THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN:

OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

B.A.,

RICHARD J. BREWER, MAJ, USA University of Maine, Orono Maine, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1991

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Title of thesis:

MAJ Richard J. Brewer The Tullahoma Campaign: Insights Operational

Approved by:

, Member
LTC Richard L. Kiper,/~.A.

, Member,
COL Charles A. Endress, Ph.D.

Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 7th day of June 1991 by:

, Director,
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U . S . Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN: OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS by Richard J. Brewer, USA, 192 pages. MAJ

This study examines the operational insights offered by the analysis of the Tullahoma, or Middle Tennessee, Campaign of 1863. The thesis uncovers these operational insights by examining how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, planned for and conducted the nine day campaign.

his study of both commanders' planning and execution of a

campaign characterized by maneuver, rather than large scale battles, highlights five important insights into operational warfighting. These insights include the translation of strategic guidance into an operational plan, offensive and defensive operational planning, the importance of deception, the effects of sustainment on an operation, and the influence of leadership on the planning and conduct of a campaign

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

............................................. ii ABSTRACT ................................................. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................iv vi LIST OF MAPS ..............................................
APPROVAL PAGE CHAPTER I I1

I11

. .

IV

......................................... 1 PRELUDE TO BATTLE .................................... 4 Strategic Setting .................................... 4 Union Military Strategy 1863 .........................7 Confederate Military Strategy 1863 ..................10 Operational Setting ................................. 13 The Terrain .........................................16 The Commanders ...................................... 25 Rosecrans' Plan ..................................... 50 Bragg's Plan ........................................ 57 THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS ................................. 73 The Fight For the Gaps .............................. 78 95 The Drive to Manchester ............................. THE CAMPAIGN ENDS ..................................114 Rosecrans Continues to Concentrate ................. 114 Bragg Considers the Situation ......................125 Tullahoma Evacuated ................................127 Rosecrans Seizes Tullahoma .........................133 Bragg Escapes and the Campaign Ends ................150 CONCLUSIONS ........................................159 Translation of Guidance into an Operational Plan ...159 Defensive Operational Planning .....................163 166 Offensive Operational Planning ..................... Deception ..........................................168 Sustainment ........................................ 170 Leadership .........................................172 175 An Overview ........................................
INTRODUCTION

APPENDIX 1 Order of Battle: APPENDIX 2 Order of Battle: The Army of Tennessee............lM Army of the Cumberland..........,l78

BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................lfI4

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION L I S T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2

LIST OF MAPS Map 1 Map Map Map Map Map

. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
.

Map 7 Map 8 Map

. 9.

Map 10

.............5 The Tullahoma Campaign. Area of Operations .....14 Terrain in the Tullahoma Area of Operations .... 17 Movements on 23 June. 1863 .....................74 Movements on 24 June. 1863 ..................... 77 Movements on 25 and 26 June. 1863 ..............89 Movements on 27 and 28 June. 1863 .............100 Movements on 28 June through Midnight 30 June. 1863 .................................... 115 Movements on 1 July through 8 A.M. 2 July. 1863 ..........................................134 Movements on 2 July through 3 July. 1863 ......141
Strategic Setting. May . June. 1863

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The American Civil War represents a field of As such it study

rich with examples of operational art. numerous campaign principles execution, insights in into operational

provides One

warfighting. of the

particular embodies many promote it sound being a

operational and of

that

operational little-known

planning campaign

despite

maneuver in which the participants suffered fewer than 2,300 casualties. It was the Tullahoma or Middle Tennessee

Campaign of 1863. The Tullahoma Campaign immediately preceded the

Chickamauga campaign and in the larger operational sense was part of it. It marked the peak of Federal Major General decline campaign Rosecrans

William of

Starke Rosecrans* career and the continued

Confederate General . . Braxton Braggls. It was a

of brilliant operational planning and maneuver by

and less than effective operational performance by Bragg. Despite Campaign its relative obscurity, the Tullahoma war the

had far reaching effects on the course of the Rosecrans' victory coincided with

in Middle Tennessee.

two great Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg and as a result

i s often overlooked.

Yet, this little

known

or

studied

campaign

resulted in the opening of

the

path

to and

Chattanooga, and ultimately, the capture of Chattanooga Atlanta.

The very nature of this campaign is a stark contrast to most Civil War campaigns. It was not a campaign that

began or ended with a climactic battle.

The casualties were

a mere drop in the bucket of the carnage which characterized the in American Civil War. Unlike most campaigns it occurred nine were in

terrible weather conditions; it rained the

entire

days of the campaign. for the

The commanders within each army

the most part unknown to those who observed the war East. The armies themselves had a distinctive Most of the Federals hailed from of

western Illinois, Bragg's

composition. Indiana,

Ohio and Kentucky.

The preponderance

army came from Tennessee, Alabama and Kentucky. were veteran armies with experienced

Both armies <Wid

commanders

extensive wartime service. OBJECTIVE

..
The objective of this study is to determine examine the operationa1 insights gleaned from an analysis of the campaign. After acquainting the reader with the States those or will

strategic goals of the United States and Confederate in 1863, the thesis will follow the translation of

goals

into operational plans and how those plans failed Following this discussion the thesis

succeeded.

address success goals will

both

operational

commanders

in

terms the

of

their

in accomplishing their missions and The underlying of operational

strategic then, and

within their theaters. highlight the process

theme, warfare

provide

increased

insight into the nature

of

operational

warf ighting.

CHAPTER 2 PRELUDE TO BATTLE STRATEGIC SETTING In the spring prepared hopefully attempts for end another the war. of 1863 Union and Confederate armies campaigning winter which of would

season of

Following a

fruitless and

to gain Vicksburg by attacking from the north

west, Major General Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Tennessee sat its on the west bank of the Mississippi ready to advance against General John
C.

continue forces

Pemberton's

around Vicksburg (Map 1 ) . Hooker, their with

In the East, Major General Joseph smarting from

the Army of the Potomac still at Fredericksburg the

defeat

previous

December,

prepared Army of

again

for a battle with General Robert Virginia. Major General

E.

Lee's
S.

Northern

William

Rosecrans,

at Murfreesboro, after his victory over

General

Braxton Bragg on 2 Jan 1863, faced Bragg's Army of Tennessee and threatened Middle Tennessee and ultimately the rail

hub at Chattanooga, which, if seized would mean the of the gates to Georgia. Hooker and Grant moved on
27

opening

and

29

April, Grant

respectively, against the Confederates.

On 30 April

crossed the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg and in the

early days of May maneuvered between Vicksburg and

Jackson., toward

Mississippi. After capturing Jackson, Grant advanced

Vicksburg, defeated Pemberton's army of maneuver at Champion Hill and, by 18 May reached the outskirts of the city. July Pemberton surrendered his army and the city On 4 of

Vicksburg. fortress,

The fall of Vicksburg made the other Confederat:e Port Hudson, untenable. With its surrender on
8

July the entire length of the Mississippi River was in Union hands. 2 Hooker, the last in the East, moved against Lee's army subsequent Battle on of

day of April but lost the

Chancellorsville.

On the 4 May Hooker vithdrew his The Army of

entire

army north of the Rappahannock River. Virginia to the Lee's north

Northern access battle, until moved

again prevented the Federals from gaining After the

the land south of the Rappahannock. Army of the Potomac rested near

Fredericksburg he

movements north forced it to pursue Lee as toward the great confrontation at

Gettysburq,

Pennsylvania. 3 As Rosecrans for the these events developed in other the theaters, Cumberland on few
23

continued to prepare his Army of summer offensive he would

commence A

June

against and these

Braxton Braggls Army of Tennessee.

cavalry between in

infantry skirmishes characterized the

action

armies from the end of the Battle of Stones River

January to the initiation of Rosecrans' offensive in June.

UNION MILITARY STRATEGY 1863 In 1861 and 1862 the Union had attempted to strangle the the Confederacy economically "Anaconda Plan." however,

--

the strategy

suggested

by

Winfield ~cott's supporting was distorted by a strong

military to

strategy,

desire

capture the Confederate capital at Richmond and at the time protect Washington. his

same

Major General Henry W. Halleck, on armies in

assignment as General-in-Chief of all Union

July of 1862, brought with him a firm conviction that was much more to Scott's "Anaconda Plan" than

there simple a

strangulation. strategy It was,

The path to victory for the North lay in

that capitalized on the Union effort in the in a way, a continuation of Scott's

West. of idea

policy

strangling

the South, but it went beyond the

current

maintained by Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. that constant pressure on the enemy on all fronts

Stanton was the

only way to win. 4 Halleck the possibly thought that the Union armies in

West, because of their distance from Washington, a better chance of success. These western

might armies

stand would

not have to contend with the

continued

interference separated Halleck recent

from Washington, given the time and distance that them from the politicians in the East. Also

certainly

realized that his Western armies had

won

victories and appeared to be on the verge of winning more. 5

Halleck theater. Confederate than The

recognized Federal

the stalemate of the

in

the

Eastern the more

Army

Potomac

and

Army of Northern Virginia had done little each other without attaining

bloody

significant against little The

territorial

gains.

Furthermore, Federal

success

Richmond would be a great psychological victory, but would change in the East if Lee's army survived.

Confederates would move their capital and continue the war. 6 If, on the other hand, Halleck could implement his beliefs and concentrate Union strength against Jominian

Confederatze

weakness, a resolution to the war might result. 7 The capture of key western cities would serve to cut the Confederate rail and water routes for the and render it t:o

difficult, supply for the

perhaps

impossible,

Confederates bread

their armies. Confederacy. in the

The West represented a Grain crops of and the

baske.t weze

livestock

plentiful Preventing

regions

west

Appalachians. Confederate

these

supplies from

reaching

the

armies would eventually take its toll. 8 Halleck also believed that such a policy, in concert with would counter constant pressure on Confederate armies in divide the the Confederate high command on Union threat. He believed that the East, to

measures

maintaining

pressure in the East should further Confederate concerns for their capital. it difficult, This strategy, Halleck asserted, would if not impossible for the make to

Confederates

shift

forces

from

the

eastern

theater

to

the

western

theater. 9 Lincoln, involved, and capture of admittedly ever concerned about demand idea. the for risk the This

conscious of accepted

public Halleck's called

Richmond, new

relatively strategy, over the

departure, or so

wLincoln-Halleck'' the It North meant in

would set the prevalent direction for next two and a half years of the war.

that in early 1863 the Union would make its major effort the West.

While the Army of the Potomac would still conduct

Eastern campaigns, their actions would be a manifestation of Lincoln and Halleck's desire to keep constant pressure on

all points of the Confederacy.10 Halleck, the winter having given priority to the West during of the

of 1862-1863, for to the

identified Grant's Army Halleck then fixing

Tennessee Rosecrans army. By

major effort.

directed Bragg's

support Grant's movements by

May, Hooker's failure at

Chancellorsville, and caused to

Grant's successful crossing of the Mississippi which General relieve He Joseph Johnston to shift Confederate further Ambrose

forces

Vicksburg, led Halleck to give

guidance. Burnside, with of the

directed Rosecrans and Major General the

commanding

Department of the Ohio and

operating

forces under Brigadier General George Hartsuff northeast Rosecrans in Kentucky, to maintain pressure on

Confederate forces and drive them from

East Tennessee.

As

Rosecrans conducted his offensive Halleck wanted Burnside to protect Rosecransl left flank and cooperate with his advance by destroying Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Bucknerls Army East Tennessee and thereby denying the northern of East Tennessee to the Confederacy.11 CONFEDERATE MILITARY STRATEGY 1863 Jefferson War, had ~ a v i s and the Confederate northern Secretary of of portion

J.A. Seddon, not unlike their

counterparts, of

an inclination to focus more on the Eastern theater They and did not, however, the goals go for as far

operations. prioritizing Davis, in

toward armies. that be He,

defining

their

particular,

was steadfast in

his

belief

through the use of interior lines the Confederacy should able to be strong where it mattered, when it mattered. therefore, Joseph be gave his Western theater commander,

General to

E. Johnston, guidance that reflected this desire

everywhere. Essentially, this meant

strong

Johnston where main

would he

not receive definitive guidance that specified take risk and where he must establish his

could

effort. Johnston and others saw the fallacy of Davis1 and tried as best they could to sway the logic

Confederate forces for in

President. decisive order lost to and

Johnston battles.

suggested concentrating

Johnston further informed Davis that be

concentrate, certain areas might

temporarily of vital

asked Davis to specify what areas were

importance with more

to the Confederacy and which were

not.

Davis, as was

Seddon's concurrence, refused to specify any areas important of than others. conducting Davis argued than one the major North

incapable

more

western

operation at a time and further believed that Johnston would have adequate time to know where and when the Federals would attack. Davis believed Johnston could shuttle his troops

where needed most. 1 2 Johnston countered this argument by trying to

convince Davis that Tennessee, by its physical location, was vital to the protection of the Confederate depots the in

Chattanooga,

Atlanta, and other storehouses in

south.

He further added that it was not as simple as it appeared to shuttle Railroads to reach. forces from one place to another in his theater. had

seldom ran directly toward the point an army Even in the best of cases, time consuming of differing railroad gauges

train were

changes

because

required. 13 There Johnston's Johnston were others who tended P.G.T. that to agree with wrote in and the told from

appraisal. in early

General May of

Beauregard he in

1863

believed Tennessee relieve He

establishing Kentucky. pressure Johnston He

priority

for an offensive

felt such a move necessary

to

on Vicksburg and the Mississippi River. that the offensive would draw Union

forces

Grant's army to contend with the new threat.

Whatever merit

Beauregard's idea an opportunity

held, Johnston did not aggressively propose a bold offensive to

seek

to

Davis. of

Instead,

Johnston

concerned himself with the

problems

coordinating Pemberton's and Bragg's armies. he continued to assert that if priority it should be for

Additionally, were placed in

Middle

Tennessee,

defensive

purposes

initially.

Only after the wearing down of Rosecranst army

should the Army of Tennessee take to the offense.14 Also proposed Virginia, to in May, Lieutenant General and Seddon that of his James own Longstreet corps from forces

Davis

and

elements

Johnston's

western

reinforce Braggts army in Tennessee. by

He suggested an attac:k from into his the

the Army of Tennessee into Ohio to draw Grant and force the Union armies well back idea, an

siege,

northern because

states. he was

Davis tabled Longstreet's at the time intrigued by

perhaps

alternative

proposed by General Lee. 15 Lee, not desiring to commit any part of the Army Northern Virginia for western excursions, had his own for the breaking the deadlock. He proposed an attack deep enemy's territory in the East. Lee felt a of

ideas int:o

successful the

attack Army of

into Pennsylvania, and the subsequent defeat of the Potomac might cause an already tired In

Union late of

public to pressure their leaders to sue for peace. May, Davis accepted Lee's plan for the

invasion

Pennsylvania. 16

Davis strategy Johnston

thus closed the door on a

western

offensive It fell the to

or a diversion of troops to the west.

to develop a strategy for the armies in

West

using the forces at hand.

By May, left to fend for himself,

and directed to defend everything, Johnston absorbed himself in the problem of Vicksburg and generally neglected the rest of his theater. OPERATIONAL SETTING For Tennessee thirty the first six months of
1863

the

Army more

of than

and the Army of the Cumberland sat no astride the main line of the

miles apart

Nashville

and Chattanooga Railroad (Map 2) and each used it for their resupply. Rosecrans drew his sustenance from Nashville and Bragg received the bulk of his

Louisville to the north.

forage from the local countryside and Alabama to the south. He relied on his base at Chattanooga, and whatever he could procure Bragg's from Atlanta, for his dry goods and ordnance. and the

army was all that stood between Rosecrans

major rail hub in Chattanooga. The spring was a fairly quiet time for both Both engaged periodically in cavalry raids on each armies. others

lines of supply, but there was little other combat activity. Both seemed content to ready their armies for the eventual

confrontation.

Units were restructured, supplies stockpiled

and reinforcements sought.

n M R V l L L l ( 8 0 MI)
UURFRCEOsORO

UDUINNVILLE

~lCI.DO10

10

I
APPROXIYUC 8 O L C IMILEII)

TULLAllOUA

Federal Units Confederate Unlts

ELK R I V E R

FNETTEVILLE

U*lV.ll*lT*

cec

Map 2. The Tullahoma

General

Bragg,

after

withdrawing

from

the

Murfreesboro battlefield on 3 January 1863, had a defensive line along the Duck River. army

established his to

By June of 1863 west

of 45,000 was spread from Spring Hill in the in the east. cavalry Brigadier General Nathan the

McMinnville Forrest's flank outer Polk's

Bedford left the

division covered

Confederate to

and screened a tenuous line from Spring Hill reaches of Shelbyville. Lieutenant General

Leonidas works in two

corps of two divisions occupied defensive Lieutenant General William

Shelbyville.

Hardee's

division corps occupied Wartrace, with elements Tullahoma, of

garrisoning points Joseph and west

and others picketing the southern egress and Hoover's Gaps. Major General

Liberty

Wheeler's Hardee's

cavalry corps, positioned

forward of Polk's

corps, occupied a line from Guy's Gap in the

to McMinnville in the east. 17 Major General Rosecrans encamped around Murfreesboro with Major four infantry and one cavalry corps (XIV Corps General George Thomas, XX Corps under McCook, the XXI Corps under Major Major General Major Major under

General Thomas General General

Alexander

Crittenden, Gordon David

reserve corps commanded by and the Cavalry corps under totaling over 70,000

Granger Stanley)

effectives.18 each corps, along

Rosecrans' containing however,

infantry corps were stronger than Bragg's, at least three divisions. The reserve duty

had two divisions assigned to picket

the

line

of communication from it with too, only one

Louisville for

to the

Nashville, campaign. to

leaving

division

Rosecrans,

established a series of

entrenchments

protect against any possible offensive attempt by Bragg. Rosecrans, successful during the intervening months was more

than Bragg in bolstering his manpower.

Through

great diligence and perseverance, Rosecrans managed to build his cavalry arm up to 10,000 effectives. of With the addition 13,000 Braggl!s in and

3,000 mounted infantry Rosecrans, in effect, had This put Rosecrans at least at par with Rosecrans actually had several

horsemen. cavalry. l9 cavalry.

advantages

His mounts were in better shape than Bragg's

his mounted infantry brigade, under Colonel John T. was armed with the new Spencer repeating rifle. THE TERRAIN

Wilder,

The terrain in Middle Tennessee presented challenges to the attacker and the defender alike. intensify the challenges. 3). a Poor weather would

The terrain itself is varied (Map

Numerous creeks laced the entire area and proved to be hindrance to movement in wet weather. The relief of of

terrain features in the area greatly affected the course the roads, streams and railroads. to the Cumberland As one moved south Mountains While the the

from

Murfreesboro continued to

terrain elevation

increase in elevation.

changes were generally gradual, there were some exceptions.

Map 3.

Terrain in the Tullahoma Area of Operations. 2 0

17

Map 3.

Terrain in the Area of Operations (continued). 21

18

Bragg's defensive line along the Duck River received protection from one such exception. north rose four from
,

Approximately ten miles rocky hill to

of Shelbyville an east-west line of high steeply. miles

At places, this line of hills was They

three

in depth, from north to south.

extended west of feet

Bradeyville in the east to about three miles

Fosterville.

The hills themselves rose as much as 500

above the table land and presented a barrier to movement. Through between these hills four gaps provided Gap access was a

Murfreesboro

and Tullahoma.

Hoover's

long, narrow defile that narrowed to the width of two wagons at places. Further to the west lay Liberty Gap, then

Bellbuckle Gap, through which the Nashville and Railroad defense Lastly, Guy's barely ran. Each of the three gaps was

Chattanooga suitable for

by a determined and well emplaced

infantry

force. at

the Shelbyville Pike ran through the low ground Gap. Guy's Gapwasactuallya low, wide

saddle,
a

noticeable as a gap.

It served little purpose to

defender as the ground west of it was traversible. 2 2 The was the next exception to the gradual elevation running from Wartrace change to to

escarpment

northeast steeply

Woodbury.

South of this line the terrain rose

form a wide plateau that extended to the Duck River.

Except

for the hills breaking the plateau on the eastern side, this plateau was uniform.

West of Wartrace and north of Shelbyville, extending to Murfreesboro and west to Columbia basically flat.

Franklin, few

the

land the

remained

Except for a

creeks,

terrain in this area was easily trafficable. Moving further south another exception to the

gradual elevation changes occurred. up from

Another escarpment rose and formed to the 600 on

the south bank of the Duck River of the "Barrens."

Plateau feet this

The elevation rose 500

above the previously mentioned escarpment. plateau The that Braggts advanced depot at

It was

Tullahoma from

rested.

"Barrens" ran in an easterly

direction

Upper Elkton (50 miles west of Tullahoma) to Tullahoma, then ran northeasterly to McMinnville and beyond. The operations last sharp elevation increase in the area River of in

occurred just to the south of the Elk

the vicinity of the Cowan It the

University Place - Pelham it

line.

was here that the ground rose sharply up as Cumberland Mountains.

reached above a

At an elevation 1200 feet

the Cumberland Mountains were visible from the lfBarrens,*t great distance and appeared as a solid wall to

southerly

movement. The two major rivers in the area of operations hindered movement. The Duck River never exceeded more also than

fifty yards in width during good weather and was fordable at many places. Still, there were a number of and points, Nashville

particularly

to the west of the Chattanooga

Railroad where crossings were possible only on bridges or in the ford sites. The problem. good Elk River presented a somewhat In more difficult wide in on

places it was more than fifty yards One generally had to cross

weather.

exclusively Worse, and

bridges or were only

the limited number of ford sites. four good bridges between Pelham Springs). Two of the

there

Allisonia one a

(vicinity Estell railroad at

bridges,

and the other a highway bridge, crossed the One bridge crossed at Bethpage and

river the

Allisonia.

remaining bridge crossed at Pelham. In roads, cities. did have 1863 the area had a number of good, macadamized towns and

the best of which ran between the larger

Only one major railroad ran through the area but it short via and spurs. One spur ran from Tullahoma Decherd City to to via

McMinnville Winchester

Manchester, another ran

from

the last ran from Cowan to Tracy

University P ace. roads such for went.

The terrain determined largely where the at points avenues avenues

Though many of these roads joined

as the gaps or bridges there were a number of north-s uth movement. To the attacker these

represented a number of opportunites. Should Shelbyville, routes to Rosecrans opt for a direct approach three to

Wartrace or Tullahoma, there were use. Each of the three would entail

good

movements

through one of the three westernmost gaps in the line of low

hills north of the Duck River.

If Rosecrans desired to move

on Wartrace, and then to Tullahoma the roads running throu.gh Liberty approach. from Gap and Bellbuckle Gap presented the he desired to move straight to most direct

If

Shelbyville through

Murfreesboro, the Shelbyville Pike, which ran

Guy's Gap, presented the best option. From also the vicinity of Murfreesboro Rosecrans could Bragg's

choose a number of indirect routes to envelop

Duck River line and continue on to Tullahoma, Chattanooga or points in between. On Bragg's right flank two fairly good

roads led from McMinnville to Tullahoma.

It was, however, a McMinnville

75 mile trip from Murfreesboro to Tullahoma via

and therefore not a likely route for an attacker. 2 3 There movements.. to were other options available for flank

The town of Manchester presented an

opportunity possible

stage for a flank attack on Tullahoma.

It was

to reach Manchester by two routes. to Manchester were.

One led from Bradeyville where the

and avoided the high rocky hills The other went directly from

gaps

Murfreesboro

through Hoover's Gap to Manchester. Once at Manchester there were four roads due west to Tullahoma. broad front. proceeding a go

These roads allowed an advance on

If, however, Rosecrans preferred he could

south from Manchester and bypass Tullahoma.

From Manchester

there were roads that led to Pelham, the University, Decherd and Winchester.

Lastly, the numerous roads to the vest allowed access open route to Shelbyville. The terrain on this flank was most

easy more

and level. from

The Shelbyville Pike was the

direct the

Murfreesboro to Shelbyville.

To the from

west

Middleton

road also ran to Shelbyville

Murfreesboro.

Further to the west there were a number of less direct roads such as those running from Triune, Spring Hill and Columbia. During commanders their planning considered for the the campaign both

carefully

terrain.

Neither,

however, indicated undue concern for what effect the weather might have on their plans. Prior to the execution of

Rosecrans' advance there were no discussions concerning what the army would for do in the event of heavy rain. the It was

unfortunate,

this was one campaign

that

weather

dramatically affected trafficability. While Shelbyville, the main pikes running from Murfreesboro to the

Wartrace and Manchester were macadamized,

lesser roads connecting the smaller towns were in most cases nothing sustained more than worn dirt tracks. roads became During virtual periods of

rain,

these

quagmires.

Crittenden's corps would travel on one such route during his advance and it would take him four days to travel 17 miles. Similarly, the creeks and rivers became obstacles Duck rainy to movement during periods of heavy significant rain. banks The in

and Elk Rivers swelled normally above their weather.

The widths and depths of both rivers

could

increase this ford

as much as twice their normal measurements. one could only cross the Duck River In the case of the Elk at

When the the

happened

and bridge sites.

River,

fords could also become completely unusable leaving only the bridges as a means to cross. Rain rivers. also greatly increased the velocity of th.e

This made it difficult, in some cases impossible to In those places where force had to

put pontoon bridges across the river. fording was

possible it meant the crossing

place heavy ropes across the river to prevent having the men and horses swept downstream. The combined nightmare possessed from. road systems and potential weather made effects, defense
a

with

the nature of the terrain,

anywhere forward of the Elk River.

The

attacker choose or

a great advantage with so many avenues to

The opportunities for envelopments, either single The multitude of

double, abounded in this region. available to an attacker made it defend

avenues to the in

practically impossible This meant that

effectively against each one.

defender could defend only the most likely attack routes force. force

Additionally, if the weather turned wet, a defending with its back to either of the major rivers risked

losing its withdrawal routes. However, if the defender could avoid defending Except

forward of the Duck River, there were other options. for the McMinnville

via Jasper approach (20 miles southeast

of the University), all other roads in the region the Cumberlands at either Cowan or University. one piece of decisive terrain that Bragg

traversed

This was the had at his

disposal.

A determined resistance in this

location

would would,

force an enemy to take a wide detour.

A wide detour

in turn, expose the attacker to flank attacks on his line of communication. Most importantly,
a

wide

detour

would

preclude use of the railroad for sustainment. 2 4 Importantly, southeast pass long and to even though forces could traverse had to foot

Chattanooga via Cowan, this movement The the

through the railroad tunnel at Cowan. tunnel completely controlled access to

2200

railroad, over the

without it forces could not move through, or at or this point. In the event the

mountains destroyed

Confederates a lengthy there the

blocked the tunnel it would cause

delay to the Federals. would

Faced with such a proposition

only be the road south from University on

which

Federals could proceed southeast to Chattanooga. 25 THE COMMANDERS THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND By Army of the spring of 1863 the senior commanders in Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee the were

the

veterans of extensive Civil War service. at the Military Academy at West Point.

Most were educated Some had served Many fought on in

continuous

active duty for over 20 years.

the Indian Wars and in the Mexican War.

One experience they

all

shared, however, was prior to the Civil War, maneuvered organizations the size and

they

had of

never

complexity

those they now commanded. William the Cumberland, Starke Rosecrans, commander of the Army was born 6 September 1819 in of

Delaware

County, Ohio. became

Despite a limited formal education, Rosecrans demonstrated received Academy. regimen As an an He and a was

an extremely proficient reader and streak. to the In 1838,

inventive appointment excelled graduated reward

Rosecrans, Military academic

United States formal

in in for

West

Point's

1842 fifth in his class of fifty-one. his academic excellence, Rosecrans

commissioned a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. 26 On his departure from West Point, Rosecrans spent year working on fortifications at Hampton Roads, a

Virginia.

He then spent four years at West Point teaching engineering, an assignment which prevented Lieutenant Rosecrans from

seeing

action in the Mexican War.

The years that

followed 1 : n

were uneventfully spent on various engineering projects.

1854 Rosecrans resigned his commission to return to civilian life where he eventually applied his inventive talents t : o

the refining industry.27 When the war began Rosecrans volunteered as an to Major General George B. McClellan, commander of aide the this the

Department of the Ohio. capacity

"Colonel" Rosecrans served in became

from 19 April to 10 June 1861 when he

commander of the 23rd Ohio Infantry. appointment, Rosecrans

Shortly following this in the

became a brigadier general

Regular Army and took command of a brigade. in

He participated won his

McClellanls operations in western Virginia and

first significant engagement at the Battle of Rich on 11 July 1861. Army

Mountain

When McClellan left to take command of the commander of

of the Potomac, Rosecrans served as the

the Department of the Ohio until September 21, 1861 and then as the commander of the Department of Western Virginia until

7 April 1862.28
Rosecrans division commander placed Grant. the in of left Virginia to take command of a the

the Army of the Mississippi that army on 11 June 1862.

and

became This

position S. of 19 to

Rosecrans

directly under Major General

Ulysses

Rosecrans fought his first battle as of the Mississippi at Iuka,

commander on

Army

Mississippi

September pursue Thus men.

1862.

Despite winning the battle, he had

failed

the withdrawing Confederates as Grant

ordered. two his

began the ill feelings that developed between the The day after Iuka, Rosecrans learned of

previously confirmed promotion to major general. 29 The Battle of Corinth, Mississippi followed on In this battle Rosecrans skillfully Van Dorn and Sterling Price the attacking Confederates. and
3-4

October 1862. Generals heavy Earl

repulsed a

exacted

toll on

As at Iuka,

however,

Rosecrans

failed

to

pursue

the

retreating

Confederates, increasing Grant's annoyance with him. 30 Grant even considered relieving Rosecrans, however, orders directing Rosecrans to succeed Major General Don

Carlos Buell in command of the Army of the Cumberland, saved Grant felt would the trouble. a Grant indicated in his memoirs that for Rosecrans Grant he and knew

separate command would be good show

the qualities of sound generalship

Rosecrans to possess. 31 The pit assignment to the Army of the Cumberland against Braxton Bragg, After his would

Rosecrans his

adversary his

throughout supply

command of this army.

building

base at Nashville, Rosecrans moved south and

fought 31 by men. of

the Battle of Stones River at Murfreesboro, Tennessee on December 1 8 6 2 both

2 January 1 8 6 3 .

The casualties suffered

armies rivaled Shiloh; all told more than 24,000

Rosecrans, despite facing near disaster on the first day the battle, saw Bragg withdraw and was thus able for the North. for Rosecrans then settled to in

claim around into army

victory

Murfreesboro spring.

the remainder of the winter and

on

He spent the ensuing six months preparing his

for its inevitable advance on Bragg. 32 Following the Battle of Stones River, Rosecrans He was

enjoyed a mixed reputation as a military commander. known throughout the United States Army as a

methodical

planner and an excellent organizer. 3 3

He had a keen eye for

operational maneuver and grand strategy. was one of his more noted strengths. membership Point had

Strategy, in fact, his West in

It is likely that

in Dennis Hart Mahan's "Napoleon Clubft at fired Rosecrans' interest and proficiency

strategy. 34 It is perhaps significant that even Rosecrans' him.

principal enemy, Braxton Bragg, said good things about

Following the Battle of Stones River, Bragg, in his official report of the battle, issued forth a complimentary word Rosecrans and his enemy which fought judgment which for

" . .

.with a skill and able commander the Her firm army

has ever characterized his

IRosecransl . 1 1 3 5 On another occasion, Bragg remarked to visiting Majesty's leader, Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, was of a

Coldstream

Guards,

that Rosecrans

and the only man he was aware of in the Union

who did not suffer grave defeats. 36 The opinions of the soldiers of Rosecrans' army yet another indicator of the high reputation are

Rosecrans his years the ever

enjoyed. courage. later that men.

Rosecrans' soldiers liked him and A member of Rosecrans' army would

respected write

"Old Roseyl' enjoyed a great reputation with

He went on to say that

..

.no commander

was

more liked by his soldiers than Rosecrans. 37 command hearts bravery observed of the

Many under his in for the his

that Rosecrans held a warm glace was respected

soldiers, that he

under fire, and that he was a compassionate

leader

as

demonstrated by his care and concern for the health

and

comfort of the troops. 38 Rosecrans* reputation with others, however, was lees favorable. Corinth Grant, as a result of accused him of Rosecrans* actions lacking at

and Iuka,

aggressiveness.

Because Rosecrans expressed little love for politicians, and did not appreciate political interference with his plans, he often drew criticism for his actions from and Halleck.
A.

campaign Stanton

Still others, notably, Brigadier General James Rosecrans* chief possessing of staff, for would accuse but

Garfield, of

Rosecrans

great genius

strategy,

lacking patience in combat to give the tactical maneuverings time to develop. 39 Another was his important aspect of and Rosecrans' reputatian was a

character

personality.

Rosecrans

methodical without preferred upcoming amount almost of six

planner who did not believe in accepting all necessary preparations.

battle h.e an

making

Rather,

to take the time and meticulously prepare for operation. Rosecrans would also spend a

great His

time in reflection prior to a months of preparation for

campaign. 4 0 his move

against

Tullahoma proved to be an extreme example of this tendency. Rosecrans great Roman was also tireless. He seemed capable He was a of

amounts of work with little sleep. Catholic,

devout of

but possessed an extensive

vocabulary He was

profanities

that he was not averse to using.

often

given

not from fear because of anger or impatience.41 Whatever

to

excitement,

or

nervousness,

but

the opinion held by those associated bickering

with with

Rosecrans, the

it is likely that his continued

higher authorities contributed to his relief

following

the Battle of Chickamauga. in command managed

Other generals lost and remained had the

because of political support, but Rosecrans

to erode whatever support he might have had by

time the call for his relief came. 42 If Rosecrans had a mixed reputation as a so too did most of his corps commanders. was the notable exception. Thomas, a Virginian, His commander, XIV Corps George Point, U.S.

commander Henry

Major General attended West

"Pap"

graduated 12th in his class in 1840 and joined the 3rd Artillery.

Prior to the Civil War he fought bravely against in a

the Seminoles. Following the Seminole Wars Thomas fought the Mexican War, served on the faculty at West Point instructor and fought Indians in the as

tactics

western

frontier.43 With in the outbreak of the Civil War Thomas, a remained with the Union, quickly achieved a major his a

the, 2nd Cavalry, roots. He

despite as

Virginia

reputation Thomas

dependable and proficient field commander. 44 his First

fought at the

first battle of the war as a brigade commander Manassass. This was his first and only

Eastern

theater fight.

Following Manassass and an assignment to the

Western

theater

he

fought

at

Mill

Springs,

Shiloh,

Perryville and Stones River. 45 Thomas with other apparently enjoyed a "most trusted" status each

the army commander. since

Thomas and Rosecrans friends.

knew

West Point and were fast

Rosecrans

also deeply respected Thomas. keen eye for strategy, had

He believed that Thomas had a the character of George

Washington, and was absolutely trustworthy. 46 After Cumberland, frequent Rosecrans making evening assuming command of the Army of the

Rosecrans initiated the practice of discussions with his corps

conducting commanders. t : o the a

evening

acquired the habit of calling on Thomas prior critical decisions that would come out in

any

discussions. with

Even if time was not available for Rosecrans

consultation

all corps commanders,

almost

always consulted Thomas. 47 Major of General Alexander McDowell McCook, was born in Ohio in 1831. of the normal four, at He West commander spent Point five and

XX

Corps, instead

years,

graduated in 1852 as a lieutenant of infantry. uneventful Mexico, and career of fighting in the Indian Military

He served an wars in New to

by 1858 returned to the

Academy

teach tactics. 48 When the Civil War began, McCook left his instructor duties and returned to Ohio to serve as a colonel in the 1st Ohio Infantry Regiment. Prior to the Tullahoma campaign he

fought at First Manassass as a brigade commander, at as as the a division commander and at Perryville and Stones a corps commander. right At Stones River his corps

Shiloh River

comprised of the

wing of the army and suffered the brunt

Confederate attack, but fought bravely and managed to disaster. 49 Rosecrans esteem. and did not hold McCook in particularly

avoid

high pushy

Rosecrans believed McCook to be a political, McCook impressed Rosecrans

boyish individual.

as

one

who was not serious about his profession and prone to joking when there was a need for attentiveness. Furthermore, of deep why and

Rosecrans

did not believe that McCook was capable

reasoning and sound decisionmaking. 50

This may explain

McCook inevitably was kept in close proximity to Thomas Rosecrans during the advance on Tullahoma. Major General Thomas

L.

Crittenden,

XXI

Corps

commander, was born in Kentucky in May of 1819. unlike his fellow corps commanders in the

Crittenden, Army of the

Cumberland,

did not attend West Point.

He became a

lawyer Mexican the a

in 1840 and practiced law until the outbreak of the War when he enlisted in the army.

Crittenden attained

rank of colonel during war and eventually took command of regiment. 5 1 With the Union the declaration of war, Crittenden sided militia

with still

and took command of all Kentucky

loyal to the United States.52

In September 1861

Crittenden

received a commission as a brigadier general of He later fought at Shiloh and Corinth as By the fall of
1862,

volunteers. brigade and

division

commander.

Major

General

Crittenden assumed command of one of the three army corps in Buell's Rosecrans army. 53 His force became the XXI Army Corps when the

assumed command from Buell and

redesignated

Army of the Ohio as the Army of the Cumberland. Crittenden enjoyed the reputation of being a warrior and his men harbored great respect Crittenden's his intentions for him. and Rosecrans that he

believed

were good

discharged

duty to his

fullest

ability.

Rosecrans, lack of

however, was somewhat concerned about Crittenden's formal military education. 54 Rosecrans would give In spite of any

reservations, in the

Crittenden an important role

Tullahoma Campaign. The Reserve Corps commander was Major General Gordon Granger. graduated Born in New York state in November of 1822, he 1845. with

from West Point as an artillery officer in

Granger served initially in the western frontier then,

the opening of the war with Mexico, went south with Winfield Scott's to army. in Following the Mexican War, Granger the western frontier in a mounted returned infantry

serve

regiment. 55 Granger's first Civil War action was as a regimental commander at Wilson's Creek, Missouri in August of 1861.

Following this he led a brigade at New Madrid, Island No. 10

and

the siege at Corinth.

In the spring of 1863 he

joined

the Army of the Cumberland as the Reserve Corps commander.56 Granger although his was noted for his independence In spite of independent periodically Granger's character, skirted

insubordination. independence lack

demonstrated Granger might the

and drive, Rosecrans suspected

the drive to see actions through, particularly if

action in question did not benefit Granger. 57 Rosecrans' Cavalry Chief of Cavalry and commander of the in 1852 War

Corps, Major General David S. Stanley, was born Stanley graduated West Point in
He served all of his

Ohio in June of 1828. as a cavalry officer.

pre-Civil

service in the western frontier.58 When the Civil War came, Stanley, although offered a commission in the Confederate Army, elected to stay with the Union. in He served initially as a cavalry company commander at a Iuka and

the Missouri campaign and participated in the action Creek. Following this, Stanley commanded

Wilson's division and

in the battles at New Madrid, Island No. 10, Over the course of his service at Iuka

Corinth.

Corinth Stanley impressed Rosecrans as a proficient officer

cavalry

In

recognition

of

Stanley's

contributions Chief

Rosecrans

appointed now Major General Stanley as the

of Cavalry for the Army of the Cumberland. 59

THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE Braxton Bragg, the commander of the Army of

Tennessee, was born in North Carolina in 1817. large family, to

Raised in a sought an We

with no money for college, Bragg the United States Military

appointment

Academy.

entered the Academy in 1833 and was considered an excellent:, though somewhat moody, student. Bragg graduated a in

lieutenant his class. 6 0

of artillery in 1837, the fifth of 50 cadets

After

graduation

Bragg

was assigned

to

the

3rd and

United States Artillery. 1843

At various times between 1830 the

Bragg participated in campaigns against in Florida. It was during this time

Seminole that

Indians

period

Bragg developed the first of many illnesses, dysentery. 61 Bragg fought in all the major battles of the Mexican War as an artillery commander and finished the Lieutenant Colonel. He was an war as a

Brevet leader. of

extremely

brave Battle earned a

His most notable action occurred during the Vista in 1847. It was here that Bragg

Buena

Jefferson

Davis' respect and lasting gratitude.

During

desperate moment in the battle, when all that stood the Mexican Army and the American army's rear was

between Davis' positicn battle a not

regiment, Bragg wheeled his artillery battery into just in time to save Davis' command. Bragg Mexican held Throughout the

his ground against heavy odds and

prevented

breakthrough. Davis later remarked that had it

been for Bragg's gallantry under fire that the American army would have surely suffered defeat. 62 ~ f t e k the Mexican War Bragg served on the performing lieutenant various routine duties. By 1856 Bragg, frontier then a

colonel and frustrated with chasing Indians

and He the

not getting choice assignments, resigned from the army. became a planter in Louisiana where he remained until

opening of the Civil War. With Confederacy of the coming of the Civil War Bragg joined the Army the from Bragg Davis. and

as a brigadier general in the Provisional During the first months of

the Confederate States.

war he served as coastal commander for all land forces Pensacola once Davis to Mobile. It was in this capacity that

again bolstered his reputation with commented favorably on Bragg's

Jefferson performance

remarked that Bragg was the only general in the army who accomplished what he set out to do. 6 3 By Major September,
1861 Bragg received a

Confederate

promotion

to

General and assumed command of General Albert Second Army Corps in the Army of

Sidney

Johnston's

Mississippi. at fell time

Bragg fought his first major battle as a corps commander Shiloh fatally in April
1862.

During the

battle

Johnston

wounded and Bragg controlled the battle for a Beauregard could take command.

until General P.G.T. bravery

For his with

at Shiloh, Bragg was promoted to full General

an effective date of 6 April 1862. 6 4

In the

June 1862, Bragg replaced P.G.T. of the Army of Mississippi.

Beauregard Bragg

as

commander

then 1862 at

devised

an invasion plan for Kentucky.

In October of

Braggfs army, now called the Army of Tennessee gathered Perryville, Kentucky and engaged Union forces under

Major

General Don Carlos Buell. tactical withdrew

Although Perryville was largely a field to an.d a

draw, Bragg ordered a retreat from the from the state allowing the North

claim

victory. 65 As was line a result of his failed Kentucky campaign, Braq'g

left with little choice but to reestablish a in Tennessee. His presence near

defensive an.d Stones again, withdrew event he

Murfreesboro

Rosecransf advance south precipitated the Battle of River despite from the from 31 December 1862

2 January 1863.

Once

the lack of clear tactical defeat,

Bragg

the field. battle

He had not thought out plans in the longer than a day. As a

lasted

result

improvised movements poorly, which allowed Rosecrans to hold the field. He then moved his army south of the low

foothills

of middle Tennessee, and deployed his army with headquarters at Tullahoma.

along

the Duck River line,

~ragg's'reputation during the first half of 1863 was much While mixed, with less favorable than that of his Bragg's reputation, like Federal counterpart. was somewhat

Rosecrans,

the differences of opinion held by those Bragg were more pronounced.

associated Bragg's

Interestingly,

superiors tolerated

[Davis, him,

Seddon

and

General reservation,

Samuel

Cooper1 Bragg

and with some

judged

capable of continued high command. was for two reasons. Bragg had

This toleration of Bragg demonstrated exceptional the

abilities in previous campaigns, notably Shiloh, and at moment, other than Joseph Johnston, there was no one in Davis' mind to replace Bragg. Most of

better Braggts

subordinates, however, questioned his competence.

His corps

and division commanders disliked Bragg personally and lacked confidence victory. 66 This lack of confidence stemmed partly from propensity of to retreat in the face of victory. permeated Braggts subordinates River. An Bragg's attitude the in his ability to lead the Army of Tennessee to

disgust at

after After

"defeats"

Perryville and Stones

. Stones
than for to

River, Bragg asked his commanders for a vote of While others, the some of his subordinates were more

confidence. tactful

all agreed a change of commander would be good As a result of this and Bragg's failure

army.

exploit success, Bragg's subordinates lobbied their contacts for a new commander for the Army of Tennessee. 67 Bragg remained in command in spite of the clamorings for his relief This and the low state of morale among was his

officers. ambivalent Bragg

is not to say that

Richmond

totally visited of

about the situation.

Davis

personally

at Murfreesboro in December of 1862 after hearing

discontent in Bragg's army. Murfreesboro Tullahoma Davis Davis ordered

After Bragg's General

withdrawal Johnston take

from t : o

Joseph

to visit Bragg and, if necessary,

command. in the of

and Seddon apparently believed by this point

war that Bragg might need relief and Johnston, by virtue his position, could take command and later advise

Davis. was

Still, Johnston found conditions satisfactory and Bragg not relieved. The air of dissatisfaction and low

mora1.e

continued to pervade his army. 68 Although Johnston told Davis that Bragg would remain in command and left for Mobile, he had not been gone a t : o

month, when on 9 March Davis ordered Johnston to proceed Tullahoma and assume command of Bragg's army. arrived was not he found Bragg in troubled spirits.

When Johnston Bragg's wife

ailing and Bragg felt he should go to telling Bragg that he was in

her.

Johnston, to month assume later Bragg Army of the

Tullahoma A

command, Bragg

agreed

and took over for Bragg.

returned to find Johnston too ill to command. resumed Bragg his role as commander of remain in command the

therefore Tennessee.

would

through

Battle for Chattanooga in November 1863.69 Johnston's refusal to Bragg Bragg's was a take command of the army from Bragg. his Based on

result of his respect for War reputation and

Mexican

demonstrated Braqg Bragg

abilities early in the Civil War, Johnston considered a capable commander. He was also aware that

reciprocated this respect.

Johnston knew that it was

Bragg

who had lobbied the hardest for him to become the of all Confederate armies in the west. by Johnston and Bragg was a The mutual major

commander respect in

shared

factor

Johnston's reluctance to relieve Bragg. 7 0 Part retreats, practically together battle. of a a of lay the with reason for Bragg's Bragg defeats, indecisive was capable a and subsequent In

nature. of

every

case,

putting

viable plan of action prior to

campaign

or

However, Bragg inevitably wavered at the first hint problem in executing the plan. He was indecisive,

rather than flexible. 71 This indecisiveness likely stemmed from Bragg's fear of making mistakes. The situation Bragg found himself in as

the commander of the Army of Tennessee was unenviable to say the least. His army did not enjoy a high priority for

reinforcements or supplies, yet by the fall of 1862 the burden of action in Kentucky that the and Tennessee. gain

carried Davis' into As a

insistence Tennessee result, preserve access created As

Federals must not

access

placed great pressure on Bragg to perform. Bragg searched hungrily for the options that his army and, at the same time, deny the

would

Federals in turn, fail. his

to

the land they doggedly sought.

This,

a fear in Bragg that what he might do

would

events unfolded during a battle Bragg often changed

mind because of the fear he might have made a mistake.

Bragg's Many of

subordinates disliked and

distrusted harsh at

him. times,

Bragg's officers considered him

quarrelsome, without compassion and unable to appreciate the human side of life. felt Bragg's character even made its effect:s A private in Braggls

all the way down to the men. 7 2

army best described how the men felt about Bragg: None of General Bragg's soldiers ever loved him. They had no faith in his ability as a general. He He was looked upon as a merciless tyrant. [Braggl loved to crush the spirits of his men. The more of a hangdog look they had about them the better was General Bragg pleased. Not a single sold$5r in the whole army ever loved or respected him.

.. .

Bragg adherence Tennessee

was a

strict disciplinarian At one point

and believed in a regiment right of to

to the regulations. volunteers

insisted that they had the Bragg

leave when their term of enlistment expired.

stated day of

simply that there would not be mutiny or desertion. The of reckoning came and Bragg ordered up a battery

artillery to force the men to remain in the service. 7 4 Bragg's reputation as the most argumentative man in

the whole Confederate army haunted him long before the Civil War. A popular story, recounted in Grant's memoirs,

referred to a time when Bragg was both the quartermaster and a company commander at a post in the army. One day as
a

company

commander

Bragg requisitioned something

from to

the the to

quartermaster.

As the quartermaster he refused it

company commander (himself).

When Bragg took the matter

the

post

commander for resolution,

the

commander,

well Bragg

aware argued

of Bragg's nature, exclaimed that not only had vith everyone in the army, but now he was

arguing

with himself. 7 5 To his credit Bragg was a good organizer, understood the value of discipline, and appreciated the need for drill. He did much to improve the Army of Tennessee in this regard. Unfortunately for Bragg, it was his harsh methods, lack of lost his

tact and unflinching adherence to the regulations that what he so hungrily sought; the respect and love of

soldiers. Bragg interpersonal nature. enemy This alike. even simply could not deal with individuals on level. He had an irritable and an

impatient friend and

abrasive nature could infuriate Bragg publicly humiliated more importantly, he his

subordinates. to cultivate for

Perhaps enemies.

seemed ready

They

provided Bragg with

scapegoats

failures. 76 Lastly, Bragg suffered from a diversity of that likely contributed to his foul ailments He and and

personality. dyspepsia sparingly

suffered terrible slept at

from

frequent bouts of dysentery, headaches. He ate very

migraine

little, although he was still capable of

functioning

a much higher degree than many of those around him. 77

It
is little wonder that Bragg had such

difficulty that in

dealing

with subordinates.

It is perhaps amazing

spite

of

the

terrible

dissension

within

his The

army, answer

he t : o

remained

in command for as long as he did.

his continued command goes beyond his reputation with and evils Johnston. Bragg might be the lesser of the Confederacy. For the

Davis

possib1.e like his

confronting

Bragg, his

superiors,

had crosses to bear.

Some of

subordinates

would try the most patient of men. One such man was corps commander, Lieutenant General Leonidas L. Polk. in April 1806. Polk was born in Raleigh, North Carolina He attended West Point and graduated two ' n men

1827.

While there he met Jefferson Davis and the a deep friendship that would have

developed

important

consequences during the Civil War. 78 After six months of active duty, Polk resigned his

commission and entered the Episcopal ministry. of in the Civil War Polk was the Southwest Louisiana.

By the start Bishop

Missionary Polk

Answering the call to arms,

reentered

the army as a Confederate major general. 79 Polk intitially commanded Military Department Number
2 in the expansive area which stretched from Kentucky to the

Mississippi

River

and organized

the Army

of

Mississippi

(later to become the Army of Tennessee).

By late 1861, when the

Ue

General Albert S. Johnston succeeded Polk in command of Army of Mississippi, Polk became in a corps commander. of

fought

every major campaign of the

Army

Tennessee

until killed at Pine Mountain, Georgia in 1864.80

As

leader

Polk

lacked

tactical

skill

and

aggressiveness.

He was lavish in his appetites and

dress.

He had the irksome quality of obeying only those orders that suited him. Bragg thought at times Polk's slowness and

selective compliance was insubordinate.

Polk did,

however,

have one very special thing in his favor. good

He was not only a following in

friend of Davis but possessed a sizable

Richmond. 81 Because of this special relationship with Davis others the in Richmond, Polk enjoyed great power in and out Additionally, he was extremely kind which strengthened his power base toward from the and of his

army.

soldiers, Polk

below. of

believed

himself to be the overseer of

Army

Tennessee and as such he felt it his duty to protect it from ruin by the incompetent command of Bragg. ,When it to Polk that Bragg would destroy the army he appeared over

went

Bragg's head and issued his complaints directly to President Davis in Richmond. 82 Polk Richmond failure first began to take matters invasion. directly After Davis to the and Polk view

after

the failed Kentucky

at Stones River, Polk wrote directly to

recommended Joseph Johnston take command of the army. wrote Davis yet again in March of 1863 expressing his

that Bragg might be of better service elsewhere. 83 Bragg was not blind to Polk's maneuverings and Bragg

Polk's behavior widened the rift between the two men.

suspected May of

Polk was instigating ill feeling toward him. 1863, Bragg charged Polk with disobedience

By at

Perryville and to

Polk, fearful of arrest, renewed his efforts Bragg and Polk's t : o

consolidate support for his defense. damaged

animosity

the Army of Tennessee as it prepared

meet Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee. 84 Bragg's General in second corps commander was Lieutenant Georgia He

William J. Hardee.

Born in Camden County,

October of 1815,

he graduated West Point in

1838.

fought

in the Indian Wars as an infantry company

commander promotions the his

and later served in Mexico where he received two for bravery. of

After the Mexican War Hardee served as cadets at West Point where he wrote

commandant

renowned textbook entitled Rifle and Liaht Infantry Tacticq. This highly regarded manual was used by both sides during

the Civil War. 86 When Georgia seceded from the Union, Hardee resigned his commission in the U.S. Army to become a colonel in army. He By October of 1861 he was a the

Confederate general.

major A.S. wing at

fought

as a division

commander

under

Johnston at Shiloh. commander in the

Following Shiloh, Hardee became a army and fought in the

battles

Perryville and Stones River. 87 Most tactician commanders army and and officers believed Hardee to be resolute fighter and and his a sound

sub0rdinat.e him. Indeed,

men respected

admired

Hardeels

influence than

within the army stemmed more political connections. courage. consistently

from In He

his

proficiency battle he

from

every also

exhibited

great

personal

understood

the value of terrain and

apprised

Bragg of such facts.8 8 Though very different from Polk, he showed the dislike of Bragg. Hardee also incurred Bragg's wrath same and the

distrust after the failure of the Kentucky campaign and retreat disgusted the from Murfreesboro. Hardee, like many

others into he

with Bragg's command style, eventually fell faction with Polk. 8 9 After Perryville

anti-Bragg

openly criticized Bragg's performance in front of the officers. that After Stones River, Hardee candidly wrote

other Bragg

in his opinion Bragg no longer enjoyed the

confidence

of the army and that a change was necessary.90 Faced with such honesty on the part of a

subordinate, Bragg remained at odds with Hardee until he was transferred later in the year. nothing his In Braggls eyes, Hardee enjoyed was

more than a troublemaker, who

criticizing

superiors, but accepted little, if any, Bragg's vocal opinions of Hardee,

responsibility however, the did

himself. little

more

than drive more fence-sitters into

anti-

Bragg camp. 9 1 Bragg's relationship with his cavalrymen was hardly better. and Continued infighting among the cavalry penchant for failing to provide leadership Bragg with

their

detailed intelligence at critical times caused Bragg a great deal of consternation. Bragg did, however, hold a high

opinion of his senior cavalryman. 92 Major cavalry, age of 22. in less General Joseph Wheeler, Bragg's chief of the

graduated West Point and graduated in 1859 at

In April of 1861 he resigned his commission, and than two years was a Confederate major general. infantry and

Initially, at Shiloh,

he fought as a regimental commander of shortly thereafter transferred to

cavalry

became the chief of cavalry for the Army of Tennessee. 9 3 Wheeler until every was the in almost constant combat from end of the war. He participated July in of 1862

virtually A

battle and skirmish the Army of Tennessee fought. fighter who loved action, Wheeler lost He had a
36

dangerous

staff

officers to enemy fire during the war.

reputation enduring

perhaps second only to Forrest and enjoyed Bragg's respect. 94 While Bragg thought highly of Wheeler

the

other

commanders in the army were less gracious. more pronounced was within the cavalry. At

This feeling was the age of

25

Wheeler

junior in years to every Brigadier

cavalry

general Forrest

he and

commanded.

General Nathan Bedford

Brigadier General John Morgan in particular disliked serving under him. at devising They believed he was too impatient and not adept independent operations. In fact, after the

attack

by Forrest and Wheeler on Fort Donelson in

Februa~y

of

1863,

Forrest

swore he would never

take

orders

from

Wheeler again.

Morgan for his part tried and was eventually

successful in escaping Wheeler's command. 9 5 Nathan Bedford Forrest was perhaps the best in Braggls army, yet he was self-taught in the general art of

warfare. Forrest humble dealer

Born in Bedford County, Tennessee on 13 July 1821, received little formal education. Despite and this slave in the

beginning he became a successful planter prior to army the Civil War. in early After a

enlisting private, own

Confederate equipped a

1861 as

Forrest and in men

battalion

of cavalry at his

expense

became its commander. 1862 Forrest

During the siege at Fort Donelson with his

received permission to escape

rather elected Forrest

than surrender.

Prior to Shiloh, the 3rd By July

Tennessee of and 1862 took

Forrest colonel of the regiment. received

promotion to brigadier general

command of a cavalry division. of

Throughout the later

months

1862, Forrest's cavalry harassed Grant's

communications

in West Tennessee. 96 Despite Forrest's successes, Bragg never him anything more than a partisan raider, considered of the

devoid

capability for higher command. enjoyed detested probably with

The close relationship Bragg since This Forrest behavior and

Wheeler probably did not help and openly showed it.

Wheeler

contributed to the ill feelings between Bragg

Forrest. 97

ROSECRANS' PLAN In late October of the Army his of the 1862, shortly after taking command Cumberland from from Bue11, Halleck R0secran.s directed Army of

received Rosecrans

orders

Halleck.

to apply pressure on Bragg to force the Halleck also directed

Tennessee out of Kentucky. to cover

Rosecrans t;o and that the

Nashville and repair and secure the movement of supplies between

railroad

permit

the

Nashville

Louisville. it

Additionally, Halleck informed Rosecrans keep

was necessary to remain actively employed and on Bragg to prevent the Army

pressure moving

of '~ennessee from In these orders

west to affect Grant's operations.

Halleck also provided Rosecrans with two "great for was the operations in Tennessee. to first Specifically, the

objectives" Rosecra:ns out of

move his army to drive

rebels
'I.

Kentucky and Middle Tennessee. and hold

Second, he was

.to take at the the

East Tennessee, cutting the line of Cleveland, or Athens, so as to

railroad destroy and

Chattanooga, connection

of the valley of Virginia with Georgia

other Southern states. ''98 By the end of January Rosecrans, already a developing portion

reputation for slowness, achieved only the first

of Halleck's directions. and on him. pushed Bragg south.

Rosecrana had moved into Tennessee Bragg, however, still had a grasp expel

Middle Tennessee and it remained for Rosecrans to

Rosecrans before

delayed

the better part

of

six

months four

attempting to remove Bragg from Tennessee First, Rosecrans' army was greatly

for

basic reasons. in

depleted that goal great his

supplies, wagon transport and cavalry, a situation rectification before moving on. have enough supplies on hand to Rosecrans' fight two

required was to

battles. lines of

Second, Rosecrans stated that he must secure communication before advancing, which

required Louisville the

additional troops to guard the 185 miles between and Murfreesboro. weather

Third, the extremely wet winter and May.

spring

made roads impassible until

Lastly, part in be

Rosecrans suggested he might actually be accomplishing of his mission

support of

Grant

by

remaining

position.

Rosecrans feared that the Confederates might

willing to sacrifice Middle Tennessee, and go to Pemberton's aid if threatened by an advance. that Bragg's an Alternatively, ill Rosecrans effect a of

suggested forcing

advance might have the

already depleted forces back to

better men

defensive

line at Chattanooga.

From Chattanooga fewer

could defend and Bragg could slip reinforcements west. 9 9 Whatever that Rosecrans' reasons for delay it is clear are do that Thomas
1863.

it was not for the lack of planning.

Indications

that Rosecrans knew well before June what he intended to and how he wanted to do it. It is unlikely, however,

anyone in his command with the possible exception of knew the details of the plans prior to 22 or 23 June

Rosecrans plans to

stated

years later that in May he General north Hartsuff and

divulged

the

Brigadier with

(Burnside's deputy of Rosecrans). the

operating However,

forces

east

Rosecrans was quick to point out that he gave

details of his plan to no one else. 100 Much of Rosecrans' hesitancy to inform his fear

subordinates about the campaign design stemmed from a that a loose tongue might allow the enemy to gain of the plan. Rosecrans was well aware that

knowledge

"nonmilitary

enemiesM (spies and southern sympathizers) occupied his area of the of operations and from time to time passed enemy. information o ' number were

He was also aware that there might be a

uniformed soldiers and officers in his command who An incident in early May confirmed this time Brigadier two two General Confederate men possessed John

spies. At that

suspicion. cavalry as from

Turchin's

brigade

captured The
D.C.

officers false

posing orders

inspectors. Washington,

and Rosecrans'

headquarters

authorizing danger

them to inspect all Federal positions. in situations such as this did much to

The inherent curtail

Rosecrans'

issuance of orders well before an event. 101 Based necessary Tennessee, was a key to to on Halleck's guidance the Rebels not Rosecrans only out deemed of it

drive

Middle

but out of Chattanooga and beyond. railhub for traffic northeast to

Chattanooga Virginia, of the

southeast

Atlanta, and west to Memphis.

Loss

Chattanooga area Confederates to the Virginia. rail

would make it virtually impossible for the east wrest the

to move men swiftly vest to Vicksburg or Rosecrans estab1ishe.d a phased plan to from the Confederates. His plan

line

for

overall operation follows: First: We must and Chattanooga logistics I . follow the line of the Nashville Railroad [For the purposes of

Second: We must surprise and manoeuvre Bragg out of his intrenched camps by moving over routes east of him to seize the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad in his rear; beat him if he fights, and follow and damage him as best we can, until we see him across the Tennessee. Third: We must deceive him as to the point of our crossing of the Tennessee and securely establish ourselves on the south side. Fourth: We must then manoeuvre him out of Chattanooga, get between him and that point, and fight him, if possible, on ground of our. own choosing, and if not, upon such ground as we can. Fifth: Burnside must follow and guard the left flank of our movement, especially when we get into the mountains. His entrance into East Tennessee will lead Bragg's attention to Chattanooga and northward, while we cross below that point. Sixth: Since our forces in the rear of Vicksburg would be endangered by General Joseph E. Johnston, if he should have enough troops, we must not drive Bragg out of Middle Tennessee until it shall be too for his command to reenforce lTtj5 Johnston's. This operational scheme extends beyond the scope this much study, however, it demonstrates Rosecrans was further ahead than the mere removal of of

looking from

Bragg

Tennessee. First,

This scheme points out some key

considerations. Chattanooga

Rosecrans oriented on the Nashville and

Railroad to protect and sustain his replenishment and at th,e same time looked to cut Bragg's line of communications. not Bragg

Second,

this scheme further explains Rosecrans' desire Rosecrans deduced that by forcing

to move too early. to

keep the Army of the Cumberland in check, this

actua1l.y

helped preclude reinforcing Vicksburg. 103 A third and significant point is that Rosecrans under orders from Halleck to cooperate with was

Burnside. Rosecrans flank In was the to

Burnside did not

too was not ready to move until dare

June.

move until assured that his left Halleck almost undid the plan.

protected,

though

first week of June he ordered Burnside to provide forces Grant which at the very time Burnside was preparing caused Rosecrans and Burnside to delay to

advance, to

further

assess the impact.104 Understanding what Rosecrans intended to do in the

long term, one can now appreciate the following of Rosecrans' plan. two phases of or

explanation first Middle of

Rosecrans planned to conduct the of the

his grander scheme as part Tullahoma and campaign. Bragg's

Tennessee

After defenses,

months

reconnaissance determined assault a

study of

Rosecrans An safe over of al.so

frontal assault would be too

hazardous. a

against Shelbyville would also allow Bragg

line of retreat through the narrow roads that moved up the Barrens and south to Chattanooga. superiority in Ever mindful

Bragg's

supposed

cavalry

Rosecrans

assumed

that

Bragg could keep his railroad open

during

retreat. 105 Rosecrans, therefore, envisioned a two part plan rid Middle Tennessee of Bragg. The first part of his to plan

would entail the deployment of forces to deceive Bragg about the location of the main attack, thereby forcing Bragg The out

of his entrenchments along the Duck River line.

second

part of Rosecrans' plan, never realized during the campaign, entailed cutting Bragg's line of communication by moving the railroad to bridge over the Elk River which on a disadvantageous line. would While
if

on

cause the he

Bragg second

retreat

part

of the plan risked battle with

Bragg,

fought, this was not Halleck's primary charter to Rosecrans. Rosecrans' that instructions from Halleck established was clearly the main

driving

Bragg out of Middle Tennessee

objective and Rosecrans' plan reflected this as the mission. ignored This Bragg's of did not mean, however, clearly in

primary plan the

Rosecrans' envisioned to

army.

Rosecrans Bragg

possibility

fighting

Tennessee

destroy

Bragg's army if Bragg fought.

Rosecrans' plan of

maneuver, and

however, oriented primarily on a geographical objective

addressed the enemy only from a contingency perspective. 106 To accomplish to his plan Rosecrans felt it necessary on the

convey that the Union main effort would advance route.

Shelbyville actually go

he' main effort, however,

through

would Gap

on the Manchester Pike

Hoover's

south

to

Manchester. Bragg's flank

From

Manchester, line of

the

army

could This

threaten

and his

retreat.

maneuver, by enveloping Bragg's right flank, would hopefully force Bragg to leave his entrenchments this scheme, Rosecrans to Triune and on and retreat. to I13 move to

accordance Granger's threaten would

with command

intended

tovard

Christiana cavalry

Shelbyville.

A small infantry and

force east on

advance simultaneously with this feint and head

toward Woodbury.

Rosecrans believed the force advancing

Woodbury would appear to Bragg as a feint, designed to cover the perceived main attack on Shelbyville. In the meantime

two of Rosecrans army corps would force the gaps and pass to the east of the main entrenchments. 107 Once envelopment force flee, Rosecrans enveloped Bragg's right would become a turning movement flank, that th.e

wou1.d to

Bragg out of his defensive works. as Rosecrans hoped he would,

If Bragg chose would

Rosecrans

deny use

Bragg the best withdrawal routes.

Rosecrans could then

the better routes to pursue Bragg's army thereby driving him out would of Tennessee. draw Bragg If Bragg attempted to into a one-sided fight Rosecrans Rosecrans

battle.

reasoned that whether Bragg fled or fought, the result would be the same, however, his emphasis was on gaining Middle

Tennessee through maneuver not decisive combat. 108

BRAGG'S PLAN Bragg, unlike his counterpart to the north, did receive much in the way of long range guidance from not his

superiors. superior,

In the early months of 1863, Bragg's General Joseph Johnston, was himself

immediate unsure of and of army a

Richmond's expectations for Middle Tennessee. Bragg seemed to have agreed on a

Johnston form

defensive/offensive strategy. would

In other words, Bragg's

remain initially on the defense and attack only if

clear opportunity presented itself. was not articulated

This strategy, however, as a source of

well and it served

confusion for Bragq's subordinates. the situation was had more with not

By May, it seemed Johnston, Vicksburg now and

that in its

improved. with a

Mississippi, situation

absorbed developing

than

strategy Johnston

with

Bragq.

Furthermore,

during the month of May

incorrectly

believed he did not command Bragg's department. 109 Without specific direction from Richmond or in

Johnston, Bragg had to deduce what he was expected to do

Middle Tennessee; which he believed was simply to defend and prevent felt From deny field went it the the capture of Chattanooga. To do this Bragg works.

would be far better to remain in defensive works Bragg could fend

prepared off

Rosecrans, open

him the railroad and avoid decisive defeat on an of battle. beyond Bragg's rationale for unwillingness to defense, lose

however, His

Davis'

ground.

reliance on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, a belief that his presence could check Rosecrans and of troops from Bragg were the all continual possible

siphoning

contributors to the need to defend. 111 During that also lines his defensive planning it is also apparent It of
i s

Bragg considered Rosecrans' likely objectives. obvious that Bragg, concerned with security

his a

of communication still looked at opportunites

for

counterstroke. Bragg relied on two means to sustain his army. The

bulk of his sustainment came from what the army could forage in the surrounding areas. The rest came from whatever Bragg These, however, bulk of If tbe Bragg no

could eke out of the warehouses in Atlanta. were not

part of Bragg's Department and the

suppli'es were earmarked for armies in the East. resorted to an offensive it was likely he would

find

sustenance in an area already stripped bare by both his army and that of Rosecrans. Furthermore, even if Bragg could

find sustenance, he lacked the means to transport it. 112 In that for move terms of transportation it is important to was note

the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad two reasons.

important means to and

First, it represented the best

whatever supplies Bragg received from Chattanooga Second, the and more importantly, the

Atlanta. provided

railroad army or

quickest means to withdraw

Bragg's

receive reinforcements for it.

Bragg's troop strength represented another to offensive planning. While at Tullahoma,

obstacle Bragg and army

Johnston

managed

to gather replacements for

Bragg's

from other areas in the West.' Additionally, Bragg over

5000 soldiers as a result of General

received Pillow's these January Bragg's kept at

Gideon

conscription

of men in Tennessee and Alabama.

With

acquisitions Bragg received over 10,000 men between and May of 1863. to at However, transfers of men from

command Bragg

the West, particularly in April and

May, with

basically the same strength he finished

Stones River. 113 Perhaps continued for the most interesting reason for Bragg's

defense was a parallel to

Rosecrans'

philosophy early

not attacking Bragg. Bragg

In a letter to his wife in demonstrations the effect and of

June, behind

stated that his lines had

raidings checking in Middle

Rosecrans' Bragg

Rosecrans.

maintained that by remaining

Tennessee, and thereby fixing Rosecrans' army, he Rosecrans from shifting troops to aid Grant.

prevented Bragg also he

maintained that by defending and the occasional raiding, concealed his own transfer of troops to the

West.

Traditional defense thus became Bragg's choice. 114 Braggls defensive line stretched over seventy across its front. and knew Bragg was forced to spread out to Bragg, miles forage

cover the approaches to Chattanooga.

however, and

that the better roads lay in front of Shelbyville

traversed

Guy's

and Bellbuckle Gaps.

The

railroad It

that: made the

Rosecrans would use passed through Bellbuckle Gap. sense course to Bragg that Rosecrans would need to

follow

of the railroad to secure it.

Additionally,

Bragq

believed that the terrain to the east of Hoover's Gap, while passable, was too difficult and too far from Rosecrans'

intended line to be a serious threat. 115 Hardee, tasked with defending the right flank, exception with Bragg's analysis. Hardee pointed out too:k that few felt The

Tullahoma and the defensive positions around it offered advantages Tullahoma for could a defense against Rosecrans. be enveloped via the right Hardee flank.

enemy, he maintained, could come shallow on the Manchester

Decherd approach or come deep via the McMinnville - Pelham Cowan approach. first and Of the two approaches, Hardee believed He stated that a Hoover's more the Gap

to be the most likely.

the

road from Lumley's Stand provided

direct

route to Chattanooga than did the approach via Hardee further

Shelbyville. west to

stated that Tullahoma was too far

prevent the Federals from continuing south once they Manchester.

gained

Hardee maintained Rosecrans would simply bypass

Tullahoma in this case.116 Bragg disagreed and argued that Rosecrans would to take a more direct approach to reach opt

Chattanooga. Federal spring.

Bragg's activity

belief stemmed from a continued pattern of on the Confederate left flank during the

On no less than three occasions, twice in March and once April, Spring Bragg's flank of the Federals conducted strong Hill and Guy's Gap reconnaissances

in near

respectively.

Additionally, right Federal

intelligence confirmed that an attack on the the army was highly unlikely, noted. as no

activity

in the east had as yet been

Furthermore, east

Bragg reasoned, it made no sense for Rosecrans to move away from his line of communications. 117 In opportunity only as a March Bragg developed a plan which Bragg intended to fix Rosecrans. use When offered

an

to maneuver. position to

Tullahoma Rosecrans east in by

attempted to continue south from Bellbuckle and to the

.

of

Shelbyville then

he would be stopped by Hardee's be susceptible to attack on his

forces flank

Tullahoma,

Polk's corps from Shelbyville. 118 Unfortunately for Bragg he could not make his two

corps commanders understand the concept.

Other than briefly did was

outlining the concept of potential flank attacks, Bragg not convey these ideas as orders. As a result, Hardee

confused

as to his role, and even where he should

position know

his forces.

Polk, for his part, maintained he did not

anything of his role in a maneuver plan until it was ordered on the 26th of June. 119 Hardee apparently thought he was not supposed to east to

contest heavily attacks made by Union forces advancing of Liberty Gap. Rather, he believed he should fall back

Tullahoma

if threatened and defend from the works

therein. defend

This is a likely explanation for Hardee's failure to

well forward in strength at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps. 120 Apparently, Bragg also considered another

alternative in his defense. tried River, could to and

In the unlikely event Rosecrans the Elk

flank to the west of Shelbyville, cross proceed directly south of a flank attack from his

Shelbyville, Wartrace

Hardee

conduct

position.

Once again, however, it appears that neither Polk nor Hardee understood the details of this plan. 121 This confused situation did not improve in the

months between March and June. the help leadership

In fact, the discord

within but

of the Army of Tennessee did

anything

foster an attitude of understanding or cooperation for By June, Bragg's army was still sitting of Bragg's still thilt

the defensive plan. on the

Duck River line with the preponderance in Shelbyville and Wartrace. The

forces covered

cavalry

the gaps.

One difference did, however, exist Hardee received

was not the case prior to June. from Bragg

permission north and

to position infantry forces further

closer to the gaps. to cover the gaps

After convincing Bragg of the necessity with more force, Hardee positioned General Grove.

Brigadier Alexander Hardee

General William Bate's brigade of P. Stewart's division forward at

Major Beech

then moved the remainder of his corps (minus Lucius

Polk's brigade of Cleburne's division) to Wartrace. 122

Such Tennessee Bragg's While as

was the

the

situation of the

armies

in

Middle While

summer campaign

season

opened. his

leaders

feuded, Rosecrans planned

operation. and for

Bragg

lost soldiers, Rosecrans gained While Bragg

strength pleaded

improved supplies

his cavalry capability. to feed his army,

Rosecrans

stockpiled

enough

supplies for two great battles.

The months of June and July

would be momentous for the Union and would further frustrate the ailing fortunes of the Confederate armies in the West.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 2 Inatthew Forney Steele, Civil War Atlas to Accom~anv (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office), 74. '~erman Hattaway and Archer Jonei, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 19831, 392-94. 3 ~ e n r ySteele Commager and John S. Bowman, The Civil War Almanac (New York: Gallery Books, 1983), 151-160. '~ichard M. McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 19891, 53. 5 ~ c ~ u r r yTwo , Great Rebel Armies 53. 6 ~ c ~ u r r yTwo , Great Rebel Armies 53-54; McMurry states it is possible Halleck believed that the Northern soldier procured from the Eastern Federal states was not as good as his Virginia counterpart or that he simply realized that the status quo had been reached in the East. Halleck also observed that the seizure of Richmond would take troops away from the Washington defenses. This was a distasteful thought to the politicians, not that Halleck was known to take their opinions seriously, but it nonetheless figured into his considerations.; Commager and Bowman, The Civil War Alma_nac 161. 7 ~ c ~ u r r yTwo , Great Rebel Armies 53; Halleck was known to be a believer in Jomini's theories of interior lines and strength against weakness. This knowledge and influence gleaned from Jomini possibly contributed to Halleck's philosophy of priority to the Western theater of war. '~ames M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The CivilWar Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 612; McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies 53. '~attawa~ and Jones, How the North Won, 384-85; The events by mid-1863 were to bear out the soundness of this rationale. Lee's concern for the Union threat in his theater caused him to persuade Davis that the Army of Northern Virginia could not afford to send forces to

Johnston in the West. Secretary Seddon prevailed on Johnston to take the soldiers he needed to aid Pemberton from Bragg's army and from the scattered garrisons in the West. 1~c~urry, Two Great Rebel Armies, 54; Grant's maneuverings during his 1864-65 campaign in Virginia were a manifestation of this policy. He would conduct his campaign primarily to keep Lee from sending troops to other areas, allow Sherman to advance without threat, and to satisfy the public opinion of the north which still desired a visible attempt to capture Richmond. ' ' u n i t e d States, The War Department, The War of the &bellion: A Comoilation of the Official Records of the W o n and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U . S . Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol 23/2; Message from Halleck to Rosecrans, 30 Jan, 1863, 23; Message from Halleck to Burnside, 23 Mar, 1863, 162; Message from Halleck to Rosecrans, 25 Mar, 1863, 171; Message from Halleck to Burnside, 18 May, 1863, 337; Message from Halleck to Rosecrans, 3 Jun, 1863, 383. (Hereafter referred to as OR. Volume and part cited in Series I unless otherwise noted); Victor Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 19661, 187; McPherson, Battle Crv of Freedom 669. l2~hornasL. Connelly, Autumn of Glorv (Baton Rouge : Lousiana State University Press, 19711, 93; McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, 57. 1 3 @ 3 23/2: Johnston to Polk, 3 Mar. 1863, 659-60.

14stanley F. Horn, The Armv of Tennessee: A Militarv Historv (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19411, 232. "~ames Longstreet, From Manassas to A D D O ~ ~ ~ ~ O X (Secaucus, N.J.: The Blue and Grey Press, ND.), 327; Glenn Tucker, in Chickamauaa: Bloodv Battle of the West, mentions that Longstreet may have had designs on Bragg's command. This may have entered Longstreet's mind as a motivation for recommending the movement of his corps to Tennessee. 16~orn,The Armv of Tennessee 232. 170~ 23/1: Army of Tennessee strength return for June 20, 18637585.
"OR 23/1: Army of the cumberland strength return for month ofJune 1863, 411; Rosecrans' extensive Department of the Cumberland actually contained over 97,000 officers and men, however, the leaves, absences, and garrison details

left his fighting forces at Murfreesboro at just over 65,000. 190R 23/1: Army of Tennessee strength return for June 20, 18637585; Army of the Cumberland strength return for the month of June 1863, 411. 20~hiefof Engineers, United States Army, Military Ma.? of the Tullahoma. Chickamauaa and Chattanooaa Cam~aians. 21~hief of Engineers, Militarv Mao.
22 0 23/1: ~ Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.

3 23/1: ~ ~

Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.

24~onnelly,Autumn of Glorv, 112. 25~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 134. 2 6 ~ z r aJ. Warner, Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19641, 410; David L. Wilson, "William S. Rosecrans," in American Militarv Leaders, eds. Roger J. Spiller and Joseph G. Davson 111, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 19691, 263. 27~illiamM. Lamers, The Edae of Glory. A Bioara~hvof General William S. Rosecrans, U.S.A. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 19611, 16; Wilson, "Rosecrans" in American Military Leaders, eds. Spiller and Davson, 263; Warner, Generals in Blue, 410. 28~amers,Edae of Glorv, 34; Wilson, "Rosecrans" in American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Dawson, 263; Warner, Generals in Blue, 411. 29~amers,Edae of Glory, 103-121; Wilson, ''Rosecrans" in American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Davson, 264. 30~amers,Edae of Glorv, 103-121; Wilson, ffRosecrans" in American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Dawson, 264. 31~lysses S. Grant, Ulvsses S. Grant. Personal Memoirs Selected Letters 1839-1865 (Memoirs of U.S. Grant orignially published New York: Charles Webster Co., 1885-6; Letters originally published by Southern University Press, 1967-85; this book represents the incorporation of both; New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1990), 282.

32~ilson,ffRosecrans"in American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Dawson, 264; Warner, Generals in Blue, 411.

33~ruceCatton, "At the Edge of Glory," American Heritaqe Maoazine, February 1962, 109. 34~amers,Edae of Glory, 15.
3 5 20/1: ~ ~ Bragg to Cooper; Braggls report of Tullahoma Campaign, 665.

36~amers,Edqe of Glory, 245. 37~rankG. Carpenter, Personal Letters, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Carpenter Files in Staff Ride Office), 1 38~rankG. Carpenter, "With Old Rosey, " The National Tribune 7 January 1892. 39~rant,Memoirs, 282; Lamers, Edqe of Glorv, 4; Lamers, Edae of Glorv, 4. 40~amers,Edae of Glorx, 5. 41~icken,Illinois in the Civil War, 187. 4 2 ~ l e n nTucker, Chickamauqa: Bloody Battle in the

West, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,1961;

repr., Dayton, OH: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 19841, 37. 4 3 ~ o h nFitch, Annals of the Armv of the Cumberland, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1863), 56. 4 4 ~ c ~ u r r yTwo , Great Rebel Armies, 34. 45~arner,Generals in Blue, 501. 46~homasB. Van Horne, Historv of the Armv of the Cumberland (Cincinnati: Ogden, Campbell and Co., 1875; reprinted, Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 19881, 245. 47~arner,Generals in Blue, 500; Van Horne, Historv, xiv, 245. 48~arner, Generals in Blue, 294-5. 49~itch,Annals, 73-5. 50~illiamF.G. Shanks, Personal Recollections of Distinquished Generals, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 18661, 248-9. 51~arner, Generals in Blue, 100. 67

52~arner,Generals in Blue, 100. 5 3 ~ a nHorne, Historv, 184. 54~hanks,Recollections, 249. 55~arner,.Generals in Blue, 181. 56~arner, Generals in Blue, 181. 5701iver L. Spaulding, Jr., "William S. Rosecrans," in Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Bioqra~hv (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19431, Vol. XVI, 164. 58~arner,Generals in Blue, 470. 59~arner, Generals in Blue, 470. 6 0 ~ z r aJ. Warner, Generals in Grav (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19591, 30; Henry Steele Commager and John S. Bowman, The Civil War Almanac (New York: Gallery Books, 1983), 313. 'l~rad~ McWhiney, Braxton Braqq and Confederate Defeak Vol. 1, (New York: Columbia University Press, 19691, 27. 62~arner,Generals in Gray, 30; Don C. Seitz, Braxtor! Brass General of the Confederacy (Columbia, S.C.: the State Company, 1924), 9. 6 3 ~ c ~ h i n e yBraxton , Braaq, 202. 64~arner,Generals in Grav, 30; Seitz, Braqq, 104; McWhiney, Braxton Braqq, 202, 230-1. 65~arner,Generals in Grav 30; Commager and Bowman, Almanac 316; Thomas L. Connelly, Armv of the Heartland: TheArmv of Tennessee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 19671, 183. 66~n February of 1863, Davis dispatched General Joseph Johnston on an inspection visit to determine the state of Bragg's army. He also desired Johnston to determine if Bragg was still fit for command. In his reports to Davis Johnston, satisfied that Bragg's army was in good spirits, stressed to Davis that Bragg was fit for command. 23/2: Johnston to Davis, 3 Feb. 1863, 624; Johnston to Davis, 12 Feb. 1863, 632; Others within the Army of Tennessee such as General Polk wrote to Davis and implored the president to relieve Bragg for the good of the army. Q& 23/2: Polk to Davis, 30 Mar. 1863, 729.

6 7 great ~ deal of the problem was that the Army of Tennessee did achieve tactical successes. Bragg's tendency to overestimate the enemy inevitably led him to the conclusion to retreat from the field. This meant that a potentially beaten Union Army, who stayed on the field of battle, claimed the victory. Of additional importance are the attempts by Bragg's subordinates to seek his relief. After Perryville and Murfreesboro many of Bragg's subordinates wrote letters to Davis. OR 23/2: Polk to Davis, 30 Mar. 1863, 729. Others within Braggls army such as Cheatham, Hardee, Withers, and Cleburne either openly told or wrote Bragg that his presence was no longer desirable and 20/2: that he no longer had the confidence of the army. Cleburne to Bragg, 3 Jan. 1863, 699; 20/1: Cheatham to Bragg, 13 Jan. 1863, 698; Horn, Tennessee 223; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv 75-77.
6 8 0 & 52/2: Davis to Johnston, 22 Jan. 1863, 410; Connelly, Autumn of Glory 40, 77.

69~illiamM. Polk, Leonidas Polk, B i s h o ~and General Vol 2., (New York: Longmans Publishing Co., 18931, 298-9; OR 23/2: Johnston to Bragg, 10 Apr. 1863, 745-6. 70~ilbertE. Govan and James W. Livingood, A Different E. Johnston. C.S.A. (New Valor: The Story of General J o s e ~ h York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 19561, 162. 71~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv 71. 72~onnelly,Autumn of Glory 70; Horn, Tennessee 156. 7 3 ~ a mR. Watkins, IfCo. Avtch." Maurv Gravs. First Tennessee Reuiment (Nashville: Cumberland Presbyterian Publishing House, 1882; repr. edition, Wilmington, North Carolina: Morningside, 19901, 98. 74~illiamWatson, Life in the Confederate Army (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 18881, 368. 75~rant,Memoirs 449-50. 76~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv 69; Horn, Tennessee 157. 77~ucker, Chickamausa 76, 79. 78~arner, Generals in Gray 242; OR 20/2: General Order No. 143, 388. 79~arner,Generals in Grav 242-3. ' ' W a r n e r , Generals in Grav 74. 69

" ~ c ~ u r r y , Two G r e a t R e b e l A r m i e s 1 1 4 ; L e t t e r f r o m Bragg t o h i s w i f e , 25 Sep. 1863, Bragg P a p e r s . 8 2 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 20-1. 8 3 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r y 20-1, OR 2 0 / 1 : P o l k t o D a v i s , 3 F e b . 1 8 6 3 , 698-9; P o l k , Polk 296-7; OR 23/2: P o l k t o D a v i s , 30 Mar. 1 8 6 3 , 729-30.

8 5 ~ o m m a g e r a n d Bowman, Almanac 341; W a r n e r , G e n e r a l s i n Grav 124. 8 6 ~ o m m a g e r a n d Bowman, Almanac 341; Warner, j n Grav 124. Generals

8 7 ~ o m m a g e ra n d Bowman, Almanac 341; W a r n e r , G e n e r a l s i n Grav 124. 8 8 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 21, 8 9 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 21. 9 0 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 22, 76, c i t i n g Hardee t o Bragg, J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1 8 6 3 , i n W i l l i a m J . H a r d e e P a p e r s , Alabama. 91Polk, 261-63, 304.

Polk,

11, 1 6 5 . ,

Connelly,

Autumn o f G l o r v ,

23.

23/1: A r m y o f T e n n e s s e e S t r e n g t h R e t u r n f o r J u n e 20 a n d J u l y 1 0 , 1 8 6 3 , 585; C o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 1 1 6 . 9 3 ~ a r n e r , G e n e r a l s i n G r a y 333. 9 4 ~ o m m a g e ra n d Bowman, Almanac 390; W a r n e r , G e n e r a l s i n Grav 333. 9 5 ~ o h nW i t h e r s p o o n Du Bose, G e n e r a l J o s e o h W h e e l e r a r d t h e Armv o f T e n n e s s e e ( N e w York: The Neale P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1 9 1 2 ) , 157-8; C o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 1 2 2 - 4 . 9 6 ~ a r n e r , G e n e r a l s i n Gray 92; Thomas J o r d a n a n d J . P . Pryor, t h e Camoaisns of L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l N.B. F o r r e s t ( D a y t o n OH: M o r n i n g s i d e Bookshop, 1 9 7 7 1 , 277-8. 9 7 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 27-9, 123.

92m

98~illiam S . R o s e c r a n s , "The Campaign f o r C h a t t a n o o g a " C e n t u r y M a s a z i n e , 34 ( O c t o b e r 1 8 8 7 ) , 1 2 9 ; 16/2: Halleck t o R o s e c r a n s , 24 O c t o b e r 1 8 6 2 , 640-1.

99~osecrans, wChattanooga,ff129-30; Whitelaw R e i d , W in the War: Her Statesmen. Her Generals. and Soldiers (Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach and Baldvin, 1868) 752.; 0R24/3: Rosecrans to Halleck, June 2, 1863, 376. 100~osecrans, "Chattanooga,' I 130. lolvan Horne, Army of the Cumberland, 217, 297-8. 102~osecrans, "Chattanooga," 130; It is important to note that Rosecrans wrote this passage over 24 years after the campaign. There is a possibility that he wrote this in retrospect to play down his failures at Chickamauga, however, the available evidence in the Official Records does not contradict the first two points of the plan which were key to the campaign. Additionally, a review of the messages divulged no evidence to contradict what Rosecrans said he intended to do. Indeed, the available evidence indicates that Rosecrans conducted the Chickamauga campaign with the strategy he outlined in his article. 103~osecrans, "Chattanooga," 130; Tucker, Chickamausa, 44; Jerry Korn and the editors of Time-Life Books, The Fisht For Chattanooaa - Chickamauaa to Missionarv Ridae (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc., 1985), 19. 23/2: Halleck to Burnside, 23 March 1863, 162; Burnside to Rosecrans, 4 April 1863, 210; Halleck to Burnside, 27 April 1863, 284; Halleck to Burnside and Rosecrans, 18 May 1863, 337; Halleck to Burniside, 3 June 1863, 383. lo5~amers,Edae of Glorv, 277. 23/1: Rosecrans to Halleck, 24 July 1863, 403-4. lo60~ l o 7 m 23/1: Rosecrans to Halleck, 24 July 1863, 404-5.

2311: Rosecrans to Halleck, 24 July 1863, 404-5. 109~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv, 97; citing Davis to Johnston, 15 June 1863, in Johnston Papers, William and Mary. llO~onnelly,Autumn of Glorx, 110-113. lll~onnelly,Autumn of Glorv, 110-113.

'120R 23/2: Seddon t o Johnston, 3 March 1863, 657-8; Seddon, 4 March 1863, 661; Guy to Ewell, 9 March Johnston 1863, 675; Banks t o Ewell, 13 March 1863, 688-9; McMicken t o Harvie, 3 March 1863, 764-5; Scherck to Harvie, 23 March 1863, 769.

to

52/2: 113~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 109-10; Personnel Return for the Army of Tennessee, January 1863, 472; 23/2: Personnel Return for the Army of Tennessee, June 1863, 873. l l 4 ~ r a g g , Bragg t o Wife, 20 June 1863, Braxton Bragg Papers, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 1 1 5 ~ o n n e l l ~Autumn , of ~ l o r v , 116. ll60R 23/2: Hardee to Bragg, 26 Jan 1863, 617. 117~onnelly, autumn of Glorv, 113-7.

' " O R
760-1.

- 23/2:

W. P. Johnston t o Davis, 1 5 April 1863,

1 2 0 0 ~23/2: Roy t o Stewart, 24 June 1863, 884 121~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 113. 122~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv, 118.

CHAPTER 3 THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS When operations Burnside indicated his readiness on to commence to move.

22 June 1863, Rosecrans was ready

With his operational plan in mind, Rosecrans issued specific orders at 2 A.M. on the morning of June 23, 1863. ordered Triune Granger Granger to move with his command at to Salem (Map to send
4).

Rosecrans from

daylight

Additionally,

Rosecrans

ordered to

Mitchell's cavalry (recently attached

Granger) down the Eagleville and Shelbyville Pike to the push the the enemy's cavalry. The intent of this maneuver

attack was to onto Bragg at

the Confederate cavalry and infantry screen back main line at Shelbyville. idea This would convey to

of a main attack oriented on Polk's

position

Shelbyville.1 Concurrent Palmer of with Granger's movement, corps, would Major General from toward the the then would

Crittenden's toward

advance turn

east

Murfreesboro Bradeyville.

Woodbury and then

south

Palmer's mission as the advance guard of First, Palmer would seize the Barrens, and

XXI Army Corps was two-fold.

head of a defile

leading up to

continue

on toward Manchester.

Second, the maneuver

serve as a diversion designed to make Bragg think of it as a

I
APPRQLIYUC 8 W L E (YILES)

TULLAHOYA

Federal Unlta
Unlts

0
l a
ELK R I V E R

y
DECHERD I.#

' i ,

Confederate

WINCHEITER

FMETTIVILLE

UIIVI~IIITV CLLtll

Map 4. Movements on 23 June, 1883

OYU~IOO*A
LII)

feint. maneuver

Bragg would not believe that Rosecrans would attempt in the broken terrain in the east and would think

Rosecrans was attempting to trick him. Bragg

Rosecrans hoped that object

would continue to believe Shelbyville was the

of the main attack. 2 Rosecrans kept the rest of his army in readiness to

advance, but issued no orders for Thomas and McCook to move. Rosecrans secrecy. aimed probably did this to help maintain a level
23

of

Specific orders for Thomas and McCook on

June and

only at making sure they drew adequate

supplies

were capable of moving quickly when the word came. 3 Movements June. made commenced shortly after daylight on
23

Mitchell's cavalry division quickly drove south contact with the Confederate cavalry at Rover

and and

pushed the Confederate cavalry out of the way after a engagement near the town. the with retreating cavalry corps.

sharp

After this fight Mitchell pursued made contact from the

enemy to Unionville where he from Wheeler's division and

infantry off

Polk's

Outnumbered,

Mitchell

broke

engagement and pulled back to Rover for the night. 4 It is important to note that prior to 2 2 June On
1863 22

Wheeler had operated on the Confederate right flank.

June, however, he received information that a strong Federal force was assembling on the Shelbyville front. to this information Wheeler moved the vast In bulk response of his He

cavalry

command west to intercept the reported threat.

left only one brigade of Brigadier General John A. Wharton's division Liberty regiment to Gap. cover On the ground between Hoover's only one Gap and

this brigade's right

cavalxy To its

remained in place to guard Hoover's Gap.

right Wheeler left nothing. 5 Moving corps. General parallel and behind Mitchell came Granger's Brigadier Thomas to

Granger, with one organic division under

Absalom Baird and an attached division from

under Brigadier General J. M. Brannan, moved from Triune Salem. the

Palmer on the Union left flank began his movement as of Crittenden' s corps and moved east toward

advance

Woodbury. 6 With Rosecrans evening these prel iminary his movements completed, on the *at the would advance

called of the

together
23

corps his

commanders

June.

From outlined

headquarters plan for

Murfreesboro, continuance continue his

Rosecrans

his

of the movements against Bragg. feint on the Federal right

Granger an

with

toward Middleton (Map 5).

As he moved, Granger would detach

Brannan's division which would move to rejoin Thomas' corps. Stanley, would with one brigade of Turchin's cavalry division, joined,

link

up with Mitchell at Versailles.

Once

Stanley and Mitchell would conduct an attack in with Granger south toward Middleton and drive

cooperation the enemy's on (R.

cavalry before them.

McCook would attack with his corps

the Shelbyville road, turn east and move two divisions

Federal unlta

0
Map 6. Movements on 24 June, 1803

Johnson and Jefferson C. Davis) and would hold Liberty Gap.

toward Millersburg to seize division Granger's Thomas' (Sheridan.) eventua.1 XIV Corps the wou1.d leave

McCook's third

advance to Fosterville and cover from Middleton to Christiana.

movement would

advance on the Manchester Pike to seize and hold toward Manchester. Additionally, Crittenden Thomas would

advance seize,

if possible, Hoover's Gap.

one division (Van Cleve's) to garrison Murfreesboro and move to Bradeyville brigade as his with Palmer and Wood's join Once divisions. Crittenden One and

cavalry operate

under Turchin would advance guard.

at

Bradeyvillc,

Crittenden was to await further orders. 7 THE FIGHT FOR THE GAPS The morning of 24 June brought with it a downpour. It was a rain that did not stop for continuous seventeen

consecutive days.

Colonel John T. Wilder's mounted infantry

on

brigade of Major General Joseph J.Reynoldls division led Thomas' axis. Unknown to Wilder he was about to

make At

history and earn lasting praise for his action that day.

3 A.M. Wilder's brigade moved forward on the Manchester Pike

toward Hoover's Gap. toward moved Liberty Gap. toward

By 5 A.M. McCook's corps was in motion On McCook's right After Mitchell's cavalry from attac:k from his

Versailles. led

receiving a

orders

Granger, against

Mitchell Middleton,

his forces in was

spirited by

which

occupied

cavalry

Wheeler's corps.

To the north of Mitchell, Granger led

infantry column south on the Shelbyville toward Christiana. On the far left of

Murfreesboro Pike the Union flank

Crittenden's XXI Corps pushed forward at 7 A.M. objective of Bradeyville. 8 Thomas' objectives for forces the day. were the first to

toward their

seize infantry

their moved

Wilder's mounted

rapidly south toward Hoover's Gap. the

Once at the north end of gap to

gap Wilder's orders were to attack through the the he narrow part located midway down the was to wait for Reynold's infantry By midmorning gap. to

seize there before

Once up

come

advancing further.

Wilder's

brigade northern pushed the

made contact with the Rebel cavalry located on the approach the gap. to Hoover's Gap. Wilder's brigade

easily

cavalry pickets aside and continued headlong

into

Wilder urged Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick, in charge the gap. men

of a five company advance guard, to push on and prevent enemy from occupying executed any these fortifications orders promptly in and the his

Kirkpatrick

followed him through the gap so rapidly that they

prevented

the enemy cavalry and signal stations from warning the enemy infantry of their approach.9 Wilder reached the narrow part of the gap at 12 noon with his main it body. On Wilder's arrival at previously the gap he He 3rd the

observed

was not defended as

thought.

learned instead that a regiment of cavalry, the 1st and Kentucky Regiments Consolidated, occupied a position on

Garrison Beyond General

Fork

of

the Duck River just south

of

the

gap. Major

this regiment was Bate's infantry brigade, of

A.P. Stewart's division, located two miles

to

the Beech

east of Garrison Fork, about three miles southwest of Grove.

Wilder determined at that moment to seize the entire

length of the gap before the infantry brigade could respond. Unknown responded to Wilder, as it would be he was some time before of Bate

because

yet

unaware

Wilder's

presence. 10 Although retreating initially cavalrymen west at Bate was close to Hoover's Gap and he

Confederate knew nothing

cavalry rode past his of the Federal

position

advance.

These mi1.e to

notified Stewart, located at least another At 2 P.M., Stewart ordered Bate

Fairfield.

advance to Hoover's Gap. 11 Wilder certainly was not aware of this activity

within Stewart's division. the gap before

He concerned himself with takin.g reinforcements arrived and

Confederate

therefore ordered his brigade to continue to press His initiative resulted in the capture of the entire of Hoover's Gap by 12:30 P.M.. the the

forward. length of

On reaching the terminus

gap Wilder established a defensive position to Confederates from retaking the gap. Wilder

prevent sent until

then

word to Reynolds that he could and would hold the gap Reynolds could bring up the infantry.12

By and

2 P.M. Bate, finally apprised of

the

situation he he

ready to take action, moved north to push back what was Federal cavalry. As he moved forward

thought

directed two of his regiments to move along lateral roads to ptotect his flanks. with at Bate continued northeast toward the gap Starting piecemealed Wilder's hour-long he

only three of his five regiments (700 men).

3:30

P.M.

he mounted

three

determined,

attacks to dislodge Wilder but the heavy fire from Spencers pushed Bate's infantry back after an

engagement. faced a

The volume of fire caused Bate to he thus

believe

"vastly superior force" and positions.

established Brigadier sent

defensive General

At 7 P.M., Stewart ordered

Bushrod Johnson to relieve Bate's brigade and

Bate to the rear to reorganize. 13 Interestingly, Bate might have succeeded in his last attack had Wilder obeyed his new orders. Shortly after

Bate's first effort, Wilder received orders from Reynolds to withdraw infantry. courier, messenger relieved.14 Wilder's Reynolds situation once. came brigade forward at did indeed hold and its ground. the at from the south end of the gap and await the

In spite of the threat of arrest from Wilder that refused to withdraw. his men could hold He their told

Reynold's Reynold's until

ground

about 4

P.M.

seeing forward

ordered

his remaining two

brigades

Within an hour, two more regiments

joined

Wilder's

forces and by 7 P.M. the rest of the division extended General the defensive H, line. Later that of

arrived

and

evening Thomas'

Major corps

Love11

Rousseau's division

relieved Reynolds of the responsibility for the gap. The unexpected. would Thomas many 2,000 only take rapid seizure of Hoover's Gap was quite it

Rosecrans believed that, in all likelihood, two days of heavy fighting to force the

gap. as

believed

his forces would not gain the gap of at

for

as

three days and not without the loss The seizure of the gap,

least took of

casualties. hours

however, men,

and Wilder's losses totaled merely 60

which only 12 were killed in action. 15 Why did Stewart's division defend the gap so poorly? Why did Hardee not direct Stewart to place infantry the gap in the first place? questions lies Part of the plan forces to

within these

answer to

in Bragg's overall

defend

against Rosecrans' advance.

Bragg's comparatively low troop made

strength, combined with the broad front he must cover, economy forces spots of force a necessity. Bragg therefore

positioned trouble fixed

where he could shift them easily to support along his line rather than string them out in

positions.16 Perhaps more important was Hardee's interpretation

of Bragg's intentions. of the

From the beginning of the occupation exactly what ideas

Duck River line, Hardee did not know

Bragg wanted him to do.

Bragg's vaguely communicated

led Hardee to conclude that Bragg did not intend to

prevent

the Federals from passing into the Duck River Valley east of Liberty Gap. Rather, Hardee understood that
if

Rosecrans to

attempted to force Hoover's Gap Stewart should pull back the vicinity of Wartrace and prepare to defend into Rosecrans' flank. This was or

conduct in

attacks Hardee's made

reflected

orders to Stewart on 24 June.

Hardee

therefore which he

no effort to sharply defend a position from

was to withdraw. 17 There exists no evidence to show whether Bragg

attempted to clarify Hardee's understanding. did not

Possibly Bragg the plan. the any that if the

realize that Hardee did not understand it is possible Bragg simply failed to

Worse, issue. efforts these

address

This is possible in view of Bragg's belief that on the right would be no more than feints and be countered by a defense at Tullahoma

could

necessary. two

More likely, however, probably the issue.

ill-feeling between any

commanders

prevented

effective

communication about The mission though for the

seizure of Liberty Gap proved to be Rosecrans' forces than Hoover's

tougher even was

Gap, Gap

Confederate defensive plan of Liberty Confederate cavalry was to

similar.

The

provide

early

warning and allow the infantry to position for the attack. However, unlike Hoover's Gap, the

oncoming

Confederate

forces were better positioned initially.18

The Patrick Cleburne, the gap. brigade post

defense

of Liberty Gap fell to division of Hardee's

Major Army

General Corps. in his to In

Cleburne's

2nd

unlike Stewart in the east, stationed

forces

Earlier in the month, Cleburne ordered one of commanders, Brigadier General St. John Liddell, pickets (two regiments) in Liberty at Gap.

strong to

addition Cleburne two

Liddell's remaining regiments

Bellbuckle, Gaps with some

could reinforce Bellbuckle and Liberty

additional brigades located with him at

Wartrace

five miles from Liberty Gap. 19 Cleburne's posting of infantry in the gaps was once

again the result of Hardee's interpretation of Bragg's plan. Hardee understood that Bragg wanted them defended to prevent the Federals from supporting their main attack against front. Hardee translated this successfully the to

Shelbyville Cleburne.

Cleburne, in turn, ensured that an infantry force

covered the gap. At 12 noon, shortly after Wilder reached the part with of Hoover's Gap, McCook's XX Corps came enemy pickets north of Liberty Gap. into The narrow contact second

division of XX Corps, under the command of Brigadier General Richard pickets Liberty began

W. Johnson, easily pushed aside the

from Gap. Wharton's division and

enemy them

cavalry toward forces to

drove

Once in the gap, however, the Federal

to meet stiff resistance.

McCook ordered Johnson

seize the gap, but

Johnson was unable to continue

straight

ahead posture

as

Wilder had at Hoover's Gap. Liddell's regiments made

The it

good

defensive for hills most back

of

necessary

Johnson's and flank

brigades to deploy off the road, climb the Liddell's positions. In what became the

severe

fight of the campaign, Liddell eventually fell

to prepared defensive positions at the mouth of gap. 2 0 As unfolded, continued toward the actions at Hoover's and Liberty Gaps cavalry advanced out of up then their to

the other two Federal corps supported by Rosecrans' deception. Granger's corps drove the rebels

Christiana while Mitchell He

Middleton. with

then returned to Christiana and

linked

Major General Stanley.

This large cavalry force

bivouacked near Granger.

Granger and Stanley ordered

forces to build a large number of fires for the evening,

further the impression of a large column moving south toward Shelbyville. 21 Crittenden, north of Bradeyville, continued to his way through the mud. He encountered little slog

resistance

during his march and reached the outskirts of Bradeyville by evening. as they The going was extremely slow for Crittenden's marched over one of the worst roads in grew worse with each passing unit. the men area.

This

road

Crittenden and

reported eight

later that it often took as many as fifty men wagon

mules, tugging and pulling, to move a

forward

over the mired roads.2 2

As Rosecrans evaluated his operations that night had were reason to be pleased. in his had possession. moved Both Liberty and All units of and the had Hoover's Army reached had of

he

Gaps the their for more

Cumberland designated concern. than

as planned

objectives.

Still, Rosecrans

reason

His rapid seizure of Hoover's Gap might seem the

a diversion to Bragg, which could unravel

entire

deception. The the campaign and early capture of Hoover's Gap the first day opened the way for the advancing McCook's corps. It accelerated columns the of

of

Thomas'

great

turning move envisioned by Rosecrans. side that realized

While perhaps neither the move and

it fully at the time, it would be

in a matter of days would unhinge Bragg's defense

render his prepared works untenable. The reaching army. adjust early seizure of Hoover's Gap movements also of had far

effects

on the planned

Rosecrans' to

With the seizure of the gap early, Rosecrans had the movements of his army accordingly. It

would The could plan,

still take time to concentrate the army at Manchester. linkup not in Manchester was delayed because quickly. To accomplish his Crittenden deception

move

Rosecrans Gap.

also continued feints on Shelbyville and

Libert:y slow the

Therefore, it became necessary to actually

movement on Thomas' axis in order to develop the picture and synchronize the movement of all forces.

Rosecrans admitted in his report on the battle it was not clear at the time how Bragg might interpret movements. Additionally, Rosecrans was not

that the yet to of He if

Federal certain flank

if the enemy would advance on McCook or attempt Clearly, Rosecrans maintained the envelopment on the Union left idea

Thomas. the

continuing definitely possible. of enemy

flank. left

wanted

Thomas to move further to the

Rosecrans requested Thomas to give an activity to the front and offer an

assessment opinion for and

continued operations.

Rosecrans similarly asked McCook

Granger to observe and report activity to their front. 23 Bragg did not seem to have yet determined this

Federal plan. Throughout the 24th, confused reports filtered in to Braggls headquarters. of the Federal attack Wheeler and Polk believed was aimed at the

brunt

Shelbyville. made this major report and he

Hardee's view

reports on the fighting at Liberty Gap

seem plausible, however, Hardee also reported a at Hoover's Gap. As a result of the latter

effort Bragg

displayed some concern about his right flank Wharton late to shift two regiments of in the day of the in 24th. cavalry Bragg

ordered

toward further move.

Manchester ordered However, he

Polk

to hold his command

readiness

to

other orders issued by Bragg on the 24th to believe the major attack would

indicate fall on

continued

Shelbyville.

His orders to Hardee reflected Bragg's belief

that

the

Liberty

Gap

and

Hoover's

Gap

actions

wese

demonstrations. 2 4 Bragg's factors. First, beliefs were likely the result of with four the

Bragg had little or no contact He relied

forces actually fighting the Federals. on

primari1.y delivered

telegraph and courier messages which were not

in a timely fashion.

Second, the move by Wheeler across the

front to Shelbyville on 22 point of the main

23 June misled Bragg as to

the and

attack.

His

trust

in

Wheeler,

Wheeler's rapid movement to the west caused Bragg to believe that Wheeler was responding to the greater threat. Wheeler's infantry cavalry forces on move, in reported (Mitchell strong and Federal Third., and of
of

cavalry in a the front result way he

Granger) Fourth, as little in

Shelbyville Wheeler's

23 and 24 June.

Bragg the

had east.

of had Gag.

reconnaissance practically no

Additionally, at

contact with the forces

Hoover's

Bragg, therefore, received no information from that quarter. The four factors were enough to convince Bragg that

Rosecrans intended to attack Shelbyville. 25 Rosecrans, of course had no knowledge of what was thinking. of This uncertainty led Rosecrans, ever Bragg mindful June paint and

his grand turning movement, to issue orders for 2 5 would hopefully outline the scene he wanted
61.

that (Map

to Stand

Crittenden would advance to Lumley's with Thomas.

open communications

Thomas would attack the

XXXX
10

Federal Unlis Oonlederale Unlts

0
0

Movemento, 26 June Movements, 28 June

- --

Map 8. M o v e m e n t 8 on 26 and 28 June, 1883

rebels and drive them toward Fairfield.

This would make

it

look like Thomas intended to head for Shelbyville. would continue to threaten an advance in force

McCook through present drive towaxd

Liberty Gap. the image

Stanley and Granger would continue to of a large combined force attempting

to

south to Shelbyville.

If the Confederates retreated

Wartrace, Thomas was to send the bulk of his force south McCook also to Manchester. This move would pave the

directly way for

to follow and join him. join Thomas the and

Crittenden, in turn, This maneuver Bragg's

could would weak the on

Crittenden.

concentrate flank.

Army

of the Cumberland

on

Bragg,

in the meantime would be responding

to

deception the wrong

and would continue to concentrate his flank. Rosecrans believed the

forces

situation

would

compel Bragg to withdraw. 2 6 More drenching rain greeted both armies as appeared on the 25th. planned road, muddy for daylight

The rain slowed many of the movemenx Crittenden. His The

the day, especially that of

poor even in good weather, was by now a morass. condition of the road greatly fatigued

Crittenden's

men and slowed his movement to a crawl. determination did the head of his command Springs, a position
4 miles short of

Only through dogged make it to Hollow Lumley's Stand by

nightfall.27 Granger, of on the opposite flank, was now in command the

Stanley and Mitchell in addition to the infantry of

Reserve column

Corps. to

Early in the day he to

directed counter

cavalry

advance on Fosterville

Confederate Shelbyville regiments the The

attempts to drive in the Federal pickets on the road. from

In a sharp engagement that afternoon, two Colonel Robert H. Minty's cavalry brigade

pushed

Confederate pickets into and then south of Fosterville. Federal cavalry managed to drive the Confederate

cavalry At that

back onto the infantry forces occupying Guy's Gap.

point the Confederates opened fire with artillery and forced Minty's cavalry to retrace their steps back to Christiana.28 Thomas, too, made contact to his front. His fourth

division under Reynolds made slow headway as a result of the driving Johnson. foot him rain and continued skirmishing with Bate and

By the day's end, Reynold's division secured the enemy detached forced from late and

of the heights toward Fairfield but the to halt there. Brannan, who had been

Granger on the 24th, was unable to rejoin Thomas until on the 25th. Thomas reported the delay to Rosecrans

offered

observations about the situation.

Thomas

believed

the enemy had a brigade on the Fairfield road and one on the Manchester defend. to Pike and that the enemy intended to delay or

Thomas then recommended that the XIV Corps

prepare his on

attack the next morning.

Thomas proposed to launch moved

main

effort against Fairfield while one division

Manchester. 29

The movements of Hardee's corps on the 25th prompted Thomas' observations. Hardee ordered Stewart not to contest Hardee also t : o

the approach to Manchester if pressed heavily. stipulated that Stewart was to fall back

gradually

Wartrace if pressed.

In effect Stewart's orders meant

that

he was not to defend or delay on the axis toward Manchester. Stewart's subsequent compliance had grave consequences for

Bragg's ability to stop the Federal advance. 30 But Stewart's on the 25th at least, brigades Thomas hard. the 25th did not The push slow

withdrawing of

very

concentration some respite.

the Federal corps gave On the afternoon of the

Confederates Crittenden's t : o the t : o

lead elements were just beginning their difficult ascent Lumley's poor Stand. he as In view of the weather conditions and traveled, quickly Crittenden and could not get

route

Manchester

as Thomas

McCook.

Rosecrans t:o the

likely understood this and probably conveyed his concern Thomas. numerically This seems the logical explanation for

superior XIV Corps to halt instead of

brushing

Stewart aside. McCook's heavier corps, in Liberty after Gap, however, faced

resistance.

Shortly

daylight,

Liddell's McCook's

brigade launched a series of local attacks against

forces in Liberty Gap while Cleburne moved Brigadier General S.A.M. Wood's brigade north in support. 31 On Cleburne 's

arrival later in the morning, Cleburne observed that Liddell

still

guarded Gaps.

the approaches coming Indeed, by 4 P.M.

from

Bellbuckle thought

and the

Liberty

Liddell On his own

Federals appeared to be retreating.

initiative,

Liddell ordered an attack on Liberty Gap. spirited Wood's

Despite Liddell's provided not worse early by

assault and additional reinforcement brigade, Cleburne's To division could

dislodge Mccook evening, result Federal He more

McCook 's

forces. toward

make

matters in the

counterattacked threatening of

Cleburne

to force Cleburne out of the gap.

As a

the heavy action Cleburne determined at least a

division therefore

held the gap and probably had more behind it. ordered his division to fall back to the

defensible terrain around Bellbuckle. 32 It

is

appropriate to point out here

that

Bragg's

concern of the main attack falling on Shelbyville to influence the actions of Hardee and his

continued division of the were and

commanders. the

By the evening of the 24th and the morning from

25th Bragg still had very little information Gap area. He did know, however, that

Hoover's

there

strong Federal forces operating on the Shelbyville Pike in Liberty Gap. north in

Realizing that Granger's forces were halted activity the

of Guy's Gap and that there was still heavy

Liberty Gap, Bragg revised his opinion and

decided

Federal main effort would come through Liberty Gap. 33 This may account for Hardee's apparent to resisting the Federals along the indifference Road and

Fairfield

Manchester Pike.

It also helps account fox Hardee's

orders And,

to Stewart for a gradual delay back from Hoover's Gap. of course, it explains why Cleburne considered it

important

to prevent the Yankees from pushing through Liberty Gap. 34 On again the third day of the campaign Rosecrans once bit Gaps. of

had reason to be pleased, although he remained a His forces still held Hoover's and Liberty

anxious.

Thomas had pushed Stewart back. the Cumberland

Both flanks of the Army their tasks,

were accomplishing progress remained

although only toward June with

Crittenden's concern was

slow.

Rosecrans' to push

about

Thomas'

inability

Manchester. he decided

As Rosecrans considered his plans for 26 that the orders for the 25th would stand

only a few exceptions. 35 Although Rosecrans agreed in part with Thomas' for an advance on Fairfield and Manchester, he plan

directed

Thomas to weight the Manchester approach, while continuing a supporting Hardee's attack forces toward Wartrace. This would the force main

toward Wartrace, while allowing

body of Thomas' corps to proceed toward Manchester. 36 Rosecrans also ordered McCook to prepare his corps

to disengage and move east to follow Thomas through Hoover's Gap. and McCook was to leave one division to hold Liberty keep up the impression of an attack striking from Gap that

direction. 3 7

THE DRIVE TO MANCHESTER At 4 A.M. on 26 June, Reynold's division of Thomas' Beech Thomas the Major

corps initiated the day's movements with an attack on Grove on the road to Manchester. ordered enemy General between either. Hollow Rousseau's toward James the Shortly after this to

and Brannan's divisions

drive

Fairfield to secure Reynold's

S.

flank.

Negley's

division

remained

positioned to support Matt's and

two columns as a reserve prepared

By early afternoon Wilder's brigade seized and opened the gate to Manchester.

Brannan

Rousseau too were extremely successful. the enemy back toward Fairfield,

They rap dly

drove any

thereby

re1 eving

pressure on Thomas' main column. 3 8 McCook on the right kept up the deception in Liberty Gap with Davis' division and one He brigade from Johnson's east To and cover a

division. prepared his move

moved the rest of XX Corps to the

to advance south through Hoover's Gap. McCook ordered Davis' division to

conduct

demonstration the

against the defenders to the south to Davis'

convey

idea of an attack toward Shelbyville.

division

soon made contact with a strong enemy force to its front and Davis halted. Throughout the day Davis kept up the the

impression enemy. 3 9

of an advance by continued skirmishing with

Crittenden, slowly

for

his

part,

continued

to

proceed to bring

past Hollow Springs while his men labored

the

wagons

through

the quagmire.

On

the

Federal

right

flank,

Stanley and Granger, maneuvering around

Christiana, road

maintained

the impression of a general advance on the

to Shelbyville. busy

Granger also kept some of Stanley's cavalry By the

searching to the west for Forrest's cavalry.

end of the day all movements planned and

the 26th were complete manner

Rosecrans proposed to continue in much the same

on the following day. 40 By Hardee s late corps evening of 26 June Rosecrans was apparently had learned toward

withdrawing

Shelbyville, Wartrace or possibly Tullahoma.

Therefore, his reflected maneuver. concentrate

orders to the Army of the Cumberland for the 27th a continuance of the same general scheme to of

Rosecrans

would continue to maneuver so as

his army on the left flank in the vicinity of Manchester. 41 Understanding the problems Crittenden encountered on his route, Rosecrans ordered him to move toward Manchester move
27

as fast as possible.

Rosecrans then ordered Thomas to

his main column rapidly toward Manchester at daylight on June. Thomas was to threaten Fairfield with the

remainder

of his forces to protect the main column and drive the-enemy from that place. Rosecrans also told Thomas that once the

enemy was driven from Fairfield the rest of XIV Corps should proceed to Manchester by the shortest route. These orders

to Thomas reflected a concern that Bragg might be trying to

prevent

flanking

maneuver by

concentrating

forces

at

Tullahoma for a possible attack or retreat. 4 2 Rosecrans' unchanged. close up orders to McCook remained basically to

Rosecrans did reflect his desire for McCook quickly behind Thomas as the movement

toward received Gap. the

Manchester orders to

continued. advance cavalry

On McCookls right, Granger further than

in force no

Guy's out

Stanley's enemy. feel front. to the

received instructions to

feel

If Stanley received no significant contact he

could its

free to advance on Shelbyville and demonstrate to

Following the demonstration Stanley was to move east Manchester Pike and rejoin the main column of the

Army of the Cumberland. 4 3 Bragg did not know Rosecrans' exact dispositions the afternoon of the Gap Bragg flank attack and
26 June.

on

Instead, Bragg now believed that Liberty in mind the would 27th would Polk argued

main Federal column was positioned in front of ready to descend on Shelbyville. With this

called Polk to Army headquarters and resurrected maneuver contemplated in the spring. Polk the

north through Guy's Gap on the morning of the Federals in their flank.

strike

Hardee while Polk

continue shattered that Polk's the

to hold his position to fix Rosecrans the Federal right. plan A visibly upset however,

was unworkable, With

Bragg

overruled apparently

protest.

Braggls

decision

irreversible,

Polk

returned to Shelbyville

to

issue

the

necessary orders. 4 4 By near

4:30

P.M. Bragg learned of Hardeels

hard

fight his
2

Fairfield. with

Although Bragg did not know it before Polk, Thomas had outflanked Stewart of a possible shift in the Union In the at

discussion P.M..

Conscious

effort:, meantime

Bragg canceled the previous order to Polk. Stewart's under

division continued to pull back toward enemy pressure. At

5

Fairfield finally By 6 P.M. Stewart's road might Bragg

heavy

P.M.

Bragg

received the news of Stewart's left being turned. Bragg right to received word that Thomas had threatened

forcing Stewart to fall back.

This meant the that Rosecrans Finally, If

Manchester was now wide open and Stewart the all the way to of the

drive

Wartrace. situation.

realized

danger

Rosecrans division The north turn, it

continued to press Stewart to Wartrace, Cleburne's would be cut could off from the rest of Bragg's

army. the in

Federals side of

also threaten to strand Polk on This situation would,

the Duck River. Polk from

prevent

joining Bragg at

Tullahoma

should

become necessary. 4 5 Bragg apparently he understood the danger to his army but of

still did not understand

the

objective

Rosecrans' maneuver. a concern about a

Bragg's concern for Wartrace reflected shallow envelopment. Rosecrans, of

course,

envisioned

a wider and deeper

envelopment,

which

aimed to turn Braggfs right and seize the Elk River in Bragg's rear. 46 Bragg's and his unwillingness to attack to discern Rosecrans' true

bridges

flank, designs,

failure forced

Rosecrans'

ultimately Bragg stay

him to retreat.

At 5 P.M. on

26

June, should no made Bragg

requested and fight

Polk's advice on whether the or retreat to Tullahoma.

army

Although

evidence of a response exists, later developments soon the question a moot point. By 6 P.M. on the 26th,

learned

that Stewart's division could not

hold

Fairfield This was

against an enemy advance in force in the morning. a critical time for a decision, and, at
11

P.M.,

Bragg fall

ordered

Polk and Hardee to vacate their positions and

back on Tullahoma in the morning. 47 The Federal army continued its successful on the morning of the 27th (Map 7). movements entered

Wilder

Manchester at 8 A.M., taking the town completely by surprise and capturing the small garrison. Reynolds, with the 1n drove his

remainder the

of the division, entered Manchester at noon. Brannan and Rousseau Fairfield.

11:30

meantime

successfully Negley in began the

Stewart's movement

division south to

from

Manchester at

morning.

Shortly after 12 P.M. Brannan and Rousseau wheeled south and followed Negley toward Manchester. 48 Armed going as with reports from Thomas that things were of

planned,

Rosecrans began to issue

series

SOALE I N MILES

Map 7. Movements on 27 and 28 June, 1863.

orders to get the army to Manchester as rapidly as possible. He urged Thomas to close quickly so as to clear the way McCook's Grove, corps. split to McCook, with his lead division division on the and sent at for Beech of it The

Sheridan's Manchester

part Pike.

directly remaining

Manchester

brigade

moved south behind Rousseau.

At 1 P.M.

Rosecrans, apparently remembering the importance of securing his right flank and seeing a potential log jam on the

Manchester Pike, revised the order. to

He now directed

McCook to

send all of Sheridan's division by way of

Fairfield

Manchester. Fairfield Rosecrans

Additionally, Sheridan was to post a brigade at to cover the passing of the other then directed McCook to push two his brigades. other two

divisions to Manchester behind Thomas on the direct route of the Manchester Pike. also Turning his eyes further to the Van Cleve to bring two of rear his

Rosecrans

ordered

brigades forward from Murfreesboro immediately.4 9 Content Rosecrans with the success of his main effort, ordered The lack

turned next to his left flank.

He again

Crittenden to get to Manchester as quickly as possible. instructions Rosecrans provided Crittenden reflected a

of concern for any threat from the east to this exposed left flank.
He

told Crittenden to leave a brigade

with

the

corps trains and proceed forward with the remaining Crittenden, however, displayed some caution.

forces.

He ordered

Turchin

to proceed to Pocahontas to screen

the left

flank

until the corps passed Lumley's Stand. 5 0 While and A.M., Stanley in Rosecrans directed these movements, flank. out Granger At
9

were busy on the Federal right

pursuance of his orders, Stanley moved

from

Christiana. division Guy's Gap. determined Stanley the gap. and south

Supported by an infantry brigade from headed south to dislodge the

Baird's from

Stanley

enemy

After a 2 hour skirmish at Fosterville, that only cavalry was present in

Stanley Gap. seize gap fled by

Guy's

informed Granger who then ordered Stanley to

Stanley's compos te force quickly carried the it

continued in pursuit of the enemy cavalry as toward Shelbyville Baird's infantry,

ordered

Granger to remain in posit on, continued to hold the gap. 5 1.

-

Stanley's the

troopers chased the enemy cavalry to their

south.,

following three

Shelbyville Pike,

fortifications enemy fight:.

miles north of Shelbyville. led

At this point the turned to

cavalry,

by Major General Wheeler,

Wheeler directed artillery at Stanley's force, but the Union cavalry ignored it. Stanley directed Minty's brigade to

charge the works. the back of

Minty wasted no time and his charge brok:e Confederate defense. Wheeler's Martin's

the feeble

force,

of Wheeler's and Brigadier General Will T.

divisions, turned and retreated again. 5 2 Wheeler immediately halted of his forces at at a line
6

of P.M.

work:s and

north

Shelbyville

about

attempted of three

to defend once again. well placed guns not wanting

Wheeler directed the as he

fire

on Stanley

approached. ordered a

Stanley,

to lose momentum,

again

charge, and within minutes his cavalry carried the position, causing Wheeler to flee from Shelbyville. then tried Stanley's cavalry as Wheeler

pursued Wheeler's force to the Duck River to make goodhis escape. Only a

sharp

rearguard

action by a regiment of Martin's cavalry prevented Wheeler's capture and allowed most of his force to escape.53 In of this action, Stanley made contact with and Martin's cavalry divisions, but In fact it was not until elements did not

Wheeler's

encounter

Forrest.

midnight,

after four days of action, that Stanley learned of Forrest's whereabouts. Although Forrest was in the vicinity of the

cavalry fighting on the 27th he missed the action. On the 25th, while still on picket duty near Hill, Forrest received orders from Wheeler to Spring his

move

division to Shelbyville.

Late on the 26th Forrest,

moving received cavalry the

east at Bigbyville (20 miles east of Shelbyville), orders to continue east to try to intercept Union

known to be on the Shelbyville Pike. 27th Forrest from

By the morning of Gap.

was within ten miles of Guy's that direction, Forrest

Hearing Brigadier a

gunfire

pushed

General Frank Armstrong's brigade rapidly east to attempt juncture with Wheeler's cavalry. neared the Pike, he saw

But, by the time Armstrong retreating toward

Wheeler

Shelbyville. line speed

Forrest elected to move parallel to

Wheeler's The

of retreat and effect a link up at

Shelbyville.

of Wheeler's retreat and Stanley's pursuit

prevented

the desired union. Forrest to turn Shelbyville. contact with

The presence of Stanley's cavalry forced

and cross the Duck River four miles west of crossing Federal the river and Forrest moved avoided east to

After the

cavalry

Tullahoma. 5 4 While Stanley's cavalry fought through the afternoon of the 27th, the left wing of Rosecrans' army continued to

concentrate.

Reynolds entered Manchester at noon and closed Rosecrans and Thomas themselves Negley's division division at arrived
10

his trains prior to 6 P.M.. arrived at

8

shortly after Reynolds. P.M. followed

by Brannan's

P.M..

Rousseau's

arrival at midnight meant that most of

Thomas'

corps was gathered around Manchester.

Throughout the night, Beech

Thomas' remaining trains and detachments left between Grove

and Manchester streamed in and by daylight on 28 June

had closed on Manchester. 55 McCook did not get any of his divisions into

Manchester until the 28th owing to the poor road and delays for Thomas' corps to clear out of By

conditions his path.

Crittenden was also bogged down on his route.

nightfall

on the 27th the head of his column was still four miles frcm Manchester and his tail stretched back to Lumley's Stand.. column

While the distance between the front and rear of his

was

no more than 6 to 7 miles it took many of notably the trains, two more days to

Crittenden's traverse the

units,

distance to Manchester 56 As took Rosecrans' army moved toward to concentrate the Army Manchester, of Bragg at the

measures

Tennessee on

Tullahoma. next

During the night of 26 June, and early orders to Hardee's Stewart

morning, the corps commanders issued commanders to move to Tullahoma. At first light

their corps started

division began his

its movement first.

movement

south, paralleling the Wartrace

Tullahoma south

Road. toward

Cleburne's division, Tullahoma As via Hardee

at the same time, moved

Wartrace moved

his

Schoeffner's corps south

Bridge

Tullahoma.

Wharton's

cavalry division covered the rear of the column. 57 Polk's cleared to the corps moved at 5:30 A.M. on the 27th and

Shelbyville by 8:00 A.M..

Wither's division

moved to

Tullahoma via the Flat Creek Road which ran parallel Elk River about six miles south of it.

Cheatham's the Elk

division River, Bridge.

moved directly east on the north side of then turned south to cross the Elk At
1

at

Schoeffner's and Only allow

P.M.

the

convergence

of

Cleburne's

Cheatham's columns created a bottleneck at the bridge. after Polk ordered Cleburne to pull off the road and the movement resume. folloved by Cleburne

Cheatham to pass did bridge, Cheatham,

Once across the proceeded to

Rovesville, then south on the Wartrace - Tullahoma road. 58

The Army of Tennessee moved slowly owing to the poc~r weather and the use of the same roads by several The divisions. bot:h of and

roads were in such bad shape that the infantry of

corps did not reach Tullahoma until early in the morning the 28th. The last elements of the army, the trains,

Wheeler's cavalry, closed more than 12 hours later. 59 The seemingly rapid movements of the enemy and Shortly had the after

slow progress of his own army worried Bragg.

8 A.M.

on

27

June

he

learned

Rosecrans

captured in As the the the

Manchester. vicinity day

Bragg

also knew the enemy had scouts

of Wartrace, shadowing Wharton's cavalry.

wore on Bragg received scattered reports detailing Sometime before 11 P.M.,

traffic jam of his columns.

Brag.9 a

received word that Martin's cavalry division had suffered defeat at Shelbyville.60 As seriousness Bragg. his army struggled to reach Tullahoma apparent

the to

of the situation became even more

If the Federals continued to operate against Bragg's

right they could cut off his railroad line of supply and his avenue of retreat. open to Bragg knew there were many First, alternatives Rosecrans Second, P1ac:e could main

Rosecrans to accomplish this.

could move to cut the railroad bridge near Decherd. Rosecrans and could move via Hillsborough to Third,

University Rosecrans the

then directly to Chattanooga.

seize pike,

Cowan and thereby control the railroad and toward Chattanooga. Additionally, this

location

controlled access to the Cowan railroad tunnel. the below Chattanooga Cowan. and Nashville Railroad would Lastly, Rosecrans could opt for

If blocked, be a unusable shallow River

envelopment and seize the crossing sites over the Elk between Tullahoma and De~herd.~' Rosecrans' evacuation McMinnville campaign. Rosecrans had of seizure of Manchester and

Bragg's
-

the Spring Hill ended the

Shelbyville phase

of

Wartrace

line

first

Rosecrans' conditions Bragg confused had moved good

In spite of heavy rains and poor road

turned Bragg out of position as planned. the Federal deception and remained

believed it

until

was too late. his

On the other hand, As both

Rosecrans armies several

maneuvered into

forces brilliantly.

their new positions, Rosecrans retained

options but Bragg had only two choices:

fight or retreat!

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 3
' O R 23/1: Granger to Rosecrans, 15 July 1863, 535; 23/1: ~ E e c r a n sto Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405.

QR

'0~23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405.

3~~ - 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405.

4pa 23/1: Mitchell to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 543-4.

5~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv, 126. 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405; Rosecrans states in his report that he ordered Palmer's division to advance on the 23rd concurrently with Granger's advance. However, Crittenden and Palmer state their orders 23/1: Palmer to Oldershav, 10 were for the 24th of June., July 1863, 528; Careful scrutiny of Rosecrans' report bears this out. He mentions that Granger's and Mitchell's movements occurred as planned on the 23rd, however, says nothing about Crittenden's corps or Palmer's division until the 24th., 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405-6.

6m

7~~ - 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405.

Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 535; Mitchell to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 543; Crittenden to Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 521. '~eorge S. Wilson, Wilder's Brisade of Mounted Infantrv in the Tullahoma - Chickamauaa Cam~aians (Topeka: Kansas Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion 23/1: of the United States tM.O.L.L.U.S.1, 18911, 7; Wilder to Reynolds, 11 July 1863, 457-8; John T. Wilder, "Hoover's Gap," The National Tribune, 20 September 1906, 2. 1wilson, Wilder's Br iqade, 7; Brigadier General William Bate of Stewart's division, did indeed command the infantry brigade responsible for manning the defenses within the narrow portion of Hoover's Gap. However, Stewart positioned most of his infantry south of Hoover's Gap at Garrison's Fork in the vicinity of Beech Grove. Bate's

rangert to

8 0 23/1: ~ Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 405;

2 3 Q ! 3 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 406; 23/2: Garfield to Thomas, 24 June 1863, (10 P.M.), 451; Garfield to McCook, 24 June 1863, 450.

24~olk,Polk, 218-9; Q!3 23/2: Mackall to Polk, 24 June 1863, (6:15 P.M.), 883; Roy to Stewart, 24 June 1863, (4:30 P.M.), 884; Bragg's orders to move cavalry further to the east might not have been necessary had Wheeler remained on station as ordered. Prior to Rosecrans' advance Wheeler moved his division of cavalry into a position in front of Shelbyville. Wharton had only one cavalry brigade in position covering the front between Liberty and Hoover's Gaps. To the east of Whartonls division one solitary cavalry regiment guarded Hoover's Gap. To the east of this Wheeler left nothing. This explains Crittenden's failure to 0 23/1: Bate to Hardee, 15 make contact with the enemy., & July 1863, 611-13; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 126. 25~olk,Polk, 11, 218-19; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 127.
2 6 Q ! 3 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 406.
270~ 23/1: Palmer to Oldershaw, 10 July 1863, 528; An account a soldier in Crittenden's corps describes best the terrible conditions the soldiers moved in. "Thursday, June 25. Still raining this morning, and the mud is getting pretty deep. The men seem loath to start but there is no alternative. Soon the different bands begin to pour forth their lively strains, thus instilling some enthusiasm into s a most imposing sight. Soon the the men. Altogether it i men and artillery are upon the road, next the teams [of wagonsl, many of which are heavily loaded. Go about four miles, when we come to the town of Bradeyville, a perfect mudhole--not over a dozen houses and only two of them inhabited by white people. One mile farther, and the division halts about three hours for Palmer's division to get out of the road, which is almost impassible, everything like a [turnlpike ending here. Our road [leads] through a mountain pass or gap. [we1 go about a mile and halt again--this time right in a wheat field. This [farmerl will .This be saved the trouble of cultivating this field. has been another day of rain and mud; and although we have made only six or seven miles, all hands are willing to turn in for the night.", John Wesley Marshall, from the John Wesley Marshall Diary, (97 Ohio Regiment, Wood's division), Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff Ride Committee, Combat Studies Institute.

..

280~ 23/1: Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 538-9; Minty t o t a n l e y , 8 July 1863, 556.

290R 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 406; Francis F. McKinney, Education in Violence: The Life o f Georqe H. Thomas and the Historv of the Armv of the Cumberland (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961), 212; Lamers, Edae of Glorv, 280-81; 23/2: Thomas to Rosecrans, 25 June 1863, 458.
30Q& 23/2: Roy (Hardeels AAG) to Stewart, 24 June 1863, (10 P.M.), 884.
310~ 23/1: M C C O O ~ to Rosecrans, 10 ~ u l y 1863, 465-66;

~ l e b u r n e - f b Hardee, 3 August 1863, 587.

, 2 3 23/1: Liddell to Cleburne, 1 August 1863, 589-91; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 127-28; 23/1: McCook to Rosecrans, 10 July 1863, 465.

33~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 127-28; to Hardee, 3 4 , 5:30 P.M., 127.

23/1: Cleburne

23/2: Roy to Stewart, 24 June 1863, (4:30 P.M., and 10:30 P.M.), 884; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 24 July 1863, 406.

35 0~ 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton,

3 6 , 3 7 ,

23/2: Rosecrans to Thomas, 25 June 1863, 458. 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 406.

Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 431; 3 8 0 23/1: ~ Rousseau to Thomas, 6 July 1863, 435; Brannan to Thomas, 28 June 1863, 451.
, 9 3 23/1: McCook to Rosecrans, 10 July 1863, 466; Davis to McCook, 9 July 1863, 469.
, 0 4 23/1: Palmer to Crittenden, 10 July 1863, 529; 23/2: Granger to Rosecrans, 26 June 1863, 461.

4 Granger
P.M.),

to Rosecrans, 26 June 42m 23/2: Rosecrans to

1 23/2: ~ ~ Goddard to Granger, 26 June 1863, 461; 1863, 461.

Thomas, 26 June 1863, (10:35 467; Rosecrans to Crittenden, 26 June 1863, 460.

4 3 0 23/2: ~ Rosecrans to McCook, 26 June 1863, 464; ~ a r f i e l d t oStanley, 26 June 1863, 465.

4 4 ~ u c k ,Cleburne's Command, 130-31; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 128; 23/2: Mackall to Polk, 26 June 1863, 886.

23/1: Mackall to Polk, 26 June 1863, 618; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 128.
46Q& 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.

45m

47~onnelly, autumn of Glory, 128-29; G. J. Fiebeger, C a m ~ a i a n sof the American Civil War (West Point, N.Y.: Military Academy Printing Office, 1910), 233. 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 431; Negley to Thomas, 8 July 1863, 443; Brannan to Thomas, 28 June 1863, 452.

48m

490R 23/2: Garfield to McCook, 27 June 1863 (12:30 P.M.), 471; Garfield to McCook, 27 June 1863 (1:OO P.M.), 471; Bond to McCook, 27 June 1863, 470-71.
500~ 23/2: Garfield to Crittenden, 27 June 1863 (10:1.5 A.M.), 470; 23/1: Turchin to Stanley, 10 July 1863, 553; 23/2: Garfield to Van Cleve, 27 June 1863, 475. 510~ 32/1: Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 539-40; Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 536-37; Mitchell to Granger Stanley, 8 July 1863, 544-45.

to

52Q&32/1: Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 539-40; Granger to Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 536-37; Mitchell to Stanley, 8 July 1863, 544-45.
5 3 32/1: ~ ~ Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 539-40; Granger to Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 536-37; Mitchell to Stanley, 8 July 1863, 544-45.

5 4 ~ o r d a nand Pryor, C a m ~ a i q n sof Forrest, 290-91.

McCook to Rosecrans, 10 July 1863, 467; Palmer to Crittenden, 10 July 1863, 529; Wood to Cr ittenden, 7 July 1863, 524.
570~ 23/2: Hardee to Stewart, 26 June 1863 (8 P.M.), 886; Hardee to Stewart, 27 June 1863 ( 4 A.M. 23/1: Liddell to Hardee, 1 August 1863, 591. 5 8 0 23/1: ~ Notes of Lieutenant W.B. Richmond, ~ieutenaz General Polk's aide-de-camp, 26 June - 7 July 1863, 619.

55m 23/1: 56m 23/1:

Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 431.

59~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv, 129.

600R 2 3 / 1 : Bragg t o Cooper, 27 June 1 8 6 3 , 583; 23/2: Wharton t o Wheeler, 27 June 1 8 6 3 , 889; C o n n e l l y , Autumn o f Glorv, 129.
6 1 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn of G l o r v , 1 2 9 .

CHAPTER 4 THE CAMPAIGN ENDS ROSECRANS CONTINUES TO CONCENTRATE Bragg's the fears that Rosecrans would attempt to cut vellon cu.t th.e by

Army of Tennessee's line of communication were

founded

As the Army of the Cumberland slowly closed during 27 and 28 June, Rosecrans decided to in Bragg's rear. This move marked

Manchester the

railroad

beginning of the second phase of the Tullahoma campaign. threatening Bragg's line of communications,

R0secran.s

believed he would once more force Bragg out of position, and hopefully cause Bragg to retreat at a disadvantage. 1 Accordingly, Rosecrans dispatched orders directly to Thomas and Reynolds, directing Colonel Wilder south to the Elk River Bridge near Allisonia and render the useless between Decherd and Cowan. Negley to send Brigadier General Rosecrans also John Beatty's burn

railroad directed infantry

brigade to Hillsboro to cover the left flank of the army and to support Wilder's brigade. Wilder started forward (Map
8).

promptly

at 4 : 3 0 A.M. on the morning of the 28th

Beatty followed at 7 : 3 0 A.M. and occupied Hillsboro prior t:o noon. 2

Federal Movernentr

I*UTALOW

Conlederate Movements r r>

Map 8. M0~81n8nt8 on 28 June through Mldnlght 30 June 1883

These orders reflected Rosecrans' adherence to concept Rosecrans of threatening Bragg's line of

this

communication:^.

felt that such a maneuver in Bragg's

rear

vould

cause Bragg great concern for his line of communications and force Bragg to reorient his attention. Wilder's actions

vould disrupt the railroad, vhile Beatty's move vould keep a path open for of vacate the Federals to use for a continued cau:se ar.my to

envelopment Bragg to

Bragg's flank. Tullahoma,

This dilemma thereby

should his

rendering

incapable of an orderly retreat, and possibly vulnerable attack. While Wilder's and Beatty's forces moved south, Army of the Cumberland continued to concentrate

the at send

Manchester.

At 2:30 P.M. Rosecrans ordered Thomas to Rosecrans further

tvo divisions tovard Tullahoma. that

directed from this

these divisions move to a position 5 to 6

miles From

Tullahoma and thereby threaten Bragg's position.

position Thomas vould throw out scouting parties to the left and right. Rosecrans wanted Bragg's trains harassed and the

railroad cut if possible. 3 Having started his maneuver to force Bragg out of

Tullahoma, Rosecrans turned his eyes tovard his other commanders. his to

corps

Crittenden received additional orders to hasten Rosecrans also ordered Van soon as Cleve

march to Manchester. rejoin

Crittenden at Manchester as

Granger's to

command relieved his forces at Murfreesboro.

McCook vas

continue further brigade

to close his corps on Manchester and operations. from

prepare send in

for a his

Rosecrans ordered Granger to

Nashville to Manchester and entrench

present locations as necessary to fend off any rebel attack. Lastly, Rosecrans directed Granger to send Stanley's cavalry to the vicinity of Manchester if circumstances permitted. 4 These instructions indicate a bit of uncertainty the part of Rosecrans. Rosecrans retreat Columbia. retain told the the was to unsure As late as the afternoon of 28 whether the enemy cavalry line on June in

was

Tullahoma or still on its

screen

toward to

His instructions granting Granger the option cavalry reflect this. Furthermore,

Rosecrans found on

Granger to attack any enemy cavalry that he Federal right flank. wanted

If,

however, to

the send

conditions Stanley to

allowed,

Rosecrans

Granger

Manchester at once.

Rosecrans' willingness to allow Granger

to make the decision underscores the concern about where the enemy's cavalry was. 5 As the day progressed significant events occurred on the Federal left flank in the vicinity of Davis' Mill. that then cross the and

Wilder, on reaching the Elk River, found it so swollen his brigade could not ford or swim across. Wilder

directed the main body of his brigade to move east to near Pelham. He also ordered the 123rd Illinois, under of Colonel James Monroe, to continue west

command

destroy the Allisonia bridges.

Following destruction of the

bridges Monroe would join the brigade at Decherd. 6 Colonel Monroe was the first of Wilder's command reach Estell his objective. Springs a As he neared the railroad two Allisonia bridge to at

(one of

bridges)

Monroe i t : .

discovered Monroe

Confederate infantry came under attack

division

guarding

soon

by

Confederate mission,

cavalry. Colonel

Outnumbered

and unable to accomplish his

Monroe fell back to Hillsboro. 7 Wilder, luck. with the main body, had somewhat better small were

On approaching Pelham, he learned there was a of Confederates at the bridge, who

detachment

attempting to destroy the only bridge across the Elk in that vicinity. Wilder immediately ordered a regiment forward to

seize the bridge and prevent its destruction. seizure guard rest of the bridge, Wilder left a small

~ollowing'the detachment with number to the of

P.M.

the bridge and continued on toward Decherd of his command. Difficult terrain and a

swollen

streams slowed Wilder's advance.

Not until 8

did the brigade reach Decherd. 8 At Decherd, Wilder ordered the brigade to attack the eighty man garrison and seize the town. Wilder's Wilder's water men dislodged and After a sharp fig:ht the defenders. track depot and and

scattered

men then began to tear up the railroad His men burned supplies at the

tanks.

wrecked

the

telegraph.

Additionally, they

destroyed

the

trestle works on the Winchester branch of the railroad.' After destroying 300 yards of track, the destructive spree was cut short. The enemy troops that Wilder's men of

captured stated that a strong Confederate infantry force six regiments was enroute to Decherd to retake that he could not hold against such a ordered a withdrawal toward the

depot. at

Believing night, moving brigade

force

Wilder

Pelham. ordered

After the until

nearly eight miles to the east, Wilder off the road and went into

bivouac

daylight. 10 While Wilder escaped, and the Federal army continued to concentrate in Manchester, Rosecrans continued he to

evaluate

the situation.

Despite his success,

believed

more forces might be necessary to effect a flanking maneuver around Tullahoma. Additional forces were also necessary Rosecrans to

secure his growing lines of communication. needed right send

also his to and

R.S.

a clear picture of what the enemy was doing on flank. Brigadier Accordingly, Rosecrans directed General James D. T. Morgan's Granger division of

Brigadier

General

William

Ward's

brigade

Granger's division from Nashville to Murfreesboro. This made it unnecessary for Granger to send his infantry back to Ward

secure Murfreesboro.

Once at Murfreesboro, Morgan and

would assist the safeguarding of the railroad and assist the engineers in the repair of the line. Additionally,

Rosecrans directed Granger to provide detailed on activity to his front." With and vere

intelligence

his orders in hand, Granger provided to Rosecrans' engineers who, at

security the time,

assistance

repairing the railroad line near Wartrace. to regain the railroad and keep the

Granger's in

efforts

telegraph

operation The

were imperative to the success of the

operation. thereby

weather had made resupply extremely difficult,

making the railroad the only means of transport. orders to Granger were indicative of his

Rosecran:~' concern for

resupply as he advanced further south. Baird's the

Granger then

posted to on put the

division at Shelbyville to oversee efforts through the and to gain intelligence Lastly, Van

telegraph on

situation assured

Federal right that he would

flank. return

Granger to

Rosecrans

Cleve

Crittenden at the earliest possible moment. 12 Granger's greatest contribution to Rosecrans in ensuing from hours was the intelligence he cavalry indicated that back provided. Bragg's toward the

Reports army, to

Stanley's his

include Granger line.

cavalry, was falling

Tullahoma. Duck River and

believed the Rebels had vacated their Additionally, Granger was sure that

Wheeler

Forrest were in retreat toward Bragg's army at Tullahoma.1 13 This absence of enemy on the Shelbyville front of

enabled Stanley to move east and join with the left wing the army by
29

June.

Granger was

also

able

to

begin

pushing

through and

the

railroad

and

telegraph the

between Federal on

Murfreesboro right

Rosecrans.

Thus events on

freed up all but Granger's reserve forces for use

the left flank.14 Subsequent events on the morning of 29 June verified what Rosecrans already suspected. At 9:25 A.M. Brannan Bragg, also

reported Lucius reported the

information from a local civilian Polk and Cheatham at Tullahoma. extensive works around The

placing civilian

Tullahoma.

Additionally, at that

civilian stated that more of Bragg's army was Brannan's information to fight from

moment entering Tullahoma. further that Bragg

indicated Tullahoma. of

intended

Lastly, Brannan received information that confirmed some Bragg's forces were on detached service to Vicksburg. 15 Rosecrans Thomas, knew of also learned from Reynolds,

through now a

the progress of Wilder's raid.

Rosecrans that

that

Wilder's men held the bridge at Pelham;

Confederate that

division guarded the bridges at Allisonia; men had not destroyed either the road

and or the

Wilder's

railroad bridges. 123rd Illinois to

Rosecrans also received reports from of Wilder's command confirming at Tullahoma. Illinois that

Bragg local

intended civilians

defend the

Specifically, that Bragg had

told

123rd

no army

significant forces south of the Elk River and that his was in heavy concentration at Tullahoma. 16

Brannan's and Reynold's information provided detail

enough was was

for Rosecrans to develop a good picture of what By integrating Granger's reports, Rosecrans determine that all of Bragg's army was of

happening. able to

either Lucius these bet

enroute Polk

to, or in Tullahoma.

Brannan's mention

and Cheatham in Tullahoma is critical. were from different corps.

Each of good

commanders

It was a

that both Hardee and Leonidas Polk were also in the town. Late the morning of 29 June, to further his

knowledge of the Confederate dispositions and keep on Bragg, Rosecrans and the ordered Bobo's Thomas cross to advance

pressure toward Sher idan, ready to

Tullahoma commanding

occupy

roads. corps

only division of McCook's

advance, was to fall in on Thomas' right at Crumpton's Creek and close up on ~rannan's division. 17 By mid-day Thomas' divisions were in position, with

Brannan, Reynolds and Negley occupying the right, center and left respectively. position Rousseau's division assumed the Thomas' reserve corps,

behind the three lead divisions.

and Sheridan on his right, threw strong pickets out to probe along all the east-west roads running an into Tullahoma. advance.

Rosecrans,

however,

did not order

immediate

Rather, he continued to push McCook's and Crittenden's corps to assemble in the vicinity of Manchester. it prudent to wait for word of Rosecrans Wilder's felt

further

accomplishments before doing much else.18

Rosecrans, however, did not receive any supplemental reports was the of Wilder's actions. Unknown to Rosecrans, Wilder in

at that time operating in the Cumberland vicinity of University Place. At

Mountains

daylight, and

Wilder infantry to

confirmed

that

the enemy had strong cavalry

detachments

near Decherd and that any further

attempts

destroy the railroad at that point would likely fail. 19 Wilder, not yet satisfied to return to Thomas to University Place at 8 A.M. and destroyed a running to Tracy City. He also moved of

section

railroad John
J.

directed

Colonel south to out do

Funkhouser of the 98th Illinois to move the railroad at Tantalon. Wilder then of

destroy toward

moved to

Anderson

(eight miles south

Tantalon)

likewise.2 0 Unfortunately, scouts these attempts failed. Wilder's were at

reported that two trains laden with troops At the same time Wilder learned of Tantalon. these Wilder did not realize Buckner's

Anderson. trains time, enroute

three it at

troop the then

near but to

trains contained

troops

reinforce Bragg, who had on 23 from Buckner. To make

June

requested worse, at

reinforcements about Place moving

matters

6 P.M. Wilder learned that his pickets at

University by infantry was from by

were under attack by cavalry, supported up in yet another train. The

cavalry

Forrest's Wheeler

division which had earlier been ordered south to intercept Wilder. At this point Wilder

decided

he

could do nothing but withdraw.

With Forrest's

cavalry via

division in pursuit Wilder headed north for Manchester Pelham. 21 Wilder's accomplishment guidance Bragg's for the to raid did, however, contribute tasks. at to

the

of one of Rosecrans' key oriented

Halleck's driving concept foremost. because it

Rosecrans

specifically

army out of Middle Tennessee.

Rosecrans' and

campaign reflected this idea first raid Bragg

Wilder's caused

was the extension of this logic concern over his line of

communication. concerned enough he the

Rosecrans about would the

believed

that if Bragg became of

vulnerability of his line from Tullahoma.

communication later p;oved

withdraw

Events

soundness of this logic. Unable Rosecrans June. to await word from Wilder any longe::, on
2 9

issued

his orders just prior to midnight

Rosecrans' wanted to portray to Bragg that the

Army It of

of the Cumberland would attack Tullahoma from the east. would his were be another ruse! corps Thomas was to position the rest McCook and

along his present line.

Crittenden Thomias that

to deploy their corps on the right and left of Crittenden would deploy in a manner

respectively. refused to move

the Federal left flank and provided an rapidly south. While not explained to

opportunity the cor:?s and 1i:ne

commanders at the time, Rosecrans envisioned Crittenden Thomas' corps eventually turning south to cut Bragg's

of

retreat

and

thereby

force

Bragg

to

withdraw. to a

Additionally, all corps commanders received instructions conduct heavy reconnaissance to support the impression of pending attack. 22 Rosecrans next addressed his cavalry.

Stanley's 29th toward

cavalry corps had moved through Shelbyville during the and Beech found it empty. and Stanley then continued in camp east at

Grove,

by evening was

Fairfield. Manchester prepare to the the

Rosecrans on the

sent word for him to join the army at 30th. Once Stanley arrived he was to

conduct operations south to complete the destruction of Elk River bridges and prevent Braggfs withdrawal using Turchin to screen and his one brigade on the left flank of of cavalry the army

railroad. continue

would until

Stanley's column arrived. 23 BRAGG CONSIDERS THE SITUATION Bragg, Federal cavalry could for his part, remained confused by the no

movements on the 28th and 29th. yet protecting his line prevent Wilder's of

With virtually

communication, raid on the

Bragg 28th. large

not

Decherd

Combined with news of this action, Bragg learned of a

Federal force deploying on the approaches from Manchester to Tullahoma. body. repeated Still, Bragg was unsure about Rosecransf main Wheeler, Bragg He

In a series of orders dispatched to a theme that characterized his

uncertainty.

directed Wheeler to gather positive information on the enemy

to

the

left

and, at the same time,

determine

where

the

Federal left was [which was largely, an empty flank]. 2 4 As was his custom, Bragg decided to confer with corps into Polk commanders. After ordering Polk to move his Bragg June. his

forces called Bragg the

position on the east side of Tullahoma, to army headquarters at 9 A.M. on

29

informed Polk that the enemy's cavalry (Wilder) had cut army's cavalry line of communication at Decherd and that had 'failed to prevent it. Bragg then

Wheeler'ls his

stated

view that it would be best to stand and fight at Polk, however, disagreed and to the argued that if Bragg

Tullahoma. remained cut, from Bragg

fight at Tullahoma with the lines of communication army ran the risk of being surrounded and cut off base. Polk's protests, however, did not sway

their

and his decision to defend atJTullahoma stood. 2 5 After and they inform leaving Bragg, Polk rode out to him of Bragg's decision. Polk find Hardee that
At

suggested

meet with Bragg and attempt to change his mind.

P.M., vhen both men visited Bragg at army headquarters, disagreement continued. was sufficient to

the

Bragg argued that Wheeler's cavalry of communication to

secure the lines

Chattanooga,

Polk countered with his belief that

Wheeler's the felt

cavalry force was not large or strong enough to prevent Federals from seizing the line of communication. Bragg's Pemberton plan then risked faced falling at into the same Polk

position Polk

Vicksburg.

Furthermore,

argued, Rosecrans would not feel compelled to attack Bragg's Tullahoma works. surrounding the Rather, Rosecrans would satisfy himself by Tennessee. At army

Bragg and starving the Army of

very least, Polk feared Rosecrans could force the

to retreat on a disadvantageous line.2 6 As Polk argued, fresh news added to the confusion.

Bragg's small force at Decherd telegrammed that the railroad had not been badly damaged and would be usable by nightfall. Hardee, retreat. Bragg, at He this point, stated that he was not ready to

wanted to wait and see what

happened.

Like the of

he believed the army could hold Tullahoma while

cavalry, backed by some infantry, could secure the lines communication. Bragg bank Polk, however, maintained adamantly the

that south Bragg

should order a retreat at least as far as of the Elk River.

After hearing the arguments,

accepted Hardee's support and reiterated again his to defend Tullahoma. 27 TULLAHOMA EVACUATED

decision

Heavy rain greeted both armies on the morning of the 30th, but the movements ordered by Rosecrans commenced after first forward be light. Each of the three Federal corps moved slowly to army

to portray an attack in force.

The 30th proved As the report of

a busy day for the Army of the Cumberland. forward, Thomas During was the first to

moved

useful

intelligence.

the night

soldiers

Steedman's an

brigade of Brannan's division had killed a Rebel bearing

important message indicated Tullahoma. from Forrest

from Wheeler to was operating

Forrest. between

The

message and

Manchester

Subsequent skirmishes with the enemy by and Reynold's and divisions

pickets the the

Brannan's of

confirmed between

presence

infantry

cavalry

forces

advancing Federal columns and Tullahoma. on the right of Brannan encountered

Sheridan's picket:s resistance as

stiff

well. 2 8 The cavalry was indeed that of Forrest as In fact, by this date cavalry in the well as

elements of Wheeler's corps. had virtually all of his

Wheeler of

vicinity

Tullahoma screening to the north and east.

The infantry the Brigadier division.

Federal columns encountered was primarily that of General Bushrod Johnson's brigade of Stewart's

Behind Johnson's brigade lay the remainder of Hardeels corps which occupied the eastern side of the Tullahoma works. 2 9 Later in the day Rosecrans received further from about his commanders reflecting their progress what Bragg might do. and
report:^

beliefs he had

ranger

reported that Gap and the

forces guarding Rosecrans that

Shelbyville and Guy's given the lack of

informed Federal Thomas a

contact on

right, Bragg did not intend to defend at Tullahoma.

reported Wilder's return and confirmed the destruction of

section of track at Decherd and the capture of the bridge at Pelham. 30

By
regiments halted in

the were the

day's

end

Reynolds'

and

Brannan's where

lead they and was

within two miles of Tullahoma, face of stiffening enemy

resistance,

fearful of a possible trap. the progress on

Of particular significance Thomas' corps of by

the left of pickets,

Negley's the other

division. divisions that day.

Negley's

unlike those

of Thomas' and McCook's corps, met no

resistance toward to

As Negley's lead regiments moved forward

Estell

Springs they discovered the road from Manchester

Estell Springs was devoid of any enemy. 31 Negley's report was not the only good news Rosecrans received. Early on the morning of the 30th Rosecrans Clair main

directed his Chief Engineer, Brigadier General J. St. Morton, to determine the practicability of moving the locations

co,lumns of the army from their present south

directly Morton possible

to gain the critical crossing near Allisonia. later in the day that such a move was

reported because maneuver

the ground to the south was much more favorable for than was the ground to the vest of the army's

current positions. 32 Recall actions maneuver Second, that Rosecrans' concept called for two his

during this phase.

First, Rosecrans

designed

to fix Bragg in his defensive works at once fixed, Rosecrans would maneuver corps south to cut the

Tullahoma. Thomas' and

Crittenden's movements on

railroad already

[Negley's oriented

the left of Thomas'

corps

south

and

were

the

preliminary

movements

of

th.e

envelopment].

Meanwhile

, Stanley

would seize the

bridges

over the Elk River.

This combined maneuver would

hopefully Negley's presented than and

compel Bragg to retreat on a disadvantageous line. discovery of no enemy and Morton's report

Rosecrans with the opportunity to accomplish much more a mere turning of Bragg's position. With skillful

timely maneuver Rosecrans now had the chance to cut avenue of retreat. Interestingly, Should Rosecrans behind If Bragg not another to possible retreat option from

Bragg's

existed. Tullahoma, in

attempt

could easily encircle Bragg's army by getting It was this action that Polk feared

him.

earlier. end in

Rosecrans encircled Bragg, the war would likely for the Army of Tennessee, since an

Tullahoma

encircled,

starving army, would have little choice but surrender. Whether It is apparent, Rosecrans considered a siege is not however, that Rosecrans clear. the

formulated

orders getting defend.

for his next series of movements with an eye in behind Bragg. Rosecrans still felt Bragg

toward would

Wilder's regorts of reinforcements, the

resistance

of the enemy to Thomast front and Brannan's concern that the enemy was trying to lure his regiments into a trap were

indications of Bragg's commitment to defense. no doubt of Bragg's intent. 33

Rosecrans had

Rosecrans, therefore, had no reason to believe Bragg was attempting conviction to flee. This contributed to of fix

that to

Rosecrans' front while

that he would have

Bragg's

maneuvering forces to the rear

Tullahoma. behind achieve

Such a maneuver might hopefully force Bragg out from his earthworks. the Satisfied that this maneuver would corps

desired effect, Rosecrans issued his

commanders

their orders at 3:30 A.M. on the 1st of July. 34 Rosecrans envisioned a continuation of a fixing

movement with part of his army at the same time the movement of the main body southwest would interpose forces between

Bragg and the Elk River. remain Negley's prepare basically division to

The previous day's alignment would corps and and

intact, however, Crittenden's would orient directly When

southwest ordered,

move in that direction.

Thomas McCook

would move the rest of his corps behind Negley while continued greater command railroad. able to to fix Bragg. To give the intended

envelopment his the being at a

depth Stanley would occupy Hillsboro and ready for movement These across the Elk River toward of

orders did indeed show promise

not only turn Bragg, but force him to fight however, the latter was not Rosecrans'

disadvantage, He for

goal.
is

remained hopeful of forcing Bragg to withdraw and it this reason that Stanley and Crittenden were

not

immediately dispatched across the Elk River. 35

On conclusions reports toward

the

morning of 30 June, Bragg reached what Rosecrans was doing. He

his

own

about

received west and

from Hardee of a strong Federal force

moving

Tullahoma along the major roads from Manchester This information, combined with

Hillsboro. knowledge near

Braggts June

of the Federal cavalry raids (Wilder) on 29 darkened the outlook of a

University,

successful

defense at Tullahoma.

To make matters worse, Bragg began to

receive reports of a strong Federal force within three miles of the bridges at Bethpage and Estell Springs. were the soldiers of Negley's division No doubt

these

conducting

their reconnaissance in force. 3 6 Along with the Federal movements, weather played important Tullahoma. rivers road part in Bragg's reevaluation of his defense an at and

By 30 June the rain was in its seventh day Virtually

and creeks overflowed their banks.

every to

was a sea of mud.

If the Federals somehow managed

capture be

or destroy the bridges across the Elk, Bragg an escape route. 37 In this situation,

would Bragg On the the any

without

risked being surrounded and besieged as Polk feared. other bridges hand, he if Bragg crossed the river and stood to prevent Rosecrans

destroyed moving

from

further south. On arrival hold the afternoon of 30 June Bragg, despite the not and

of Buckner that morning, decided that he could At

3 P.M. he issued orders to

Tullahoma.

Polk

Hardee to prepare for immediate movement (Map 9). to expeditiously move the army,

In

order use

Polk and Hardee would

different routes and separate crossings over the Elk Bragg directed Hardee to retreat south and cross

River. the Elk move

River at the Bethpage bridge. to

He then ordered Polk to Allisonia

the west of Hardee, and cross at the

bridge. retreat

Wheeler

and Cleburne's divisions were to cover the

of the army. 38 Movements commenced at 5 P.M. with the corps' trains moving south toward Allisonia. corps began to move at 11 P.M.. The main bodies of both army Although the distance that miles,
12

Polk's and Hardee's men had to travel was only eight the roads slowed the movement greatly. noon on
1 July that both corps had

It was not until the preponderance

of

their infantry across the Elk River. 39 ROSECRANS SEIZES TULLAHOMA On the morning of 1 July Federals it became apparent to the

that Bragg was in retreat from Tullahoma.

Thomas

learned shortly after 8:30 A.M. that Brigadier General James B. Steedman's brigade had observed a great deal of in Tullahoma during the night. activity all

Steedman reported that

through which

the night his pickets heard the running of and departed every hour. Judging

trains, from it the

arrived

accompanying the

beating of drums, Steedman believed The and

meant of

departure or arrival of troops. pickets to Steedman's right

disappearance the

enemy

increasing

SOALE IN MILES

\
t

Federal Movements

3
I ,

Oonloderste Movements

Map 9. Movements on 1 July throught 8 A.M. 2 July 1888.

distance

between

the pickets to Steedman's front

and

the

enemy indicated that an evacuation was in progress. 40 Using his initiative, Thomas ordered Brannan to send Steedman forward to reconnoiter as close to Tullahoma as the situation allowed. left. Reynold's division would support to his

Thomas also ordered his corps to remain in

readiness the

to move at a moment's notice.

He warned Negley that if

rumor of Bragg's departure from Tullahoma was true, he could expect orders to move in pursuit. 41 At Bragg in 9:45 fact A.M. Thomas learned from a had evacuated Tullahoma civilian earlier in that the

morning.

The citizen explained that Bragg's infantry

moved at the

out during the night and that a great many of them were, that moment, endeavoring to cross the bridges in

vicinity of Estell Springs. 42 At activities.

10 A.M. Thomas informed Rosecrans of

the three

above corps

Thomas

also suggested that

all

wheel south and begin a pursuit. right would south and should

Thomas felt

McCook on the center move

follow the railroad, XIV corps in the

follow the Winchester road and Crittenden could on Thomas' left. Thomas went on to add that

Stanley via

the cavalry should move forward rapidly to

Pelham

Hillsboro to get into the enemy's rear. 43 Rosecrans, up to the time he received Thomas' Thomas' After a

message, assumed Bragg intended to stay and fight. information threw a new light on the situation.

quick Thomas'

evaluation

of

the reports,

Rosecrans a

assented

to

preparations wanted see

to prepare for what Steedman

pursuit, up

however, prior to

Rosecrans

turned

ordering execution of a pursuit. 44 The coming. regiment results of the reconnaissance were not long Ln a
1 . 1

After continued skirmishing vith enemy cavalry, from Reynold's division entered Tullahoma at

A.M. followed shortly thereafter by Steedman's brigade.

12

At left and

noon

Steedman Brannan

reported the

Rebel

infantry

had

Tullahoma.

arrived on the heels of

Steedman

reported likewise. to

He added that the Rebel cavalry appeared regiments. of

be the only force still opposing his advance who closed on Tullahoma with also confirmed the the

Sheridan, Brannan's

remainder of

division,

absence

enemy

infantry at Tullahoma. 45 The discovery that Tullahoma was devoid of Bragg's reflected to

infantry led Rosecrans to issue new orders, which much of what Thomas had earlier recommended. concentrate permission rest his corps in Tullahoma.

McCook was

Thomas

received while the to

to send a portion of his corps south Rosecrans ordered

occupied Tullahoma.

Crittenden

move his corps to Pelham via Hillsboro. one near

Turchin, vith were

on1:y

brigade of cavalry, [the other brigades Walker's Mill in the vicinity of

encamped

Manchesterl received

orders to march to Pelham, and then on toward the Cumberland Mountains to discover Bragg's retreat route. 4 6

The

corps

commanders

took

action

as

ordered.

Thomasf corps, in effect the only force with units in active pursuit on the afternoon of the lst, received the lion's

share of the action.

Thomas ordered Reynolds and Brannan to Additionally, both supplies and of

continue to move forward into Tullahoma. received

instructions to secure all captured

soldiers, and turn them over to Sheridan. this

On completion Mill

task they were to join Thomas near Hale's

(five Negley, along

miles from Tullahoma) the next day. then

Thomas ordered

Rousseau, to move south from Bobo's Cross-roads

the Winchester Road to Heffnerfs Mill. 4 7 During the course of the afternoon Negley maintained contact with the enemy rear guard as he advanced south. nightfall driven enemy River Tullahoma was completely secured and the enemy just beyond Heffner's Mill. Negley With the By had the Elk

defending

the heights on the south side of

Rosecrans determined that more force at the His

crossing subsequent

sites would be necessary to dislodge Bragg. orders the night of 1 July indicate a

belief

that reflect

Bragg also

intended

to hold the river line.

The orders

Rosecrans' adherence to flanking maneuvers. 48 Rosecrans place pressure scheme called for two of his corps to

on Bragg's forces and, if

possible, other rear.

seize forces The

crossing would

sites at the Elk.

At the same time Bragg's

skirt

around the left flank to was in effect a

maneuver

ordered

parallel

pursuit.

Rosecrans pressure

directed McCook and Thomas to supply force. Their movements would keep

the

direct on

pressure

Bragg's rear and hopefully hasten his withdrawal. 49 Simultaneously with these movements, Rosecrans

wanted Stanley to move his whole command directly to Decherd to create the impression that he intended to block Braggl's send but near be

retreat. Wood's wanted

Rosecrans directed Crittenden to continue to left,

division to Pelham to secure the Federal

Palmer's division to proceed to Hart's Tanyard Ferry. By this positioning, Crittenden would

Stamper's

ready to move directly south to University and would to Bragg an attempt to cut the line of retreat. 50 As the night wore on Rosecrans made

convey

minor

adjustments to this plan of action. anxious three urging twofold. to

Rosecrans was extremely On no less tham

get forces down to the Elk. he sent messages to

occasions them

Thomas The

and

Stanley were with the

to hasten to the river. 51

reasons

First, Rosecrans wanted to maintain contact This allowed Rosecrans to determine the means to prevent a river if

Bragg 's army. enemy possessed

crossing.

Second, and equally important, the swollen rivers would make fording difficult. If Rosecrans could seize bridges intact

it would make a crossing much easier, and thereby enable him to maintain pressure on Bragg. As Bragg Rosecrans endeavored to reach the Elk River, to

considered the day's events and contemplated what

do next.
1

His infantry had safely crossed the Elk by noon of and his cavalry had fought well. Wheeler's Polk's men and

July

delayed

Negley's

forces long enough to

allow

Hardee's infantry to establish defenses on the south bank of the the Elk River. Bethpage Additionally, Braggls men managed and Allisonia bridges as they to fire

retreated.52

Yet, with all this success, there remained problems. Bragg eventually fall. reasoned the river's water level would

This would offer Rosecrans many undefended Of

crossing sites between Hardee's right flank and Pelham. even site more concern to Bragg was the advantage at Pelham gave Rosecrans. the

crossing at

If the Federals crossed

Pelham, Rosecrans would be virtually behind Bragg's routes via Cowan or University.

retreat

Bragg once again faced the

dilemma of whether to defend or continue the retreat. 5 3

At
play.

this point Bragg's indecisive nature

came

into

He asked Polk's advice as to whether the army

should repair Bragg was

continue to retreat and he directed his engineers to the roads to the rear for retreat. In typical

fashion, however, he also sent word to Richmond that he now in a much better defensive did little to promote line. 5 4 Polk's Such and

undecided Hardee's

behavior

confidence in Bragg's ability to defend on his new Elk River line. Both Hardee and Polk stated it was necessary to

defend in the vicinity of the mountains at Cowan, yet seemed not to hear or care.

Bragg

Later, during the night, Hardee

sent

word

to

Polk that he lacked

confidence

in

Bragg's a

ability

to direct a defense.

Hardee further recommended

conference to sort out what should be done. 5 5 Bragg's subsequent actions that evening rendered the conference again army unnecessary. Bragg decided that retreat was the

necessary. to

At 1:30 A.M. on 2 July Bragg ordered Polk's destination was

move at daylight.

Cowan.

Hardee received instructions to move up the Brakefield Point road toward University Place (Map 10). Buckner, the reserve Polk the Once would bridge

located on the south side of Winchester, would precede to Elk Cowan. River Bragg ordered Wheeler to maintain watch and dispute any enemy attempts to Polk's corps were in position cross. Wheeler on

Hardee's continue

and

to harass the enemy, destroy the

railroad

and defend the railway against use by the enemy. 56 Bragg's corps began movement promptly at daybreak on

2 July.
continue movement Decherd and

As the morning progressed, however, Bragg seemed to his began, indecisive Bragg behavior. Shortly after to turn the tbe

sent word to Polk

toward shift

and defend there. tovard

As soon as Polk made received new

headed him

Decherd he

instructions head far

ordering Cowan. 57

to stick to the original plan of Polk, Hardee too, His movement began

and

East

received on time,

conf1ictin.g but faced Bragg

instructions. constant

contact with the Federal cavalry.

However,

issued conflicting orders indicating withdrawal then defense

Federal Movement8

>
I I

Oontederate Movernentr

r)

Map 10. M 0 ~ 8 m e n t 8 on 2 t h r o u g h 3 J u l y 1883.

and

so

on throughout the day.

This

meant

the

division

commanders suffered similar confusion. 5 8 Cleburne, guarding the approaches near the bridge, Morris' the day. hold their and Stewart, watching the crossings at fords received conflicting instructions Bethpage and

Jones'

throughout t : o hold
24

They received orders from Bragg through Hardee

their ground, then to retire, then to return and ground again. Bushrod Johnson reported that in a

hour period he had crossed the Elk River three times, from the vicinity of Bethpage to Jones' Ford,

moved sent and t:o the

detachments then moved

to Morris' Ford to assist Martin's cavalry southeast almost to Brakefield to return forward to Point only

receive

orders

defend

near

intersection of the Brakefield and Hillsboro roads. 59 If Bragg's indecisiveness contributed to conflicting orders and a sense of confusion, so too did Federal on 2 July. length actions the by day, an.d an.d

With daylight came continued pressure along Rosecrans, somewhat slow Negley the chagrined previous Thomas

of Bragg's line. ability to

Wheeler's

aggressively

pushed a river crossing.

He told

McCook the object of the day was to push with all vigor impress was on on the enemy that the whole Army of the their that Thomas heels. Additional expected instructions Stanley then to to

Cumberland to Thomas for to

indicated Thomas.

Rosecrans and

work

Stanley were

cooperate

destroy the Confederate cavalry and trains. 60

In desire Bragg

these

instructions

Rosecrans

emphasized understood variable

his that was to the

for speed.

By this time Rosecrans

was continuing a retreat.

The unknown

where would Bragg stop? make

Rosecrans, for his part, wanted

sure that Bragg had no option but to retreat past

Cumberland Mountains. Early on the morning of the 2 July, Thomas a possible answer. Thomas procured information provided from a

civilian that indicated Bragg was retreating on two

routes; road

the Brakefield road leading to the University, and the leading to Cowan. Thomas added that the civilian

believed

Bragg's army would not stop until it reached Chattanooga.61 There was another possibility that likely entered the and

Rosecrans' mind. foothills University. for of the

Bragg might opt to stop and defend at Cumberland Mountains near Cowan

Such a course of action would make it difficult The long If to

Rosecrans to fight Bragg on favorable terms. line had few passes and favored the

ridge

defender.

Rosecrans did try to maneuver around Bragg he would have cut loose from his rail line of communications, which necessitate a move through very difficult terrain

would over

extended distances to get in Bragg's rear. In defense in order the to preclude Bragg or from establishing south a

mountains

continuing

toward

Chattanooga, Rosecrans desperately needed crossings over the Elk River. This explained the need for speed and for an

advance the

on a broad front.

The wider the front, the ford site.

better The

chances

of finding a good bridge or

quicker the army got across the river the better the chances of convincing Bragg that further defense was futile.62 Unfortunately for Rosecrans, weather and the enemy In was right well.

destruction of bridges hindered his scheme of maneuver. the center, Thomas confirmed that the Bethpage in the its present state. bridges to his McCook on front Bridge

unusable reported

Thomas' as

destroyed

Crittenden, with Palmer's and Wood's divisions moving toward Hillsboro and Pelham but respectively, reported only minor Elk

skirmishing,

that he had not as yet

reached

the

River due to poor road conditions. 63 As the day progressed, however, subordinate their commanders exercised many of Rosecrans' to overcornme the E1.k to
He

initiative

obstacles.

Thomas, after discovering

that

River bridges were down, directed three of his divisions move further up the river to find crossing sites.

informed would

Rosecrans that once across the Elk he and into Bragg's flank and cut off the

Stanley line of

get

retreat.64 During and the morning Thomas moved Rousseau, Brannan at

Reynolds northeast to Jones' Ford.

Negley remained

the Bethpage bridge to fix the enemy's attention. arrived fire at the ford first, and received a volley elements of Martin's cavalry and

Rousseau of enemy

from

Stewart's

infantry. away. and

Rousseau deployed immediately and drove the enemy its put deep ropes it

The treacherous nature of the river, with rapid the current, required Rousseau's men river to use the ford. to

across took

Once this

occurred one 2nd

the

better part of the afternoon to get river. By nightfall, Rousseau's

brigade Brigade

across

the

occupied a defensive position approximately three-fourths of a mile south of the crossing. 6 5 Negley, at too, achieved some success at his Throughout the morning artillery on of the his position artillery bank. and

Bethpage bridge. with arms

dueled Small

Wheeler's fire

opposite command

between men

Cleburne's

Negley's division was also exchanged periodically throughout the morning. of By

2:30

P.M.

Negley's

skirmishers managed up

took to more the

possession save part

the flaming Bethpage bridge and

of the structure.

Negley then brought

infantry bridge. and the

and by 3 : 3 0 P.M. drove the enemy from view of Unfortunately, the bridge could not handle river was still too deep to ford. As a

traffic result

Negley could only hold what he had and await orders. 66 Negley Late near also provided some valuable intelligence. burned bridges The

in the afternoon he reported that the Allisonia

were still under guard by the

enemy.

enemy's purpose ap,peared to be to protect the rail line from envelopment. railroad cars Negley believed that Bragg was directing to come close to that point to take the on

supplies

and

troops.

In this manner,

he

believed,

the

Confederates could hasten their withdrawal to Chattanooga. 67 Sheridan, likewise Sheridan Winchester crossing as the lead division of to he accomplish could not his cross McCook's mission. the Elk for did corps, When near another Sheridan Despite on the the

endeavored discovered

Springs, he moved up river to look site. Only after great difficulty

find a suitable ford near the mouth of Rock Creek. receipt far river of continuous fire from Wheeler's division Sheridan managed to get his cavalry late afternoon. Davis' division,

bank, by

across

close

behind,

encamped on the north bank with Sheridan's infantry to await the coming of daylight and hopefully, the falling of the

river 6 8 On the Federal left there was success as well. to

After receiving orders to proceed back to Hillsboro then Decherd, daylight cavalry bluffs Turchin's command reached Morris' Ford just on the 2 July. retreated on the After a sharp skirmish occupied the

after Rebel low then At

across the ford and The

some

opposite bank.

enemy

artillery

fiercely contested Turchin's attempts to cross the ford.

2

P.M.

Stanley By

arrived with the

remainder

of

Turchin's the

division.

late afternoon Stanley's force

crossed

river and drove the Confederates back. fight until midnight at which time the

Stanley continued to enemy broke off.

Stanley then suspended further movements until daylight. 69

Crittenden's

corps,

on the far left of

the

Army, General

captured a crossing over the Elk as well. Brigadier Thomas Wood J. Wood's division arrived at Pelham a spirited engagement with by

12

noon. under the

fought

cavalry

Forrest,

who seeing that they

were outnumbered, fired

bridge and withdrew.

Wood's division, however, then

seized

the bridge and extinguished the flames.

At that point, when assist to

Crittenden could have crossed the river and moved to

Stanley, orders came from Rosecrans directing Crittenden return Wood to Hillsboro.

As a result, no crossing occurred forces

at Pelham and Rosecrans lost a chance to cut off the

of Wheeler's and Hardee's corps opposing Thomas, Stanley and Crittenden. forces in This decision reflected a concern to leave some a position More to support the growing reflected lines of

communication.

importantly, it

Rosecrans decisive forcing

intent not to cut Bragg off completely and force a battle. Rather, Rosecrans continued to orient on

Bragg to withdraw. 70 As
2 July closed, multiple crossing sites were

now at

in the hands of the Federals.

However, stiff resistance

the crossing sites and high water slowed the Federal advance greatly. This provided Bragg with the necessary time to of

gather his forces and retreat further south. night move allowed Bragg to continue this almost

The coming

administrative to

and, at the same time, hindered Rosecrans' ability

pursue.

Moreover, some of the Federal movements had occurred so rapidly that with all the advancing left Federal right. corps Negley lost for to

communications example spent

their day

and

attempting

unsuccessfully On the

reestablish contact with McCook on the right. Thomas was unable to tie in Stanley and was and to largely Stanley a result had made of

left, This that This these flank

Crittenden. the movements the day. that

situation Crittenden failure

during

establish

communication

meant

commanders had to exercise more caution to preclude a attack from the enemy. 71 By them sunset Rosecrans weighed the facts as as he

knew

and determined to continue with the plan

ordered.

He directed crossings in the morning as soon as practicable. He and also directed Granger to continue to push the railroad forward. Morton received orders telegraph to get

pontoons up to Thomas and Sheridan to ensure that a crossing on

3 July would be possible.

In Rosecrans mind, at

least,

the pursuit would continue. 72 Although Rosecrans was concerned Bragg would along case. retreat effect retreat be the Cowan In to defend not ordered that for the a in the not would

University Place line, that vas Bragg

the late afternoon of 2 July, Chattanooga. the These vere the Bragg's

orders

ended

campaign.

rationale

was simple.

If he defended at Covan, he would Rosecrans

able to force Rosecrans into a fight.

probably outmaneuver him, cut the line to Chattanooga and in all likelihood destroy the Army of Tennessee in the

bargain. 7 3 It appears that Bragg did not understand the the

considerations Army of

that would enter Rosecrans' mind should defend at Cowan. From

Tennessee

Rosecrans' University to of did

perspective all roads converged toward Cowan and Place. It was not, therefore, a in this simple

proposition lack He

outmaneuver appreciation

Bragg

terrain.

Bragg's

for terrain influenced his thinking.

not believe he could conduct a successful defense at

Cowan.

He did not consider the naturally defensible terrain to stop Rosecrans. advice from Furthermore, this time, Bragg did his corps commanders and not solicit made the land the

instead

decision entirely on his own. could offer him nothing.

Bragg reasoned that the

With his forces operating in army.

mountains did Bragg

there would be no forage for his

Neither have of

appreciate the difficulty Rosecrans

would lack

trying

to flank a position in the mountains.

The

roads and their distance from the railroad would make a wide envelopment unattractive to Rosecrans. 7 4 Throughout of the the night of the 2 July and the morning the Cove

3 July, Bragg's army slowly retreated up

over

Cumberland Mountains and descended down into Sweeden's toward cavalry Chattanooga. remained in As the army the rear to moved cover south, its

Wheeler's

withdrawal.

Bragg, railroad failure, Bragg have the

however,

failed

to order Wheeler

to

destroy Key to

the this Had would put the The These

behind the retreating Confederates. was that the Cowan Tunnel remained

intact.

destroyed the 2 2 0 0 foot tunnel it is likely it taken the Federals several months to clear it and railroad in operation. Additionally, Bragg

left

railroad south of the tunnel almost completely intact. smaller bridges were burned, but not the larger ones. failures later facilitated Federal repairs and the was

railroad River

completely operable all the way to the Tennessee

by 25 July. 75 BRAGG ESCAPES AND THE CAMPAIGN ENDS On the morning of 3 July the Army of the Cumberland, unaware of Braggfs decision to break off from the fight:,

advanced forward in anticipation of a day of heavy Early in the and morning drove Sheridan attacked

contact. int:o that it:s

forward from

Winchester place. crossing was at

the Confederate of

cavalry

The

remainder

McCookfs corps

completed

of the Elk by mid-afternoon. Cowan station and Davis'

By 3 P.M. division

Sheridan was in

Winchester. 76 Thomas' sites. continued Brannan corps crossed the Elk at two different Ford Negley and and

and Rousseau crossed at

Jones'

southeast

toward Brakefield Point.

Reynolds crossed to Rousseau's right and moved parallel wit:h him toward Brakefield Point. Reynolds had a particular

stroke the

of good luck as many of his men managed to cross enough

on to

Bethpage bridge, which was by then repaired infantry. By the end of the day, the

support

XIV

Corps

occupied a line two miles from the crossing sites. fell across bank. 77 Crittenden on
3

As night shuttle south

July, men and equipment river

continued on

to

the

reinforcing the strength

the

remained with his corps near Pelham

and

Hillsboro and thereby continued to portray a force to pounce on University.

readying far

Stanley, like Sheridan, vent

across the river on the 3 July. Decherd, Covan, and

By evening he had forces at Point. Stanley's

Brakefield

intelligence, combined with that of Sheridan, indicated that other gone. 7 8 On the morning of 4 July, Sheridan that reports from Stanley and All than scattered cavalry rearguards, Bragg's army was

confirmed that Bragg's army was indeed gone. were a handful of regiments of

remained

Wheeler's

cavalry. to be

These cavalry regiments gave ground all too easily protecting much. After a sharp skirmish near

University

Place between Wharton's and Sheridan's

cavalry,

the Rebel opposition evaporated. 79 Rosecrans felt that Bragg had indeed withdrawn the

Army of Tennessee toward Chattanooga.

With this realization

he halted the pursuit and ordered his units to find suitable encampments and occupy the countryside. He further directed

details forward.

to restore the roads and bridges to bring Following these orders Rosecrans moved

supplies over t : o wit:h

Winchester McCook 80

to enjoy a 4th of July victory celebration

SUMMARY

Thus ended this nine day campaign. of the Cumberland achieved great

Rosecrans'

Arny a

success.

During

brilliant series of maneuvers, Rosecrans forced Bragg out of Middle Tennessee with only a light loss of troops. His

total casualties were 560 compared to Bragg's which numbered 1 7 0 0 . ~ ~ Although Rosecrans did not destroy his campaign did achieve the goals set by Bragg's Halleck army, and

Lincoln. the

Middle Tennessee was once again in Union hands and all army

railroad from Nashville was almost entirely intact Most notably, Bragg's

the way to the Tennessee River. was now clearly on the defensive.

As Rosecrans reflected on the campaign he to

explained the

Stanton that it was one of relentless marching amid

most drenching rains he had ever seen, yet it achieved great results. He was never more proud of his soldiers and Interestingly, Rosecrans believed the He believed their Army the been heavy

determination. of army the

Cumberland might have done more.

could have maneuvered to Bragg's rear had it not

for the terrible ground conditions resulting from the rains. 8 2

Bragg, loss. indeed He

for

his part, attempted to

play

down he

his had had

defended his withdrawal by stating that the enemy battle, but that

offered

Rosecrans

declined. Federal terrain

He said that he could not assail Rosecrans as the army for was greater in strength and a defensive. Importantly, had Bragg the noted better that

continued defense in the mountains would greatly deplete his already itself. weakened For army by denying it the means to supply remained to did

all this rationalization, the

fact

Bragg's retreat had inflicted a great psychological blow his army. Of particular note, his decision to retreat

nothing to quell the clamorings for Bragg's relief. infighting, field indecisiveness, and poor performance his

Bragg's in the

would continue and ultimately result in

removal

from command in November 1863.83 The conclusion of the Tullahoma campaign on 4 July

coincided with the great Federal victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. defeated, strategic With the three major Confederate armies on the the as

the Confederacy would now clearly remain defensive. The first week of July

marked

attainment of the Federal strategic goals for the summer laid down by Lincoln and Halleck. The war had

indeed

reached a turning point.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER 4 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.

2 0 23/1: ~ Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 407;

23/2: ~ o n dto Reynolds, 27 June 1863, 474; 23/1: Negley to Thomas, 8 July 1863, 442.
3 0 23/1: ~ Beatty to Negley, 6 July 1863, 445; 23/2: ~ a r f i e l d t oThomas, 28 June 1863, 477. 4 0 23/2: ~ Garfield to Van Cleve, 27 June 1863, 475; Bond toGranger, 28 June 1863, 477.

5m23/2:

Bond to Granger, 28 June 1863, 477.

6 0 23/1: ~ Wilder to Thomas, 11 July 1863, 460.

70323/1: Wilder to Thomas, 11 July 1863, 460.

' 0 3 23/1: Wilder to Thomas, 11 July 1863, 460.
' O R 23/1: Wilder to Thomas, 11 July 1863, 460.

' ' 0 3

23/1: Wilder to Thomas, 11 July 1863, 460.

"OR 23/2: Garfield to Granger, 29 June 1863, 479; Bond to Granger, 28 June 1863, 477.

- 23/2: Bond to Granger, 28 June 1863, 477. 120R - 23/2: Granger to Rosecrans, 29 June 1863 (1:45 130R P.M.), 480.
l 4 23/2: ~ Granger to Rosecrans, 29 June 1863 (1:45 P.M.), 480; 23/1: Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 540. 15~otablyBreckinridgels division and elements of Van Dornls old cavalry division. OR 23/2: Brannan to Garfield, 29 June 1863 (9:25 A.M.), 482. 16= 23/2: Reynolds to Flynt, 29 June 1863, 484.

170R - 23/2: Garfield to Thomas, 29 June 1863 ( 10:40 A.M.), 482; Bates to Sheridan, 29 June 1863 (11:OO A.M. ) , 485. 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 461.

"OR - 23/1: Wilder to Flynt, 11 July 1863, 461

20 0~ 23/1: Wilder to Flynt, 11 July 1863, 461.

Garfield to Thomas, 29 June 1863 (11:45 P.M.), 483; 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 407.
2 3 0 23/1: ~ Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 542; ~itchell-fbRosecrans, 8 July 1863, 545; Turchin to Stanley, 10 July 1863, 553.

21m 23/1: 22m 23/2:

Wilder to Flynt, 11 July 1863, 461.

24~osephH. Parks, General Leonidas Polk C.S.A.: The Fishtina Bishoo (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 23/2: Press, 1962), 313; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 130; Mackall to Wheeler, 29 June 1863 (4:00 P.M.), 891; Mackall to Wheeler, 29 June 1863 (4:15 P.M.), 891. 25= 23/1: W. B. Richmond Notes, 29 June 1863, 621; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 130.

W. B. Richmond Notes, 29 June 1863, 621-2; Lamers, Edse of Glory, 285; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 131.
280~ 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 407; 23/2: ~ h z a s to Rosecrans, 30 June 1863 (8:30 A.M. ) , 487; 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432.

26m 23/1: 27m 2311:

W. B. Richmond Notes, 29 June 1863, 621.

23/1: Johnson to Stewart, 12 July 1863, 608; Parks, Polk C.S.A., 314. 23/2: Granger to Rosecrans, 30 June 1863, 486; 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432. 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432; Negley to Thomas, 8 July 1863, 443.
3 2 23/1: ~ Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 408.

29m

30m 31m

33~amers,Edae of Glorv, 283-4. 34~amers, Edse of Glorv, 284.

23/2: Garfield to Crittenden, McCook, Thomas, and Sheridan, 1 July 1863 (3:30 A.M.), 494. 36~onnelly,Autumn of Glory, 131; OR 23/1: Mackall to Polk in the Richmond Notes, 30 June 1863 (11:OO A.M.), 622; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 131; OR 23/2: Roy to Stewart, 30 June 1863, 892-3; Colyar to Bragg, 30 June 1863, 893-4. 37~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv, 131. 38~onnelly,Autumn of Glorv, 131; Parks, Polk C.S.A., 314, OR 23/1: Mackall to Polk in the Richmond Notes, 30 June 1 1863 (11:OO A.M.), 622-3; Harvell and Elizabeth Purdue, Cleburne: Confederate General (Hillsboro, Texas: Hill Junior' College Press, 19731, 194..
3 9 0 23/1: ~ Mackall to Polk in the Richmond Notes, 30 June 1863, 622-3, Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 131.

35m

23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 408; Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432; 23/2: Steedman to Lambert, 1 July 1863, 498. 23/2: Flynt to Reynolds, 1 July 1863, 501; Flynt to Negley, 1 July 1863, 500.
4 2 23/2: ~ ~ Flynt to Brannan, 1 July 1863, 498-9; Thomas to Rosecrans, 1 July 1863 (10:OO A.M.), 498.
4 3 0 23/2: ~ Thomas to Rosecrans, 1 July 1863 (10:00

40m

41m

A.M.), 498.

4 4 23/2: ~ ~ Rosecrans to Granger, 1 July 1863, 495.

450~ 23/1: Reynolds to Flynt, ND., 457; Brannan to Flynt, l J u l y 1863, 453, McCook to Rosecrans, 10 July 1863, 465.

23/2: Garfield to McCook, 1 July 1863, 496; 23/.l: Crittenden to Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 522; Stanley to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 540; 23/2: Garfield to Stanley, 1 July 1863, 497.
4 7 0 23/2: ~ Thomas to Brannan, 1 ~ u l y 1863 (2:00 P.M. ) , 499; 2 3 / c Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432.

46m

4 8 23/1: ~ ~ Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 432; Lamers, Edse of Glorv, 286.
490~ 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 408. 23/2: ~arfieldto McCook, 1 July 1863 (12 Midnight), 496.

23/1:

' ' ~ a r f i e l d t o S t a n l e y , 1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 ( 7 : 1 5 P.M.), C r i t t e n d e n t o R o s e c r a n s , 1 3 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 522.

497;

"OR 23/2: G a r f i e l d t o S t a n l e y , 1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 ( 7 : 1 5 ) , 497; ~ a r f i e l d t o Thomas, 1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 ( 1 1 : 5 5 P.M. ), 501; Goddard t o Thomas, 1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 ( 8 : 1 0 P . M . ) , 499-500.

5 2 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v ,

132.

53~ragg d i d n o t r e a l i z e it a t t h e t i m e , b u t t h e F e d e r a l s no l o n g e r h e l d t h e b r i d g e a t P e l h a m . After W i l d e r ' s withdraw1 back t o Manchester, e l e m e n t s of h i s command v a c a t e d t h e b r i d g e a s w e l l . C o n n e l l y , Autumn o f Glorv, 132.
5
Polk,

4 23/2: ~ ~

Walter t o Polk,

1 J u l y 1863, 894.

55 2 3 / 1 : B r a g g t o C o o p e r , 1 J u l y 1863, 623.

1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 583; H a r d e e t o

5 6 0 ~ 23/1: H a r d e e t o P o l k i n t h e Richmond N o t e s , 1 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 624; G e n e r a l O r d e r s i n t h e Richmond N o t e s , 2 J u l y 1863, 624.

7 23 ~/ 1 : ~

Richmond N o t e s ,

2 J u l y 1863, 133. 1 3 3 ; OR 23/1:

624.

5 8 ~ u c k , C l e b u r n e Command, 5 9 ~ u c k , C l e b u r n e Command, S t e w a r t , 1 2 J u l y 1863.

Johnson t o

60~illiam C. Dodson, C a m ~ a i a n so f W h e e l e r a n d H i s C a v a l r v ( A t l a n t a : H u d g i n s P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1 8 9 9 ) , 95-8; OR 2 3 / 2 : R o s e c r a n s t o Thomas, 2 J u l y 1 8 6 3 ( 8 : 3 0 A . M . ) , 504.

6 10 ~ 23/2: A.M. ) , 5 0 4 . Thomas t o G a r f i e l d , 2 J u l y 1863 (8:30 2 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 503-4.

23/2: 6 2 0 ~

Rosecrans t o Granger,

6 3 23/1: ~ Thomas t o R o s e c r a n s , 8 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 432; McCook t o R o s e c r a n s , 1 0 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 467; C r i t t e n d e n t o R o s e c r a n s , 1 3 J u l y 1863, 522.

4 23/2: ~

Hubbard t o Goddard, Thomas t o R o s e c r a n s , Negley t o F l y n t , N e g l e y t o Thomas,

2 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 504-5. 8 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 432. 443-4; Negley

65m2 3 / 1 : 66m23/1:
t o Thomas,

8 J u l y 1863,

2 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 441-442.
2 J u l y 1 8 6 3 , 441-2.

67m2 3 / 1 :

68 0 23/1: ~ Sheridan to Thurston, 7 July 1863, 515-6.

69m 23/1:

Turchin to Stanley, 10 July 1863, 554-5.

700~ 23/1: Crittenden to Rosecrans, 13 July 1863, 522; Turchin to Stanley, 10 July 1863, 555. 710~ 23/2: Negley to Thomas, 2 July 1863, 505; Thomas to ~ a r f i z d ,3 July 1863. 7 2 0 23/2: ~ Garfield to Granger, 2 July 1863, 503;

~arfieldto Morton, 2 July 1863, 503. 23/1: Mackall to Polk in the Richmond Notes, 2 July 1863, 625; Bragg to Cooper, 3 July 1863, Davis Papers, cited in Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 133. 74~onnelly,Autumn of Glorv, 133.

73m

75m 23/1:

Richmond Notes, 3 July 1863, 625.

76~amers,Edse of Glorv, 287; Rosecrans, 10 July 1863, 467.

OR 23/1: McCook to

770~ 23/1: Thomas to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 433; 23/2: ~ l z to t Negley, 3 July 1863, 509; Reynolds to Flynt, 3 July 1863, 509.

8 23/1: ~ ~ Stanley

to Rosecrans, 8 July 1863, 541.

79~odson,Wheeler, 97; OR 23/1: Sheridan to Thurston, 7 July 1863, 516.

8 0 0 23/2: ~ Garfield to Thomas, 4 July 1863 (6:OO

A.M.),

512; Lamers, Edue of Glorv, 288. 81~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 134.

8 2 0 23/1: ~ Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 433; 23/2: Rozcrans to Burnside, 8 July 1863, 522.

8 3 23:/1: ~ ~ Bragg to Johnston, 3 July 1863, 584; Connelly, Autumn of Glorv, 134.

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS Campaign objectives, plans are designed to attain strategic defeat

such as the control of territory or the To

of an enemy force in the area of operations. these the

accomplish understand

objectives the operational commander must fundamentals of operational art and

apply

them

appropriately.

The Tullahoma campaign highlights several of

the actions critical for successful operational planning and warfighting. guidance These include the translation of strategic defensive deception, a positive

into an operational plan, offensive and planning, of effective and use of

operational sustainment

operations,

establishing

leadership climate. TRANSLATION OF GUIDANCE INTO AN OPERATIONAL PLAN FM planning commander 100-5, Ooeration~, states strategic that to "Operational a theater mission

begins

with

guidance

or with the commander's recognition of a

in an active theater of operations."' the heart and it was soul of our just as modern relevant

This concept reflects operational in

1863.

doctrine, After an that

however,

examination

of the Tullahoma campaign it is

apparent

one army commander received guidance that reflected developed aims, whereas the other did not. Once the theater commander receives the

clearly

strategic operations plan of In

guidance or deduces a mission for his theater of he has attendant responsibilities to formulate a

action. doing

He must determine how he will defeat the enemy. so he normally attempts to accomplish the

mission The and

decisively while limiting losses of lives and material. commander must also consider the enemy's intentions he

capabilities operations. 2

in conjunction with his guidance as

plans

Halleck's guidance to Rosecrans established the aim, or in slightly different terms, the vision for what had in Rosecrans' theater of operations. Rosecrans to for of the

happen

his part took the.guidance and translated it into a plan action. By modern terms he did quite well. By

standards of his day he did a superb job.

He was able to do

this because Halleck's long range goals were logical, clear, and specific, and provided all the necessary information

for Rosecrans to begin his planning. In his translation of Halleck's operational plan. the

guidance, Rosecrans developed a six point operational The

first two points encompassed his operations during campaign. Throughout the campaign

Tullahoma

Rosecrans

never wavered from his goal of first causing Bragg to vacate

his

defenses,

and

second, causing him

to

leave

Middle

Tennessee. In his planning, Rosecrans demonstrated a firm grasp of the importance of specifying how he would defeat Bragg. and

Halleck's guidance reflected a geographical orientation Rosecrans' Admittedly, plan became gave dominated by this to a

aspect. decisive he 1n

Rosecrans

consideration

battle as well but by his own admission it was something intended Middle to enter into only if Bragg tried to fight. on

Tennessee Rosecrans' primary focus was

terrain,

not the enemy force. Rosecrans achieving Rosecrans Halleck's was well also aims understood the importance of of life. to

without needless loss forcing Bragg's

aware that

army

retreat was the least costly way to accomplish the

mission. of

This awareness reinforced Rosecrans' campaign philosophy maneuver versus decisive engagement.

Essentially, Rosecrans after

hoped to defer a major battle with Bragg's army until he had seized Chattanooga. Rosecrans' six point strategy also considered military battle).4 objective outlined withdrawal officers today call sequels (actions after

what the

Rosecrans' strategy went far beyond the immediate of the driving general Bragg from Middle would Tennessee. follow He

actions that

Bragg's sequels

from Middle Tennessee and specified the

necessary army.

to

seize Chattanooga, and then

destroy

Bragg's

Bragg, guidance deduce the from

however, his

did

not

receive

similar Bragg plan

clear had t:o

superiors.

As a result

his mission and design an operational

without of very

benefit of his superiors' vision.

While the record

events tends to make Bragg look incompetent, or at the least, lacking as an operational planner, to deny Rosecrans Middle Tennessee. Unlike Confederacy Bragg Bragg Davis, Bragg was not a Like believer Joseph that

Bragg did attempt

the

could hold everything.

Johnston, others. but he

knew certain areas were more important questioned the value of Middle

than

Tennessee,

clearly understood the importance of maintaining his army as a fighting force. He also understood the necessity of

protecting Chattanooga. firm guidance

This combination, in the absence of established the

from Richmond, essentially

vision for Bragg's mission. Bragg's evacuation of Middle Tennessee thus

reflected his concern for his army and Chattanooga. became of

When it Army I l e better lack

apparent Rosecrans might destroy or bypass the

Tennessee, Bragg did what he considered essential.

moved to Chattanooga to protect it and reestablish a line of defense.

This behavior does not represent the

of an understanding of operational warfare.

It reflects the

behavior

of a man following operational guidance as he

had

deduced it! DEFENSIVE OPERATIONAL PLANNING The defeat ultimate goals of defensive campaigns are to

an attacking force to retain territory, to buy

time for

for other units to reinforce the theater, or to prepare subsequent offensive operations. a large area for an extended

If the defender must cover period, without hope of of

reinforcement, he must take risk and incorporate economy

force into his operations so as to be strong at the point of decision. 5 Braggts occupation most of his combat power of a line, and which concentrated the railroad, key

controlled

represented an operational understanding of some of the considerations for an effective defensive campaign.

Bragg's own of the the and

defensive orientation attempted not only to protect his line of communication but to threaten Rosecranst as well. of Clearly, the knew Bragg line

communication strategic Tennessee

understood south of

significance River. Bragg

terrain that the

Nashville

Chattanooga Railroad was critical for supporting any Federal advance toward Chattanooga and Atlanta. He also knew that

the terrain south of the Elk River made movement of and supplies dependent on the railroad. This not be is the most important reason why Bragg for his willingness to yield

armies

should Middle

condemned

Tennessee. as much

After all, he needed access to the railroad just as did Rosecrans, and of this need. Bragg's defense exhibited for when his the the

consideration Bragg

It was entirely

correct

to remain oriented on the line of communication the defensive options. Bragg concentrated and

considering defenses

along of

the rail line in Middle Tennessee Polk's and Hardee's corps

dispositions

supported

defense of the rail line. Part is the and parcel of a successful defensive of centers of gravity. campaign War

understanding

Civil

generals were not familiar with this Clausewitzian term, but they did exhibit some understanding of the concept. defensive line protected his withdrawal Bragg's (the

route

Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad), which in turn protected his own center of gravity

--

his army. wit:h than

Bragg, however, seems to have been preoccupied Rosecrans' truly entire army as an enemy center of gravity, rather communication. the

looking to the rail line of defensive

Bragg's of and

plan seemed oriented on

avenues line

approach terrain toward

Rosecrans was likely to use.

The rail the

to its west best supported a move by Wartrace and Shelbyville, so Bragg

Federals his

positioned

main force there. Additional Rosecrans' In his army plan proof that Bragg oriented is his concept to regain envisioned defensive primarily on

the and

initiative. offensive

Bragg

maneuver army. destroy essence,

complementing

each other

to

destroy

RoSecrans'

He never seriously considered maneuver to threaten or Rosecrans' line of communication. Bragg, with in his had

equated his enemy's "center of gravity"

own (his force) and planned accordingly.

However, even

Bragg considered attacking Rosecrans' line of communication, his army's ability to execute any plan was limited. Where tactical critical enemy or Bragg does deserve great criticism is at Bragg failed to do what the

level.

is

absolutely his

at the tactical level; he did not seriously to consider the

anticipate

indirect his gave

approaches on real at of

available Rosecrans' possibility striking

Rosecrans. Bragg

Because of essentially tactical

orientation up any aimed line

army, of

designing

operations the rail

Rosecrans'

weakness;

communications.

Braggfs plan was one of passive defense and

as such placed him in the position of reacting to Rosecrans' movements Failure to rather than seeking to disrupt appreciate the tactical nature his for enemy led Bragg to of those of movements. terrain or

understand protection

provide

inadequate He

his force and line

communication.

failed to defend properly the gaps that controlled access to his the never right flank. importance Because of his operational fixation own army, an with Bragg

of the rail line for his

understood that Rosecrans might opt for

indirect take

approach to seize it.

He believed Rosecrans would not

the

difficult

routes,

but

instead,

would As a

attack on the result Bragg

better

terrain forward of Shelbyville.

did not ensure that Hardee could prevent a flank attack. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL PLANNING The ultimate goal of offensive campaigns is to reach a decision before the attacker loses the means to conduct

further offensive action. campaigns include

The primary purposes of offensive enemy forces, seizing and

defeating

securing key on decisive terrain, disrupting enemy deceiving the enemy, and depriving the enemy of

attacks,

resources.

If the offensive commander must attack a concentrated enemy, he should attempt to maneuver and force the enemy to quit

his position or fight at a disadvantage.

These concepts are

key to an attacker's attainment of his objectives. 6 Rosecrans' offensive scheme embodied these and reflected the essence of successful offensive concepts. maneuver. a

Clearly, Rosecrans understood offensive campaigns against concentrated enemy and sought to force the enemy to his position or fight at a disadvantage.

abandon that

Realizing

Bragg his

occupied strong defensive works, operations against the flanks conducted the and

Rosecrans rear of of

directed Bragg's Bragg's allowed

defenses

Rosecrans lines

penetrations weak areas

defensive envelopment.

through

that

Furthermore, he oriented these

envelopment:^

on tactical objectives that supported his operational goal. 7

Rosecrans' Bragg's his

initial moves sought to place forces

on

weak flank (Manchester) to penetrate, then positions. Once this occurred,

envelop

forward

Rosecrans He then and the

feinted toward Tullahoma with the mass of his army. sent a portion of the army to destroy the bridges

railroad that controlled Bragg's communications. to these communications Once was enough to

The threat Bragg's and his a

force

withdrawal.

Bragg began his retreat in

earnest

abandoned Middle Tennessee, Rosecrans halted to prepare army for further movements. Rosecrans realized that

further and

advance without an adequate line of

communication, could

the necessary supplies for extended campaigning,

easily imperil the Army of the Cumberland should Bragg elect to contest its movement. Rosecrans' decision to halt, which a

meant deferring the fight with Bragg, was, however, fully part of his overall operational plan. Rosecrans' preoccupation with his plan of which meant

maneuver, Bragg,

that he postponed decisive battle with Whenever a commander orients on he

is

significant. than

maneuver, an

rather

on destruction of his enemy,

foregoes

opportunity to inflict decisive defeat. appreciated fighting became this at because his six

Rosecrans evidently plan envisioned in what

point

Bragg

a later time.

Consequently,

known as the Chickamauga Campaign, Rosecrans

seized This the

Chattanooga, then oriented on destroying Bragg's army. deferring of battle, however, would ultimately allow

initiative to shift to Bragg.

Rosecrans would then lose his

decisive battle, under conditions far less favorable than he enjoyed during the Tullahoma Campaign! DECEPTION Another campaign was notable aspect of operational art the use of operational in this In

deception. to

practically success. enemy as

A

all

cases, deception is vital

operational

commander must strive to confuse and mislead his to his goals and when, where, and how he will

concentrate for battle.

Ideally, his concept will embody an

indirect approach to safeguard his strength for the decisive battle. To do so he must understand his enemy and enemy

optimally convince the enemy that he will do what the believes he will. Bragg failed almost completely in this regard.

He

did nothing to conceal his true dispositions from Rosecrans. Once he established his defensive line on the Duck River months.

Bragg remained in

the same basic positions for six

As a result of cavalry probes and civilian information t h e ~ e was lay. The one area that Bragg may have inadvertently little doubt in Rosecrans' mind where Bragg's strengt:h

created deception was in the defenses of the gaps forward of his main line. As indicated by Rosecrans' and Thomas' Hoover's gaps

remarks to Reynolds and Wilder after the taking of

Gap, the Federals believed Bragg's forces defended the

in

strength.'

This did have an effect on Rosecrans' force

plan,

because Gap The and

he assumed two days were needed to reasonably sent Crittenden via the it took Thomas to attack through

Hoover's route. would his broke

longer the gap

time in

allow, distance through.

theory, enough time for Crittenden to thus be close at hand when

move

and

Thomas

Unlike Bragg, Rosecrans gave a great deal of thought to do operational deception. He sought from the beginning to

what is absolutely necessary for a successful

deception opponent build his

operation -- to make his opponent believe what his was inclined to to believe. Rosecrans saw Bragg

defense

counter a threat advancing on the

most

direct

avenues to Shelbyville and Tullahoma.

Rosecrans, therefore,

aimed at confirming what Bragg expected. During skillfully the first phase of the campaign, Rosecrans on

painted a picture of the main attack falling

the Shelbyville front.

At the same time, his main movements

indicated nothing more than feints to draw Bragg's attention from The the idea perceived main attack on the was brilliantly executed Shelbyville and Bragg front. reacted

accordingly. The deception skill was with which even Rosecrans conducted Gap his fell. Gaps

evident

after

Hoover's

Rosecrans continued heavy attacks on Guy's and Liberty while turning the weight of Thomas' corps toward

Wartrace.

This

maneuver continued to portray a massive attack and the railroad near Wartrace which, in

toward turn,

Shelbyville

allowed Rosecrans to claim the route to Manchester. After maneuvering Bragg from the Duck River line and into Tullahoma, Rosecrans continued his deception. Rosecrans attempted to once again rivet By his

movements,

Bragg's to

attention at the wrong place while other elements sought

threaten Bragg's escape route and cause Bragg to give up the defenses. Indeed, it was deception that proved most Bragg

critical to the campaign's outcome.

Deception pushed

to evacuate Middle Tennessee without causing any significan.t Federal casualties. SUSTAINMENT Another important aspect of this campaign is that cf operational sustainment-and its influence on the campaign..

The campaign plans of both army commanders reflect a concern for continued sustainment in their area of operations. B0t.h

armies were dependent on the railroad, although Bragg relied more on local forage than did Rosecrans. In supplies Rosecrans. Wartrace and fact, Bragg's defensive plan took his into account at least as much as the Bragg's line, while concentrated Shelbyville, extended to a need for from at over

threat primarily

width

of

seventy miles. the forage

This broad frontage was necessary to provide his cavalry and fresh livestock for his

for

troops.

This railroad

is not to say that Bragg did not rely

on

the

for resupply of critical items such as

ammunition

and dry goods. from his

He did need the railroad to move these items The fact came remains, from the

storehouses in Chattanooga. that much of his

however,

foodstuffs

countryside, supply

which overcame limitations of the The land in the Cumberland

Confederate Mountains forage. starved. did Cowan

system.

afforded Bragg nothing in the way of beef, grain or

If

he

defended there his army would likely

have

Faced with this predicament it is easy to see why Bragg not stop after crossing the Elk.
If Bragg stopped at

and University he would need to extend his forage lines deep into Alabama and Georgia to procure subsistence. The

problem did not

with such a course of action was that the run from middle Alabama directly to

railroad the Cowan would nearest

position. be

This meant the only way to move the forage the

by using wagons to transport the forage to

railheads.

Distance and time would make resupply difficult,

if not impossible.10 Rosecrans, while dependent to an extent on forage,

could rely more on the railroad. superior Federal supply system. Bragg's and army had

The reason was more than a During its completely occupation scoured value to on of the an the

Murfreesboro, countryside army.

requisitioned everything of

As a result, Rosecrans was forced to

depend

railroad to move practically every form of supplies from his bases in Nashville and Louisville. Rosecrans, supplies railroad. operated to ever mindful of the need for to these the

sustain momentum, was therefore

tied

His plan reflected this need and Rosecrans always within a day's wagon distance of the railroad. ensured

Throughout the execution of the campaign, Rosecrans

the engineers and infantry repaired the railroad rapidly. Rosecrans interdicted line also understood the effects His of orders am to

of supply on his enemy.

Wilder to fire the bridges across the Elk and his subsequent orders reflect to a Stanley and Thomas to cut Bragg's rail using line the that cause

primary desire to prevent Bragg from

line for resupply. threatening

It also reflected an understanding would

an enemy's line of communications

the enemy to react to Federal initiative. LEADERSHIP An leadership campaigns. tactical, important and what insight in this campaign is it means to the that of of

prosecution

Leadership encompasses not only the operational., and technical proficiency of a commander but Through his sound leadership, his the his "The a

command climate as well. operational subordinates. skill and

commander can hopefully foster the same in FM 100-5 goes so far as to say that

personality of a strong

commander

represent

significant part of his unit's combat power. 1111

The army commanders in this campaign demonstrate the truth of such a statement. greatly influenced In each case the army commander by his but

the performance of his

forces

leadership. Bragg leader. Prior required and,

~osecrans provided positive

influence,

illustrates much that is undesired in an

operational

to

the campaign ~osecransdid

those

things

of a competent leader. his plan,

He analyzed the a firm

situation grasp of input

through

demonstrated

operational planning and execution. of

He solicited the

his subordinate commanders, but at all times

maintained

firm control of the maneuver of his army. Rosecrans' subordinate leaders respected him. is little evidence within the Official Records, letters other primary took sources to suggest with that Rosecrans' or There and

corps of to in

commanders maneuver. the

exception

his

plan

scheme orders

Each corps commander carried out his

best of his ability without complaint. paid high compliments to his

Rosecrans,

turn,

subordinate

commanders

for their dedication and perseverance. 12 This positive leadership climate allowed subordinate commanders to see opportunities and exercise initiative. It

meant that individuals took actions in the absence of orders without fear of beratement. It meant further Wilder's that the

overall efficiency of the army increased. of Hoover's Gap, Minty's charge into

seizure and

Shelbyville,

Sheridan's perseverance in finding River

a crossing over the a

Elk

were the manifestations of initiative in

positive

command climate. Alternatively, desirable. competence Other His Bragg's leadership was from a less lack than of

failures

resulted less positive

than from a lack of

command

climate. had no of If not

than Wheeler, Bragg's subordinate commanders

faith in Bragg's ability.

This in turn reduced the Army

Tennessee's ability to accomplish any planned missions. subordinates respect feelings him, feel they a commander is incompetent, will likely not support or him. do

These to

go far to undermining the commander's

ability

plan and execute successfully. Bragg's climate. His very nature precluded a that he was positive always c0mman.d correct.,

insistence

particularly after he solicited input from his subordinates, and his demands to do things his way established in his command. Bragg's indecisiveness disharmony pressure

under

exacerbated the problem.

Bragg simply feared that he might As a

make a mistake, which translated into indecisiveness. result, power. Bragg's army lost much of its potential

combat

Instead of obeying orders without complaint, Bragg's tended to question them. A further result of

subordinates this

heavy handed environment was that Bragg's

subordinat~e

leaders did not take initiative for fear of chastisement.

This greatest Tullahoma. the right

poor

leadership contributor

climate to

was

perhaps failures

the at

single

Braggts

If Bragg had listened to Hardee's concerns about flank, if he had ensured that Polk and Hardee if he

understood

the offensive defensive idea, or perhaps

had just shown a little more tolerance, his subordinates may have contributed positive words and actions. Unfortunately,

Braggts personality and the damage it caused within his army precluded any valuable dialogue and undercut before individual Rosecrans attempt

initiative.

This

damage was done

long

moved forward and it significantly hindered Bragg's to hold Middle Tennessee.

AN OVERVIEW

Thus,

understanding

these insights from

little to

known Civil War campaign, is significant for our ability conduct operational warfighting today. The dominant

thread

that runs throughout, however, is the ability at all levels, of the commander to translate a superior's guidance into operational operational plan and conduct wise the campaign. clever an

Clear

guidance,

planning,

deception,

adequate sustainment, and positive leadership all contribute to this ability. Only by combining these critical pieces

can the operational commander design and conduct a capable of accomplishing its strategic objectives.

campaign

ENDNOTES
CHAPTER 5 'united States, Department of the Army, - F 100-5. Ooerations (Washington: GPO, 1986), 28. 2~~ 100-5, 29.
3~~ - 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404. 4~~ 100-5, 31.

8~~ 100-5, 30.

'wilder,

"Hoover's Gap," 2.

lorn 23/1: Bragg to Johnston, 3 July 1863, 584; DuBose, Wheeler, 174.

llm, 14.
12rn 23/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 408-9

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1 ORDER OF BATTLE: ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

The following order of battle reflects division level and higher commands. The Official Records contain the

detailed order of battle for the Army of the Cumberland. The information presented is an extract of Report Number 3: Organization of Troops in the Department of the Cumberl'and, 23/1: June 30, 1863, pages 411 to 418. Armv of the Cumberland Major General William S. Rosecrans Fourteenth Army CorDs Major General George H. Thomas First Division Major General Love11 H. Rousseau Second Division Major General James S. Negley Third Division Brigadier General John M. Brannan Fourth Division Major General Joseph J. Reynolds Twentieth Armv Coros Major General Alexander McD. McCook First Division Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis Second Division Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson Third Division Major General Philip H. Sheridan

Twentv-First Armv Coxaa Major General Thomas L. Crittenden First Division Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood Second Division Major General John M. Palmer Third Division Brigadier General Horatio P. Van Cleve Reserve Corvs, Armv of the Cumberland Major General Gordon Granger
'

First Division Brigadier General Absalom Baird Second Division* Brigadier General James D. Morgan Third Division* Brigadier General Robert S. Granger Cavalrv Corvs Major General David S. Stanley First Division Brigadier General Robert B..Mitchell Second Division Brigadier General John B. Turchin

At Nashville on garrision duty.

179

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2 ORDER OF BATTLE: THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE

The following order of battle reflects division level and higher commands. The information presented is an

extract of the information found in Report Number 90: Abstracts from Returns of Department No. 2, for June 20 and July 10, 1863; QR 23/1: June 20 and July 10, 1863, pages 585 to 586. The Armv of Tennessee General Braxton Bragg First Armv Corus Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk Wither's Division Major General Jones M. Withers Cheatham's Division Major General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham Second Armv C o r ~ s Lieutenant General William J. Hardee Stewart's Division Major General Alexander P. Stewart Cleburne's Division Major General Patrick R. Cleburne Beserve Division. Armv of Tennessee* Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner

* Major General Buckner commanded the Department of East Tennessee. Responding to Bragg's request for reinforcement on 23 June 1863, Buckner departed Knoxville, Tennessee on 27 June with 3,000 troops and a battery of artillery. He joined Bragg at Tullahoma on 30 June, and by 7 July was back in Tennessee.

Cavalry: The Armv of Tennessee Major General Joseph Wheeler, Chief of Cavalry Wheeler's CorDs Major General Joseph Wheeler (Also retained command of his division) Wheeler's Division Major General Joseph Wheeler Wharton's Division Brigadier General John A . Wharton Martin's Division* Brigadier General Will T. Martin Morgan's Division** Brigadier General John H. Morgan Forrest's Division*** Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest

* On service with Forrest's command at the start of the Tullahoma campaign.

* * Morgan's division did not participate in Tullahoma Campaign. His division was enroute to Ohio to conduct a raid during the campaign.

*** Forrest's Division was not part of Wheeler's Cavalry Corps, however, Forrest did come under Wheeler's command.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS Boatner, Mark Mayo 111. The Civil War Dictionarv. New Yor David McKay Company Inc., 1959.Buck, Irving A. Cleburne and His Command. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1985. Cist, Henry M. The Armv of the Cumberland. New York: Charles of the Civil Scribner's Sons, 1883; reprint, -aims Volume IV. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1963.

m,

Commager, Henry Steele, and John S. Bowman. The Civil War Almanac. New York: Gallery Books, 1983. Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Armv of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Autumn of Glorv: The Armv of Tennessee. 1862-1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Civil War Tennessee: Battles and Leaders. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979. Coppee, Henry D. General Thomas. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1893. Davis, George B., Leslie J. Perry, Joseph W. Kirkley, Calvin D. Cowles and Richard Sommers, eds. The Official Militarv Atlas of the Civil War. Hong Kong: Fairfax Press, 1983. (originally published in Washington: Authority of the Government Printing Office; Arno Press - Inc., and Crown Publishers, 1891-1895. Dodson, W. C. Camoaiqns Of Wheeler and His Cavalry 1862 Atlanta: Huggins Publishing Company, 1899.

w.

Drake, Edwin L. Battles and Enqaaements of the Western Armies of the Confederate States. Nashville: Tavel, Eastman and Howell, 1879. Dubose, John Wiherspoon. General Joseah Wheeler and the Armv of Tennessee. New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1912.

Dyer, Frederick H. A Comwendium of the War of the R e b e l U u , Volume 1. Dayton, Ohio: The National Historical Society in cooperation with The Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1979. Fieberger, G. J. Cam~aiansof the American Civil War. West Point, New York: United States Military Academy Printing Office, 1914. Fitch, John. Annals of the Army of the Cumberland. Philiadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1863. Govan, Gilbert E. and James W. Livingood. A Different Valor: The Story of General J O S ~ D E. ~ 'Johnston. C.S.A.. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956. Grant, Ulysses S. Ulvsses S. Grant. Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. Selected Letters 1839 - 1865. New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1990. Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How The North Won: A Military Historv of the Civil War. Urbana and Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Hicken, Victor. Illinois in the Civil War. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966. Horn, Stanley F. The Army of Tennessee: A Military History. Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1941. Johnston, J. Stoddard. Confederate Military Historv, Volume IX. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1962. Jordan, Thomas and J.P. Pryor. The Cam~aisnsof Lieutenant General N. B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1977. Korn, Jerry and the editors of Time-Life Books. The Fisht For Chattanooaa - Chickamauaa to Missionary Ridae. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books Inc., 1985. Lamers, William M. TKhe Edae of Glory: A Bioarawhv of General William S. Rosecrans. U.S.A.. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1961. Liddell, St John and Nathaniel C. Hughes, ed. Liddell's Record. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1985. Longstreet, James. From Manassass to A D D O ~ ~ ~ ~ Secaucus, OX. New Jersey: The Blue and Grey Press, ND.

Mackall, William W. A Son's Recollections of His Father. New York: UNK, 1930. McKinney, Francis F. Education in Violence: The Life of Georae H. Thomas and the Historv of the Armv of the Cumberland. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1961. McGee, B. F., and William R. Jewell, ed. Historv of the 72nd Indiana Volunteer Infantrv of the Mounted Liahtnina Briaade. LaFayette, Indiana: S. Vater and Company, 1882. McMurry, Richard M. Two Great Rebel Armies, Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. McPherson, James M . Battle Crv of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. McWhiney, Grady. Braxton Braaa and Confederate Defeat, Volume 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Parks, Joseph H. General Leonidas Polk C.S.A.: The Fiahtina Bishow. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. Polk, William M. Leonidas Polk. B i s h o ~and General, Volume 2. New York: Longmans Publishing Co., 1893. Purdue, Harvell and Elizabeth. Pat Cleburne: Confederate General. Hillsboro, TX: Hill Junior College Press, 1973. Reid, Whitelaw. Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen. Her Generals. and Soldiers, Volume I. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, and Baldwin, 1868. Seitz, Don C. Braxton Braas General of the Confederacv. Columbia, S.C.: The State Company, 1924. Shanks, William Franklin Gore. Personal Recollections of Distinauished Generals. New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1866. Spaulding, Oliver L. Jr. "William S. Rosecrans," in Dumas Malone, ed. Dictionary of American Bioara~hv.New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. Spiller, Roger J. and Joseph G. Dawson 111, eds. American Military Leaders. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.

Starr, Stephen 2 . The Union Cavalrv in the Civil War, Volume 3, The War in the West 1861 - 1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. Steele, Matthew Forney. Civil War Atlas to Accomoanv Steele's American Camoaians. West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1941. Tucker, Glenn. Chickamauqa: Bloody Battle in the West. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1961; repr., Dayton, OH: Press of the Morningside Bookshop, 1984. Van Horne, Thomas B. History of the Army of the Cumberland, Volume I. Cincinnati, OH.: Ogden, Campbell and Co., 1875; reprint, Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1988. Watson, William. Life in the Confederate Army. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1888. Wilson, George S. Wilder's Briaade of Mounted Infanrv in the Tullahoma Chickamauaa Camoaisns. Topeka: Kansas Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, 1891.

Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Grav. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. Watkins, Samuel R. Co. "AvtchV - First Tennessee Reaiment. Nashville: Nashville Press, 1882; repr., Dayton, OH: The Press of the Morningside Bookshop, 1990.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Merrill, William E. Military Mao Showina the Theater of Overations in the Tullahoma. Chickamauaa and Chattanooaa Camoaians. Washington, D.C.: Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1874. United States, Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-5. Ooerations. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.

United States, The War Department. The War of the Rebellior~ A Com~ilationof the Official Records of the Union andi Confederate Armies. 128 volumes. Washington: GPO, 1888 - 1890. PERIODICALS Catton, Bruce. "At the Edge of Glory," American Heritase Maaazing, February 1962, 109. Carpenter, Frank G. "With Old Rosey," The National Tribune, 7 January 1892. Rosecrans, William S. "The Campaign for Chattanooga," Centurv Maaazine, 34 (October 1887): 129-31. Wilder, John T. "Hoover's Gap,." The National Tribune, 20 September 1906, Staff Ride Committee, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS Bragg, Braxton. Braxton Bragg Papers, Washington, D.C., 20 June 1863. Campbell, Henry. "Extract From the Journal of Henry Campbell, Eighteenth Indiana Battery: Regarding Battle of Hoover's Gap, Special Collections, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1907. Carpenter, F. Personnel Letters, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Staff Ride Files.

SOURCES NOT CONSULTED BOOKS Athearn, Robert G., ed. Soldier in the West: The Civil War Letters of Alfred Lacev Houah. Philadelphia: University of Pennyslvania Press, ND. Bickham, William Denison. Rosecrans' Camoaiun with the Fourteenth Armv Coros or the Armv of the Cumberland. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co., 1863. Crute, Joseph H., Jr. Units of the Confederate States Armv. Midlothian, Virginia: Derwent Books, 1987. Griess, Thomas E., ed. Atlas for the American Civil Way. The West Point Military History Series. Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, 1986. Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. Fieldhead, England: Fieldbooks, 1986. King, W.C. and W.P. Derby. Camofire Sketches and Battlefield Echoes of the Rebellion. Springfield, MA: W.C. King and Company, 1887. Lawrence, J. Pinckney, Seale B. Johnson, Robert A McGaw, and Thomas A. Wigginton, eds. Tennesseans in the Civil War, Two Volumes. Nashville: Civil War Centennial Commission, 1964. Lindsley, John Berrien M.D., ed. The Military Annals of Tennessee. Nashville: J.M. Lindsley & Co. 1886. McWhiney, Grady and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil Yar Militarv Tactics and the Southern Heritaue. Tuscaloosa, Alambama: University of Alabama Press, 1982. Newlin, W.H., D.F. Lawler, and J.W. Sherrick. A History o t the Seventv-Third Reuiment of Illinois Infantrv Volunteers. Washington: Regimental Reunion Association of Survivors of the 73rd Illinois Infantry Volunteers, 1890. Oates, William C. War Between the Union and the Confederacv and its Lost Oooortunities with a History of the Fifteenth Alabama Reuiment. New York: unknown, 1905.

Porter, James D. Confederate Militarv Historv: Tennessee, Volume X . Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1987. Ridpath, John Clark. The Life and Work of James A. Garfielck The Twentieth President of the United States. Cincinnati: Jones Brothers & Co., 1881. Schalk, Emil. Cam~aiansof 1862 and 1863. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1863. Smith, Theodore Clarke. The Life and Letters of James Abrarn Garfield. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. Stevenson, A. F. The Battle of Stone's River. Boston: Osgood Publishing Company, 1884. Sunderland, Glenn W. Wilder's Liahtninu Briaade - and its SDencer Reveaters. Washington, Illinois: Book Works, 1984. Tomes, Robert, M.D., and Bengamin G. Smith. The Great Civil m, Volume 2. New York: R. Worthington, ND. Williams, Frederick D. The Wild Life of the Armv: Civil War Letters of James A. Garfield. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1964. Yoseloff, Thomas. Ptlas to Accomvanv the Camvaians of the Civil War. New York: A.S. Barnes and Co. Inc., 1963. Westrate, E. V. Those Fatal Generals. New York: Knight Publications Inc., 1936. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS United States, Congress, Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Revort of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Second Session of the Thirtv-eiath Conuress. Washington: GPO, 1865. PERIODICALS Austerman, Wayne. "The Northern Spencer Goes Southf1* Civil War Times Illustrated, 23.3 (May 1984): 26-30.

Henry, O.E. "Garfield As a Soldier." Hational Tribune. 8 August 1901. Longacre, Edward G. "A General Vanquished in the West, Civil War Times Illustrate& 24.6 (October 1985): 16-19, 44-7. Swinton, William. "General Rosecrans Army in Motion Toward the Enemy." New York Times. 29 June 1863. Swinton, William. ItGeneral Rosecrans' March." New York Times. 2 July 1863. Swinfon, William. "General Rosecrans in Possession of T~llahoma.~ New York Times. 3 July 1863. Wert, Jeffry. "George Crook: Sheridan's Second Fiddle," Civil War Times Illustrated, 22.8 (Dec. 1983): 10-17.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314 LTC John I. Boxberger Operations Group National Training Center Fort Irwin, California 92310-5031 COL Charles A. Endress 2682 Harvard San Angelo, Texas 76904 LTC Richard L. Kiper Combat Studies Institute USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 Park Historian Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia 30742 LTC Robert D. Ramsey I11 Combat Studies Institute USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 William G. Robertson. Ph.D. Combat Studies ~nstitute USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900