SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'!

9;! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4 OF 50
ART I Sovereignty over Place Ligitan and Palau Sipadan FACTS: In case of Indonesia/Malaysia over Palau Ligitan and Palau Sipadan, the Philippines specified that it seeks to intervene in the case as non part. Philippines believe that its claim of sovereignty over North orneo might be affected by the courts reasoning or interpretation of the issue in the dispute bet!een Indonesia and Malaysia. 6EL0: "he Philippines has emphasi#ed the importance of a document dated $anuary %%, &'(' by !hich the Sultan of Sulu !ith !hom title, a lease to part of Sabah )North orneo* lay, had made a grant in that part to Messrs. +verbeck and ,ent )!hich grant does not include Palau Ligitan and Palau Sipadan*. "his instrument, according to the court, is said by the Philippines to be its -primal source. of title in North orneo and is observed that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia relies on the &'(' grant as source of title to Ligitan and Sipadan. /ourt cannot grant application to intervene. ART III SEC 4 S!n'&!(, 7* V!*8"e9 %&( S/01 233 FACTS4 Petitioner5Meriam Santiago !as planning to go abroad for study purposes. ut the Sandiganbayan ordered the /I, not to allo! her to leave on the ground that she has a pending case under the 1nti 6 7raft and /orrupt practices 1ct pending on the said court. Since that order !as issued !ithout notice and hearing, petition argued that it has violated here right of due process. 6EL04 "he issuance of the order by the Sandiganbayan is an e8ercise of its inherent po!er to maintain the effectiveness of its 9urisdiction over the case and the person of the petitioner. /ourts have the po!er to do all necessary things, as long as it is reasonable for the administration of 9ustice !ithin their 9urisdiction. Cen'r!$ B!n: 7* CA %%: S/01 ;32 FACTS4 ased on e8amination report submitted by the Supervision and <8amination Section of /entral ank, it stated that the financial condition of "S is on insolvency and continuing its business !ould probably mean great loss to its deposition and creditors. "he Monetary oard issued a resolution ordering the closure of "S , and not allo!ing it to do business in the Philippines, and placing it under receivership. "S contended that such closure denied "S due process of la!. 6EL04 =nder the /entral ank 1ct, there is no re>uirement that a hearing be conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. It is sufficient that a report be made after e8amination of a bank that sho!s that the bank is insolvent. "he appointment of receivership may be made !ithout notice and hearings but it is sub9ect to 9udicial revie!. ,ue process does not re>uire a prior hearing. "he hearing may be subse>uent to the closure. 1 prior hearing !ill only result in a bank run. C,"r' Ad-&n&*'r!',r 7*. P!*#"!$ %;? S/01 2:@ FACTS4 1 municipal 9udge !as charged !ith bribery as !ell as administrative cases before the Sandiganbayan. In submitting his report, the 0"/ 9udge !ho investigated the case relied solely on the complaint, the ans!er, the memorandum of respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing before the Sandiganbayan. 6EL04 Pascual !as not given procedural due process. Ae !as not given the right to an open trial !here he could confront the !itness against him and present evidence in his defense. "he procedure fell short of the re>uirement of due process. Bern!rd, 7* CA %(; S/01 @&( FACTS4 0espondent sued petitioner in the 0"/. 1ll pleadings on his behalf !ere filed by the la! firm Puerto, NuBe# and 1ssociates. ,uring the initial trials, the court interpreter informed the $udge that 1tty. $ose Puerto died. Pending verification of 1tty. PuertoCs death, the court proceeded !ith the trial. 1 ne! la!yer appeared and mentioned that 1tty. Puerto had died. Dithout acting on the matter, the court decided the case in favor the respondent. Petitioner argued that he !as denied due process since he !as not allo!ed to present evidence. 6EL04 1 verified proof of death must accompany the appearance of a ne! counsel, !henever the death of previous attorney is the cause of substitution of a counsel. Petitioner failed to comply !ith the

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2 OF 50
re>uirement. "he death of 1tty. Puerto is not significant, because it is the la! firm that represents him. Petitioner alleged that the other associate died ahead of 1tty. Puerto such that he !as the only la!yer in that office. ut, 1tty. Puerto misled the court into believing that the la! firm consisted of more than one la!yer. Pe,2$e 7* Tee)!n:ee 2;< SCRA =; FACTS4 "eehankee !as convicted of % counts of murder and & count of frustrated murder. "hat said crime !as highly publici#ed. Ae claimed that he !as denied due process, because of the pervasive pre9udicial publicity !hich attended the trial. 6EL04 Ereedom of the Press is not incompatible !ith fair trial. Publicity is not pre9udicial to the rights of an accused to a fair trial. $udges are competent and are trained to disregard off court evidence. Publicity does not infect their impartiality. "o !arrant a finding of pre9udicial publicity, there must be proof that 9udges !ere unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. We// 7* Pe,2$e %(2 S/01 ;@ FACTS4 Aubert Debb !as charged !ith rape !ith homicide. "he $udge denied most of his pleadings. Such as a motion to be hospitali#ed because of asthma of the skin. "he 9udge refused to allo! the defense to confront the !itness !ith the school records to sho! that her testimony regarding her educational attainment is false. "he trial 9udge denied the motion to take the deposition of !itness in the =.S. "he 9udge admitted only &: out of the &@% e8hibits of the petitioner. "he trial 9udge denied the petition for bail. Petitioner argued that the trial 9udged should be dis>ualified for bias. 6EL04 <8trinsic evidence is re>uired to established bias, malice, bad faith or corrupt purpose in addition to palpable error. 0epeated rulings against the accused, no matter ho! erroneous and vigorously e8pressed are not bases for dis>ualification of a 9udge on grounds of bias. Gr!2&$,n Pe'&'&,n 3:% S/01 &3' FACTS4 "he complainants seek the removal of 1tty. 7rapilon from being the I P president. /omplainants, !ho !ere employees of the I P, charged 1tty. 7rapilon !ith immorality, >uestionable disbursement of funds, dishonesty, etc. "hereinafter, complainants !ere dismissed by the I P oard of 7overnors for according to the latter, the employees !ere guilty of committing acts inimical to the interest of I P. /omplainants contended that said termination !as a violation of the I P employeesC right to due process of la!. 6EL04 "he I P oard of 7overnors had complied !ith the re>uirement of the la!. "he petitioners !ere notified of the clarificatory hearings and also the charges that !ere raised against them. "he hearing !as intended to give the petitioners the opportunity to ans!er the charges against them. y their refusal to participate at the hearing they may be deemed to have forfeited their right to be heard in their defense. M!r#,* 7* S!nd&(!n/!y!n %?( S/01 ?? FACTS4 Eive counts of violation of the 1nti5 7raft and /orrupt Practices 1ct !as charge against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. =nanimity !as not reached so the presiding 9ustice constituted a special division of ; 9ustices. +ne of the 9ustices re>uested that he be given &; days to submit his manifestation. +n the same day 3 9ustices had lunched together and discussed the case in the absence of the % 9ustices. 1 9ustice !ho !as not member of the division !as present. "he 3 9ustices agreed to ac>uit petitioner in three of the cases and to convict her on the other. Dhen they returned to their office, the presiding 9ustice dissolved the special division. 6EL04 ased on the rules of the Sandiganbayan, sessions should be held at its principal office. "heir rules like!ise state that unscheduled discussion is not allo!ed nor shall informal discussion be allo!ed. It also does not allo! the presence of a non5member in the deliberation of cases and does not allo! the e8clusion of a member of a division in the deliberation of cases. Petitioner had the right to be heard by all ; 9ustices of the special division. "he decision of the Sandiganbayan is void for violating the right of petitioner to substantive and procedural due process of la!. L!#*,n 7*. Se#re'!ry 3:& S/01 %?' FACTS4 Principal accused Lacson !as among the accused of the Furatong aleleng rub out. "he Sandiganbayan initially took charge of the case as the policemen involved !ere public officers. ut the Sandiganbayan transferred the case to the 0"/ because some of the principal accused have been classified

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 5 OF 50
falling belo! salary grade %( )01 (?(;*. Ao!ever, 01 '%@? !as enacted !hich includes the rank of chief superintendent as covered under the Sandiganbayan 9urisdiction. Is the 0"/ divested of 9urisdictionG 6EL04 "he case shall remain !ith the 0"/. "he salary grade as it cannot be sho!n that the crime as alleged !as perpetrated by the police officers in the performance of their duties as public officers. 0ECS 7* S!nd&e(, &': S/01 ;33 FACTS4 "he Secretary of ,</S issued a regulation not allo!ing a student !ho has failed the National Medical 1dmission "est for three times from taking it again. 0espondent, !ho had failed three times and !anted to take the test again, claimed the regulation violated due process. 6EL04 "here is a substantial distinction bet!een medical students and other students. "he regulation is intended to insulate the medical school from the intrusion of those not >ualified to become a doctor. "he regulation is !ithin the police po!er of the state. It is the responsibility of the state that the medical profession is not infiltrated by those not >ualified. A(#!,&$& 7* Fe$&2e &@? S/01 33? FACT4 "his is a petition challenging the constitutionality of the +mnibus <lection /ode particularly the part !hich re>uires the indelible marking of the forefingers as re>uisite or condition to the e8ercise of suffrage and insofar as it penali#e failure to comply or refusal to submit to said re>uisites. 6EL04 In safeguarding the integrity of the ballot, the state may adopt appropriate and reasonable measures in order to regulate the electoral process such as marking of the forefingers of the voters to prevent multiple voting. MM Pr,-, 7* CA %2: S/01 3&? FACTS4 "he ,</S issued an order !hich re>uired training testing and certification of performing artist before their deployment abroad. 1n artist !ho complies !ith the re>uirements !ould be issued 1rtist 0ecord ook, !hich is a re>uirement for processing their papers by the P+<1. Petitioner argued that the re>uirement violates due process, since the right of the artist to return to !ork abroad having >ualified under the old procedure could not be abridged and their accreditation !as a property right. 6EL04 "he order in >uestion is issued in pursuant to the police po!er of the stateH this is because a lot of artists ended up as prostitutes. "hese measures !ere adopted to ensure that those individuals !ho !ill meet the set of standards !hich !ould >ualify them as legitimate artists !ould be deployed. "he constitution like!ise mandates the government to e8tend protection to +EDs. Dhile oneCs calling is a property right, it is sub9ect to the valid e8ercise of police po!er. S!$7!#&,n 7* Cen'r!$ B!n: %(' S/01 %( FACTS4 1ccused 7reg artelly an 1merican tourist !as charged of raping a &% yr old girl . 1 !rit of preliminary attachment !as issued by the trial /ourt against the dollar deposit of the accused. Ao!ever, garnishment cannot be instituted against the dollar deposit of the accused on the ground that Sec. &&3 of /entral ank /ircular prohibited it. Said provision is assailed as unconstitutional as it takes a!ay the right of the petitioner to have the bank deposit of accused garnished to satisfy the 9udgment rendered in petitionerCs favor. It is contended that the provision is a violation of the substantive due process guaranteed by the constitution. 6EL04 "he application of the la! depends on the e8tent of 9ustice. "he court ruled that the >uestioned Sec. &&3 of central ank /ircular No. ?2: !hich e8empts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of the court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body. "o make it applicable to foreign transient/tourist, !ould result to in9ustice especially to a citi#en aggrieved by a foreign guest like 7reg artelli. Such circular is applicable only to foreign investors and not transients. O2$e 7* T,rre* %?3 S/01 &@& FACTS4 "he president issued 1dministrative +rder. No. 3:', the national computeri#ed identification reference system. Sec. @ 1.+. 3:' provides that the population reference number shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies and that the Secretariat should coordinate !ith the different social security and services agencies to establish the standard in the use of biometrics technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. Petitioner contended the 1.+. No. 3:' violates the ill of rights. 6EL04 1.+. No. 3:' violates the right of privacy. "he broadness and the vagueness of the act !ill put the

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 ; OF 50
right to privacy of the people in clear and present danger. 1.+. 3:' does not state that specific biological characteristics and !hat particularly biometrics technology shall be used to identify people !ho !ill seek its coverage. 1.+. 3:' is indefinite and can give the government moving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his population reference number. 1.+. 3:' does not state !ho !ill control and access the data under !hat circumstances and for !hat purpose. "his makes 1.+. No. 3:' unconstitutional. G"9-!n 7* NU &@% S/01 2?? FACTS4 N= refused to allo! petitioner to re5enroll on the grounds that they had participated in activities !ithout prior permit !hich disrupt classes. N= also filed a separate criminal case for malicious mischief, and a civil case for damages. Petitioner filed an action to compel N= to allo! them to re5enroll on the ground that in effect they !ere e8pelled !ithout due process. 6EL04 "he imposition of disciplinary sanctions upon students re>uires the observance of due process. ,ue process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceeding similar to those prescribed for proceedings in court. "he students in student discipline cases may be summary. "here are minimum standards !hich must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process. Since respondent never conducted any proceeding, petitioners should be allo!ed to re5enroll !ithout pre9udice o any disciplinary proceedings to !hich they may be sub9ected. A'ene, de M!n&$! Un&7er*&'y 7* CA &@; S/01 &:: FACTS4 1 cafeteria !aitress complained to the oard of ,iscipline that the son of respondent, a college student, cursed and slapped her. "he son admitted the truth to the chairman of the oard of ,iscipline. "he board posted a notice of its meeting. "he son of the respondent !as also informed of the meeting and told to secure the help of his parents. "he son of respondent admitted the truth of the charge before the board. 1s a result, he !as dropped from the roll of students. /laiming denial of due process, respondent filed an action for damage. 6EL04 1ll the re>uirements of due process !ere met. "he son !as given a notice of the proceedings. Ae actually appeared and admitted to the charge. "he &' yr old son !as matured enough to kno! his responsibilities. "he claim of the respondent that they should have been informed is untenable. "he son is assumed to have reported the matter to his parents. If he did not, that is his fault. Iiolation of disciplinary regulation is a valid ground for dropping a student. Aence, respondent cannot recover damages. UP 7* Te$en %%( S/01 3@% FACTS4 0espondent !rongfully state in his application for reduction of tuition his family income. Ae !as ordered e8pelled by the <8ecutive /ommittee. =pon appeal to the oard of 0egents, the penalty !as reduced to suspension of & year, but still found him guilty. Ae !as not notified of the meeting !hen the oard of 0egent acted on his case, thus he is no! claiming that he !as not accorded due process. 6EL04 =niversity rules do not re>uire the attendance in board meeting of individuals !hose cases are included in the agenda of the board. ,ue process also does not re>uire sending of notice of the board meeting to respondent. S',. 0,-&n(, 7* Ord,>e9 &22 S/01 &%3 FACTS4 Petitioner, a municipal planning and development officer, is holding a permanent position. ut his employment !as terminated by the +I/ Mayor. Petitioner complained that he !as terminated !ithout due process of la!. "he petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, !hich !as dismissed because of lack of merit. 6EL04 "he fundamental rule in the due process clause is the opportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, petitioner !as heard on his motion for reconsideration filed !ith the 0evie! /ommittee. Ae !as accorded every opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. "he charges against him are easily related !ith documentary evidence regarding the completion of the pro9ect. "here is absolutely no evidence of arbitrariness or caprice in the >uestioned act of the respondent. Aence, he cannot claim that he !as deprived of his right to due process. 0,r"e$, 7* MN0 &2? S/01 @@' FACTS4 Petitioner !as assigned to be a captain of a vessel, !hich collided !ith a tanker because of the recklessness of the petitioner. "he Philippine /oast 7uard suspended petitioner for % years, after investigation. Petitioner appealed to the National

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 = OF 50
,efense, but it increased his suspension to three years because of information that he !as involved in another collision. 6EL04 In administrative proceedings the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing or at least contained in the records and disclosed to the parties affected. "herefore this makes the increase of duration of suspension of petitioner erroneous. G, 7* NAPOLCOM %(& S/01 @@( FACTS4 1 raid of the house of the petitioner, a police officer resulted in the arrest of &; persons, including his !ife, a confiscation of materials used in 9ai alai. 1 second raid in a report that petitioner and his brother !ere involved in 9ai alai. No formal complaint !as filed nor any supporting affidavit of !itnesses. "he summary dismissal board took cogni#ance of the case against petitioner. Petitioner appeared before the summary dismissal board thrice, but no hearing !as held because either the complainant or his !itnesses !ere absent. "he board ordered the dismissal of the petitioner for alleged involvement on $ai alai. "he director general of PNP and the NP/ denied his appeal. Petitioner argued that he !as denied due process. 6EL04 "he claim of the petitioner has merit. "he summary dismissal board received the report on the t!o raids, but the report is not in the record of this case. "his is in violation of the rule on administrative proceedings, !hich state that decisions must be rendered on the evidence contained in the records and disclosed to the party affected. Nor !as petitioner heard in his defense. L"-&("ed 7* Se#re'!ry %'% S/01 &%; FACTS4 Petitioner !as charged !ith malversation through falsification, violation of /+1 rules and regulation and oppression and harassment. 1n investigation !as conducted and !as directed to submit counter affidavit. /ommittee hearing !as conducted but Lumigued !as not assisted by a counsel. +n the %nd hearing he moved to reschedule it to enable him to hire a counsel. ut neither he nor his counsel arrived on the day he has chosen. So the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for additional hearing alleging that he suffered a stroke, but on the day of the trial he !as discharge this fact !as sho!n through his discharge record. 6EL04 "he right to counsel is not indispensable in due process unless re>uired by the constitution or la!. "he assistance of a counsel !hile desirable cannot validly act at all e8cept only !ith a la!yer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process, as long as a party !as given the opportunity to e8plain once side. 1n actual hearing is not al!ays indispensable aspect of due process, as long as a party !as given the opportunity to defend his interest in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of la!, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Pe,2$e 7* C!y!' 2' Phil &% FACTS4 /ayat, a member of the non5/hristian tribes, !as convicted for violation of 1ct No. &23?. Sec % state that -It shall be unla!ful for any native of the Philippines !ho is a member of the non5/hristian tribesJto buy, receive, have in his possession or drinks any ardent, spirit, ale, beerJ. other than the so called native !ine or li>uor !hich members of such tribe have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this act. -/ounsel for defendant says that the phrase -member of non5/hristian tribe. violates the e>ual protection clause of the constitution. 6EL04 It is an established principle of constitutional la! that the guarantee of the e>ual protection of the la! is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. 1ct No. &23? satisfies the conditions given. "he classification rests on real and substantial distinction, not only imaginary or !himsical distinctions. "he term -non /hristian tribes- refers not to religious belief, but in a !ay geographical area and more directly, to the nature of the Philippines of a lo!5 grade civili#ation. =sually living in the tribal relationship apart from settled community. 1ct No. &23? therefore does not violate e>ual protection clause. )note4 re>uisites of a valid classification4 a* must not be arbitrary b* based on substantial distinction c* classification is germane to the issue d* not only based on present condition but shall apply to future conditions as !ell e* must apply e>ually to all members of a class.* In#),n( 7* 6ern!nde9 &:& Phil &&;% FACTS4 Petitioner on behalf of other aliens adversely affected by the provision of 01 &&': brought this action to obtain 9udicial declaration that the said act is unconstitutional. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 ? OF 50
of the act contending that it denies to alien residents e>ual protection of the la! and deprives them of their liberty and property !ithout due process of la!. 01 &&': prohibits non5citi#en of the Philippines from engaging directly or indirectly !ith retail business. 6EL04 "he e>ual protection of the la! is against undue favor on individual or class privilege as !ell as hostile discrimination or the oppression of ine>ualities. It is intended to prohibit legislation !hich is limited either in the ob9ect to !hich it is directed or by territory !ithin !hich it is to operate. It does not re>uire absolute e>uality among residents, it merely re>uires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances both as to privilege conferred and liabilities enforced. P)&$&22&ne "d(e* A**,#&!'&,n 7* Pr!d, %%( S/01 (:3 FACTS4 01 No (3?@ repealed franking privilege of the $udiciary. Petitioner are >uestioning the constitutionality of the said act particularly Sec.3?. "hey argued that it violated e>ual protection since the franking privilege of the President, Iice president, Senator, member of the lo!er house, /+M<L</, former President, !ido!s of former president, National /ensus and Statistic +ffice, and the people filing complaints against public officer !ere retained. 6EL04 "he grant of the franking privilege !as the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation !hich !ould 9ustify a !aiver of revenue by the Philippine Postal /orporation. "here is no reason !hy the $udiciary be likened !ith other offices from !hich the franking privilege has been !ithdra!n. Sec 3; placed the court in a category to !hich it does not belong. It !as similarly treated as the 1rmed Eorces of the Philippines Ladies Steering /ommittee. "he repealing clause denies the $udiciary e>ual protection. T&" 7* CA 3:& S/01 %(' FACTS4 Petitioner alleged the <.+. ?(51 violates their right of e>ual protection. <+ ?(51 provides, inter alia, the ta8 and duty free privilege granted to the -secured area. in the former Subic Naval ase usiness and enterprise. Individuals residing !ithin the -secured area. are free to import ra! materials, capital goods, e>uipmentCs and consumer items are ta8 and duty free. 6EL04 <.+. ?(51 is valid and constitutional. It does not violate the e>ual protection clause. It is settled that the e>ual protection guarantee does not re>uired territorial uniformity of la!. 1s long as there is actual and material difference bet!een territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. If the grouping !ere characteri#ed by substantial distinction that made real difference, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. "he classification must also be germane to the purpose of the la! and must apply to all belonging to the same class. T,$en'&n, 7* Se#re'!ry %@? S/01 2%' FACTS4 01 ((&2 e8panded the scope of the Ialue 1dded "a8. It repealed the e8emption from the value5 added ta8 of the publisher of ne!spapers and maga#ine. "he /ooperative =nion of the Philippines also argued that the la! violated e>ual protection because it retained the e8emption of electric cooperatives but abolished the e8emption of other cooperatives. 6EL04 "he argument is !ithout merit. "he classification is reasonable. It rests on a congressional determination that there is a greater need to provide cheaper electricity to as many people as possible than there is to provide them !ith other necessities. "he Legislative dept is not re>uired to adhere to all5or5 nothing policy in choosing the sub9ect of ta8ation. SEC 2 Pe,2$e 7* T,n,( %:; S/01 ((% FACTS4 1 dead body !as found. ,uring the investigation a person told the police officer that it !as the accused !ho killed the victim. "he accused !as charged of murder, but he claimed that his pair of pants !as not admissible as evidence. 6EL04 1 peace officer may make an arrest !ithout a !arrant !hen an offense has 9ust been committed and he has personal kno!ledge of the fact indicating that the person to be arrested committed it, this 9ustifies the !arrantless arrest. "he police officer, !ho effected the arrest, had kno!ledge of the facts !hich !ere gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating that the accused !as one of the killers. "he pair of pants !as taken as an incident of the arrest. ecause of that fact, it is admissible as evidence.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 @ OF 50
Pe,2$e 7*. Geren'e %&? S/01 (;2 FACTS4 "here !as a mauling incident reported at the police station. 1t the hospital, !here the victim !as brought, the police found out that the victim !as dead. "he police officer !ent to the place !here the mauling took place. "hey found a piece of !ood !ith blood stains, a hallo! block and t!o roaches of mari9uana. "he accused !as one of the killers according to an eye!itness. Dhen the police frisked the accused, they found mari9uana in a coin purse. 1ccused argued that the mari9uana leaves !ere not admissible as evidence, because it !as illegally sei#ed. 6EL04 1 crime has 9ust been committed, and the police officer had personal kno!ledge of the fact indicating the accused, such that this makes the !arrant less arrest of the accused valid. "he police officer sa! the dead victim at the hospital. "he police officers found the instrument of death, a piece of !ood and a hollo! block. 1n eye!itness pointed to the accused as one of the killers. "he search conducted on the person of the accused !as la!ful because it !as an incident of a valid arrest. Pe,2$e 7* A-&nn"d&n &23 S/01 @:% FACTS4 1n officer of the Philippine /onstabulary accosted defendant !hile he !as descending from a boat, inspected his bag, confiscated the mari9uana leaves inside in side it, and arrested him, this !as done in response of a tip from an informer given t!o days earlier. "hey did not have any !arrant of arrest and search !arrant. ,efendant !as charged !ith violation of the ,angerous ,rug 1ct. 6EL04 ,efendant !as not caught inflagrante delicto, this makes the search illegal. 1t the moment of his arrest, he !as not committing a crime. Nor !as he about to do so or had 9ust done a crime. "o all appearances, he !as like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. L&- 7* Fe$&1 &?@ S/01 %?% FACTS4 Eour informations for murder against the petitioner !ere filed by the fiscal in Masbate. ut the S/ ordered a transfer of venue to Makati. Petitioner asked the court at Makati to order the transmittal of the records of the preliminary investigation to enable it to determine if there !as probable cause for their arrest. "he court denied the motion and issued !arrants for the arrest of petitioner. 6EL04 "he 9udge has not personally determined the e8istence of probable cause, !hen he relies solely on the certification of the prosecution !hen the records are not brought before him. "he constitutional re>uirement has not been satisfied. "he 9udge has not personally e8amined the !itness. "here should be a report and necessary document supporting the certification of the prosecutor. 1ll these should be before the 9udge. "he e8tent of the e8amination of the report and the documents depend on the circumstances of each case. "he 9udge should e8ercise his sound discretion. C,$"-/&! 7* CA %2% S/01 %&? FACTS4 1fter verifying the information he received that respondent had in his possession pirated videotapes, poster, advertising materials and other items used for sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public e8hibit of the pirated video tapes, an intelligence officer of the I0 obtained a search !arrant. 0espondent filed a motion to >uash the search !arrant on the ground that the search !arrant did not state specific offense, but !as denied by the court. 0espondent filed another motion to lift search !arrant on the ground that it !as issued !ithout probable cause, !hich !as granted by the lo!er court. Aence Petitioner >uestioned the said decision. 6EL04 PetitionerCs consistent position that the order of the lo!er court denying respondent motion to lift the order of search !arrant !as properly issued there having been satisfactory compliance !ith the then prevailing standards under the la! for determining probable cause is indeed !ell taken. "he lo!er court could not possibly have e8pected more evidence from petitioner in their application for a search !arrant other than !hat the la! and 9urisprudence and the e8isting and 9udicially accepted re>uirements !ith respect to the finding of probable cause. Pe,2$e 7* E*'r!d! %?2 S/01 3'3 FACTS4 "he E1, applied for a search !arrant against respondent for selling drugs !ithout a license from them in violation of 1rt. @ of the /onsumer 1ct. In support of the application, she submitted the affidavit to the police stating that he bought drugs from respondent and upon verification from the registry of E1,, he found out that respondent had no license to operate. "he application also stated the residence as located at ;&2 San $ose de la Montana Street, /ebu

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 A OF 50
/ity, !hich !as a compound and attached a sketch indicating the resident of respondent !ith -K.. 1 search !arrant !as issued to look for drugs in possession and control of respondent. Police did not found anything at the resident of respondent, they !ent to nearby !arehouse o!ned by somebody and sei#ed the drugs they found. 6EL04 ,ocumentary proof that respondent had no license to sell drugs should have been presented. Eact and circumstances that sho! probable cause must be the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that respondent had no license to sell drugs is the certification to the effect from the ,+A. Like!ise the search team e8ceeded its authority by conducting a search in another place belonging to another person. Pe,2$e 7* M!$-*'e!d' &?' S/01 @:& FACTS4 "here !as a report that a foreigner !as transporting prohibited drugsH the police officers set up a checkpoint. "hey stopped a bus in !hich the accused, a foreigner, !as riding. "hey noticed a bulge on the !aist of the accused and asked for the passport. Dhen he failed to comply, the police asked him to bring !hat !as bulging on his !aist. It turned out that it contained hashish. "he accused !as asked to alight the bus. Ae stopped to get % bags, !hich has teddy bear in it. It !as only then that he presents his passport. Ae !as brought to the police head>uarter. "he teddy bear !as found to contain hashish the accused !as charged !ith violation of the ,angerous ,rug 1ct. 1ccused argued that the search !as illegal. 6EL04 "he search made upon his personal effect !as la!ful as an incident to a la!ful arrestH this is because the accused !as arrested !hile in the act of transporting drugs. "he receipt of information that a foreigner had prohibited drugs in his possession and the failure of the accused to produce his passport, gave rise to the probable cause, !hich 9ustified the !arrant less search. Pe,2$e 7*. L& W!& %&@ S/01 ;:@ FACTS4 1t the condominium of the accused, he !as arrested by police officer !hile selling heroin po!der. "hey then searched the premises and sei#ed a pocket of mari9uana leaves and a bag containing shabu. 1ccused argued that the arrest and search !as illegal. 6EL04 "he accused !as caught inflagrante delicatoH this makes the arrest valid. Dhile entry into his d!elling !as effected !ithout a search !arrant, it !as merely coincidental since the accused chose to consummate the illicit transaction inside the d!elling. "he search of his condominium is valid as an incident of la!ful arrest. It !as conducted in a confined place !ithin his immediate control, !here he might gain possession of a !eapon or destroy evidence constituting proof of his crime. Pe,2$e 7* S!$!9!r %22 S/01 2:( FACTS4 In an entrapment, a police officer, posing as a buyer, bought mari9uana from the accused in her store and arrested her !ithout !arrant. 1 police officer like!ise sei#ed a plastic container on the table inside the store from !hich the accused took the mari9uana. "he plastic container contained si8 more mari9uana sticks. "he accused !as charged !ith selling mari9uana. Sala#ar argued that the !arrantless sei#ure of the mari9uana !as illegal. 6EL04 "he accused had been caught inflagrante delicto. "he arresting officers !ere duty bound to apprehend her immediately. "he search being an incident of a valid arrest needed no !arrant to be valid. Darrant less search and sei#ure, as an incident to a la!ful arrest, may e8tend to include the premises under the immediate control of the accused. "he accused may not successfully invoke the right against a !arrant less search, even as regard to the plastic container !ith dried mari9uana leaves found on the table in her store. Pe,2$e 7* C"en#, %?' S/01 2%& FACTS4 1 police officer !ho posed as a user of mari9uana arrested the accused for selling mari9uana. 1t that time the accused !as standing by the door of the store, !hich !as part of his house. "he police officer search, the house of the accused and sei#ed dried flo!ering tops of mari9uana in his bedroom. "he accused !as then charged !ith selling mari9uana and illegal possession of mari9uana. 1ccused argued the search at his house is illegal. 6EL04 "he accused !as arrested inflagrante delicto. In a valid arrest, it becomes both the duty and the right of the police officer to conduct a !arrant less search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the area !ithin his effective control. Since the store !as part of the house of the accused it became advisable, if not necessary, for the police officer to undertake a search of the house as being !ithin the area of immediate control of the accused.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 < OF 50
P!d&$$! 7* CA %2? S/01 @:% FACTS4 1 citi#en sa! the accused driving his motor vehicle very fast. Ae then heard that the motor hit somebody. 1ccused start driving, the citi#en reported the incident to the police by radio and chased the motor vehicle. "he radio comptroller flashed the message to all police units. 1 mobile unit intercepted the motor vehicle and forced it to stop. "he accused alighted from his vehicleH police sa! the butt of a revolver protruding from his !aist. "he police confiscated it. 1nother police sa! a maga#ine of an 1rmalite tucked in his back pocket. Ae sei#ed the maga#ine. "he police opened the door of the vehicle and sa! an armalite !ith maga#ine. 1ccused !as arrested and surrendered the pistol and maga#ine. 1ccused argued that sei#ure !as illegal. 6EL04 "he sei#ure of the revolver and the maga#ine !as 9ustified, for they !ere ceased !ithin the plain vie! of the police officer !ho inadvertently discovered them. "he same 9ustification applies to the confiscation of the 1rmalite, !hich !as readily apparent !hen the police took a casual glance at his vehicle. "he accused voluntarily surrendered the pistol and three maga#ines. "his !as a !aiver of the right against the search and sei#ure. Moreover, the sei#ure of the firearm and maga#ines can be 9ustified as an incident of a la!ful arrest. esides, the !arrant less search of a motor vehicle is constitutionally permissible. C,"r' Ad-&n&*'r!',r 7*. B!rr,n %?( S/01 3(2 FACTS4 0espondent, a 9udge called the president of a corporation !hich had a pending case before him, and told him that he !ould decide the case in favor of the corporation. Ae asked for money. "he president of the corporation reported the case to the N I. It dre! up a plan to entrap the 9udge. "he president of the corporation handed to 9udge a bag containing marked money. 1t a signal agents of N I rushed to the car of the respondent. "hey caught him placing the money under the drivers seat. 0espondent !as arrested and charged !ith bribery. $udge argued that the !arrant less search of his car !as illegal. 6EL04 Since respondent !as caught inflagrante delicto, and there !as no need for a !arrant for the sei#ure of the fruits of the crime. "he search !as incidental to the la!ful arrest. M!$!#!' 7* CA %'3 S/01 &;? FACTS4 1 team of police conducted a patrol because of a report that a group of Muslim e8tremists !ould e8plode a grenade. "he police officer sa! petitioner trying to detonate a grenade. Police chased petitioner and his companion so the attempt !as aborted. "!o days later, police sa! petitioner, !ho acted suspiciously !ith his eyes moving very fast. Dhen the police approached him, he hurriedly fled. +nce they caught up !ith petitioner, they found a grenade tucked inside his !aistline. Petitioner !as caught and !as charged of illegal possession of hand grenade. 6EL04 "he police officer had no personal kno!ledge of an overt physical act on the part of the petitioner indicating that he committed a crime. "his makes the !arrant less arrest of the petitioner illegal. Aence, the !arrant less search conducted on petitioner !as not incidental to a la!ful arrest. L!rr!n!(! 7* CA %'( S/01 ;'& FACTS4 Petitioner is charged !ith % counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Petitioner alleged the he !as denied the right to preliminary investigation and sought to annul the information as !ell as the !arrant of arrest issued in conse>uence thereof. +n Sept. &;, &??( some members of the PNP /I7 !ent to //1 in L/ to arrest petitioner !ithout a !arrant. Petitioner resisted arrest and sought the aid of his la!yer, after negotiation the PNP allo!ed petitioner to go home, but made an undertaking that they !ill appear on Sept. &(, &??( for preliminary investigation. +n that said date petitioner moved the he be accorded a regular preliminary investigation but !as denied, stating that petitioner is only entitled of in>uest proceedings 6EL04 "he fact of this case sho!s that kidnapping !as committed $uly &2, &??(. +ne of the victim !as found dead on $uly &', &??(, !hile the other victim remains missing to date. "here is no sho!ing that at the time of arrest the other victim !as being detained by petitioner. Aence, petitioner may not be considered as continually committing the crime of kidnapping !ith serious illegal detention at the time of the arrest. Pe,2$e 7* Le!n(*&r& %;% S/01 %&3 FACTS4 1ccused !as arrested at the arrival area of the N1I1 !ith heroin. Ae informed the authorities that he !as to deliver the heroin to 3 people at Las Palmas Aotel. Later !hile at room ;:@ of said hotel, accused )together !ith Narcotics 1gents* received a phone call

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 40 OF 50
that the heroin !ill be picked up. 1t about &: pm appellant !ent to the room of the accused and got the heroin. +n her !ay out of the room, the N10/+M agent arrested the 1ppellant !ho said that she !as staying at 0m. @&3. 1ccompanied by Aotel o!ner, the N10/+M agent searched room @&3. "uck in the telephone book !as a piece of paper in the name of Leangiri !ritten it. "he paper and other possession !ere confiscated. 1ppellant, 1midus, argued that search is illegal. 6EL04 In the case at bar appellant !ere arrested in 0m. ;:@ of the Aotel. "he piece of paper bearing Leangiri name !as obtained through !arrant less arrest at 0m. @&3. /learly the !arrant less search, is illegal and the piece of paper bearing LeangiriCs name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellant. "he inadmissibility of this evidence !ill not, ho!ever e8culpate appellant. Its e8clusion does not destroy the prosecutionCs case against appellant. "he remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable ground. Pe,2$e 7* C"/#"/&n 70. &32%2(, $uly %:, %::& FACTS4 1ccused !as found guilty of murder by the 0"/. "he police found the victim dead on his tricycle !hich !as parked on the road. 1 tricycle driver told the police that the accused and the victim !ere seen coming out from a cafM. Dhen the police !ent to that cafM, the !aitress also told them that she had seen accused !ith the victim in the cafM. "he police proceeded to the house of the accused. "hey confiscated a !hite shirt stained !ith blood, % empty shells of .3' caliber bullet and a .3' revolver !ithout serial number. "he accused assailed the illegality of the search and sei#ure conducted by the policeman in his house because there is no !arrant. 6EL04 "he search of accusedCs house !as illegal. "herefore the things obtained as result are inadmissible in evidence against him. Daiver by implication cannot be presumed. 1 !arrant less search is in derogation of a constitutional rightH peace officer cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. <ven assuming the !arrant less arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. 1 valid arrest allo!s only the sei#ure of evidence of dangerous !eapon !ithin the person or area of his immediate control. It is clear that the !arrant less search in this case cannot be 9ustified on this ground. Eor neither the "5shirt nor the gun !as !ithin the area of the accusedCs immediate control. Pe,2$e 7* P!*"d!(& 70 &%''%%, May @, %::& FACTS4 1ccused !as found guilty of illegal cultivation of mari9uana by the 0"/. 1 policeman spotted a (: s>uare meter mari9uana plantation. Ae then formed a team to conduct an investigation !ith such matter. "hereafter, the team !ent to the house of the accused !hich is ; meters a!ay from the said mari9uana plantation. "hey took pictures of the accused standing beside !ith the mari9uana plant and took him to the police station. 6EL04 7enerally, a search !arrant is re>uired before a la! enforcer may validly search the person, house, paper or effect of any individual. In the case at bar, policeman had ample time to a secure search !arrant4 they failed to secure one. "ime !as not of the essence to uproot the plant. "he mantle of protection e8tended by the ill of 0ights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high5handedness of la! enforcers, regardless of the praise!orthiness of their intentions. Dith the illegal sei#ure of the mari9uana plants sub9ect of this case, the sei#ed plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused because evidence is inadmissible. Pe,2$e 7* 6&nd,y !nd Ne(r,*! 70. &3%22%, May &:, %::& FACTS4 Informant gave information to the policemen that there !as a shipment of illegal drugs !hich !as received by the accused Negrosa. "herefore, an organi#ed team !as sent to the house of the accused to conduct a buy bust operation. It !as Aindoy, !ho sold a kilogram of mari9uana to a member !ho posted as buyer. 1fter that, police identified themselves and searched the house, !here &% more kilograms of mari9uana !ere found. "he 0"/ found the accused guilty for violation of 01 2@%; as amended by 01 (2;?. 1ccused contended in their appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the mari9uana in evidence since it !as confiscated !ithout search !arrant. 6EL04 "he search, being incident to a la!ful arrest !as valid not!ithstanding the absence of a !arrant. In fact, the !arrant less search and sei#ure, as an incident to a suspectCs la!ful arrest may be e8tended beyond the person or surrounding under his immediate control. <vidence obtained in violation of 1rt III. Sec % is inadmissible, ho!ever it is not !ithout e8ception, as in instances of searches incidental to la!ful arrest. =nder

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 44 OF 50
Sec ;, 0ule &&3 of the 0ules of /ourt, a peace officer may, !ithout a !arrant, arrest a person !hen in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. SEC 5 GAANAN 7 IAC 4;= SCRA 442 FACTS4 "his petition asks for the interpretation of 01 @%::, other!ise kno!n as the anti6!iretapping act, on the issue of !hether or not an e8tension telephone is among the prohibited devices, such that !hen it is used to overhear a private conversation !ould constitute unla!ful interception of communications bet!een the t!o parties using a telephone line. 6EL04 "he phrase -any other device or arrangement. in 01 @%:: kno!n as the anti5!ire tapping la! does not cover an e8tension line. "he la! refers to a -tap. of a !ire or cable or the use of a -device or arrangement. for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording the communication. "here must be a physical interruption thru a !iretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept or record the spoken !ords. 1n e8tension telephone cannot be place in the category as a ,ictaphone, dictagraph or other devices enumerated in sec & of 01 @%:: as the use thereof cannot be considered as -tapping. the !ire or cable of a telephone line. "he telephone e8tension in this case !as not installed for that purpose. "hey !ere not liable for the violation of the anti5!iretapping act. PEOPLE 7 MEN0OBA 504 SCRA ?? FACTS4 1ppellant !as accused of parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. "he trial court held him guilty of both charges. "he possession of the fatal gun by the appellant !as established by the memorandum receipt signed by the appellant himself and a mission order authori#ing him to carry the said !eapon from Nov. &;, &?'2 to ,ec &;, &?'2. "he memorandum receipt and the mission order !as found by the father of the !ife5victim in the appellantCs house after the killing of the !ife in &?''. "he appellant claims that these documents !ere illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and sei#ure. 6EL04 "he solicitor general is correct in e8plaining that such right applies as a restraint directed against the government and its agencies. "he case of Pp v Marti is in point !here the /ourt had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei#ures refers to the immunity of oneCs person from interference by the government and it cannot be e8tended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it !ithin the ambit of alleged unla!ful intrusion. In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order !ere discovered by accused5appellantCs father5in5la!, a private citi#en. OPLE 7 TORRES 2<5 SCRA 4;4 FACTS4 "he president issued 1dministrative +rder No. 3:', !hich provides for the adoption of a national computeri#ed identification reference system. Sec @ of 1+ No. 3:' provided that the population reference number shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies and that the secretariat of the inter5agency coordination committee should constitute !ith the different social security and services agencies to establish the standards in the use of biometrics technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. 6EL04 1ssuming arguendo, that 1+ 3:' need not be the sub9ect of a la!, still it cannot pass constitutional muster, as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. "he essence of privacy is the right -to be let alone.. Said the /ourt, in no uncertain terms, !e also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all intrusions into individual privacy. "he right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely re>uires that the la! be narro!ly focused and a compelling interest 9ustify such intrusions. Intrusion into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and !ell defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. AYER 7 CAPULONG 4?0 SCRA A?4 FACTS4 Senator <nrile seeks to en9oin the movie company from producing -"he Eour ,ay 0evolution,. a dramati#ation of the Eebruary &?'2 revolution, for public sho!ing, on the ground that it !ould violate his right to privacy. 6EL04 Motion pictures are protected medium for the communication of ideas and e8pression of the artistic impulse. "his freedom is available to both local and foreign o!ned production companies even if they are commercial. Indeed there is such a thing as the right to

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 42 OF 50
privacy. ut this cannot be invoked to resist publication of matters of public interest. Dhat the right to privacy protects is the right against un!arranted intrusions and !rongful publications of the private affairs of individuals !hich are outside the sphere of legitimate public concern. <nrileCs role in that revolution is a matter of public interest because he !as a principal figure in that event. BULUETA 7 CA 2=5 SCRA ?<< FACTS4 Petitioner, the !ife of respondent, !ent to the clinic of the respondent, in the absence of the said respondentCs kno!ledge and consent, took documents consisting of private correspondence bet!een respondent and his alleged mistresses. "hereafter, respondent sued petitioner for the recovery of the documents and had her en9oined from using them as evidence. 6EL04 "he court ruled the mentioned documents are inadmissible in evidence. "he constitutional provision declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is applicable even bet!een spouses. "he only e8ception is if there is a la!ful order from a court or !hen public safety or order re>uires other!ise, as prescribed by la!. PEOPLE 7*. ALBOFERA 4=2 SCRA 425 FACTS4 Dhile the accused !as charged !ith murder, he !rote the prosecutionCs !itness a letter asking him to change the declaration in his affidavit and to testify in his favor. "he prosecution presented said letter as evidence. "he accused argued that its admission in evidence violated his right to privacy of communication. 6EL04 "here !as no violation of the right of the accused to P0II1/N of /+MM=NI/1"I+N. "he production of the letter !as not the result of an unla!ful search and sei#ure nor !as it through any un!arranted intrusion into his privacy. It !as the recipient !ho produced it in the course of his testimony in court. SEC ; ACINTO 7 CA GR 42;=;0% N,7 4;% 4<<@ FACTS4 Petitioners, teachers from various schools in Metro Manila, incurred unauthori#ed absences bet!een the period Sept &(5%&, &??: in connection !ith the mass action they staged. +n Sept &(, &??:, ,</S Secretary Isidro /arino issued a return to !ork order !hich !as ignored by the petitioners. 1s a result, petitioners !ere charged administratively !ith gross misconduct, gross neglect of duty, etc. for 9oining unauthori#ed mass actions, ignoring return to !ork order, un9ustified abandonment of teaching posts and non5observance of civil service la!, rules and regulations, etc. Sec /arino, after an investigation has been made, found the petitioners guilty as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal e8cept to petitioner Merlinda $acinto and 1delina 1gustin !ho !ere suspended for 2 months. 6EL04 Petitioners, e8cept Merlinda $acinto, !ere not penali#ed for the e8ercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for redress of grievances. 0ather the /S/ found them guilty of conduct pre9udicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves !ithout proper authority, from their school and during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non5holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for !hich they !ere responsible. 1s it !as, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibitions against strikes by government !orkers. EASTERN BROA0CASTING 7 0ANS 45@ SCRA ?2A FACTS4 1 petition !as filed by petitioners to compel the respondents to allo! the reopening of 0adio Station ,N0< !hich had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. "he petitioner raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears that the respondents charged petitioners of -inciting people to commit acts of sedition. because of the petitionerCs shift to!ards !hat it stated on its coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared to!ards public affairs. 6EL04 1ll forms of media, !hether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and e8pression clause. "he test for limitations on freedom of e8pression continues to be the clear and present danger rule 6 that !ords are use in such circumstances, and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they !ill bring about the substantive evils that the la!makers has the right to prevent. "he clear and present danger test, ho!ever, does not lent itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 45 OF 50
BAL0IVAR 7 SAN0IGANBAYAN 4@0 SCRA 4 FACTS4 Eor claiming that the Supreme /ourt deliberately rendered a !rong decision in retaliation against him, respondent !as cited for contempt and indefinitely suspended from the practice of la!. 0espondent argued that the Supreme /ourt adopted the dangerous tendency rule rather than the clear and present danger rule. 6EL0: "he S/ did not adopt a ne! doctrine of visible tendency. =nder either the clear and present danger test or the balancing of interest test, the statements made by respondent !ere of such a nature and !ere made under such circumstances as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. "he substantive evil !hich the S/ is seeking to prevent is not physical disorder but the degradation of the 9udicial system and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct re>uired from members of the bar. OSMENA 7 COMELEC 2AA SCRA ;;@ FACTS4 Petitioners >uestioned the constitutionality of Sec &&)b* of 01 No. 22@2, !hich prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates, on the ground that it had not leveled the playing field but !orked to the disadvantage of poor candidates by depriving them of a medium they can afford to pay !hile their more affluent opponents can resort to other means to reach voters like rallies, parades and handbills. 6EL04 "here is no total ban on the political advertisements, much less restriction on the content of the speech. Since print space and airtime can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates, there is a legitimate government interest 9ustifying e8ercise of the regulatory po!er of the /ommission of <lections. "he provision in >uestion does not only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time in the mass media for allocation, free of charge, to candidates. "he clear5and5present danger is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutionality of Sec &&)b* of 01 22@2, !hich is not concerned !ith the contents of political advertisements but only !ith their incidents. BOR AL 7 CA% 504 SCRA 4 FACTS4 et!een May and $uly &?'?, a series of !ritten articles by the petitioner !as published on different dates in his column at the Philippine Star. "he article dealt !ith the alleged anomalous activities of an -organi#er of a conference. !ithout naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the EN/L" as conference therein mentioned. 0espondent reacted to the articles and sent letters to the Philippine Star insisting that he !as the -organi#er. alluded by the petitionerCs column. "hereafter, respondent filed a libel suit against petitioner. 6EL0: Publication !hich are privileged for reason of public policy are protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. In order that a discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition 6 if the comment is an e8pression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. or9al is ac>uitted of the charges. In Re: "r!d,% AM n,. <5C2C05@% A2r. ?% 4<<= FACTS4 1 ne!spaper columnist !rote in his column about corruption in the 9udiciary. Dhen he !as asked to shed light on his charges, the columnist did not do so. "!o of the individuals he mentioned e8ecuted affidavits denying his accusations. Dhen he !as asked !hy he should not be cited for contempt, the columnist invoked the freedom of the press. 6EL04 Ealse reports about a public official are not shielded by freedom of the press. "hey belong to the category of utterances !hich are not essential part of the e8position of ideas and are out!eighed by the social interest in order and morality. SEC = EBRALINAG 7 0IV SUPT. OF SC6OOLS OF CEBU FACTS4 Petitioners, !ho are members of the $<A+I1ACs !itnesses, !ere e8pelled from school for refusing to take part in the flag ceremony on account of their religious beliefs. "hey considered the flag ceremony as an act of religious devotion !hich they cannot give to anyone e8cept 7od. 6EL04 "he e8pulsion of petitioners from school violates their religious freedom. Petitioners >uietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to sho! their respect for the right of those !ho choose to participate in the flag ceremony. "hey do not engage in disruptive behavior. 1bsence of threat to public safety, the e8pulsion of petitioners from school is not 9ustified. <8empting petitioners from the flag

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4; OF 50
ceremony has not produced a nation bereft of patriotism. "hey may be taught the virtues of patriotism in school. "he e8pulsion of petitioners from school also violates their right to receive education. Dhile the state has the responsibility to inculcate patriotism in the youth, its interest in molding the young into patriotic citi#ens is not free from a balancing process !hen it intrudes into fundamental rights such as freedom of religion. 0efusal to take part in the flag ceremony is not so offensive as to prompt legitimate state intervention. "he state argues that to e8empt petitioners !ill benefit a privileged fe!. "he essence of the guarantee of free e8ercise of religion is freedom from conformity by the conformity to religious dogma. "he #one of protection afforded by the constitution cannot be violated e8cept upon a sho!ing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil !hich the state has the right to prevent. TOLENTINO 7 SEC OF FINANCE 25= SCRA ?50 FACTS4 01 ((&2 e8panded the scope of the value added ta8. It repealed the e8emption from the value added ta8 of printed books and articles. "he Philippine ible Society argued that the removal of the ta8 e8emption of religious books and articles violated freedom of religion. 6EL0: Ereedom of 0eligion does not prohibit the imposition of a ta8 on the sale of religious materials by a religious organi#ation !hich is generally applicable. GERONA 7 SECRETARY 40? P)&$ 44 FACTS4 "his is an appeal to the decision of the /EI of Masbate banning $ehovahCs !itnesses from admission to public schools, solely on account of their refusal to salute the flag !hich in violation of <ducation ,ept. +rder No. ' !hich compels daily flag ceremony in all public or private schools. "he $ehovahCs !itnesses are teaching that the obligation imposed by la! of 7od is superior to that of la!s by the state. 6EL0: "he flag is not an image but a symbol of the 0epublic of the Philippines, an emblem of National Sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty !hich it and the constitution guarantee and protect. =nder the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag conse>uently does not involve any religious ceremony. "he flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar. .n,'e: ')&* r"$&n( )!* /een !/!nd,ned /y ')e E/r!$&n!( #!*e3 IGLESIA n& CRISTO 7 CA 2=< SCRA =2< FACTS4 Petitioner presents over its television program its religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often in comparison !ith those of other religions. "he oard of 0evie! of Moving Pictures and "I disapproved several video tapes of the program for public vie!ing on the ground that they constituted an attack against other religions. Petitioner argued that re>uiring that its "I programs be revie!ed by the oard of 0evie! for Moving Pictures and "I violates freedom of 0eligion and of Speech. 6EL04 "he evidence sho!s that the respondent oard 85rated petitioners "I series for -attacking. other religions, especially the /atholic /hurch. 1n e8amination of the evidence !ill sho! that the so5 called -attacks. are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. "he videotapes !ere not vie!ed by the respondent court as they !ere not presented as evidence. Net they !ere considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to la! and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public vie!ing under sec 3)c* of P, &?'2. "his ruling clearly suppresses petitionersC freedom of speech and interferes !ith its right to free e8ercise of religion. Ereedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental la!s, past and present. "he court has affirmed this preferred status !ell a!are that Oit is designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allo! each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent !ith the liberty of others !ith the common good. "he court thus re9ected petitionersC contention that its religious program is per se beyond the revie! by the board. Its public broadcast on "I of it religious program brings it out of the bossom of internal belief. "he e8ercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the state !hen it !ill bring about the clear and present danger or some substantive evil !hich the state is duty bound to prevent. SEC ? MARCOS 7 MANGLAPUS% 4@@ SCRA ??A FACTS4 Petitioners Marcos and his family, after they fle! from the country after the <,S1 0evolution,

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4= OF 50
!ere barred by President 1>uino from returning to the Philippines. Petitioners filed a petition to compel the Secretary of Eoreign 1ffairs to issue to them travel documents to enable them to return to the Philippines. 6EL04 "he right to return to oneCs country is not among the rights guaranteed by the ill of 0ights. <8ecutive po!er is not limited to the po!er to enforce the la!s, for the president is head of state and head of government. Dhatever po!ers are inherent in such position pertain to the office unless the /onstitution !ithholds it. <8ecutive po!er is only one of the po!ers of the president. "he po!ers of the president are not limited to the specific po!ers enumerated in the constitution. =nder the /onstitution, it is the duty of the government to serve and protect the people and to maintain peace and order. In making any decision, the president has to consider such principles. "o protect the peace, the president has the po!er to bar the petitioners from returning. "he history of the efforts of petitioners to destabili#e the country indicates that their return !ould intensify the violence against the state. MARCOS 7 SAN0IGANBAYAN% 2;@ SCRA 4;@ FACTS4 Petitioner !as convicted of violation of 1nti57raft and /orrupt Practices 1ct on t!o accounts. She filed a motion for reconsideration, !hich !as pending resolution. She filed a motion for leave to travel abroad for treatment of hypertensive heart disease, uncontrolled angina pections, and anterior myo5cardial infraction. "he Sandiganbayan sought the opinion of the Philippine Aeart /enter. "he Sandiganbayan informed petitioners of the referral. Aer counsel re>uested the court to submit additional >uestions to the PA/. +n the basis of the reports attached to the motion of the petitioner, the panel of specialists of the PA/ made a finding that the petitioner !as not suffering from coronary heart disease and uncontrolled high blood pressure, that she !as not in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death, that the recommended tests are available in the Philippines, and that the facilities and e8pertise in the Philippines are more than ade>uate to treat patients !ith hypertension and coronary heart disease. "he chairman of the panel testified and !as cross5e8amined. "he court denied the motion of the petitioner. 6EL04 "he Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Since the sub9ect of her motion !as beyond the competence of the court, it !as 9ustified in seeking the opinion of specialists in the field. "he court could not be e8pected to 9ust accept the opinion of the physician of the petitioner. Petitioner did not have an absolute right to travel because of the criminal cases against her. She failed to prove the necessity for her travel. OPLE 7 TORRES% 2<5 SCRA 4;4 FACTS4 "he president issued 1dministrative +rder No. 3:', !hich provided for the adoption of a national computeri#ed Identification reference system. 6EL04 1ssuming arguendo, that 1+ 3:' need not be the sub9ect of a la!, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. "he essence of privacy is the -right to be let alone.. "he court further held that if they e8tend their 9udicial ga#e, the !ill find that the right of privacy is recogni#ed and enshrined in several provisions or our constitution. "his includes Section 25 the liberty of abode and of the right to travel. SEC @ BROA0CAST ATTYS 7 COMELEC% 2A< SCRA 55@ FACTS4 Petitioners >uestioned the constitutionality of Section ?% of the +mnibus <lection /ode, !hich re>uires all radio and "I stations to provide radio or "I time free of charge to be allocated e>ually and impartially among candidates !ithin the area of coverage of the radio and "I stations. 6EL04 "he court affirmed the validity of P lg. ''&, Sec ?% for public broadcasters has the obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. Eor !hile broadcast media are not mere common carriers but entities !ith free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged !ith the duty of ensuing that the people have access to the diversity of vie!s on political issues. It is the right of the vie!ers or the listeners or of the people not the right of the broadcasters !hich is paramount. C6AVEB 7 PCGG% 2<< SCRA @;; FACTS4 ecause of the reports that the P/77 had entered into a compromise !ith the Marcos family to settle all claims against the latter for their ac>uisition of ill5gotten !ealth, petitioner filed a petition in his capacity as ta8payer, Eilipino citi#en, and former solicitor general to compel the P/77 to disclose all negotiations and agreements !ith the Marcos family.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4? OF 50
6EL04 =nder <+ Nos. &,%, and &@, ill5gotten !ealth refers to assets and properties ac>uired by former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and associates through illegal use of government funds or properties by taking undue advantage of their public office, or by their use of po!er, influence or relationship. /learly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government. Eor all intents and purposes, they belong to the people. Petitioner has a right to the disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the purported ill5gotten !ealth of the Marcos family. "he intent of the framers of the constitution is to include negotiations leading to a transaction !ithin the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information. It is incumbent upon the P/77 to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up !ith the Marcos family. Such information must pertain to definite propositions of the government and not to recommendations or communications in the e8planatory stage. ACT 7 CARINO% GR <==<0% A"( ?% 4<<4 FACTS4 +n Sept &(, &??:, Monday, regular school day, some ':: teachers !ho 9oined the mass action did not conduct their classesH instead they convened at the Li!asang onifacio in the morning !hen they proceeded to the national office of the ,</S for a !hole day assembly. "he Sec. of ,</S, !ho brushed aside their grievances, !arned them that they !ould lose their 9ob for going on illegal and unauthori#ed mass leave. "o avoid the disruption of classes, respondent /arino issued a -return to !ork order. and !arned them that dismissal proceedings !ill be instituted against them if they do not return to !ork !ithin %@ hours from their !alkout. "he issue here is on the rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the constitution. 6EL04 Public school teachers have the right to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but not during class hours. SEC A STATE6OO0 7 SEC .2$* re+er ', A$/!n,D* re7&ewer3 UCO 7 NLRC% GR <A40@% A"( 4A% 4<<@ FACTS4 Petitioner $uco !as hired as a pro9ect engineer of respondent NatCl Aousing /orp )NA/* from Nov. &2 &?(:5 May &@, &?(;. +n May &@, &?(;, he !as separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NA/ !ith the ,ept. of Labor. Ao!ever, respondent NA/ filed its appeal holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor /ode and thus is not under the 9urisdiction of the NL0/. 6EL04 NA1 is !ithin the 9urisdiction of the ,ept of Labor and <mployment, it being a government5o!ned or controlled corporation !ithout an original charter. NA1 !orkers or employees undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employeesC organi#ation, and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification of election among them as they are covered by the Labor /ode. UNITE0 PEPSI COLA S"2er7&*,r UNION V LAGUESMA% 2AA SCRA 4= FACTS4 Petitioner filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route of managers of respondent. "he Secretary of Labor and <mployment denied the petition on the ground that under Sec %@; of the Labor /ode, managerial employees are not eligible to form any labor organi#ation. Petitioner argued that the provision violates Sec ', 1rt III of the /onstitution. 6EL04 1s the la! stood at the time the constitutional commission considered Sec ', 1rt III of the constitution, 1rt %@' of the Labor /ode then prohibited supervisors and security guards from forming labor unions. "he ob9ective of Sec ', 1rt III !as to reinstate the right of supervisors and security guards to organi#e. /ommissioner Lerum, !ho proposed the amendment of Sec ', art III, never referred to managerial employees. 1rt %@; of the Labor /ode is the result of the amendment of the Labor /ode in &?'? by 01 2(&;. Sec ', 1rt III is not infringed by a ban against the formation of labor union by managerial employees. "he right guaranteed is sub9ect to the condition that its e8ercise should be for purposes not contrary to la!. "here is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming labor unions. If they !ould belong to a labor union, the labor union might not be assured of their loyalty in vie! of the conflict of interests.

SEC <

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4@ OF 50
P6ILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE 7 COMELEC% 2;; SCRA 2@2 FACTS4 "he /+M<L</ adopted 0esolution No %((%, !hich provided that it !ould procure free print space of not less than one5half page in at least one ne!spaper of general circulation in every province or city and !ould allocate the space free of charge among all candidates. "he /+M<L</ then sent letters to various publishers of ne!spapers directing them to provide one5half page to be allocated among the candidates. Petitioner, an organi#ation of ne!spapers and maga#ine publishers, >uestioned the constitutionality of 0esolution No. %((% on the ground that it constituted taking of property for public use !ithout 9ust compensation. 6EL04 "o compel print media companies to donate free space amounts to taking of private property for public use. "he necessity of the taking has not been sho!n. It has not been sho!n that the print media companies are un!illing to sell print space to the /+M<L</ for election purposes. It has not been sho!n that the /+M<L</ has been granted the po!er of eminent domain by the constitution or by the legislature. "he taking of private property for public use must be !ith payment of 9ust compensation. MANOSCA 7 CA% 2=2 SCRA ;42 FACTS4 "he National Aistorical Institute declared the parcel of land o!ned by petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it !as the site of the birth of E<LIK M1N1L+, the founder of Iglesia ni /risto. "he 0epublic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioner argued that e8propriation !as not for a public purpose. 6EL04 Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. "he taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Eeli8 Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines. NATIONAL POWER CORP 7 CA% 2=; SCRA =@@ FACTS4 elieving that it formed part of the public land reserved for them, petitioner NP/ took possession of a parcel of land belonging to the private respondents to build hydroelectric po!er plant. 1fter more than &: years, petitioner recogni#ed that the property really belonged to the respondent. 1s the parties could not reach any agreement as to the market value of the property, respondent filed a case to recover the possession of the said property and asked for the repayment of rent from &?(', the time of the taking. In turn, on $uly &??%, petitioner filed an e8propriation case. "he t!o cases !ere consolidated. "he trial court dismissed the complaint of the petitioner but fi8ed the compensation on the basis of the value of the property !hen it filed the action for e8propriation. Petitioner argued the compensation should be based on the market value of the property in &?(', the time of the taking of the disputed property. 6EL04 "he general rule is that the time of taking is the critical date in determining the 9ust compensation. "here !ill be an in9ustice to the e8propriation if the incremental advantages arising from the use to !hich the government devoted the property e8propriated !ill accrue in favor of the o!ner. Ao!ever, it is difficult to conclude ho! there could have been an e8traordinary increase in the value of the land arising from the e8propriation. "aking is the entry into the property, should be under !arrant or color of legal authority, for petitioner believed it !as public land. "here !ere negotiations for the purchase of the property, but they constituted an attempt at a voluntary purchase. It !as only in &??% !hen petitioner filed its complaint for e8propriation that it manifested its intention to e8ercise the po!er of eminent domain. "he compensation should be based on the fair market value of the property in &??%. LAN0BANE 7 CA% 2=A SCRA ;0; FACTS4 ,10 and Landbank contended that the opening of trust accounts in favor of the lando!ners is sufficient compliance !ith mandate of 01 22;(. "he validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the re9ecting lando!ners and !ithholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latterCs refusal to accept the afford compensation thereby making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the landbank for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the lando!ners. 6EL04 "he /ourt re9ected ,10Cs contention !ith respect to Sec &2 of 01 22;( !hich maintains that -the deposit contemplated by Sec &2 )e* absent any specific indication may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary or other forms kno! in la!, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying. "he court said that Sec &2 of 01 22;( !as very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the re9ecting lando!ners, that it is in -cash or in Landbank bonds.. Dithout prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 9ust for the property o!ner is

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4A OF 50
made to suffer the conse>uence of being immediately deprived of his land !hile being made to !ait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope !ith his loss. 0E ENEC6T 7 CA% 2<0 SCRA 225 FACTS4 Petitioner o!ned a parcel of land along <,S1 and Aarrison in Pasay. "hey constructed ' houses, ( !ere leased and occupied one of them as their residence. "he city treasurer of Pasay discovered that the petitioners failed to pay real estate ta8es in the property from &?':5&?'&. "he treasurer sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder 6 arbieras and Sangalangs. Petitioners failed to redeem the property !ith one year, thus the arbieres and Sangalangs both filed for registration of their name as co5o!ner of the sub9ect land !ithout notice to the petitioners. "he 0egister of ,eeds issued a ne! title in the names of the aforementioned ne! o!ners. "he petitioners only learned about the auction sale by the time they received the orders of the land registration courts. Mean!hile, P lg. 3@: authori#ing the national government to e8propriate certain properties in Pasay for the <,S1 e8tension. 6EL04 Dhen a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the o!ner of the fee simple is not necessarily the only person !ho is entitled to compensation 6 in the 1merican 9urisdiction, the term -o!ner. !hen employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate persons !ho are to be made parties to the proceedings, refers, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those !ho have la!ful interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgage, a lessee and a vendee in possession under e8ecutory contract. "he petitioners lost !hatever rights or colorable title they had to the properties after the court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. "he fact that the petitioner remained in physical possession cannot give them another cause of action and resurrect an already settled case. REPUBLIC 7 TAGLE% 2<< SCRA =;< FACTS4 0espondent enite# is the registered o!ner of t!o parcels of land. "he Philippine government thru Philippine Auman 0esources ,evelopment /enter )PA0,/*, signed a memorandum of agreement !hich provides that enite# undertakes to lease !ithin the %: years and / or sell a portion of that property in favor of PA0,/. In vie! of that agreement to sell, PA0,/ prepared a ,eed of 1bsolute Sale. Ao!ever, enite# did not sign the deed of absolute sale. Eurthermore, she even demanded from PA0,/ the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises !ithin 3: days from notice. Eor failure to ac>uire the property involved thru negotiated sale, petitioner thru ,"I, to !hich it is attached, instituted a complaint for eminent domain. 0espondent 9udge issued an order granting the motion for issuance of a !rit of possession but move to >uash it. 6EL04 It is clear that, in >uashing the !rit of possession, respondent 9udge violated <+ &:3; on the >uaint and !himsical ground that petitioner !as already in actual possession of the property. It is !ell settled that eminent domain is an inherent po!er of the state that need not be granted by the fundamental la!. Section ?, art III of the constitution in mandating that private property shall not be taken for public use !ithout 9ust compensation. Petitioner has deposited not 9ust &:P re>uired under <+ &:3;, but the !hole amount of the 9ust compensation that private respondent is entitled to. SEC 40 OPOSA 7 FACTORAN% r% 22; SCRA @<2 FACTS4 Petitioners, !ho are minors, filed a case to compel the Sec of <nvironment and Natural 0esources to cancel all timber license agreements on the ground that they have a right to a sound environment. "he lo!er court dismissed the case on the ground that granting that the relief prayed for !ould impair the obligation of contracts. 6EL04 1 timber license agreement is not a contract or a property right protected by the constitution. =nder the forestry reform code, any license may be rescinded !hen national interest so re>uires. LIM 7 PACFUING% 2;0 SCRA ?;< FACTS4 Invoking the provision in the charter of the /ity of Manila, !hich authori#ed it to regulate betting by the public on 9ai5alai and to grant e8clusive rights to establishments for this purpose. "he municipal board of manila passed +rdinance No. (:2;, !hich authori#ed respondent to operate 9ai5alai. P, ((& revoked all e8isting franchise issued by local governments to permit betting on 9ai5alai. 0espondent argued that P, ((& violated the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts. 6EL04 1 franchise is not a contract. It is privilege especially in matters !hich are !ithin the po!er of the

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 4< OF 50
government to regulate or prohibit through the e8ercise of police po!er. 1 gambling franchise is al!ays sub9ect to the e8ercise of police po!er for the public !elfare. 0BP 7 CA% 2?2 SCRA 2;= FACTS4 Private respondents !ere the original o!ners of a parcel of land. +n May 3:, &?((, private respondents mortgaged said land to petitioner. Dhen private respondents defaulted on their obligation, petitioner foreclosed the mortgaged on the land and emerged as a sole bidder in the ensuing auction sale. +n 1pril 2, &?'@, petitioner and private respondents entered into a deed of conditional sale !herein petitioner agreed to reconvey the foreclosed property to private respondents. =pon completing the payment of the full repurchase price, private respondents demanded from petitioner the e8ecution of a deed of conveyance in their favor. Petitioner then informed private respondents that the prestation to e8ecute and deliver a deed of conveyance in their favor have been become legally impossible in vie! of Sec 2 of 01 22;( and <+ @:(. 6EL04 "he trial court and /1 have correctly ruled that neither Sec 2 of 01 22;( nor sec & of <+ @:( !as intended to impair the obligation of contract. "he /10L )01 22;(* !as not intended to take a!ay property !ithout due process of la!. No! is it intended to impair the obligation of contracts. In the same manner, <+ @:( be regarded. It !as enacted % months after private respondents had legally fulfilled the condition in the contract of conditional sale by the payment of all installments on their due dates. "hese la!s cannot have retroactive effect unless there is an e8press provision in them to that effect. <+ @:( took effect on $une &:, &??: but private respondents completed payment on 1pr 2, &??:. Aence, the land covered !as detached from the mass of foreclosed properties held by , P. CMMA 7 POEA% 2;5 SCRA ??? FACTS4 Petitioner /MM1, an incorporated association of licensed Eilipino manning agencies, and its co5petitioners, all licensed manning agencies !hich hire and recruit Eilipino seamen for and in behalf of the respective foreign shipo!ner5 principals, urge to annul resolution :&, series of &??@ of the governing board of the P+<1 and P+<1 memorandum circular no :;, series of &??@ on the ground that the resolution is unconstitutional for they violate the e>ual protection clause and the non5impairment clause of the constitution. 6EL04 "he constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read !ith literal e8actness. It is restricted to contracts !ith respect to property on some ob9ect of value and !hich confer rights that may be asserted in a court of 9usticeH it has no application to statutes relating to public sub9ects !ithin the domain of the general legislative po!ers of the state and involving the public rights and public !elfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper e8ercise by the state of its police po!er by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the !ealth, safety, morals, comforts or general !elfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the po!er of the state to regulate and control them. SEC 4; M!r#,* VS S!nd&(!n/!y!n %?( S/01 ?; FACTS4 Petitioner !as charge !ith ; counts of graft and corruption before the Sandiganbayan. 1s there !as no unanimity of votes, the presiding 9ustice constituted a special division of ; 9ustices. +ne of the ne! 9ustices re>uested for &; days to submit manifestation. +n the same day 3 9ustices lunch together and discussed the cases in the absence of % other member. 1 9ustice !ho !as not a member of the division !as present. 3 9ustices agreed to ac>uit petitioner in 3 of the cases and convict her in other cases. Dhen they returned to their office, presiding 9udge dissolved special division. +n appeal to the S/, it !as suggested that case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for the promulgation of a ne! decision. 6EL04 Petitioner !as first indicted in $anuary &??%. More than si8 years have passed, but the prosecution of petitioner is far from over. "o remand the case into the Sandiganbayan !ill violate her constitutional right to the speedy disposition of case. M!r#e$, VS S!nd&(!n/!y!n 3:& S/01 &:% FACTS4 Pasicolan, a public officer together !ith t!o other private individual 0omero and Marcelo !as arrested, charged, they convicted of >ualified mail pilferage )all as principal*. Petitioner says that only government employee can be charged of >ualified theft 6mail pilferage, unless there is a conspiracy bet!een

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 20 OF 50
government employee and private individual. Petitioner argued that it !as his first time to meet !ith Pasicolan and denied having anything to do !ith the transferring of mails. 6EL04 1s long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in 1rt 3&: of the 0P/, the crime is >ualified theft. In this case it is mail matter. Aence, it is not necessary that petitioner be sho!n to have been in conspiracy !ith a government employee in order to hold him liable of >ualified theft. e that as it !as may his testimony !as refuted !hen N I agent testified that petitioner !as instrumental in transferring the contents of the mail bag !hich Pasicolan handed to them to their traveling bag, this testimony !as also collaborated by "umagan. 6&9,n VS CA %2; S/01 ;&( FACTS4 Petitioners !ere charged !ith violation of P, (:@ committed by using sodium for fishing. Sec 33 of P, (:@ provided that the illegal fishing is presumed to have been committed !hen fish caught or killed !ith the use of e8plosives, obno8ious or poisonous substances or by electricity are found in a fishing boat. Petitioners alleged that the presumption of guilt violated the presumption of innocence established by the constitution. 6EL04 "he legislative has the po!er to provide that proof of certain facts !ill constitute accused provided there is a rational connection bet!een the acts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. "he fact presumed by Section 33 of the P, No (:@ is a natural inference from the fact proved. P!r!d! VS Vener!#&, %2? S/01 3(& FACTS4 /omplainant !as charged !ith estafa. Ae notified the court of his change of address. Notice of the hearing !as sent to his former address. Eor failure of the complainant to appear at the hearing, respondent ordered trial in absentia and rendered 9udgment convicting him. 6EL04 Eor a valid trial in absentia, the accused must have been notified of the trial and his failure to appear must be un9ustifiable. /omplainant had not been duly notified of the trial, because the notice the notice of hearing !as sent to his former address despite the fact that he notified the court of his change of address. "he sending of the notice of hearing to his former address cannot bind complainant. A-&,n VS C)&,n(*,n 3:& S/01 2&@ FACTS4 1mion claims the respondent 9udge erred in appointing a counsel de officio for him on a hearing day despite the fact that he can hire a counsel de parte of his choice. ecause of this he alleged he !as denied of his constitutional right of counsel of his choice. "he fact of the case sho!s that the case !as already pending for almost @ years. "his is because of a lot of delaying tactic employed by 1mion. 1mong them are that his la!yers !as ill, counsel did not sho! up, motion for inhibition against the 9udge, change of counsel more than once Q !ithdra!al of counsel. 6EL04 "here is no denial of the right to counsel !here a counsel de oficio !as appointed during the absence of the accusedCs counsel de parte pursuant to the courtCs desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. 1n e8amination of related provisions in the constitution concerning the right to counsel, !ill sho! that the preference in the choice of counsel -pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than one !ho is the accused in a criminal prosecution.. 0e G"9-!n VS S!nd&(!n/!y!n %;2 S/01 &(& FACTS4 Petitioner !as charged !ith graft and corruption for his alleged failure to account P%::,::: he received for training program of ,epartment of 1griculture. 1fter the prosecution had rested the la!yer of petitioner asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to the evidence. "he re>uest !as denied. "he la!yer invested 9ust the same in filing a demurrer to the evidence. 1s a result the case !as submitted for decision and petitioner !as convicted by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme court. Ae filed a motion to set aside his convictions to sho! that he had properly disbursed the P%::,::: he received. 6EL04 Petitioner is about to lose his liberty because his former counsel pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of investing on filing a demurrer to the evidence although it had become an imprudent remedy. 1s a result petitioner !as barred from presenting his evidence. "he higher interests of 9ustice and e>uity demand the petitioner be not penali#ed for the costly importuning of his previous counsel. 1 contrary rule !ill amount to condoning a serious in9ustice to petitioner, !ho reposed his faith on his previous counsel. "he motion should be granted.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 24 OF 50
0e $! R,*! VS CA %;3 S/01 @?? FACTS4 ? Informations for violation of P %% !ere filed against petitioner. "he first 3 hearings !ere postponed at the instances of petitioner, !ho claimed that he had no la!yer. "he cross e8amination of the & st prosecution !as postponed at the instance of petitioner. I other hearing !as postponed at the instance of petitioner, because his la!yer have previous commitment. 1 hearing !as also postponed upon motion for prosecution !ithout any ob9ection from petitioner because of a previous out5of5to!n commitment of the complaining !itness. 1t the ne8t hearing, the prosecution asked for postponed on the ground that the complaining !itness needed time to refresh his recollection of the details of numerous transaction involved. Invoking his right to a speedy trial, petitioner ob9ected. "he trial court denied the motion for postponement and dismissed the case. 6EL04 "he several postponement the accused obtained amount to a !aiver of his right to a speedy trial. "he reason of the prosecution for asking for postponement !ere not capricious. "he dismissal of the case is capricious. It does not give rise to double 9eopardy. Pe,2$e VS C!'"/&( 7.0.No &3('@% 1ug, %3, %::& FACTS4 1ccused !as charged the crime of rape !ith no >ualifying circumstances stated in the complaint. Ao!ever during the trial it !as proven that his victim is his o!n daughter !ho is under &' years old. Ae !as found guilty by the 0"/ and sentenced to death. =pon appeal the accused e8plained that the lo!er court erred in not taking into consideration the fact that the information !as defective to failure to state that the accused !as the father of the victim and that the victim !as under &' years of age at the time of commission of the alleged rape. 6EL04 "he minority of the victim and her relationship !ith the offender are special >ualifying circumstances that need to be alleged in the information for the penalty of death to de decreed. "he /onstitution guarantees to be inviolable the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is a re>uirement that renders it essential for every element of the offense !ith !hich he is charged to be properly alleged in the complaint. In the case at bar accused should only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua because for failure to include the >ualifying circumstance in the complaint. M!$&w!' VS CA %;2 S/01 (&' FACTS4 "!o separate informations !ere filed before the /EI charging petitioner !ith crime of Ealsification of Public and official document. "he court notes that from the time of petitioners arraignment up to the time the prosecution offered its evidence and rested, the hearing !ere either reset or cancelled no less than thirty. "he court convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. Petitioner claimed that he !as denied due process. Petitioner further alleged that former clerk of court, ,ia#, no! the $udge !ho convicted him testified against him !hile ,ia# still clerk of court. 6EL04 Petitioner cannot claim that he !as denied due process. "he record sho!s that he testified on his o!n behalf and !as cross5e8amined by the prosecution. 1dmittedly he !as unable to adduce additional documentary evidence. It !as petitioner !ho sought the postponement and cancellation of hearings. It took almost a decade from arraignment to promulgation of 9udgment. 0egarding the issued raised against ,ia# the solicitor general correctly averred that the testimony of ,ia# !as limited to certain facts directly connected !ith or arising from the performance of his official duties as clerk of court !ithout any pronouncement as to innocence or guilt of the petitioner. Pere9 VS E*'r!d! 1.M. No. :&5@5:35S/ $une %?,%::& FACTS4 F P re>uested the S/ to allo! live media coverage of the trial against former Pres. <strada before the Sandiganbayan in order to -assure the public of full transparency. in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. $ustice is a matter of public interest Q the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern. 6EL04 "he right of the accused prevailed over the right of press and public information. ,ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until he contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an ob9ect of public attention and !here the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and arguments give in open court, !here fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. 1n accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 22 OF 50
belongs to him. 1 public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt !ith and !ould not be un9ustly condemn and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long agoH a public trial is not synonymous !ith publici#ed trialH it only implies that the court doors must be opened to those !ho !ish to come sit in the available seats. In the constitutional sense a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of public to observe the proceedings, not too small and not too large. SEC 4= Pe,2$e VS L!/r&!(er %;: S/01 &23 FACTS4 1ccused !as caught selling t!o bags of mari9uana in a buy bust operation conducted on $an %&,&?''. 1ccused !as found is possession of &&; grams of mari9uana. She !as convicted of drug pushing and !as sentenced to life imprisonment. Dhen 01 (2;? !as enacted to life imprisonment. Dhen 01 (2;? !as enacted she filed a motion and prays for the retroactive application of the 1ct, and for her eventual release from confinement at the correctional Institute as a conse>uence of the application of the ne! la! to her case. 6EL04 Dhere the decision convicting the accused is already final, the appropriate remedy of the convict !ho invoked the retroactive application of a statute is to file a petitioner for habeas corpus, not a motion for reconsideration !ith modification of sentence. 0ules on habeas corpus should be liberally applied in cases !hich are sufficient in substance. Fer&! VS CA 3%; S/01 ;%; FACTS4 Petitioner has been under detention for &% years. Ae sought to be transferred to the ureau of correction in Muntinlupa. ecause of such re>uest it !as found out that the entire records of the case !hich includes the 9udgment !ere missing. It !as then discovered that t he records have been destroyed in a fire at the %nd and 3rd floor of the city Aall. Petitioner filed a petition for Issuance of a !rit of Aabeas /orpus praying from his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention !/o any valid 9udgment is illegal and violation of his /onstitutional 0ight to due process. 6EL04 "he mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subse>uent to conviction !ill not render the 9udgment of conviction void, nor !ill it !arrant the release of the convict by virtue of !rit of Aabeas /orpus. "he proper remedy is the reconstruction of 9udicial records !hich is as much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense. "he !rit of Aabeas /orpus may also be availed of !here , as a conse>uence of a 9udicial proceeding 1* there has been a deprivation of a /onstitutional right resulting in a restrain of a personH * the court has no 9urisdiction to impose the sentence, /* an e8cessive penalty has been imposed as such sentence is void as to such e8cess. "he burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner !ho attacks such restraint. SEC 4? G"errer, 7* CA %;( S/01 (:3 FACTS4 Petitioner !as charged !ith triple homicide through reckless imprudence. Dhen the case !as already submitted for decision, it !as raffled to a ne! 9udge. 1s the transcripts of stenographic notes !ere incomplete, the 9udge ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the !itnesses. Petitioner claimed double 9eopardy. 6EL04 "he retaking of the testimonies of the !itness !ill not place petitioner in double 9eopardy, as there has been no termination of the first 9eopardy. Re2"/$&# 7* S!nd&(!n/!y!n 3:& S/01 %:( FACTS4 "his is originally as action by 0epublic of the Philippines against retired rig. 7en. aldanero alleging that the latter ac>uired funds, real properties and other assets manifestly out of proportion, to his total salaries and emoluments as an army officer and as incomes from business other legitimately ac>uired properties. 1ssociate Solicitors "agapan and del 0osario manifested during the hearing, that they had been relieved from the case and that there !ere % solicitors !ho !ere designated for the case. ut the latter % !ere not able to attend the case for they had an official business. 1ssociate Solicitor "agapan asked for the resetting of the hearing to !hich the Sandiganbayan reacted adversely. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and that it be allo!ed to present evidence in formal trial. It !as denied. /ounsel contends that the reason given for the re>uested resettings of hearings !ere meritorious ground !hich !ere not intended to delay the case nor violate private respondents rights to speedy trial.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 25 OF 50
6EL04 Petitioner failed to sho! patent and grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent in denying its oral motion for postponement. 1 careful reading of the >uestion order of the Sandiganbayan sho!s that public respondent ob9ected not so much on the assignment of the case to young and ine8perienced solicitors, but that such re5assignment !as done on short notice very close to the date of scheduled hearings. "he e8cuse given by the +S7 completely failed to 9ustify !hy the re5assignment had to be done so near to the scheduled hearing and !orse the solicitor !ho !ere not even present. SEC 4@ M!r#e$, 7* S!nd&(!n/!y!n 3:& S/01 &:% FACTS4 Pasicolan, a public officer, together !ith t!o private individuals 0omero and Marcelo !ere arrested for mail pilferage. "hey !ere brought to the N I head>uarters along !ith the motorcycle o!ned by 0omero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession. "hey !ere asked to affi8 their signature on the envelopes of the letters. "hey did so in the presence of N I 1dministrative and Investigation staff, !ithout any counsel. "hey !ere convicted of >ualified theft by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner contend that their signature on the envelope in inadmissible as evidence for it is done !ithout the assistance of a counsel. 6EL04 "he signature of the accused, secured during custodial investigation and !ithout assistance of counsel, !hich !ere affi8ed in the envelopes sei#ed as a means of authenticating the same as those sei#ed from them are inadmissible evidence, the same being evidence of admission obtained under 1rt III, Sec &% Q&( of the constitution. ut the letters are not themselves inadmissible in evidence, they can stand on their o!n being the fruits of the crime validly sei#ed during a la!ful arrest. Petitioner and his co5accused !ere not convicted solely on the basis of the signature found on the letter, but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of N I agents and other prosecution !itness. Pe,2$e 7* S"!re9 %2( S/01 &&? FACTS4 1ccused !as found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery !ith Aomicide 1ccused >uestions the lo!er courts decision by challenging the admissibility of their e8tra9udicial declaration. 1ccused Pe,2$e 7* E#)e(!r!y %2( S/01 2'% FACTS4 "he accused !as convicted of raping his daughter and sentenced to death pursuant to 0epublic 1ct No. (?;?. Ae argued that the restoration of the death penalty is unconstitutional. 6EL04 1rt III, Sec &? of the /onstitution plainly vests in /ongress the po!er to re5impose the death penalty. "he e8ercise of the /ongress defined only crimes that >ualify as heinous. "he preamble of 0.1. (2;? sufficiently describes !hat are to be considered heinous. "hese are crimes !hich by their very nature are despicable because life !as callously taken or the victim !as treated like an animal. "here are crimes !hich are abominable because of the significance and implication of the criminal acts in the scheme of the socio5political and economic conte8t in !hich the State find itself to be struggling to provide the underprivileged. 0. 1. (2;? correctly identified the crimes !arranting the penalty of death. E#)e(!r!y 7* Se#re'!ry %?( S/01 (;@ FACTS4 Petitioner !as convicted for rape and sentenced to death by lethal in9ection. Petitioner argued that e8ecution by lethal in9ection is a cruel degrading, and inhuman punishment because 0.1. No. '&(( did not provide for the drugs to be used, the dosage for each drugs, the la! is uncertain as to the date of e8ecution and this uncertain as to the date of e8ecution and this uncertainty causes sufferings to the convict, and the possibility of mistake in administering the drugs renders lethal in9ection cruel. 6EL04 1ny infliction of pain in lethal in9ection is merely incidental in carrying out the e8ecution of the death penalty and does not fall !ithin the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading or inhuman claims that their e8tra9udicial declaration !ere obtained through force and intimidation and !ithout the benefit of effective counsel. 6EL04 +nce the prosecution has sho!n that there !as compliance !ith the constitutional re>uirement on pre5interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the accused bears the burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. 1 confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it !as given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of re!ard or leniency. SEC 4<

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2; OF 50
punishment. "he cruelty !hich the /onstitution protects is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment. Dhile improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain the fe! minutes of pain do not rise to a constitutional violation. "he implementing details of 0.1 No '&(( are matters !hich are properly left to the administrative officials. Section & of 0.1. No. '&(( re>uires that all personnel involved in the e8ecution should be trained. SEC 20 V!#! 7* CA %?' S/01 2;2 FACTS4 Petitioner !as convicted by the 0"/ and affirmed by /1 for violation of P%%, ouncing /heck La!. Petitioner !as sentenced to suffer & year imprisonment and pay a fine of P&:,::: and cost. P%% Sec & par & provides for a penalty of -imprisonment of not less than 3: days but not more than & year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double the amount of the check !hich fine shall in no case e8ceed P%::,::: or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.. Petitioner pray that in the alternative the penalty be modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and in lieu thereof, a fine in an increased amount be imposed on them. 6EL04 Petitioners are first time offenders. In determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of P %%, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence La! is observed namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal of social orders. In the case at bar a fine in an amount e>ual to double the amount of the check involve is an appropriate penalty. Sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioner are ordered to pay a fine of P%::,::: e>uivalent to double the amount of the check. LIM 7* Pe,2$e 70 &3::3' September &', %::: FACTS4 /1 Q 0"/ petitioner guilty of t!ice violating .P.%% and imposing on her t!o &year imprisonment for each of the % violation ordered her to pay % fines each amounting P %::,:::. +n 1ug. %;, &??: petitioner bought various 9e!elry !orth P 3::,::. She !rote a check dated 1ug. %;, &??: payable to -cash. dra!n on Metrobank in the amount of P3::,::: and gave the check to Seguam. "he ne8t day petitioner again purchased 9e!elries valued at P %@&,22' and issued another check payable to -cash. dated 1ug. &2, &??:, same bank. "he % checks !ere returned !hen presented !ith notice of dishonor for the account !as closed. Petitioner argued that she issued % checks and gave to Nadera and not Seguam. 6EL04 "he gravaman of P%% is the act of making and issuing a !orthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. "he act is malum prohibitum, pernicious, and inimical to public !elfare. La!s are created to achieve a good intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Dhy and to !hom the check !as issued in irrelevant in determining culpability in P%% one need not prove that the check !as issued in payment of obligation or if there !as damage. "he damage is done to the banking system. If an act is mala prohibita, the only in>uiry is has the la! been violatedG. "he court affirmed the /1 decision !ith modification that the sentence of imprisonment be set aside and sentence her to pay P%::,::: in each case !ith subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency or non payment not to e8ceed 2 months )1rt. 3? 0P/* SEC 24 Pe,2$e 7* F"&G!d! %;? S/01 &?& FACTS4 1ccused !as convicted by the 0"/ of t!o offenses !hich !ere separately charged in t!o separate information. "he first !as under 1rt. %@' of the 0evised Penal /ode and the second !as illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under P, &'22. oth have arisen in the same incident, so the case !ere consolidated and 9oint hearing !as held. 6EL04 Sec %&, 1rt III of the /onstitution deals !ith t!o different kinds of double 9eopardy. "he first sentence prohibits double 9eopardy of punishment of the same offense, !hile the second contemplates double 9eopardy of punishment of the same act. "he constitutional protection against double 9eopardy is available only !here an identity is sho!n to e8ist bet!een the previous and subse>uent offense charged. "he elements of illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form are different from the element of murder or homicide, let alone that these crimes are defined and penali#ed under different la!s, the former being malum prohibitum, !hile the latter in mala in se.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2= OF 50
M!r'&ne9 7* CA %3( S/01 ;(; FACTS4 Petitioner !as charged of the crime of libel before the 0"/ of Manila but !as subse>uently dismissed because of the ,+$ Secretary order or opinion that the language used in the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same !as not actionable for libel. /omplainant Laurel filed an appeal to /1. "he appeal !as granted and the appellate court ordered that the case be remanded to the lo!er court for arraignment. Petitioner contended that it violated his right against double 9eopardy. 6EL04 1ppeal against the order of dismissal !as not foreclosed by the rule of double 9eopardy said order having been issued before arraignment. Legal 9eopardy attaches only )&* upon a valid indictment )%* before a competent court )3* after arraignment )@* a valid plea having been entered, and );* the case !as dismissal or other!ise terminated !ithout the e8press consent of the accused. "he right to appeal from a final 9udgment or order in a criminal case is granted to -any party. e8cept !hen the accused is placed in double 9eopardy. In a previous case the S/ ruled that the !ord -party. must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons !ho may be affected by the 9udgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. "hus the party in9ured has been held to have the right to appeal. Pe,2$e 7* P&-en'e$ %'' S/01 ;@% FACTS4 0espondent !as previously charged of the crime of subversion. =pon arrest, an unlicensed revolver and si8 rounds of ammunition !ere found in his possession. Ae !as then subse>uently charged of Illegal Possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance of subversion under Presidential ,ecree No. &'22. Private respondent contends that he !as placed in double 9eopardy !ith the filing of the second information against him. 6EL04 In order that the protection against double 9eopardy may be used to benefit the accused the follo!ing re>uisites must have obtained in the first criminal action )1* valid complaint and information ) * competent court )/* defendant had pleased to the charged ),* defendant !as ac>uitted or convicted, or the case against him !as dismissed or other!ise terminated !ith out his e8press consent. In the case at bar, respondents motion to >uash filed in the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double 9eopardy simply because it had not arisen yet. "he private respondent had not even been arraigned in the first criminal action for subversion. esides, the t!o criminal charges against private respondent are not of the same offense as re>uired by Sec %&. 1rt III of the /onstitution. C"&*,n 7* CA %2? S/01 &;? FACTS4 "he trial court convicted the accused of double homicide and ordered him to pay P 3:, ::: to the heirs of each of the victims. +n appeal the /1 affirmed the decision !ith the modification that the civil indemnity !as increased to P ;:,:::. Dhen the case !as remanded to the trial court for promulgation of the decision of the /1, the trial court promulgated the decision only !ith respect to civil liability. "he /1 ordered the trial court to promulgate the decision ane! and to include the affirmance of the conviction of the accused. "he accused invoked double 9eopardy on the ground that the first promulgation of the decision of the /1 terminated the criminal cases against him. 6EL04 "he trial court promulgated the decision !ith respect to the civil aspect of the case only. "he promulgation !as not merely incomplete. It !as also void. "he grave abuse of discretion of the trial court rendered the act void. Since the criminal cases had not yet been terminated double 9eopardy cannot prosper as a defense. Pe,2$e 7* N&'!+!n 3:% S/01 @%@ FACTS4 0espondent Imelda Marcos !as charged of three criminal information for violation of Sec @ of /entral ank /ircular No ?':. 0espondent 9udge dismissed the t!o cases on the ground, that Marcos right against double 9eopardy !as violated. It is respondent 9udgeCs posture that based on Solicitor 7eneralCs allegation in its motion for consolidation filed in ranch ;' of Pasig, that the three cases form part of a series of transaction !hich are sub9ect of the cases pending before ranch %2 of Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. 0espondent 9udge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondents for a series of transaction !ould endo! it !ith the functional ability of multiplication or reproduction. 6EL04 "he ground of double 9eopardy invoked by respondent 9udge is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. ,ouble 9eopardy re>uires the concurrence of three re>uisites, thus )&* the first

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2? OF 50
9eopardy must have attached prior to the second )%* the first 9eopardy must have been terminated )3* the % nd 9eopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the %nd offense includes or in necessarily included in the offense charged in the &st information, or is an attempt to commit the same as is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first 9eopardy has yet attached nor any such 9eopardy terminated. SEC 22 Wr&()' 7* CA %3; S/01 3@& FACTS4 1ustralia and the Philippines entered into an e8tradition treaty. "he treaty provided that e8tradition may be granted irrespective of the date !hen the offense !as committed. 1ustralia asked that petitioner be e8tradited for s!indling and per9ury committed before the treaty took effect. Petitioner argued that his e8tradition for offenses committed before the affectivity of the e8tradition treaty violate the prohibition against e8 post facto la!s. 6EL04 "he prohibition against e8 post facto la!s applies to penal la!s only. "he e8tradition treaty is not a criminal statute. "herefore it is not covered against e8 post facto la!s. L!#*,n 7* Se#re'!ry 70 &%':?2, $an %:, &?? FACTS4 1ccused Lacson !as among those accused of rub out of the Furatong aleleng gang members. "he Sandiganbayan initially took cogni#ance over the case as the policemen involved in said murder !ere public officers. ut petitioner !ere able to persuade the Sandiganbayan to transfer the case to the 0"/ because none of the principal accused are in the salary grade of %( pursuant to 01 (?(;. Ao!ever, 01 '%@? !as enacted, !hich defines the 9urisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It specifies the rank of superintendent as covered by the Sandiganbayan 9urisdiction. Petitioner argues that 01 '%@? is an e8 post facto la!. 6EL04 <8 facto la! generally prohibits retrospectively of penal la!s. 01 '%@? is not a penal la!. It is substantive la! on 9urisdiction !hich is not penal in character. Not being a penal la!, the retroactive application of 01 '%@? cannot be challenge as unconstitutional. 1n e8 post facto la! is a la! that )&* makes an act criminal before the passing of the la!, !hich !as innocent !hen committed, and punishes the act )%* aggravates a crime )3* inflicts a greater punishment than the la! anne8ed to the crime !hen committed )@* alters the legal rules of evidence. );* alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage )2* imposes a penalty of deprivation of a right !hich !hen done !as la!ful )(* deprives accused of la!ful protection !hen he !as entitled to. Pe,2$e 7* T!("/! %%? S/01 &'' FACTS4 "he accused !ere found guilty of eight counts of illegal recruitment and convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale in violation of Presidential ,ecree No. %:&'. 6EL04 =nder Presidential ,ecree No. %:&', illegal recruitment is committed on a large scale if it !as committed against three or more persons. Presidential ,ecree No. %:&' took effect of on Eebruary &:, &?'2. Since only t!o of the complainants !ere illegally recruited after this date. Presidential ,ecree No. %:&', cannot apply to the accused retroactivity or other!ise it !ould be an e8 post facto la!. Bened&#', 7* CA 70 &%;3;? Sept @, %::& FACTS4 +n ,ec. %(, &??&. 1ccused Imelda Marcos Q 0ivera !ere indicted for violation of / /ircular ?2: prohibits person from maintaining foreign e8change account abroad !ithout prior / , approval for foreign e8change funded e8penditure obtained from banking system. /ircular &3&' and &%;3 contained saving clause e8cepting from their coverage pending criminal action, involving /ircular No. ?2:. Petitioners contend that they are prosecuted for acts punishable under la!s that have already been repealed. "hey point to the e8press repeal of /ircular No. ?2: by /ircular Nos. &3&' and &3;3. 6EL04 "he test !hether a penal la! runs afoul of the e8 post facto clause of /onstitution is -does the la! sought to be applied retroactivity take from an accused any right that !as regarded at the time of the adoption of the /onstitution as vital as the protection of life and liberty and !hich he en9oyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against himG. "he crucial !ords of the test are - vital for the protection of life and liberty.. "he test is not applicable to the penal clause of 01 (2;3. Penal la!s and la!s not penal in nature have provisions defining offenses prescribing the penalties for their violations operate prospectively. Penal la!s cannot be given retroactive effect e8cept

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2@ OF 50
!hen they are favorable to the accused. No!here in 01 (2;3, is any indication that the increased penalties provided therein !ere intended to operate retroactively. "here is therefore no e8 post facto la! in this case. ARTICLE IV C V Y" 7* S!n'&!(, &2? S/01 3'@ FACTS4 Petitioner !as previously a Portuguese citi#en. Ae became a naturali#ed Eilipino. Ae applied for and !as issued a Portuguese passport. Ae declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed. "he /ommission on Immigration and ,eportation ordered his deportation. Petitioner argued that he !as a Eilipino citi#en. 6EL04 "he acts of petitioner considered together constitute an e8press renunciation of his Philippine /iti#enship ac>uired through naturali#ation. <8press renunciation means a renunciation that is made kno!n distinctly and e8plicitly and not left to inference or implication. Dith best kno!ledge and legal capacity after having renounced Portuguese citi#enship upon naturali#ation as a Philippines citi#en, Petitioner resumes his prior status as a Portuguese citi#en. Such resumption of Portuguese citi#enship is inconsistent !ith his maintenance of Philippine citi#enship. L!/, 7* C,-e$e# &(2 S/01 & FACTS4 Petitioner married an 1ustralian citi#en in &?(2 )but !as later annulled* but did not automatically became an 1ustralian. Ae became a citi#en of 1ustralia because he !as naturali#ed through a formal and positive process. 1s a condition of his 1ustralian naturali#ation he took the oath of allegiance and renounced all other allegiance. Ae came home to the Philippines using 1ustralian passport. Ae later asked for a change of his status and !as granted certificate of residence. Ae also categorically declared that he !as a citi#en of 1ustralia in a number of s!orn statement voluntarily made by him. Petitioner claims that his naturali#ation in 1ustralia made him only a dual national and did not divert him of Philippine citi#enship. 6EL04 /1 No. 23 enumerates the mode by !hich Eilipino citi#enship may be lost. 1mong these are )&* naturali#ation to foreign country )%* e8press renunciation of citi#enship and )3* subscription to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or la!s of a foreign country, all of these are applicable to petitioner. =nder 1rt II Sec ; of the present constitution. -,ual allegiance of citi#ens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt !ith by la!.. <ven if the marriage !as annulled the fact sho!s that he voluntarily and freely re9ected Philippine citi#enship and !illingly and kno!ingly embraced 1ustralian citi#enship. "he annulment did not automatically reinstate him as a citi#en of the Philippines. =nder /1 23 Philippine citi#enship may be reac>uired )&* by direct act of congress, )%* by naturali#ation, )3* by repatriation. It does not appear that petitioner reac>uire citi#enship by any of these methods. A9n!r 7* COMELEC &'; S/01 (:3 FACTS4 +n November &?, &?'(, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of governor. +n $anuary %%, &?'', petitioner filed a petition to dis>ualify him on the ground that he is not a Eilipino citi#en, since he registered !ith /ommission on Immigration and ,eportation as an alien. 6EL04 0espondent is the son of a Eilipino father and is presumed to be a Eilipino citi#en. Petitioner failed to present any proof that respondent had lost his Eilipino citi#enship. Petitioner merely argued that since respondent !as issued an alien certificate of registration and !as given permission to re5enter the Philippines by the /ommission on Immigration and ,eportation, he has been naturali#ed as an 1merican citi#en. 0espondent denied that he took an oath of allegiance to the =nited States. Erom the mere fact that petitioner obtained an 1lien certificate of registration, it does not follo! that he has renounced Philippine citi#enship. C, 7* E$e#',r!$ Tr&/"n!$ &?? S/01 2?% FACTS4 Petitioner and respondent !ere candidates for /ongressman. 0espondent !on, petitioner filed an election protest on the ground that respondent is not a natural born Eilipino citi#en. "he grandfather of respondent became a permanent resident. "he mother of respondent is a natural born, Eilipino citi#en. Ais father applied for naturali#ation and !as declared a Eilipino citi#en. Dhen he took his oath of allegiance, respondent !as a minor. 0espondent passed the board e8amination for /P1, such re>uires Philippine citi#enship. Ae !orked in the /entral ank as e8aminer. Ae is a registered voter. 0espondent has considered himself a Eilipino.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2A OF 50
6EL04 =nder the Philippine ill of &?:%, inhabitants of the Philippines !ho !ere Spanish sub9ect on 1pril &&, &'?? and !ere residing in the Philippines and their children born subse>uently !ere conferred the status of Eilipino citi#en. 0espondentCs grandfather !as >ualified and formally elected Philippine citi#enship !hen he became of age, thus, he !as already a Eilipino citi#en because of the naturali#ation of his father !hen he !as a minor. "he acts of respondent are formal manifestation of his choice of Eilipino citi#enship. 0espondent could have foreseen that the &?'( /onstitution !ould re>uire him to have a s!orn statement electing Philippine citi#enship. Sec & 1rt II should be applied to those !ho elected Philippine citi#enship before Eebruary %, &?'(. Re2"/$&# 7* 0e $! R,*! %3% S/01 ('; FACTS4 1 petitioner for naturali#ation !as filed by Erivaldo. "he trial court directed the publication of the petition and order in the +.7. and a ne!spaper of general circulation for 3 consecutive !eeks, the last publication of !hich should at least 2 months before the scheduled date of hearing. ut through the petitionerCs motion, the court heard the petition before the scheduled date of hearing, the change of schedule !as not published and it !as heard !ithin 2 months from the last publication of hearing. "he petition !as granted and petitioner took his oath of allegiance the same day. Petitioner used to be a Eilipino /iti#en but became naturali#ed =.S. citi#en. 0an for governor and !on &??% election. 6EL04 Naturali#ation procedure should be complied by everyone as prescribed by la! and not 9ust select the re>uirements he think is applicable to him and disregard the rest. Eailure to comply !ith the publication and posting re>uirements under 0evised Naturali#ation La! rendered null and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and oath of allegiance taken. 1 decision in a petition for naturali#ation becomes final only after 3: days from its promulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the Solicitor 7eneral of his copy of the decision. 1 decision granting citi#enship in naturali#ation proceedings shall be e8ecutory until after t!o years from its promulgation. /ourts cannot implement any decision granting the petitioner for naturali#ation before its finality. Petitioner is not a citi#en of the Philippines therefore not >ualified to hold public office. Fr&7!$d, 7* COMELEC &(@ S/01 %@; FACTS4 Petitioner !as proclaimed elected governor on $anuary &?'' election. 1 petition to annual his proclamation !as filed on the ground that he !as not a Eilipino citi#en, having been naturali#e in =.S. on $an. %: &?'3. Petitioner insisted that he !as a Eilipino because his naturali#ation as an 1merican !as no voluntary )force because of martial la!*. Ae contended that his oath in his certificate of candidacy that he !as a natural born citi#en is a sufficient repatriation. Ae further claims that his active participation in election automatically forfeit his 1merican citi#enship. 6EL04 "he claim of petitioner that his naturali#ation !as not his o!n free choice must be re9ected. "here are many Eilipinos in the =.S. similarly situated !ho did not take oath of allegiance to the =.S. <ven if he lost his 1merican citi#enship by his participation in Phil election, such did not automatically restore his Philippine citi#enship. Philippine citi#enship previously diso!ned is not that cheaply recovered. y simply filing his certificate of candidacy, he has not effectively recovered Philippine citi#enship. "hat is not the formal declaration re>uired for repatriation. /iti#enship is favored by the /onstitution and la!. ut once surrendered and renounced it is gone and cannot be lightly restored. "he returning renegade must sho! by an e8press and une>uivocal act, the rene!al of his loyalty land love. Fr&7!$d, 7*. COMELEC %;( S/01 (%( FACTS4 +n March ', &??;, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of governor. 0espondent filed a petition to dis>ualify him on the ground that he !as not a Eilipino citi#en. Dhile the petition !as granted, the motion for reconsideration of petition !as not denied until after the election on May ', &??;. Petitioner !on as governor. +n May &&, &??;, the /+M<L</, denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. It then ordered the proclamation of respondent as the !inner since he obtained the % nd highest member of votes. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation. Ae claimed that his petition for repatriation !as granted by a special /ommittee on Naturali#ation created by P, (%; and he took his oath of allegiance on $une 3:, &??;.

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 2< OF 50
6EL04 "he repatriation of petitioner should be deemed to retroact to the date of the filing of his application on 1ug. &(, &??@. Statutes !hich are curative and !hich create ne! rights should be given retroactive effect. P.N. (%; created a ne! right and provides for a ne! remedy to reac>uire Philippine citi#enship under simplified procedures of repatriation. It is not only the la! !hich should be given retroactive effect. <ven the repatriation granted under it should be deemed to have retroacted to the date of application. It is the intent of the la! to benefit the greatest number of former Eilipinos. 0etroactivity also prevents pre9udice to applicants in case of delay in the processing of their application. C!!*& 7* COMELEC &?& S/01 %%? FACTS4 Private respondent Miguel !as elected Municipal Mayor of olinao Pangasinan. Petitioner !ho !as a rival candidate of Miguel sought the dis>ualification of private respondent )elected mayor* on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the =nited States of 1merica, not of olinao. 6EL04 "o be dis>ualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the la! re>uires that the candidate !ho is a green card holder must have -!aived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. -"herefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a !aiver of the status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the =S1. "he !aiver of his green card should be manifested by some acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Dithout such prior !aiver, he !as -dis>ualified to run for any elective office.. M!r#,* 7*. COMELEC %@3 S/01 3:: FACTS4 Private respondent Monte9o filed a petition of cancellation and dis>ualification of the candidacy of Imelda Marcos alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional re>uirement for residency. Private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the one year re>uirement on the evidence of declaration made by her in her voter registration record and certificate of candidacy stated that -she has al!ays maintained "acloban /ity as her domicile or residence. 6EL04 Dhen the constitution speaks of residence in election la!, it actually means only of domicile. "he court has stated many times that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. "he absence from legal residence to pursue a profession, to study, or to do other things of temporary nature does not constitute loss of residence in "acloban /ity her residence since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy. A8"&n, 7* COMELEC %@' S/01 @:: FACTS4 Petitioner 1gapito 1>uino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of 0epresentative for the %nd district of Makati /ity. Ae provided in his certificate of candidacy that he has been residing in district for & year and &3 days as evidenced by a lease contract bet!een petitioner and an o!ner of a condominium unit in said city. M+I< Makati, a duly registered political party, filed a petition to dis>ualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner lacked residence >ualification as a candidate for congressman as provided by Sec 2, 1rt II of the /onstitution. Eacts sho! that the petitioner !as a resident of "arlac since his birth, hence ;% years immediately preceding that election. 6EL04 In order that petitioner could >ualify as a candidate for 0epresentative of the second district of Makati /ity, he must prove that he has established not 9ust residence but domicile of choice. "he place -!here a party actually or contructively has his permanent home, !here he, no matter !here he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, his domicile, is that to !hich the constitution refers !hen it speaks of residence for the purpose of election la!, from the data furnished by petitioner to the /omelec at various times during his political career, !hat stands consistently clear is that his domicile of origin of records up to the filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the &??; election !as /onception "arlac. ,omicile of origin is not easily lost. Petitioner must prove actual removal. Petitioner is ineligible for the elective position of representative of Makati. R,dr&("e9 7* COMELEC %;? S/01 %?2 FACTS4 Petitioner 0odrigue# and private respondent Mar>ue# !ere protagonist for the position of 7overnor in Lue#on Province. 0odrigue# !on and !as proclaimed duly elected governor. Mar>ue# challenge 0odrigue# victory as the former revealed that

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2002 SERIES 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES By: Andrew C. !"#"$!n% M!r&'! Ann U. On( W&') d&(e*'* +r,- Ry!n M,n'ene(r, .ed&'ed /y 0!1 N!2!,3 50 OF 50
0odrigue# left the =.S. !here a charge is pending against the latter for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. "he issue raised has !hether or not 0odrigue# !as considered a -fugitive from 9ustice. so as not to >ualify him for the said gubernatorial post. 0odrigue# arrived in the Philippines on $une %;, &?';, !hile the filing of the felony complaint against him !as on Nov. &%, &?'; and the issuance of the arrest !arrant !as almost five months after. 6EL04 "he Supreme /ourt has already ruled that a -fugitive from 9ustice. includes not only those !ho flee after conviction to avoid punishment but like!ise those !ho after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. "he definition stated indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates oneCs flight from a particular 9urisdiction. "here can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment !hen there is kno!ledge by the fleeing sub9ect of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated 9udgment of conviction. 0odrigue#C case 9ust cannot fit in this concept. Eor it is impossible for him to have kno!n about such felony complaint Q arrest !arrant at the time he left the =.S B!y!n M"n! 7* COMELEC 70 &@(2&3, $une %2, %::& FACTS4 "his is a case about the party list system of the %::& <lection. "he /+M<L</ approved the manifestation. +f &;@ parties and organi#ation and >uality them for the party list election. Petitioners seek the dis>ualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system has intended to benefit the marginali#ed and under representedH not the mainstream political parties, the non5marginali#ed or overrepresented. 6EL04 "he court ruled that Sec ? of 01 (?@& must be follo!ed such as that the nominee must be natural born citi#en of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period not less than & year immediately preceding the day of election, able to read and !rote, a bona fide member of the party or organi#ation !hich he seeks to represent for at least ?: days preceding the day of the election, is at least %; years old on day of election, and not more than 3: years old if representing youth sector. "he nominee of the party must belong and represent marginali#e by a retiree. Nominees must like!ise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that !ill benefit the nation as a !hole. 'ee*,& 5H02H02