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Reviews : Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action. Oxford: Polity Press, 1996. 220 pp
Derek Layder History of the Human Sciences 1997 10: 117 DOI: 10.1177/095269519701000411 The online version of this article can be found at: http://hhs.sagepub.com/content/10/4/117

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upon

theoretical atheism, which characterizes todays social constructionmuch as it did Marx or Durkheim. According to social constructionists, meaning is produced by social interaction between humans. Nevertheless, many of these humans, but not social constructionists, cite gods as actors in their accounts of the origins of meaning. A social science, which was not sceptical about such claims, but which was sceptical about the social constructionists routine scepticism, would look very different from that which is now the conventional orthodoxy. Constructing Identities might be a small book. In terms of style, it has a nice author, to match those nice animals and nice environments, of which he writes. But do not be deceived by the engaging modesty. A conceptual network is being redrawn; social scientists are being invited to rewrite their identities. We do not know where this will lead, but the journey is sure to be
a

ism

as

exciting.
Michael

Billig Loughborough University,

UK

Hans Joas, The Creativity of Action. Oxford: Polity Press, 1996. 220 pp.

Although Joas states that this book is not meant to provide an encyclopedic view of its primary subject-matter and instead seeks to advance a particular approach to a theory of action (3) he nonetheless covers an immense amount of ground in his review of the pertinent literature. Joas is undoubtedly correct in saying that he advances a particular approach to action theory although this approach and the specific ramifications it has for sociological theory in general sometimes tend to become lost or at least disguised in the welter of argumentative themes and issues. In this respect I think Joass arguments can be split up in terms of two broad claims, which can be evaluated separately. The first claim is that there is a creative dimension to all
human action and that this overarches the two other models of action which have stressed its rational and normatively oriented aspects. Joass arguments in this respect are quite convincing and the book both demonstrates this proposition and at the same time succeeds in centralizing the notion of creativity in sociological theory in general. This is no small accomplishment especially considering the marginal place that many approaches have

assigned to it.

The second claim, however, is much more in the way of an attempt to reconfigure social theory along the lines that Joas prefers. This involves the

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assertion that Joass specific version of action theory provides a means of dealing with collective social phenomena which goes beyond functionalism and some of the postmodern diagnoses of modernity. This is a far more difficult claim to evaluate not only because it is much more contentious and contestable, but also because the contours and substance of the argument that Joas sets out are less easily discernible and convincing than those concerned with the assertion that all action possesses a creative component. Chapter 1 concentrates on documenting the claim that the creative dimension of action has been marginalized in sociological theory. In particular Parsons is criticized for neglecting the work of Simmel, and the philosophical schools of pragmatism and the philosophy of life. Partly on the basis of this, Joas also questions Parsonss claim about a convergence in classical sociological thought (reflected in the perceived similarities between Webers theory of charisma and Durkheims theory of the sacred [44-65]). Chapter 2 examines other currents of thought since the mid-18th century which have given a more central role to the idea of creativity. Joas discusses these partly by focusing on metaphors of creativity and the authors who were principally influenced by them. Thus Gottfried Herders notion of expression and Karl Marxs ideas about production and revolution are examined with reference to what they have to offer concerning the subject of creativity. However, according to Joas it was not until the latter half of the 19th century that attempts were made to define creativity in a more profound way (71). The philosophy of life in Europe (indebted to the work of Schopenhauer) with its concept of life, and pragmatism in the United States with its concept of intelligence: these are two different and competing ways of trying to grasp creativity. As far as the philosophy of life is concerned both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche fail to deal with creativity properly because they treat it in isolation from the intersubjective and objective contexts of human action (125). On the other hand the work of the pragmatists provides us with a theory of situated creativity (133) which is much more nuanced in this respect and can be discerned in the writings of Dewey, James, Mead and so
on.

Chapter 3 concentrates on developing the notion of the creativity of action by drawing out three facets of action with a view to restructuring the principles underlying mainstream action theory (145). Thus Joas focuses on the intentional character of action, and suggests that the adoption of a nonteleological approach makes it become immediately obvious that it is not sufficient to consider human action as being contingent on the situation, but that it should also be recognised that the situation is constitutive of action (160). This is complemented by an emphasis on the corporeality of action because the role of the body in action should not be confined to the margins of sociology (167). According to Joas, action theory must concern itself with the emergence of the ability to control, as well as with easing control of the

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body - in either case such control cannot be assumed. Finally the assumption of the primary autonomy of the individual actor must be relinquished in favour of the idea of primary sociality.
This attempt to offer a model of action which is suited to Joass aims of demonstrating the inherent creativity of action is well documented although in many ways it is also fairly uncontentious since much of the basis of this model already exists - most strongly in pragmatism, but also in other scattered elements of sociological thought. However, the second thematic of a reconfiguring not only of action theory but also of sociological theory more widely conceived also makes an appearance at this juncture and this aspect of Joass argument seems less easily acceptable in a general sense. With reference to Luhmanns work Joas states that our aim in the present context is the opposite of Luhmanns, namely to realign the theory of action in order precisely to avoid the necessity of resorting to instruments of systems theory in order to solve the problem of social order (149). This strong aversion to systems theory (and functionalism) is carried forward into Chapter 4 (the final chapter) where Joas deals with the problem of creativity and collective action. It is necessary to point out that in dealing with this issue and the associated ones of creative democracy, differentiation and democratization and creativity in the postmodern age, Joas covers a whole wealth of materials and authors including Giddens, Beck, Etzioni, Habermas, Luhmann, Smelser, Castoriadis and Touraine, to name but a few. However, although the chapter is densely argued the underpinning theoretical plot is clear. Joas wants to demonstrate the superiority of a theory of the creativity of action theory over other approaches (normative and rationalistic approaches in particular) and thus to legitimate a programme for a nonfunctionalist macrosociology based on action theory (198). In this respect while rejecting for the most part Luhmanns justification of functional analysis and systems theory (and Habermass use of it), Joas believes that both Giddens and Habermas have shown that the critique of functionalism does not necessarily lead to the adoption of methodological individualism. Thus the common task is to develop a social theory which is based on action theory, does not conflate functional analysis and causal explanations, yet contains the benefits of a controlled use of systems models (222). Unfortunately this involves abandoning any fundamental ontological distinctions between agency and structure (or action and system) and adopting a position in which systems analysis is restricted to the real reciprocal effects of the interactions between actors (222). Joas simply presses ahead with this idea assuming that a controlled use of systems models automatically means the wholesale adoption of an interactionist ontology and the complete abandonment of the definitive ontological features associated with social systems and structures. However, it could be, and has been, argued (Archer, 1995; Layder, 1994; Layder, 1997) that this sort of position also creates greater problems than it

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solves and has severe explanatory deficiencies. Not the least of these is that such a position leads to a sort of dual reductionism in which structure and agency are dissolved into one another - thus preventing any real analytic purchase on their respective and mutually constitutive roles in the formation of action or the reproduction of structure. Derek

Layder University of Leicester

REFERENCES

Archer, Margaret (1995) Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach .

Cam-

bridge : Cambridge University Press. Layder, Derek (1994) Understanding Social Theory. London: Sage Publications. . Layder, Derek (1997) Modern Social Theory: Key Debates and New Directions London: University College Press.

Sallie Westwood and John Williams (eds) Imagining Cities: Signs, Memory. London: Routledge, 1997. x + 289 pp.

Scripts,

It is not just technology which appears to be accelerating towards meltdown,

cultural and sociological understandings of the world. This brief quotation from Gibson (235), rather than prosaic references to space-time compression, more appropriately captures the excitement which accompanies the best of the contributions in this edited volume. The blurring of the boundary between real and imagined allows various authors to explore the theorization of the city in novel ways. The essays, which had their origin in a sociological conference, are logically grouped into five sections. If they were not, then the framework offered in the first essay by Soja, as he summarizes six discourses on the postmetropolis, could have accommodated several of the subsequent contributions. Sojas piece, based on Los Angeles, that paradigmatic city where it all comes together, is a summary of six discourses in as many pages. It is a rich condensing of the content of his forthcoming book. Despite a fondness for coining new words, some more appropriate than others, the content merits careful reading and rereading. In a balanced review of the general challenge of telecommunications on the
so are our

future of cities,

we

do well

to

head several of Grahams realistic reminders.