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G.R. No. 72110. November 16, 1990.* ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rodrigo Law Office for petitioner. Antonio P. Barredo and Napoleon M. Malinas for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals,2 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed 2 AC-G.R. CV No. 69626, Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. and set aside and another one entered for the plaintiff ordering the defendant-appellee Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. to accept the balance of P124,000.00 being paid by plaintiff-appellant and thereafter to execute in favor of Robes-Francisco Realty Corporation a registerable Deed of Absolute Sale over 20,655 square meters portion of that parcel of land situated in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan described in OCT No. 575 (now Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-169493, 169494, 169495 and 169496) of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. In case of refusal of the defendant to execute the Deed of Final Sale, the clerk of court is directed to execute the said document. Without pronouncement as to damages and attorneys fees. Costs against the defendant-appellee.3 The case at bar arose from a complaint filed by the private respondent, then plaintiff, against the petitioner, then defendant, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, at Sta. Maria, Bulacan,4 for specific performance with damages, based on a contract5 executed on July 7, 1971. The property subject matter of the contract consists of a 20,655 sq.m.-portion, out of the 30,655 sq.m. total area, of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 575 of the Province of Bulacan, issued and registered in the name of the petitioner which it sold to the private respondent for and in consideration of P123,930.00. The crux of the instant controversy lies in the compliance or non-compliance by the private respondent with the provision for payment to the petitioner of the principal balance of P100,000.00 and the accrued interest of P24,000.00 within the grace period. A chronological narration of the antecedent facts is as follows: On July 7, 1971, the subject contract over the land in question was executed between the petitioner as vendor and the private respondent through its then president, Mr. Carlos F. Robes, as vendee, stipulating for a downpayment of P23,930.00 and the balance of P100,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum to be paid within four (4) years from execution of the contract, that is, on or before July 7, 1975. The contract likewise provides for cancellation, forfeiture of previous payments, and reconveyance of the land in question in case the private respondent would fail to complete payment within the said period. On March 12, 1973, the private respondent, through its new president, Atty. Adalia Francisco, addressed a letter6 to Father Vasquez, parish priest of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, requesting to be furnished with a copy of the subject contract and the supporting documents. On July 17, 1975, admittedly after the expiration of the stipulated period for payment, the same Atty. Francisco wrote the petitioner a formal request7 that her company be allowed to pay the principal amount of P100,000.00 in three (3) equal installments of six (6) months each with the first installment and the accrued interest of P24,000.00 to be paid immediately upon approval of the said request. On July 29, 1975, the petitioner, through its counsel, Atty. Carmelo Fernandez, formally denied the said request of the private respondent, but granted the latter a grace period of five (5) days from the receipt of the denial8 to pay the total balance of P124,000.00, otherwise, the provisions of the contract regarding cancellation, forfeiture, and reconveyance would be implemented. On August 4, 1975, the private respondent, through its president, Atty. Francisco, wrote9 the counsel of the petitioner requesting an extension of 30 days from said date to fully settle its account. The counsel for the petitioner, Atty. Fernandez, received the said letter on the same day. Upon consultation with the petitioner in Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Fernandez, as instructed, wrote the private respondent a letter10 dated August. Consequently, Atty. Francisco, the private respondents president, wrote a letter11 dated August 22, 1975, directly addressed to the petitioner, protesting the alleged refusal of the latter to accept tender of payment purportedly made by the former on August 5, 1975, the last day of the grace period. In the same letter of August 22, 1975, received on the following day by the petitioner, the private respondent demanded the execution of a deed of absolute sale over the land in question and after which it would pay its account in full, otherwise, judicial action would be resorted to. On August 27, 1975, the petitioners counsel, Atty. Fernandez, wrote a reply12 to the private respondent stating the refusal of his client to execute the deed of absolute sale due to its (private respondents) failure to pay its full obligation. Moreover, the petitioner denied that the private respondent had made any tender of payment whatsoever within the grace period. In view of this alleged breach of contract, the petitioner cancelled the contract and considered all previous payments forfeited and the land as ipso facto reconveyed. From a perusal of the foregoing facts, we find that both the contending parties have conflicting versions on the main question of tender of payment. The trial court, in its ratiocination, preferred not to give credence to the evidence presented by the private respondent. According to the trial court: x x x What made Atty. Francisco suddenly decide to pay plaintiffs obligation on August 5, 1975, go to defendants office at Malolos, and there tender her payment, when her request of August 4, 1975 had not yet been acted upon until August 7, 1975? If Atty. Francisco had decided to pay the obligation and had available funds for the purpose on August 5, 1975, then there would have been no need for her to write defendant on August 4, 1975 to request an extension of time. Indeed, Atty. Franciscos claim that she made a tender of payment on August 5, 1975such alleged act, considered in relation to the circumstances both antecedent and subsequent thereto, being not in accord with the normal pattern of human conductis not worthy of credence.13 The trial court likewise noted the inconsistency in the testimony of Atty. Francisco, president of the private respondent, who earlier testified that a certain Mila Policarpio accompanied her on August 5, 1975 to the office of the petitioner. Another person, however, named Aurora Oracion, was presented to testify as the secretary-companion of Atty. Francisco on that same occasion. Furthermore, the trial court considered as fatal the failure of Atty. Francisco to present in court the certified personal check allegedly tendered as payment or, at least, its xerox copy, or even bank records thereof. Finally, the trial court found that the private respondent had insufficient funds available to fulfill the entire obligation considering that the latter, through its president, Atty. Francisco, only had a savings account deposit of P64,840.00, and although the latter had a money-market placement of P300,000.00. the same was to mature only after the expiration of the 5-day grace period. Based on the above considerations, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, finding plaintiff to have failed to make out its case, the court hereby declares the subject contract cancelled and plaintiffs down payment of P23,930.00 forfeited in favor of defendant, and hereby dismisses the complaint; and on the counterclaim, the Court orders plaintiff to pay defendant. (1) Attorneys fees of P10,000.00; (2) Litigation expenses of P2,000.00; and (3) Judicial costs. SO ORDERED.14

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Not satisfied with the said decision, the private respondent appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) assigning as reversible errors, among others, the findings of the trial court that the available funds of the private respondent were insufficient and that the latter did not effect a valid tender of payment and consignation. The respondent court, in reversing the decision of the trial court, essentially relies on the following findings: x x x We are convinced from the testimony of Atty. Adalia Francisco and her witnesses that in behalf of the plaintiff-appellant they have a total available sum of P364,840.00 at her and at the plaintiffs disposal on or before August 4, 1975 to answer for the obligation of the plaintiff-appellant. It was not correct for the trial court to conclude that the plaintiff-appellant had only about P64,840.00 in savings deposit on or before August 5, 1975, a sum not enough to pay the outstanding account of P124,000.00. The plaintiff-appellant, through Atty. Francisco proved and the trial court even acknowledged that Atty. Adalia Francisco had about P300,000.00 in money market placement. The error of the trial court lies in concluding that the money market placement of P300,000.00 was out of reach of Atty. Francisco. But as testified to by Mr. Catalino Estrella, a representative of the Insular Bank of Asia and America, Atty. Francisco could withdraw anytime her money market placement and place it at her disposal, thus proving her financial capability of meeting more than the whole of P124,000.00 then due per contract. This situation, We believe, proves the truth that Atty. Francisco apprehensive that her request for a 30-day grace period would be denied, she tendered payment on August 4, 1975 which offer defendant through its representative and counsel refused to receive. x x x15 (Italics supplied) In other words, the respondent court, finding that the private respondent had sufficient available funds, ipso facto concluded that the latter had tendered payment. Is such conclusion warranted by the facts proven? The petitioner submits that it is not. Hence, this petition.16 The petitioner presents the following issues for resolution: A. Is a finding that private respondent had sufficient available funds on or before the grace period for the payment of its obligation proof that it (private respondent) did tender of (sic) payment for its said obligation within said period? xxx xxx xxx B. Is it the legal obligation of the petitioner (as vendor) to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the private respondent (as vendee) before the latter has actually paid the complete consideration of the salewhere the contract between and executed by the parties stipulates That upon complete payment of the agreed consideration by the herein VENDEE, the VENDOR shall cause the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the VENDEE. xxx xxx xxx

C. Is an offer of a check a valid tender of payment of an obligation under a contract which stipulates that the consideration of the sale is in Philippine Currency?17 We find the petition impressed with merit. With respect to the first issue, we agree with the petitioner that a finding that the private respondent had sufficient available funds on or before the grace period for the payment of its obligation does not constitute proof of tender of payment by the latter for its obligation within the said period. Tender of payment involves a positive and unconditional act by the obligor of offering legal tender currency as payment to the obligee for the formers obligation and demanding that the latter accept the same. Thus, tender of payment cannot be presumed by a mere inference from surrounding circumstances. At most, sufficiency of available funds is only affirmative of the capacity or ability of the obligor to fulfill his part of the bargain. But whether or not the obligor avails himself of such funds to settle his outstanding account remains to be proven by independent and credible evidence. Tender of payment presupposes not only that the obligor is able, ready, and willing, but more so, in the act of performing his obligation. Ab posse ad actu non vale illatio. A proof that an act could have been done is no proof that it was actually done. The respondent court was therefore in error to have concluded from the sheer proof of sufficient available funds on the part of the private respondent to meet more than the total obligation within the grace period, the alleged truth of tender of payment. The same is a classic case of non-sequitur. On the contrary, the respondent court finds itself remiss in overlooking or taking lightly the more important findings of fact made by the trial court which we have earlier mentioned and which as a rule, are entitled to great weight on appeal and should be accorded full consideration and respect and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons.18 While the Court is not a trier of facts, yet, when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court,19 or when the inference of the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,20 the Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based on the record. Apropos the second issue raised, although admittedly the documents for the deed of absolute sale had not been prepared, the subject contract clearly provides that the full payment by the private respondent is an a priori condition for the execution of the said documents by the petitioner. That upon complete payment of the agreed consideration by the herein VENDEE, the VENDOR shall cause the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the VENDEE.21 The private respondent is therefore in estoppel to claim otherwise as the latter did in the testimony in cross-examination of its president, Atty. Francisco, which reads: Q Now, you mentioned, Atty. Francisco, that you wanted the defendant to execute the final deed of sale before you would given (sic) the personal certified check in payment of your balance, is that correct? A Yes, sir.22 xxx xxx xxx Art. 1159 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. And unless the stipulations in said contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.23 What the private respondent should have done if it was indeed desirous of complying with its obligations would have been to pay the petitioner within the grace period and obtain a receipt of such payment duly issued by the latter. Thereafter, or, allowing a reasonable time, the private respondent could have demanded from the petitioner the execution of the necessary documents. In case the petitioner refused, the private respondent could have had always resorted to judicial action for the legitimate enforcement of its right. For the failure of the private respondent to undertake this more judicious course of action, it alone shall suffer the consequences. With regard to the third issue, granting arguendo that we would rule affirmatively on the two preceding issues, the case of the private respondent still can not succeed in view of the fact that the latter used a certified personal check which is not legal tender nor the currency stipulated, and therefore, can not constitute valid tender of payment. The first paragraph of Art. 1249 of the Civil Code provides that the payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. The Court en banc in the recent case of Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals,24 G.R. No. L-49188, stated thus: Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment (citing Sec. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan London Co. v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a managers check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Hence, where the tender of payment by the private respondent was not valid for failure to comply with the requisite payment in legal tender or currency stipulated within the grace period and as such, was validly refused receipt by the petitioner, the subsequent consignation did not operate to discharge the former from its obligation to the latter.

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In view of the foregoing, the petitioner in the legitimate exercise of its rights pursuant to the subject contract, did validly order therefore the cancellation of the said contract, the forfeiture of the previous payment, and the reconveyance ipso facto of the land in question. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the DECISION of the respondent court promulgated on April 25, 1985 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED and the DECISION of the trial court dated May 25, 1981 is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., No part, former counsel of petitioner. Petition granted. Decision set aside and annulled.

ROMAN CATHOLIC OF MALOLOS V. IAC 191 SCRA 411 FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land. It then entered into a contract of lease agreement with Robes-Fransisco Realty for the parcel of land. The agreement was that there would be downpayment plus installments with interest. Robes-Fransisco was then in default. Knowing that it was in its payment of the installments, it requested for the restructuring of the installment payments but was denied. It then asked for grace period to pay the same and tendered a check thereafter. Such was refused and the contract was cancelled. HELD: A check whether a managers check or ordinary check is not legal tender and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. As this is the case, the subsequent consignation of the check didn't operate to discharge RobesFransisco from its obligation to petitioner. ANICETO[1] M. QUIO, petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS, PURIFICACION L. CANSON, EDITHA G. LEONARDO, CARMELITA L. MORI, JOSEFINA L. BAIS, AIDA L. COLLYER, ANTONIO G. LEONARDO, RUDOLFO G. LEONARDO, ROBERTO G. LEONARDO and TERESA L. REGNER, in substitution for ANTONIO LEONARDO SR., JOSEFA GALAN and JOSE BITOON, respondents DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: On 29 October 1974 Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agricultural land with an area of 2.3926 hectares situated in Basak, Compostela, Cebu, to spouses Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan for P2,000.00. More than a decade later, or on 30 October 1986, petitioner Aniceto Quio filed aa complaint for redemption of the property against the vendees claiming that he had been instituted as tenant thereon by the Galans since 1951; consequently, he had the right to be notified in writing of the owners' intention to sell the property to enable him to exercise his right of preemption under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844[2] but that notwithstanding the Galans had not informed him of the sale. He claimed that he learned of the transaction only on 1 September 1986 when he found out that the Leonardos were already the new owners. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to redeem the property and consigned the purchase price with the trial court on the same day he filed his complaint. Meanwhile, on 4 November 1986 the Leonardos sold the property to private respondent Jose Bitoon for P30,000.00. On 12 November 1986 petitioner filed another complaint against the same spouses for injunction with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin his ejectment from the property. During the pendency of the case, Antonio Leonardo Sr. died. His children, private respondents Purificacion L. Canson, Editha G. Leonardo, Carmelita L. Mori, Josefina L. Bais, Aida L. Collyer, Antonio G. Leonardo, Rudolfo G. Leonardo, Roberto G. Leonardo and Teresa L. Regner, were substituted in his stead as co-defendants. Sometime thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon dated 24 November 1986 notifying him of the transfer of ownership of the land to his client. As no supporting document was attached to the letter to bolster counsel's claim, petitioner went to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building and obtained on 2 March 1987 a copy of the pertinent deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon. On 27 July 1987 petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading Jose Bitoon as additional defendant. However, on 8 October 1990 the trial court dismissed the original as well as the amended complaint after finding that majority of the essential requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties did not exist.[3] The Court of Appeals however arrived at an entirely different evaluation of the evidence.[4] On 5 August 1994 it held that all the essential requisites for tenancy relationship were present, and being a tenant petitioner was entitled to the rights of preemption and redemption under Secs. 11 and 12, respectively, of RA No. 3844. Nevertheless it noted a stumbling block to petitioner's complete victory thus Be that as it may, since the land in question had already pass(ed) on to defendant-appellee Jose Bitoon, and plaintiff-appellant's quests against defendant-appellees spouses Antonio Leonardo and Josefa Galan may be considered moot and academic under RA 3844, Section 10, defendant-appellee Jose Bitoon having been subrogated to the rights and obligations of his predecessors-in-interest, his obligation under the law to the tenant-plaintiff continues and subsists, that if he decides to sell the land, then plaintiff-appellant can still exercise his rights under the law (Velasquez v. Nery, 211 SCRA 28, underscoring supplied).[5] The appellate court decreed thus 1. declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr.

substituted by his (nine?) children and in turn of the present owner, respondent Bitoon;

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2. ordering respondent Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him; 3. ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which he consigned with the trial court as redemption price for the land in question, covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986; and, 4. no pronouncement as to costs.[6] On 23 November 1994 respondent Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.[7] The issue then is whether respondent Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner could not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it on the strength of the ruling in Velasquez v. Nery.[8] Petitioner asserts that Velasquez is inapplicable because of the difference in factual circumstances. landowners to a third party was by virtue of a court order and not as envisioned under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844. therein to preemptively purchase was not violated. Hence the right of redemption was unavailing to them. In that case, the sale made by the In other words, the right of the tenants

For a better understanding of the controversy, it is essential to discuss first the statutory right of redemption and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. Section 12 of RA No. 3844 as amended by RA No. 6389 provides Sec. 12. Lessee's right of Redemption. - In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration x x x x The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale x x x x The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale x x x x Simply stated, in the event that the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter is granted by law the right to redeem it within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice in writing and at a reasonable price and consideration. Petitioner was not notified of the first and second instances of sale of the property apparently because all the respondents disputed petitioner's assertion that he has been a tenant thereon since 1951. These instances of sale without notification gave rise to his right to redeem the property as lessee although no longer from the Leonardos but from its present owner, respondent Bitoon. A letter dated 24 November 1986 from the counsel of respondent Bitoon was received by petitioner informing him that the ownership of subject property has been transferred to respondent Bitoon. However the counsel did not bother to furnish petitioner with the supporting documents which is why petitioner did not readily believe what was written in the letter. Petitioner had to proceed to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building on 2 March 1987 to secure a copy of the deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon. The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start running.[9] The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic document on 2 March 1987. The amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days. The preceding discussion leads us to the requirement concerning reasonable price and consideration. An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period.[10] It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchased price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual.[11] As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration.[12] Petitioner consigned the amount of P2000.00 paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. However when he amended his complaint by imp[leading respondent Bitoon, he did not increase the amount consigned as would have made it equivalent to P30,000.00, representing payment by the second vendee. In this regard, petitioner submits that he is not required to consign the latter amount since that would put an additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. After all, he would be paying whatever amount would be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable price and consideration. It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time.[13] Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law and leaves the Court with no choice but to rule against him. With the foregoing ratiocination, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of whether petitioner may redeem the property from respondent Bitoon. Nevertheless, we shall pursue the discussion thereon if only to rectify some points. In Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses, in a nutshell, were agricultural lessees of the property owned by the Nery spouses and the Lorenzos. Later, the owners filed an action for partition before the trial court. In a compromise agreement, they agreed to sell the property to Delta Motor Corporation. Having received information about the impending sale, the Velasquez spouses filed an action for redemption before the then Court of Agrarian Relations. Subsequently, the sale materialized. Unfortunately, the redemption case was dismissed due to lack of interest to redeem the property at its acquisition price. The appeal before respondent court and the petition before this Court met the same fate. However, we also noted that the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was not a party to the case, had in the meantime extrajudicially foreclosed the property. By way of obiter dictum we statedBecause of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject property by the Philippine National Bank, the present case has become moot and academic with regard to petitioners' claim against Delta Motor Corporation. It is now the PNB or its subsequent transferees from whom the petitioners must redeem, if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future x x x x

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Respondent appellate court must have taken out of context our statement therein when the former ruled that "if respondent Bitoon decides to sell the land then petitioner can still exercise his rights under the law." The phrase in the Velasquez case that "if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future" logically refers to "its subsequent transferees" only, and not as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption as what respondent court perceived it to be. To further stress the matter, the ruling of respondent court overlooks the essence of redemption provided in the amended Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 which, as previously mentioned, grants to the lessee such right in case the property is sold to a third person without his knowledge. Since that situation obtained in Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses had the right to redeem the property from the PNB as new owner. The circumstance that the property was sold to a third person without the knowledge of the lessee provides the source from which the right of redemption springs. Analyzing this right, it may be stated that such right works only one way - in favor of the redemptioner. For he can compel the purchaser to sell but he cannot be compelled to buy. Supposing the lessee failed to redeem the property and the purchaser decided to sell or alienate it without notifying the former, the property may be redeemed from the subsequent transferee because another essence of the right of redemption is that it attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law.[14] The plain import of the obiter dictum in the Velasquez case is that the Velasquez spouses may redeem the property from the PNB as new owner, or should PNB decide to sell the property they may redeem the same from its transferee. Thus, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, Velasquez is applicable but not as so applied by respondent court; instead, it should have based its main ruling on the lack of interest to redeem the property at the acquisition price paid by respondent Bitoon. Hence we reiterate that, for failure of petitioner to consign the entire redemption price, there was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to redeem. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals (1) declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan, and in turn, of the present owner respondent Bitoon; (2) ordering respondent Jose Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him; (3) ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of P2,000.00 which he consigned as redemption price for the land in question covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986, with no pronouncement as to costs, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Davide Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ. concur.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

Appears as "Anecito" in the complaint filed with the trial court. The Agricultural Land Reform Code, approved 8 August 1963. Decision penned by Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, RTC-Br. 28, Cebu City, Records, p. 85. Decision penned by Justice Artemon D. Luna with the concurrence of Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Ramon A. Barcelona; Rollo, pp. 17-45. G.R. No. 64284, 3 July 1992; Rollo, p. 44. [6] Id., pp. 44-45. [7] Id., p. 51. [8] Respondents allegedly likewise resorted to this Court but their petition was dismissed on a technicality. [9] Conejero v. Court of Appeals, No. L-21812, 29 April 1966, 16 SCRA 775. [10] Lee Chuy Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104114, 4 December 1995, 250 SCRA 596. [11] . Belisario v. IAC, G.R. No. 73503, 30 August 1988, 165 SCRA 101,citing Angao v. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, and Rumbaoa v. Arsaga, 84 Phil. 182. [12] . Cuano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 122. [13] See Note 10.

[14]

See Note 13.

G.R. No. L-32116 April 2l, 1981 RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO, respondents. DE CASTRO, * J.: This is a petition for review by way of certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 39760-R entitled "Maxima Castro, plaintiffappellee, versus Severino Valencia, et al., defendants; Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and Arsenio Reyes, defendants-appellants," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in favor of plaintiff- appellee, the herein private respondent Maxima Castro. On December 7, 1959, respondent Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to the Rural Bank of Caloocan to apply for an industrial loan. It was Severino Valencia who arranged everything about the loan with the bank and who supplied to the latter the personal data required for Castro's loan application. On December 11, 1959, after the bank approved the loan for the amount of P3,000.00, Castro, accompanied by the Valencia spouses, signed a promissory note corresponding to her loan in favor of the bank. On the same day, December 11, 1959, the Valencia spouses obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan for P3,000.00. They signed a promissory note (Exhibit "2") corresponding to their loan in favor of the bank and had Castro affixed thereon her signature as co-maker. The two loans were secured by a real-estate mortgage (Exhibit "6") on Castro's house and lot of 150 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7419 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. On February 13, 1961, the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff Basilio Magsambol, sent a notice of sheriff's sale addressed to Castro, announcing that her property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 would be sold at public auction on March 10, 1961 to satisfy the obligation covering the two promissory notes plus interest and attorney's fees. Upon request by Castro and the Valencias and with conformity of the bank, the auction sale that was scheduled for March 10, 1961 was postponed for April 10, 1961. But when April 10, 1961 was subsequently declared a special holiday, the sheriff of Manila sold the property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 at a public auction sale that was held on April 11, 1961, which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday. Castro alleged that it was only when she received the letter from the Acting Deputy Sheriff on February 13, 1961, when she learned for the first time that the mortgage contract (Exhibit "6") which was an encumbrance on her property was for P6.000.00 and not for P3,000.00 and that she was made to sign as co-maker of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") without her being informed of this. On April 4, 1961, Castro filed a suit denominated "Re: Sum of Money," against petitioners Bank and Desiderio, the Spouses Valencia, Basilio Magsambol and Arsenio Reyes as defendants in Civil Case No. 46698 before the Court of First Instance of Manila upon the charge, amongst others, that thru mistake on her part or fraud on the part of Valencias she was induced to sign as co-maker of a promissory note (Exhibit "2") and to constitute a mortgage on her house and lot to secure the questioned note. At the time of filing her complaint, respondent Castro deposited the amount of P3,383.00 with the court a quo in full payment of her personal loan plus interest.

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In her amended complaint, Castro prayed, amongst other, for the annulment as far as she is concerned of the promissory note (Exhibit "2") and mortgage (Exhibit "6") insofar as it exceeds P3,000.00; for the discharge of her personal obligation with the bank by reason of a deposit of P3,383.00 with the court a quo upon the filing of her complaint; for the annulment of the foreclosure sale of her property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 in favor of Arsenio Reyes; and for the award in her favor of attorney's fees, damages and cost. In their answers, petitioners interposed counterclaims and prayed for the dismissal of said complaint, with damages, attorney's fees and costs. The pertinent facts arrived from the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties as stated by respondent Court of Appeals are as follows: Spawning the present litigation are the facts contained in the following stipulation of facts submitted by the parties themselves: 1. That the capacity and addresses of all the parties in this case are admitted . 2. That the plaintiff was the registered owner of a residential house and lot located at Nos. 1268-1270 Carola Street, Sampaloc, Manila, containing an area of one hundred fifty (150) square meters, more or less, covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila; 3. That the signatures of the plaintiff appearing on the following documents are genuine: a) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 7, 1959 in the amount of P3,000.00 attached as Annex A of this partial stipulation of facts; b) Promissory Note dated December 11, 1959 signed by the plaintiff in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan for the amount of P3,000.00 as per Annex B of this partial stipulation of facts; c) Application for Industrial Loan with the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 11, 1959, signed only by the defendants, Severino Valencia and Catalina Valencia, attached as Annex C, of this partial stipulation of facts; d) Promissory note in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, dated December 11, 1959 for the amount of P3000.00, signed by the spouses Severino Valencia and Catalina Valencia as borrowers, and plaintiff Maxima Castro, as a co-maker, attached as Annex D of this partial stipulation of facts; e) Real estate mortgage dated December 11, 1959 executed by plaintiff Maxima Castro, in favor of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, to secure the obligation of P6,000.00 attached herein as Annex E of this partial stipulation of facts; All the parties herein expressly reserved their right to present any evidence they may desire on the circumstances regarding the execution of the above-mentioned documents. 4. That the sheriff of Manila, thru Acting Chief Deputy Sheriff, Basilio Magsambol, sent a notice of sheriff's sale, address to the plaintiff, dated February 13, 1961, announcing that plaintiff's property covered by TCT No. 7419 of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, would be sold at public auction on March 10, 1961 to satisfy the total obligation of P5,728.50, plus interest, attorney's fees, etc., as evidenced by the Notice of Sheriff's Sale and Notice of Extrajudicial Auction Sale of the Mortgaged property, attached herewith as Annexes F and F-1, respectively, of this stipulation of facts; 5. That upon the request of the plaintiff and defendants-spouses Severino Valencia and Catalina Valencia, and with the conformity of the Rural Bank of Caloocan, the Sheriff of Manila postponed the auction sale scheduled for March 10, 1961 for thirty (30) days and the sheriff re-set the auction sale for April 10, 1961; 6. That April 10, 1961 was declared a special public holiday; (Note: No. 7 is omitted upon agreement of the parties.) 8. That on April 11, 1961, the Sheriff of Manila, sold at public auction plaintiff's property covered by T.C.T. No. 7419 and defendant, Arsenio Reyes, was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued to him as per Annex G of this partial stipulation of facts; 9. That on April 16, 1962, the defendant Arsenio Reyes, executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex H of this partial stipulation of facts; 10. That on May 9, 1962, the Rural Bank of Caloocan Incorporated executed the final deed of sale in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in the amount of P7,000.00, a copy of which is attached as Annex I of this partial stipulation of facts; 11. That the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila issued the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 67297 in favor of the defendant, Arsenio Reyes, in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7419 which was in the name of plaintiff, Maxima Castro, which was cancelled; 12. That after defendant, Arsenio Reyes, had consolidated his title to the property as per T.C.T. No. 67299, plaintiff filed a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Manila and the same was annotated in the back of T.C.T. No. 67299 as per Annex J of this partial stipulation of facts; and
2

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13. That the parties hereby reserved their rights to present additional evidence on matters not covered by this partial stipulation of facts. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing partial stipulation of facts be approved and admitted by this Honorable Court. As for the evidence presented during the trial, We quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals the statement thereof, as follows: In addition to the foregoing stipulation of facts, plaintiff claims she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write the English language; that she can speak the Pampango dialect only; that she has only finished second grade (t.s.n., p. 4, December 11, 1964); that in December 1959, she needed money in the amount of P3,000.00 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valencia, who accompanied her to the defendant bank for the purpose of securing a loan of P3,000.00; that while at the defendant bank, an employee handed to her several forms already prepared which she was asked to sign on the places indicated, with no one explaining to her the nature and contents of the documents; that she did not even receive a copy thereof; that she was given a check in the amount of P2,882.85 which she delivered to defendant spouses; that sometime in February 1961, she received a letter from the Acting Deputy Sheriff of Manila, regarding the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of her property; that it was then when she learned for the first time that the mortgage indebtedness secured by the mortgage on her property was P6,000.00 and not P3,000.00; that upon investigation of her lawyer, it was found that the papers she was made to sign were: (a) Application for a loan of P3,000.00 dated December 7, 1959 (Exh. B-1 and Exh. 1); (b) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for the said loan of P3,000.00 (Exh- B-2); (c) Promissory note dated December 11, 1959 for P3,000.00 with the defendants Valencia spouses as borrowers and appellee as co-maker (Exh. B-4 or Exh. 2). The auction sale set for March 10, 1961 was postponed co April 10, 1961 upon the request of defendant spouses Valencia who needed more time within which to pay their loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank; plaintiff claims that when she filed the complaint she deposited with the Clerk of Court the sum of P3,383.00 in full payment of her loan of P3,000.00 with the defendant bank, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum up to April 3, 1961 (Exh. D). As additional evidence for the defendant bank, its manager declared that sometime in December, 1959, plaintiff was brought to the Office of the Bank by an employee- (t.s.n., p 4, January 27, 1966). She wept, there to inquire if she could get a loan from the bank. The claims he asked the amount and the purpose of the loan and the security to he given and plaintiff said she would need P3.000.00 to be invested in a drugstore in which she was a partner (t.s.n., p. 811. She offered as security for the loan her lot and house at Carola St., Sampaloc, Manila, which was promptly investigated by the defendant bank's inspector. Then a few days later, plaintiff came back to the bank with the wife of defendant Valencia A date was allegedly set for plaintiff and the defendant spouses for the processing of their application, but on the day fixed, plaintiff came without the defendant spouses. She signed the application and the other papers pertinent to the loan after she was interviewed by the manager of the defendant. After the application of plaintiff was made, defendant spouses had their application for a loan also prepared and signed (see Exh. 13). In his interview of plaintiff and defendant spouses, the manager of the bank was able to gather that plaintiff was in joint venture with the defendant spouses wherein she agreed to invest P3,000.00 as additional capital in the laboratory owned by said spouses (t.s.n., pp. 16-17) 3 The Court of Appeals, upon evaluation of the evidence, affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive portion of which reads: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court renders judgment and: (1) Declares that the promissory note, Exhibit '2', is invalid as against plaintiff herein; (2) Declares that the contract of mortgage, Exhibit '6', is null and void, in so far as the amount thereof exceeds the sum of P3,000.00 representing the principal obligation of plaintiff, plus the interest thereon at 12% per annum; (3) Annuls the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged property held on April 11, 1961, as well as all the process and actuations made in pursuance of or in implementation thereto; (4) Holds that the total unpaid obligation of plaintiff to defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., is only the amount of P3,000.00, plus the interest thereon at 12% per annum, as of April 3, 1961, and orders that plaintiff's deposit of P3,383.00 in the Office of the Clerk of Court be applied to the payment thereof; (5) Orders defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. to return to defendant Arsenio Reyes the purchase price the latter paid for the mortgaged property at the public auction, as well as reimburse him of all the expenses he has incurred relative to the sale thereof; (6) Orders defendants spouses Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. the amount of P3,000.00 plus the corresponding 12% interest thereon per annum from December 11, 1960 until fully paid; and Orders defendants Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and spouses Severino D. Valencia and Catalina Valencia to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P600.00 by way of attorney's fees, as well as costs.

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In view of the conclusion that the court has thus reached, the counterclaims of defendant Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc., Jose Desiderio, Jr. and Arsenio Reyes are hereby dismissed, as a corollary The Court further denies the motion of defendant Arsenio Reyes for an Order requiring Maxima Castro to deposit rentals filed on November 16, 1963, resolution of which was held in abeyance pending final determination of the case on the merits, also as a consequence of the conclusion aforesaid. 4 Petitioners Bank and Jose Desiderio moved for the reconsideration 5 of respondent court's decision. The motion having been denied, before this Court in the instant petition, with the following Assignment of Errors, to wit: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE, EXHIBIT 2, AND THE MORTGAGE, EXHIBIT 6, INSOFAR AS THEY AFFECT RESPONDENT MAXIMA CASTRO VIS-A-VIS PETITIONER BANK DESPITE THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF EITHER ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT OR COMPETENT PROOF IN THE EVIDENCE OF ANY FRAUD OR OTHER UNLAWFUL CONDUCT COMMITTED OR PARTICIPATED IN BY PETITIONERS IN PROCURING THE EXECUTION OF SAID CONTRACTS FROM RESPONDENT CASTRO. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING UPON AND CONSIDERING PREJUDICIALLY AGAINST PETITIONERS, AS BASIS FOR THE PARTIAL ANNULMENT OF THE CONTRACTS AFORESAID ITS FINDING OF FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE VALENCIA SPOUSES UPON RESPONDENT CASTRO IN UTTER VIOLATION OF THE RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE. III THE COURT OF APPEAL ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, UNDER THE FACTS FOUND BY IT, RESPONDENT CASTRO IS UNDER ESTOPPEL TO IMPUGN THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY OF HER QUESTIONED TRANSACTION WITH PETITIONER BANK. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT, BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT CASTRO, THE LATTER SHOULD SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE VALENCIA SPOUSES, IN AS MUCH AS IT WAS THRU RESPONDENT CASTRO'S NEGLIGENCE OR ACQUIESCENSE IF NOT ACTUAL CONNIVANCE THAT THE PERPETRATION OF SAID FRAUD WAS MADE POSSIBLE. V THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE DEPOSIT BY RESPONDENT CASTRO OF P3,383.00 WITH THE COURT BELOW AS A TENDER AND CONSIGNATION OF PAYMENT SUFFICIENT TO DISCHARGE SAID RESPONDENT FROM HER OBLIGATION WITH PETITIONER BANK. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS VALID AND BINDING UPON RESPONDENT CASTRO THE HOLDING OF THE SALE ON FORECLOSURE ON THE BUSINESS DAY NEXT FOLLOWING THE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED DATE THEREFOR WHICH WAS DECLARED A HOLIDAY WITHOUT NECESSITY OF FURTHER NOTICE THEREOF. The issue raised in the first three (3) assignment of errors is whether or not respondent court correctly affirmed the lower court in declaring the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as they affect respondent Castro vis-a-vis petitioner bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only. Respondent court declared that the consent of Castro to the promissory note (Exhibit 2) where she signed as co-maker with the Valencias as principal borrowers and her acquiescence to the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) where she encumbered her property to secure the amount of P6,000.00 was obtained by fraud perpetrated on her by the Valencias who had abused her confidence, taking advantage of her old age and ignorance of her financial need. Respondent court added that "the mandate of fair play decrees that she should be relieved of her obligation under the contract" pursuant to Articles 24 7 and 1332 8 of the Civil Code. The decision in effect relieved Castro of any liability to the promissory note (Exhibit 2) and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) was deemed valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only which was equivalent to her personal loan to the bank. Petitioners argued that since the Valencias were solely declared in the decision to be responsible for the fraud against Castro, in the light of the res inter alios acta rule, a finding of fraud perpetrated by the spouses against Castro cannot be taken to operate prejudicially against the bank. Petitioners concluded that respondent court erred in not giving effect to the promissory note (Exhibit 2) insofar as they affect Castro and the bank and in declaring that the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) was valid only to the extent of Castro's personal loan of P3,000.00. The records of the case reveal that respondent court's findings of fraud against the Valencias is well supported by evidence. Moreover, the findings of fact by respondent court in the matter is deemed final. 9 The decision declared the Valencias solely responsible for the defraudation of Castro. Petitioners' contention that the decision was silent regarding the participation of the bank in the fraud is, therefore, correct.
6

they now come

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We cannot agree with the contention of petitioners that the bank was defrauded by the Valencias. For one, no claim was made on this in the lower court. For another, petitioners did not submit proof to support its contention. At any rate, We observe that while the Valencias defrauded Castro by making her sign the promissory note (Exhibit 2) and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6), they also misrepresented to the bank Castro's personal qualifications in order to secure its consent to the loan. This must be the reason which prompted the bank to contend that it was defrauded by the Valencias. But to reiterate, We cannot agree with the contention for reasons abovementioned. However, if the contention deserves any consideration at all, it is in indicating the admission of petitioners that the bank committed mistake in giving its consent to the contracts. Thus, as a result of the fraud upon Castro and the misrepresentation to the bank inflicted by the Valencias both Castro and the bank committed mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. In other words, substantial mistake vitiated their consents given. For if Castro had been aware of what she signed and the bank of the true qualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that they would not have given their consents to the contracts. Pursuant to Article 1342 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. We cannot declare the promissory note (Exhibit 2) valid between the bank and Castro and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) binding on Castro beyond the amount of P3,000.00, for while the contracts may not be invalidated insofar as they affect the bank and Castro on the ground of fraud because the bank was not a participant thereto, such may however be invalidated on the ground of substantial mistake mutually committed by them as a consequence of the fraud and misrepresentation inflicted by the Valencias. Thus, in the case of Hill vs. Veloso,10 this Court declared that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit by a third person, even without connivance or complicity with one of the contracting parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to the contract. Petitioners argued that the amended complaint fails to contain even a general averment of fraud or mistake, and its mention in the prayer is definitely not a substantial compliance with the requirement of Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The records of the case, however, will show that the amended complaint contained a particular averment of fraud against the Valencias in full compliance with the provision of the Rules of Court. Although, the amended complaint made no mention of mistake being incurred in by the bank and Castro, such mention is not essential in order that the promissory note (Exhibit 2) may be declared of no binding effect between them and the mortgage (Exhibit 6) valid up to the amount of P3,000.00 only. The reason is that the mistake they mutually suffered was a mere consequence of the fraud perpetrated by the Valencias against them. Thus, the fraud particularly averred in the complaint, having been proven, is deemed sufficient basis for the declaration of the promissory note (Exhibit 2) invalid insofar as it affects Castro vis-a-vis the bank, and the mortgage contract (Exhibit 6) valid only up to the amount of P3,000.00. The second issue raised in the fourth assignment of errors is who between Castro and the bank should suffer the consequences of the fraud perpetrated by the Valencias. In attributing to Castro an consequences of the loss, petitioners argue that it was her negligence or acquiescence if not her actual connivance that made the fraud possible. Petitioners' argument utterly disregards the findings of respondent Court of Appeals wherein petitioners' negligence in the contracts has been aptly demonstrated, to wit: A witness for the defendant bank, Rodolfo Desiderio claims he had subjected the plaintiff-appellee to several interviews. If this were true why is it that her age was placed at 61 instead of 70; why was she described in the application (Exh. B-1-9) as drug manufacturer when in fact she was not; why was it placed in the application that she has income of P20,000.00 when according to plaintiff-appellee, she his not even given such kind of information -the true fact being that she was being paid P1.20 per picul of the sugarcane production in her hacienda and 500 cavans on the palay production. 11 From the foregoing, it is evident that the bank was as much , guilty as Castro was, of negligence in giving its consent to the contracts. It apparently relied on representations made by the Valencia spouses when it should have directly obtained the needed data from Castro who was the acknowledged owner of the property offered as collateral. Moreover, considering Castro's personal circumstances her lack of education, ignorance and old age she cannot be considered utterly neglectful for having been defrauded. On the contrary, it is demanded of petitioners to exercise the highest order of care and prudence in its business dealings with the Valencias considering that it is engaged in a banking business a business affected with public interest. It should have ascertained Castro's awareness of what she was signing or made her understand what obligations she was assuming, considering that she was giving accommodation to, without any consideration from the Valencia spouses. Petitioners further argue that Castro's act of holding the Valencias as her agent led the bank to believe that they were authorized to speak and bind her. She cannot now be permitted to deny the authority of the Valencias to act as her agent for one who clothes another with apparent authority as her agent is not permitted to deny such authority. The authority of the Valencias was only to follow-up Castro's loan application with the bank. They were not authorized to borrow for her. This is apparent from the fact that Castro went to the Bank to sign the promissory note for her loan of P3,000.00. If her act had been understood by the Bank to be a grant of an authority to the Valencia to borrow in her behalf, it should have required a special power of attorney executed by Castro in their favor. Since the bank did not, We can rightly assume that it did not entertain the notion, that the Valencia spouses were in any manner acting as an agent of Castro. When the Valencias borrowed from the Bank a personal loan of P3,000.00 evidenced by a promissory note (Exhibit 2) and mortgaged (Exhibit 6) Castro's property to secure said loan, the Valencias acted for their own behalf. Considering however that for the loan in which the Valencias appeared as principal borrowers, it was the property of Castro that was being mortgaged to secure said loan, the Bank should have exercised due care and prudence by making proper inquiry if Castro's consent to the mortgage was without any taint or defect. The possibility of her not knowing that she signed the promissory note (Exhibit 2) as co-maker with the Valencias and that her property was mortgaged to secure the two loans instead of her own personal loan only, in view of her personal circumstances ignorance, lack of education and old age should have placed the Bank on prudent inquiry to protect its interest and that of the public it serves. With the recent occurrence of events that have supposedly affected adversely our banking system, attributable to laxity in the conduct of bank business by its officials, the need of extreme caution and prudence by said officials and employees in the discharge of their functions cannot be over-emphasized.

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Question is, likewise, raised as to the propriety of respondent court's decision which declared that Castro's consignation in court of the amount of P3,383.00 was validly made. It is contended that the consignation was made without prior offer or tender of payment to the Bank, and it therefore, not valid. In holding that there is a substantial compliance with the provision of Article 1256 of the Civil Code, respondent court considered the fact that the Bank was holding Castro liable for the sum of P6,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum, while the amount consigned was only P3,000.00 plus 12% interest; that at the time of consignation, the Bank had long foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and the sale of the mortgage property had already been scheduled for April 10, 1961 for non-payment of the obligation, and that despite the fact that the Bank already knew of the deposit made by Castro because the receipt of the deposit was attached to the record of the case, said Bank had not made any claim of such deposit, and that therefore, Castro was right in thinking that it was futile and useless for her to make previous offer and tender of payment directly to the Bank only in the aforesaid amount of P3,000.00 plus 12% interest. Under the foregoing circumstances, the consignation made by Castro was valid. if not under the strict provision of the law, under the more liberal considerations of equity. The final issue raised is the validity or invalidity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at public auction of the mortgaged property that was held on April 11, 1961. Petitioners contended that the public auction sale that was held on April 11, 1961 which was the next business day after the scheduled date of the sale on April 10, 1961, a special public holiday, was permissible and valid pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code which ordains: Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day. Respondent court ruled that the aforesaid sale is null and void, it not having been carried out in accordance with Section 9 of Act No. 3135, which provides: Section 9. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city. We agree with respondent court. The pretermission of a holiday applies only "where the day, or the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday," or when the last day of a given period for doing an act falls on a holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done, as distinguished from a period of time within which an act should be done, which may be on any day within that specified period. For example, if a party is required by law to file his answer to a complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to the next succeeding business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case on a certain day but the said date is subsequently declared a public holiday, the trial thereof is not automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day. Since April 10, 1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by the deputy sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legally be made on the next succeeding business day without the notices of the sale on that day being posted as prescribed in Section 9, Act No. 3135. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment under review, We affirm the same in toto. No pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Acting, C.J.) Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. Footnotes

* Mr. Justice de Castro was designated to sit with the First Division under Special Order No. 225. 1 Rollo, pp. 112-133. 2 Record on Appeal, pp. 84-89. 3 Rollo, pp. 112-117. 4 Rollo, pp. 117-118. 5 Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp. 134-167. 6 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated May 25, 1970, Rollo, p. 168. 7 Art. 24. In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. 8 Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read or if the contract is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. 9 Guico vs. Mayuga 63 Phil. 328; Velasco vs. Court of Appeals, 90 Phil. 688; Fonacier vs. Court of Appeals, 96 Phil. 417. 10 31 Phil. 160. 11 pp. 13-14, CA decision. [G.R. No. 55361 : December 10, 1990.] 192 SCRA 163

SPOUSES TEOFILO ERCILLO and TERESITA ERCILLO, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES LUTGARDA CIFRA and BENJAMIN CIFRA, SR., represented by their son and attorney-in-fact, BENJAMIN CIFRA, JR., and HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, Respondents.

DECISION MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10524 which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX affirming the judgment of the City Court of Quezon City. The facts of the case are as follows:

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Private respondents spouses Benjamin Cifra and Lutgarda Cifra leased an apartment building located at 11-C Purdue Street, Cubao, Quezon City, to herein petitioners spouses Teofilo Ercillo and Teresita Ercillo at a monthly rental of P140.00 payable within the first five (5) days of the month at the residence of private respondents. On November 23, 1976, private respondents filed an action for unlawful detainer with the City Court of Quezon City. It was alleged in the complaint that the petitioners failed to pay the rentals for the month of August, 1976 up to the filing of the complaint; that private respondents demanded from petitioners payment of the accrued rentals and the surrender of the possession of the leased premises to them before the complaint was filed and that the petitioners neither paid the accrued rentals nor surrendered the possession of the leased premises. Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that they never defaulted in the payment of their rentals; that private respondents refused to accept their payments; that they deposited the payments with the Family Savings Bank, Account No. 419022473, in the name of Mrs. Teresita Ercillo or Mrs. Lutgarda Cifra and that the petitioners were advised by the former of the said deposit.: nad Sometime also in November, 1976, the private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioners with the Office of the Civil Relations (OCR), Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The petitioners then withdrew the rentals deposited with the Family Savings Bank and deposited the money and the accruing rentals with the OCR. When the action for ejectment was pending with the City Court, the petitioners deposited the rentals with the said court. After trial, the City Court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of the decision provides: "WHEREFORE, . . . this Court finds the material allegations in the complaint filed in this case to be duly proved with convincing and satisfactory evidence and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants spouses TEOFILO ERCILLO and TERESITA ERCILLO, as follows: "1. Ordering defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises located at 11-C Purdue Street, Cubao Quezon City and restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; "2. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the sum of P1,680.00 representing accrued monthly rentals for the period August, 1976 to July, 1977 at P144.00 a month; "3. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the further sum of P144.00 a month commencing on August 1, 1977 and every month thereafter until they and all persons claiming rights under them finally vacate the premises and restore the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiffs; "4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the sum of P1,500.00, as and for attorney's fees; and "5. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the cost of the suit. "The counter-claim interposed by the defendants is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. "SO ORDERED." (pp. 14-15, Rollo). On appeal to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Quezon City, the decision of the City Court was affirmed in toto. The petitioners filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on September 6, 1980 (pp. 14-18, Rollo). The decision of the Court of Appeals stated: "Since the consignation of the accrued rentals with the Court was made only during the pendency of the ejectment case, although they (petitioners) had effected deposits with the Office of the Civil Relations, which office as opined by the trial court, "is not a judicial authority," such act could not have and did not have the effect of discharging petitioners' obligation in the payment of rentals.chanrobles virtual law library "Thus, no judicial consignation having been made in accordance with Art. 1256, 1257 and 1258 of the New Civil Code; "WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. "SO ORDERED." (p. 18, Rollo) On December 1, 1980, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. The petitioners contend that respondent Court of Appeals committed a legal error when it ruled that the deposit of the rentals with the bank did not release the petitioners from their obligation to pay the rentals and that LOI 768 which took effect only on November 16, 1978 cannot apply to this case which was filed on November 23, 1976. The petition is devoid of merit. The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the private respondents had a valid ground for ejecting petitioners. The ground raised by private respondents in ejecting petitioners from the leased premises is the latter's failure to pay rents due. There is no question that this is one of the grounds by which a lessor may judicially eject the lessee under Article 1673 of the New Civil Code. Further, Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that a lessor or his legal representative shall bring an action against a lessee for failure to pay rent due only after the lessee shall have failed to pay such rent for a period of fifteen days after a written demand therefor had been made. Private respondents assert that there was no payment of the rent due within the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by the rules nor even after the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period after a written demand to pay and to vacate was made on petitioners. The petitioners, for their part, assert that their obligation to pay rent had been extinguished in view of their consignation of the rent due with the bank after the private respondents refused to accept them. The law on tender of payment and consignation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation is covered by Article 1256, Article 1257 and Article 1258 of the New Civil Code. "Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. "x x x "Art. 1257. In order that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. "The consignation shall be ineffectual if it is not made strictly in consonance with the provisions which regulate payment. "Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of judicial authority before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. "The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof."

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It is the requirement under Article 1258 which had not been strictly complied with by petitioners. What the law requires is the deposit of the thing due at the disposal of judicial authority before whom the tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case. The deposit of the rentals with the bank is not the consignation contemplated by law. Depositing the rentals in the bank does not place such rental at the disposal of the judicial authority.chanrobles virtual law library Petitioners argue further that since the case is still pending, the full legal effect of P.D. 20 together with its implementing Instructions, LOI 768, should be made to apply in this case. P.D. 20, issued on October 12, 1972, amended Republic Act No. 6359 regulating rentals for dwelling units. It was not until November 16, 1978 when Letter of Instruction No. 768 was issued implementing P.D. 20. It provided, among others: "3. The following shall not constitute grounds for judicial ejectment of lessees: "a) That the lessee has failed to pay any increased rental not mutually agreed upon; provided, that in case of refusal of the lessor to accept payment of the rent previously agreed upon, the lessee shall either consignate the amount in court or deposit the said amount in a bank for the account of the lessor." Petitioners seek shelter under this provision. However, it should be noted that LOI 768 which allows the deposit of accrued rentals in a bank as an alternative to consignation in court of rental payments which the lessor refuses to accept, was issued only on November 16, 1978. The action for ejectment, on the other hand was filed on November 23, 1976 or some two (2) years before the issuance of LOI 768 when the law in effect then was Article 1257 of the New Civil Code. Clearly, the private respondents had, at the time of the institution of the complaint, a valid ground for ejecting petitioners. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. [G.R. No. 44167 : December 19, 1990.] 192 SCRA 388 JULITA FRANCISCO and her husband, HERMENEGILDO TANKENKO, and RESTITUTO FRANCISCO and his wife, FELISA ABEJO, Petitioners, vs. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; FRANCISCA FRANCISCO, MAXIMA FRANCISCO and FRANCISCO FRANCISCO, Respondents.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

In Civil Case No. 501-V of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch III, Valenzuela) which was an action for partition and reconveyance instituted by Maxima, Francisca, and Francisco, all surnamed Francisco, together with their respective spouses, against Julita, Romeo, Lorenza and Restituto, all also surnamed Francisco, and their respective spouses judgment was rendered on August 11, 1971 by Judge Juan de Borja the dispositive portion of which is as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Maxima Francisco entitled to 138 square meters and Francisca Francisco to 126 square meters from the portion sold to Restituto Francisco and Francisco Francisco to 360 square meters from the portion sold to Julita Francisco at a price of P11.00 per square meter, the same to be paid within thirty (30) days after this decision becomes final, otherwise plaintiffs shall loss all their rights to said portion, and after payment shall have been made defendants shall execute the proper deeds of conveyance in favor of plaintiffs . . ." (Emphasis supplied) This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on September 16, 1975. 1 No appeal was attempted from the Appellate Court's decision which consequently became final and executory on October 9, 1975, and was remanded to the Trial Court for execution. On January 12, 1976, the plaintiffs filed a motion for execution. The motion was denied by respondent Judge, Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, by Order dated February 2, 1976. 2 His Honor ruled that since the judgment had given the plaintiffs thirty (30) days from finality of decision within which to pay to the defendants the price of the areas respectively awarded to them at the rate of P11.00 per square meter; and since considerably more than thirty (30) days had elapsed since the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Trial Court, had become final, said plaintiffs had, in accordance with the judgment, lost "all their rights" to their portions.:-cralaw The respondent Judge however later reconsidered and set aside his Order of February 2, 1976, on motion of the plaintiffs. This he did in an Order dated April 14, 1976 3 In said Order, he declared that upon the facts, the failure of the plaintiffs to effect payment within the appointed time could not be ascribed to their fault. His Honor found that ". . . plaintiffs' attempt to tender payment in accordance with the decision of this Court which the Court of Appeals affirmed on September 16, 1975 failed to materialize because plaintiff Restituto Francisco and his wife were in the United States and defendant Julita Francisco to whom plaintiffs tendered payment refused the same which resulted in their failure to comply with their obligation to pay within the period of thirty (30) days provided for in the decision, the Court considers plaintiffs' attempt to tender payment sufficient to comply with their undertaking. Art. 1186 of the New Civil Code provides that the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.'" The respondent Judge accordingly RESOLVED ". . . to set aside. . . (the) Order of February 2, 1976 and plaintiffs are given a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order within which to tender payment to the defendants and/or deposit with the Office of the Clerk of Court the amount corresponding to the value of the parcel of land subject matter of this case after the same is segregated from the portion belonging to the defendants." The defendants moved, in their turn, for reconsideration of the Order of April 14, 1976. The motion was seasonably opposed by the plaintiffs, and thereafter denied by Judge Bautista, by Order dated July 2, 1976. It is these Orders of April 14, and July 2, 1976 that the petitioners would have this Court annul in the special civil action of Certiorariat bar. The petitioners theorize that in rendering the Order of April 14, 1976, respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion because he had in effect substantially altered the final and executory judgment of his predecessor, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a court has plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the decision becomes final, or before an appeal from that decision has been perfected. 4 However, after the decision has become final and executory, it can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. 5 This principle of immutability of judgments already final and executory has invariably been adhered to by this Court regardless of any occasional injustice, for the equity of a particular case must yield to the

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"overmastering need" of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. 6 Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. 7 It is these principles that petitioners invoke to nullify the questioned orders of the respondent Judge in this case. The facts here and the applicable principles, however, preclude such relief.:cralaw A distinction should be made between the jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment and its power to enforce it. The former ceases to attach when the judgment becomes final, while the judgment has become final for the purpose of its execution, 8 the propriety of its exercise rather than the jurisdiction to amend or modify being the real issue here. Now, in the execution proceedings in question, the court a quo found as a fact that plaintiffs were prevented from consummating the requisite tender of payment due to the absence of two of the defendants from the Philippines and the refusal of the third to accept such tender which, it is not seriously disputed, was attempted within the prescribed 30-day period from finality of the judgment. There is no cogent reason to disturb that factual conclusion, which therefore is binding and conclusive upon this Court. 9 This Court has held in several cases 10 that where a timely and valid tender of payment is made pursuant to the exercise of a right (not an obligation) it is sufficient, without consignation, to preserve such right. In Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca, 11 it was ruled that consignation referred to in Article 1256 of the Civil Code is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said provision refers to consignation as one of the means for the payment or discharge of a "debt," whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises. The lessee merely exercised a right of option and had no obligation to pay said price until execution of the deed of sale in his favor, which the lessor refused to do. And in the fairly recent case of Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 12 which involved the exercise of the right to repurchase, the Court also held that ". . . In instances where no debt 15 due and owing, consignation is not proper. "We have ruled early that: 'Consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of payment is enough if made on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retro to resell the property.' "Since the case at bar involves the exercise of the right to repurchase, a showing that petitioner made a valid tender of payment is sufficient. It is enough that a sincere or genuine tender of payment and not a mock or deceptive one was made. The fact that he deposited the amount of repurchase money with the Clerk of Court was simply an additional security for the petitioner. It was not an essential act that had to be performed after tender of payment was refused by the private respondent although it may serve to indicate the veracity of desire to comply with the obligation." The tender having been made, not so much to discharge an obligation as to enforce or exercise a right (to a reconveyance of the portions of law adjudged to them), no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle the private respondents to such reconveyance. Hence, the respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in setting aside his Order of February 2, 1976 and giving said respondents a new period within which to tender payment to the petitioner and/or deposit the required amount in court. It may even be said that in view of the efficacy of said tender for the purpose of enforcing a reconveyance the grant of a fresh period within which to reiterate the same is superfluous and unnecessary.:-cralaw Moreover, as previously shown, the rights and obligations of the parties arose from a judgment, not from contract and therefore the Civil Code requirements as to consignation are not applicable. 13 Thus, in case of refusal of a tender of the amount due on a judgment, the court may direct the money to be paid in court and when this is done, order satisfaction of the judgment to be entered. 14 The tender of payment of a judgment is not the same as tender of payment of a contractual debt and consignation of the money due from a debtor to a creditor. 15 The requisites of consignation under Art. 1256 et seq. do not apply to the former. It appearing that private respondents have already deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Valenzuela, Bulacan, the sum of P6,864.00 in accordance with the order of the court a quo dated April 14, 1976, and this as early as May 13, 1976, or six days after their receipt, thru counsel, on May 7, 1976 of said order, 16 approval of the consignation and discharge of private respondents' obligation are warranted. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the court a quo is hereby ORDERED to approve the consignation made by private respondents, and direct execution of the judgment in question so as to effectuate the reconveyance prescribed therein according to its terms. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Endnotes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. The decision was written for the Court by Vasquez, J., with whom concurred Leuterio and Bautista, JJ. Judge Bautista succeeded Judge de Borja after the latter was transferred to Manila. Annex A, petition. People v. Villanueva, 17 SCRA 272 [1966] citing U.S. v. Vayson, 27 Phil. 447, U.S. v. De Iro, 33 Phil. 14, U.S. v. Balliad and Tamaray, 35 Phil. 14, People vs. Buyson Lampa, 58 Phil. 757. Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474 [1967] citing Marasigan v. Ronquillo, 94 Phil. 237; Gabaya v. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 400 [1982]; Heirs of Remigio Tan v. IAC, 163 SCRA 752 [1988]. Gabaya v. Mendoza, supra, citing Contreras and Ginco v. Felix and China Banking Corp., Inc., 44 O.G. 4306. Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Liwanag Paras Brios, et al., 165 SCRA 464 [1988]. Santos v. Acua, et al., 53 O.G. 358; Miranda v. Tiangco, et al., 96 Phil. 526. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 597 [1987]; People v. Adanes, 144 SCRA 364 [1986]; Tan Hong v. Paredes, 157 SCRA 694 [1988]; Alba v. Santander, 160 SCRA 8 [1988]. Immaculata v. Navarro, 160 SCRA 211 [1988] citing Rosales v. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495 [1913], Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca, 29 SCRA 1 [1969], Villegas v. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416 [1907]; SEE Fructo v. Fuentes, 15 Phil. 362 [1910], La Font v. Pascasio, 5 Phil. 391 [1905]. 29 SCRA 1 [1969] citing Asturias Sugar Central v. Pure Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 255 and Conejero v. CA, L-21812, April 29, 1966. 142 SCRA 82 [1986], at page 88, citing Asturias Sugar Central v. Pure Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 255 [1934], Villegas v. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416; Rosales v. Reyes, et al., 25 Phil. 495; Paez, et al. v. Magno, 46 O.G. p. 5425. Salvante v. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236 [1951] citing Del Rosario v. Sandico, 85 Phil. 170. Salvante v. Cruz, supra, citing 31 Am Jur. p. 362. Arzaga v. Rumbaoa, et al., 91 Phil. 499 [1952]; Salvante v. Cruz, supra. Comment of Private Respondents, p. 2; Rollo, p. 86.