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Terrorism and Political Violence

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Beyond Belief: Islamist Strategic Thinking and International Relations Theory


David Martin Jonesa; M. L. R. Smithb a School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia b Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, London, UK Online publication date: 09 March 2010

To cite this Article Jones, David Martin and Smith, M. L. R.(2010) 'Beyond Belief: Islamist Strategic Thinking and

International Relations Theory', Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 2, 242 266 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/09546550903472286 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550903472286

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Terrorism and Political Violence, 22:242266, 2010 Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 online DOI: 10.1080/09546550903472286

Beyond Belief: Islamist Strategic Thinking and International Relations Theory


DAVID MARTIN JONES
School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia

M. L. R. SMITH
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Department of War Studies, Kings College, University of London, London, UK


The development of radical Islamist strategic thinking and the impact of post-modern, Western styles of thought upon the ideology that informs that strategy is often overlooked in conventional discussions of homegrown threats from jihadist militants. The propensity to discount the ideology informing both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements with an analogous political philosophy like Hizb ut-Tahrir neglects the influence that critical Western modes of thought exercise upon their strategic thinking especially in the context of homegrown radicalization. Drawing selectively on non-liberal tendencies in the Western ideological canon has, in fact, endowed Khilaafaism (caliphism) with both a distinctive theoretical style and strategic practice. In particular, it derives intellectual sustenance from a post-Marxist Frankfurt School of critical thinking that in combination with an English School of international relations idealism holds that epistemological claims are socially determined, subjective, and serve the interests of dominant power relations. This critical, normative, and constructivist approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also to transcend it. This transformative agenda bears comparison with radical Islamist critiques of Western ontology and is of interest to Islamisms political and strategic thinking. In this regard, the relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s not only reflect a loss of faith in Western values in a way that undermines the prospects for a liberal and pluralist polity, but also, through a critical process facilitated by much international relations orthodoxy, promotes the strategic and ideological agenda of radical Islam. It is this curious strategic and ideological evolution that this paper explores. Keywords caliphism, critical terrorism studies, Hizb ut-Tahrir, international relations, Islamism, strategy

Since the bombing attacks launched on the transport systems in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005, and the discovery of similar plots between 2005 and 2007 in
Dr. David Martin Jones is an associate professor in the School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland. Dr. M. L. R. Smith is a professor of Strategic Theory, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University of London. Address correspondence to M. L. R. Smith, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University of London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK. E-mail: mike.smith@ac.uk

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Toronto, New York, Sydney, Melbourne, Copenhagen, and Frankfurt, Western governments increasingly recognize that homegrown Islamist radicalization represents a profound threat to open, liberal, secular, Western societies. Peter Neumann, for example, argues that Europe has developed into the nerve centre of global jihad,1 whilst others have noted that every major attack launched under the auspices of al-Qaeda, even before 9=11, has had some link to Europe.2 David Kilcullen contends that Europe is both a site of conflict that jihadists exploit, and the source of intellectual capital that increasingly performs a cadre function for promoting both global and local jihadism.3 Having established the threat that this polymorphous phenomenon poses, analysts subsequently emphasize the social practices of recruitment amongst deracinated second generation migrants via informal networks that penetrate formerly moderate Muslim community organizations, university societies, or a more captive audience in Western prisons. Curiously, it has also become orthodox amongst scholars to see only a limited connection between the radical ideology of Islamism and the practice of jihadist subversion.4 After the publication of Robert Papes Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,5 a literature has emerged that considers the ideology that motivates radical groups seeking to redefine the international and domestic order, often by violent means, as merely a secondary concern. Scholars, following Pape, have come to identify a range of grievances that, in the case of homegrown radicalization, range from alienation from the broader community, socio-economic marginalization, to resentment generated by the general conduct of Western foreign policy. In this context, a report by the New York Police Departments intelligence division in 2007 identified four stages in the process of radicalization. The worrying proliferation of homegrown networks possessed a membership remarkable, the report concluded, only for its unremarkability.6 Indeed, David Kilcullen, a leading proponent of contemporary counterinsurgency thinking exemplifies the prevailing tendency to negate the relationship between ideology and Islamist strategic practice.7 Kilcullen, for example, considers the group Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Europe based movement publishing in London, to be pursuing a classic insurrectionist approach to gaining power initially through subversive means short of force.8 Nevertheless, he conspicuously dismisses the Islamist ideology informing the movement and others like them, maintaining instead that the sociological characteristics of immigrant populations represent the central factor explaining contemporary threats rather than Islamic theology.9 This understanding holds, therefore, that in the practice of recruitment to informal Islamist terror networks radical Islamic theology per se has little functional relationship with violence.10 Interestingly, moreover, this evolving orthodoxy receives support from a somewhat unexpected source that renders this mainstream understanding academically plausible: namely, a radical and intellectually fashionable critical international relations theory, which similarly rejects the notion that Islamist ideology, or Muslim religion, plays a major role in either homegrown or Middle Eastern militancy. It further contends that terrorist resistance is the inevitable consequence of a post-Cold War, state-based, and U.S.-imposed violent peace. How, we might wonder, has this critical understanding of international relations that inhabits what Mark Lilla terms the foggy archipelago of cuttingedge social science11 come to reinforce an emerging policy and media consensus concerning the phenomenon of homegrown radicalization? This study argues that the role of ideology in the theory and strategic practice of Islamic radicalism should not be underestimated. In this exercise, the paper explores

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an understanding of the role of ideology in the development of Islamist terrorism and the recourse to asymmetric violence intimated in recent studies by Ekatarina Stepanova of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stephen Ulph of the Jamestown Foundation and Rohan Gunaratna of the Centre for Terrorism and International Violence Research at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Contra Pape (whose work is cited positively by Hizb ut-Tahrir)12 and Kilcullen, Gunaratnas counter-radicalization work with former al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah members demonstrates that ideology . . . is the key driver of politically motivated violence.13 Similarly, Ulph considers ideological justification . . . a crucial element in the recourse to jihad.14 Meanwhile, Stepanova contends that in the conduct of asymmetric warfare apparently weak non-state actors possess underestimated yet genuine advantages and strengths. More precisely, the crucial advantage that anti-state, armed actors, especially those that systematically employ terrorist means, have at their disposal is the very high power of mobilization and indoctrination that their radical, extremist ideologies have in certain segments of society.15 Significantly, Stepanova finds that in contemporary Islamist radicalization practice hybrid, organizational structures of anti-system non-state actors, which increasingly deploy network features, the role of radical ideology as the glue holding together informally connected cells assumes growing importance.16 In this evolving milieu, quasi-religious Islamist ideology has emerged as the replacement for the secular radical socio-revolutionary ideas of the past as the main justification of the type of modern terrorism that goes beyond localized contexts.17 These works notwithstanding, the prevailing scholarly and policy consensus largely discounts the ideological glue informing the transnational appeal of Khilaafaism (caliphism) promulgated by both al-Qaeda and nominally non-violent Islamist movements like Hizb ut-Tahrir.18 This has led, we shall argue, to a misunderstanding of the character of these movements. We further suggest that an academically fashionable critical, Western, ideological mutation has played both an interesting yet understudied role in influencing Islamist thinking and its strategic practice, particularly in diasporic, cosmopolitan settings and has sought to undermine the capacity of government agenciesnotably in Britain and Australiato respond proactively to the asymmetric threat that homegrown jihadism presents. An examination of the intellectual antecedents of Islamisms leading Western think-tank, Hizb ut-Tahrir, reveals, as we shall show, its growing dependence upon a mode of critical inquiry widely practiced in European and Australian university social science departments for its conduct of ideological warfare against the modern liberal-democratic state. The intellectual current that prevails in contemporary British and Australian social science, particularly in the field of international relations theory, deconstructs liberal self-understanding, and promotes histrionic empathy with a purportedly misunderstood other that ultimately provides ideological legitimacy to a jihadist style of thought and practice. Consequently, critical theory has, we shall demonstrate, the consequence of affording ideological legitimacy to homegrown jihadisms strategic ambitions. It thereby distorts an understanding of Islamist ideology and subverts a coherent policy response to counter-radicalization strategies.

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The Curious Evolution of British Islamism


As the homegrown threat evolved during the 1990s, an Islamist ideology, calibrated to the anxieties of second generation Muslims confronted by the conflicting demands

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of a modern secular lifestyle and a traditional family structure, played an important role in recruitment and radicalization. The ideology of Islamism thus assumed a particularly Western style of thought and strategic practice in order to solve a specifically modern, urban, dilemma of diasporic anomie. Central to the current articulation and promotion of an Islamist ideology is the London-based Party of Liberation, Hizb ut-Tahrir.19 Although deriving its inspiration from the judicial system of the Muslim judge Taqiuddin al-Nabhani and the Islamic liberation struggle in Jordan and Palestine in the 1950s,20 it was the radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed who effectively re-formed the party in London in the 1990s to promote an Islamist Internationale.21 The movement seeks: to resume the way of life and to convey the Islamic dawah [call to the Truth] to the world. This objective means bringing the Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in Dar al-Islam [realm of Islam=sphere of faith] and in an Islamic society such that all of lifes affairs are administered according to the Shariah [Islamic law] rules, and the viewpoint in it is the halal [that which is lawful and permitted in Islam] and the haram [that which is unlawful and not permitted in Islam] under the shade of the Islamic States, which is the Khilafah [Caliphate] state.22 Recruiting high quality graduates from London universities, Hizb ut-Tahrir quickly established itself as the new and excitingly alternative, cool Britannic, radical voice. As former member, Mohammed Ed Husain, explains in his autobiographical account, The Islamist, Hizb ut-Tahrir exploited any issue that might demonstrate the decadence of the secular kuffar West and the moral superiority of the alternative presented by what Hizb ut-Tahrir terms an Islamic system in order to consolidate a sense of Muslim outrage and separatism.23 Indeed, a central Hizb ut-Tahrir text, The Method to Re-establish the Khilafah, required continuing to call the people to the faith not through force but intellectual discourse.24 This in turn demanded intellectual and political struggle adopting the interests of society and highlighting the [corruption of] the [democratic] system whilst illustrating the virtue of the Islamic alternative.25 The multicultural policies promoted by successive British governments together with the politically correct nature of British university politics enabled the party to evolve its ideology and elaborate its Manichean distinction between Islamism and secularism in a persuasive manner that recruited educated middle-class British Muslims to its cause.26 As Husain explains, Hizb ut-Tahrir made full use of British pluralism27 to develop our radical stance of confrontation with the West, establishment of an Islamic state, and commitment to ideological warfare. Long before the War on Terror the Hizb openly declared ideological war.28 He continued: In the multicultural Britain of the 1980s and 1990s we were free to practise our religion and develop our culture as we wanted. Our teachers left us alone, so long as we didnt engage in public expressions of homophobia or intimidation of non-Muslims. But Britishness and the British values of democracy had no meaning for us. Like me, most of the students at college had no real bond with mainstream Britain. Yes, we attended a British educational institution in London, but there was nothing particularly British about it. It might as well have been Cairo or Karachi.29

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This essentially post-Cold War creation, which over the best part of two decades produced a cohort of tertiary educated British Islamists, also actively exported its ideology. Hizb ut-Tahrir currently has more than 40 branches, including franchises in Sydney, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta, and produces radical material of a high quality in various languages for global consumption. Officially non-violent, as a number of former adherents including Husain, Maajid Nawaz, Shiraz Maher, and Hassan Butt maintain, Hizb-ut-Tahrir provided the ideological glue uniting the British jihadi network. Although such testimonies must sometimes be read with a degree of scepticism, nevertheless reading these first-hand accounts in conjunction with evidence from the official reports Hizb-ut-Tahrir posts on its website, it is possible to identify the influences and concepts that inform this quasi-ideology or political religion.30

Deconstructing Caliphism
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Hizb ut-Tahrirs strategy seeks to build a post-modern caliphate that transcends the decadent secular state whether in Britain, in Indonesia (where the party organized a conference to rebuild the caliphate in August 2007), or in Australia. It shares this political vision with al-Qaeda. Since its dissolution by Atatu rk in 1924, those Muslims who have dreamed of a reformed and purified umma have also envisaged its achievement through a religiously inspired Caliph reviving the pure political religious doctrine first promulgated by Mohammad and his rightly guided ancestors the salif al saleh. The subsequent corruption of this perfect order resulted in the eventual dissolution and deracination of the Muslim world. In order to reconstitute it, Muslim societies had to be stripped of their customary, secular nationalist and Western accretions. In their place, sharia discipline would govern the reformed constitution. The Muslim brother and martyr to the pharaohnic post-colonial regime of Colonel Nasser in Egypt, Sayyid Qutb, in a number of seminal writings, outlined the details of the khilaafah ideal.31 Qutbs brother, Mohammed, taught the young Osama bin Laden in Saudi Arabia, and Sayyid Qutbs views shaped the thinking of Ayman al-Zahwahiri in Cairo after his execution in 1966. Consequently, al-Qaeda and its affiliates both in London and elsewhere consider the restitution of the caliphate central to their ideological mission. Hence, we find bin Laden in an interview with al Jazeera in 2001, observing that our concern is that our umma . . . unites under the Word of the Book of God or His Prophet and that this nation should establish the righteous caliphate of our umma, which has been prophesied by our Prophet . . . that the righteous caliph will return.32 In an earlier 1996 interview with Australian Muslim activists, bin Laden specifically identified the Taliban regime in Kabul as the basis for this revived caliphate, where the people are amongst the most protective of the religion approved by God, and the keenest to fulfil his laws, and establish an Islamic state.33 Likewise, bin Ladens deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in a letter to the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Masub al-Zarqawi, in July 2005, contended, that our intended goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate. He further observed that the second stage of the Islamist struggle requires the building of an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphateover as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq.34 The goal of the caliphate inevitably permeated the worldview of UK based jihadist preachers and was promulgated to their followers at radical mosques like

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Finsbury Park in North London after 1993. Prominent Finsbury Park sheikhs like Abu Hamza and Abdullah Faisal dismissed secular, liberal democracy as un-Islamic. For Abu Hamza democracy is shirk [idolatry]. Shirk in legislation. Shirk in lies. Shirk in everything. Abdullah Faisal promoted a similar teaching.35 Meanwhile, exiled Jordanian cleric, Abu Qatada al-Filistini, who issued fatwas from London (GIA) and maintained close conon behalf of the Algerian Groupe Islamique Arme tacts with al-Qaeda, prior to his arrest in 2002, pronounced that the only way to have a khilafa is through jihad.36 This understanding influenced a generation of homegrown British jihadists. Thus an al-Qaeda training manual found by police in Manchester in 1998, and subsequently submitted in evidence to District Court of Massachusetts in the case of the United States versus Richard Colvin Reid, the shoe bomber, in July 2003, observed that jihadist violence is my contribution toward paving the road that leads to Majestic Allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy.37 Significantly, the Jordanian cleric, Omar Bakri Mohammed, who effectively re-founded Hizb ut-Tahrir in London after he moved there in 1987, broke with that organization in 1997 over the methodology for instantiating the caliphate. A prominent advocate of jihad and Supreme Judge of the Sharia Court of the United Kingdom until 2004, Omar Bakri, who founded al-Muhajiroun (the Migrants) in London in 1997, disagreed with Hizbs official view that sought to establish the Khilafah only in a specific Muslim country. By contrast, al-Muhajiroun engage in the divine method to establish the Khilafah wherever they have members.38 Al-Muhajiroun also believed in combining dawa (the call to Islam) with jihad, whereas theoretically non-violent Hizb ut-Tahrir did not believe that jihad could be waged by agents not affiliated to the Islamic state.39 Despite the differences over methodology, both al-Qaeda linked clerics and Hizb ut-Tahrir evidently share the caliphist ideal. Hizb strategically promotes its anti-liberal and anti-pluralist vision through a global network of websites, chat rooms, and videos. At the core of the Hizb system, as with al-Qaedas, sits the promotion of the Khilaafah or caliphate, a seventh century Muslim ideal that would, if suitably adapted for contemporary consumption, restore the moral and political authority of Islam.40 As recent Hizb ut-Tahrir publications comprehensively elaborate, the caliphate, unlike a liberal democracy, constitutes the regime most appropriate for an integrated Islamic lifestyle and the antidote to the current political and economic uncertainty in the Middle East, South Asia, and wherever else the ummah is troubled.41 The caliphate, in Hizbs account, represents a political system derived from the ideology of Islam that transcends ethnic and religious differences. Its realization would usher in a new era of stability for the Muslim world.42 The Palestinian jurist Taqiuddin al-Nabhani identified the key features of a constitution for an Islamic state that Hizb ut-Tahrir promulgates.43 Nevertheless, Western ideas and constitutional assumptions evidently influenced this Islamist system. A social contract, bayah, determines the relationship between the caliph and the people or ummah while a judiciary monitors the interpretation of the law.44 Thus, the caliphate would promote both the rule of law, and accountability by [sic] the people through an independent judiciary.45 The law, however, is not common law, but Koranic law, and religious scholars, and their judicious interpretation of the Koran and haddith, preside over the Islamic systems judiciary. Obviously, despite the surface influence of Western constitutionalism, the Islamist system vigorously opposes the promotion of secular, liberal democracy,

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and is intent on promoting Islamic values instead. What is perhaps more curious is that this system also draws selectively from non-liberal ideas in the Western philosophical canon.46 Hizb ut-Tahrir derives much of its current ideological momentum from understandings of a neo-Marxist critical perspective combined with a deeply illiberal and relativist strain in contemporary Western political thought. In the United Kingdom, for example, Islamist organizations initially followed and developed the consciousness raising tactics pioneered by militant groups, most notably the Socialist Workers Party. As Husain points out, we borrowed, as we did much else, from radical socialists.47 Significantly, Ed Husain charts his gradual disillusionment with the Islamic Party of Liberations politics through the progressive realization that Nabhanis teachings were not innovatory but wholly derived from European thought, notably that of Hegel and Rousseau. For disillusioned Islamists, like Husain and Maher, the provenance of much nineteenth and twentieth century reformist Islamic thought demonstrated that Islamist ideology deceived when it claimed it was pure in thought, and not influenced by the kufr.48 Indeed, Nabhanis strategy for reviving the caliphate owed little to Islamic teaching but more to the Marxist theorist, Antonio Gramsci, who demonstrated how the masses might be ideologically mobilized through the subversion or capture of a societys cultural and educational institutions. It was not sufficient to propagate new ideas, Husain noted, but old ideas had to be destroyed and supplanted by new ones. He continued: And that was exactly what I was taught in my halaqah, and what I tried to execute on the streets of London. Nabhani shrewdly linked Gramscis concepts to the life of the Prophet Mohammed, and in Muslim ears this found greater acceptance.49 Similarly, Caliphisms critique of the liberal democratic state and the perceived injustices its foreign policy in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Iraq committed upon the Muslim world draws intellectual sustenance from the international idealism and critical thinking of a post-Gramscian Frankfurt School that prevails in many European university departments of political science and international studies. Critical theory developed, from both Gramsci and the Frankfurt School, the epistemological claim that all knowledge is socially determined, and serves the interests of dominant systems of power in the international system. Consequently, this critical understanding holds that the international order is a self-serving construct of the United States and its allies. As one recent work in this genre argues, al-Qaeda style violence is either the construction of, or a reaction to, Western elite power. From this perspective, at the end of the Cold War, the United States consciously set out to impose a violent peace through a westernised world system.50 Such critical thinking has assumed the status of orthodoxy in many European, Asian, North American, and Australian departments of politics and international relations. Scholars inculcated in this style of thought regularly declare that terror is not only a phenomenon produced by politics, but is also a consequence of economic structures. It is the inevitable consequence of the global capitalist system.51 The solution requires a system of sustainable security, based . . . on justice and emancipation.52 The details of this new, emancipatory sustainable security system remain opaque, but beyond the promotion of an ill-defined global justice, it will inter alia require the abandonment of market economics and the ills it allegedly engenders.

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Interestingly, al-Qaeda and its European and Southeast Asian franchises increasingly concur with this critical diagnosis. Osama bin Ladens broadcast to the world on 7 September 2007 stated that: as you liberated yourselves before from the slavery of monks, kings, and feudalism, you should liberate yourselves from the deception, shackles and attrition of the capitalist system . . . The capitalist system seeks to turn the entire world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to protect democracy . . . the reeling of many of you under the burden of interest-related debts, insane taxes and real estate mortgages; global warming and its woes; and the abject poverty and tragic hunger in Africa: all this is but one side of the grim face of this global system.53 It is only perhaps when bin Laden insists on the infallible methodology of Allah, the most High, which requires total obedience to the orders and prohibitions of Allah Alone in all aspects of life that critical international relations theory and al-Qaeda might part company about the ultimate telos of global justice. What the broadcast does illustrate, however, is how the notion of overturning and ethically transforming the global capitalist order has, by a well established process of ideological adaptation, come to permeate contemporary Islamist rhetoric and its strategic analysis of world politics. In other words, both bin Laden and the Hizb ut-Tahrir propagandists who wrote recent publications available on its well maintained UK website like Iraq: A New Way Forward and Radicalisation, Extremism and Islamism: Realities and Myths in the War on Terror have imbibed their current theory and practice, in part, from an idealist, state-transcending international theory, most notably the English School of critical international relations. This ethical approach to international relations seeks not only to explain the historical emergence of the global order, but also as two of its leading proponents, Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, explaintransform it into a solidarist world informed by global ethics.54 Let us first examine the evolution of this mode of inquiry before assessing its strategic utility for contemporary Islamist thought and practice.

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Caliphism and the English School of Critical International Relations Theory


The English School is the name given to an amorphous interpretative framework that draws inspiration from a series of international relations texts written between 1938 and 1979. Its conception of international relations has been abstracted from the often very different accounts offered by E. H. Carr, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, C. W. Manning, and Hedley Bull (who was in fact Australian). In the early 1980s, this group of scholars was subsumed under the rubric of an English School of thought. This School, it was maintained, emphasized the historical interpretation of international relations and identified the lineaments of an international society that contrasted with notions of anarchy that pervaded more conventional, and largely American, realist and neo-realist accounts of the international system.55 It was, however, in the immediate post-Cold War era during the 1990s, when the embryonic new world order afforded the possibility of transforming international society, that the English School received renewed scholarly attention.56 In particular,

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globalization and the desultory congeries of non-state actors and supranational institutions like the European Union, multinational corporations, and non-governmental pressure groups that rose to prominence in its wake, challenged conventional, realist accounts of state power and the structural function of an international system. The emerging dispensation also posed new economic, social and ecological questions which included pollution, human rights, drugs and terrorism that the state-centric Cold War order, it seemed, inadequately answered. As David Held and Anthony McGrew maintained, these questions reflected an increasing number of transnational policy issues which cut across territorial jurisdictions and existing political alignments, and which require international cooperation for their effective resolution.57 In this post-Cold War context, Andrew Linklater performed the hermeneutic function of re-describing the intellectual legacy of the English School and applying it to a critical understanding of international politics. Yet, Linklater, whose work throughout the 1980s elaborated an idealist and emancipatory international relations theory, derived his inspiration not from the putative founders of the English School, but from the German, Frankfurt School associated with the critical radical democratic thinking of Ju rgen Habermas. The fact that, as Roger Epp explains, Habermas had identified the English School insightfully with a practicalhermeneutic knowledge interest in the international order facilitated Linklaters enterprise.58 Consequently, enthusiasm for the exciting possibilities afforded by the new critical mode of interpreting the otherwise theoretically limited field of international behaviour, blossomed. By 2001, Barry Buzan viewed the English School an underexploited resource and considered the time ripe to apply its historicist, constructivist, and methodologically pluralist approach to IR.59 The English Schools supposed sensitivity to the role that norms played in the international system further increased its cachet for post-Cold War scholarship. English School normativism fortuitously coincided with a growing predilection in American international relations theory for constructivist and sociological accounts of the international order. The radical transformative possibilities that these developments presented enabled the English Schoolor, more precisely, its critically re-described progenyto contrast their new thinking with an apparently outmoded, positivist, Cold War, American, and neo-realist approach, to international order.60 As Buzan further asserted: The English School is not just another paradigm to throw into the tedious game of competing IR theories. It is, instead, an opportunity to step outside that game and cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations.61 Stepping outside the game of international relations offered seductive theoretical possibilities. In particular, the more idealistically inclined increasingly contrasted pluralist with solidarist accounts of the world.62 The pluralist understanding of international relations, which in fact reflected classical writing in the English School tradition, maintained that a mature anarchy regulated international society. From this perspective, the primary actor in that society was, and remained, the state.63 Pluralism also recognized that power politics constrained relations in the society of states, and as Martin Wight averred, diplomacy, alliances, and war remained the permanent institutions of international order. This pluralist, nay classical realist, outlook evinced by the original English School writers, therefore, was sceptical about the possibility for progressive change in that order.64 By contrast, the new solidarist approach advanced by the re-described English School of the 1990s, as Dale Copeland observed, emphasized the more

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revolutionary or Kantian end of the spectrum. From this perspective, actors in the international system do more than simply acknowledge sovereign co-existence: they also share a sense of global values and human rights. Solidarists additionally accentuate the role of non-state actors in international society, and emphasize the pursuit of global justice based on a shared global morality, even at some cost to the interstate order.65 While forms of solidarism could, and indeed did, legitimize neo-liberal interventionist policies to uphold humanitarian norms,66 it was the opportunity for the radical critique of the existing order and the possibility for normative transformation of the system itself that increasingly cast its idealist, post-Kantian pall over departments of international relations from Europe to Australasia. The intellectual genealogy of this idealistic solidarism is, then, somewhat curious. For, as we have seen, it is not entirely clear how it derives from the pluralist thinking that permeated the classic texts of the English School. It seems, however, that those like Ken Booth, Robert Cox, and Andrew Linklater67 who detected in the English School its practical-hermeneutic knowledge interest in the international order created the otherwise unlikely link between the conservative, classically realist, minded first generation of English School thinkers and the global emancipationism68 that a subsequent generation of scholars considered a universal ideal underpinning progressive international studies,69 and which represented both empirically and theoretically the soundest response to war, injustice, and unreason.70 The neo-Kantian and neo-Marxist inspired critical thinking of Ju rgen Habermas formed, as we have suggested, the improbable bridge between the scepticism of Bull and Wight and the new global solidarism of Linklater and Booth. In a series of books, essays, and interviews, Habermas promulgated what he considered a radical democratic, post-national constellation, of which the European Union was the harbinger, announcing the possibility of global justice founded upon un-coerced communication between the global North and South. Captivated by the possibility of cosmopolitan justice, critical European international theorizing embarked upon an idealist and radically pacifist adventure that evinced increasing hostility to the hegemonic discourse of Western realism. Critical English School theory argued that this hegemony merely entrenched and legitimated existing power inequalities in the international system. It thereby perpetuated a global economic system that consigns millions to the generally silenced terror that is synonymous with the hunger and disease and hopelessness of abject poverty.71 Resentment towards the post-Cold War imperium exercised by the American hyperpower reinforced this increasingly critical agenda. After the September 2001 attacks by Islamist militants on the United States and the initiation of the war on terror it was a short, but radically deconstructive, step for analysts to represent al-Qaeda as an essentially hybrid form of struggle by a weak, oppressed, and oxymoronic global south against the hegemonic West. In this context, as Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey explain, Al-Qaeda is not a state nor a great power but a transnational network and more importantly an idea around which resistance is organised globally and locally.72 Radical solidarism combined with a species of post-Marxist critical unmasking revealed Western capitalism and the market state as the real cause of global crisis. From this perspective, a U.S. imposed violent peace had created an axis of disagreement between the West and the Rest. The self-appointed task of critical

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international relations theory, therefore, is to expose this conflict and supply its radical, emancipatory, and transformative antidote.73 Taraq Barkawi, for example, perceives that the root causes of the current situation lie in the working out of long-term histories of western expansionism and their dynamic interaction with the Islamic world.74 In this understanding, a generic West is solely responsible for both the creation of the Islamist threat and its baleful consequences. From this perspective, the centuries of Western colonialisms violent, rapacious and dominating oppression results in the inevitable retaliation of the more militant members of the global South.75 Whilst all critical theorists share this diagnosis of the root cause of international terrorism, they evidently disagree about the extent and seriousness of the threat posed by radical Islamism and the means necessary to ameliorate it. Barkawi and Laffey, for instance, consider that the globally oppressed respond violently to the Western threat and that as long as inequality prevails in the international system so the West will experience asymmetric attacks. Thus the ability of the Southern resistance movement to inflict wounding strikes on the home territory of a leading metropolitan power is nearly unprecedented . . . . The natives have struck back and are likely to continue doing so.76 By contrast, other more conspiratorially minded critical theorists maintain that international Islamist terror presents no real threat to the West. Instead, they claim that a state manipulated politics of fear has legitimated a war on terrorism. This fear in turn has provoked Western democracies to suspend civil liberties at home and embark upon damaging foreign policy adventures.77 From this standpoint a widespread terrorist threat is a delusion.78 Consequently: The current war on terrorism is a multi-billion dollar exercise to protect the United States from a danger that, excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks has killed less Americans per year over the past three decades than bee stings and lightning strikes. Even in 2001, Americas worst year of terrorist deaths, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by deaths from auto-related accidents, gun crimes, alcohol and tobacco related illnesses, suicides and a large number of diseases like influenza, cancer, and heart disease.79 Disagreement in the ranks of critical theory over the nature of the threat further engenders confusion over the policy required to address it. Most critical theorists maintain, following Linklater and Booth, that given the choice the oppressed global majority would elect to live in a world of justice, freedom, and equality. Emancipation, from this critical perspective, entails escape from scarcity, liberation from ignorance and lies, and freedom from political tyranny and exploitation.80 Critically informed policy, therefore, would unshackle people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do.81 Critical theory, it seems, knows intuitively what people want, namely, emancipation from the manacles of global capitalism.82 However, for an even more critical critical minority, this emancipationist ethic merely conceals another form of Western domination, indeed, a Eurocentricity that regards the weak and the powerless as marginal or derivative elements of world politics . . . at best the site of liberal good intentions or at worst a potential source of threats.83 As Barkawi and Laffey contend: For liberal and some critical

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approaches to security studies, the weak are of interest but primarily as bearers of rights and objectives of emancipation, that is, for their normative value in western political theoretic terms.84

The Influence of Orientalism


These epistemological differences notwithstanding, critical emancipationists, radical theorists of Southern resistance, English School ethicists, and Hizb ut-Tahrir ideologues, all agree nonetheless that terrorism is the inevitable consequence of Western exploitation and domination. To reinforce this claim, both critical theorists and Islamist ideologists draw extensively from post-colonial discourse theory in general and Edward Saids critical exploration of Western Orientalism in particular. Saids analysis permits the critical theorist to reject the thesis that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed in Muslim societies the return of Islam in a new ideological guise. Scholars who advance this hypothesis have, critical theorists maintain, committed the fallacy of orientalizing the non-Western other.85 Richard Jackson, following Said, thus considers Orientalism a system of knowledge based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between the orient and the occident in which the orient is constructed largely as a negative inversion of Western culture. It employs a series of biological and cultural generalizations and racial and religious prejudices, including depictions of Arab cultures as irrational, violent, backward, anti-Western, savage and the like.86 Analogously, Barkawi and Laffey assert that Western identity requires an imaginary non-Western other, thus facilitating the definition of the West through a series of contrasts regarding rationality and development in which the non-West is generally found lacking.87 This means that the Western person only exists as a contrast to with the Oriental Other. 88 Moreover, as globalization has come to be seen as the late-modern, sociological term for the civilizing process . . . terrorism as a form of barbarism can be seen as a challenge to international order and the civilizing process of globalization.89 Consciously, or unconsciously, Orientalism informs the Wests perception of the Islamist. As a result, Barkawi claims, somewhat contradictorily, that Orientalism represents the reality of resistance arising from the global South against the Western have-lots,90 while at the same time, it also constructs imaginary imperial and neo-imperial battlefields.91 Meanwhile, Jackson considers Western identity constructed in opposition to the libidinous, irrational, violent, and dangerous barbarity of the Eastern world. Rather incoherently, however, Jackson condemns the civilizing processes that inhere in ideas of global justice and emancipation that he advocates as the emancipatory solution to global conflict.92 Critical theorists rarely bother to address problems of logic or incoherence in their analysis of the sources of Islamist violence. Primarily, this is because critical theory is not interested in Islamist violence. Its main purpose instead is to expose the questionable Western democratic response to such violence. In this context, Orientalism serves the useful function of de-emphasizing the role of quasi-religious ideology in the motivation of contemporary jihadists. Accordingly, critical international theory reinforces the view that religion is a secondary factor next to political grievances and nationalism that the religious language of terrorists is instrumental and culturally idiomatic rather than causative.93 Instead of ideology the real cause of terror may be found closer to hand, in the structures of Western

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oppression. Therefore, Islamist discourse, although often expressed in religious terms may be conveniently re-described as a form of secular or nationalist protest at external and internal domination and forms of exclusion.94 Delivering itself from the otherwise pressing need to explain the political religion that informs contemporary Islamism, via the device of Orientalism, critical theory instead focuses upon its real object of concern, namely, the Western liberal democratic state and the oppressive order it sustains. Significantly, critical theorists derive comfort from the fact that Islamisms principal theorist, Sayyid Qutb, was influenced in particular by Marxism-Leninism, taking the concept of the revolutionary vanguard and the idea that the world could be re-made through an act of will. Qutbs implicit Leninism permits the critical theorist to present jihadism in more acceptable academic garb, as merely a variation upon Western revolutionary self-understanding. Consequently, Islamism now becomes a universal ideology of emancipation in modern conditions representing a distinctive combination of Islamic and enlightenment thinking.95 Indeed, reinterpreting Qutb as a critical theorist avant la lettre further facilitates the deconstruction of Western forms of external and internal domination and forms of exclusion.96 Critical theorists further consider that the Western state discourse and practice of counter-terrorism determines forms of exclusion and domination, thereby delegitimizing dissent and narrowing the discursive space for political debate.97 In combination with counter-terrorism laws at home, Western foreign policy makes international terrorism worse through entrenching cycles of violence and counter-violence; that just as has already occurred [sic] in Israel, Chechnya, Kashmir, Colombia, Iraq, Algeria, Spain, and other places, it is making the world less secure, more violent and more unjust.98 American foreign policy maintains this external form of domination. Unsurprisingly, Hizb ut-Tahrir endorses and follows this critical analysis of the Wests war on terror. Hizb ut-Tahrir reports maintain that the Wests foreign policy has illustrated not just the unacceptable face of Western imperialism but the true face of Western states with the indomitable pursuit of profits, raw materials and cheap labour.99 Following the analysis and the academic argot of the prevailing critical dispensation, Hizb ut-Tahrir considers the war on terror a narrative told by Western governments.100 Islamist terrorism is consequently a distorted Western construct, that The Party of Liberations various reports deconstructs.101 Similarly, paralleling critical theorys discursive turn this Islamist perspective also finds that the Wests orientalist discourse regarding the Caliphate a device for alienating Muslim political thought.102 Orientalism, therefore, and its ideological cousin, colonialism, constitute the roots of Muslim oppression and the source of the Islamist resistance that has evolved in dialectical opposition to it since the nineteenth century. Moreover, not only does Hizb ut-Tahrirs analysis reflect contemporary critical international relations theory, it also shares critical theorys policy prescriptions to counter U.S. imperialism. Hence, Iraq: A New Way Forward contends that stability in the Middle East requires the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces from the Gulf region.103 This would facilitate the rebuilding of the Caliphate and enable the Muslim world, funded by the Gulfs oil resources, to determine its own destiny. Such a model would, of course, reject the false Western ideal of liberal democratic universalism and the destabilizing economics of the free market. Analogously, both Islamists and critical theorists consider the solution to the Palestine question requires the transformation of the Middle East. For Islamists it would

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necessarily entail the dissolution of the illegal Zionist state of Israel and its incorporation into the new Caliphate. Under the regime of the Caliph, Jews, Sunnis and Shias, Kurds, Lebanese, Persians, and Arabs would all transcend their false ethnic or religious consciousness and achieve true emancipation through Islams universal and undoubtedly transformative ethic.104 This appreciation of Muslim discontent and the foreign policy necessary to redress it correlates almost exactly with the analysis and transformational agenda of critical international relations theory.105 Immediate withdrawal from Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and a greater awareness of the Muslim other, it is argued, will dilute Islamist rage whether homegrown or externally generated. For Tarak Barkawi this requires us to empathize with the practitioners of radical Islamist violence. It should be accepted that suicide bombers are fighters for a cause. They represent a response to historic injustice and therefore must be granted full and unqualified humanity.106 Meanwhile, Jackson informs us that Islamist parties, when permitted mainstream political influence, often follow moderate and pragmatic directions.107 Presumably, he has in mind parties like Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In this empathetic vein he further contends that Jihadist texts reveal a nuanced political analysis of the situation in the Middle East. These nuances include a modest agenda encompassing support for the establishment of a Palestinian state; the end of US military occupation of the Arabian peninsula and its material support for Israel; the overthrow of corrupt and oppressive western-backed Arab regimes; the support of insurgencies in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Philippines and elsewhere; and the expulsion of western forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.108 Given their agreement upon the strategic goals of Islamist militancy, it is not entirely surprising to discover that a Hizb ut-Tahrir report such as Radicalisation, Extremism and Islamism reads like an essay in critical international relations complete with methodological framework and appropriate footnotes.109 In fact, one would not be entirely surprised to learn that it began life as a thesis in a department of International Relations at a British university. What, we might wonder, are the ideological implications of this critical approach that legitimates Islamist thought and practice and which increasingly imposes its emancipatory grip upon the study of international relations on Western university campuses?

Critical Terror Studies and al-Qaedas Strategic Thinking


Central to the evolving relationship between critical thought and a radical empathy with Islamist strategy are new international journals like Critical Studies on Terrorism. The journals rationale is to foster a more self-reflective, critical approach to the study of terrorism, that accommodates those who study terrorism, but reject the (perceived) ontological, epistemological, and ideological commitments of existing terrorism studies.110 More precisely, the extension of critical thinking to the study of terrorism provides a forum where research from a constructivist, poststructuralist, feminist, critical, normative or other alternative theoretical approaches can be presented.111 We can further derive a view of what critical engagement with Islamist terror entails from a number of university or research funded projects, conferences, and journal articles in recent years. For example, Australias leading forum for international relations, the Oceanic International Studies Conference (OICS), devoted

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four panels in 2006 to critical international theories while other panels considered topics like Transnational Identities, Voices of the Other.112 Its precursor, 2004 conference included offerings such as Myth: Islamists Under the Bed the Howard Government and the Politics of Paranoia.113 Critical international theory panels also feature prominently at the annual conference of the British International Studies Association (BISA). The 2007 conference entertained several panels on the theme and featured papers on Border Imaginaries and the War on Terror, Critical Approaches to Islamic Terrorism, and Constructing Intervention in the War on Terrorism.114 In 2006, both BISA and the government funding body, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), co-sponsored a conference entitled, Is it Time for a Critical Terrorism Studies? at the University of Manchester.115 The question was purely rhetorical. The conference organizers quickly concluded that indeed it was time. The proceedings of the conference subsequently formed the first edition of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism that appeared in April 2008. Elsewhere, a brief encounter with Adelaide Universitys e-journal Borderlands introduces the unwary reader to titles like Terror Australis: Security, Terror and the War on Terror Discourse116 or Regimes of Terror: Contesting the War on Terror, an edited collection from a colloquium organized by Macquarie University, Sydney, in December 2005, which brought together activists, artists, academics, and lawyers working on the links between racism, colonialism and terrorism.117 Opening a few of these articles reveals that critical terrorism studies requires no research into the history, ideology, or strategic thinking of transnational non-state actors like al-Qaeda or its regional affiliates. Instead, critical engagement is a euphemism for an assault on the Australian, British, and U.S. government responses to terrorism, which the de rigueur critical perspective pronounces a disturbing new international phenomenon.118 The disturbing politics of terrorism further requires democratic politicians to pose as the people who will protect us from our fears and regulate the world accordingly. Critical theory reveals that the pose serves as a mask for the erosion of civil liberties.119 What permeates the critical method, therefore, is not the threat or the appropriate level of response to it, but the authoritarianism of the purportedly liberal democratic state. Katrina Lee Koo of the Australian National University informs us accordingly that the ease with which the US War on terror discourse has been assimilated into the discourse and practice of Australias security reflects the enduring commitments that both have to notions of statism, permanent threat and insecurity and the acceptance of violence against those who may threaten us.120 The war on terror, she maintains, merely reinforced an unethical practice of security.121 Analogously, Jackson avers that current counterterrorism discourse functions ideologically to maintain a liberal international order in which the US and EU retain a dominant position. He continues: That is, in addition to delegitimizing all forms of nonstate, counterhegemonic violence, the language of counterterrorism also functions to set the parameters of debate and restrict the array of policy options to a narrow band of possibilities that do not fundamentally challenge existing international and national power structures.122 In a similar vein, Anthony Burke, Associate Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, in an essay in Social Identities, that also doubles as a chapter in his oddly titled book Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other (2006), explores the relationship between Freedoms Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War.123 Burke maintains, somewhat

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obscurely, that an onto-technology of freedom through US history, the Cold War and the War on Terror, and considering its functional mirroring by the Islamist threat . . . exposes the multiple dangers posed by the aggressive assertion of a simultaneously instrumental and universalizing image of historical action and inevitability that rejects any restriction of its powers and any responsibility for their effect.124 In the Carnegie Councils journal Ethics and International Affairs, Burke further reveals that the real target of his critical assault is the modern liberal democratic state and its violent and exclusivist understanding of sovereignty that lingers like a latent illness in the very depths of modern cosmopolitanism.125 Predictably, perhaps, Burke concludes that terrorism is the fault of the U.S. and its allies, and the recourse to military force to contain violent Islamism is both unethical and unnecessary. Overall, state discourses of national security merely reinforce a process of othering Islamist difference. Here critical thinking adapts a Marxist understanding of alienation in order to present the bourgeois democratic state as engaged in a process of marginalizing minorities. The exclusion of the Other thus represents critical theorys key, or, more precisely, its only, analytic tool. It purportedly demonstrates that the modern state ultimately secures sovereignty, physically and existentially, through violence against and alienation from the Other.126 Or as Katrina Lee Koo tautologically contends, this powerful process of widespread or blanket Othering in order to shore up, protect and defend who we are, has led to our lack of empathetic or ethical compassion for our Other.127 The rhetoric of freedom and the democratic way of life it upholds, Burke, and others of this critical disposition, argue, inflames the Muslim community. The critically informed antidote to this rage requires us, if we are to grapple with the new terrorism to engage in a force-free dialogue with the other.128 This Habermasian pursuit of intersubjective communication would result in new, uncoerced norms that would ethically transform the conduct of global politics. Central to the strategic understanding of critical terror studies, therefore, is a relativist understanding of both the democratic state and the non-state actors recourse to violence. Both state and non-state actors from this perspective are terrorists. Indeed, the modern state is the greater terrorist because it possesses the greater capacity for violence. The idealist solution that emerges, albeit obscurely, from this analysis requires the replacement of the modern democratic state by a new post-national constellation of international norms. In other words, critical terror studies requires not an understanding of international relations per se but the ethical transformation of those relations. Asserting this radical interpretation of the world reveals the critical research projects ideological agenda. Its commitment to transformative ethics means that its academic purpose is not to promote methodological pluralism but to achieve ideological hegemony.129 Jackson admits that criticism requires a continuous articulation and re-articulation130 of current discourses through subversive forms of knowledge131 that render quite accepted understandings open to de-stabilization and counter-hegemonic struggle.132 Moreover, it is this preference for revolutionary transformation that critical theory shares with the violent utopian dreamers that inspire al-Qaeda as well as officially non-violent proponents of khilaffahism like Hizb ut-Tahrir. How, we might finally consider, has this undoubtedly critical understanding evolved and what does its ideological influence over university international relations departments mean for the secular, liberal capacity to inquire into

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assumptions about the ideology of Islamism, its recourse to terrorism, and the strategies required to address it?

What Weve Got Here . . . Is a Failure to Communicate


Here it is necessary to evaluate the general direction of research in political science and international studies since the 1990s, most notably in the United Kingdom, where this critical approach first took hold and, which via the latest manifestation of the cultural cringe, has now colonized international studies in Australia. As University of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer observed in his 2004 E. H. Carr lecture at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, utopian idealism now dominates international relations scholarship in Britain. As with their Australian epigone, Mearsheimer argued, the British idealists believe in the possibility of radically rejecting reality in order to promote their ideological imperative to change the world.133 Even before 9=11, international relations theorists of this idealist provenance evinced a predisposition to read events through a critical English School lens that unmasked the false consciousness of liberal democracy to reveal the instrumental rationalism that drove it. It further sought to demonstrate that Western foreign policy discursively created threats through what David Campbell termed practices of differentiation and modes of exclusion.134 From this perspective, a discourse of danger in the 1990s manufactured putative threats to the international system in order to maintain existing power relations. In that curious Zeit without Geist between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center, critical theory came together with a constructivist international relations methodology to disclose the structural and normative imbalances in the international order. This structure and its subsequent globalization, it was asserted, served Western state dominance while systematically impoverishing, oppressing, and excluding disenfranchised, non-Western populations.135 From this critical perspective, the dissolution of Cold War verities had prompted an insecure West to search for an alternative monolithic threat to replace that of the former Soviet Union.136 An amorphous terrorism linked to a global Islamist Internationale neatly filled the vacancy. Even in the mid-1990s, critical international relations theory termed the Western stance Islamophobia, which it was claimed had improperly cast Muslims as incomprehensible, irrational, extremist and threatening.137 For contemporary critical terrorism theorists this characterization reinforces their belief that Islamic terrorism functions as a construct to maintain national identity and marginalizes an alien, non-Western other. Moreover, given the extent to which the discourse has penetrated the politics and culture of Western societies, it can hardly be doubted that Islamic terrorism now functions as a negative ideograph.138 For Jackson, dangers are those facets of social life interpreted as threats, adding that dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception.139 Concern, fear, or anxiety is, therefore, a domestic construct, a product of racism140 and phobic narratives.141 According to Brian Massumi, the enemy is not out there, instead, we are it. 142 From the critical idealist perspective, then, there are no material threats in the international system, only negative discourses. Consequently, rather than accept the fact that violent militants inspired by an Islamist ideology launched the 9=11

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attacks, critical thinking instead moved its discursive goalposts. Critical theorists subsequently maintained that Western governments exaggerated the new threat in order to narrow the discursive space for political debate and curtail civil liberties at home.143 Western democracies, critical theorists contend, conjured up the spectre of Islam and catastrophic terror attacks to persuade the gullible masses to accept an extension of state powers under the rubric of counter-terror policy. In this understanding, the political process functions for constructing fear and moral panic, provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence . . . [and] distracting the public from more complex and pressing social ills.144 Via this process of denial, Islamist terror dissolves and liberal democracy emerges as the real threat to global peace. In short, Jackson warns somewhat mysteriously, the danger is that the war on terrorism becomes a war of terrorism. 145 The student of international relations inculcated in this critical orthodoxy may perhaps pause to wonder whether the authorities are de-legitimizing dissent all that efficiently given the proliferation of government grants, books, and journals devoted to arguing against the politics of fear, exposing government security initiatives, and asserting the need for more critically informed terrorism studies.146 This seems especially curious given that the current structure of rewards for academic research excellence and preferment have over the last decade installed critical theory as social science canon. In the United Kingdom, as Mearsheimer notes, it has created a realist-free zone,147 a point that applies also to leading international relations schools in Australia. Research conducted by the respected Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Project published by the Institute of the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William and Mary bears out Mearsheimers contention, demonstrating that realist orientated scholarship in Britain and Australia has become a distinctly minority avocation.148 Furthermore, the extent to which critical theory empathizes with Islamisms moderate and pragmatic goals indicates a shared illiberal and revolutionary transformative outlook. Thus, Anthony Burke informs us that violence in Palestine cannot be resolved without the call to ethics and the love of the Other.149 For Burke, the solution to the Wests perverse perseverance of sovereignty is both deconstructive and re-productive, a line that could easily have appeared in a Hizb ut-Tahrir report. Yet as a number of former Islamists have observed: By blaming the government for our actions . . . [commentators] did our propaganda work for us. More important, they also helped to draw away any critical examination from the real engine of our violence: Islamic theology.150 In the face of evidence from both former radicals and scholars like Ekaterina Stepanova who take an interest in the social and political motives informing contemporary political violence, one might assume that Western governments would be attuned to the inherent dangers of fuelling Islamist propaganda and recruitment to jihadism.151 This, however, is not the case. Somewhat myopically, university councils welcome the new funding opportunities that the cutting edge critical terror studies agenda supposedly affords and which government agencies, like the UKs Department of Education Skills and Training and the Australian Research Council, supports with large grants. Taxpayers fund critical evaluations of the the politics and ethics of force or ethical and conceptual approaches to counter-terrorism.152 It is not entirely clear what value this adds to our understanding of the phenomenon, but the conclusion is already known. As Ruth

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Blakeley of the University of Kent explains, the northern democracies have been responsible for widespread terrorism.153 In the strange, foggy archipelago that critical international ethicist thinking inhabits the present system of states is the real problem and demands the transformation of the world as we know it. Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that the policy advice to resist and transform is warmly endorsed not only by Hizb ut-Tahrir but by most modern revolutionary groups that view sacrifice and transformation as necessary stages on the road to utopia.

Conclusion
Leo Strauss presciently observed that the crisis of the West consists in the West having become uncertain of its purpose. The West was once certain of its purpose of a purpose in which all men could be united and hence it had a clear vision of its future . . . We do no longer have that certainty and that clarity. Some among us even despair of the future, and this despair explains many forms of Western degradation.154 A society accustomed to understanding itself in terms of a liberal, universal, and progressive purpose cannot lose faith in that purpose without becoming utterly bewildered. The relativist and critical approaches that have come to dominate the academic social sciences since the 1990s reflect the bewilderment that has become more apparent since 9=11, and the evident failure of history to end with the triumph of reason and democracy. Moreover, by attempting to identify histrionically with the supposedly marginalized Islamist other, critical theory and the contemporary, so-called, English School affords crucial ideological support to those who violently oppose Western understandings of liberalism, secularism, and pluralism. Indeed, by rejecting the very idea of having enemies, critical thought reinforces the bewildering loss of purpose in the democratic state-based international order. The global jihadism that confronts Western liberal democracies in the shape of al-Qaeda and its affiliates is, above all, a war of perception and propaganda. In other words, it is a war of will and ideology. Significantly, both critical terror and more mainstream counter-insurgency studies deny this, preferring instead to address second order concerns. The prevailing academic illiberalism, as we have shown, ` ne to jihadisms ideological critique of the interforms the intellectual mise en sce national order. Through its corrosive relativism it also undermines the Wests own political democratic self-understanding. Although the details of the ethically transformed, sustainable security world remain obscure, we do know that it will be neither liberal nor democratic. At a minimum it will see the end of capitalism and free markets; the promotion, by violence if necessary, of post-national formations; the transformation of the Middle East; an end to the state of Israel; and a commitment to redistributive policies both globally and locally combined with enhanced and enforced multicultural sensitivity towards the oppressed non-Western other. Ultimately, the argument and style that characterizes the more sophisticated jihadist texts reflect the deconstructive thinking in critical international relations theory and its offspring, critical terror studies. By a curious and little explored irony, state subsidized Western university departments dreamed up the ideology that informs jihadism. It finds its way into the reports of the jihadist equivalent of think-tanks and to the latest strategic thinking of al-Qaeda.

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Notes
1. Peter R. Neumann, Europes Jihadist Dilemma, Survival 48, no. 2 (2006), 71. 2. Lorenzo Vidino, Al-Qaeda in Europe (Amhurst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 368. 3. See David Kilcullen, Subversion and Counter Subversion in the Campaign against Terrorism in Europe, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2006), 653. 4. The use of the term Islamism in this article refers to the radical belief that Islam is not merely a faith but a system of political thought that can regulate all aspects of society in accordance with Islamic principles. It does not inherently connote a belief in violent extremism and is not to be conflated with Islam as a revealed religion. 5. Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 6. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Batt, Radicalization in the West: The Home Grown Threat (New York: New York City Police Department 2007), 5. 7. David Kilcullen, a former Australian army colonel and a PhD graduate of the University of New South Wales, is today probably the most influential terrorism and insurgency analyst in Washington. His work, for instance, his advocacy of Disaggregation as the basis of a global counterinsurgency strategy, has informed the evolution of much U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in recent years. See for example, David J. Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency, Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (Aug. 2005), 597617. 8. Kilcullen (see note 3 above), 658. 9. Ibid., 649. 10. Ibid., 652. 11. Mark Lilla, A New, Political Saint Paul, New York Review of Books 55, no. 16, 23 October 2008. 12. See Radicalization, Extremism and Islamism: Realities and Myths in the War on Terror: A Report by Hizb-ut- Tahrir, Britain (London: al-Khilafah, 2007), 14. 13. Rohan Gunaratna, Ideology in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Lessons from combating al-Qaeda and Al Jemaah al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, in Abdul Halim bin Kader, ed., Fighting Terrorism: The Singapore Perspective (Singapore: Taman Bacaan, 2007), 95. 14. Stephen Ulph, Al Qaedas Enemy Within, available at: (http://bbc.co.uk/nol/ shared/spl/hi/programmmes/analysis/transcripts/07_08-08.txt). 15. Ekaterina Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research Report 23 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 20. 16. Ibid., 25. 17. Ibid., 66. Stepanova also makes the point that while jihadist activists may not be recognized intellectuals or in the case of religious terrorists advanced theologians does not mean that theologians are not ideologically driven, 25. 18. Khilaffah is the term that Hizb ut-Tahrir uses in its various works advocating their preferred outcome for the political organization of the Muslim world. Khilaffaism is perhaps the most appropriate coinage to express the ideology. The alternative is the anglicized term caliphism which we also use in this article. 19. Olivier Roy, Euro-Islam: The Jihad Within, The National Interest 71 (Spring 2003), 67. 20. Taqiuddin Nabhani, The System of Islam Nidham al-Islam (London: al-Khilafah, 2002); Thought al-Tafkeer (London: al-Khilafah, 2004); Islamic Personality al-Shaksiyyah al-Islamiyyah (London: al-Khilafah, 2005). 21. Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (New York: Encounter, 2006), 1417. 22. See (http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html) accessed 22 Aug. 2005. 23. Ed Husain, The Islamist (London: Penguin, 2007), 83110. 24. Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Method to Re-establish the Khilifah (London: Al-Khilifah, 2000), 1. 25. Ibid., 105106. 26. For a survey see Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British University Campuses (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2005). 27. Husain (see note 23 above), 108.

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28. Ibid., 102. 29. Ibid., 73. 30. Hassan Butt, My Plea to Fellow Muslims: You Must Renounce Terror, The Observer, 1 July 2007. See also Shiraz Maher, How I Escaped Islamism, Sunday Times, 12 Aug. 2007; Maajid Nawaz and Dawud Masieh, In and Out of Islamism (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2008). Butts testimony concerning the jihadi network is unreliable. See Vikram Dodd, Al-Qaida Fantasist Tells Court: Im a Professional Liar, The Guardian, 9 Feb. 2009. Nevertheless, despite his propensity to lie for money, Butt was the spokesman for Omar Bakri Mohammeds al Mujahiroun in the 1990s, and as Manchester Police acknowledge, had links to a number of convicted terrorists. Muslim radicals have also questioned the role that both Husain and Nawaz played in Hizb ut-Tahrir. The attempt to traduce the reputation of former brothers is a familiar feature of radical sectarian politics. Moreover, the aspersions cast upon Husain and Nawazs credentials also reflects the fact that their think-tank the Quilliam Foundation is prominently engaged in counter radicalization strategies. Nawaz was in fact gaoled in Egypt in 2001 for his membership of Hizb. 31. For Qutb after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate no country had replaced Turkey as the Islamic worlds centre. To bring about a new caliphate governed by Gods law there must be a revival in one Muslim country, enabling it to attain that status. Significantly, after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996 and established an Islamic state governed by sharia law, in the view of bin Laden and others, Afghanistan became the strongest candidate for the core of the new caliphate. See Interview with Nidaul Islam in Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), 42. 32. Ibid., 121. 33. Ibid., 4142. 34. Ayman al-Zawahiri letter to Musab al-Zakarwi, 9 July 2005, available at: (http:// www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm). 35. Abu Hamza quoted in James Brandon, Virtual Caliphate: Islamic Extremists and their Websites (London: Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008), 3. Abdullah Faisal also described democracy as shirk, 6. 36. Cited in ibid., 14. 37. Al-Qaeda Training Manual, 9. The full text is available from the U.S. Department of Justice at: (http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm). 38. Mahan Abedin, Al Muhajiroun in the UK an Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, Spotlight on Terror 2 no. 5, 22 March 2004, at: (http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=290), accessed 29 September 2009. 39. Ibid. However, former leading Hizb ut-Tahrir member Maajid Nawaz stated in a BBC Newsnight interview on 13 September 2007 that the organization secretly believes that the killing of millions to expand the caliphate would be justified. The interview is available at: (http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/2007/09). 40. For example, nearly all Hizb ut-Tahrir texts make some form of reference to the Khalifah as the ultimate source of salvation. See for instance some of the organizations press statements such as: Only the return of the Khilafah will silence those who attack Islam, 4 April 2008 (http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/press-centre/press-release/only-the-return-of-thekhilafah-will-silence-those-who-attack-islam.html); Hizb ut-Tahrir Calls For Replacing the Israeli Apartheid State with Khilafah, 19 May 2008; (http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/ press-centre/press-release/hundreds-attend-palestine-meeting-marking-60-years-of-occupationand-oppression.html), accessed 1 June 2008. 41. Hizb ut-Tahrir, Iraq: A New Way Forward at <www.hizb.org.uk> accessed 7 Nov. 2007. See also Radicalism, Extremism and Islamism (note 12 above), ch. 3 which explores the caliphatic system, 20ff. 42. Iraq: A New Way Forward (see note 41 above), 5055. 43. See Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, The System of Islam (London: al-Khilafah, 2002). This is a Hizb ut-Tahrir translation of al-Nabhanis system written in Jordan in the 1950s. 44. Radicalism, Extremism and Islamism (see note 12 above), 2021. 45. Iraq: A New Way Forward (see note 41 above), 52. 46. The similarity between Islamist thinking and Western styles of illiberal thought was a point initially observed and developed by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: Norton, 2003), esp. 53153.

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47. Husain (see note 23 above), 161. 48. Ibid., 162. 49. Ibid., 163. 50. Paul Rogers, Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion of Control (Routledge: London, 2008), 82. 51. Ken Booth, The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking-Glass, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (April 2008), 75. 52. Rogers (see note 50 above), 33. 53. Osama bin Laden, video 7 September 2007 at: (http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/ msnbc/sections/news/070907_bin_laden_transcript.pdf), accessed 29 May 2008. 54. Andrew Linklater and Hidegami Suganami, The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 246272. 55. See Roy E. Jones, The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure, Review of International Studies 7, no. 1 (1981), 113. 56. Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (London: Macmillan, 1998), 511. 57. David Held and Anthony McGrew, The End of the Old Order? Globalization and the Prospects for World Order, Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998), 232. 58. Roger Epp, The English School and the Frontiers of International Society, Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998), 49. 59. Barry Buzan, The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR, Review of International Studies 27, no. 3 (July 2001), 472. 60. See Richard Little, English School vs. American Realism: A Meeting of Minds or Divided by a Common Language? Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (Oct. 2003), 443460. 61. Buzan (see note 59 above), 472. 62. See Dale C. Copeland, A Realist Critique of the English School, Review of International Studies 29, no. 3 (2003), 430. 63. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). 64. Martin Wight did write of the three approaches that he felt characterized the study of the international system (realism, rationalism, and revolutionism), see Martin Wight, International Relations: The Three Traditions (eds. Brian Porter and Garbriele Wight) (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991). However, whether this constitutes the English School tradition, let alone represents Wights own position on the question of the underlying factors that govern the international system (which appear to be classically realist) is rather questionable. See for example, Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Penguin, 1978). 65. Copeland (see note 62 above), 430. 66. Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 67. Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990), 89. 68. See Andrew Linklater, Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in International Relations at the End of the Post-War Age, Millennium 23, no. 1 (1994), 119131. 69. See Richard Devatek, The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory, Millennium 24, no. 1 (1995), 3738. 70. Ken Booth, Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice, International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991), 539. 71. Booth (see note 51 above), 65. 72. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, The Post-Colonial Moment in Security Studies, Review of International Studies 32, no. 2 (April 2006), 329. 73. Ken Booth, Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991), 313326; Bikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy, in David Held, ed., Prospects for Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 156175; and Steve Smith, The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of a International Relations Theory, in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 911.

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74. Taraq Barkawi, On the Pedagogy of Small Wars, International Affairs 80, no. 1 (Jan. 2004), 28. 75. Ibid., 27. 76. Barkawi and Laffey (see note 72 above), 330. 77. Richard Jackson, Language, Policy and the Construction of a Torture Culture in the War on Terrorism, Review of International Studies 33, no. 3 (2007), 353371. 78. Michael Stohl, Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of Terrorism, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (April 2008), 1112. 79. Richard Jackson, Genealogy, Ideology and Counter-Terrorism: Writing Wars on Terrorism from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush Jr, Studies in Language and Capitalism 1 (2006), 172. 80. Booth (see note 51 above), 77. 81. Ken Booth (see note 70 above), 539. 82. Marie Breen-Smyth, Jeroen Gunning, Richard Jackson, George Kassimeris, and Piers Robinson, Critical Terrorism Studies An Introduction, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (April 2008), 2. 83. Barkawi and Laffey (see note 72 above), 332. 84. Ibid., 333. 85. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1978); Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (London: Vintage, 1981). 86. Richard Jackson, Constructing Enemies: Islamic Terrorism, in Political and Academic Discourse, Government and Opposition 42, no. 3 (2007), 399. 87. Barkawi and Laffey (see note 72 above), 336347. 88. Richard Jackson, Security, Democracy and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism, Democracy and Security 1, no. 2 (2005), 152. 89. Ibid., 152. 90. Barkawi and Laffey (see note 72 above), 347. 91. Barkawi (see note 74 above), 33. 92. Jackson (see note 88 above), 152. 93. Richard Jackson, An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 2 (June 2007), 243. 94. Ibid., 243. 95. Barkawi and Laffey (see note 72 above), 347. See also Anthony Burke, The End of Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 1 (2008), 45 which also cites Qutb positively, arguing that his critique of the West is sometimes well observed and converges with elements of critical theory. 96. See Fred Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences (London: Saqi, 2002). 97. Jackson (see note 88 above), 166. 98. Ibid., 166. 99. Hizb ut-Tahrir, Radicalization, Extremism and Islamism (see note 12 above), 9. 100. Ibid., 5. 101. Ibid., 7. 102. Ibid., 2325. 103. It should be noted here the Hizb ut-Tahrirs objectives are not confined merely to the Middle East but like the Islamist project in general, its agenda is global not regional. 104. Hizb ut-Tahrir, Iraq: A New Way Forward (see note 41 above), 150155. 105. See Jeroen Gunning, A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies? Government and Opposition 2, no. 3 (2007), 363393. 106. Barkawi (see note 74 above), 29. 107. Richard Jackson, Responses, International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007), 174. 108. Ibid., 174175. 109. Hizb ut-Tahrir (see note 12 above), 136. 110. Breen-Smith, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris, and Robinson (see note 82 above), 2. 111. Routledge journal proposal for Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2006. 112. Oceanic Conference on International Studies Conference, University of Melbourne, 57 July 2006 (http://www.politics.unimelb.edu.au/ocis/draft.pdf), accessed 2 June 2008.

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113. Oceanic Conference on International Studies Conference, Australian National University, 1416 July 2004 (http://rspas.anu.edu.au/ir/Oceanic/OCIS%20Final%20Program. pdf), accessed 4 June 2008. 114. British International Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Cambridge, 1719 Dec. 2007 (http:// www.bisa.ac.uk/2007/index.htm), accessed 4 June 2008. 115. Is it Time for Critical Terrorism Studies, University of Manchester, 2728 Oct. 2006, co-sponsored by the British International Studies Working Group on Critical Studies on Terrorism, The Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, the Economic and Social Research Council and the University of Manchester. 116. Katrina Lee Koo, Terror Australis: Security, Terror and the War on Terror Discourse, Borderlands 4, no. 1 (2005). 117. Goldie Osurie, Regimes of Terror: Contesting the War on Terror, Borderlands 5, no. 6 (2006). 118. Koo (see note 116 above), para. 11. , Fear and Terror in a Post Colonial Age, Government and Opposition 119. Bill Durodie 42, no. 2 (2007), 442. 120. Koo (see note 116 above), para. 33. 121. Ibid., para. 31. 122. Jackson (see note 93 above), 244. 123. Anthony Burke, Freedoms Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War, Social Identities 11, no. 4 (2005), 315. 124. Ibid., 315. 125. Anthony Burke, Against the New Internationalism, Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2005), 74. 126. Anthony Burke, Reply to Jean Bethke Elshstein: For a Cautious Utopianism, Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2005), 98. 127. Koo (see note 116 above), para. 31. 128. Burke (see note 125 above), 74. 129. Interestingly, critical terrorism studies theorists speak endlessly not of plurality or tolerance but of self-reflexivity by which they mean reflecting exclusively upon the iniquities of the construction of Western knowledge discourses and Western policies. For example, in the first edition of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, the two and a half page introduction manages to use the phrase five times. See Breen-Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris and Robinson (note 82 above), 13. The phrase crops up regularly in other contributions to the journal. See Burke (note 95 above), 38 and 44; Booth (note 51 above), 71. Elsewhere, Gunning (note 105 above) employs the phrase eight times (370, 379, 382, 389, 392, 392, 393). 130. Jackson (see note 86 above), 396. 131. Ibid., 425. 132. Ibid., 395. See also Jackson (note 88 above), 165; Jackson (note 77 above), 371. 133. John J. Mearsheimer, E. H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On, International Relations 19, no. 2 (2005), 145. Here Mearsheimer is quoting from Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice, International Relations 18, no. 1 (2004), 9. 134. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 68. 135. Ibid., 68. 136. See Azzam Karim, Islamisms, Globalisation, Religion and Power, in Ronaldo Munck and Purnaka de Silva, eds., Postmodern Insurgencies: Political Violence, Identity Formation and Peacemaking in Comparative Perspective (London: Macmillan, 2000), 217. 137. John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 231. 138. Jackson (see note 86 above), 420. 139. Jackson, (see note 88 above), 157. Of course, this is a spurious contention as quite evidently there are dangers which are not independent of interpretation. A child playing in the middle of a busy road is objectively in a dangerous situation. The child faces a high probability of being struck by a vehicle irrespective of ones perception of the level of danger.

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140. Meghan Morris, White Panic or Mad Max and the Sublime, in Chen Kuan-Hsing, ed., Trajectories: Inter-Asian Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1998), 246. 141. See David Campbell, The Social Basis of Australian and New Zealand Security Policy (Canberra: Pacific Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989), 26. 142. Cited in Simon Philpott, Fear of the Dark: Indonesia and the Australian National Imagination, Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 3 (2001), 376. 143. Jackson (see note 88 above), 166. 144. Ibid., 157. 145. Ibid., 166. 146. It is noteworthy that the myth of the suppression of dissenting critical viewpoints (when in fact they are more than well represented in both the media and academy) is purveyed to sustain and legitimize the critical voice. For example, Jackson argues: Already, conservatives have attacked anti-globalization protestors, academics, postmodernists, liberals, pro-choice activists, environmentalists, and gay liberationists as being aligned to terrorism and its inherent evil. However, he cites no examples, and refers only to the work of David Campbella critical theorist himselfas the source of authority as justification for this claim (David Campbell, Time is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to September 11, Theory and Event 5, no. 4 (2002)). Nor does he appear to see the irony of denouncing others for supposedly de-legitimizing opposing views, while trying to do exactly the same to those who oppose his position. It suggests two things: 1) that conservative criticism (or indeed any form of criticism) of the critical voice is for some reason invalid 2) that the notion of the attempted de-legitimization of dissent is a conspiracy that is wholly manufactured, or more worryingly, actually believed by critical theorists. Jackson (see note 88 above), 166. 147. Mearsheimer (see note 133 above), 144. 148. Richard Jordan, Danial Maliniak, Amy Oaks, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, One Discipline or Many? TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculties in Ten Countries (Willamsburg, VA: Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) Project published by the Institute of the Theory and Practice of International Relations, February 2009). For example Q.26 (pp. 3132) indicates only 8 percent of UK and 16 percent of Australian international relations scholars approached their subject from a realist perspective. 149. Anthony Burke, The Perverse Perseverance of Sovereignty, Borderlands 1, no. 2 (2002), para. 64. 150. Butt (see note 30 above). 151. Stepanova (see note 15 above), 6072. 152. The title of Australian Research Council grants DPO558402 and DP0559707. 153. Ruth Blakeley paper at BISA 2006, subsequently published as Ruth Blakely, Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies, European Political Science 6, no. 9 (2007), 228235. See also Ruth Blakeley, The Elephant in the Room: A Response to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1, no. 2 (2008), 153154. 154. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), 11.

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