VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Valdes vs.

RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing o n the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. Arguments: Petitioner: Petitioner argues that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated,

(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129, (4) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership (Art 147 Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. UGALDE V. YSASI, G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008 Facts: Lorea Ugalde and Jon de Ysasi got married beforeMunicipal Judge Remigio Pea of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental and on March 1, 1951, Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III. Later on, they separated and the respondent contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith. Petitioner alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife and that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC of Negros Occidental. Thereafter, respondent contended that he and the petitioner entered into an agreement which provides that their conjugal partnership shall be deemed dissolved. Pursuant to this, an Amicable Settlement was submitted to the CFI of Negros Occidental. CFI approved the Amicable Settlement. Respondent likewise alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway and upon the latters death, she contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata. Further, respondent alleged that their marriage was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license. TC- ruled that there was no conjugal partnership of gains and that since they entered into an amicable settlement which was later on approved, the petitioner may no longer repudiate it. CA- affirmed the decision of the trial court

Issue: 1. 2. Held: 1.

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court's Decision which dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains? Whether or not the TC exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of the petitioner and respondents marriage? No.

further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code ISSUE: WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code HELD: The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It i s not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. PATERNITY AND FILIATION Babiera v.Catotal G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. Thus, the applicable law is the Civil Code (RA 386). Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains: Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled; (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. (Emphasis supplied) The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided on the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (S.P. No 3330), the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on June 6, 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date. 2. Yes. The trial court then proceeded to rule on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage. The trial court ruled that it was shown by competent evidence that petitioner and respondent failed to obtain a marriage license. Hence, the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, which was only raised by respondent as a defense to the action for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains. The validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage before RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. In 1995, the said court ruled that the marriage was null and void for failure to comply with the formal and essential requirements of the law. ALAIN M. DIO v. MA. CARIDAD L. DIO FACTS: January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner

FACTS: Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. From the petition filed, Presentacion asserted the following: that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by hilot in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by hilot; that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and HermogenaCariosaBabiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of live birth is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of a child regardless of the fact that the same is obtained by fraud or that it contained some irregularities RULING: No. The present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. The prayer was not to declare that petitioner was an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former was not the latters child at all. The action did not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there was no blood relation to impugn in the first place. While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial. The circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena was not the formers real mother. There was no evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital. The most significant piece of evidence, however, was the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which stated that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was neither hers nor her husband Eugenios. AGUSTIN V CA G.R. No. 162571 | June 15, 2005 | J. Corona Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC. In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition. Issue: W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search

Held: 1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged. 2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said: In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO v PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC G.R. No. 177066

Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. This, we declare in this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137. The facts of the case follow: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.[2] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate names him as Joselito Musni Muno. Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Joselito Musni Puno and Joselito Musni Muno were one and the same. The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioners certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name Joselito M. Puno, certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for pretrial.[3] On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial statements of the corporation. The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject of a bill of costs. SO ORDERED.[4] On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.[5]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution[6] dated March 6, 2007. In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION. II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED. III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[S] MOTION TO DISMISS. V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION.[7] The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding.[8] In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented.[9] A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.[10] As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son. As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity.[11] In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books, thus Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. x x x.

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense. xxxx Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its operations.[12] The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.[13] Such right rests upon the stockholders underlying ownership of the corporations assets and property.[14] Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.[15] Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.[16] During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.[17] Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor.[18] Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property.[19] The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. ADOPTION Sayson v. CA GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992 FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging their successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of representation because of Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and of Doribel was legitimate daughter. The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from E and R by right of representation. The CA found De and E disqualified from inheriting from E and R. ISSUE: Whether or not of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation RULING: As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of T and thus granddaughter of E and R. She has right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children. As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relative of either party. Tamargo vs CA GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992 FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. Petition for review was hereby granted. Santos Jr. v Republic G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967 PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This is as appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) dismissing the petition instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa Y Mendoza. The trial court held that the adoption will result in an incongruous situation where the minor, a legitimate brother of the petitioner wife will also be her son. The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but were denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS: The above named spouses filed petition before the JDRC for the adoption of Edwin Villa Y Mendoza, 4 years old. The spouses do not have a child of their own blood. Edwin was a sickly child since birth and due to his impairing health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who had reared and brought him up for the years thereafter. The natural parents have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption and submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt and it has been shown that the petitioners are not among these prohibited from adopting. Art 339 also enumerates those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is in consideration is not one of those excluded by law. Article 338 of the same code allows adoption of a natural child by the natural father and mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or step-mother. This article has remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited even in cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. It is not the policy of the law not to allow adoption when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. HOLDING: aside. The petition for the adoption of the minor is granted and the decision appealed is set

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner. G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname. Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name. The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surna me, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter. Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

ANSWER: Yes, an elder sister is allowed to adopt a younger brother. REASONING: The court held that there is no provision of law which states that relatives by blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one another. The only objection raised is the alleged incongruity that will result to a dual relationship of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the adopter will also be her son by adoption.

GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009 FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit. ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt. HELD: Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being. G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992 CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG v CA The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilde Dayrit Cuyugan," promulgated on May 10, 1990, and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 2 Said decision, now before us for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy. In said Civil Case No, 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows: xxx xxx xxx

administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983; 3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo; 4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced; . . . Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my heart to you and to Chad. . . . Please take good care and pray to Sto. Nio for our sake and for the child sake. . . . Keep him. Take good care of him. . . . I'm proud that you are his mother. . . I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle him to all what I am and what I've got. . . . I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir. . . . How is CHAD and you . . . . . . Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and CHAD is the product of our love. 5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs; 6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos; 7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained; 8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed; 9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; 10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still fails and

2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the defendant, the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known

refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo; 3 xxx xxx xxx

No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action. No. 4. Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition within four years from his attainment of majority (New Civil Code. Art, 285, No. 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty. Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits. No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable. No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate court has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it. The nature of the case "CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE" does not control the body of the complaint. From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient' in form and substance and, therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a special defense to the action exists. WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 8 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30, 1990. 9 As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24, 1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On May 10, 1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari. In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds: a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in UTTER DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the special civil action of certiorari; b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth or in a will: of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the action for recognition of a natural child; and c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE by the Regional Trial Court from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 10

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give him support pendente lite. Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987, disputing the material allegations in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that there is improper joinder of causes of action. 4 After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987: xxx xxx xxx

The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence on the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss requiring additional evidence is in the meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied and the case as set for pre-trial . . . 5 With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7 In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 7938, in an order dated October 24, 1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner: xxx xxx xxx

The Court now resolves: No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of action being the "primary right to redress a wrong" (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable. No. 2. The present action. despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.

Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed. The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., 11 wherein the petitioner, as plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does, the same is barred by prescription. The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. As early as 1922, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., 12 wherein we said: The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which, in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In, other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seers additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother . . . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed. Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead, paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is premised on the supposition that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created, hence it can be made to apply retroactively. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 13 Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be

dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child. Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. 14 We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15 where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed. Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon. WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

10