GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC.

V COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmers Association.) These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land. Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner? RULING: YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of forcible entry. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with

the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the land. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. As clearly stated in Article 536- In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Grand Union Supermarket Et Al., V. Jose J. Espino, Jr., Et Al., (1979) G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979 Lessons Applicable: Public humiliation (Torts and Damages) Laws Applicable: Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, Art. 26,Art. 2214, New Civil Code FACTS: Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and GamblePhilippines, Inc, together with his wife and two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked it up and held it fearing it might get lost because of its tiny size While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt so as he talked, he placed the rat tail in his breast pocket partly exposed At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but forgot to pay the file As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo regardingthe file in his pocket. He quickly apologized saying "I'm Sorry" and he turned towards the cashier to pay. But, he was stopped and instead was brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter" His wife joined him since he was taking so long and they were brought to the first checkout counter where Ms. Nelia Santos-Fandino's desk was. She made a remark:"Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Jose told Ms. Fandino that he was going to pay for the file because he needed it but she replied "That is all they say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say... They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them." Jose objected stating he is a regular customer of the supermarket He gave P5 to pay for the P3.85 cost of the file but Ms. Fandino said the P5 was his fine which will be rewarded to the guard. People were staring at them. He took the file and paid the file at the nearest checkout counter with P50 and got out as fast as they could. His first impulse was to go back to the supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass windows. But reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should take its due course. He filed against Grand Union Supermarket et al. founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and prays for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney s fees and 'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5 fine CFI: dismissed CA: reversed and granted damages of P75,000 by way of moral damages, P25,000 as exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney's fee

ISSUE: W/N Grand Union Supermarket should be liable for public humiliation founded on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code HELD: YES. Grand Union Supermarket ordered to pay, jointly and severally moraldamages P5,000 and P2,000 as and for attorney's fees; and to return the P5 fine Jose did not intend to steal the file and that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary, he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it personal circumstances: graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P. Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United States for six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington Jose was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident Fine branding him as a thief which was not right nor justified the mode and manner in which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damagesunder Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code) His forgetfullness led to his embarassment and humiliation thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. His act of omission contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness private respondent's predicament. Grand Union Supermarket acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. - eliminate the grant of exemplary damages

Lunod et al vs. Meneses | Torres, J. G.R. No. 4223 | August 19, 1908 FACTS Plaintiifs (Appellees) Nicolas Lunod and 7 others are owners of farmlands on the upper estates near a lake (Calalaran). Defendant-Appellant Higno Meneses is the owner of a fishpond and a strip of land in Paraanan adjoining said lake on one side and a river on the other. Paraan is the only outlet of water to the river from the lands of Lunod et al during rainy season. In 1901 Meneses converted the land in Paraan to a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net prevented the free passage of water through Paraan causing flood and damage of plantations in the upper estates. Lunod et al filed a complaint alleging that there exists in favor of their rice fields a statutory easement for more than 20 years before 1901 and praying that Meneses be ordered to remove the obstructions that impede the passage of water through Paraanan. TC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. ISSUE WON Meneses can be permitted to obstruct the flow of waters through his lands. HELD NO. But Lunod et al cannot prevent the defendant from building works to prevent his lands against influx of waters. RATIO Where a statutory easement exists between adjoining estates, the owner of the lower lands must not construct any work that may impair or obstruct an easement which consists in receiving the waters which naturally, and without the intervention of man, descend from more elevated lands; neither shall the owner of the latter construct any work that may increase the easement. The Civil Code allows that every owner may enclose his property by means of walls, dikes, fences, or any other device, but his right is limited by the easement with which his estate is charged. Since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands against the influx of salt water; but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the flow of the waters through his lands to the river during the heavy rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby impairing the right of the owners of the dominant estates; the court advised that it is perhaps useful and advantageous to all parties that Meneses be made to build a another dike in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in Paraanan, for the purpose of preventing the salt waters of the river flooding (at high tide) not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and its lake.

CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY 510 SCRA 590 (2006)

Upon compliance with the requirements for a valid expropriation, it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession. Capitol SteelCorporation (Capitol Steel) is a domestic corporation which owns 65 parcels of land located at the province of Misamis Oriental. Phividec Industrial Authority (PHIVIDEC) is a government owned and controlled corporation which is vested the power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring rights of way or any property for the establishment or expansion of the PHIVIDEC areas. PHIVIDEC filed anexpropriation case for the properties of Capitol Steel because it was identified as the most ideal site for the project of PHIVIDEC. The trial court denied PHIVIDECs issuance of a writ of possession, noting that the amount deposited was seemingly inadequate and was simply out of PHIVIDECs interpretation of the prevailing zonal valuation and was not mutually agreed upon but it was finally granted by the trialcourt. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of PHIVIDEC, ordering the RTC to issue a Writ of Possession. Hence, this present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred a writ ofpossession in favor of PHIVIDEC in ordering the RTC to issue

HELD: Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry inexpropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials. Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation case, in this case PHIVIDEC, is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974. To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writof possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

NPC vs. Mabuhay EXPROPRIATION - POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN In an expropriation case, NPC insisted that if any amount should be paid to the landowners, it should only be an easement fee of 10% the value of the property, not the full value, since it acquired only a simple right-of-way easement for the passage of its overhead transmission lines. It pointed out that its charter authorizes the acquisition only of a right-of-way easement for its transmission lines and the payment of an easement fee. Is the contention correct? No. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, 437 SCRA 60, it was said that granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, the Court cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. (Republic v. PLDT, 136 Phil. 20 (1969)). True, an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and owner retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. Considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive owner of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of just compensation which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land. (NPC v. Dr. Antero Bongbong, et al., G.R. No. 164079, April 3, 2007).