Why Care About Counterfactual Support?

The Cognitive Uses of Causal Order Lecture 2

You Do Care About Counterfactual Support

Two Regularities
All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter

Two Regularities
All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter

Two More Regularities

All ravens are black All members of the 1964 Greenbury School Board are bald

Two More Regularities

All ravens are black All members of the 1964 Greenbury School Board are bald

Conclusion
Some true generalizations are law-like; some are not But what is lawlikeness?

Answer
A lawlike generalization supports counterfactuals

Two Counterfactuals
If these two ravens were to mate, their offspring would be black If Hilary Clinton were elected to the 1964 Greenbury School Board, her hair would fall out

Counterfactuals and Lawlikeness

The baldness of the school board members is a coincidence; if things had gone differently, baldness would not be universal The blackness of ravens is not a coincidence; if things had gone (somewhat) differently, blackness would still be universal

Counterfactuals and Lawlikeness

The baldness of the school board members is a coincidence; if things had gone differently, baldness would not be universal The blackness of ravens is not a coincidence; if things had gone (somewhat) differently, blackness would still be universal

Counterfactual Support
A generalization All Fs are G offers counterfactual support if 1. Actual Fs in non-actual circumstances would still be G 2. Non-actual Fs would be G A matter of degree

You Care About Counterfactual Support

If you care about the distinction between law-like and accidental regularities There are other reasons, too

The Empiricist Case Against Caring

The Logical Empiricists

Rudolf Carnap Hans Reichenbach Carl Hempel

The Empiricist Program

1. Science as the only path to knowledge 2. Expunge from science all metaphysical ways of thinking

Causation Modality

The Actual and the Modal

Actual fact: a fact about what happens in the actual (even observable) world Modal fact: facts about possibilities, necessities, what might but did not happen, what could not happen

Two Positivist Theses

Only the actual is knowable Only the actual has practical signicance

Only the Actual Has Practical Signicance

Modal facts cannot make a difference to our realizing the goals of science

The Goals of Science

1. Explanation 2. Prediction 3. Control

The Empiricist Theory of Explanation

Hempel: To understand a phenomenon is to be able to predict the phenomenon (at least in retrospect) In order to explain, learn how to predict

The Goals of Science

1. Explanation 2. Prediction 3. Control

The Actual and the Modal Aspects of a Regularity

1. Actual: All actual ravens are actually black 2. (a) In some counterfactual circumstances, some actual ravens would be black (b) Some non-actual ravens, if they existed, would be black

Prediction and Control

Are about actual outcomes Thus they are covered by the actual part of a regularity Nothing else matters In particular, the modal part does not matter

The Empiricist Position

We may care about counterfactual support but we should not Find a new denition of law-likeness

Against the Empiricists But Not Against Empiricism

My Claims
Paying attention to counterfactual facts can make a difference to prediction and control Even given all empiricist assumptions Because counterfactual facts are at bottom facts about the actual world important facts!

Explaining Caring about Counterfactual Support

I will put one piece of an explanation in place: explain practical signicance of caring What then must be added: evolution? something else?

Some Attempts To Care

Two Failed Attempts to Explain Caring

1. Planning explanation 2. Induction explanation

Planning Explanation

Planning Explanation
Planning my actions requires counterfactual thinking

Planning Explanation
When I plan what to do, I select from several possible actions the one that will best realize my goal For each action I ask: what would happen if I were to do that? I decide by the counterfactual answers

Empiricist Reply
This may be the way that humans actually plan, but there is another way to plan that does not require counterfactual thinking

Empiricist Planning
Look at actual frequencies Perform the action that most often leads to the goal (other things being equal) Claim: this is for practical purposes identical to counterfactual planning

Induction Explanation

Induction Explanation
In order to learn the actual part of a regularity, I must learn its modal part If the actual part is the practical end, the modal part is the means to that end

Inductive Argument
From the fact that

! All observed Fs are G

infer that

! All Fs are G

Thesis
In order to perform this inference, you must have reason to believe that

! All observed Fs are G

is not an accident or a coincidence So: require counterfactual knowledge

Problem
The thesis is implausibly strong A better thesis: in order to make the inference, you should lack reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is a coincidence

The Theses Contrasted

To infer All Fs are G, must have reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is not an accident To infer All Fs are G, must lack reason to believe that the G-ness of observed Fs is an accident

Otherwise, How Can Induction Get Started?

We cannot have reason to believe that a pattern is not an accident until we have done some inductive inference

Lets look for something else

What Is Counterfactual Support, Really?

How Counterfactuals Work

Robert Stalnaker David Lewis Jonathan Bennett

How Counterfactuals Work

If I were to drop this pen, it would fall to the ground Stalnaker/Lewis: nd the closest possible world(s) where the pen is dropped; see if it falls to the ground

Closest Possible Worlds?

Sounds like the truth or falsity of the counterfactual depends on the spatial structure of some hyper-universe full of nonactual worlds

World Proximity
The relevant closest possible worlds are those which are like the actual world, except that something goes slightly differently so that the counterfactual antecedent occurs (e.g., the pen is dropped)

World Proximity
1. Same history as actual world 2. Something in recent past goes slightly differently, so that pen is dropped 3. Same fundamental laws as actual world Note that (2) implies partial exceptions to (1) and (3): make these very small

Very Small
The thing that happens, so that the pen is dropped, must 1. Change as little as possible about past history 2. Violate the laws as little as possible

Putting it all together

Truth for Counterfactuals

If A had happened, then B would have happened is true if

! B happens in all the evaluation

worlds for A

Evaluation Worlds for A (Lewis, Bennett)

1. Same history as actual world until shortly before occurrence of A 2. Then there is a conservative deviation from actual history that brings about A 3. From then on, actual laws determine what occurs

Conservative Deviation (Lewis, Bennett)

1. Happens as close to A as possible 2. Has as few side effects as possible 3. If possible, violates no laws and is not too improbable 4. If violation is necessary, it is discreet

Restrictions
This story is correct for ordinary counterfactuals

Closest Possible Worlds?

Sounds like the truth or falsity of the counterfactual depends on the spatial structure of some hyper-universe full of nonactual worlds Wrong

Closest Possible Worlds

What happens in the closest worlds depends on: 1. Actual history 2. Actual laws 3. Criteria for conservative deviation

Closest Possible Worlds

What makes counterfactual claims true or false are facts about the actual world Specically: Ordinary occurrent facts and facts about laws Empiricists are OK with both

Thesis
If the facts that make a counterfactual claim true are actual facts, then the modal aspect of a regularity is something actual And so can make a difference even in the empiricists sense prediction & control

Question
Still, even if an interest in counterfactuals is an interest in actual facts, why these actual facts? They look like a rather arbitrary selection

The Modal Aspect of a Regularity

The Actual and the Modal Aspects of a Regularity

1. Actual: All actual ravens are actually black 2. (a) In some counterfactual circumstances, some actual ravens would be black (b) Some non-actual ravens, if they existed, would be black

What Is In the Modal Part?

What facts make the raven counterfactuals true?

All Ravens Are Black

! If these two ravens had mated, their offspring would have been black ! If this raven had been fed a diet of worms, it would still have been black

Some Raven Physiology

Tyrosinase helps to covert tyrosine to melanin inside the melanosomes Melanosomes are incorporated into feather-producing cells Much physical structure: bundle it together and call it P

All Ravens Have P

That is, they all have this complicated physical structure that makes them black Include in P the physical structure that ensures that P is passed from parents to offspring

A Raven Counterfactual
If these two ravens had mated, their offspring would have been black Find the closest worlds where the ravens mate

Closest Mating Worlds

1. Same history as actual world until shortly before mating 2. Conservative deviation brings about mating 3. From then on, actual laws apply

Closest Mating Worlds

1. Same history, so raven parents have P 2. Deviation brings about mating conservative, so does not undermine the P-hood of the parents 3. Actual laws apply, so parents P-hood causes P-hood, blackness, of offspring

Relevant Facts
1. That actual ravens have P 2. Actual laws (by which P-hood replicates itself and causes blackness) 3. Facts in virtue of which the conservative deviations leading to mating do not undermine the P-hood of the parents

Relevant Facts
P-hood of parents is not undermined by the deviation to mating because: 1. P-hood has causal inertia 2. P-hood is separable from mating (conservatism: minimize side effects)

Separability
1. Physical separability: the fact of mating consists of physical facts distinct from P 2. Causal separability: the fact of mating consists of physical facts that are not creating or sustaining causes of P

Contrast Case
If this raven had had some genetic defects, it still would have been black Blackness not present in every evaluation world because genetic defects not separable from P

Why You Care About Counterfactual Support

Overview
Regularities in the real world are very negrained Knowledge of reasons for a regularitys counterfactual support provides compact basis for knowledge of ne-grained details

Overview
We care about regularities that offer counterfactual support because we care about having a compact basis for learning a regularitys ne-grained details

Fineness of Grain
All ravens are not black

Bleached ravens Albino ravens

Fineness of Grain
All ravens for which conditions Z hold, are black Z is very complex Learning Z is learning ne-grained details about a regularity This is one-half of neness of grain

It Is Good to Know FineGrained Details

Better prediction; more control To do: show how knowledge of ne-grained details comes from knowledge of the facts that determine counterfactual support

What Counterfactual Support Depends On

1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness

Simpler Case: Causal Antecedents

Antecedents
Antecedent of a generalization: All Fs are G Antecedent of a counterfactual: If A had occurred, then B would have occurred

Fire Burns
! Fire itself is doing the causing

Good Things to Know

1. It is hotter above than beside a re 2. Short term exposure may not cause damage 3. Damage more severe with length of exposure

How To Know Them

Dont just memorize factoids. Learn about mechanisms: 1. Damage comes from heat accumulation 2. Heat accumulation falls off with distance 3. Heat rises

What Counterfactual Support Depends On

1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness

Social Generalizations
If you have more material possessions than other people, they will tend to envy you

Non-Causal Antecedents

Roasted Raven Is Good to Eat

The antecedent, ravenhood, does not do the causing It is some physical property P of ravens that makes them edible

To Know Fine-Grained Details

1. Learn conditions under which ravens have P 2. Learn conditions under which P has its characteristic effect (taste, nutrition)

To Know Fine-Grained Details

1. Learn conditions under which ravens have P 2. Learn conditions under which P has its characteristic effect (taste, nutrition)

Learning Fine-Grained Details

In conditions Z, ravens have P How to learn Z? Method 1: learn about the mechanism that causes ravens to have P Problem: P is unobservable

Learning Fine-Grained Details

Method 2: Assume that most ravens in normal circumstances have P Worry about the nal phase, where the raven is removed from normal circumstances: killing, dressing, cooking Do these actions interfere with P?

Its All About Interference

What actions interfere with or undermine a ravens P-hood? Those that manipulate things that are not separable from P

What Counterfactual Support Depends On

1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness

Summary

Assumptions
1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness

Source of Knowledge of FineGrained Details

1. All actual ravens have P 2. Causal inertia of P 3. Causal and physical separability of P from relevant antecedents 4. Causal laws in virtue of which P causes blackness

Conclusion, Part 1
To learn or predict ne-grained details of a regularity, learn the facts in virtue of which it provides counterfactual support These are actual facts that predict other actual facts

Conclusion, Part 2
Pay special attention to regularities that provide counterfactual support, because with these regularities, there is a compact basis for learning ne-grained details

Michael Strevens Philosophy Department New York University www.strevens.org strevens@nyu.edu