.
h8QC88IbIlIty CwCrldI8lhc `carU.
halcVct aQQcat8`CC-arI8c8 wIU a Qcr-
8QcClIVcuQCnIland, a8lhu8Inhctcnlly``Ct
a Qct8QcClIVc, I8 mcanIngul: Il ha8 pnn~
CurdI8Cu88ICn CDasein's dItcClICnalIty. hc
ba8IC QhcnCmcnCn C mcanIngul aQQcat-
anCc Being and Time atgucd, I8 lhc wCtld,
lhal I8 wc dC nCl It8l cnCCunlct dI8Crclc
lhIng8 and dI8Crclc CUct 8ubjcO8 and Ucn
gtadually `buIlduQlCancXQctIcnCcCtcal-
Ily a8 a whClc bul, Cn lhcCCnltaty, wc bcgIn
wIlh an cXQctIcnCc C a mcanIngul wCrld
a8 a whClc, wIlhIn whCh Ct Cul C whCh
dt8Ctclc Hgurc8 cmctgc. Qua Qct8QcClIVal,
hCwcVcq any 8IlualICn C aQQcatIng-ny
bcIng-In-lhc-wCtldI8 alway8 8clcClIVc and
Cnc-8Idcd. hc wCtld I8 alway8 a Cultutally
thc QC88IblItIc8 C aQQcatIng C aQQtchcnd-
Ing whal Il I8 "lC bc C cnCCunlctIng Uc
`lhctc. LlhC way8 C bcng-In-lhc-wCrld-
Clhct uOrd-hCwcVct, atc al8C QC88Iblc.
wCtld, a8a 8QcCtC way CaQQcatIng, shCw8
itelf, bul through Il8cl Il I8 al8C manIc8l-
i lhc possibility C aQQcatIng. hc QC8-
sblc alway8 aIlIng lC aQQcat as suc-8
QC88Iblc-nCncthclc8 alway8 aQQcar8 as lhc
aClual. hI8 possibility of wCtld, tcalizcd In
and a8 lhc wCtld, bul nCl tOuCIblc lC Il, I8
wc nCw tclurn lC Cut IntlIal QhcnCm-
cnClCgICal QtCjcCl C dc8CtIbIng cXQtIcnCc
I8lhctc: wcCanadVanCc bcyCndCutcatlct
an8wct. LatlIct, wc tcCCgntzcd lhal, lhtCugh
lhc lcmQlc, Ct cXamQlc, a wCtld aQQcat8.
DCw wc Can dccQcn Cut dc8CtIQlICn utthct
and 8ay lhal, lhrCugh lhc lcmQlc, earth I8
aQQcarIng as world. ndccd, catlh I8 aQQcat
Ing as appearance. All apearing, hcnCc
all bcIng-In-lhc-wCtld, I8 catlh
Il8cl~Ct, mCtc cXaClly, catlh as suc
drawing from aQQcaranCc 8uCh lhal a
mIghl aQQcar.` Ilh catlh wc haVc lhc
QC88bIlIly C lhc`lhctc I8, lhal whIChIn
wIlhdtawal gIVc8 thcrc lC bc lhc mcantn@ul
8QaCcC Cut lIVc8.
mcIdcggct8 dI8Cu88ICn C `carlh
dtaw8 Cur altcnlICnlC lhc`cnablIngQoWct'
thal QtcCOc8CutcXQctIcnCcClhcmcat:tng-
ulatlICulalICnC8QaCc.`hI8 nClICn I8
lhctdcVclCQcdInthc CCUCcQlC `tImc-8QaCc
[Zeit-Raum] In Contributions to PhilosoJ/y
(1938). mcIdcggct wtIlc8:
whal I8 CwnmC8l lC lImc 8C CtI@ly
(In lImc8`cC8la8I8) lhal lImc bcCCmc8
[Sen] a88uCh. ul altcady lhInkng tmc
lhtCugh In lhI8 way btIng8 lImc In Il8
tclatcdnc88lClhcDa CDa-sein, nlCan
c88cntIal tclattCn8htQ wIlh thc 8Qatal-
Ity C Da-sein and lhu8 wIlh 8QaCc . . . .
ul mca8utcd agaIn8l lhcIt Ctdtnaty
tcQtc8cnlalICn8 ltmc and 8QaCc atc hctc
mCtc CtgInaty and ullImalcly, thcy atc
ltmc-8QaCc [Zeit-Raum], whICh I8 nCl
a CCuQlIng C lImc and 8QaCc bul whal
I8 mCtc CtIg U lhcr bclCnging
lCgclhct. (L 65, 189/1, 132)
Beig and Time lCCk lcmQCtalIly a8 Il8 Cluc
Ct nVc8ltgalng lhc nalutc C bcIng: lh0
atlICulalICn and tcalIzalCn C Cur Carc In
lhc cXQctIcnCc C lIVcd Umc I8 Cut unda-
mcnl hCld Cn lhc tclalICn8hIQ C what_,
whal wa8 and whal wll bc, and I8 thu8 lc
undamcnlal abtIC o lhc mcanIngunc88
lhcSinn-of CutcXQctIcnCc.*"3clBeing an
Time tcVcalcd lhI8 Cut mcanIngul gta8Q
C lhc wCtld, D nCl a matlcr C InlcllcClual
tcQtc8cnlalICn, bul I8 a mallct, a8 wc 8aw
abCVc, C lIVcd 8QalIalIly an nhabIlatICn C
wCtld.`` hI8 In8cQataDIlly C lImc and
8Q8CcC`DIcanIng and`cXlcn8ICn, 8C lC
8DcaK~InVIlc u8 lC tcCCgnIzc a 8CutCc Ct
caCh lhat QtcCcdc8 thcIt aQQatcnl 8cQataDIl-

hI8 I8 Uc`tImc-8QaCc [Zeit-Raum] C

cCh'ibtiom to Philosophy.
8catlhI8lhal CwhICh wCtdI8lhctcalI-
'""'""' Zeit-Raum I8 lhal C whiCh thc 8QaCc
thc lImc lhat wc lIVc atc tcaIzalICn8.
what makc8 QC88IDc 8QaCc and tImc,
I8 nCl QtCQcty gra8Qablc In lhc

ctm8of 8QaCcandlImc.buChlctm8,hCwcVct,
`atc lhc lctm8 C mcanIng Ct u8. Zeit-Raum,
thcn, a8 lhc `gtCund C mcanIng, I8 Il8cl

Cul8Idc lhc dCmaIn C mcaning: Il I8 Qtc-
C8cy mcanInglc88. n lhI8 8cn8c, Zeit-Raum
"gtCund In thc 8cn8c C "Abgrund"
aDy88.`hc tcCCgntICn D Zeit-Raum I8 thc
tcCCgnlICn that mcanIng as suc CannCl bc
`lhc la8l wCtd, 8C lC 8Qcak, bul as mean-
1 Jng QtcCI8cly QCInl8 lC Il8 Cwn tCClcdnc88 In
a ktnd C ab8cnCc C mcanIng.
bcCCgnIzIng lhI8 ab8cnCc C mcanIng I8
ncIthct a thcCtclICalmatlc( nCt a matlct C
`pIhIlI8m,bulI8,a8mcIdcggct altcadyanlIC-
IQatcd In hI8 8ludy C anXIcly In Being and
Time, QtcC8cly a lIVcd tcaIzatICn C Cnc8
Cwn cXQC8urc lC an`Cul8Idc lhal, a8 8uCh,
CaDncVct bc btCughl wIlhIn thc CCnInc8 C
CCmCtlablc cXQctIcnCc: an Cul8Idc In whICh
wc Can ncVct Dc al hCmc. hc cXQctIcnCc
C 8QaCc I8 away8 lhc cXQctIcnCc C bcIng
cXQ8cdtCCutlImIl8, andhctc, InUI8cngagc-
mcnl wIth lhc dccQc8l 8cn8c [Ct ab8cnCc C
8cn8c) C8QaCc, wc8ImIlarly cngagclhI8cXQC-
8urcal IlmO8lcXltcmclcVcl.'Dasein undct-
Il8c dcQcnd8 Cn Da-sein undct8lCCd a8 an
CtIgInary hCmclc88nc88 lhal I8 Cur tclalICn tC
8QaCca8 Zeit-Raum.19
Da-sein, lhc 8Itc C Cut hCmclc88 cXQC-
8utc tC Zeit-Raum, I8 nCt 8ImQly Cthct lhan
Dasein, Cut bctng-al-hCmc In lhc wCtd.
Zeit-Raum, thc QC88IbIlIty C mcanIn@ul
8QaCc and mcanIngul tImc, I8 ncIthct a 8Qa-
lIaly8cQatalc cxi8lcnlnCt a lcmQCtallyanlc-
Ccdcnl tcaIlyIndccd, Il dCc8 nCl cXI8l Inany
way Clhct lhan as 8QaCc andlImc.`hctc I8
Cny thc event [Ereignis} lhal I8 thc aQQrOQtI-
alIng ClhcQC88IbIlItyCDcIngInlhchaQQcn-
Ing C a mcanngul wCtld. hc cVcnl 8 lhc
CC-CCCuttcnCcCZeit-Raum andC 8QaCc and
tImc, bulIlI8QtcCI8cly thc cVcnl ClhcIr8cQa-
taliCn tCm caCh Clhct: lhcy caCh cXI8l Cny
In and a8 lhi8 CCn8lIlulIVc`8ltIc.' bImIatly,
In Cut InhabIlatICn C a amIlIat wCrd~
Cut cXI8lcnCc a8 usctnthctc alway8 utk8
Da-sein, Cur CCn8lItutIVc hCmcc88nc88 lhal
CattIc8wIlhInIlaCalllCtcCCgnIzc lhalwcatc
thu8 cXQC8cd lC lhc aby88 and, cQualy, Cut
hCmcc88 Da-sein Can cXI8l In nC way Clhct
than a8 makIng a hCmc In bcIng, aQQtCQtIat-
Ing bcIng In Cnc way Ct anClhcrhal I8ultI-
malcly at 8lakc In Cur8QatIalIly I8 thc`hCw
C Cut aQQtCQtIaltCn: 8QcCIDCally, what I8 al
8takc I8 whcthct wc lIVc Cut Dasein In a way
thal aCknCwlcdgc8lhI8, Il8Inhctcnl Da-sein.
Da-sein, aCCCtdIng lC Contributions IO
Philosophy, I8 lhc`8Ilc Ct thc mCmcnl C
lhcgtCundIng Cthc ltulh Cbc-Ing [L 65,
323/CPl, 227).22 c cXI8t a8lhc8Ilca8whICh
lhc cVcnt C bcing a8 lhc 8ltIc C catlh and
wCtld I8 cnaClcd, and tcCCgnIzIng lhI8 I8 tcC-
CgIZIng lhc tundamcnlal tc8QCnsIbtlIIy lbat
dcInc8 u8. ndccd, Cut 8QalIalItyI8 ulImatcly
a graQQlIng wIth whal matlct8 mC8l dccQly
Contributions to Philosophy cmQha8izc8
thc CCnlcmQCtary QClICal and sOCIal QtCb-
lcm C what mcIdcggct lhctc Call8`maChina-
lICn [Machenschaf]. c 8aw In Cut InIlIa
8tudy O IVcd 8QaCc thc QtOblcm O COnu8-
Ing thc mathcmatICally mca8utablc cmQty
8QaCc O Our ObJcCtIVc tcatIOn tO thc wOtld
wIth thc OtIgInal 8QatIalIty O Our dwcllIng.
NaChInatIOn I8thcCattyIngOutataglObal
lcVcl O thI8 mI8aQQtchcn8IOn O Out nhct
cnt 8QatIaIty: wIth maChInatIOn wc InhabIt
InhabItatIOnwc dwell Inawaythatbcttay8
dwcllIng~andthc res etensa a8whICh8QaCc
aQQcat8 whcn wc COnHOnt thc wOtld a an
Ob]cCt bcCOmc8 an cXQlOItatIVc InhabItIng
O thc wOtd that aCtIVcly ttan8Otm8 thc
wOtd IntO a dc8ctt. cnCc thc COnCctn O
Contributions to Philosophy: c nccd tO
8hOw hOw It haQQcn8 that 8QaCc and ttmc
bcCOmc tamIngtcQtc8cntatIOn ...Ot'math-
cmauCalCalCulatIOnandwhy thc8c COnCcQt8
O 8QaCc and tImc dOmnatc all thInkIng
(L J //L1 Z|. Jhc tcOtIcntatIOn In
Out undcr8tandIng O 8QaCc that cIdcggct8
QhIlO8OQhy Oct8 I8 It8cl CtuCIal tO tc8I8tIng
thc Inhctcnty dc8ttuCtIVc way In wC wc
CuttcnUy InhabIt Our wOtld.
Jhc analy8I8 O dwcllIng [Wohnen]
In uIldIng LwcllIng hInkIng (1fJ1'
Oct8 tc8OurCc8 Ot a 8IgnIICanty dIHct-
cnt aQQtOaCh tO Out nhabItatIOn O Our
QlaCc8 HOm that cuaCtcd In maChInatIOn.
Jhc dc8CtIQtIOn O thcLtccktcmQlc InJhc
w buId I8 hOw wc attICuatc 8QaCc whICh
Indccd I8 hOw wcOQcna wOtld.bQaCc I8nOt
a gIVcn cmQty COntaInct and buIldIng I8 nOt
mctcly In8ttumcntal tathcq hOw wc buIld
Out atChItcCtutal 8QaCc8 I8 hOw wc dI8ClO8c
8QaCc a8 a QlaCc Ut dwcllIng.Lut buIldIng
8ImultancOu8ly tclca8c8 tO u8 hOw thc wOtld
Can bc InhabItcd and COttclatVcly I8 cXQtc8-
8Vc O hOw wc atc:
Jhc way In whICh yOu atc and1am thc
maonct n whICh wc human8 are On thc
catthI81mndwclllng.... JhcOldwOtd
bauen, whICh 8ay8 thatman is In8Oar a8
hcdwells, thI8 wOtd bauen hOwcVct also
mcan8 at thc 8amc ttmc tO ChctI8h and
QtOtcCt tO Qtc8ctVc and Catc Ot.(L /

11f/LJ 11/ '
Ow wc c8tablI8h Out habItattOn~hOw wc
buIld~I8 hOw wc 8hcltct (bergen]
cIdcggct InuIldIng LwcllIng,JhInl;tng"
Call8 thc OutOld whICh hc thctc
tIc8 a8 thc c88cnHal ChataCtct O bcIng:
Lwctng a8 Qtc8ctVIng [als Shonen], kccg8
thcOuUOld InUat wIth whIChmOttal8
In thIng8(L /1J/LJ 1J1|.hat thI8
mcan8In 8hOtt8 that buIldIngI8 nOt 8ImQy
n8ttumcntal 8hcltct Ot u tOm thc natu-
tal clcmcnt8 It I8 On thc COnttaty hOw
8hcltct all that I8 O Valuc Inthc wOtldhOw
wc 8hcltct thc QO88IbIlItIc8Ot bcIng.JhOugh
Out 8tudy O 8QaCc tcCOgnIZcd thc QtIOtIty O
Zeit-Raum, thc wcIght O thl8 tcCOgnItIOn
I8 thc aCknOwlcdgmcnt that It I8 Only In Out
aCtual dwO that thI8 cnablIng QOwct I8
hOu8cd.8 thc 8Itc Ot thc mOmcnt o thc
gtOundIng O thc ttuth O bc-Ing,Out cX8t-
cnCc Inhctcnty Qut8 uQOn u8 thc CaQaCIty tO
8haQc hOw thc QO88IbIlIuc8 O bcIng wIll bc
tcalIzcd, a CaQaCIty that IuVOlVc8 thc dangct
that wc wIl lIVc In dc8ttuCtIVc dcnIal O thc
Vcty abtIC O mcanIng but a CaQaCIty that I8
cQuallythcQO88IbIlItyO8hcltctIng thc gIVng
JhI8 cmQha8I8 On thc COnCtctcnc88 and
cXI8tcntIal IntImaCy O 8QaCc I8 btOught.,tO
a QOwctul COnCu8IOn tn cIdcggcr8 8tud-
Ic8 O 8CulQtutc HOm thc 1 f8."A and
bQaCc, (1f f| I8 a mcdItatIOn On hOw
thc 8CulQtutal wOtk tclca8c8 thc natutc O
8QaCc tO Out cXQctIcnCc. 1t I8 Ony In Our
aCtual dwcllIng that thc QO88IbIlIty O 8QaCc
cXI8t8 and 8CulQtutc btng8 tO aQQcaranCc
thI8 dcQcndcnCc o 8QaCc uQOn thc QlaCc8
O whICh It I8 thc QO88bIlIty: laCc 8 nOt
\rJ^ In a Qtc-gVcn 8QaCc act thc man-
O Qhy8ICal-tcChnOOgICal 8QaCc.Jhc lat-
tct unOld8 It8c Ooly thrOugh thc tcIgnIng
O QaCc8 O a tcgIOn(tt and bQaCc11|.
nd Ju8t a8 8QaCc 8 nOt an Indctcnt COn-
O Indctcnt QlaCc8 8O I8 QlaCc nOt
IndIHctcnt COntanct Ot an IndIctcnt
cwOuld haVc tO lcatn tO tcCOgnIZc
thIng8thcm8cVc8 atc QaCc8 and dO nOt
mctclybclOng tO a QlaCc (IbId.'.JhI8 nc O
thIokIng 8 COmQctcd In thc ClO8cy tclatcd
''Jcmatk8 On tt-bCulQtutc-bQaCc whctc
cIdcggct IdcntIIc8 thc CtuCal tOlc Othc
0Ody In tclatIOn tO 8QaCc:
Jhc human ha8 nO bOdy and 8 nO bOdy
but tathct It lIVc8 It8- bOdy [ Leib ]. Jhc
human lIVc8 In that It bOdc8 [leibt], and
thu8I8It admIttcdIntO thcOQcnO 8QaCc
and thtOughIhI8 8cl-admIttanCc It hOd8
t8c altcady tOm thc Out8ct In a tca-
tOn tO It8 cllOw human8 and thtng8
cbcganbynOtIngthat OutbcIng8La-8cIn
VhCh8rlg-OQcn.bCuQturctcVcal8 that
t8bcIng-OQcnI8 cnaCtng Only a8 OutbOd-
yng.t 8 utImatcly n and a8 thc COnCtctc-
nc88 O Our bOdIly cngagcmcnt wIth thIng8
tatthctc I8'
hat I8Uctc! c w ncVct cxhau8t thc
dc8CtQtIOn O th8 and 8O wc wIll ncVct
cxhau8t Out aCCOunt O 8QaCc thc coIgmatIC
QO88IbIlIty and aCtualIty O thc wOtd that
COn8tItutc8 thc COntcXt and abtIC O Our
IVc8.bQaCc I8 whctc wc lIVc n thc COmOtt-
ablc amIIatty O bcIng-at-hOmc and a8O
whctc wc cnCOuntct thc Ca tO 8hcltct thc
Vcty QO88IbIlIty O mcaoIng n an aCknOwl-
cdgmcnt O Out hOmclc88nc88.Ow wc hccd
th8 Ca wIll bc dcCI8Vc In thI8 tcChnOlOgICa
wOtldthatI8Qtcm8cd uQOnthc dcnIalO Out
c88cntIa tcaty.
See Thomas Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift m
Heidegger Research," Continental Philosophy
Review, 32 (2001), 1-20.
2 GA 2, 63-113/BT 91-148, division 1, chaptr 3,
"The Worldhood of the World." The concept
of "wOtld is also discussed extensively in the
. 1927lecture course, Die Grudprobleme der
Phinomenologie, GA24,230-41 and 412-29/
BP, 162-70 and 291-302, and in earlier courses
such as the 1925 course, Prolegomena zur
Geschichte des Zeitbegrifs, GA20 210-325/
HC 156-236, division 1, chapter 3, sections
19-25. For the idea that Heidegger's later phi
losophy of space represent a fundamental shift
in position, see Andrew J. Mitchell, Heidegger
among te Sculptors: Body, Space and the Art
of Dwelling (Stanford: Stanford University '
Press, 2010); for a powerful criticism of this
position, see Franois Raffoul, "The Event
of Space," Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle
Annual,2 (2012), 89-106.
3 ot"dwelling," see GA 2, 54/BT, 79-80; for
"involvements," see section 18, GA 2,84/BT,
116, and to compare the notion of "equipmen
tal totality," see GA 2,68/BT, 97.
' See GA 2,11-15 ad 52-9/BT, 32-5 and
78-86. See Kirsten Jacobson, "A Developed
Nature: A Phenomenological Account of the
Experience of Home," Continental Philosophy
Review, 42 (2009), 355-73. Initially, Heidegger
presented "Dasein" as a word without
hyphenation; later he hyphenated the word
"Da-sein." In discussing Being and Time, we
use the term without hyphenation; the relation
betwee the earlier and later uses is considered
in the seond section of this chapter.
s GA 2,138/BT, 104: "To ecounter the ready-to
hand in its environmentl space remains
ontically possible only because Dasein itself is
spatial' with regard to it Being-in-the-world."
6 Sections 22-4, "The Spatiality [Riumlichkeit]
of Dasein." See Yoko Arisaka, "On Heideger's
Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus, .
Inquiry 38 (1995), 455-67; Jing Long, "The
Body and the Woddhoo mthe World, .
joul of Philosophical Research, 31 (2006),
' See also GA 20 306-25/CT 223-36, O25.
See Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A
Coentary on Heideger's Being and Time,
Division I (Cambridge: APress, 1991),
132; Jeffy Malpas, Heidegger's Topology,
(Cambridge, A Press, 2006), 91, 376;
Peg Birmingham, "Heidegger and Arendt:
The Birt of Political Action and Speech," in
eds Franois Rafoul and David Pettigrew,
Heidegger's Practical Philosohy (Albany:
SUNY Press, 2002), chapter 12, 197.
9 For "regions," see GA 2, 103/BT, 136-7.
See Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A
Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of
Califoria Press, 1997), 247-56.
Heidegger's phenomenological description of
lived eperience also challenges the mutual
isolation that we typically presume to ei
between subjects; Being and Time, division
1, chapter 4.

Compare Heidegger's remarks on a "pheom

enology of minapparent," GA 15, 135/FS, 80.
' See Tomas Sheean," Kehre and Ereignis:
A Prolegomenon to Introduction to
Metphysics," in ee Richard Polt and
Gregory Fried, A Companion tO Heideger's
Introduction to Metphysics (New Haven and
London: Yale Universjty Press, 2000), 3-16,
263-74, especially 7.
"The meaning [Sinn) of Dasein is temporality,"
GA 2, 331/BT, 380.
See GA 2, 367-9/BT, 418-21 for Heidegger's
discussion of the relation of space and time in
Being and Time.
" GA 65, 371-88/CP1, 259-71, "Der
Zeit-Raum als der Ab-grund." On this
theme, see Friedrich-Wilhehn von Hnn,
"Wa-ZeirRa-" in e. Ewald Rieht Die
Fge Nach dr Wahrheit (Frankfrt am Main:
Klostnnann, 1997). Compre Heideger Der
Kunst und der Raum (St. Gaiie, Switerland:
Erker Verlag, 1969), translated by Charles
H. Siebert as "Art and Space," Ma and World
6 (1973), 3-8,7: "Space-does it belong to the
primal pheomena at the awareess of which
m anovercome, as Goethe says, by an awe
to the pint of anxiety? . . . For behind space, so
it will appear nothing more is given to which
it could btraced O.Wnspace there u
no retreat to something c.Se Stuart Elden,
"Contibutons to Gegraphy? The Spacs of ;, .
Hideger's Beige, Environent ad PC.
D:SoandSpae,23 (2005),811-27.
especially GA 2, 186/BT, 180.
See Mitchell, Heidegger among the
Sculptors, 52.
Heidegger takes up our "homeless " or . ,
"unhomel y" character in Being and Tme (e.g.:

,: ,
GA 2, 189/BT, 183). It na cntral theme of the
1942 lecture course, HO/derlin's Hymne "der :-'
Ister," GA 53.

Zeit-Raum is "originally the site fr the

moment of enowning [Augenblicks-Sdes
Ereignisses]." (G 65,30/CP1,22)
See GA 65, 29/CP1, 21: "Tune-space [is] the,
site for the moment of strif . . , . Strif [is]
te stif of earth and world because truth of
be-ing [takes place] only in sheltring, sheltt-
ing as grounding the'berween' in beings: te
tug of earth and world."
t @John Sallis, "Grounders of the Abyss,"
in es Charles Scott, Susan Schoenbohm,
Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Allejandro Vallega,
Companion to Heidegger's "Contributions to
Philosophy'' (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2001), 181-97.

' See Elde, "Contibutions to Geography?" 819:

mContributins to Philosophy, similarly,
Heidegger identifes the "hiaden essenc "
of Zeit-Raum as 'nearness and remotees,
emptiness and gifting, frvor and dawdling," in
contrast to quantitative measurability we com
monly take to b defnitive of objective space
and time (GA 65, 372/CP1, 260).
2 Compare GA 7, 29-36/BW 333-41.
16 Bemerkungen zKunst-Pistik-Raum, ed.
Hermann Heidegger (St. Gallen, Switerland:

Erker Verlag, 1996), 13; quoted in Mithell,
Heiegger among te Sculptors, 40.
On the concretness of space se Jefrey
Malpas, Heidegger and the Thinking of
Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being
(Cambridge A:APress, 2012) and the
review of this book by Frois Raffoul, Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews, July 19, 2012.
Hans Run
Up until the mid-nineteenth century, the
question and problem of technology was not
seen as an issue of great philosophical inter
est. It is in the social philosophy of Marx and
other left Hegelians that one can first see a
genuine shift among philoSophers in this
respect. The modes of production and thus
the very technical means of life are now seen
as cultural forces in their own right, and thus
as influencing the thoughts, experiences, and
self-understanding of a society. D 1877 Ernst
Kapp, a philosopher and a contemporary of
Marx, publishes the first book with the title
"Outline for a Philosophy of technology"
(Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik),
where he launches the idea of the tool-as an
"organ-extension" of man.
With the First World War the question
takes on another urgency. The war was not
only a human and cultural disaster of previ
ously unseen dimensions. It was also an expe
rience of how the machinery of war somehow
seemed to have taken over the lives of men,
and made them into its servants rather U
its masters. Together with the rapid and con
vulsive industrialization of the West it contrib
uted to bringing the question of technology U
the forefont of the cultural and philosophi
Cdebates in postwar Europe.
In the 1920s many European philosophers
and intellectuals turn their interest toward
technology as the defining issue of our time.
Ortega y Gasset in Spain, Nikolai Berdjajev
in Russia (and France), Oswald Spengler,
Ernst Jiinger, and Ernst Cassirer in Germany,
and many others take part in the discussion
of the meaning and consequences of the tech
nologizing of culture. The culmination of the
Second World War brought the whole mat
ter U yet another level. The atomic bomb
marked a new step in both the technological
and the spiritual evolution of humankind. It
now had the ability to abolish life on eanh
as such. With the parallel discovery of the
human genome, humanity appeared to have
fulfilled the ancient phantasies of a demi
urge that in his hands had the power and the
techne to create and destroy life.
The first phase of this discussion takes
place when Heidegger is developing his own
version of phenomenology as existential
ontology. Yet, in his early published works,
including Being and Time, the question of
technology does not stand forth as a funda
mental concern. It.is not until the early 1950s
that he explicitly and publicly takes on the
question of technology as a philosophical
theme in its own right. He then gives several
public lectures on this theme, which are then
edited into the immensely influential essay
"The Question Concerning Technology"
in 1954. Here he describes the essence of
Bloomsbury Companions
The Bloomsbury Companions series is a major series of single volume companions to key
research felds in the humanities aimed at postgraduate students, scholars, and libraries.
Each companion ofers a comprehensive reference resource giving an overview of key topics,
research areas, new directions, and a manageable guide to beginning or developing research in
the field. A distinctive feature of the series is that each companion provides practical guidance
o advanced study and research in the field, including research methods and subject-specifc
Aesthetic, edited by Anna Christina Ribeiro
Analytic Philosophy, edited by Barry
Dainton and Howard Robinson
Aristotle, edited by Claudia Baracchi
Continentl Philosophy, edited by
Jobn Mullarkey and Beth Lord
Epitemology, edited by Andrew Cullison
Ethics, edited hy Christian Miller
Exitentialism, edited by Jack Reynolds,
Felicity Joseph, and Ashley Woodward
Hegel, edited by Allegra de Laurentiis and
Jeffrey Edwards
Hobbes,edited by S.A. Lloyd
Hume, edited by Alan Bailey and
Dan O'Brien
Kant, edited by Gary Banbam,
Dennis Schulting, and Nigel Hems
Leibniz, edited by Brandon C. Look
Locke, edited by S.-J. Savonious-Wroth,
Paul Schuurman, and Jonathan Walmsley
Metaphysics, edited by Robert W. Barnard
and Neil A. Manson
Philosophical Logic, edited by Leon Harston
and Richard Pettigrew
Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel
Garcia-Carpintero and XKolbe!
Philosophy of Mind, edite by James Garvey
Philosophy of Scince, edited by
Steven French and Juha Saatsi
Plato, edited by Gerald A. Press
Pltical Philosophy, edited by Andrew Fiala
a Matt Matravers
Pragmatsm, edited by Sami Pihlstrom
Socrates, edited by John Bussanich and
Nicholas D. Smith
Spinoz, edited by Wiep van Bunge
Franois Raffoul
Eric S. Nelson