Additional 9 G.R. No. 131235 November 16, 1999 UST FACULTY UNION (USTFU) vs.

BITONIO Facts Petitioners-appellees [herein P rivate Respondents] Marino, et. al. (appellees) are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (UST FU). The union has a subsisting five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employer, the University of Santo Tomas (UST ). Appellee Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General of UST FU, posted a notice addressed to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly. Among others, the general assembly was called to elect UST FU's next set of officers. Through the notice, the members were also informed of the constitution of a Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to oversee the elections. Some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, directed against herein appellees and the members of the COMELEC. The petition alleged that the COMELEC w as not constituted in accordance with USTFU's constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the election. The secretary general of UST, upon the request of the various UST faculty club presidents, issued notices allowing all faculty members to hold a convocation. Denominated as [a] general faculty assembly, the convocation w as supposed to discuss the "state of the unratified UST -UST FU CBA" and "status and election of UST FU officers" The med-arbiter issued a T RO against herein appellees enjoining them from conducting the scheduled election. The general faculty assembly w as held as scheduled. The general assembly w as attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by "non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit." On this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU's new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands. The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez, admittedly not a member of UST FU, that the UST FU CBL and "the rules of the election be suspended and that the election be held [on] that day" Appellees filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs and the nullification of the results of the election. Appellees alleged that the holding of the same violated the T RO issued. Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the election as spurious for being violative of UST FU's CBL, specifically because the general assembly resulting in the election of

appellants was not called by the Board of Officers of the UST FU; there was no compliance with the ten-day notice rule required by Section 1, Article VIII of the CBL; the supposed elections were conducted without a COMELEC being constituted by the Board of Officers in accordance with Section 1, Article IX of the CBL; the elections were not by secret balloting as required by Section 1, Article V and Section 6, Article IX of the CBL, and, the general assembly w as convened by faculty members some of whom were not members of USTFU, so much so that non-USTFU members were allowed to vote in violation of Section 1, Article V of the CBL. Appellees filed another urgent ex -parte motion for a TRO, this time alleging that appellants had served the former a notice to vacate the union office. For their part, appellants moved to dismiss the original petition and the subsequent motion on jurisdictional grounds. Both the petition and the motion were captioned to be for "P rohibition, Injunction with P rayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." According to the appellants, the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, "including the ancillary remedies of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which are merely incidental to the main petition for PROHIBITION." Appellants also averred that they now constituted the new set of union officers having been elected in accordance with law after the term of office of appellees had expired. They further maintained that appellees' scheduling of the elections w as illegal because no rules and regulations governing the elections were promulgated as required by UST FU's CBL and that one of the members of the COMELEC w as not a registered member of UST FU. Appellants likewise noted that the elections called by the appellees should have been postponed to allow the promulgation of rules and regulations and to "insure a free, clean, honest and orderly elections and to afford at the same time the greater majority of the general membership to participate." Finally, appellants contended that the holding of the general faculty assembly w as under the control of the Council of College/Faculty Club P residents in cooperation with the UST FU Reformist Alliance and that they received the Temporary Restraining Order issued only on 07 October 1996 and were not aw are of the same on 04 October 1996. Appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001. Consequently, appellees again moved for the issuance of a T RO to prevent appellants from making further representations that [they] had entered into a new agreement with UST. Appellees also reiterated their earlier stand that appellants w ere usurping the former's duties and functions and should be stopped from continuing such acts. Over appellants' insistence that the issue of jurisdiction should first be resolved, the med-arbiter issued a T RO directing the respondents to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors of USTFU.

In the meantime, appellants claimed that the new CBA w as purportedly ratified by an overwhelming majority of UST 's academic community. For this reason, appellants moved for the dismissal of what it denominated as appellees' petition for prohibition on the ground that this had become moot and academic. Petitioners appealed the med-arbiter's Decision to the labor secretary, who transmitted the records of the case to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Director Bitonio Jr. of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) affirmed the Decision of Med-Arbiter. The decision rendering the election of UST FU officers and its election results as null and void ab initio. Hence, this Petition. Issue: WoN the election of UST FU officers is null and void ab initio Held: Yes. At the outset, the Court stresses that National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Laguesma has held that challenges against rulings of the l abor secretary and those acting on his behalf, like the director of labor relations, shall be acted upon by the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari. However, inasmuch as the memoranda in the instant case have been filed prior to the promulgation and finality of our Decision in NFL, w e deem it proper to resolve the present controversy directly, instead of remanding it to the Court of Appeals. Having disposed of the foregoing procedural matter, we now tackle the issues in the present case seriatim. Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the Labor Code. Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection. Whether employed for a definite period or not, any employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day of service, for purposes of membership in a labor union. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union's constitution and bylaws. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that go with this new status and becomes bound by the union's rules and regulations.

Petitioners claim that the numerous anomalies allegedly committed by the private respondents during the latter's incumbency impelled the October 4, 1996 election of the new set of USTFU officers. They assert that such exercise w as pursuant to their right to self-organization. Petitioners' frustration over the performance of private respondents, as well as their fears of a "fraudulent" election to be held under the latter's supervision, could not justify the method they chose to impose their will on the union. Director Bitonio aptly elucidated: The constitutional right to self-organization is better understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and P rotection of Right to Organize), to which the Philippines is signatory. Article 3 of the Convention provides that w orkers' organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their representatives in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities. The freedom conferred by the provision is expansive; the responsibility imposed on union members to respect the constitution and rules they themselves draw up equally so. The point to be stressed is that the union's CBL is the fundamental law that governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers as well as the members are defined. It is the organic law that determines the validity of acts done by any officer or member of the union. Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals governed by mob rule. A union election is held pursuant to the union's constitution and bylaws, and the right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election. However, the reverse is not alw ays true; an employee belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a nonunion activity. The importance of a union's constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized. They embody a covenant betw een a union and its members

and constitute the fundamental law governing the members' rights and obligations. As such, the union's constitution and bylaws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or public policy. The ratification of the new CBA executed between the petitioners and the University of Santo T omas management did not validate the void October 4, 1996 election. Ratified were the terms of the new CBA, not the issue of union leadership a matter that should be decided only by union members in the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper procedures.

Additional 10 G.R. No. 110399 August 15, 1997 SAN M IGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION vs. LAGUESMA Facts: Petitioner union filed before DOLE a Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia P oultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fern ando and Otis. Med-Arbiter issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit. Respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter's error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis, Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature. The public respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent company's Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classificati on of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit. Upon petitioner-union's motion, Undersecretary Laguesma granted the reconsideration prayed for and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis. Respondent company, San Miguel Corporation Reconsideration with Motion to suspend proceedings. filed a Motion for

2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit. Held: 1. No. 2. Yes. Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The tw o criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aw are of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. "Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company's position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters." An important element of the "confidential employee rule" is the employee's need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee's necessary access to confidential labor relations information. It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned employees may handle will have to relate to their functions. From the foregoing functions, it can be gleaned that the confidential information said employees have access to concern the employer's internal business operations. As held in Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, "an employee may not be excluded from appropriate bargaining unit merely because he has access to confidential information concerning employer's internal business operations and which is not rel ated to the field of labor relations." It must be borne in mind that Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates the State to guarantee to "all" w orkers the right to self-organization. Hence, confidential employees who may be excluded from bargaining unit must be strictly defined so as not to needlessly deprive many employees of their right to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing.

An Order was issued by the public respondent granting the Motion and modifying the Decision of this Office to the extent that employees under supervisory levels 3 and 4 (S3 and S4) and the so-called exempt employees are not allowed to join the proposed bargaining unit and are therefore excluded from those who could participate in the certification election. Hence this petition. Issue: 1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."

Additional 11 G.R. No. L-77415 June 29, 1989 ASIAN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. FERRER CALLEJA Facts: Petitioner Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation (ADMACOR) is a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the law s of the Philippines. It operates a rattan furniture factory at Maguikay, Mandaue City, Cebu. Upon petition of Buklod ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP ), one of several labor unions at ADMACOR'S factory, the Labor Relations Division, (Cebu City) ordered a certification election to be conducted on May 21, 1986, a regular business day. Several factory w orkers of ADMACOR held a strike. No previous notice of strike was filed by the factory workers with the Bureau of Labor Relations. ADMACOR filed a petition for the indefinite resetting of the scheduled certification election, which petition w as not acted upon by the Labor Relations Division. The scheduled certification election w as conducted, despite the strike. Of the 423 workers who voted, 413 voted for Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SP FL) as their exclusive bargaining agent. On the same day, ADMACOR filed a complaint for illegal strike and for illegal picketing with the Regional Arbitration, Cebu City. ADMACOR filed a petition to declare the certification election conducted on May 21, 1986 as null and void on the ground that there being a strike by some w orkers in the premises of the factory on the day of the certification election, such day cannot be considered a regular business day. The Med-Arbiter dismissed ADMACOR's complaint to annul the May 21, 1986 certification election and certified SPFL as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of ADMACOR. This dismissal w as appealed by ADMACOR to the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau) by w ay of a motion for reconsideration. The Concerned Workers Association of ADMACOR filed a motion for intervention in the case appealed to the Bureau. The public respondent Pura Ferrer-Calleja acting as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed the appeal of ADMACOR and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. The motion for intervention filed by the Concerned Workers Association of ADMACOR w as denied for having been filed after the actual certification election had already been conducted. The motion for reconsideration of the resolution w as also denied. These two resolutions are assailed in this petition for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Meanwhile, on a decision on the twin complaints for illegal strike and illegal picketing was rendered by Labor Arbiter declaring the strike against ADMACOR as illegal. In this petition, ADMACOR questions the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Bureau) to resolve or determine the factual and legal basis of a strike in relation to the question of representation of employees. Issue: WoN the certification election is null and void Held: No. Indeed, the question involving the legality of the strike which w as conducted against ADMACOR is an independent issue, the resolution of which pertains to the Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, the issue of the validity of the certification election pertains solely to the Bureau of Labor Relations, originally, the Med-Arbiter and by w ay of appeal, to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. However, We find no overlapping by the Bureau of the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter on the question of legality, or illegality of the complained strike. The allegation that the Bureau assumed on its own an implied determination of said issue is belied by the fact that the assailed resolutions of respondent Director confined itself to the issue of the validity of the certification election. There w as nothing in the assailed resolutions which contain any conclusion or ruling by the Bureau that the alleged strike w as legal or illegal. What w as resolved was whether or not there w as compliance with the procedural requirement set by Section 2, Rule VI, Book VI of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code that the election shall be set during a regular business day. In answer to petition's contention that there being a strike on May 21, 1986, the day the certification election w as held, said day cannot be considered a regular business day, the respondent Director ruled: The alleged strike and/or picketing of some employees at the company's premises which coincided with the actual conduct of certification election might, perhaps have affected the actual performance of works by some employees, but did not necessarily make said date an irregular business day of the company to go against the aforesaid Rule. We agree with the said ruling of respondent Director upholding the validity of the certification election despite the strike. In the first place, since petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Bureau when it filed its election protest before the Med-Arbiter, it cannot now be allowed to repudiate the same jurisdiction after failing to obtain affirmative relief. Moreover, it can not be denied that an

actual election was conducted on said date where, of the 423 w orkers who voted, 413 voted for SPFL as its exclusive bargaining agent. In the "Minutes of the Certification Election among the Rank and File Employees of Asian Design Manufacturing Corp.", the representatives of the contending unions, and of the Ministry of Labor even attested that the election was peaceful and orderly (pp. 79-83, Rollo) and none of the parties registered any protest on any matter concerning the election proceedings. There is thus, no valid reason to annul the certification election. On the pretext that the issue deposited in this petition is the lack of jurisdiction of the Bureau in dismissing its protest against the certification election despite the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter on the validity of the strike, petitioner seeks exception to the rule that an employer has no standing to question a certification election. We reiterate the rule that such concern over the validity of certification election must come from the employees themselves.

Additional 12 DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v Sec of Labor Facts: Med-Arbiter certified the Divine Word University Employees Union (DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. The University replied and requested a preliminary conference. However, two days before the scheduled conference, DWUEUs resigned vice -president Mr. Urmeneta w rote a letter addressed to the University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the preliminary conference w as cancelled. After almost three years, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated Labor Union, requested a conference with the University for the purpose of continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. Not having heard from the University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow -up letter reiterating its request for a conference and w arning the University against committing acts of interference through its various meetin gs with both the academic and nonacademic employees regarding their union affiliation and activities. Despite the letter, the University persisted in maintaining silence. DWUEU-ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts, specifically, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on (sic) employees. The conferences which were held after the filing of the notice of strike led to the conclusion of an agreement betw een the University and DWUEU-ALU. However, it turned out that an hour before the agreement w as concluded, the University had filed a petition for certification election with the office of the Department of Labor and Employment. On the other hand, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University. Thereafter, through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), marathon conciliation conferences were conducted but to no avail. Hence, then Secretary of Labor Drilon, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directing all striking w orkers to report back to w ork within twenty-four (24) hours and the management to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the w ork stoppage. The Secretary also designated the NCMB to hear the case and to submit its report thereon. On the same day, Med-Arbiter acting on the Universitys petition for certification election, issued an Order directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and no union, after he found the petition to be well -supported in fact and in law. Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an

urgent motion seeking to enjoin Milado from further acting on the matter of the certification election. The Labor Secretary granted said motion and directed Milado to hold in abeyance any and all certification electi on proceedings at the University pending the resolution of the labor dispute. The Labor Secretarys Order where the issue of strong disagreement among the parties on the question of representation was deemed subsumed in the labor dispute certified for compulsory arbitration. The NCMB conducted hearings on the case. Divine Word University Independent Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which w as registered earlier that day, filed a motion for intervention alleging that it had at least 20% of the rank and file employees of the University. The Secretary consolidated the entire labor dispute including all incidents arising therefrom, or necessarily related thereto in his Order and the following cases were subsumed or consolidated to the labor dispute. " The same Order dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU -ALU for unfair labor practice on the ground of the unions failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor practice acts specifically complained of but also the complaint filed by the University for unfair labor practices and illegal strike for obvious lack of merit brought about by its utter failure to submit evidence The said Order pronounced as untenable the University's claim that the assumption Order earlier issued by the Office of the Secretary of Labor merely held in abeyance the holding of a certification election and that the representation issue w as not deemed consolidated by virtue of the said assumption Order. The University filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Order. It w as opposed by the DWUEU-ALU. However, since the DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with violation of the return -towork order of the Secretary of Labor and unfair labor practices such as dismissal of union officers, coercion of employees and illegal suspension, the Office of the Secretary called for a series of conciliation and mediation conferences between the parties. At the conference, the University agreed to submit its proposals on how to settle amicably the labor dispute. On said date, however, the University failed to appear. Instead, its representative phoned in a request for the resetting of the conference purportedly because its Board of Directors had failed to muster a quorum. Hence, after so informing ALUs Eastern Visayas Vice- P resident, the conference w as rescheduled. The University once again failed to appear. In view of the Universitys intransigence, the DWUEU -ALU pursued its second notice of strike. Four days later, the University filed with the Of fice of the Secretary of Labor a motion praying that said Office assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration on the

ground that the strike affected not only the University but also its other academic and non-academic employees, the students and their parents. The Office of the Secretary of Labor received a Resolution passed by the students of the University urging said Offices assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the earliest resolution of the case. Consequently, Secretary Drilon issued an Order reiterating the Order which assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. He ordered all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours and the University to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment; deemed the issues raised in the notice of strike as subsumed in this case; ordered the Director of Regional Office to hear the issues raised in said notice of strike and to submit his findings and recommendations within ten days from submission of the case by the parties, and enjoined the parties to cease and desist from any act that may aggravate the employer -employee relationship. Acting Secretary of Labor, dismissed for lack of merit the Universitys motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Order. He noted the fact that the collective bargaining proposals of the DWUEU had not been validly withdrawn as the unions Vice - P resident had resigned and the withdrawal w as signed only by three of the eight members of the Executive Board of said union. Granting that the withdrawal w as valid, the Acting Secretary believed that it did not exculpate the University from the duty to bargain with the Union because the collective bargaining processes had been set in motion fro m the time the CBA proposals w as (sic) received by the University until the impasse took place on account of its failure to reply to the Unions letters pursuing its CBA P roposals. On the Universitys assertion that no negotiations took place insofar as the collective bargaining proposals are concerned, the Acting Secretary found that: The records indicate otherwise Conciliation meetings were conducted precisely to discuss the CBA proposals the Union submitted to the University. As a matter of fact, the University admitted the existence of the deadlock when a provision w as incorporated in the agreement. On account of the deadlock regarding the CBA proposals, it w as agreed that the Union submit a renewed CBA proposal which it did. The records indicate that no response w as made by the University. The uncooperative posture of the University to respond and continue with the negotiations could very well be explained when one (1) hour prior to the start of the conciliation, the University filed a Petition for Certification with (sic) Regional Office. The surreptitious filing of the petition and at the same time cunningly entering into an agreement which required the Union to submit a renewed CBA proposal, is patently negotiating in bad faith. The University should have candidly and timely raised the issue of representation, if it believed that such issue was valid, not by entering into an agreement. The Agreement only served to falsely heighten the expectations of the Union and this Office that a

mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute was in the offing. This Office cannot tolerate such ac tuations by the University. The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement and for its reluctance and subscription to legal delay, the University should be declared in default. He also maintained that since under the circumsta nces the University cannot claim deprivation of due process, the Office of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully impose the Unions collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio. On the Universitys contention that the motion for intervention of the DWU-IFEU w as not resolved, the Acting Secretary ruled that said motion w as in effect denied when the petition for certification election filed by the University w as dismissed in the Order. Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition. Issue: WoN the orders of Sec. Drilon were violative of the constitutional right of employees to self-organization which includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining." Held: No. In this regard, petitioners undue interest in the resolution of the DWU -IFEUs motion for intervention becomes significant since a certification election is the sole concern of employees except where the employer itself has to file a petition for certification election. But once an employer has filed said petition, as the petitioner did in this case, its active role ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Any uncalled-for concern on the part of the employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company union. An employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except upon a clear showing that one of these tw o instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result or (b) w hen a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. While there is no question that the petition for certification election w as filed by the herein petitioner after almost four years from the time of the certification election and, therefore, there is no question as to the timeliness of the petition, the problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists. A deadlock is defined as the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill. There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the

action of equal and opposed forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature. The word is synonymous with the word impasse which, within the meanin g of the American federal labor laws, presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties. A thorough study of the records reveals that there w as no reasonable effor t at good faith bargaining specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude tow ards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement.

Addtl 13 G.R. No. 98363. June 15, 1992. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMM ISSION Facts: Private respondent Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) had four (4) Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) with petitioner Nestl Philippines, Inc. covering four (4) bargaining units of the latter, namely: (1) Makati, (2) Alabang/Cabuyao, (3) Cebu/Davao and (4) Cagayan de Oro. These CBAs were to expire on 30 June 1987. P rior to such expiration, both UFE-DFA and Nestl negotiating panels met to draft the ground rules for the negotiation of new CBAs, the agreement on the said rules was eventually signed . After sixteen (16) negotiation meetings, the UFE-DFA panel declared a deadlock. Then Secretary Franklin Drilon of the Department of Labor and Employment issued an Order enjoining the UFE-DFA from resorting to any strike and directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that w ould aggravate the situation. This notwithstanding, UFE-DFA, declared and staged a strike at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro work locations of Nestl. Nestl deemed the strike illegal and terminated from employment all the union officers for allegedly instigating the same and knowingly participating in it. UFE-DFA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Even before the case was decided, the striking officers and members of UFE-DFA voluntarily and unconditionally offered to return to work Nestl admitted all the striking employees, except eighty-three (83) officers and thirty-three (33) members, included in this number are the twenty-eight (28) individual private respondents The said employees were issued separate letters of termination by Nestl. The UFE-DFA and the herein 28 individual private respondents filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, Manila, a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, reinstatement to former or substantially equivalent positions and damages. One of the issues raised by herein petitioners in their Position P aper is improper venue. They allege that under Section 1, Rule V of the new Rules of the NLRC, all cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) having jurisdiction over the w orkplace of the complainant. Since 13 of the 20 individual complainants were employed in the Cagayan de Oro plant and 9 were employed in the Cabuyao plant of Nestl, venue then w as improperly laid insofar as they are concerned. The complaints should have been filed in the RAB in Cagayan de Oro City and in the RAB in Region IV. After the submission of the Position P apers, a hearing on the merits w as conducted by Executive Labor Arbiter. As observed by the public respondent NLRC, petitioners herein "participated, without reservation, in the hearings on the merit of this case before the ELA, where no less than three of the

complainants witnesses had already given their testimonies, and they (respondents) even reserved their right to cross-examine later said witnesses." Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that venue is improperly laid, to which herein private respondents filed an Opposition. Petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition and the private respondents filed a Rejoinder. Executive Labor Arbiter Guanio handed down an Order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appealed this order to the public Respondent. P ublic respondent promulgated a resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioners has waived the defense of improper venue. Their motion for the reconsideration of the resolution having been denied. Petitioners filed the instant petition. Issue: WoN the case should be dismissed because of improper venue. Held: No. We agree with the public respondent that petitioners w aived the defense of improper venue. Although petitioners invoked the said ground in their P osition P aper, they did not pursue it with the diligence of a party confidently if not absolutely, certain of the indubitability of his defense. One who is so would incur no delay in pursuing the defense to end the litigation and prevent further waste of precious time and expense. In this case, it w as only four (4) months later and after they had participated, with neither qualification nor condition, in the hearing on the merits of the case, and more specifically in the reception of the testimonies of three (3) witnesses for the herein private respondents, that they belatedly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It is settled that objections to the venue are deemed w aived if a defendant, inter alia, submits through conduct manifesting satisfaction with the same until after the trial or abides by it until the matter has proceeded to a hearing. This belated aw akening from deep slumber and deafening silence deserves no sympathy but, rather, condemnation as it is a crude legal maneuver, grounded on pure technicality and unfavorable to labor, designed to delay the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. The rule on the construction of labor laws abhors it. Our reading of the Revised Rules of the NLRC further reveals that no motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue may be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceedings. When juxtaposed with paragraph (c), Section 1, Rule V, hereinafter quoted and which speaks merely of improper venue not objected to before or at the time of the filing of the position paper, the

intention of the Rules to exclude improper venue as a ground for a motion to dismiss and to consider it as a mere formal procedural defect appears indubitable. Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." Section 2, Rule I of the Revised Rules of the NLRC provides: "These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution and the Labor Code of the Philippines and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expedi tious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes." We agree with private respondents that since paragraph (a) of the abovequoted Section speaks of the complainant/petitioners workplace, it is evident that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. The reason for this is not only convenience, it is economic as well. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and his adverse party must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to overburden the former. This being the case, the worker may w aive the benefit. It must be stressed, however, that this section does not constitute a complete rule on venue in cases cognizable by Labor Arbiters. For one, it cannot apply to instances where the complainants are labor unions or where a single act of an employer gives rise to a common cause of action to many of its employees working in different branches or w orkplaces of the former. In such instances, recourse should be made to the Rules of Court which, pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the Revised Rules of the NLRC, has suppletory application. The more appropriate rule on venue under the Rules of Court is paragraph (b), Section 2, Rul e 4 thereof. It is not denied that Nestl has its principal office in the National Capital Region. It is likewise admitted that the UFE-DFA and six (6) of the individual complainants are residents in areas within the National Capital Region. All of the indi vidual private respondents are members of the UFE-DFA. All are aggrieved by the decision of Nestl to dismiss them. Under the aforequoted rule, the case may be filed with the RAB, NCR, or with the RAB of either Cagayan de Oro City (Region X) or the RAB of Region IV. The application of this rule in this case would be the most logical step to take to prevent multiplicity of suits which w ould only delay and render expensive the settlement of the dispute in violation of the basic rules of construction set forth in Section 2, Rule I of the Revised Rules of the NLRC.

Addtl addtl 1 G.R. Nos. 64821-23 January 29, 1993 UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION vs. NLRC Facts: On various dates, petitioner filed the following complaints against the University of Pangasinan before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC in Dagupan City: 1. for nonpayment of benefits and emergency cost of living allow ance (ecola) to part-time teachers, and for prompt and accurate computation of benefits and the payment of ecolas; 2. for nonpayment of all ecolas to instructors; 3. for nonpayment of ecolas, and extra loads during typhoons "Nitang" and "Osang"; 4. for nonpayment of extra loads on (Anniversary celebration); 5. for nonpayment of all ecolas to faculty members who were also members of the union; 6. for violation of Wage Order No. 1 and delayed payment of salaries; and 7. for nonpayment of salary differentials for summer The Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the petitioner's complaints for violation of certain labor standards law s but requiring respondent university to integrate the cost of living allowance into the basic pay of the covered employees and reminding it to pay its employees at intervals not exceeding sixteen (16) days. The petitioner appealed the said decision to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WoN the mandamus must be granted. Held: No. As succinctly provided in this section, anyone who wishes to avail of the remedy of mandamus must state in a verified petition "the facts with certainty." On account of this requirement, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases and showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner is required. Indeed, while the labor arbiter is duty bound to resolve all complaints referred to him for arbitration and, therefore, he may be compelled by mandamus to decide them (although not in any particular way or in favor of anyone), we find that the peculiar circumstances in this case do not merit the issuance of the writ of mandamus. Petitioner's contention that the cases filed by Consuelo Abad as its president should affect, not only herself, but all the other union members similarly situated as she was, is well taken. The uncontroverted allegation of the

petitioner is that it is the holder of Registration Certificate No. 9865-C, having been registered with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. As such, petitioner possessed the legal personality to sue and be sued under its registered name. Corollarily, its president, Consuelo Abad, correctly filed the complaints even if some of them involved rights and interest purely or exclusively appertaining to individual employees, it appearing that she signed the complaints "for and in behalf of the University of Pangasinan Faculty Union." The University's contention that petitioner had no legal personality to institute and prosecute money claims must, therefore, fail. To quote then Associate Justice Teehankee in Heirs of T eodelo M. Cruz v. CIR, "[w ]hat should be borne in mind is that the interest of the individual w orker can be better protected on the whole by a strong union aw are of its moral and legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for them the best w ages and working terms and conditions. . . . Although this w as stated within the context of collective bargaining, it applies equally well to cases, such as the present wherein the union, through its president, presented its individual members' grievances through proper proceedings. W hile the complaints might not have disclosed the identities of the individual employees claiming monetary benefits, such technical defect should not be taken against the claimants, especially because the University appears to have failed to demand a bill of particulars during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. But more apropos is the ruling of this Court in University of P angasinan Faculty Union v. University of P angasinan and NLRC, a case involving the same parties as in the instant petition and dealing with a complaint filed by the petitioner seeking, among others, the payment of emergency cost of living allowances for a semestral break. The Court held therein: . . . The "No w ork, no pay" principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioner's members received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the . . . law that it contemplates a "no w ork" situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, certainly do not, ad voluntatem absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from w ork. For this, they cannot be faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law. To a certain extent, the private respondent can specif y dates when no classes would be held. Surely, it was not the intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to withhold employee benefits by the simple expedient of unilaterally imposing "no work" days and consequently avoiding compliance with the mandate of the law for those days.

Addtl addtl 2 G.R. No. 88957 June 25, 1992 PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs. NLRC Facts: PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of six (6) CBAs with private respondent Philips Employees Organization -FFW (P EO-FFW), a registered labor union and the certified bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of P IDI. In the first CBA, the supervisors referred to in R.A. No. 875, confidential employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales representatives w ere excluded from the bargaining unit. In the second to the fifth CBAs, the sales force, confidential employees and heads of small units, together with the managerial employees, temporary employees and security personnel, were specifically excluded from the bargaining unit. The confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management and the Personnel Department. In the sixth CBA, it w as agreed upon, among others, that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration. P ursuant thereto, P EO-FFW filed a petition before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) praying for an order "directing the parties to select a voluntary arbitrator in accordance with its rules and regulati ons." As the parties failed to agree on a voluntary arbitrator, the BLR endorsed the petition to the Executive Labor Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 228 of the Labor Code. Labor Arbiter Amansec rendered a decision ordering the respondent to conduct a referendum to determine the will of the service engineers, sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit. It is hereby declared that the Division Secretaries and all Staff of general management, personnel and industrial relations department, secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees and as such are hereby deemed excluded in the bargaining unit. PEO-FFW appealed from the decision to the NLRC. NLRC rendered the questioned decision, setting asidebthe appealed decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and declaring respondent company's Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file bargaining unit.

Its motion for the reconsideration of this decision having been denied by the NLRC, petitioner PIDI filed the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the subject employees may be part of the existing bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI. Held: Yes. Even if the issue w as, indeed, as perceived by the NLRC, still, a palpable error w as committed by it in ruling that under the law, all w orkers, except managerial employees and security personnel, are qualified to join a union, or form part of a bargaining unit. At the time Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-11-0393687 w as filed in 1987, security personnel were no longer disqualified from joining or forming a union. On the main issue raised before Us, it is quite obvious that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter and in decreeing that P IDI's "Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file bargaining unit." In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force personnel, are confidential employees. Their classification as such is not seriously disputed by PEO-FFW; the five (5) previous CBAs betw een PIDI and P EO-FFW explicitly considered them as confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to them. As regards the service engineers and the sales representatives, tw o (2) points which respondent NLRC likewise arbitrarily and erroneously ruled upon agreed to be discussed. Firstly, in holding that they are included in the bargaining unit for the rank and file employees of PIDI, the NLRC practically forced them to become members of P EO-FFW or to be subject to its sphere of influence, it being the certified bargaining agent for the subject bargaining unit. This violates, obstructs, impairs and impedes the service engineers' and the sales representatives' constitutional right to form unions or associations and to self-organization.

G.R. Nos. 43633-34 September 14, 1990 ARIZALA vs. COURT OF APPEALS Under the Industrial Peace Act, government-owned or controlled corporations had the duty to bargain collectively and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private sector. The Act also prohibited supervisors to become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees, and prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition. It w as under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that the GSIS became bound by a collective bargaining agreement executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-membership" clause, i.e., that all employees who, at the time of the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or became members thereafter, were obliged to maintain their union membership in good standing for the duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued employment in the GSIS. There appears to be no dispute that at that time, the petitioners occupied supervisory positions in the GSIS. P ablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao w ere, respectively, the Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section of said Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant Chief of the Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their supervisory positions. They refused to do so. Consequently, tw o (2) criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu. Both criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the accused in separate decisions. They appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeals were consolidated on motion of the appellants, and eventuated in a judgment affirming the convictions of all four appellants. The appellants moved for reconsideration. They argued that when the so called "1973 Constitution" took effect, the case of Arizala and Maribao w as still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated, repealing the Industrial Peace Actplaced employees of all categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall within the coverage of the

Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation thereof. They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer appeared in the Labor Code. The Appellate Court denied their plea for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Issue: whether or not the petitioners' criminal liability for a violation of the Industrial P eace Act may be deemed to have been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and the provisions of the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Held: But EO 111 restored the right to organize and to negotiate and bargain of employees of "government corporations established under the Corporation Code." And EO 180, and apparently RA 6715, too, granted to all government employees the right of collective bargaining or negotiation except as regards those terms of their employment which were fixed by law; and as to said terms fixed by law, they were prohibited to strike to obtain changes thereof. The petitioners appear to be correct in their view of the disappearance from the law of the prohibition on supervisors being members of labor organizations composed of employees under their supervision. The Labor Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. And under the Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors who were members of existing labor organizations on the effectivity of said RA 6715 were explicitly authorized to "remain therein." The correctness of the petitioners' theory that unfair labor practices ceased to be crimes and w ere deemed merely administrative offenses in virtue of the Labor Code, cannot be gainsaid. Article 250 of the Labor Code did provide as follows: ART. 250. Concept of unfair labor practice.-The concept of unfair labor practice is hereby modified. Henceforth, it shall be considered merely as an administrative offense rather than a criminal offense. Unfair labor practice complaints shall, therefore, be processed like any ordinary labor disputes. But unfair labor practices were declared to be crimes again by later amendments of the Labor Code effected by Batas P ambansa Blg. 70, approved on May 1, 1980. As thus amended, the Code now pertinently reads as follows: ART. 248. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prose cution thereof. Unfair labor practices violate the right of w orkers and employees to self organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, and hinder

the promotion of healthy and stable labor management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also offenses against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided. xxx xxx xxx

Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil Code. No criminal prosecution under this title may be instituted without a final judgment, finding that an unfair labor practice was committed having been first obtained in the preceding paragraph. ... The decisive consideration is that at present, supervisors who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, are authorized to "remain therein." It seems plain, in other words, that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present law. T o the same effect and in even more unmistakable language is P eople v. Almuete where the defendants-appellees were charged under section 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended (the Agricultural Land Tenancy Law of 1954) which penalized pre-threshing by either agricultural tenant or his landlord. They sought and secured a dismissal on the ground, among others, that there w as no law punishing the act charged-a reference to the fact that Republic Act No. 1199 had already been superseded by the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 which instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain conditions. On appeal by the Government, this Court upheld the dismissal, saying: The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal

G.R. No. 79025. December 29, 1989. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. HON. PURA FERRERCALLEJA Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter referred to as BWLU- ADLO) filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of BENECO at Alapang, La Trinidad, Benguet alleging, inter alia, that BENECO has in its employ two hundred and fourteen (214) rank and file employees; that one hundred and ninety-eight (198) or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of the petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative. An opposition to the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union (BELU) contending that it was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are tw o cases it filed against BENECO involving bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any representation question. BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron -consumers in the City of Baguio and Benguet P rovince; and, that the employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the cooperative. The med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition for certification election. However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of petitioner who are non -members thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. BELU and BENECO appealed from this order but the same was dismissed for lack of merit. Whereupon BENECO filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and /or restraining order, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit. The ordered certification election w as held. P rior to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote when . . . they are not eligible to be members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification election." Petitioner submitted a certification showing that only four (4) employees are not members of BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass of the votes showed that BELU garnered forty-nine (49) of the eighty-three (83) "valid" votes cast.

Thereafter BENECO formalized its verbal manifestation by filing a P rotest. Finding, among others, that the issue as to whether or not memberconsumers who are employees of BENECO could form, assist or join a labor union has been answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court, the medarbiter dismissed the protest. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) director P ura Ferrer-Calleja affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of BENECO. BENECO filed the instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not respondent BELU should be the sole and exclusive bargaining representtative of the rank and file employees of BENECO. Held: The issue of whether or not employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining has already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer Calleja, et al. [G.R. No. 7795, September 26,1988] and reiterated in the cases ofBatangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al. [G.R. Nos. 62386, 70880 and 74560 November 9, 1988] and San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. [G.R. No. 77231, May 31, 1989] wherein the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who are neither members nor co-owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self -organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the 1987 Constitution and applicable statutes. The above contentions are untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the members-employees of petitioner do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The Court's ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining w as based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners." [Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, et al., supra]. It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual management of the cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining. The above contention of respondent union is based on the errone ous

presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and privileges given to ordinary corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other privileges not granted to the latter [See Sections 4, 5, 6, and 8, Pres. Decree No. 175; Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra]. Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights and obligations different from those of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the special nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining. It is important to note that, in her order dated September 2, 1985, medarbiter Elnora V. Balleras made a specific finding that there are only thirtyseven (37) employees of petitioner who are not members of the cooperative and who are, therefore, the only employees of petitioner cooperative eligible to form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining [Annex "A" of the Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 22]. However, the minutes of the certification election [Annex "C" of the Petition: Rollo, p. 28] show that a total of eightythree (83) employees were allowed to vote and of these, forty-nine (49) voted for respondent union. Thus, even if We agree with respondent union's contention that the thirty seven (37) employees who were originally non members of the cooperative can still vote in the certification election since they were only "forced and compelled to join the cooperative on pain of disciplinary action," the certification election held on October 1, 1986 is still null and void since even those who w ere already members of the cooperative at the time of the issuance of the med-arbiter's order, and therefore cannot claim that they were forced to join the union were allowed to vote in the election.

Addtl addtl 5 G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA In this special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks the nullification of the Order of Director P ura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations holding that "professors, associate professors and assistant professors (of the University of the Philippines) are . . rank-and-file employees . . ;" consequently, they should, together with the so-called non-academic, non-teaching, and all other employees of the University, be represented by only one labor organization. The University is joined in this undertaking by the Solicitor General who "has taken a position not contrary to that of petitioner and, in fact, has manifested . . that he is not opposing the petition . . ." The case w as initiated in the Bureau of Labor Relations by a petition filed by a registered labor union, the "Organizati on of Non-Academic Personnel of UP" (ONAPUP ). Claiming to have a membership of 3,236 members comprising more than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non -academic personnel of UP -Diliman, Los Baos, Manila, and Visayas, it sought the holding of a certification election among all said non -academic employees of the University of the Philippines. At a conference thereafter held in the Bureau, the University stated that it had no objection to the election. Another registered labor union, the "All UP Workers' Union," filed a comment, as intervenor in the certification election proceeding. Alleging that its membership covers both academic and non -academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file employees in one union, it declared its assent to the holding of the election provided the appropriate organizational unit was first clearly defined. It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and P rofessional Staff (REPS), who are academic non teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit. For its part, the University, through its General Counsel, made of record its view that there should be two (2) unions: one for academic, the other for non academic or administrative, personnel considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules governing these employee groups. Director Calleja ruled on the matter. She declared that "the appropriate organizational unit . . should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the University of the Philippines, including all its branches" and that there w as no sufficient evidence "to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative personnel into an organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or teaching personnel." The Director thus commanded that a certification election be "conducted

among rank-and-file employees, teaching and non -teaching" in all four autonomous campuses of the UP, and that management appear and bring Copies of the corresponding payrolls for January, June, and July, 1990 at the "usual pre-election conference . . ." At the pre-election conference, the University sought further clarification of the coverage of the term, "rank-and-file" personnel, asserting that not every employee could properly be embraced within both teaching and non -teaching categories since there are those whose positions are in truth managerial and policy-determining, and hence, excluded by law. At a subsequent hearing, the University filed a Manifestation seeking the exclusion from the organizational unit of those employees holding supervisory positions among non-academic personnel, and those in teaching staff with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher. The ONAPUP quite categorically made of record its posi tion; that it w as not opposing the University's proferred classification of rank-and file employees. On the other hand, the "All UP Workers' Union" opposed the University's view, in a P osition P aper presented by it. Director Calleja subsequently promulgated an Order resolving the "sole issue" of "whether or not professors, associate professors and assistant professors are included in the definition of high -level employee(s)" in light of Rule I, Section (1) of the Implementing Guidelines of Executive Order No. 180. The Director adjudged that said teachers are rank-and-file employees "qualified to join unions and vote in certification elections." The University seasonably moved for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration w as denied. Issues: 1. whether or not professors, associate professors and assistant professors are "high-level employees" "whose functions are normally considered policy determining, managerial or . . highly confidential in nature." 2. whether or not, they, and other employees performing academic functions, should comprise a collective bargaining unit distinct and different from that consisting of the non-academic employees of the University, considering the dichotomy of interests, conditions and rules existing between them. Held: 1. Yes. 2. Yes. As regards the first issue, the Court is satisfied that it has been correctly

resolved by the respondent Director of Bureau Relations. In light of Executive Order No. 180 and its implementing rules, as well as the University's charter and relevant regulations, the professors, associate professors and assistant professors (hereafter simply referred to as professors) cannot be considered as exercising such managerial or highly confidential functions as w ould justify their being categorized as "high-level employees" of the institution. From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic Personnel Committee, composed of deans, the assistant for academic affairs and the chief of personnel, which formulates the policies, rules and standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff. The departmental and college academic personnel committees' functions are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to review and evaluation by the University Academic Personnel Board. Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the status of high-level employees. Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining functions through the University Council, still such exercise w ould not qualify them as high-level employees within the context of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by private respondent, "Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be construed within that context. Within that context, the University of the P hilippines represents the government as an employer. 'P olicy-determining' refers to policydetermination in university mattes that affect those same matters that may be the subject of negotiation between public sector management and labor. The reason why 'policy-determining' has been laid down as a test in segregating rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in areas that are still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves become part of those employees who seek to change these policies for their collective welfare." A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. Our labor laws do not however provide the criteria for determining the proper collective bargaining unit. The Court further explained that "(t)he test of the grouping is community or mutuality of interests. And this is so because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights' (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 490)." Hence, in that case, the Court upheld the trial court's conclusion that two separate

bargaining units should be formed, one consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores. Since then, the "community or mutuality of interests" test has provided the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. In Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company, et al. vs. Alhambra Employees' Association (PAFLU), 107 Phil. 23, the Court, noting that the employees in the administrative, sales and dispensary departments of a cigar and cigarette manufacturing firm perform work which have nothing to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw lead (malalasi), cigar, cigarette, packing (precintera) and engineering and garage departments, authorized the formation of the former set of employees into a separate collective bargaining unit. The ruling in the Democratic Labor Association case, supra, w as reiterated in Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Unit vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 110 Phil. 176, where casual employees were barred from joining the union of the permanent and regular employees.