The Media Take Center Stage

Zafarullah Khan Brian Joseph

Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 4, October 2008, pp. 32-37 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.0.0039

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v019/19.4.khan.html

Access provided by Lahore University of Management Sciences (31 May 2013 01:37 GMT)

Pakistan After Musharraf

the media take center stage

Zafarullah Khan and Brian Joseph

Zafarullah Khan is a former journalist and currently serves as executive director of the Centre for Civic Education, a nonprofit, nonpartisan civic-education and media-monitoring organization in Islamabad. Brian Joseph is director of South and Southeast Asia programs at the National Endowment for Democracy.

For the first time in Pakistans 61-year history, a vibrant, if not entirely

free, mass media played a central role in restoring elected civilian government after years of military rule. When General Pervez Musharraf ousted elected civilian premier Nawaz Sharif in 1999, and then for several years afterward, the Pakistani media world was dominated by the state-owned Pakistan Television Corporation and Radio Pakistan, plus a low-circulation but influential set of privately owned print newspapers and magazines. Following the liberalization of the electronic media sector in 2002, FM radio, satellite television, and local cable-TV operators flooded the market. During this time, Pakistan also witnessed the phenomenal growth of mobile-phone and, to a lesser degree, Internet usage. It was in this information-saturated environment that the nearly yearlong movement to restore democracy in Pakistan played out, starting with the 9 March 2007 sacking of Supreme Court chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry and running through the democratic oppositions victory in the 18 February 2008 elections. Although the emergence of independent broadcast media in Pakistan took place during Musharrafs time as presidentsomething that the General and his backers like to make much ofmedia liberalization is actually traceable to the mid-1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. According to Adnan Rehmat of the nonprofit NGO Internews Network, millions of Pakistanis tuned in to Indian satellite television for live coverage of the war in the absence of private [Pakistani] broadcast media and with state-owned TV and radio telling them virtually nothing of Pakistans military setbacks [in Kargil].1 Less than a year after the Kargil conflict,
Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 4 October 2008 2008 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

Zafarullah Khan and Brian Joseph

33

Minister for Information Javed Jabbar explained Pakistans intentions in liberalizing the electronic-media sector as an attempt to develop an indigenous capacity to counter increasing Indian propaganda.2 Within two years, Musharrafs military government had thrown open the door to privately owned and run television and radio. A decade later, the ramifications of this decision would make themselves felt in a way that Musharraf and his lieutenants seem scarcely to have anticipated. Aside from a vibrant print media, there are more than 40 TV channels (54 satellite-TV licenses have been issued); 50 FM radio stations (102 licenses issued); and 1,218 local cable-TV operators.3 The governmentcontrolled Pakistan Television (PTV) network has four channels, reaching nearly 90 percent of the country, while the 25 state-run radio stations, which broadcast in nineteen languages, have a countrywide reach. In addition, more than 80 million peopleabout half Pakistans total populationhave mobile phones. Nearly 20 million enjoy regular Internet access. Although Internet-based news remains a small part of the media landscape, during Musharrafs imposition of emergency rule from 3 November to 15 December 2007, when the government shut down most private TV and radio news programming, the Internet served as a lifeline for news and information. In addition, like others in Asia, Pakistanis are increasingly using mobile-phone text-messaging via Short Message Service (SMS) and other modern information technologies to stay informed and organized. The growing importance of the Internet and mobile phones became apparent as lawyers and other citizens organized in response to attacks on the judiciary and the imposition of the state of emergency. For example, one widely disseminated SMS message sent out on November 3 read, Suicide attack on the constitution, the judiciary, and media: The bomber survived, the victims died. Not only did this message reach millions directly despite government efforts to limit information, but newspapers and columnists around the country picked it up as well. Pakistanis also increasingly turned to social-networking sites and blogs to disseminate information. More than five-thousand people joined a Facebook group titled We Oppose Emergency in Pakistan, which included links to online petitions, up-to-date news reports, and video clips recorded by detained opposition leaders. An anonymous group of students launched a blog called The Emergency Times that quickly grew in popularity and provided daily citizen-generated reports and regular updates on the emergency situation.

Turmoil on Live TV
Although satellite TV and FM radio continued to extend their reach, only when Musharraf sacked Chief Justice Chaudhry did their importance reveal itself. As thousands of black-suited lawyers took to the streets in

34

Journal of Democracy

open defiance of Musharrafs increasingly autocratic rule, satellite TV was there to cover it. The harsh treatment of the lawyers coupled with the governments crude effort to control the judiciary quickly caught the publics attention as millions across the country for the first time watched live as citizens risked all to challenge the power of the state. As the highly telegenic lawyers movement spread, Musharrafs government found itself facing another challenge, this time from armed Islamists ensconced in the heart of Islamabad. When Musharraf ordered security forces to storm the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) on 3 July 2007, cameras were there, broadcasting live. The bloody, week-long drama showed not only private TVs increasingly central role, but also its inexperience and shortcomings. Early coverage focused on the unverified claims and inflammatory statements made by the Lal Masjid administration. Later, as security formations gathered, the tilt shifted toward legitimizing the troops pending assault on the mosque complex. The young TV stations and their crews had landed suddenly and unexpectedly on the frontlines of a violent struggle in the countrys capital, yet without the experience to cover the conflict adequately, or to put it into its social, economic, political, and cultural context. After a bomb attack killed more than 140 people during Benazir Bhuttos triumphant return to Karachi from exile on 18 October 2007, the government put limits on public rallies and processions, the traditional staples of Pakistani political campaigns. Unable to organize as many open-air public events as they had planned, the parties turned to the mediaand paid political advertisementsto get out their respective messages. Musharrafs November 3 declaration of a state of emergency came just a day before the Supreme Court was to rule on his eligibility to run for reelection as president. Private radio stations were silenced, and satellite-TV service was disrupted. The only TV station that was allowed to continue live broadcasts was the state-owned PTV. On December 27, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated while campaigning in Rawalpindi. The deaths of Bhutto and the other rally-goers killed with her not only horrified the nation and the world, but demonstrated the new role that satellite TV was playing in Pakistan, as millions tuned in to watch coverage of the assassination and the public mourning that followed. The media, interestingly including PTV and Radio Pakistan, provided extensive coverage of her assassination as well as largely positive retrospectives on her life and contributions to the cause of democracy in Pakistan. Among the first institutions to be targeted following the imposition of the emergency were the media and the courts.4 The Musharraf regime quickly amended its own March 2002 media law, known as the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) Ordinance, while the Commerce Ministry placed new import restrictions on satellite dishes and digital receivers. The new regulations forbade the publication of any material likely to jeopardize or be prejudicial to the ideology of Paki-

Zafarullah Khan and Brian Joseph

35

stan or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or any material that is likely to incite violence or hatred or create inter-faith disorder or be prejudicial to maintenance of law and order.5 The amended ordinance also made it illegal to discuss Supreme Court cases challenging the October electoral-college vote that had returned Musharraf to power; to broadcast live coverage of antigovernment protests; to report on attacks carried out by antigovernment militants; or to carry statements from or pictures of Islamist militants. Breaking the new law could have resulted in a three-year jail term, possibly combined with a fine of up to 10 million rupees (US$165,000), as well as the suspension of broadcasting licenses. During the first few days of the emergency, the four major news stations (GEO, ARY One World, Aaj TV, and Dawn News) and three international channels (CNN, BBC World, and Al-Jazeera) were taken off the air. Even after ending the emergency, the government continued to place press freedom under restriction. The regimes agent here was PEMRA, which further tightened controls, in part by banning live coverage of events related to the national elections. In mid-December 2007, PEMRA sent a letter warning private channels not to broadcast live reports from political rallies or live telephone call-in shows. PEMRA also introduced a Voluntary Code of Conduct that aimed to control content and coverage of political events. Although the new code was technically voluntary, no private station was allowed back on the air without agreeing to its terms. Private stations stood to lose vast sums from being off the air and being denied government advertising,6 and most signed the Code in fairly short order. The last holdout, GEO TV, caved in mid-January 2008. Among the casualties of the new PEMRA regulations were the many political talk shows that fostered debate and discussion on contemporary issues. According to a January 12 statement by the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, The [private TV] channels have been told [by the government] not to give any assignments to Aajs Nusrat Javed, GEOs Hamid Mir, Dr. Shahid Masood and Asma Chaudhry, ARYONE Worlds Kashif Abbasi, and Asma Sherazai. These popular anchors reappeared on their respective channels only after the February 18 national and provincial legislative elections. More disturbing still, journalism remained a dangerous profession in Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Federation of the Union of Journalists, in 2007, seven media workers were killed, thirteen were physically harmed, five were abducted or disappeared, and many received direct threats.

The February 2008 Elections

Despite the curbing of the media, the February 18 national elections were the first in Pakistans history to take place in the presence of so many electronic-media outlets, whose number now exceeded ninety. Al-

36

Journal of Democracy

though the state-run PTV devoted most of its airtime to Musharraf and his allies, the opposition parties received significantly better coverage on the private channels. The cumulative effect was, according to the European Union, that the media provided parties and candidates with the opportunity to explain their platforms, and elecWhen Musharraf sent tion administration activities were also out his agents to stop widely covered.7 press freedom, TV and In addition, political parties were using radio stations were more paid ads than ever. From 11 Decemthere to cover the asber 2007 to 17 February 2008, the Censault and ultimately to tre for Civic Education recorded 36,339 challenge and help unadvertisements carried on 38 television seat Musharraf himself. channels, all of them together costing an estimated US$8.6 million. Tellingly, only 13 percent of all party ads appeared on the state-run PTV; the remaining 87 percent went out via private stations. Each of the leading parties used paid ads. The print media, which reach a far smaller (albeit unusually influential) audience, did not face the same restrictions as the electronic media, and thus covered the elections with comparative freedom. A review of nine newspapers showed relatively balanced coverage. In addition, editorial and op-ed coverage was also spread fairly evenly among the major political forces, with considerable attention paid to the political parties as well as the electoral process itself.8 Overall, the tone and tenor of the campaign and the media coverage focused largely on domestic issues and highlighted the major political topicsthe return from exile of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto; the state of emergency; the judiciary, courts, and constitution; nuclear issues; the energy and economic crises; the war on terror; and jihad and the rise of terror attacks within Pakistan. The law of unintended consequences holds that actions always have side effects, often of an unlooked-for or unwanted sort. Musharrafs efforts first to promote the media, and then to bring it to heel, are perfect examples. In short, the newly liberalized electronic media, born out of the failures of the Pakistani press and the governments worries about the publics vulnerability to Indian propaganda as exposed during the brief spasm of fighting in the high and remote mountains of Kashmirs Kargil district, quickly took advantage of the new opportunities with which Musharraf had presented them. When he sent out his regimes agents in order to stop press freedom, it was precisely those same TV and radio stations that were there to cover the assault and ultimately to challenge and help unseat Musharraf himself. It was a sign of the times when, on 16 March 2007just a day after Musharrafs government had raided and attacked GEO TV in an effort

Zafarullah Khan and Brian Joseph

37

to stop its coverage of the growing lawyers movementMusharraf felt compelled to go on TV to apologize. I regret the attack on Geo TV by the police, he said.
I condemn it. I would like to assure the nation that one of the main strength[s] of my reform efforts is freedom of the press . . . . Protecting human rights is also my mandate. I condemn any violation of these freedoms.9

The development of new mass media in Pakistan, in particular satellite TV and FM radio, helped to weaken an increasingly authoritarian regime and proved to be one of the most significant developments in the restoration of elected civilian government in Pakistan. Over the course of the year leading up to the February 2008 elections, Pakistanis witnessed lawyers, civil society activists, and party workers struggling to actualize such staples of liberal democracy as the rule of law, judicial independence, and media freedomall on live television. Viewers also saw the ugly reality of a regime that would not shrink from attempts at the brutal suppression of dissent. In the end, the lesson is a hopeful one: Driven by his own authoritarian imperatives and interests, a dictator had unleashed a force for public transparency and accountability that he could not fully control, and democratic prospects improved as a result. 10 September 2008 NOTES
1. Intermedia, Pakistan Media Comes of Age Despite Rising Violence, Annual State of Pakistan Media Report, 200607. 2. The News (Ralawpindi), 5 March 2000. 3. These figures are from the Pakistani Finance Ministrys Economic Survey of Pakistan 200708, available at www.accountancy.com.pk/docs/economic-survey-pakistan-2007-0802.pdf. 4. Adnan Rehmat, Murder and Mayhem: The Worst Year Ever for Pakistani Media, available at www.intermedia.org.pk. 5. Quoted in Human Rights Watch, Pakistan: Media Restrictions Undermine Elections, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/02/16/pakist18088_txt.htm. 6. Emergency in Pakistan: Crisis Mission Rapid Assessment, January 2008, available at www.ifj.org and www.pfuj.info. 7. EU Election Observation Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Final Report, 2008, available at www.eueompakistan.org. 8. Centre for Civic Education, Watching the Watchdog: Media Monitoring Report 2008, available at www.civiceducation.org/publications.php. 9. See www.newssafety.com/hotspots/countries/pakistan/miscagencies/pakistan160307. htm.