Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Phil., G.R. no. 158540 Aug.

3, 2005

Facts: The case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For the respondent, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures and obedience to the law. The case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act 8800, the Safeguard Measure Act (SMA), which was one of laws enacted by congress soon after the Philippine ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on Gray Portland Cement in accordance with SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measures, the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports on Gray Portland Cement. On March 13, 2002, the Tariff Commission issued and recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of Gray Portland Cement. The DTI, after seeking the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission, in which the Secretary said NO under the SMA, the DTI Secretary then promulgated a decision wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, denying Philcemco rs application for safeguard measure. Philcemcor challenged the decision of the DTI Secretary by filling with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition mandatus seeking to set aside the DTIs decision as well as the Tariff Commissions r eport. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission and that the report is void. The Court of Appeals, 12th division (peened by Asso. Justice Elvi John Asuncion) partially granted Philcemcors petition. It ruled that: it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion; while it annulled the findings of the Tariff Commission. On June 23, 2003, SOUTHERN CROSS filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or nonexistence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. On June 25, 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a decision ruling that: in light of the Appellate Courts decision, there was no l onger any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measure. On July 7, 2003, Southern Cross filed with a Court very urgent application for a temporary restraining order and/or a writ o f preliminary injunction (TRO application) seeking to enjoin the DTI Secret ary from enforcing his decision dated June 25, 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court. Issues: * Whether the decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; * Assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether its decision is in accordance with law; and * Whether a temporary restraining order is warranted. Court Ruling:

* The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, the proper remedy under section 2 9 of the SMA being a petition for review with the CTA; * And that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative determination of the Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general safeguard measures, since section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff Commission made a positive and final determination before the DTI Secretary could impose these measures. Decision: * Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 5, 2003 was declared null and void. * The Court likewise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated June 25, 2003 rendered after the filling of this present petition. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs Aeronautics Board 270 SCRA 538 (1997) FACT: Grand Air applied a certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Chief Hearing Officer issued a notice of hearing directing Grand Air to hand out a copy of the application and notice to all scheduled Philippine Domestic operators. Grand Air filed its compliance and requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL filed a disagreement to the application on the ground that the CAB had no jurisdiction to hear the application until Grand Air obtains a franchise to activate from Congress. The Chief Hearing Officer denied the opposition and the CAB approved the issuance of the TOP for a period of 3 months. The opposition of the TOP was likewise denied. The CAB justified its supposition of jurisdiction over Grand Airs application on the basis of Republic Act 776 which gives it the precise power to issue any TOP or Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. ISSUE: WON the CAB can issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or TOP even though the prospective operator and does not have a legislative franchise HELD: YES, as mentioned by the CAB, it is duly authorized to do sounder Republic Act 776 and a legislative franchise is not necessary before it may do so, since Congress has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the CAB, an administrative agency. The delegation of such authority is not without limits since Congress had set specific standard and limitations on how such authority should be exercised. Public convenience and necessity exits when the proposed facility will meet a reasonable want to the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately afford. Thus, the Board, should be allowed to continue hearing the application, since it has jurisdiction over it provided that the applicant meets all the requirements of the law.

Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals *Facts A. A petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals. B. The Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) is the government agency tasked with the administration of the PAG-IBIG Fund created under P.D. No. 1530 intended for housing purposes to be sourced from voluntary contributions from its members. C. P.D. No. 1530 was amended by P.D. No. 1752 providing that membership in the fund is mandatory for all gainfully-employed Filipinos. D. P.D. No. 1530 was amended by R.A. No. 7742 providing that the coverage of the fund extends to all members of the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System, as well as their employers. Membership is voluntary for employees earning less than P4,000.00 a month. (pakibasa nalang yung rules and regulations nung HDMF J) E. The petitioner applied for renewal of its waiver from the fu nd coverage after it lapsed. The ground relied upon was superior retirement plan to that of fund. F. Petitioners application was disapproved o the ground that its retirement plan is not superior to that provided by the fun d. Petitioner was directed to register employees with the fund and to remit their monthly contributions together with the mandatory employers share. G. Petitioner appealed to the HDMF Board of Trustees but was denied. H. The petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review =denied. J. Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration contending that HDMF does not have the power to amend the implementing Rules and Regulations, and that the power to make laws does not necessarily include the power to alter or repeal the same.Also, HDMF as an administrative agency tasked to implement the law, its authority to promulgate implementing Rules does not include the power to amend or revise them. *Decision: Denied *Held: A. Its a doctrine of long-standing that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training knowledge of such agency. B. The grant of waiver or exemption from the coverage of fund is a privileged granted by the state, but it may be withdrawn by the state finding that the recipient is no longer entitled to it. C. The task determining whether such application should be granted is best discharged by the HDMF, not by the courts. D. The legislative power has been delegated generally as the power to make, alter, and repeal laws, but the legislature cannot foresee every contingency involved in a particular problem that it seeks to address. It becomes customary for it to delegate to instrumentalities of the executive department known as administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulation. In general, rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency, pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by law, have the force and effect, or partake of the nature, of a statute. E. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, this grant of express power to the HDMF to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter or repeal at the same.

Sultan Osop Camid vs. The Office of the President G.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005 Facts: The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. xxx The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao. President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power. After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents, despite t he fact that no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong since 1968. Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence, particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned municipality. Issue: Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-blown municipality Held: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Petitioners seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced. The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.

There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments. The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities. If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for the petitioner and likeminded persons to awaken to legal reality. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO G.R. NOS. 91223-26

Facts: In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner assumed office on on April 7, 1986. On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager, approved by the President on the same date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors. On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating him concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity. Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent. Issue: Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation. Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority Held: Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows: SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the

expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400) Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the Philippines when performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, as also happened in the case at bar. With these rulings, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).itc -asl In either case, the petitioners claim of security of tenure must be rejected. The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases. HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

NPC DAMA v. NPC FACTS: On June 8, 2001, RA No. 9136 was enacted, otherwise known as Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law). The latter was about privatization and restructuring power industry which is the National Power Industry. Under the EPIRA Law, a new set of board of directors was constituted and the members are: Sec. of Finance as Chairman, Sec. of Energy, Sec. of Budget, Sec. of Agriculture, Director General of the National Economic and Development, Sec. of Environment and Natural Resources, Sec. of DILG, Sec. of DTI Pres. of the National Power Corporation On Feb. 27, 2007, NPB passed Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, in accordance with EPIRA law, which provided the guidelines about the Separation Program, Selection and Placement of Personnel and other Separation benefit which mean that NPC employees shall be legally terminated. The Resolutions were not passed and Issued neither by the majority of the board members nor by a quorum. Only Sec. of DOE, Sec. of Dept. Budget and NPC OIC constituted the resolutions. The said members are not actually the one who executed the resolutions but rather their own respective representatives which was a violation of DELEGATED POWERS CANNOT BE FURTHER DELEGATED according to the Petitioners and which they filed a petition for Injunction against it. The Assailants countered that the act was still valid. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions No.2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted. HELD:

The Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT on the ground that they lack necessary numbers of votes for their adoption. The execution, by the representatives of the said members who constituted the Resolution, is without effect because of the violation of DELEGATED POWERS CANNOT BE FURTHER DELEGATED People V. Dacuycuy GR No. 45127 FACTS: several public school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for (1)lack of jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack of merit. The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Leyte. They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of Section 32 the following reasons: (1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment is left to the discretion of the court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670 particularly Section 32 is valid and constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of imprisonment. Too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it undue delegation of power of the legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard. If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of separation of powers but also the delegability of legislative powers. Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the municipal court where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34. Although Sec 32 was declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid. LINA VS. PURISIMA power to dispense rules * Lualhati Lina was a bookkeeperat PVB. * Petitioner files for mandamus to compel Cabanos (President of Phil. Veterans Bank) to restore Lina to her position. Lina claims she was removed from office by Cabanos who acted in gadalej. * It appeared from the annexes of the amended petition that Lina was dismissed by Cabanos pursuant to LOI # 13 / LOI # 19 for being notoriously undesirable. * The RTC dismissed the petition because: o Since the removal of Lina was pursuant to LOI issued by the President pursuant to Proclamation 1081, the validity or legality of said act is beyond the power of the courts to review, much less modify, or reverse. This is one of the express limitations upon the power of the Courts in GENERAL ORDER # 3 by President Marcos. o The General Order provides that the courts cannot rule upon the validity or legality of any decree order or act issued by President Marcos, pursuant to Proclamation 1081. SC: The petitioners right to redress is beyond dispute. When the RTC invoked General Order #3, it was nothing short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority. The judge was apparently unaware that the Court has always deemed General Order # 3 as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation 1081. There is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We make take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations. Also, the President has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the SC.

Thus, the RTC committed grave error in not taking jurisdiction over the case. Ordinarily, the case should be remanded to the judge to be tried on the merits. Yet, this Supreme Court, whose power and duty to do justice are inherent, plenary and imperative, extends to all instances where it appears that final resolution of the parties involved full opportunity to be heard. Thus, the SC may at its option, whenever it feels the best interest of justice would be thereby subserved, dispense with the usual procedure of remanding the case to the court of origin for its own judgment, and instead, the SC may already resolve the issues and rended the final judgment on the merits. SC reinstated Lina to work. MAGO V. JUDGE PEALOSA-FERMO A.M. NO. MTJ-08-1715, MARCH 19 2009 FACTS: Rodolfo Mago (Mago) filed before the MTC a complaint for GRAVE COERCION against Sheriff Angeles of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Sheriff Angeles filed a counter-charge for GRAVE THREATS against Mago and his sons. Mago alleged that MTC Judge Pealosa-Fermo (Judge) committed gross ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him. Hence, Mago filed the present administrative complaint. Magos position: (1) Instead of summoning Sheriff Angeles for a Preliminary Investigation, he received a complaint charging him and his sons with grave threats. (2) The GRAVE THREATS case against him is purely fabricated and the complainant in the said case was not Sheriff Angeles. Furthermore, the affidavits of the witnesses in the said case could not be found in the records of the MTC. (3) He and his witnesses attended the Preliminary Investigation of the GRAVE THREATS case against him, and even without the assistance of counsel, they were examined through a prepared set of questions handed to them by the stenographer. The Judge was not present then. (4) On JULY 20 or right after the preliminary investigation, he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for 3 days and released after he posted the P12,000 bail. (5) Arraignment was set beyond the period provided by the Rules. (6) Despite the filing a Petition for Certiorari questioning the order of the Judge in denying his motion to quash the information, the Judge continued to direct him to appear at the pre-trial/preliminary conference. (7) Judge was biased when hearing his case. Judges position: (1) In re 2nd position: Affidavits of the sheriffs witnesses were attached to the record. (2) In re 3rd position: Admitted. After a complaint is filed, Judge Fermo prepares her questions for preliminary examination based on the affidavits of the complaining witness and counter affidavits of the accused. This is done to make it easy for the Stenographers to take/print the transcript of the proceedings. Some witnesses even ask to read/study the question and request that they write down their answers to the questions for the Stenographers to finalize. This is a convenient procedure which makes it easier for the Stenographers and the witnesses considering the cramped office space. After the witnesses are briefed, the stenographers take over since the prepared sheets are given to them so they could propound the questions and the answers are typed directly. (3) In re 4th position: The PI was on JULY 19 not July 20. It was on July 20 that she found probable cause and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. According to the Warrant Officers Return of Service, Mago was arrested on JULY 21. (4) In re 5th position: Admitted. The clerk might have overlooked it. However, when the arraignment was scheduled, Magos counsel opposed it and filed a motion which resulted in the resetting of the arraignment. (5) In re 6th position: The petition was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. (6) In re 7th position: Prior to the filing of the complaints, she did not know any of them. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) held Judge administratively liable for her unfamiliarity with the rules on Preliminary Investigation. It was an irregularity and the Judge should not have allowed the Stenographer to handle the latter part of the proceedings. The Judge should have personally taken charge of the entire proceedings since the power to conduct Preliminary Investigations vests only on the Judge, not on the stenographer. She was fined P20,000 since it was only her first offense. The Court, on the recommendation of the OCA, re-docketed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Fermo can delegate to the Stenographer the conduct of the Preliminary Investigation. HELD: NO. PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT of Rules 112 and 114,1 MTC judges were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they exercised discretion in determining whether there was probable cause to summon the respondent into court. An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed competent to exercise that discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. Then, as now, a PERSONAL EXAMINATION of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Under Rule 112 BEFORE its amendment, the Investigating Fiscal was required to certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses. By the Judges delegation of the examination of the sher iffcomplainant in the GRAVE THREATS case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to read/study the written questions to be propounded to them and to write their answers to avoid inconvenience, Judge betrayed her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system.

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) vs. NLRC 198 SCRA 586 (1991)

Facts: The union known as Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM) said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the significant distortion in the workers' wages.

In that demand, the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727 which reads as follows: Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission having jurisdiction over the workplace. It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide any dispute arising under this Section within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it for arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of the increase in the wage rates prescribed under this Section.

Issue: Whether or not the strike is legal in the resolution of wage distortion.

Ruling: The strike involving the issue of wage distortion is illegal as a means of resolving it. The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefore. It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue.

The provision states that the employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration. In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such distortions. Any dispute arising there from shall be settled through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or Wage Order.

The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout."

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators, petitioners, Vs. Philippine Coconut Authority, respondents G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, writ of preliminary injunction, while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued a Resolution for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines for not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. ISSUES: At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business. HELD: The petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. The President Aquino approved the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA. In the first place, it could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which setup the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority. Rabor v. CSCFacts:Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. Heentered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, an offici al in the Office of the Mayor of DavaoCity, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he hadalready more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS certificate witha notation to the effect that his service is extended fo r him to complete the 15 -years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government wrote to theRegional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City informingthe latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what action should be takeno n R a b o r s c a s e . D i r e c t o r C a w a r d r e p l i e d b y s a y i n g t h a t R a b o r s c o n t i n u e d e mployment is contrary to OP M.C. No. 65 hence, it is nonextendible. MayorDuterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawads letter and order him n o t t o w o r k anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for extension of his job until he completedthe 15-year requirement but was denied. Rabor then asked OP for an extension. Hisrequest was referred by OP to CSC and thereafter CSC denied Rabors request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Raborreiterated his request to Mayor Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition.Issue:WON Rabor request for extension should be granted in view of Cena caseHeld:N o . C e n a d o c t r i n e o v e r t u r n e d . I n C e n a v . C S C , t h e C o u r t r e a c h e d i t s conclusio n primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11(b) of P.D. No. 1146. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualifiedterms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances

which prescribelimitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who hasreached sixty-five (65) years of age. These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and OPM . C . N o . 6 5 . T h e C o u r t r e s o l v e d t h e c h a l l e n g e s p o s e d b y t h e a b o v e t w o ( 2 ) a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s b y , f i r s t l y , c o n s i d e r i n g a s i n v a l i d C i v i l S e r v i c e Memorand um No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e C o u r t n o w r u l e d t h a t t h e S C i n C e n a m a d e a n a r r o w i n t e r p r e t ation. It is incorrect to decide the issue on the basis only of PD 1146.Reading the pertinent provisions the Admin Code particularly the provisionsgoverning t h e C S C , i t i s c l e a r t h a t b o t h t h e A d m i n C o d e a n d P D 1 1 4 6 a r e t h e governing laws relating to retirement of government officials and employees. It wason the basis of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doingso, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the governmente m p o w e r e d t o p r o m u l g a t e p o l i c i e s , s t a n d a r d s a n d g u i d e l i n e s f o r e f f i c i e n t , responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." It was alsodischarging its function of "administering the retirement program for governmentofficials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement." It isalso incorrect to say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or

is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beingsare in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expectedfrom individual persons.CSC Memo No. 27 is not invalid for having gone beyond the parameters setby PD 1146. In fact what the legislature intends is that the CSC should fill in the details in the implementation of PD 1146