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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOP CS N C ! L LA"


Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOP C# REQU REMENTS FOR T$E !AL D TY OF MARR A%E &1'(') 1''*) 1''+) 1''3) 1'',) 1''-) 1''.) 1''() 1''') +**+/ I What is the status of the following marriages and why? A. B. !. $. '. A A A A A marriage marriage marriage marriage marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent. between two 21-year olds without parental ad ice. between two "ilipino first cousins in #pain where such marriage is alid. between two "ilipinos in %ong &ong before a notary public. solemni(ed by a town mayor three towns away from his )urisdiction. *1999+

ANS"ERS# A. ,he marriage is oidable. ,he consent of the parties to the marriage was defecti e. Being below 21 years old- the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. ,he consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its alidity. B. Between 21-year olds- the marriage is alid despite the absence of parental ad icebecause such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal re.uisite /i.e.- the marriage license0and does not affect the alidity of the marriage itself. ,his is without pre)udice to the ci il- criminal- or administrati e liability of the party responsible therefore. !. By reason of public policy- the marriage between "ilipino first cousins is oid 1Art. 23- par. *1+- "!4- and the fact that it is considered a alid marriage in a foreign country in this case- #pain0 does not alidate it- being an e5ception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said !ode which accords alidity to all marriages solemni(ed outside the 7hilippines 5 5 5 and alid there as such. $. It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is alid under %ong &ong law- the marriage is alid in the 7hilippines. 8therwise- the marriage that is in alid in %ong &ong will be in alid in the 7hilippines. '. 9nder the :ocal ;o ernment !ode- a town mayor may alidly solemni(e a marriage but said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the e5ercise by a town mayor of such authority. %owe er- by analogy- with the authority of members of the )udiciary to solemni(e a marriage- it would seem that the mayor did not ha e the re.uisite authority to solemni(e a marriage outside of his territorial )urisdiction. %ence- the marriage is oid- unless it was contracted with either or both parties belie ing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemni(e this particular marriage 1Art. 2<- par. *2+- "!4.

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ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# !. ,he marriage is oid. 9nder Article 26 of the "amily !ode- a marriage alid where celebrated is alid in the 7hilippines e5cept those marriages enumerated in said Article which marriages will remain oid e en though alid where solemni(ed. ,he marriage between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein- hence- it is oid e en though alid in #pain where it was celebrated. $. If the two "ilipinos belie ed in good faith that the =otary 7ublic is authori(ed to solemni(e marriage- then the marriage is alid. '. ,he marriage is alid. 9nder the :ocal ;o ernment !ode- the authority of a mayor to solemni(e marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority e en outside the territory thereof. %ence- the marriage he solemni(ed outside his municipality is alid. And e en assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality- such marriage will-

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ne ertheless- be alid because solemni(ing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy- 2<9 #!>A 129. In this case- the #upreme !ourt held that the celebration by a )udge of a marriage outside the )urisdiction of his court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the alidity of the marriage notwithstanding Article ? of the "amily !ode which pro ides that an incumbent member of the )udiciary is authori(ed to solemni(e marriages only within the court@s )urisdiction. OT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# !. By reason of Article 1< in relation to Article 23 of the !i il !ode- which applies to "ilipinos where er they are- the marriage is oid. '. ,he marriage is oid because the mayor has no authority to solemni(e marriage outside his )urisdiction. II 8n Aalentine@s $ay- 1996- 'lias and "ely- both single and 2< years of age- went to the city hall where they sought out a fi5er to help them obtain a .uicBie marriage. "or a fee- the fi5er produced an ante-dated marriage license for them- issued by the !i il >egistrar of a small remote municipality. %e then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall- and the latter solemni(ed their marriage right there and then. A. Is their marriage alid- oid- or oidable? B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was spurious? '5plain. *1996+ ANS"ERS# A. ,he marriage is alid. ,he irregularity in the issuance of a alid license does not ad ersely affect the alidity of the marriage. ,he marriage license is alid because it was in fact issued by a !i il >egistrar *Arts. 2 and C- "!+. B. =o- the answer would not be the same. ,he marriage would be oid because of the absence of a formal re.uisite. In such a case- there was actually no alid marriage license. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the solemni(ing officer- the marriage is alid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and both of them were aware of the fact- the marriage is oid. ,hey cannot claim good faith in belie ing that the solemni(ing officer was authori(ed because the scope of the authority of the solemni(ing officer is a matter of law. If- howe er- one of the parties belie ed in good faith that the other was a member of the sect- then the marriage is alid under Article 2<*2+- "!. In that case- the party in good faith is acting under a mistaBe of fact- not a mistaBe of law. TOP C# PROPERTY RELAT ONS 0ET"EEN $US0AND AND " FE &1'(') 1''+) 1'',) 1''3) 1''() +***/ I In 19?2- Dauricio- a "ilipino pensioner of the 9.#. ;o ernment- contracted a bigamous marriage with 'rlinda- despite the fact that his first wife- !arol- was still li ing. In 19?<- Dauricio and 'rlinda )ointly bought a parcel of >iceland- with the title being placed )ointly in their names. #hortly thereafter- they purchased another property *a house and lot+ which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1931- Dauricio died- and !arol promptly filed an action against 'rlinda to reco er both the >iceland and the house and lot- claiming them to be con)ugal property of the first marriage. 'rlinda contends that she and the late Dauricio were co-owners of the >icelandE and with respect to the house and lot- she claims she is the e5clusi e owner. Assuming she fails to pro e that she had actually used her own money in either purchase- how do you decide the case? *1993+ ANS"ER#

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!arol@s action to reco er both the >iceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are con)ugal property in iew of the failure of 'rlinda- the wife in a bigamous marriage- to pro e that her own money was used in the purchases made. ,he #upreme !ourt in a case applied Art. 1C3"amily !ode- despite the fact that the husband@s death tooB place prior to the effecti ity of said law. %owe er- e en under Art. 1CC- !i il !ode- the same conclusion would ha e been reached in iew of the bigamous nature of the second marriage. ANOT$ER ANS"ER# 9nder Art. 1C3 of the "!- which applies to bigamous marriages- only the properties ac.uired by both parties through their actual )oint contribution of money- property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respecti e contributions. Doreo er- if one of the parties is alidly married to another- his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute communityFcon)ugal partnership e5isting in such alid marriage. ,hus- in this case- since 'rlinda failed to pro e that she used her own money to buy the >iceland and house and lot- she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the >iceland nor the e5clusi e owner of the house and lot. #uch properties are Dauricio@s. And since his share accrues to the con)ugal partnership with carol- !arol can alidly claim such properties to the e5clusion of 'rlinda *Art. 1CC- !i il !ode+. II In 19?G- Bob and Issa got married without e5ecuting a marriage settlement. In 19?<- Bob inherited from his father a residential lot upon which- in 1931- he constructed a two-room bungalow with sa ings from his own earnings. At that time- the lot was worth 73GG-GGG while the house- when finished cost 76GG-GGG. In 1939- Bob died- sur i ed only by his wife- Issa and his mother- #ofia. Assuming that the relati e alues of both assets remained at the same proportionH A. #tate whether #ofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not con)ugal but e5clusi e property of her deceased son. B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 2- 1933? *1993+ ANS"ERS# A. #ince Bob and Issa got married in 19?G- then the law that go erns is the =ew !i il !ode *7ersons+- in which case- the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of the spouses is the system of relati e community or con)ugal partnership of gains *Art. 119- !i il !ode+. By con)ugal partnership of gains- the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their worB or industry *Article 1C2- !i il !ode+. In this instance- the lot inherited by Bob in 19?< is his own separate property- he ha ing ac.uired the same by lucrati e title *Art. 1C3- par. 2- !i il !ode+. %owe er- the house constructed from his own sa ings in 1931 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is con)ugal property and not e5clusi e property in accordance with the principle of Ire erse accessionJ pro ided for in Art. 1<3!i il !ode. B. Kes- the answer would still be the same. #ince Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way bacB in 19?G- then the property relations that will go ern is still the relati e community or con)ugal partnership of gains *Art. 119- !i il !ode+. It will not matter if Bob died before or after August 21933 *effecti ity of the "amily !ode+- what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way bacB in 19?G- the property relation that go erns them is still the con)ugal partnership of gains. *Art. 1<3- !i il !ode+ ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# A. #ofia- being her deceased son@s legal heir concurring with his sur i ing spouse *Arts. 93<936- and 99?- !i il !ode+- may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not con)ugal but belong to the hereditary estate of Bob- the alue of the land being more than the cost of the impro ement *Art. 12G- "!+. B. If Bob died before August 2- 1933- which is the date the "amily !ode tooB effect- the answer will not be the same. Art. 1<3- !i il !ode- would then apply. ,he land would then be deemed con)ugal- along with the house- since con)ugal funds were used in constructing it. ,he husband@s estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the alue of the land from con)ugal partnership funds.

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III "or fi e years since 1939- ,ony- a banB ice-president- and #usan- an entertainer- li e together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to marry each other. #ince ,ony@s salary was more than enough for their needs- #usan stopped worBing and merely IBept the houseJ. $uring that period- ,ony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdi ision. %owe er- after fi e years- ,ony and #usan decided to separate. A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot? B. Would it maBe any difference if ,ony could not marry #usan because he was pre iously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? *2GGG+ ANS"ERS# A. ,ony and #usan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in e.ual shares. 9nder Article 1C? of the "amily !ode- when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other li ed e5clusi ely with each other as husband and wife- the property ac.uired during their cohabitation are presumed to ha e been obtained by their )oint efforts - worB or industry and shall be owned by then in e.ual shares. ,his is true e en though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household. B. Kes- it would maBe a difference. 9nder Article 1C3 of the "amily !ode- when the parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment- only those properties ac.uired by both of them through their actual )oint contribution of money- property- or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respecti e contributions. ,he efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered ade.uate contribution in the ac.uisition of the properties. #ince #usan did not contribute to the ac.uisition of the house and lot- she has no share therein. If ,ony cohabited with #usan after his legal separation from Alice- the house and lot is his e5clusi e property. If he cohabited with #usan before his legal separation from Alice- the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice. IA :uis and >i((a- both 26 years of age and single- li e e5clusi ely with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. :uis is gainfully employed. >i((a is not employed- stays at home- and taBes charge of the household chores. After li ing together for a little o er twenty years- :uis was able to sa e from his salary earnings during that period the amount of 72GG-GGG presently deposited in a banB. A house and lot worth 7<GG-GGG was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. 8f the 7<GG-GGG used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property- 72GG-GGG had come from the sale of palay har ested from the hacienda owned by :uis and 72GG-GGG from the rentals of a building belonging to >i((a. In fine- the sum of 7<GG-GGG had been part of the fruits recei ed during the period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth 71GG-GGG being used by the common-law spouses- was donated )ust months ago to >i((a by her parents. :uis and >i((a now decide to terminate their cohabitation- and they asB you to gi e them your legal ad ice on the followingH A. %ow- under the law- should the banB deposit of 72GG-GGG- the house and lot alued at 7<GG-GGG and the car worth 71GG-GGG be allocated to them? B. What would your answer be *to the abo e .uestion+ had :uis and >i((a been li ing together all the time- i.e.- since twenty years ago- under a alid marriage? *199?+ ANS"ERS# A. Art. 1C? of the "! pro ides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other- li e e5clusi ely with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a oid marriage- their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in e.ual shares and the property ac.uired by both of them through their worB or industry shall be go erned by the rules of co-ownership.

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In the absence of proof to the contrary- properties ac.uired while they li ed together shall be presumed to ha e been obtained by their )oint efforts- worB or industry- and shall be owned by them in e.ual shares. A party who did not participate in the ac.uisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to ha e contributed )ointly in the ac.uisition thereof if the former@s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. ,husH 1+ ,he wages and salaries of :uis in the amount of 72GG-GGG shall be di ided e.ually between :uis and >i((a. 2+ ,he house and lot alued at 7<GG-GGG ha ing been ac.uired by both of them through worB or industry shall be di ided between them in proportion to their respecti e contribution- in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. %ence- :uis gets 2F< while >i((a gets 2F< of 7<GG-GGG. 2+ ,he car worth 71GG-GGG shall be e5clusi ely owned by >i((a- the same ha ing been donated to her by her parents. B. ,he property relations between :uis and >i((a- their marriage ha ing been celebrated 2G years ago *under the !i il !ode+ shall be go erned by the con)ugal partnership of gains- under which the husband and wife place in common fund the proceeds- products- fruits and income from their separate properties and those ac.uired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance- and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership- the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be di ided e.ually between them *Art. 1C2- !i il !ode+. ,husH 1+ ,he salary of :uis deposited in the banB in the amount of 72GG-GGG and the house and lot alued at 7<GG-GGG shall be di ided e.ually between :uis and >i((a. 2+ %owe er- the car worth 71GG-GGG donated to >i((a by her parents shall be considered to her own paraphernal property- ha ing been ac.uired by lucrati e title *par.2Art.1C3- !i il !ode+ TOP C# ADOPT ON &1'(') 1''-) 1''() +***) +**1/ I #ometime in 199G- #arah- born a "ilipino but by then a naturali(ed American citi(en- and her American husband ,om- filed a petition in the >,! of DaBati- for the adoption of the minor child of her sister- a "ilipina. !an the petition be granted? *2GGG+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# It depends. If ,om and #arah ha e been residing in the 7hilippines for at least 2 years prior to the effecti ity of >A 3<<2- the petition may be granted. 8therwise- the petition cannot be granted because the American husband is not .ualified to adopt. While the petition for adoption was filed in 199G- it was considered refiled upon the effecti ity of >A 3<<2- the $omestic Adoption Act of 1993. ,his is the law applicable- the petition being still pending with the lower court. 9nder the Act- #arah and ,om must adopt )ointly because they do not fall in any of the e5ceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt )ointly- the #upreme !ourt has held in a line of cases that both of them must be .ualified to adopt. While #arah- an alien- is .ualified to adopt under #ection ?*b+*i+ of the Act for being a former "ilipino citi(en who seeBs to adopt a relati e within the Cth degree of consanguinity or affinity- ,om- an alien is not .ualified because he is neither a former "ilipino citi(en nor married to a "ilipino. 8ne of them not being .ualified to adopt- their petition has to be denied. %owe er- if they ha e been residents of the 7hilippines three years prior to the effecti ity of the Act and continues to reside here until the decree of adoption is entered- they are .ualified to adopt the nephew of #arah under #ection ?*b+ thereof- and the petition may be granted. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# #ince the petition was filed before the effecti ity of the $omestic Adoption Act of 1993the "amily !ode is the law applicable. 9nder the "!- #arah and ,om must adopt )ointly because they do not fall in any of the e5ceptions where one may adopt alone. 9nder a long line of cases decided by the #upreme !ourtwhen husband and wife must adopt )ointly- both of them must be .ualified to adopt. While #arah is

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.ualified to adopt under Article 13C*2+*a+ for being a former "ilipino citi(en who seeBs to adopt a relati e by consanguinity- ,om is not. %e is not a former "ilipino citi(en and neither is he married to a "ilipino. 8ne of them not being .ualified to adopt- the petition must be denied. TOP C# DECLARAT ON OF NULL TY ANNULMENT &14o5nds) de6la4ations and e22e6ts/ &1''1) 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) +**+/ LE%AL SEPARAT ON &14o5nds and e22e6ts/ &1'(') 1'',) 1''-) 1''.) +**+/ I Bert and Baby were married to each other on $ecember 22- 1933. #i5 months later- she disco ered that he was a drug addict. 'fforts to ha e him rehabilitated were unsuccessful. !an Baby asB for annulment of marriage- or legal separation? '5plain. *1996+ ANS"ER# =o- Baby cannot asB for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation because both these actions ha e already prescribed. While concealment of drug addiction e5isting at the time of marriage constitutes fraud under Art. C6 of the "! which maBes the marriage oidable under Art. C< of the "!- the action must- howe er- be brought within < years from the disco ery thereof under Article C?*2+- "!. #ince the drug addiction of Bert was disco ered by Baby in Lune 1939- the action had already prescribed in Lune of 199C. Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. <<*<+ and Art. <? of the "! re.uires that the action must be brought within < years from the occurrence of the cause. #ince Bert had been a drug addict from the time of the celebration of the marriage- the action for legal separation must ha e been brought not later than 22 $ecember 1992. %ence- Baby cannot- nowbring action for legal separation. II A. ;i e a brief definition or e5planation of the term Mpsychological incapacityM as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. B. If e5isting at the inception of marriage- would the state of being of unsound mind or the concealment of drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- homose5uality or lesbianism be considered indicia of psychological incapacity? '5plain. !. If drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality should occur only during the marriage- would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation- or would they render the marriage oidable? *2GG2+ ANS"ERS# A. M7sychological incapacityM is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of lo erespect- cohabitation- mutual help and support- trust and commitment. It must be characteri(ed by )uridical antecedence- gra ity and incurability and its root causes must be clinically identified or e5amined. *Santos v. CA- 2CG #!>A 2G 199<4+ B. ln the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals- 2CG #!>A 2G *199<+- the #upreme !ourt held that being of unsound mind- drug addiction- habituaI alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality may be indicia of psychological incapacity- depending on the degree of se erity of the disorder. %owe erthe concealment of drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality is a ground for annulment of marriage. !. ln accordance with law- if drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality should occur only during the marriage- theyH 1+ Will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity *Art 26- "amily !ode+E 2+ Will constitute as grounds for legal separation *Art. <<- "!+E and 2+ Will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage oidable *Art. C< and C6- "!+.

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III !adio and !orona contracted marriage on Lune 1- 1932. A few days after the marriage- !orona disco ered that !adio was a homose5ual. As homose5uality was not a ground for legal separation under the !i il !ode- there was nothing that !orona could do but bear with her problem. ,he couple- howe er- started to li e separately. With the enactment of the "amily !ode- !orona decided to be legally separated from !adio based on the new ground of homose5uality. !orona brought her action for legal separation on #eptember 1<- 1933. Will the action prosper? ;i e your reasons. *1939+ ANS"ER# Kes- the action will prosper because the IcauseJ arose only on August 2- 1933- the effecti ity of the "amily !ode- and the action had not yet prescribed. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# ,he action will prosper. ,he offense of homose5uality as a continuing offense can be a ground for legal separation. ,he prescripti e period of fi e years will apply only when the offense has a fi5ed period of time and- therefore- the date of its occurrence can be computed.

Property
TOP C# USUFRUCT N %ENERAL) R %$TS AND O0L %AT ONS OF T$E USUFRUCTUARY AND E7T N%U S$MENT OF T$E USUFRUCT &1'(') 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''(/ I 8n 1 Lanuary 193G- Diner a- the owner of a building- granted 7etronila a usufruct o er the property until G1 Lune 1993 when Danuel- a son of 7etronila- would ha e reached his 2Gth birthday. Danuel- howe er- died on 1 Lune 199G when he was only 26 years old. Diner a notified 7etronila that the usufruct had been e5tinguished by the death of Danuel and demanded that the latter acate the premises and deli er the same to the former. 7etronila refused to acate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her fa or would e5pire only on 1 Lune 1993 when Danuel would ha e reached his 2G th birthday and that the death of Danuel did not e5tinguish the usufruct. Whose contention should be accepted? *199?+ ANS"ER# 7etronila@s contention is correct. 9nder Article 6G6 of the !i il !ode- a usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall subsist for the number of years specified e en if the third person should die unless there is an e5press stipulation in the contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar- there is no e5press stipulation that the consideration for the usufruct is the e5istence of 7etronila@s son. ,hus- the general rule and not the e5ception should apply in this case. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# ,his is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Danuel until he reaches 2G years of age- with 7etronila ser ing only as a conduit- holding the property in trust for his benefit. ,he death of Danuel at the age of 26- therefore- terminated the usufruct. TOP C# R %$T OF ACCESS ON &1'(') 1''+) +***) +**1/ I $emetrio Bnew that a piece of land bordering the beach belonged to 'rnesto. %owe ersince the latter was studying in 'urope and no one was taBing care of the land- $emetrio occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with tables and benches which he rented out to people who wanted to ha e a picnic by the beach. When 'rnesto returned- he demanded the return of the land. $emetrio agreed to do so after he has remo ed the nipa sheds. 'rnesto refused to let

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$emetrio remo e the nipa sheds on the ground that these already belonged to him by right of accession. Who is correct? *2GGG+ ANS"ER# 'rnesto is correct. $emetrio is a builder in bad faith because he Bnew beforehand that the land belonged to $emetrio. 9nder Art. CC9 of the =!!- one who builds on the land of another loses what is built without right to indemnity. 'rnesto becomes the owner of the nipa sheds by right of accession. %ence- 'rnesto is well within his right in refusing to allow the remo al of the nipa sheds. II #ubse.uent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a ri er- its area was increased by accession. ,his additional area was not included in the technical description appearing on the ,orrens !ertificate of ,itle ha ing been ac.uired subse.uent to the registration proceedings. Day such additional area be ac.uired by third persons thru prescription? ;i e your reasons. *1939+ ANS"ER# ,he :and >egistration :aw pro ides that no title in derogation of the registered owner may be ac.uired by ad erse possession or ac.uisiti e prescription. #ince the law refers to registered lands- the accession mentioned in this .uestion may be ac.uired by a third person through ad erse possession or ac.uisiti e prescription. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# If the accession is man made- then it cannot be considered as pri ate property. It belongs to the public domain- and- therefore- cannot be ac.uired by ad erse possession or ac.uisiti e prescription. TOP C# 0U LDER N %OOD FA T$ &1''+) 1''') +***) +**1/ I Bartolome constructed a chapel on the land of 'ric. What are Bartolome@s rights if he wereH A. A possessor of the land in good faith? B. A possessor of the land in bad faith? !. A usufructuary of the land? $. A lessee of the land? *1996+ ANS"ERS# A. A chapel is a useful impro ement. Bartolome may remo e the chapel if it can be remo ed without damage to the land- unless 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel. In the latter caseBartolome has the right to the reimbursement of the alue of the chapel with right of retention until he is reimbursed. *Art. CC3 in relation to Art. <C6 and <C?- =!!+. B. !. Bartolome- under Art. CC9 of the =!!- loses whate er he built- without any right to indemnity. Bartolome has the right to remo e the impro ement if it is possible to do so without causing damage to the property *Art. <?9- =!!+. %e may also set off the impro ement against any damages which the property held in usufruct suffered because of his act or the acts of his assignee. *Art. <3G- =!!+ ,he owner of the land- as lessor- can ac.uire the impro ement by paying for one-half of its alue. #hould the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount- the lessee may remo e the impro ement- e en though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby *Art. 16?3- =!!+.

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ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# A. Assuming that 'ric acted in good faith- Bartolome@s rights will depend upon what option 'ric chooses. 'ric- the owner of the land- may choose to ac.uire the chapel- which is a useful e5pense or to sell the land to the builder *Bartolome+.

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


If 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel- he has the right to reimbursement for useful e5penses- with a right of retention until paid. If 'ric chooses to sell the land to Bartolome- Bartolome may refuse to buy the land if the alue of the land is considerably more than the alue of the building- in which casethere will be a forced lease between them. It is the owner of the land who has the right to ac.uire the chapel without paying indemnity- plus damages- or to re.uire Bartolome to remo e the chapel- plus damages or to re.uire Bartolome to buy the land- without any option to refuse to buy it. *Arts. CC9 and C<3- =!!+ If 'ric acted in bad faith- then his bad faith cancels the bad faith of Bartolome- and both will be taBen to ha e acted in good faith. *Art. C<2- =!!+

CIVIL LAW

B.

ADD T ONAL ANS"ER# A. If 'ric acted in good faith- then Bartolome has the right of absolute remo al of the chapelplus damages. %owe er- if 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel- then Bartolome has the right to reimbursement- plus payment of damages- with right of retention *Art. C<C in relation to Art. CC?- =!!+ II DiBe built a house on his lot in 7asay !ity. ,wo years later- a sur ey disclosed that a portion of the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Lose- to the e5tent of CG s.uare meters. Lose claims that DiBe is a builder in bad faith because he should Bnow the boundaries of his lot- and demands that the portion of the house which encroached on his land should be destroyed or remo ed. DiBe replies that he is a builder in good faith and offers to buy the land occupied by the building instead. A. Is DiBe a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why? B. Whose preference should be followed? Why? *2GG1+ ANS"ERS# A. Kes- DiBe is a builder in good faith. ,here is no showing that when he built his house- he Bnew that a portion thereof encroached on Lose@s lot. 9nless one is ersed in the science of sur eying- he cannot determine the precise boundaries or location of his property by merely e5amining is title. In the absence of contrary proof- the law presumes that the encroachment was done in good faith 1Technogas Phils. vs. CA, 263 #!>A <- 1< *199?+4 B. =one of the preferences should be followed. ,he preference of DiBe cannot pre ail because under Art. CC3 of the !!- it is the owner of the land who has the option or choice- not the builder. 8n the other hand- the option belongs to Lose- he cannot demand that the portion of the house encroaching on his land be destroyed or remo ed because this is not one of the options gi en by law to the owner of the land. ,he owner may choose between the appropriation of what was built after payment of indemnity- or to compel the builder to pay for the land of the alue of the land is not considerably more than that of the building. 8therwise- the builder shall pay rent for the portion of the land encroached. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# A. DiBe cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he built his house without first determining the corners and boundaries of his lot to maBe sure that his construction was within the perimeter of his property. %e could ha e done this with the help of a geodetic engineer as an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do under the circumstances. B. Lose@ s preference should be followed. %e may ha e the building remo ed at the e5pense of DiBe- appropriate the building as his own- oblige DiBe to buy the land and asB for damages in addition to any of the three options. *Arts. CC9- C<G- C<1- !!+ TOP C# EASEMENT &CONCEPT) K NDS) AND EFFECTS/ & 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) +***) +**1) +**+/ I :auro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. %ernando owns an ad)acent land de oted to his piggery business- which is two *2+ meters higher in ele ation. Although %ernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery- it is inade.uate to contain the

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waste water containing pig manure- and it often o erflows and inundates :auroNs plantation. ,his has increased the acidity of the soil in the plantation- causing the trees to wither and die. :auro sues for damages caused to his plantation. %ernando in oBes his right to the benefit of a natural easement in fa or of his higher estate- which imposes upon the lower estate of :auro the obligation to recei e the waters descending from the higher estate. Is %ernando correct? *2GG2+ ANS"ER# %ernando is wrong. It is true that :auro@s land is burdened with the natural easement to accept or recei e the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends from a higher estate to a lower estate. %owe er- %ernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to :auroNs land. %ernando has- thus interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. 9nder Art. 69? of the !!- abatement of a nuisance does not preclude reco ery of damages by :auro e en for the past e5istence of a nuisance. ,he claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191 *C+ of the !!. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# %ernando is not correct. Article 62? of the =ew !i il !ode pro ides that the owner of the higher estate cannot maBe worBs which will increase the burden on the ser ient estate. * Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA- 22G #!>A 1C< 12GGG4+. ,he owner of the higher estate may be compelled to pay damages to the owner of the lower estate. II 'mma bought a parcel of land from '.uitable-7!I BanB- which ac.uired the same from "elisa- the original owner. ,hereafter- 'mma disco ered that "elisa had granted a right of way o er the land in fa or of the land of ;eorgina- which had no outlet to a public highway- but the easement was not annotated when the ser ient estate was registered under the ,orrens system. 'mma then filed a complaint for cancellation of the right of way- on the ground that it had been e5tinguished by such failure to annotate. %ow would you decide the contro ersy? *2GG1+ ANS"ER# ,he complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way must fail. ,he failure to annotate the easement upon the title of the ser ient estate is not among the grounds for e5tinguishing an easement under Art. 621 of the !i il !ode. 9nder Art. 61?- easements are inseparable from the estate to which they acti ely or passi ely belong. 8nce it attaches- it can only be e5tinguished under Art. 621- and they e5ist e en if they are not stated or annotated as an encumbrance on the ,orrens title of the ser ient estate. *II ,olentino 226- 193? ed.+ ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# 9nder #ection CC- 7$ =o. 1<29- e ery registered owner recei ing a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration- and e ery subse.uent innocent purchaser for alue- shall hold the same free from all encumbrances e5cept those noted on said certificate. ,his rule- howe eradmits of e5ceptions. 9nder Act C96- as amended by Act =o. 2G11- and #ection C- Act 2621- an easement if not registered shall remain and shall be held to pass with the land until cut-off or e5tinguished by the registration of the ser ient estate. %owe er- this pro ision has been suppressed in #ection CC- 7$ =8. 1<29. In other words- the registration of the ser ient estate did not operate to cut-off or e5tinguish the right of way. ,herefore- the complaint for the cancellation of the right of way should be dismissed. III A. What is easement? $istinguish easement from usufruct. B. !an there be *1+ an easement o er a usufruct? *2+ a usufruct o er an easement? *2+ an easement o er another easement? '5plain. *199<+ ANS"ERS# A. An easement or ser itude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immo able for the benefit of another immo able belonging to a different owner. *Art. 612- =!!+

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9sufruct gi es a right to en)oy the property of another with the obligation of preser ing its form and substance- unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise pro ides *Art. <62- =!!+. An easement or ser itude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immo able for the benefit of another immo able belonging to a different owner *Art. 612- =!!+.

CIVIL LAW

B. *1+ ,here can be no easement o er a usufruct. #ince an easement may be constituted only on a corporeal immo able property- no easement may be constituted on a usufruct which is not a corporeal right. *2+ ,here can be no usufruct o er an easement. While a usufruct may be created o er a right- such right must ha e an e5istence of its own independent of the property. A ser itude cannot be the ob)ect of a usufruct because it has no e5istence independent of the property to which it attaches. *2+ ,here can be no easement o er another easement for the same reason as in *1+. An easementalthough it is a real right o er an immo able- is not a corporeal right. ,here is a >oman ma5im which says thatH ,here can be no ser itude o er another ser itude. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# A. 'asement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immo able for the benefit of another immo able belonging to a different owner in which case it is called real or predial easement- or for the benefit of a community or group of persons in which case it is Bnown as a personal easement. ,he distinctions between usufruct and easement areH a. 9sufruct includes all uses of the property and for all purposes- including us fruen!i. 'asement is limited to a specific use. b. 9sufruct may be constituted on immo able or mo able property. 'asement may be constituted only on an immo able property. c. 'asement is not e5tinguished by the death of the owner of the dominant estate while usufruct is e5tinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention appears. d. An easement contemplates two *2+ estates belonging to two *2+ different ownersE a usufruct contemplates only one property *real or personal+ whereby the usufructuary uses and en)oys the property as well as its fruits- while another owns the naBed title during the period of the usufruct. e. A usufruct may be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches- while an easement cannot be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches. B. *2+ ,here cannot be a usufruct o er an easement since an easement presupposes two *2+ tenements belonging to different persons and the right attaches to the tenement and not to the owner. While a usufruct gi es the usufructuary a right to use- right to en)oy- right to the fruits- and right to possess- an easement gi es only a limited use of the ser ient estate. %owe er- a usufruct can be constituted o er a property that has in its fa or an easement or one burdened with a ser itude. ,he usufructuary will e5ercise the easement during the period of the usufruct.

Red Notes in Civil Law

TOP C# DONAT ON &1''*) 1''1) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''() 1''') +***/ I #pouses Dichael and :inda donated a 2-hectare residential land to the !ity of Baguio on the condition that the city go ernment would build thereon a public parB with a bo5ing arena- the construction of which shall commence within si5 *6+ months from the date the parties ratify the donation. ,he donee accepted the donation and the title to the property was transferred in its name. "i e years elapsed but the public parB with the bo5ing arena was ne er started. !onsidering the failure of the donee to comply with the condition of the donation- the donor-spouses sold the property to "erdinand who then sued to reco er the land from the city go ernment. Will the suit prosper? *1991+ ANS"ER#

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"erdinand has no right to reco er the land. It is true that the donation was re ocable because of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation is re oBed- it remained alid. %ence- #pouses Dichael and :inda had no right to sell the land to "erdinand. 8ne cannot gi e what he does not ha e. What the donors should ha e done first was to ha e the donation annulled or re oBed. And after that was done- they could alidly ha e disposed of the land in fa or of "erdinand. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# 9ntil the contract of donation has been resol ed or rescinded under Article 1191 of the !! or re oBed under Article ?6C of the !!- the donation stands effecti e and alid. Accordingly- the sale made by the donor to "erdinand cannot be said to ha e con eyed title to "erdinand- whothereby- has no cause of action for reco ery of the land acting for and in his behalf. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# ,he donation is onerous. And being onerous- what applies is the law on contracts- and not the law on donation *De "una vs. A#rigo, 31 #!>A 1<G+. Accordingly- the prescripti e period for the filing of such an action would be the ordinary prescripti e period for contracts which may either be si5 or ten depending upon whether it is erbal or written. ,he filing of the case fi e years later is within the prescripti e period and- therefore- the action can prosper. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# ,he law on donation lays down a special prescripti e period in the case of breach of condition- which is four years from non-compliance thereof *Article ?6C !!+. #ince the action has prescribed- the suit will not prosper. II 8n Luly 2?- 199?- 7edro mailed in Danila a letter to his brother- Lose- a resident of Iloilo !ity- offering to donate a intage sports car which the latter had long been wanting to buy from the former. 8n August <- 199?- Lose called 7edro by cellular phone to thanB him for his generosity and to inform him that he was sending by mail his letter of acceptance. 7edro ne er recei ed that letter because it was ne er mailed. 8n August 1C- 199?- 7edro recei ed a telegram from Iloilo informing him that Lose had been Billed in a road accident the day before *August 12- 199?+. A. Is there a perfected donation? B. Will your answer be the same if Lose did mail his acceptance letter but it was recei ed by 7edro in Danila days after Lose@s death? *1993+ ANS"ERS# A. =one. ,here is no perfected donation. 9nder Art. ?C3 of the !!- the donation of a mo able may be made orally or in writing. If the alue of the personal property donated e5ceeds 7<-GGG- the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Assuming that the alue of the thing donated- a intage sports car- e5ceeds 7<-GGG- then the donation and the acceptance must be in writing. In this instance- the acceptance of Lose was not in writing- therefore- the donation is oid. 9pon the other hand- assuming that the sports car costs less than 7<-GGG- then the donation may be oral- but still- the simultaneous deli ery of the car is needed and there being none- the donation was ne er perfected. B. Kes- the answer is the same. If Lose@s mail containing his acceptance of the donation was recei ed by 7edro after the former@s death- then the donation is still oid because under Article ?2C of the !!- the donation is perfected the moment the donor Bnows of the acceptance by the donee. ,he death of Lose before 7edro could recei e the acceptance indicates that the donation was ne er perfected. 9nder Article ?C6 acceptance must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.

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San 0eda Colle1e o2

Wills and Succession


TOP C# " LLS N %ENERAL &1'(') 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) 1''() +***/

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CIVIL LAW

I Danuel- a "ilipino- and his American wife 'leanor- e5ecuted a Loint Will in BostonDassachusetts when they were residing in said city. ,he law of Dassachusetts allows the e5ecution of )oint wills. #hortly thereafter- 'leanor died. !an the said Will be probated in the 7hilippines for the settlement of her estate? *2GGG+

ANS"ER# Kes- the will may be probated in the 7hilippines insofar as the estate of 'leanor is concerned. While the !i il !ode prohibits the e5ecution of )oint wills here and abroad- such prohibition applies only to "ilipinos. %ence- the )oint will which is alid where e5ecuted is alid in the 7hilippines but only with respect to 'leanor. 9nder Article 319- it is oid with respect to Danuel whose )oint will remains oid in the 7hilippines despite being alid where e5ecuted. TOP C# NTESTATE SUCCESS ON &1''+) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''() 1''') +***) +**3/ I A. :uis was sur i ed by two legitimate children- two illegitimate children- his parents- and two brothers. %e left an estate of 71 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of :uis- how much is the legitime of each- and how much is the free portion of his estate if any? B. #uppose :uis- in the preceding .uestion *a+- died intestate. Who are his intestate heirs- and how much is the share of each in his estate? *2GG2+ ANS"ERS# A. ,he compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two illegitimate children. ,he parents are e5cluded by the legitimate children- while the brothers are not compulsory heirs at all. ,heir respecti e legitimes areH *1+ ,he legitime of the two *2+ legitimate children is one-half *1F2+ of the estate *7<GG-GGG+ to be di ided between them e.ually- or 72<G-GGG each . *2+ ,he legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half *1F2+ the legitime of each legitimate child or 712<-GGG. #ince the total legitimes of the compulsory heirs is 7?<G-GGG- the balance of 72<G-GGG is the free portion. B. ,he intestate heirs are the two *2+ legitimate children and the two *2+ illegitimate children. In intestacy the estate if the decedent is di ided among the legitimate and illegitimate children such that the share of each illegitimate child is one-half the share of each legitimate child. ,heir shares areH "or each legitimate child 7222-222.22 "or each illegitimate child 7166-666.66 *Art. 932- =!!E Art. 1?6- "!+

Red Notes in Civil Law

Obligations and Contracts


TOP C# CONTRACTS N %ENERAL &6on6e8t) 9inds) 4e:5i4e;ents 2o4 validit< and 4e;edies/ &1'(') 1''*) 1''1) 1''+) 1''3) 1''-) 1''() +**+/ I >oland- a basBetball star- was under contract for one year to play-for-play e5clusi ely for :ady :o e- Inc. %owe er- e en before the basBetball season could open- he was offered a more attracti e pay plus fringe benefits by #weet ,aste- Inc. >oland accepted the offer and transferred to #weet ,aste. :ady :o e sues >oland and #weet ,aste for breach of contract. $efendants claim that the restriction to play for :ady :o e alone is oid- hence- unenforceable- as it constitutes an

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undue interference with the right of >oland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his freedom to play and en)oy basBetball. !an >oland be bound by the contract he entered into with :ady :o e or can he disregard the same? Is he liable at all? %ow about #weet ,aste? Is it liable to :ady :o e? *1991+ ANS"ER# >oland is bound by the contract he entered into with :ady :o e and he cannot disregard the same- under the principles of obligations and contracts. 8bligations arising from contracts ha e the force of law between the parties. Kes- >oland is liable under the contract as far as :ady :o e is concerned. %e is liable for damages under Article 11?G of the !! since he contra ened the tenor of his obligation. =ot being a contracting party- #weet ,aste is not bound by the contract but it can be held liable under Art. 121C. ,he basis of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is founded on .uasi-delict- assuming that #weet ,aste Bnew of the contract. Art. 121C of the !! pro ides that any third person who induces another to iolate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# It is assumed that :ady :o e Bnew of the contract. =either >oland nor #weet ,aste would be liable- because the restriction in the contract is iolati e of Article 12G6 as being contrary to law- morals- good custom- public order- or public policy. II 7rintado is engaged in the printing business. #uplico supplies printing paper to 7rintado pursuant to an order agreement under which #uplico binds himself to deli er the same olume of paper e ery month for a period of 13 months- with 7rintado in turn agreeing to pay within 6G days after each deli ery. #uplico has been faithfully deli ering under the order agreement for 1G months but thereafter stopped doing so- because 7rintado has not made any payment at all. 7rintado has also a standing contract with publisher 7ublico for the printing of 1G-GGG olumes of school te5tbooBs. #uplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing 1-GGG olumes- 7rintado also fails to perform under its printing contract with 7ublico- #uplico sues 7rintado for the alue of the unpaid deli eries under their order agreement. At the same time 7ublico sues 7rintado for damages for breach of contract with respect to their own printing agreement. In the suit filed by #uplico7rintado counters thatH a+ #uplico cannot demand payment for deli eries made under their order agreement until #uplico has completed performance under said contactE b+ #uplico should pay damages for breach of contractE and c+ #uplico should be liable for 7rintadoNs breach of his contract with 7ublico because the order agreement between #uplico and 7rintado was for the benefit of 7ublico. Are the contentions of 7rintado tenable? '5plain your answer as to each contention. *2GG2+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# =o- the contentions of 7rintado are untenable. a+ 7rintado ha ing failed to pay for the printing paper co ered by the deli ery in oices on time- #uplico has the right to cease maBing further deli ery. And the latter did not iolate the order agreement *Integrate! Pac$aging Corp. v. Court of Appeals- *222 #!>A 1?G- ;.>. =o. 11<11?Lune 3- 2GGG.+ b+ #uplico cannot be held liable for damages- for breach of contract- as it was not he who iolated the order agreement- but 7rintado.

Law
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c)

#uplico cannot be held liable for 7rintadoNs breach of contract with 7ublico. %e is not a party to the agreement entered into by and between 7rintado and 7ublico. ,heirs is not a stipulation pour autrui. OAforesaid4 #uch contracts could not affect third persons liBe #uplico because of the basic ci il law principle of relati ity of contracts which pro ides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it- and it cannot fa or or pre)udice a third person- e en if he is aware of such contract and has acted with Bnowledge thereof. %Integrate! Pac$aging Corp. v. CA, supra.&

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

TOP C# E7T N%U S$MENT OF O0L %AT ONS &1'(') 1''+) 1'',) 1''() +***) +**1) +**+/ I In 19?3- Bobby borrowed 71-GGG-GGG from !hito payable in two years. ,he loan- which was e idenced by a promissory note- was secured by a mortgage on real property. =o action was filed by !hito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage. But in 1991- Bobby- without recei ing any amount from !hito- e5ecuted another promissory note which was worded e5actly as the 19?3 promissory note- e5cept for the date thereof- which was the date of its e5ecution. !an !hito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 199C? *199C+ ANS"ER# Kes- !hito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 199C. Although the 19?3 promissory note for 71 million payable two years or in 193G became a natural obligation after the lapse of ten *1G+ years- such natural obligation can be a alid consideration of a no ated promissory note dated in 1991 and payable two years later or in 1992. All the elements of an implied real no ation are presentH a+ an old alid obligationE b+ a new alid obligationE c+ capacity of the partiesE d+ animus novan!i or intention to no ateE and e+ ,he old an new obligation should be incompatible with each other on all material points *Art. 1292+. ,he two promissory notes cannot stand together- hence- the period of prescription of ten *1G+ years has not yet lapsed. II Arturo borrowed 7<GG-GGG from his father. After he had paid 72GG-GGG- his father died. When the administrator of his father@s estate re.uested payment of the balance of 72GG-GGGArturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father as e idenced by a notation at the bacB of his checB payment for the 72GG-GGG readingH IIn full payment of the loanJ. Will this be a alid defense in an action for collection? *2GGG+ ANS"ER# It depends. If the notation Iin full payment of the loanJ was written by Arturo@s fatherthere was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case- the notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. ,he condonation being implied- it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effecti e. ,he defense of full payment will- therefore- be alid. When- howe er- the notation was written by Arturo himself- it merely pro es his intention in maBing that payment but in no way does it bind his father *'am vs. CA, ;> =o. 1GC?26- 11 "ebruary 1999+. In such case- the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation may be inferred. ,here being no condonation at all- the defense of full payment will not be alid. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# If the notation was written by Arturo@s father- it amounted to an e5press condonation of the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be alid under the 2nd par. 8f Article 12?G of the =!!. #ince the amount of the balance is more than 7<-GGG- the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article ?C3. ,here being no acceptance in writing by Arturo- the condonation is oid and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. ,he defense of full payment is- therefore- not alid. In case the notation was not written by Arturo@s father- the answer is the same as the answers abo e.

Red Notes in Civil Law

Sales and Lease


TOP C# MACEDA LA" & 1'(') 1''') +***/

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I What are the so-called IDacedaJ and I>ectoJ laws in connection with sales on installments? ;i e the most important features of each law. *1999+ ANS"ER# ,he Daceda :aw *>.A. 6<<+ is applicable to sales of immo able property on installments. ,he most important features are *Rillo vs. CA, 2C? #!>A C61+H 1. After ha ing paid installments for at least two years- the buyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period of one month for e ery year of installment payments made- to pay the unpaid installments without interest. If the contract is cancelled- the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender alue e.ui alent to <GP of the total payments made- and after fi e years of installments- an additional <P e ery year but not to e5ceed 9GP of the total payments made. 2. In case the installments paid were less than 2 years- the seller shall gi e the buyer a grace period of not less than 6G days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the e5piration of the grace period- the seller may cancel the contract after 2G days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act. ,he >ecto :aw *Art- 1C3C+ refers to sale of mo ables payable in installments and limiting the right of seller- in case of default by the buyer- to one of three remediesH *a+ e5act fulfillmentE *b+ cancel the sale if two or more installments ha e not been paidE *c+ foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold also in case of default of two or more installments- with no further action against the purchaser. II 7riscilla purchased a condominium unit in DaBati !ity from the !itiland !orporation for a price of 71G million- payable 72 million down and the balance with interest thereon at 1CP per annum payable in si5ty *6G+ e.ual monthly installments of 7193-222.22. ,hey e5ecuted a $eed of !onditional #ale in which it is stipulated that should the endee fail to pay three *2+ successi e installments- the sale shall be deemed automatically rescinded without the necessity of )udicial action and all payments made by the endee shall be forfeited in fa or of the endor by way of rental for the use and occupancy of the unit and as li.uidated damages. "or C6 months- 7riscilla paid the monthly installments religiously- but on the C?th and C3th months- she failed to pay. 8n the C9th month- she tried to pay the installments due but the endor refused to recei e the payments tendered by her. ,he following month- the endor sent her a notice that it was rescinding the $eed of !onditional #ale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic rescission- and demanded that she acate the premises. #he replied that the contract cannot be rescinded without )udicial demand or notarial act pursuant to Article 1<92 of the !i il !ode. A. Is Article 1<92 applicable? B. !an the endor rescind the contract? *2GGG+

San 0eda Colle1e o2

ANS"ERS# A. Article 1<92 of the !i il !ode does not apply to a conditional sale. In (alarao vs. CA, 2GC #!>A 1<< the #upreme !ourt held that Article 1<92 applies only to a contract of sale and not to a $eed of !onditional #ale where the seller has reser ed title to the property until full payment of the purchase price. ,he law applicable is the Daceda :aw. B. =o- the endor cannot rescind the contract under the circumstances. 9nder the Daceda :awwhich is the law applicable- the seller on installment may not rescind the contract till after the lapse of the mandatory grace period of 2G days for e ery one year of installment payments- and only after 2G days from notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act. In this case- the refusal of the seller to accept payment from the buyer on the C9th month was not )ustified because the buyer was entitled to 6G days grace period and the payment was tendered within that period. Doreo er- the notice of rescission ser ed by the seller on the buyer was not effecti e because the notice was not by a notarial act. Besidesthe seller may still pay within 2G days from such notarial notice before rescission may be

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effected. All these re.uirements for a alid rescission were not complied with by the seller. %ence- the rescission is in alid. TOP C# LEASE N %ENERAL AND T$E R %$TS AND O0L %AT ONS OF T$E LESSOR AND LESSEE &1''*) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''') +**1/

CIVIL LAW

I In a 2G-year lease contract o er a building- the lessee is e5pressly granted a right of first refusal should the lessor decide to sell both the land and building. %owe er- the lessor sold the property to a third person who Bnew about the lease and in fact agreed to respect it. !onse.uently- the lessee brings an action against both the lessor-seller and the buyer *a+ to rescind the sale and *b+ to compel specific performance of his right of first refusal in the sense that the lessor should be ordered to e5ecute a deed of absolute sale in fa or of the lessee at the same price. ,he defendants contend that the plaintiff can neither seeB rescission of the sale nor compel specific performance of a ImereJ right of first refusal. $ecide the case. *1993+ ANS"ER# ,he action filed by the lessee- for both rescission of the offending sale and specific performance of the right of first refusal which was iolated- should prosper. ,he ruling in E)uatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. *ayfair theater, Inc. *26C #!>A C32+- a case with similar facts- sustains both rights of actions because the buyer in the subse.uent sale Bnew the e5istence of right of first refusal- hence in bad faith. ANOT$ER ANS"ER# ,he action to rescind the sale and to compel the right of first refusal will not prosper. * Ang 'u Asuncion vs. CA, 223 #!>A 6G2+. ,he !ourt ruled in a unanimous en #anc decision that the right of first refusal is not founded upon contract but on a .uasi-delictual relationship co ered by the principles of human relations and un)ust enrichment *Art. 19- et se.. !i il !ode+. %ence the only action that will prosper according to the #upreme !ourt is an Iaction for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.J TOP C# SU0 LEASE &6on6e8t and e22e6ts/ &1''*) 1'',) 1''') +***/ I A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. ,he lease contract did not contain any e5press prohibition against the assignment of the leasehold or the subleasing of the leased premises. $uring the third year of the lease- B subleased the land to !. In turn- !- without A@s consent- assigned the sublease to $. A then filed an action for the rescission of the contract of lease on the ground that B has iolated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. If you were the )udge- how would you decide the case- particularly with respect to the alidity ofH A. B@s sublease to !? and B. !@s assignment of the sublease to $? '5plain your answers. *199G+

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ANS"ERS# A. B@s sublease to ! is alid. Although the original period of two years for the lease contract has e5pired- the lease continued with the ac.uiescence of the lessor during the third year. %encethere has been an implied renewal of the contract of lease. 9nder Art. 16<G of the !i il !ode- the lessee may sublet the thing leased- in whole or in part- when the contract of lease does not contain any e5press prohibition *Arts. 16<G- 16?G- !!+. A@s action for rescission should not prosper on this ground. B. !@s assignment of the sublease to $ is not alid. 9nder Art. 16C9 of the !!- the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor- unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. ,here is no such stipulation in the contract. If the law prohibits assignment of the lease without the consent of the lessor- all the more would the assignment of a sublease be prohibited without such consent. ,his is a iolation of the contract and is a alid ground for rescission by A.

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San Beda CIVIL LAW

TOP C# CONTRACT TO SELL &NATURE AND EFFECTS/ &1''.) 1''') +**1/ I Arturo ga e >ichard a receipt which statesH I>eceiptJ >ecei ed from >ichard as down payment "or my 199< ,oyota !orolla with 7late =o. QKR-122 --------------------------------------7<G-GGG.GG Balance payableH 12F2GFG1 ----------------------------7<G-GGG.GG #eptember 1<- 2GG1. *#gd.+ Arturo $oes this receipt e idence a contract to sell? Why? *2GG1+ ANS"ER# It is a contract of sale because the seller did not reser e ownership until he was fully paid. II #tate the basic difference *only in their legal effects+ / A. B. Between a contract to sell- on the one hand- and a contract of sale- on the otherE Between a conditional sale- on the one hand- and an absolute sale- on the other hand. *199?+

ANS"ERS# A. In a contract of sale- ownership is transferred to the buyer upon deli ery of the ob)ect to him while in a contract to sell- ownership is retained by the seller until the purchase price is fully paid. In a contract to sell- deli ery of the ob)ect does not confer ownership upon the buyer. In a contract of sale- there is only one contract e5ecuted between the seller and the buyerwhile in a contract to sell- there are two contracts- first the contract to sell *which is conditional or preparatory sale+ and a second- the final deed of sale or the principal contract which is e5ecuted after full payment of the purchase price. A conditional sale is one where the endor is granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment- as the case may be- of the prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title to the property is not reser ed to the endor or if the endor is not granted the right to rescind the contract based on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment- as the case may be- of the prescribed condition.

San 0eda Colle1e o2

B.

Partnership !gency and "rusts


TOP C# CONCEPT OF PARTNERS$ P &1'(') 1''+) 1''.) +**1/ I W- Q- K and R organi(ed a general partnership with W and Q as industrial partners and K and R as capitalist partners. K contributed 7<G-GGG and R contributed 72G-GGG to the common fund. By a unanimous ote of the partners- W and Q were appointed managing partners- without any specification of their respecti e powers and duties. A applied for the position of #ecretary and B applied for the position of Accountant of the partnership.

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,he hiring of A was decided upon by W and Q- but was opposed by K and R. ,he hiring of B was decided upon by W and R- but was opposed by Q and K. Who of the applicants should be hired by the partnership? '5plain and gi e your reasons. *1992+ ANS"ER# A should be hired as #ecretary. ,he decision for the hiring of A pre ails because it is an act of administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners- W and Q. B cannot be hired- because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partners- the deadlocB must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case- the opposition of Q and K pre ails because K owns the controlling interest *Art. 13G1- !!+. II Q used his sa ings from his salaries amounting to a little more than 72-GGG as capital in establishing a restaurant. K ga e the amount of 7C-GGG to Q as Ifinancial assistanceJ with the understanding that K would be entitled to 22P annual profits deri ed from the operation of the restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years- K filed a case demanding his share in the said profits. Q denied that there was a partnership and raised the issue of prescription as y did not assert his rights anytime within ten *1G+ years from the start of the operation of the restaurant. Is K a partner of Q in the business? Why? What is the nature of the right to demand one@s share in the profits of a partnership? $oes the right prescribe? *1939+ ANS"ER# Kes- because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and an intent to di ide profits. It is founded upon an e5press trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# =o- K is not a partner because the amount is e5tended in the form of a financial assistance and therefore it is a loan- and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a partnership. ,he right is founded upon a contract of loan whereby the borrower is bound to pay principal and interest liBe all ordinary obligations. Kes- his right prescribes in si5 or ten years depending upon whether the contract is oral or written. 1. 2. 2. III !an a husband and wife for a limited partnership to engage in real estate business- with the wife being a limited partner? !an two corporations organi(e a general partnership under the !i il !ode of the 7hilippines? !an a corporation and an indi idual form a general partnership? *199C+

CIVIL LAW

ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# 1. Kes- the !i il !ode prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a uni ersal partnership. #ince a limited partnership is not a uni ersal partnership- a husband and wife may alidly form one. 2. =o. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation were to become a partner- co-partners would ha e the power to maBe the corporation party to transactions in an irregular manner since the partners are not agents sub)ect to the control of the Board of $irectors. But a corporation may enter into a )oint enture with another corporation as long as the nature of the enture is in line with the business authori(ed by its charter. * Tuason + Co., Inc. vs. ,olano, 9< 7hil 1G6+ 2. =o- for the same reasons gi en in the Answer to =umber 2 abo e. OT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ERS# 1. Kes. While spouses cannot enter into a uni ersal partnership- they can enter into a limited partnership pr be members thereof *CIR vs. Suter, et al., 2? #!>A 1<2+. 2. As a general rule a corporation may not form a general partnership with another corporation or an indi idual because a corporation may not be bound by persons who are neither directors nor officers of the corporation.

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%owe er- a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or an indi idual pro ided the following conditions are metH *a+ ,he Articles of Incorporation of the corporation e5pressly allows the corporation to enter into partnershipsE *b+ ,he Articles of 7artnership must pro ide that all partners will manage the partnership- and they shall be )ointly and se erally liableE and *c+ In case of foreign corporation- it must be licensed to do business in the 7hilippines. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# 2. =o. A corporation may not be a general partner because the principle of mutual agency in general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the corporation will iolate the corporation law principle that only the board of directors may bind the corporation. TOP C# CONTRACT OF A%ENCY &1''+) 1'',) 1''.) 1''') +***) +**1/ I 7rime >ealty !orporation appointed =estor the e5clusi e agent in the sale of lots of its newly de eloped subdi ision. 7rime >ealty told =estor that he could not collect or recei e payments from the buyers. =estor was able to sell ten lots to Lesus and to collect the down payments for said lots. %e did not turn o er the collections to 7rime >ealty. Who shall bear the loss for =estor@s defalcation- 7rime >ealty or Lesus? *199C+ ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# ,he general rule is that a person dealing with an agent must in.uire into the authority of that agent. In the present case- if Lesus did not in.uire into that authority- he is liable for the loss due to =estor@s defalcation unless Article 19GG- !! go erns- in which case the de eloper corporation bears the loss. Art. 19GG !! pro idesH I#o far as third persons are concerned- an act is deemed to ha e been performed within the scope of the agent@s authority- if such act is within the terms of the power of attorney- as written- e en if the agent has in fact e5ceeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding between the principal and the agent. %owe er- if Lesus made due in.uiry and he was not informed by the principal 7rime >ealty of the limits of =estor@s authority- 7rime >ealty shall bear the loss. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# !onsidering that 7rime >ealty !orporation only ItoldJ =estor that he could not recei e or collect payments- it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written authority or power of attorney. In this case- insofar as Lesus- who is a third person- is concerned- =estor@s acts of collecting payments is deemed to ha e been performed within the scope of his authority *Article 19GG- !!+. %ence- the principal is liable. %owe er- if Lesus was aware of the limitation of =estor@s power as an agent- and prime >ealty !orporation does not ratify the sale contract- then Lesus shall be liable *Art. 1393- !!+. II A. Q appoints K as his agent to sell his products in !ebu !ity. !an K appoint a sub-agent and if he does- what are the effects of such appointment? B. A granted B the e5clusi e right to sell his brand of Daong pants in Isabela- the price for his merchandise payable within 6G days from deli ery- and promising B a commission of 2GP on all sales. After the deli ery of the merchandise to B but before he could sell any of them- B@s store in Isabela was completely burned without his fault- together with all of A@s pants. Dust B pay A for his lost pants? Why? *1999+ ANS"ERS# A. Kes- the agent may appoint a substitute or sub-agent if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so- but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substituteH *1+ when he was not gi en the power to appoint oneE

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


*2+ when he was gi en such power- but without designating the person- and the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insol entE B. ,he contract between A and B is a sale not an agency to sell because the price is payable by B upon 6G days from deli ery e en if B is unable to resell it. If B were an agent- he is not bound to pay the price if he is unable to resell it. As a buyer- ownership passed to B upon deli ery and- under Art. 1<GC of the !!- the things perishes with the owner. %ence- B must still pay the price. TOP C# TRUST &1''3) 1''3) 1''.) 1''(/ I In 193G- Daureen purchased two lots in a plush subdi ision registering :ot 1 in her name and :ot 2 in the name of her brother Walter with the latter@s consent. ,he idea was to circum ent a subdi ision policy against the ac.uisition of more than one lot by one buyer. Daureen constructed a house on :ot 1 with an e5tension on :ot 2 to ser e as a guest house. In 193?- Walter who had suffered serious business losses demanded that Daureen remo e the e5tension house since the lot on which the e5tension was built was his property. In 1992- Daureen sued for the recon eyance to her of :ot 2 asserting that a resulting trust was created when she had the lot registered in Walter@s name e en if she paid the purchase price. Walter opposed the suit arguing that assuming the e5istence of a resulting trust the action of Daureen has already prescribed since ten years ha e already elapsed from the registration of the title in his name. $ecide. $iscuss fully. *199<+ ANS"ER# ,his is a case of an implied resulting trust. If Walter claims to ha e ac.uired ownership of the land by prescription of if he anchors his defense on e5tincti e prescription- the ten year period must be recBoned from 193? when he demanded that Daureen remo e the e5tension house on :ot 2 because such demand amounts to an e5press repudiation of the trust and it was made Bnown to Daureen. ,he action for recon eyance filed in 1992 is not yet barred by prescription *Spouses -uang vs. CA, #ept. 12- 199C+.

CIVIL LAW

Credit "ransactions
TOP C# MORT%A%E &1''+) 1''') +**1/ = PLED%E &1'',) 1''-) 1'''/ I ,o secure a loan obtained from a rural banB- 7urita assigned her leasehold rights o er a stall in the public marBet in fa or of the banB. ,he deed of assignment pro ides that in case of default in the payment of the loan- the banB shall ha e the right to sell 7urita@s rights o er the marBet stall as her attorney-in-fact- and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan. A. Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a cession? B. Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage- does the pro ision gi ing the banB the power to sell 7urita@s rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why? *2GG1+ ANS"ERS# A. ,he assignment was a mortgage- not a cession- of the leasehold rights. A cession would ha e transferred ownership to the banB. %owe er- the grant of authority to the banB to sell the leasehold rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that a mere encumbrance was constituted. ,here would ha e been no need for such authority had there been a cession. B. =o- the clause in .uestion is not a pactum commissorium. It is pactum commissorium when default in the payment of the loan automatically ests ownership of the encumbered property in the banB. In the problem gi en- the banB does not automatically become the owner of the property upon default of the mortgagor. ,he banB has to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the indebtedness.

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II A. $istinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. B. Are the right of redemption and the e.uity of redemption gi en by law to a mortgagor the same? '5plain. !. Q borrowed money from K and ga e a piece of land as security by way of mortgage. It was e5pressly agreed between the parties in the mortgage contract that upon non-payment of the debt on time by Q- the mortgaged land would already belong to K. If Q defaulted in payingwould K now become the owner of the mortgaged land? Why? $. #uppose in the preceding .uestion- the agreement between Q and K was that if Q failed to pay the mortgage debt on time- the debt shall be paid with the land mortgaged by Q to K. Would your answer be the same as in the preceding .uestion? '5plain. *1999+ ANS"ERS# A. In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor- while in a contract of pledge possession belongs to the debtor. A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract. A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind third persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing description of the thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons. B. ,he e.uity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. '.uity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor after )udgment in a )udicial foreclosure to redeem the property by paying to the court the amount of the )udgment debt before the sale or confirmation of the sale. 8n the other hand- right of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at an e5tra-)udicial foreclosure by paying to the buyer in the foreclosure sale the amount paid by the buyer within one year from such sale. !. =o- K could not become the owner of the land. ,he stipulation is in the nature of pactum commissorium which is prohibited by law. ,he property should be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the indebtedness. Any e5cess shall be gi en to the mortgagor. $. =o- the answer would not be the same. ,his is a alid stipulation and does not constitute pactum commissorium. In pactum commissorium, the ac.uisition is automatic without need of any further action. In the instant problem another act is re.uired to be performed- namely- the con eyance of the property as payment *!acion en pago+. III In 1932- #te e borrowed 7CGG-GGG from $anny- collaterali(ed by a pledge of shares of stocB of !oncepcion !orporation worth 73GG-GGG. In 1932- because of the economic crisis- the alue of the shares pledged fell to only 71GG-GGG. !an $anny demand that #te e surrender the other shares worth 7?GG-GGG? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# =o. Bilateral contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a subsidiary contract- and #te e is still indebted to $anny for the amount of 7CGG-GGG despite the fall in the alue of the stocBs pledged. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# =o. $anny@s right as pledgee is to sell the pledged shares at a public sale and Beep the proceeds as collateral for the loan. ,here is no showing that the fall in the alue of the pledged property was attributable to the pledger@s fault or fraud. 8n the contrary- economic crisis was the culprit. %ad the pledgee been decei ed as to the substance or .uality of the pledged shares of stocB- he would ha e had the right to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate payment of the obligation. ,his is not the case here.

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


"orts and #amages
TOP C# QUAS >DEL CT &1''*) 1''1) 1''-) 1''() +**+) +**3/ I As a result of a collision between a ta5icab owned by A and another ta5icab owned by B- Qa passenger of the first ta5icab- was seriously in)ured. Q later filed a criminal action against both dri ers. A. Is it necessary for Q to reser e his right to institute a ci il action for damages against both ta5icab owners before he can file a ci il action for damages against them? Why? B. Day both ta5icab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and super ision of their dri ers to be absol ed from liability for damages to Q? >eason. *2GG2+

CIVIL LAW

ANS"ERS# A. It depends. If the separate ci il action is to reco er damages arising from the criminal actreser ation is necessary. If the ci il action against the ta5icab owners is based on culpa contractual- or on .uasi-delict- there is no need for reser ation. B. It depends. If the ci il action is based on .uasi-delict the ta5icab owners may raise the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and super ision of the dri erE if the action against them is based on culpa contractual or ci il liability arising from a crime- they cannot raise the defense. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. =o- such reser ation is not necessary. 9nder #ection 1 of >ule 111 of the 2GGG >ules of !riminal 7rocedure- what is Ideemed institutedJ with the criminal action is only the action to reco er ci il liability arising from the crime or e5 delicto. All the other ci il actions under Articles 22- 22- 2C- and 21?6 of the =!! are no longer Ideemed institutedJ- and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently e en without any reser ation in the criminal action *sec. 2 >ule 111Ibid.+. ,he failure to maBe a reser ation in the criminal action is not a wai er of the right to file a separate and independent ci il action based on these articles of the =!! *! asupanan vs. "aroya .R No. /0123/, August 45, 4664&. TOP C# L A0 L TY OF T$E EMPLOYER AND T$E DR !ER N CASE OF ACC DENT &1''+) +***) +**1) +**+/

I A an owned by 8rlando and dri en by $iego- while negotiating a downhill slope of a city road- suddenly gained speed- ob iously beyond the authori(ed limit in the area- and bumped a car in front of it- causing se ere damage to the car and serious in)uries to its passengers. 8rlando was not in the car al the time of the incident. ,he car owner and the in)ured passengers sued 8rlando and $iego for damages caused by $iegoNs negligence. In their defenses- $iego claims that the downhill slope caused the an to gain speed and that- as he stepped on the braBes to checB the acceleration- the braBes locBed- causing the an to go e en faster and e entually to hit the car in front of it. 8rlando and $iego contend that the sudden malfunction of the anNs braBe system is a fortuitous e ent and that- therefore- they are e5empt from any liability. A. B. !. ANS"ERS# Is this contention tenable? '5plain. '5plain the concept of icarious liability in .uasi-delicts. $oes the presence of the owner inside the ehicle causing damage to a third party affect his liability for his dri erNs negligence? '5plain. *2GG2+

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A. =o. Dechanical defects of a motor ehicle do not constitute fortuitous e ent- since the presence of such defects would ha e been ready detected by diligent maintenance checB. ,he failure to maintain the ehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence. B. ,he doctrine of icarious liability is that which renders a person liable for the negligence of others for whose acts or omission the law maBes him responsible on the theory that they are under his control and super ision. !. ln motor ehicle mishaps- the owner is made solidarily liable with his dri er if he *owner+ was in the ehicle and could ha e- by the use of due diligence- pre ented the mishap. * Cae!o v. 'u 7he Thai, 26 #!>A C1G 119634+. %owe er- this .uestion has no factual basis in the problem gi en- in iew of the e5press gi en fact that M8rlando was not in the car at the time of the time of the incident.J

TOP C# DAMA%ES &1''+) 1''3) 1'',) +**+/ I 8n Lanuary <- 1992- =onoy obtained a loan of 71 million from his friend >affy. ,he promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. ,he note was due on Lanuary <- 1992 but before this date the two became political enemies. =onoy- out of spite- deliberately defaulted in paying the note- thus forcing >affy to sue him. A. What actual damages can >affy reco er? B. !an >affy asB for moral damages from =onoy? !. !an >affy asB for nominal damages? $. !an >affy asB for temperate damages? '. !an >affy asB for attorney@s fees? *199C+ ANS"ERS# A. >affy may reco er the amount of the promissory note of 71 million- together with interest at the legal rate from the date of )udicial and e5tra)udicial demand. In addition- howe erinasmuch as the debtor is in bad faith- he is liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation *Art. 22G1*2+- =!!+.

San 0eda Colle1e o2

B. Kes- under Art. 222G- =!! moral damages are reco erable in case of breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. !. =ominal damages may not be reco erable in this case because >affy may already be indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. =ominal damages are ad)udicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff- which has been iolated or in aded by the defendant may be indicated or recogni(ed- and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him *Art. 2221- !!+. $. >affy may asB for- but would most liBely not be awarded temperate damages- for the reason that his actual damages may already be compensated upon proof thereof with the promissory note. ,emperate damages may be awarded only when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot- from the nature of the case- be pro ed with certainty *Art. 222C- !!+. '. Kes- under par. 2- Art. 22G3 of the !!- considering that =onoy@s act or omission has compelled >affy to litigate to protect his interests. "urthermore- attorney@s fees may be awarded by the court when it is )ust and e.uitable *Art. 22G3*11G+- !!+.

11,

Law

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


Land "itles and #eeds
TOP C# PRESCR PT ON AND LAC$ES &1''*) 1''() +***) +**+) +**3/ I :ouie- before lea ing the country to train as a chef in a fi e-star hotel in =ew KorB- 9#Aentrusted to his first-degree cousin $ewey an application for registration- under the :and >egistration Act- of a parcel of land located in Bacolod !ity. A year later- :ouie returned to the 7hilippines and disco ered that $ewey registered the land and obtained an 8riginal !ertificate of ,itle o er the property in his *$ewey@s+ name. !ompounding the matter- $ewey sold the land to %uey- an innocent purchaser for alue. :ouie promptly filed an action for recon eyance of the parcel of land against %uey. A. Is the action pursued by :ouie the proper remedy? B. Assuming that recon eyance is the proper remedy- will the action prosper if the case was filed beyond one year- but within ten years- from the entry of the decree of registration? ANS"ERS# A. An action for recon eyance against %uey is not the proper remedy- because %uey is an innocent purchaser for alue. ,he proper recourse is for :ouie to go after $ewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and subse.uent sale of the land. If $ewey is insol ent- :ouie may file a claim against the Assurance "und *-eirs of Pe!ro "ope8 vs. De Castro 240 SCRA 13/ 94666: citing Sps. E!uarte vs. CA, 242 Phil 054 9/335:&. B. Kes- the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten *1G+ years- not within one *1+ year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may be filed. ,he action for recon eyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of registration %.rey Al#a vs. Dela Cru8, /; Phil 03 9/3/6:&. ,here is no need to reopen the registration proceedings- but the property should )ust be recon eyed to the real owner. ,he action for recon eyance is based on implied or constructi e trust- which prescribes in ten *1G+ years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. ,his rule assumes that the defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the landthe action for recon eyance would be in the nature of a suit for .uieting of title which action is imprescriptible %Davi! vs. *alay, 2/< SCRA ;// 9/333:&. II In 196G- an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner 8 to D- a family friend- as collateral for a loan. 8 acted through his attorney in fact- son- #- who was duly authori(ed by way of a special power of attorney- wherein 8 declared that he was the absolute owner of the landthat the ta5 declarationsFreceipts were all issued in his name- and that he has been in opencontinuous and ad erse possession in the concept of owner. As 8 was unable to pay bacB the loan plus interest for the past fi e *<+ years- D had to foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale- D was the highest bidder. 9pon issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale and registration in Lanuary- 1966- the mortgage property was turned o er to D@s possession and control. D has since then de eloped the said property. In 196?- 8 diedsur i ed by sons # and 7. In 19??- after the tenth *1Gth+ death anni ersary of his father 8- son 7 filed a suit to annul the mortgage deed and subse.uent sale of the property- etc.- on the ground of fraud. %e asserted that the property in .uestion was con)ugal in nature actually belonging- at the time of the mortgage- to 8 and his wife- W- whose con)ugal share went to their sons *# and 7+ and to 8. A. Is the suit filed by 7 barred by prescription? '5plain your answer. B. After the issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale in 1966 in this case- assuming that D applied for registration under the ,orrens #ystem and was issued a ,orrens ,itle to the said property in .uestion- would that added fact ha e any significant effect on your conclusion? #tate your reason. *199G+ ANS"ERS#

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San Beda CIVIL LAW

A. 9nder Art. 1?2- !!- the action is barred by prescription because the wife had only ten *1G+ years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of the mortgage deed. B. If D had secured a ,orrens ,itle to the land- all the more # and 7 could not reco er because if at all their remedies would beH 1. A 7etition to >e iew the $ecree of registration. ,his can be a ailed of within one *1+ year from the entry thereof- but only upon the basis of Iactual fraud.J ,here is no showing that D committed actual fraud in securing his title to the landE or 2. An action in personam against D for the recon eyance of the title in their fa or. Again- this remedy is a ailable within four *C+ years from the date of the disco ery of the fraud but not later than ten *1G+ years from the date of registration of the title in the name of D. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. ,he mortgage contract e5ecuted by 8- if at all- is only a oidable contract since it in ol es a con)ugal partnership property. ,he action to annul the same instituted in 19??- or ele en years after the e5ecution of the sheriff@s final sale- has ob iously prescribed becauseH An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four *C+ years from the date of disco ery of the fraud. #ince this is in essence an action to reco er ownership- it must be recBoned from the date of e5ecution of the contract or from the registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessor@s office for the purpose of transferring the ta5 declaration- this being unregistered land *,ael vs. IAC, ;> =o. :?CC22 Lanuary 2G- 1939- 169 #!>A 61?+. 2. If the action is to be treated as an action to reco er ownership of land- it would ha e prescribed )ust the same because more than ten *1G+ years ha e already elapsed since the date of the e5ecution of the sale. 1. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. ,he action to reco er has been barred by ac.uisiti e prescription in fa or of D considering that D has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten *1G+ years with a )ust title. TOP C# TORRENS SYSTEM &1''*) 1''1) 1'',) 1''() +**1/ I #ection ?G of 7$ 1<29- concerning ad erse claims on registered land- pro ides a 2G-day period of effecti ity of an ad erse claim- counted from the date of its registration. #uppose a notice of ad erse claim based upon a contract to sell was registered on Darch 1- 199? at the instance of the B9K'>- but on Lune 1- 199?- or after the lapse of the 2G-day period- a notice of le y on e5ecution in fa or of a L9$;D'=, !>'$I,8> was also registered to enforce a final )udgment for money against the registered owner. ,hen- on Lune 1<- 199? there ha ing been no formal cancellation of his notice of ad erse claim- the B9K'> pays to the seller-owner the agreed purchase price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the notice of le y is carried o er to the new title in his name- the B9K'> brings an action against the L9$;D'=, !>'$I,8> to cancel such annotation- but the latter claims that his lien is superior because it was annotated after the ad erse claim of the B9K'> had ipso facto ceased to be effecti e. Will the suit prosper? *1993+ ANS"ER# ,he suit will prosper. While an ad erse claim duly annotated at the bacB of a title under #ec. ?G of 7$ 1<29 is good only for 2G days- cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it ineffecti e- otherwise- the inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property. While the life of ad erse claim is 2G days under 7$ 1<29- it continuous to be effecti e until it is cancelled by formal petition filed with the >egister of $eeds. ,he cancellation of the notice of le y is )ustified under #ec. 1G3 of 7$ 1<29 considering that the le y on e5ecution cannot be enforced against the buyer whose ad erse claim against the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of le y on e5ecution.

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

II In 196G- an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner 8 to D- a family friend- as collateral for a loan. 8 acted through his attorney in fact- son- #- who was duly authori(ed by way of a special power of attorney- wherein 8 declared that he was the absolute owner of the landthat the ta5 declarationsFreceipts were all issued in his name- and that he has been in opencontinuous and ad erse possession in the concept of owner. As 8 was unable to pay bacB the loan plus interest for the past fi e *<+ years- D had to foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale- D was the highest bidder. 9pon issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale and registration in Lanuary- 1966- the mortgage property was turned o er to D@s possession and control. D has since then de eloped the said property. In 196?- 8 diedsur i ed by sons # and 7. In 19??- after the tenth *1Gth+ death anni ersary of his father 8- son 7 filed a suit to annul the mortgage deed and subse.uent sale of the property- etc.- on the ground of fraud. %e asserted that the property in .uestion was con)ugal in nature actually belonging- at the time of the mortgage- to 8 and his wife- W- whose con)ugal share went to their sons *# and 7+ and to 8. !. Is the suit filed by 7 barred by prescription? '5plain your answer. $. After the issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale in 1966 in this case- assuming that D applied for registration under the ,orrens #ystem and was issued a ,orrens ,itle to the said property in .uestion- would that added fact ha e any significant effect on your conclusion? #tate your reason. *199G+ ANS"ERS# A. 9nder Art. 1?2- !!- the action is barred by prescription because the wife had only ten *1G+ years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of the mortgage deed. B. If D had secured a ,orrens ,itle to the land- all the more # and 7 could not reco er because if at all their remedies would beH 2. A 7etition to >e iew the $ecree of registration. ,his can be a ailed of within one *1+ year from the entry thereof- but only upon the basis of Iactual fraud.J ,here is no showing that D committed actual fraud in securing his title to the landE or 4. An action in personam against D for the recon eyance of the title in their fa or. Again- this remedy is a ailable within four *C+ years from the date of the disco ery of the fraud but not later than ten *1G+ years from the date of registration of the title in the name of D. ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. ,he mortgage contract e5ecuted by 8- if at all- is only a oidable contract since it in ol es a con)ugal partnership property. ,he action to annul the same instituted in 19??- or ele en years after the e5ecution of the sheriff@s final sale- has ob iously prescribed becauseH 3. An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four *C+ years from the date of disco ery of the fraud. #ince this is in essence an action to reco er ownership- it must be recBoned from the date of e5ecution of the contract or from the registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessor@s office for the purpose of transferring the ta5 declaration- this being unregistered land *,ael vs. IAC, ;> =o. :?CC22 Lanuary 2G- 1939- 169 #!>A 61?+. C. If the action is to be treated as an action to reco er ownership of land- it would ha e prescribed )ust the same because more than ten *1G+ years ha e already elapsed since the date of the e5ecution of the sale. ANOT$ER ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# A. ,he action to reco er has been barred by ac.uisiti e prescription in fa or of D considering that D has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten *1G+ years with a )ust title.

113

Red Notes in Civil Law

College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

Con$licts o$ Law
TOP C# ART CLE 1.) NCC &1''1) 1''3) +**+/ = DOCTR NE OF FORUM NON CON!EN ENS &DEF N T ON/ &1'',) +**+/

I "elipe is a "ilipino citi(en. When he went to #ydney for acation- he met a former business associate- who proposed to him a transaction which tooB him to Doscow. "elipe broBered a contract between #ydney !oals !orp. *!oals+- an Australian firm- and Doscow 'nergy !orp. *'nergy+- a >ussian firm- for !oals to supply coal to 'nergy on a monthly basis for three years. Both these firms were not doing- and still do not do- business in the 7hilippines. "elipe shuttled between #ydney and Doscow to close the contract. %e also e5ecuted in #ydney a commission contract with !oals and in Doscow with 'nergy- under which contracts he was guaranteed commissions by both firms based on a percentage of deli eries for the three-year period- payable in #ydney and in Doscow- respecti ely- through deposits in accounts that he opened in the two cities. Both firms paid "elipe his commission for four months- after which they stopped paying him. "elipe learned from his contacts- who are residents of #ydney and Doscow- that the two firms talBed to each other and decided to cut him off. %e now files suit in Danila against both !oals and 'nergy for specific performance. A. $efine or e5plain the principle of Mle5 loci contractus.M B. !. $efine or e5plain the rule of Mforum non con eniens.M #hould the 7hilippine court assume )urisdiction o er the case? '5plain. *2GG2+

ANS"ERS# A. :e5 loci contractus may be understood in two senses- as followsH It is the law of the place where contracts- wills- and other public instruments are e5ecuted and go erns their Iforms and solemnitiesJ- pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 1? of the !i il !odeE or It is the proper law of the contractE i.e.- the system of law intended to go ern the entire contract- including its essential re.uisites- indicating the law of the place with which the contract has its closest connection or where the main elements of the contract con erge. As illustrated by =alamea v. Court of Appeals *223 #!>A 22 1I19924+- it is the law of the place where the airline ticBet was issued- where the passengers are nationals and residents of- and where the defendant airline company maintained its office. B. "orum non con eniens means that a court has discretionary authority to decline )urisdiction o er a cause of action when it is of the iew that the action may be )ustly and effecti ely ad)udicated elsewhere. !. =o- the 7hilippine courts cannot ac.uire )urisdiction o er the case of "elipe. "irstly- under the rule of forum non conveniens- a 7hilippine court or agency may assume )urisdiction o er the case if it chooses to do so provi!e!H *1+ that the 7hilippine court is one to which the parties may con eniently resort toE *2+ that the 7hilippine court is in a position to maBe an intelligent decision as to the law and the factsE and *2+ that the 7hilippine court has or is liBely to ha e power to enforce its decision.2? ,he conditions are una ailing in the case at bar. ,he 7hilippine court is not a con enient forum as all the incidents of the case occurred outside the 7hilippines. =either are both !oals and 'nergy doing business inside the 7hilippines. #econdly- the contracts were not perfected in the 7hilippines. 9nder the principle of le5 loci contractus- the law of the place where the contract is made shall apply. :astly- the 7hilippine court has no power to determine the facts surrounding the e5ecution of said contracts. And e en if a proper decision could be reached- such would ha e no binding effect on !oals and 'nergy as the court was not able to ac.uire )urisdiction o er the said corporations. **anila -otel Corp. v. N"RC- 2C2 #!>A 1-12-1C 12GGG4+ ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER#

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


A. 9nder the doctrine of le5 loci contractus- as a general rule- the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into go erns with respect to its nature and alidity- obligation and interpretation. ,his has been said to be the rule e en though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed- and particularly so- if the place of the maBing and the place of performance are the same *>nite! Airline v. CA- ;.>- =o. 12C11G- April 2G- 2GG1+.

CIVIL LAW

0AR TYPE QUEST ONS


Persons and Family Relations
QUEST ON No?1# Fo54 e;8lo<ees o2 A6t T@eate4 n6? we4e a884e@ended A< t@e 8oli6e o22i6e4s 2o4 alle1edl< ta;8e4in1 a wate4 ;ete4? On t@e Aasis o2 t@e 2o4e1oin1) t@e Met4o8olitan "ate4wo49s and Sewe4a1e S<ste; 65t t@e wate4 se4vi6e 6onne6tion o2 A6t T@eate4 a 2ew @o54s a2te4 a noti6e to s56@ e22e6t was se4ved 58on t@e latte4? Did M"SS 84o8e4l< eBe46ise its 84o84ieta4< 4i1@tsC ANS"ER# NO? !oncededly- DW##- as the owner of the utility pro iding water supply to certain consumers including the respondent- had the right to e5clude any person from the en)oyment and disposal thereof. %owe er- the e5ercise of rights is not without limitations. %a ing the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be e5ercised. Article 19 of the =ew !i il !ode states that I' ery person must- in the e5ercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties- act with )ustice- gi e e eryone his due- and obser e honesty and good faith. When a right is e5ercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another- a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case- DW## failed to act with )ustice and ga e ,heater Act what is due to it when the former unceremoniously cut off the latter@s water ser ice connection. %*etropolitan ?ater@or$s an! Se@erage System vs Act Theater Inc., .R No. /0;6;5, Aune /;, 4660& QUEST ON No?+# T@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 oAtained a loan 24o; Met4oAan9? T@e said loan was se654ed A< a 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e on a 8a46el o2 land owned A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1? Fo4 2ail54e o2 t@e latte4 to settle t@ei4 oAli1ation) Mat4oAan9 eBt4aD5di6iall< 2o4e6losed t@e 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e and t@e ;o4t1a1ed 84o8e4t< was sold to Met4oAan9 as t@e @i1@est Aidde4? 0e2o4e t@e eB8i4ation o2 t@e one><ea4 4ede;8tion 8e4iod) t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 eBt4aD5di6ial sale alle1in1 t@at Met4oAan9 Aloated t@ei4 oAli1ation to 245st4ate t@ei4 6@an6es o2 8a<in1 t@e loan? A2te4 t@e eB8i4ation o2 t@e one><ea4 4ede;8tion 8e4iod) Met4oAan9 6onsolidated its owne4s@i8 ove4 t@e 2o4e6losed 84o8e4t< and) t@e4ea2te4) 2iled a 8etition 2o4 "4it o2 Possession? T@is was o88osed A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e 6o;8laint 2iled A< t@e; is a 84eD5di6ial :5estion w@i6@ wa44anted t@e s5s8ension o2 t@e 84o6eedin1s Ae2o4e t@e 6o54t? s t@e 6o;8laint 2iled A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 a 84eD5di6ial :5estion to Met4oAan9Es 8etition 2o4 t@e iss5an6e o2 a "4it o2 PossessionC

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113

ANS"ER# NO? A pre)udicial .uestion is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue in ol ed therein- and the cogni(ance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a ci il action and a criminal action are both pending and there e5ists in the former an issue that must be preempti ely resol ed before the criminal action may proceed because howsoe er the issue raised in the ci il action is resol ed would be determinati e )uris et de )ure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. ,he complaint of the petitioners for annulment of e5tra)udicial sale is a ci il action and the respondent@s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is but an incident in the land registration case and- therefore no pre)udicial .uestion can arise from the e5istence of the two actions. %Spouses Pahang vs (estil, .R No. /0<131, Auly /4, 4660& QUEST ON No?3# Rodol2o and Ma4ietta we4e ;a44ied on Ma46@ 3) 1'3'? On De6e;Ae4 -) 1''+) Rodol2o le2t t@e 6onD51al @o;e and aAandoned Ma4ietta and t@ei4 6@ild4en?

College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

n t@e ;eanti;e) Rodol2o) w@o was desi4o5s o2 6ont4a6tin1 anot@e4 ;a44ia1e) 2iled a 8etition 2o4 t@e de6la4ation o2 t@e n5llit< o2 @is ;a44ia1e wit@ Ma44ieta on t@e 14o5nd o2 8s<6@olo1i6al in6a8a6it<? F5ll< awa4e t@at Ma44ieta @ad al4ead< t4ans2e44ed to anot@e4 4esiden6e) Rodol2o still indi6ated in @is 8etition t@at s5;;ons 6an Ae se4ved 58on Ma44ieta in @e4 84evio5s add4ess? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) Ma44ieta did not 4e6eive an< s5;;ons and 2ailed to 2ile an answe4? T@e 6o54t) 58on ;otion) de6la4ed Ma44ieta in de2a5lt and allowed Rodol2o to add56e eviden6e eB 8a4te? T@e 85Ali6 84ose65to4 w@o a88ea4ed 2o4 t@e state o22e4ed no oADe6tion to t@e ;otion o2 Rodol2o? T@e 6o54t 4ende4ed a de6ision de6la4in1 t@e ;a44ia1e o2 Rodol2o and Ma44ieta void aA initio? "as t@e 14ant o2 ann5l;ent o2 ;a44ia1e A< de2a5lt 84o8e4C ANS"ER# NO? ,he actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article C3 of the "amily !ode. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. %ence- in all cases for annulment- declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation- the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of pre enting any collusion between the parties and to taBe care that their e idence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaintthe court cannot declare him or her in default but instead- should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion e5ists between the parties. ,he prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application of legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own e idence- if in his opinion- the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. %Ancheta vs Ancheta, .R No. /012;6, *arch 0, 4660& QUEST ON No?,# Al24edo and En6a4na6ion we4e ;a44ied on Fan5a4< () 1'-*? D54in1 t@e s5Asisten6e o2 t@ei4 ;a44ia1e) t@e< a6:5i4ed 1**)*** s@a4es o2 sto69 in Cit<6o48 and 4e1iste4ed t@e sa;e in t@e na;e o2 Al24edo? On Se8te;Ae4 +-) 1'.() t@e P@ili88ine 0loo;in1 Mills Co;8an<) n6 &P0MC /oAtained a loan 24o; Allied 0an9? As added se654it< 2o4 t@e said loan) Al24edo) as t@e EBe65tive !i6e P4esident o2 P0MC eBe65ted a 6ontin5in1 15a4antee wit@ Allied 0an9 Aindin1 @i;sel2 to Dointl< and seve4all< 15a4antee t@e 8a<;ent o2 all t@e P0MC oAli1ations owin1 to Allied 0an9? P0MC 2ailed to settle its oAli1ation wit@ Allied 0an9? Allied 0an9 2iled an a88li6ation 2o4 a w4it o2 84eli;ina4< atta6@;ent w@i6@ was 14anted A< t@e 6o54t? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) t@e s@e4i22 levied on atta6@;ent t@e 1**)*** s@a4es o2 Cit<6o; sto69s in t@e na;e o2 Al24edo? En6a4na6ion) assisted A< Al24edo) t@e4ea2te4 2iled a Motion to Set Aside t@e lev< on atta6@;ent? S@o5ld t@e Motion to Set Aside t@e lev< on eBe65tion Ae 14antedC ANS"ER# YES? Article 16G of the =ew !i il !ode pro ides that all the properties ac.uired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the con)ugal partnership- unless it be pro ed that it pertains e5clusi ely to the husband- or to the wife. It is not e en necessary to pro e that the properties were ac.uired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were ac.uired by the parties during the marriage- they are presumed to be con)ugal in nature. In fact- e en when the manner in which the properties were ac.uired does not appear- the presumption will still apply- and the properties will still be considered con)ugal. In this case- the e idence adduced by 'ncarnacion is that the 1GG-GGG shares of stocBs in !itycorp were issued and registered in its corporate booBs in the name of Alfredo when the said corporation was incorporated on Day- 1C- 19?9. ,his was done during the subsistence of the marriage of Alfredo and 'ncarnacion. ,he shares of stocB are thus presumed to be the con)ugal partnership property of Alfredo and 'ncarnacion. ,he barefaced fact that the shares of stocBs were registered in the corporate booBs of !itycorp solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that Alfredo- not the con)ugal partnership- owned the same. %Ching vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /40504, Be#ruary 42, 4660& Note# 9nder the "amily !ode- Article 92- the presumption is that property ac.uired during the marriage belong to the community- unless it is pro ed that it is one of those e5clused therefrom. ,he presumption in Article 116 of the "amily !ode will only arise if the future spouses agree in their marriage settlements that the regime of con)ugal partnership of gains shall go ern their property relations during the marriage pursuant to Article 1G< "!.

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

Property
QUEST ON No?1# T@e s8o5ses Pas65a eBe65ted a Deed o2 AAsol5te Sale ove4 t@ei4 84o8e4t< and t@e i;84ove;ents t@e4eon in 2avo4 o2 t@e s8o5ses C@5a? On t@e Aasis o2 t@e said deed) T4ans2e4 Ce4ti2i6ate o2 Title No? (.-1* ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< was iss5ed to t@e latte4? T@e s8o5ses C@5a t@e4ea2te4 de;anded t@at t@e s8o5ses A8ostol va6ate t@e 84o8e4t< A5t t@e latte4 st5AAo4nl< 4e25sed to do so 6lai;in1) a;on1 ot@e4s) t@at t@e< Ao51@t t@e said 84o8e4t< and @ave Aeen in 8ossession o2 t@e sa;e in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 t@o51@ t@e< we4e not aAle to 4e1iste4 t@e deed o2 sale? T@e s8o5ses C@5a 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 5nlaw25l detaine4 a1ainst t@e s8o5ses A8ostol? T@e latte4) on t@e ot@e4@and) 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 t@e deed o2 sale and TCT and 2o4 4e6onve<an6e? Can t@e s8o5ses A8ostol Ae dis8ossessed o2 t@e 84o8e4t< notwit@standin1 t@e 2a6t t@at t@e< a4e 8ossesso4s in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4C ANS"ER# YES? ,he sub)ect property is registered under the ,orrens #ystem in the names of the spouses !hua whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacBedmuch less in an action for unlawful detainer. It is an accepted rule that a person who has a ,orrens title o er the property is entitled to the possession thereof. In La elosa s !A *26< #!>A C92+- the #upreme !ourt declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property co ered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their fa or. Doreo er- the fact that the respondents were ne er in prior physical possession of the sub)ect land is of no moment- as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. %Spouses Apostol vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /412;1. Aune /;, 4660& QUEST ON No?+# Fose is t@e owne4 o2 a 8a46el o2 land sit5ated in San A15stin) Das;a4inas) Cavite? So;eti;e in t@e ;iddle o2 1'.*) Paolo) t@e A4ot@e4 o2 Fose w@o was t@en t@e 84esident o2 Cavite Ele6t4i6 Coo8e4ative) ve4Aall< 4e:5ested t@e latte4 to 14ant National Powe4 Co48o4ation t@e 4i1@t o2 wa< ove4 a 8o4tion o2 t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< and to allow it to install wooden ele6t4i6al 8osts and t4ans;ission lines 2o4 t@e ele6t4i2i6ation o2 P5e4to AG5l? Fose a66eded to t@e said 4e:5est A5t 58on t@e 6ondition t@at t@e said installations wo5ld onl< Ae te;8o4a4< in nat54e? So;eti;e in 1'', and t@e4ea2te4 in 1''3) a1ents o2 NPC ente4ed t@e 84o8e4t< o2 Fose and 6ond56ted en1inee4in1 s54ve<s t@e4eon 2o4 t@e 8548ose o2 e4e6tin1 an all>steel t4ans;ission line towe4? Fose t@e4e58on 2iled an a6tion 2o4 a s5; o2 ;one< and da;a1es alle1in1 t@e4ein t@at 6ont4a4< to t@ei4 ve4Aal a14ee;ent) NPC 6ontin5ed to 5se @is 84o8e4t< 2o4 its wooden ele6t4i6al 8osts and t4ans;ission lines wit@o5t 6o;8ensatin1 @i; t@e4e2o4e? nstead o2 2ilin1 an answe4) NPC 2iled a ;otion to dis;iss on t@e 14o5nd t@at it @ad al4ead< a6:5i4ed A< 84es64i8tion t@e ease;ent o2 4i1@t>o2>wa< ove4 t@at 8o4tion o2 FoseEs 84o8e4t< w@e4e its 8osts and t4ans;issions we4e estaAlis@ed? $as NPC a6:5i4ed A< 84es64i8tion t@e ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa<C ANS"ER# NO? Article 62G of the !i il !ode readsH I!ontinuous and apparent easements are ac.uired either by irtue of a title or by prescription of then years.J 7rescription as a mode of ac.uisition re.uires the e5istence of the followingH *1+ capacity to ac.uire by prescriptionE *2+ a thing capable of ac.uisition by prescriptionE *2+ possession of the thing under certain conditionsE and *C+ lapse of time pro ided by law. Ac.uisiti e prescription may either be ordinary- in which case the possession must be in good faith and with )ust title- or e5traordinary- in which case there is neither good faith nor )ust title. In either case- there has to be possession which must be in the concept of an owner- public- peaceful- and uninterrupted. As a corollary- Article 1119 of the =!! pro ides thatH IActs of possessory character e5ecuted in irtue of license or by mere tolerance of the owner shall not be a ailable for the purposes of possession. In the present case- the facts re eal that =7!@s possession of that portion of Lose@s property where it erected the wooden posts and transmission lines was merely upon the tolerance of the latter. Accordingly- this permissi e use by =7! of that portion of the sub)ect property- no matter how long continued- will not create an easement of right of way by prescription. %NPC vs. Spouses Campos Ar. .R no. /02502 Aune 4;, 4662&

113

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San Beda CIVIL LAW

QUEST ON No?3# Te4esa owned a 4esidential lot wit@ t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 title in @e4 na;e? n 1'-*) s@e allowed Rosendo to 6onst456t a @o5se on t@e said lot and sta< t@e4ein wit@o5t an< 4entals t@e4e2o4e? n 1'--) s@e leased t@e 84o8e4t< to 0ienvenido Santos and assi1ned @e4 lease@old 4i1@ts to t@e Se6ond Q5eGon Cit< Develo8;ent 0an9) to w@i6@ s@e @ad an o5tstandin1 loan? Te4esa died in 1'.(? n de2e4en6e to @e4 wis@es) @e4 @ei4s allowed Rosendo to sta< in t@e 84o8e4t<? Rosendo died in 1''3? T@e @ei4s o2 Te4esa t@e4ea2te4 2iled an eDe6t;ent s5it a1ainst t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo a2te4 t@e late4 4e25sed to va6ate t@e 84o8e4t< des8ite 4e8eated de;ands? T@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo inte48osed t@e de2ense t@at Te4esa donated t@e 8a46el o2 land to Rosendo in 1'.-? T@e< 84od56ed as eviden6e t@e 8@oto6o8< o2 t@e deed o2 donation? An eBa;ination o2 t@e deed 4eveals t@at t@e sa;e is nota4iGed and a88ea4s to @ave 6o;8lied wit@ all t@e 4e:5isites o2 donation? $en6e) its validit<) a66o4din1 to t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo) ;5st Ae 84es5;ed? t a88ea4s @oweve4) t@at t@e title to t@e 84o8e4t< 4e;ained wit@ Te4esaH t@at t@e Deed o2 Donation was not 4e1iste4ed in t@e O22i6e o2 t@e Re1iste4 o2 DeedsH no4 was t@e deed annotated in t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 title? a/ Do t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo @ave t@e Aette4 4i1@t o2 8ossessionC A/ "@at a4e t@e essential ele;ents o2 a valid donationC 6/ s 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e Deed o2 Donation ne6essa4< 2o4 its validit<C ANS"ERS# a) NO? ,he fundamental principle is that a certificate of title ser es as e idence of an indefeasible and incontro ertible title to the property in fa or of the person whose name appears therein as the registered owner. ,he registered owner has the right to possesen)oy and dispose of the property without any limitations other than those imposed by law. "urthermore- the following facts and circumstances engender eritable doubts as to whether they ha e a better right of possessionH the fact that the title to the property remained with ,eresa- and that no new title had been issued in the name of >osendo because the deed was not registered in the 8ffice of the >egister of $eedsE the fact that the deed was not annotated at the dorsal portion of the certificate of titleE and the fact that it was only after eighteen years- after the heirs of >osendo were sued for e)ectmentthat this defense of donation came out for the first time. b+ ,he essential elements of donation are as followsH *a+ the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donorE *b+ the increase in the patrimony of the doneeE *c+ the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immo able property- the law further re.uires that the donation be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrumentE in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate instrument- it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form- to be noted in both instruments. c) NO? In order that the donation of an immo able property may be alid- it must be made in a public document. >egistration of the deed in the 8ffice of the >egister of $eeds or in the Assessor@s 8ffice is not necessary for it to be considered alid and official. >egistration does not est titleE it is merely e idence of such title o er a particular parcel of land. ,he necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected.

San 0eda Colle1e o2

Law

Obligations and Contracts


QUEST ON No? 1# Con6e86ion and @e4 siste4) Nieves we4e 6o>owne4s o2 a 8a46el o2 land? Nieves and @e4 @5sAand An1el 6onst456ted on t@e said 84o8e4t< a two>sto4e< 6o;;e46ial A5ildin1? Con6e86ion t@e4ea2te4 a6:5i4ed @e4 5ndivided s@a4e o2 t@e 84o8e4t< A< vi4t5e o2 a 6o54t o4de4 w@i6@ @ad Ae6o;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? S@e t@en 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 5nlaw25l detaine4 a1ainst Nieves and An1el w@i6@ was de6ided A< t@e MTC in @e4 2avo4? Con6e86ion s5Ase:5entl< eBe65ted a deed o2 aAsol5te sale 6ove4in1 @e4 5ndivided s@a4e to l5;inada w@o ;ade a 8a4tial 8a<;ent o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e and 84o;ised) 854s5ant

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to t@e 6ont4a6t) to 8a< t@e Aalan6e 58on delive4< A< Con6e86ion o2 t@e 6o44es8ondin1 6e4ti2i6ate o2 title? A2te4 t@e deat@ o2 Con6e86ion) l5;inada 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 t@e 4evival and eBe65tion o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e MTC in t@e 5nlaw25l detaine4 6ase? S@e alle1ed t@e4ein t@at s@e is t@e s566esso4 in inte4est o2 Con6e86ion) and as s56@) s@e a6:5i4ed t@e 4i1@t o2 a6tion to en2o46e t@e aAove;entioned de6ision o2 t@e MTC? Nieves and An1el) on t@e ot@e4@and) ;aintains t@at t@e 6o;8laint s@o5ld Ae dis;issed Ae6a5se Con6e86ion @ad not <et 8aid t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e o2 t@e 84o8e4t<) and as s56@) @ad not a6:5i4ed title ove4 t@e lot and t@e 4i1@t to evi6t t@e;? T@is is so Ae6a5se t@e< ;aintained t@at t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale eBe65ted A< Con6e86ion in 2avo4 o2 l5;inada was an eBe65to4<) and not an eBe65ted deedH @en6e) t@e 2ail54e o2 l5;inada to 8a< t@e Aalan6e o2 8546@ase 84i6e d54in1 t@e li2eti;e o2 Con6e8tion 4ende4ed t@e sale n5ll and void? l5;inada) t@e4ea2te4) 6onsi1ned Ae2o4e t@e 6o54t) a2te4 t@e la8se o2 +1 <ea4s 24o; t@e eBe65tion o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale) t@e a;o5nt 4e84esentin1 t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e and 2iled a ;otion 2o4 t@e eBe65tion o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e MTC in t@e 5nlaw25l detaine4 6ase? a/ Did l5;inadaEs 2ail54e to 8a< t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e 4ende4 t@e sale n5ll and voidC A/ "@at is t@e e22e6t o2 l5;inadaEs a6t o2 6onsi1nin1 t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e Ae2o4e t@e 6o54tC ANS"ERS# a) NO? In a perfected contract of sale of realty- the right to rescind the said contract depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the prescribed condition. ,he #upreme !ourt has held in a number of cases that the non-payment of the purchase price of property is a resolutory condition for which the remedy is either rescission or specific performance under Article 1191 of the =ew !i il !ode. ,his is true for reciprocal obligations where the obligation is a resolutory condition of the other. ,he endee is entitled to retain the purchase price or a part of the purchase price of realty if the endor fails to perform any essential obligation of the contract. #uch right is premised on the general principles of reciprocal obligations. Iluminada paid the downpayment of the purchase price. By the terms of the contractthe obligation of the endee to pay the balance of the purchase price ensued only upon the issuance of the certificate of title by the >egister of $eeds o er the property sold to and under the name of the endee- and deli ery thereof by the endor !oncepcion to the latter. !oncepcion failed to secure a certificate of title o er the property. When she died- her obligation to deli er the said title to the endee de ol ed upon her heirsincluding =ie es. ,he said heirs- including =ie es failed to do so- despite lapse of eighteen years since !oncepcion@s death. b+ ,he consignation by the endee of the purchase price of the property is sufficient to defeat the right of the petitioners to demand for a rescission of the said deed of absolute sale. It bears stressing that when the endee consigned part of the purchase price with he !ourt and secured title o er the property in her name- the heirs of !oncepcionincluding the petitioners- had not yet sent any notarial demand for the rescission of the deed of absolute sale to the endee- or filed any action for the rescission of the said deed with the appropriate court. Although Iluminada consigned consigned with the court an amount short of the purchase price- it cannot be claimed that !oncepcion was an unpaid seller because under the deed of sale- she was still obligated to transfer the property in the name of the endee- which she failed to do. According to Article 116? of the =!!H IIf a person obliged to do something fails to do it- the same shall be e5ecuted at his cost. ,he same rule shall be obser ed if he does it in contra ention of the tenor of the obligation. "urthermore- it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.J * .il vs Court of Appeals, .R No./4;465. Septem#er /4, 4662&

CIVIL LAW

Red Notes in Civil Law


113

QUEST ON No?+# Al24ed) an A5st4alian 6itiGen) ;et Ede4lina) a Fili8ina w@o was wo49in1 in A5st4alia as a ;asse5se? Ede4lina is ;a44ied to Kla5s) a %e4;an 6itiGen? "@en t@e two Ae6a;e 6lose) Al24ed 6onvin6ed Ede4lina to 4et54n to t@e P@ili88ines and estaAlis@ @e4 own A5siness

College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

t@e4e wit@ t@e 2o4;e4 84ovidin1 2o4 t@e 6a8ital? "@ile in t@e P@ili88ines) t@e two 8546@ased a n5;Ae4 o2 4eal estate wit@ t@e 5se o2 Al24edEs ;one< t@o51@ t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale desi1nated Ede4lina as t@e vendee? T@ei4 4elations@i8) @oweve4) did not wo49 o5t? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) Al24ed now de;ands t@at Ede4lina eBe65te t@e 6o44es8ondin1 deeds o2 t4ans2e4 ove4 t@e dis85ted 84o8e4ties in @is na;e so t@at @e 6an sell t@e sa;e at 85Ali6 a56tion and 4e6ove4 t@e val5e o2 t@e sa;e? t is @is 6ontention t@at sin6e it was @is ;one< w@i6@ was 5sed in 8546@asin1 t@e 84o8e4ties) t@e sa;e Aelon1s to @i; as t@e 4eal vendee? a/ "ill Al24ed Ae allowed to 4e6ove4 t@e 84o8e4ties on t@e Aasis o2 A4ti6le 1,1+ o2 t@e Civil CodeC A/ "ill @e Ae allowed to 4e6ove4 on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e a14ee;ent is not ille1al 8e4 se 854s5ant to A4ti6le 1,1-C 6/ "ill t@e denial o2 4elie2 to Al24ed not 45n 6o5nte4 to A4ti6le ++ o2 t@e New Civil CodeC ANS"ERS# a) NO? A contract that iolates the !onstitution and the law- is null and oid and ests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Alfred- being a party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and asB to ha e his illegal ob)ecti e carried out. 8ne who looses his money or property by Bnowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which in ol es his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. ,he law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreementE it lea es the parties where it finds them. 9nder Article 1C12 of the =ew !i il !ode- the petitioner cannot ha e the sub)ect properties deeded to him or allow him to reco er the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. '.uity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly- which- because of public policy- cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one party e.uals that of the other- the defendant is in the stronger positionS it signifies that in such situation- neither a court of e.uity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. b) NO? Alfred cannot find solace in Article 1C16 =!! which readsH IWhen the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited- and the prohibition by the law is designated for the protection of the plaintiff- he may- if public policy is thereby enhanced - reco er what he has paid or deli ered.J ,he pro ision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited- in order to benefit pri ate interests. It does not apply to contracts oid ab initio. ,he sales of three parcels of land in fa or of Alfred who is a foreigner is illegal per se. ,he transactions are oid ab initio because they were entered into in iolation of the !onstitution. ,o allow Alfred to reco er the properties or the money used in the purchase of the same would be sub ersi e of public policy. c) NO? ,he said pro ision is e5pressed in the ma5imH IDemo cum alterius deter detremento protestJ *=o person should un)ustly enrich himself at the e5pense of another+. An action for reco ery of what has been paid without )ust cause has been designated as an accion in rem erso. ,he pro ision does not apply if- as in this case- the action is proscribed by the !onstitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and un)ust to bar Alfred from filing an accion in rem erso o er the sub)ect properties- or from reco ering the money he paid for the sid properties- but as :ord Dansfield stated in the early case of %olman s LohnsonH Ithe ob)ection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant- sounds at all times ery ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his saBe that the ob)ection is e er allowedE but it is founded on general principles of policy- which the defendant has the ad antage of- contrary to the real )ustice- as between him and the plaintiff. %Bren8el vs Catito, .R No./0231<, Auly //, 4662& QUEST ON No?3# An1eli6a and @e4 6@ild4en we4e t@e 4e1iste4ed owne4s o2 3 8a46els o2 land? T@ese 84o8e4ties we4e tenanted and tilled A< 2a4;e4s? T@e said 2a4;e4s assi1ned t@ei4 4i1@ts to t@e land in 2avo4 o2 $e4;inio in 6onside4ation o2 P3*= s:; to Ae 8a<aAle w@en t@e le1al i;8edi;ents to t@e sale o2 t@e said land 6eased to eBist? $e4;inio de;anded 2o4 t@e i;8le;entation o2 t@e 6ont4a6t? T@e latte4) @oweve4) desisted and in2o4;ed $e4;inio t@at t@e< we4e 4es6indin1 t@e 6ont4a6t and t@e< will instead sell t@ei4 4i1@ts to t@e La6sonEs w@o o22e4ed @i; Aette4 te4;s? A4e t@e La6sonEs 15ilt< o2 inte42e4en6eC

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San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

Answe4# No? 9nder Art. 121C of the =!! any third person who induces another to iolate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. It has been held that the pleader has the burden of pro ingH 1+ the e5istence of a alid contractE 2+ Bnowledge by the third person of the e5istence of the contractE and 2+ interference by the third person in the contractual relation without legal )ustification. 8ne who is not a party to a contract and who interferes thereon is not necessarily an officious or malicious intermeddler. Where there was no malice in the interference of a contractand the impulse behind one@s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful moti es- a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested- and such interest moti ates his conduct- it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. #uch is the case at bar. *Tayag vs. "acson.R C /203;/ *arch 41, 4660&

Wills and Succession


QUEST ON No?1# On Se8te;Ae4 +*) 1'33) Pasto4 Li; ;a44ied R52ina L5<? D54in1 t@e ea4l< 8a4t o2 t@ei4 ;a44ia1e) Pasto4 estaAlis@ed a n5;Ae4 o2 2a;il< 6o48o4ations 5sin1 t@ei4 6onD51al 25nds? A;on1 t@ese 6o48o4ations was S9<line nte4national Co48o4ation w@e4ein t@e s8o5ses Li; we4e in6o48o4ato4s and e;8lo<ees? n 1'.1) R52ina 2iled a 8etition 2o4 le1al se8a4ation on t@e 14o5nd o2 in2idelit< a1ainst Pasto4? T@e 6o54t 14anted t@e sa;e and 58on ;otion o4de4ed t@e s@e4i22 to @ave t@e 84o8e4ties o2 S9<line levied to answe4 2o4 t@e awa4d o2 s588o4t 14anted to R52ina? On A515st +1) 1'(.) S8eed Dist4iA5tin1 Co48o4ation was 4e1iste4ed wit@ SEC wit@ Pasto4 as one o2 t@e in6o48o4ato4s? T@en on F5ne +1) 1''1) Lesli; Co48o4ation was also 4e1iste4ed wit@ SEC wit@ Pasto4 as t@e ;aDo4it< s@a4e@olde4? On F5ne 11) 1'',) Pasto4 died intestate and was s54vived A< @is wi2e w@o was t@e4ea2te4 a88ointed as s8e6ial ad;inist4at4iB o2 Pasto4Es estate? t a88ea4s t@at on two o66asions) Lesli; Co48o4ation sold to S8eed Dist4iA5tin1 Co48? 8a46els o2 land? U8on 9nowin1 t@is) R52ina 2iled a 6o;8laint a1ainst S8eed 2o4 t@e n5lli2i6ation o2 t@e deed o2 sale eBe65ted A< Lesli; in its 2avo4? S@e alle1ed t@at t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4ties) alt@o51@ 4e1iste4ed in t@e na;e o2 t@ose entities) we4e a6:5i4ed A< Pasto4 d54in1 t@ei4 ;a44ia1e? S@e 254t@e4 alle1ed t@at t@e sale was 5na5t@o4iGed sin6e at t@e ti;e o2 its eBe65tion) @e4 @5sAand w@o was ;aDo4 sto69@olde4) was al4ead< dead and 6o5ld no lon1e4 ;ani2est @is a884oval ove4 t@e sa;e? Can R52ina le1all< :5estion t@e validit< o2 t@e saleC Answe4# Yes. >ufina filed the complaint as one of the heirs of 7astor- who died intestate. #he wasin fact- the sur i ing spouse of the deceased- a compulsory heir by operation of law. ,he general rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called upon to succeed by operation of law to the inheritance without the need of further proceedings. 9nder Art. ??6- =!!- inheritance includes all the properties- rights and obligations of a party- not e5tinguished by his death. Although >ufina was appointed by the probate court as special administratri5 of the estate of 7astor- she had the rightapart from her being a special administratri5- to file the complaint against #peed for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale. A prior settlement of the estate or e en the appointment of >ufina as administratri5- is not necessary for any of 7astor@s heirs to ac.uire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death- they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. "rom the moment of 7astor@s death- all his rights not e5tinguished by his death were transmitted to his heirs. %Spee! Distri#uting Corp. vs. CA, .R No. /0321/, *arch /;, 4660&

Red Notes in Civil Law

Sales and Lease


QUEST ON No?1# A14i6o; leased its 45AAe4 8lantation to Pionee4 Ente484ises? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) A14i6o; te4;inated its e;8lo<ees in t@e 8lantation and 1ave t@e; t@ei4 se8a4ation 8a<?

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

"@ile Pionee4 was ;ana1in1 t@e 8lantation) so;e o2 A14i6o;Es seve4ed e;8lo<ees 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 ille1al dis;issal a1ainst A14i6o; and Pionee4 w@i6@ was de6ided A< t@e laAo4 a4Aite4 in 2avo4 o2 t@e e;8lo<ees? So;e individ5als 2en6ed 6e4tain 8o4tions o2 t@e 8lantation) went to t@e o22i6e o2 Pionee4 A4in1in1 taB de6la4ations and 6lai;ed t@at t@e< we4e t@e owne4s o2 t@e sa;e? Pionee4 de2a5lted in its 8a<;ent o2 t@e ;ont@l< 4ental? A14i6o; t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 s5; o2 ;one< wit@ da;a1es? n its answe4) Pionee4 ;aintained t@at s@e @ad t@e 4i1@t to s5s8end 8a<;ent o2 t@e 4entals sin6e A14i6o; 2ailed to ;aintain @e4 in 8ea6e25l and ade:5ate enDo<;ent o2 t@e leased 84o8e4t<? a/ Does A14i6o; @ave t@e oAli1ation to ;aintain t@e lessee in 8ea6e25l and ade:5ate enDo<;ent o2 t@e 84o8e4t<C A/ %4antin1 t@at t@e aAove oAli1ation eBists) was A14i6o; aAle to 6o;8l< wit@ t@e sa;eC ANS"ERS# a) YES? As lessor- the Agricom had the duty to maintain 7ioneer in the peaceful and ade.uate en)oyment of the leased premises. #uch duty was made as part of the contract of lease entered into by the parties. ' en if it had not been so- the lessor is still duty-bound under Article 16<C*2+ of the !i il !ode. b) YES? ,he duty to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and ade.uate en)oyment of the lease for the duration of the contract mentioned in Article 16<C *2+ is merely a warranty that the lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal- and not physical- possession. In the case at barno action to .uiet title was filed by any of the said claimants against 7ioneer during the time that it occupied the premises. When 7ioneer@s representati e saw that a portion of the leased premises was being fenced by the claimants- it had all the right to sue the intruders who had disturbed its physical possession as pro ided in Article 166C of the =ew !i il !ode. %owe er- 7ioneer did not file any suit against the claimants. 7atently- then7ioneer had not been disturbed in its legal possession of the property in derogation of Article 16<C of the =ew !i il !ode. %Chua Tee Dee vs Court of Appeals, .R No./21;4/. *ay 4;, 4660& QUEST ON No?+# O4lando oAtained a loan 24o; P@ili88ine Savin1s Aan9 8a<aAle wit@in a 8e4iod o2 one <ea4 in :5a4te4l< install;ents o2 P+')1'*?+(? T@e said loan was se654ed A< a 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e 6ove4in1 O4landoEs 84o8e4t<? On De6e;Ae4 +-) 1'(3) O4lando) as vendo4) and Ro1elio as vendee eBe65ted a Deed o2 Sale wit@ Ass5;8tion o2 Mo4t1a1e ove4 t@e said 84o8e4t<? A ;ont@ late4) O4lando eBe65ted a Cont4a6t to Sell involvin1 t@e sa;e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2 Ro1elio 2o4 P+3*)***?**? n t@e said do65;ent) @e oAli1ed @i;sel2 to eBe65te a deed o2 aAsol5te sale ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2 Ro1elio 58on t@e 25ll 8a<;ent o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e t@e4eo2? T@e 6ont4a6t 25t@e4 oAli1ed Ro1elio to 8a< t@e said a;o5nt to PS0 as 8a4t o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e? Ro1elio 8aid t@e 2i4st) se6ond and t@i4d :5a4te4l< install;ents in O4landoEs na;e wit@ PS0? $oweve4) on Nove;Ae4 +.) 1'(-) O4lando was noti2ied A< PS0 t@at @is loan wo5ld ;at54e on De6e;Ae4 +, o2 t@at <ea4? Fea4in1 t@at Ro1elio wo5ld not Ae aAle to 8a< t@e last install;ent) O4lando was 6o;8elled to 8a< t@e sa;e? O4lando sent a noti6e to Ro1elio t@at @e was 4ead< to eBe65te t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale and t54n ove4 t@e title to t@e 84o8e4t< 58on latte4Es 4e;ittan6e o2 t@e a;o5nt w@i6@ O4lando 8aid to PS0? On De6e;Ae4 +,) 1'(-) Ro1elio went to PS0 to 8a< t@e last install;ent and in2o4;ed t@e latte4 t@at O4lando @ad eBe65ted a deed o2 sale wit@ ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e in @is 2avo4? PS0 @oweve4 4e25sed to a66e8t t@e 8a<;ent and in2o4;ed Ro1elio t@at it was not Ao5nd A< t@e said deed? Ro1elio t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 s8e6i2i6 8e42o4;an6e a1ainst O4lando? a/ "@at is t@e nat54e o2 t@e 6ont4a6t ente4ed into Aetween O4lando and Ro1elioC A/ "@at is t@e e22e6t o2 Ro1elioEs 2ail54e in 8a<in1 t@e last install;ent to PS0C 6/ "@at 4e;ed<) i2 an<) is availaAle to Ro1elioC ANS"ERS# a) CONTRACT TO SELL? It bears stressing that 8rlando and >ogelio e5ecuted two interrelated contracts- isH the $eed of #ale with Assumption of Dortgage and the !ontract to #ell. ,o

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


determine the intention of the parties- the two contracts must be read and interpreted together. 9nder the two contracts- 8rlando bound and obliged himself to e5ecute a deed of absolute sale o er the property and transfer title thereon to >ogelio after the payment of the full purchase price of the property- inclusi e of the .uarterly installments due on the petitioner@s loan with 7#B. !onstruing the contracts together- it is e ident that the parties e5ecuted a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. It is well established that where the seller promised to e5ecute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of payment of the purchase price by the buyer- the agreement is contract to sell. b+ In contracts to sell- where ownership is retained by the seller until the payment of the price in full- such payment is a positi e suspensi e condition - failure of which is not really a breach but an e ent that pre ents the obligation of the endor 8rlando to con ey title in accordance with Article 113C of the !i il !ode. ,he non-fulfillment by >ogelio of his obligation to pay- which is a suspensi e condition to the obligation of 8rlando to sell and deli er the title to the property- rendered the contract to sell ineffecti e and without force and effect. ,he parties stand as if the conditional obligation had ne er e5isted. Article 1191 will not apply because it presupposes an obligation already e5tant. ,here can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-e5isting- the suspensi e condition not ha ing happened. c) >ogelio may reinstate the contract to sell by paying the amount paid by 8rlando to 7#B when the latter settled the last installment- and 8rlando may agree thereto and accept >ogelio@s late payment. In this case- 8rlando had already decided before and after >ogelio filed the complaint to accept the payment and to e5ecute the deed of absolute sale o er the property and cause the transfer of the title of the sub)ect property to >ogelio. %Rayos vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /2114<, Auly /0, 4660&

CIVIL LAW

Partnership !gency and "rusts


QUEST ON No?1# T@e @ei4s o2 Te6son and Eleosida a4e t@e owne4s o2 a 8a46el o2 land 6ove4ed A< TCT Nos? T>3-.-- and T>3-.,3 4es8e6tivel<? T@e aAove;entioned owne4s a4e 4e84esented A< Ma4<? On one o66asion) Ma4< ;et Antonio and A54elio w@o o22e4ed to 8546@ase t@e 84o8e4t<) o2 w@i6@ t@e 2o4;e4 a14eed? Antonio and A54elio t@e4ea2te4 de;anded t@at a deed o2 aAsol5te sale Ae eBe65ted A< Ma4< 854s5ant to t@ei4 ve4Aal a14ee;ent? "@en t@e said de;and 4ea6@ed Ma4<) s@e sent a lette4 to Antonio and A54elio in2o4;in1 t@e; t@at s@e is no lon1e4 sellin1 t@e 84o8e4t< as s@e was en6o5nte4in1 84oAle;s wit@ t@e tenants t@e4eon? Antonio and A54elio s5Ase:5entl< 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 s8e6i2i6 8e42o4;an6e wit@ da;a1es a1ainst Ma4< and t@e 4e1iste4ed owne4s o2 t@e 8a46els o2 land 14o5nded on t@e alle1ed 8e42e6ted 6ont4a6t o2 sale as eviden6ed A< t@e lette4 sent to t@e; A< Ma4<? a/ "as t@e4e a 8e42e6ted 6ont4a6t o2 saleC A/ "as t@e lette4 sent A< %4a6e a s522i6ient note o4 ;e;o4and5; o2 t@e 8e42e6ted 6ont4a6t to 4e;ove t@e sa;e 24o; t@e 6ove4a1e o2 t@e stat5te o2 24a5dsC ANS"ERS# a) NO? ,here is no documentary e idence that the respondent-owners authori(ed respondent Dary to sell their properties to another. Article 13?3 of the =ew !i il !ode pro ides that a special power of attorney is necessary to enter into a contract by which the ownership of an immo able is transmitted or ac.uired either gratuitously or for a aluable consideration- or to create or con ey real rights o er immo able property- or for any other act of strict dominion. Any sale of real property by one purporting to be the agent of the registered owner without any authority therefore in writing from the said owner is null and oid. %e declarations of the agent alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or e5tent of her authority. b) NO? !ontrary to Antonio and Aurelio@s contention- the letter sent by ;race is not a note or memorandum within the conte5t of Article 1CG2 *2+ of the =ew !i il !ode because it does not contain the followingH *a+ all the essential terms and conditions of the sale of the propertiesE *b+ an accurate description of the property sub)ect of the saleE and *c+ the names of the respondents-owners of the properties. %"iton ua vs Bernan!e8, .R No./0<//5. April /0, 4660&

113

Red Notes in Civil Law

College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

Credit transactions
QUEST ON No?1# T@e s8o5ses Se44ano oAtained a loan 24o; %S S se654ed A< a 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e 58on a @o5se and lot owned A< t@e 2o4;e4? T@e s8o5ses Se44ano eBe65ted on F5ne 3) 1'-' a deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ 8a4tial ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2 t@e s8o5ses %eli w@o i;;ediatel< too9 8ossession o2 t@e sa;e? T@e s8o5ses %eli 2ailed to settle t@ei4 oAli1ation? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) %S S 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 t@e 4es6ission o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ 8a4tial ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e? T@e 6o54t t@e4ea2te4 o4de4ed t@e 4es6ission o2 t@e said deed? T@e s8o5ses %eli elevated t@e 6ase to t@e Co54t o2 A88eals? D54in1 t@e 8enden6< o2 t@e a88eal) %S S 2o4e6losed t@e 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e ove4 t@e 84o8e4t<? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale) t@e 84o8e4t< was awa4ded to %S S as t@e @i1@est Aidde4 and a 6e4ti2i6ate o2 sale was iss5ed to it on A515st 3*) 1'(-? Un9nown to Aot@ t@e s8o5ses Se44ano and t@e Co54t o2 A88eals) t@e s8o5ses %eli 8aid t@e 4ede;8tion 84i6e on O6toAe4 3*) 1'(. and a 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4ede;8tion was eBe65ted A< %S S in t@ei4 2avo4? T@e Co54t o2 A88eals @oweve4 dis;issed t@e a88eal and t@e sa;e Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? &o8tional/ T@e s8o5ses %eli t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 8etition 2o4 6e4tio4a4i 84a<in1 2o4 t@e n5lli2i6ation o2 t@e o4de4 o2 t@e t4ial 6o54t? T@e< alle1ed t@at w@en t@e< 8aid t@e 4ede;8tion 84i6e to t@e %S S) t@ei4 a88eal o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e lowe4 6o54t was still 8endin1 Ae2o4e t@e CA? Conse:5entl<) 5nde4 t@e te4;s o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e w@i6@ was still standin1 at t@at ti;e) t@e< we4e i8so 2a6to s5A4o1ated to t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e s8o5ses Se44ano as ;o4t1a1o4s o2 t@e 84o8e4t<H @en6e) t@e< Ae6a;e owne4s o2 t@e 84o8e4t< and we4e entitled to t@e 8ossession t@e4eo2? Did t@e a6t o2 t@e s8o5ses %eli in 4edee;in1 t@e 84o8e4t< and o2 %S S in eBe65tin1 t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4ede;8tion in 2avo4 o2 t@e 2o4;e4 o8e4ated to vest in t@e; t@e owne4s@i8 ove4 t@e sa;eC ANS"ER# NO? Before the lapse of the one year period- the mortgagor-debtor remains the owner of the property. ,he right ac.uired by the purchaser at public auction is merely inchoate until the period of redemption has e5pired without the right being e5ercised by the redemptioner. #uch right becomes absolute only after the e5piration of the redemption period without the right of redemption ha ing been e5ercised. In this case- there is no showing that that the sheriff@s certificate of sale in fa or of the ;#I# has been registered in the 8ffice of the register of $eed and if so- when it was in fact registered in the said office. It cannot thus be argued that when the spouses ;eli paid the redemption price in full payment of the account of the spouses #errano- the one year period to redeem the property had by then lapsed. %ence- the spouses #errano remained the owners of the property. ,he ;#I# ne er ac.uired title o er the property and could not ha e con eyed and transferred ownership o er the same when it e5ecuted the certificate of redemption to and in the name of the spouses #errano. %Serrano vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /22<<2, Decem#er /6, 4662& QUEST ON No?+# F4an9lin was as9ed A< @is 24iend An1eles to @el8 A4t54o in in6o48o4atin1 @is A5siness A< de8ositin1 a 6e4tain a;o5nt o2 ;one< in t@e Aan9 a66o5nt o2 Ste4ela Ma49etin1? An1eles ass54ed !ives t@at @e 6o5ld wit@d4aw t@e said a;o5nt 24o; t@e sa;e a66o5nt in a ;ont@s ti;e? Rel<in1 on t@e a2o4e;entioned ass54an6es and 4e84esentations) F4an9lin iss5ed a 6@e69 in t@e a;o5nt o2 P+**)***?** in 2avo4 o2 Ste4ela Ma49etin1? F4an9lin t@e4ea2te4 went to P4od56e4Es 0an9 to ve4i2< i2 @is ;one< was still inta6t? $e was @oweve4 in2o4;ed t@at 8a4t o2 t@e ;one< in t@e a66o5nt @ad Aeen wit@d4awn A< A4t54o and t@at t@e 4e;ainin1 P'*)***?** 6o5ld not Ae wit@d4awn sin6e it @ad to answe4 2o4 so;e 8ostdated 6@e69s iss5ed A< A4t54o? A4t54o iss5ed a 8ostdated 6@e69 in t@e a;o5nt o2 P+1+)***?** in 2avo4 o2 F4an9lin w@i6@ was @oweve4 dis@ono4ed 58on 84esent;ent? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) F4an9lin 2iled an a6tion 2o4 4e6ove4< o2 s5; o2 ;one<? a/ "as t@e t4ansa6tion Aetween F4an9lin and A4t54o one o2 loan o4 6o;;odat5;C A/ Can a 6ons5;aAle t@in1 Ae a s5ADe6t o2 6o;;odat5;C

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


ANS"ER# a) COMMODATUM? "ranBlin agreed to deposit his money in the sa ings account of #terela specifically for the purpose of maBing it appear that the same had sufficient capitali(ation for incorporation- with the promise that the amount shall be returned within thirty days. "ranBlin merely accommodated Arturo by lending his money without consideration as fa or to his good friend Angeles. It was howe er clear to the parties that the money will not be remo ed from #terela@s sa ings accountand would be returned to "ranBlin after thirty days. Arturo@s attemps to return to "ranBlin the amount of 72GG-GGG.GG together with an additional 712-GGG.GG- allegedly representing interest on the mutuum- did not con ert the transaction from the commodatum into a mutuum because such was not the intent of the parties and because the additional 712-GGG.GG corresponds to the fruits of the lending of the 72GG-GGG.GG. Article 192< of the !i il !ode e5pressly states that Ithe bailee in commodatum ac.uires the use if the thing loaned but not the fruits. As such- it was only proper for Arturo to remit to "ranBlin the interest accruing to the latter@s money deposited with 7roducer@s BanB. b) YES? ,here are some instances where a commodatum may ha e for its ob)ect a consumable thing. Article 1926 of the =ew !i il !ode pro ides that I!onsummable goods may be the sub)ect of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the ob)ect- as when it is merely for distribution.J ,hus- if consumable goods are loaned only for purposes of e5hibition- or when the intention of the parties is to lend consumable goods and to ha e the ery same goods returned at the end of the period agreed upon- the loan is a commodatum and not a mutuum. %Pro!ucers ,an$ of the Philippines vs CA, .R No.//1240, Be#ruary /3, 4662& QUEST ON No?3# S58e4lines T4ans8o4tation Co? de6ided to a6:5i4e 2ive new A5ses 24o; Dia;ond Moto4s? CC Leasin1 a14eed to 2inan6e t@e 8546@ase o2 t@e said A5ses in t@e a;o5nt o2 P13 Million via a loan 58on t@e 6ondition t@at t@e A5ses s@all Ae 5sed as se654it< 2o4 t@e loan? S58e4lines @oweve4 de2a5lted in t@e 8a<;ent o2 its oAli1ation to CC? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) CC eBt4aD5di6iall< 2o4e6losed t@e 6@attel ;o4t1a1e? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale) CC o22e4ed a Aid o2 P. Million 2o4 t@e ;oto4 ve@i6les and was de6la4ed t@e winnin1 Aidde4) 4es5ltin1 in t@e de2i6ien6< o2 P- Million 24o; t@e total a;o5nt o2 t@e loan? a/ s A4ti6le 1,(, &3/ o2 t@e Civil Code a88li6aAle in t@e 84esent 6aseC A/ s S58e4lines still liaAle 2o4 t@e P- Million de2i6ien6<C ANS"ERS# a) NO? Article 1C3C *2+ of the =ew !i il !ode is inapplicable to the instant transaction between the parties. It was $iamond Dotors and not I!! which sold the sub)ect buses to #uperlines. =o e idence had been presented by #uperlines to show that I!! bought the said buses from $iamond Dotors !orporation under a special arrangement and that I!! sold the buses to #uperlines. Article 1C3C *2+ is applicable only where there is endor- endee relationship between the parties and since I!! did not sell the buses to #uperlines- the latter cannot in oBe the said law. b) YES? Applying the !hattel Dortgage :aw- it is settled that if in an e5tra-)udicial foreclosure of a chattel mortgage a deficiency e5ists- an independent ci il action may be instituted for the reco ery of the said deficiency. ,o deny the mortgagee the right to maintain an action to reco er the deficiency after foreclosure of the chattel mortgage would be to o erlooB the fact that the chattel mortgage is only gi en as security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure of payment. Both the !hattel Dortgage :aw and Act 212< go erning e5tra-)udicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage- do not contain any pro ision- e5pressly or impliedly- precluding the mortgagee from reco ering deficiency of the principal obligation. %Superlines Transportation Company vs ICC "easing an! Binancing Corporation, .R No. /165;2, Be#ruary 4<, 4662&

CIVIL LAW

Red Notes in Civil Law

"orts and #amages


QUEST ON No?1# E44ol was 2o5nd 15ilt< Ae<ond 4easonaAle do5At A< t@e RTC o2 Ro;Alon 2o4 t@e ;54de4) :5ali2ied A< aA5se o2 s58e4io4 st4en1t@) o2 AleDand4o? T@e 6o54t senten6ed @i; to s522e4 t@e 8enalt< o2 4e6l5sion 8e48et5a and o4de4ed @i; to 8a< t@e @ei4s o2 AleDand4o t@e

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

2ollowin1# a/ P3*)***?** as 6ivil inde;nit<H A/ a6t5al da;a1es Aased on t@e testi;on< t@at t@e @ei4s in6544ed A54ial and ot@e4 eB8enses as a 6onse:5en6e o2 AleDand4oEs deat@H and 6/ P+3)***?** as eBe;8la4< da;a1es? a/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 P3*)***?** as 6ivil inde;nit<C A/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 a6t5al da;a1esC 6/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 eBe;8la4< da;a1esC ANS"ERS# YES? !onformably to recent )urisprudence- the amount of 7<G-GGG.GG for ci il indemnity should be sustained. Artcile 22G6 of the !i il !ode pro ides that when death occurs as a result of a crime- the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified without need of any proof thereof. b) NO? While there was testimony that the heirs incurred burial and other e5penses resulting from the death of Ale)andro- no competent e idence was presented to pro e his claim. 9nder Artile 2199 of the !i il !ode- a party is entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly pro ed. 8nly substantiated an pro en e5penses- or those that appear to ha e been genuinely incurred in connection with the death - waBe or burial of the ictim will be recogni(ed. %owe er- under Article 222C of the same !ode- te;8e4ate da;a1es may be reco ered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot- from the nature of the case- be pro ed with certainty. In the present case- the heirs of Ale)andro clearly incurred funeral and burial e5penses. %ence- the award of temperate damages is )ustified. c) YES? ;i en the attendance of the .ualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strengththe award of e5emplary damages in the amount of 72<-GGG.GG to the heirs of the ictim in accordance with Article 222G of the !i il !ode- is in order. %People vs "achica, .R No./2/3/1. Septem#er 2, 4662& a) QUEST ON No?+# Ia;Aoan1a Develo8;ent Co48o4ation &IDC/ oAtained 24o; United Co6on5t Plante4s 0an9 &UCP0/ in w@i6@ t@e s8o5ses Teo2ilo Ra;os) S4? and A;elita Ra;os a6ted as s54eties? Teo2ilo S4? was t@e EBe65tive O22i6e4 o2 t@e 1lesia ni C4isto? Fo4 2ail54e o2 IDC to settle its oAli1ation) UCP0 2iled a 6o;8laint &Civil Case 1-,33/ 2o4 a s5; o2 ;one< a1ainst it and t@e s54eties? F5d1;ent was 4ende4ed in 2avo4 o2 UCP0? A w4it o2 eBe65tion was t@e4ea2te4 iss5ed w@i6@ 6ontained t@e na;e Teo2ilo Ra;os? n t@e 84o6ess o2 i;8le;entin1 t@e aAove w4it) UCP0 was in2o4;ed A< one o2 its a884aise4s t@at t@e< @ave lo6ated a @o5se and lot 6ove4ed A< TCT +.31-. owned A< Teo2ilo C? Ra;os) P4esident and C@ai4;an o2 t@e 0o4ad o2 Di4e6to4s o2 t@e Ra;d5st4ial Co48o4ation) and ;a44ied to ReAe66a Ra;os? Meanw@ile) Ra;d5st4ial Co48? w@o was in need o2 ;one< to 8a4ti6i8ate in a Aiddin1 84oDe6t o2 San Mi15el Co48o4ation) a88lied 2o4 a loan wit@ UCP0 5sin1 t@e @o5se and lot owned A< Teo2ilo C? Ra;os as 6ollate4al t@e4e2o4e? M56@ to t@ei4 s5484ise) t@e< we4e in2o4;ed A< UCP0 t@at it @ad to @old in aAe<an6e an< a6tion on its loan a88li6ation Ae6a5se a noti6e o2 lev< was annotated on t@e title o2 t@e 84o8e4t< Aelon1in1 to Teo2ilo C? Ra;os? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) Teo2ilo C? Ra;os @as to 45s@ to t@e @os8ital d5e to @<8e4tension 84oAle;s and Ra;d5st4ial Co48o4ation 2o42eited its 6@an6es to 8a4ti6i8ate in t@e Aiddin1? Teo2ilo C? Ra;os t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 6o;8laint 84a<in1 t@at D5d1;ent Ae 4ende4ed o4de4in1 UCP0 to 8a< ;o4al and eBe;8la4< da;a1es on a66o5nt o2 its ne1li1en6e? a/ "as UCP0 ne1li1entC A/ s t@e awa4d o2 ;o4al da;a1es 84o8e4C 6/ s t@e awa4d o2 eBe;8la4< da;a1es 84o8e4C ANS"ERS# a) YES? In determining whether or not the petitioner acted negligently- the constant test isH I$id the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would ha e used in the same situation? If not- then he is guilty of negligence.J

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


9!7B has access to more facilities in confirming the identity of their )udgment debtors. It should ha e acted more cautiously- especially since some uncertainty had been reported by the appraiser whom it had tasBed to maBe erifications. It appears that 9!7B treated the uncertainty as a flimsy matter. It placed more importance on the information regarding the marBetability and marBet alue of the property- utterly disregarding the identity of the registered owner thereof. "urthermore- the name of the )udgment debtor in !i il !ase 16C<2 was ,eofilo >amos- #r.. ,he name of the owner of the property co ered by ,!, 2?<16? was ,eofilo !. >amos. It beho ed upon 9!7B to ascertain whether ,eofilo >amos #r. in !i il !ase 16C<2 was the same person who appeared as the owner of the property co ered by the said title. If the petitioner had done so- it should ha e surely disco ered that the respondent was not the surety and the )udgment debtor in !i il !ase 16C<2. 9!7B failed to do so- and merely assumed that the respondent and the )udgment debtor ,eofilo >amos #r. were one and the same person. b) YES? "or the award of moral damages to be granted- the following must e5istH *1+ there must be an in)ury clearly sustained by the claimant- whether physical- mental- or psychologicalE *2+ there must be a culpable act or omission factually establishedE *2+ the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the pro5imate cause of the in)ury sustained by the claimantE and *C+ the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the !i il !ode. In the case at bar- all the four re.uisites are present. "irst- ,eofilo !. >amos sustained in)uries in that his physical health and cardio- ascular ailment were aggra atedE his fear that his one and only property would be foreclosed- hounded him endlesslyE and his reputation as mortgagor has been tarnished. #econd- the annotation of the notice of le y on the ,!, of ,eofilo !. >amos was wrongful- arising as it did from 9!7B@s negligent act of allowing the le y without erifying the identity of its )udgment debtor. ,hird- such wrongful le y was the pro5imate cause of ,eofilo@s misery. "ourth- the award for damages is predicated on article 2219 of the !i il !ode- particularly =o. 1G thereof *Acts and actions referred to in Article 21- 26- 2?- 23- 29- 2G- 22- 2C- and 2<+. c) NO? ,eofilo !. >amos failed to show that 9!7B acted with malice and bad faith. It is a re.uisite in the grant of e5emplary damages that the act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton- fraudulent- or male olent manner. QUEST ON No? 3# T@e RTC o2 Malolos) 05la6an) 6onvi6ted T4inidad) Sa;8a1a) and Co4ona o2 ;54de4 and was senten6ed a66o4din1l<? As to t@e 6ivil liaAilit< o2 t@e a665sed) t@e t4ial 6o54t awa4ded) a;on1 ot@e4s) t@e s5; o2 P3**)*** 2o4 loss o2 ea4nin1 6a8a6it< o2 t@e vi6ti; Aased solel< on t@e testi;on< o2 Fose8@ine) t@e vi6ti;Es da51@te4? "as t@e awa4d 84o8e4C Answe4# No? ,he award of 7<GG-GGG to the heirs of the ictim for the latter@s unearned income is barren of factual basis. ,he prosecution was mandated to adduce documentary e idence to pro e the same. ,he bare testimony of Losephine is not sufficient basis for the award. !ompensation for lost income is in the nature of damages- and re.uires ade.uate proof thereof. "or loss of income due to death- there must be unbiased proof of the deceased@s a erage income as well as proof of a erage e5penses. ,he award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceasedE that is the total income less a erage e5penses. =o proof of the ictim@s a erage e5penses was adduced in e idenceE as such- there can be no reliable estimate of lost earnings. Indeed- the award of the trial court was based merely on speculation and surmises. %People vs. Sampaga, .R No. /23<42, *arch /4, 4660&

CIVIL LAW

Red Notes in Civil Law

Land "itles and #eeds


QUEST ON No?1# An1el 2iled a 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation o2 a 8a46el o2 land on F5ne ++) 1'', 6lai;in1 t@at @e @as Aeen in a6t5al) o8en) 6ontin5o5s and noto4io5s 8ossession) in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 ove4 t@e sa;e? t a88ea4s t@at @e li9ewise 2iled a 2o4es@o4e lease a88li6ation ove4 t@e sa;e land in 1'..? D54in1 t@e t4ial) t@e 6o54t o4de4ed t@e LRA and t@e CENRO to 2ile wit@

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it a 4e8o4t on t@e stat5s o2 t@e s5ADe6t land? T@e 6o54t t@e4ea2te4 4ende4ed a de6ision on Ma< 3 1''3 14antin1 t@e 8etition? T@e said de6ision Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? T@e O22i6e o2 t@e Soli6ito4 1ene4al s5Ase:5entl< 2iled a 8etition 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 t@e aAove D5d1;ent on t@e 14o5nd t@at Aased on t@e 4e8o4t o2 t@e LRA w@i6@ was 4e6eived A< it on F5ne ++) 1''3) t@e land a88lied 2o4 is 2o4es@o4e land? a/ "@at is t@e nat54e and 6lassi2i6ation o2 2o4es@o4e landC A/ "ill t@e a6tion o2 t@e Re85Ali6 t@4o51@ t@e OS% 84os8e4C ANS"ERS# a) NO? "oreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marBs and is alternati ely wet and dry to the flow of the tide. It is that part of the land ad)acent to the sea- which is alternati ely co ered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. "oreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of pri ate appropriation. b) YES? ' en if the decision of the >,! has become final and e5ecutory- the action for annulment of )udgment should be sustained since it is impressed with public interest. ,he #tate has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by- or estopped from- the mistaBes or negligent acts of its officials or agents- mush more- non-suited as a result thereof. "urthermore- Angel had in fact filed a foreshore lease application in 19?? and paid the corresponding fees thereon. ,here is therefore doubt to Angel@s claim that he had been in actual- open- notorious- and continuous possession in the concept of an owner. %Repu#lic vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /452/5, Aune 41, 4660& QUEST ON No?+# On De6e;Ae4 +.) 1'.-) F4an6is6o 2iled a 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e t@4ee 8a46els o2 land? $e alle1ed t@e4ein t@at t@e4e we4e @a4dl< an< Ai1 t4ees in t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< and t@at @e and @is 84ede6esso4s>in>inte4est even 8lanted Aananas) 6assava) 6o6on5t t4ees and 6a;otes on t@e sa;e? $e 254t@e4 alle1ed t@at @e @ad Aeen in a6t5al) o8en) noto4io5s and 6ontin5o5s 8ossession o2 t@e 84o8e4t< in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4? T@e a88li6ation was o88osed A< t@e Di4e6to4 o2 Lands on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< was 2o4est land and was onl< 4e6lassi2ied as alienaAle and dis8osaAle onl< on A84il 1-) 1'.3? a/ S@o5ld t@e 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation Ae 14antedC A/ s t@e aAsen6e o2 Ai1 t4ees 6on6l5sive as 4e1a4ds to t@e 6lassi2i6ation o2 a 8a46el o2 land as not Aelon1in1 to 2o4est landC ANS"ERS# a) NO? 9nder #ection 6 of !ommonwealth Act =o.1C1- the classification and reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable- mineral or forest land is the prerogati e of the '5ecuti e $epartment. ,he rule on the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. "rancisco failed to adduce in e idence any certification from the Bureau of :ands or the Bureau of "orestry to the effect that the property is alienable or disposable. "urthermore- since the property was reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April 16- 19?2 and "rancisco filed his application only on $ecember 2?- 19?6- he irrefragably failed to pro e his possession of the property for the re.uisite thirty *2G+-year period. b) NO? A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may ha e stripped it of its forest co er. 7arcels of land classified as forest land may actually be co ered with grass or planted to crops by 7aingin culti ators or other farmers. I"orest :andsJ do not ha e to be in the mountains or in out of the way places. #wampy areas co ered by mangro e trees- nipa palms and other trees growing in bracBish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. ,he classification is descripti e of its legal nature or status and does not ha e to be descripti e of what the land actually looBs liBe. %=arate vs Director of "an!s, .R No. /2/16/, Auly /0, 4660& QUEST ON No?3# T@e s8o5ses I5l5eta oAtained 24o; %S S va4io5s loans se654ed A< 4eal estate ;o4t1a1es ove4 8a46els o2 land? T@e s8o5ses I5l5eta 2ailed to 8a< t@ei4 loans w@i6@ 84o;8ted

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


%S S to 2o4e6lose t@e 4eal estate ;o4t1a1es? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale) so;e o2 t@e ;o4t1a1ed 84o8e4ties we4e awa4ded to %S S? $oweve4) so;e lots w@i6@ we4e 6ove4ed A< t@e ;o4t1a1ed titles we4e eB84essl< eB6l5ded 24o; t@e a56tion sin6e t@ose t@at we4e sold we4e s522i6ient to 8a< 2o4 all t@e ;o4t1a1e deAts? T@is notwit@standin1) %S S in6l5ded t@e eB6l5ded lots w@en it eBe65ted on Nove;Ae4 +3) 1'.3 an A22idavit o2 Consolidation o2 Owne4s@i8 on t@e Aasis o2 w@i6@) 6e4ti2i6ates o2 title ove4 t@e sa;e we4e iss5ed in t@e na;e o2 %S S? I5l5eta t@e4ea2te4 t4ans2e44ed @is 4i1@ts ove4 t@e eB6l5ded lots to Ed5a4do in 1'(' w@o 6onse:5entl< de;anded 24o; %S S t@e 4et54n o2 t@e said eB6l5ded lots? Ed5a4do t@en 2iled on Ma< .) 1''* a 6o;8laint 2o4 4e6onve<an6e o2 4eal estate a1ainst t@e %S S? a/ Can %S S le1all< 6lai; owne4s@i8 ove4 t@e eB6l5ded 84o8e4ties on t@e Aasis o2 t@e 6e4ti2i6ates o2 title ove4 t@e sa;e w@i6@ we4e iss5ed in its na;eC A/ $as t@e a6tion 2o4 4e6onve<an6e 84es64iAedC ANS"ERS# a) NO? ' en if titles o er the lots had been issued in the name of the ;#I#- still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion o er them because indefeasibility of title under the ,orrens system does not attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation. ,he fraud committed by ;#I# in the form of concealment of the e5istence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their e5clusion from the foreclosure sale made ;#I# holders in bad faith. It is well settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud. b) NO? Article 1C<6 of the !i il !ode pro idesH If the property is ac.uired through mistaBe or fraud- the person obtaining it is- by force of law- considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. An action for recon eyance based on implied or constructi e trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title o er the property. ,he general rule that the disco ery of fraud is deemed to ha e taBen place upon the registration of real property because it is Iconsidered a constructi e notice to all personsJ does not apply in this case. ,he case in point is Samonte vs Court of Appeals where the #upreme !ourt recBoned the prescripti e period for the filing of the action based on implied trust from the actual disco ery of the fraud. #antiago came Bnow of ;#I#@ fraudulent acts only in 1939 and the complaint was filed in 199G. "ollowing the !ourt@s pronouncement in Samonte- the institution of the action for recon eyance was thus well within the prescripti e period. %.SIS vs Santiago, .R No. /11465, Dcto#er 4<, 4662& QUEST ON No? ,# n A515st 1'3*) t@e Re85Ali6 o2 t@e P@ili88ines 2iled an a88li6ation wit@ t@e 6adast4al 6o54t 6lai;in1 owne4s@i8 ove4 6e4tain 84o8e4ties w@i6@ 6ove4ed Lot ,3+'? %5ille4;o 2iled an answe4 6lai;in1 t@e4ein a 4i1@t ove4 Lot ,3+'? %5ille4;o died d54in1 t@e 8enden6< o2 t@e 6ase? %4e1o4io) w@o 6lai;ed to Ae t@e onl< son o2 %5ille4;o) s5Astit5ted t@e latte4) and to @i;) Lot ,3+' was adD5di6ated A< t@e 6o54t? T@e de6ision Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? On F5l< () 1'(3) OCT No? *>-)131 was iss5ed in t@e na;e o2 %4e1o4io? So;eti;e t@e4ea2te4) t@e A4ot@e4s and siste4s o2 %5ille4;o 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 4e6ove4< o2 8ossession wit@ da;a1es a1ainst %4e1o4io) alle1in1 t@at %5ille4;o died sin1le and wit@o5t iss5e and t@at %4e1o4io oAtained title to t@e 84o8e4t< t@4o51@ 24a5d de6eit and 14oss ;is4e84esentation? T@e< 84a<ed t@at %4e1o4ioEs title Ae 6an6elled and t@e 84o8e4t< Ae 4e6onve<ed to t@e;? A2te4 t@e t4ial) t@e 6o54t de6la4ed t@at %4e1o4io @as not s522i6ientl< 84oved t@at @e is t@e son o2 %5ille4;o A5t 45led t@at @e @as t@e 4i1@t o2 8ossession o2 t@e dis85ted 84o8e4t<? s %4e1o4io entitled to t@e 8ossession o2 t@e dis85ted 84o8e4t<C ANS"ER# YES? ;regorio was able to obtain a title in his name o er the .uestioned property after the cadastral proceedings instituted by the >epublic. ,his ,orrens title is now a conclusi e e idence of his ownership of the sub)ect land. After the e5piration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration- the said certificate of title became incontro ertible. In fine- whether or not his title was obtained fraudulently is beyond the competence of the #upreme !ourt to determine. ,he issue should ha e been raised during the proceeding before the cadastral court. A ,orrens title cannot be collaterally attacBed- the issue on the alidity of title- i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be raised in an action e5pressly instituted for

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that purpose. ,he prayer for the cancellation of ;regorio@s title and the recon eyance of the same to brothers and sisters of ;uillermo is legally impossible. ,o sustain the said action would be inconsistent with the rule that the act of registration is the operati e act that con eys a parcel of land to its registered owner under the ,orrens system. What we are emphasi(ing is that- although ;regorio has not sufficiently pro ed his filiation to the late ;uillermo- the fact that he has a legal title o er the sub)ect land entitles him to possession thereof- pending the final determination of the alidity of the title issued to him in an appropriate proceeding.

DOCTR NES OF SELECTED LANDMARK CASES N C ! L LA"


Persons and Family Relations
"A !ER OF R %$TS A sti85lation 4e:5i4in1 t@e 4e6i8ient o2 a s6@ola4s@i8 14ant to waive @is 4i1@t to t4ans2e4 to anot@e4 s6@ool) 5nless @e 4e25nds t@e e:5ivalent o2 @is s6@ola4s@i8 in 6as@ is n5ll and void? T@e s6@ool 6on6e4ned oAvio5sl< 5nde4stands s6@ola4s@i8 awa4ds as a A5siness s6@e;e desi1ned to in64ease t@e A5siness 8otential o2 an ed56ational instit5tion? T@5s) 6on6eived) it is not onl< in6onsistent wit@ so5nd 8oli6<) A5t also wit@ 1ood ;o4als? %Cui &s. !rellano Uni&ersity' ACTS CONTRA 0ONUS MORES A88l<in1 A4t? +1) t@e S584e;e Co54t 45led t@at a ;a44ied ;an @ad sed56ed a 1i4l t@4o51@ an in1enio5s and t4i69< s6@e;e) i?e? on t@e 84eteBt o2 tea6@in1 @e4 @ow to 84a< t@e 4osa4<) to t@e eBtent o2 ;a9in1 @e4 2all in love wit@ @i;? !e4il<) @e @as 6o;;itted an inD54< to t@e 1i4lEs 2a;il< in a ;anne4 6ont4a4< to ;o4als) 1ood 65sto;s and 85Ali6 8oli6<? %Pe &s Pe' $oweve4) t@e S584e;e Co54t denied t@e awa4d o2 ;o4al da;a1es Aased on t@e 2a6t t@at 2o4 one <ea4) 24o; 1'3(>1'3') t@e 8lainti22) a wo;an o2 ad5lt a1e) ;aintained inti;ate seB5al 4elations wit@ de2endant) wit@ 4e8eated a6ts o2 inte46o54se? S56@ 6ond56t is in6o;8atiAle wit@ t@e idea o2 sed56tion? Plainl<) t@e4e is @e4e vol5nta4iness and ;5t5al 8assionH 2o4 @ad t@e 8lainti22 Aeen de6eived) @ad s@e s544ende4ed eB6l5sivel< Ae6a5se o2 t@e de6eit) a4t25l 8e4s5asions and wiles o2 de2endant) s@e wo5ld not @ave a1ain <ielded to @is e;A4a6es) ;56@ less 2o4 one <ea4 wit@o5t eBa6tin1 ea4l< 25l2ill;ent o2 t@e alle1ed 84o;ises o2 ;a44ia1e and wo5ld @ave 65t s@o4t all seB5al 4elations 58on 2indin1 t@at de2endant did not intend to 25l2ill @is 84o;ises? $en6e) no 6ase is ;ade 5nde4 A4t? +1 o2 Civil Code? %"an(anco &s C!' "@ile a A4ea6@ o2 84o;ise to ;a44< is not a6tionaAle) it @as Aeen @eld t@at to 2o4;all< set a weddin1 and 1o t@4o51@ and s8end 2o4 all t@e weddin1 84e8a4ation and 85Ali6it<) onl< to wal9 o5t o2 it w@en t@e ;at4i;on< was aAo5t to Ae sole;niGed is a di22e4ent ;atte4? T@is 8al8aAl< and 5nD5sti2iaAl< 6ont4a4< to 1ood 65sto;s 2o4 w@i6@ t@e de2endant ;5st Ae @eld answe4aAle 2o4 da;a1es in a66o4dan6e wit@ A4t? +1 o2 t@e Civil Code? %Wassmer &s. )ele*' T@e oAli1ation o2 6o@aAitation o2 @5sAand and wi2e is not en2o46eaAle A< 6onte;8t 84o6eedin1s? n 84ivate 4elations) 8@<si6al 6oe46ion is Aa44ed 5nde4 t@e t@e old ;aBi; J KNe;o 8otest 84e6iso 6o1i ad 2a6t5;?L $oweve4) t@e 4e25sal o2 t@e wi2e to 8e42o4; @e4 wi2el< d5ties) @e4 denial o2 6onso4ti5; and @e4 dese4tion o2 @e4 @5sAand wo5ld 6e4tainl< 6onstit5te a will25l in2li6tion o2 inD54< 58on @e4 @5sAandEs 2eelin1s in a ;anne4 w@i6@ is 6ont4a4< to ;o4als) 1ood 65sto;s and 85Ali6 8oli6< 2o4 w@i6@ A4ts? +1 and ++1* &1*/ o2 t@e CC a5t@o4iGe an awa4d 2o4 ;o4al da;a1es? %"encha&e* &s. +scano' NAT ONAL TY

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 1< of the !i il !odeonly 7hilippine nationals are co ered by the policy against absolute di orces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. %owe er- aliens may obtain di orces abroad- which may be recogni(ed in the 7hilippines- pro ided they are alid according to their national law. %ence- an American =ational who had di orced a "ilipina wife cannot )ustifiably maintain that under our laws- the "ilipina- despite the di orce- has to be considered still married to him and still sub)ect to a wife@s obligation. A "ilipina should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of )ustice are to be ser ed. #he should not be obliged to li e with him- to support him- or to obser ed respect and fidelity to the e5-husband- and the latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible write to con)ugal properties. %(an Dorn vs. Romillo, "E 5<0;6, Dct. <, /3<1& ,he decree of di orce obtained by a ;erman national and its legal effects may be recogni(ed in the 7hilippines insofar as the foreigner is concerned in iew of the nationality principle in our ci il law on the matter of status of persons. ,he said ;erman national can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal Bnowledge with another- because in di orcing her- he already implicitly authori(ed the woman to ha e se5ual relations with others. %Pilapil vs. I#ayESomera, .RN <6//5, Aune 26, /3<6& PREFUD C AL QUEST ON A pre)udicial .uestion is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue in ol ed therein. It must appear not only that the ci il case in ol es facts upon which the criminal action is based- but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the ci il action would necessarily be determinati e of the criminal case. >ules of !ourt- >ule 111- #ec. <. 'lements of pre)udicial .uestion. - ,he two *2+ essential elements of a pre)udicial .uestion areH *a+ the ci il action in ol es an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal actionE and *b+ the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. %e who contracts a second marriage before the )udicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risB of being prosecuted for bigamy- and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a ci il case for declaration of nullity. 8therwise- all that an ad enturous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article CG of the "amily !odecontract a subse.uent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is oid and that the subse.uent marriage is e.ually oid for lacB of a prior )udicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may e en enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a re.uisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subse.uent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is oid. #uch scenario would render nugatory the pro isions on bigamy. %,o#is vs. ,o#is, .RN /2<163, Auly 2/, 4666& FUR D CAL PERSONAL TY T@e Ro;an Cat@oli6 C@546@ is a 6o48o4ation A< 84es64i8tion) wit@ a69nowled1ed D54idi6al 8e4sonalit<) inas;56@ as it is an instit5tion w@i6@ antedated) A< al;ost a t@o5sand <ea4s) an< ot@e4 8e4sonalit< in E54o8e) and w@i6@ eBisted w@en %4e6ian elo:5en6e still 2lo54is@ed in Antio6@ and w@en idols w@e4e still wo4s@i88ed in t@e te;8le o2 Me66a? %,arlin &s. Ramire*' T@e estate o2 a de6eased 8e4son s@o5ld Ae 6onside4ed an a4ti2i6ial o4 D54idi6al 8e4son 2o4 t@e 8548oses o2 t@e settle;ent and dist4iA5tion o2 @is estate w@i6@) o2 6o54se) in6l5de t@e eBe46ise d54in1 t@e D5di6ial ad;inist4ation t@e4eo2 o2 t@ose 4i1@ts and t@e 25l2ill;ent o2 t@ose oAli1ations o2 @is w@i6@ s54vived a2te4 @is deat@? %Lim(oco &s. -ntestate +state o$ Pedro Fragrante' 7arents of an unborn fetus cannot sue damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who oluntarily procured her abortion could not reco er damages from the physician who caused the same. #ince an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal in)ury or death pertains primarily to the in)ured- no such right of action could deri ati ely accrue to the parents or heirs of

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an unborn child. In fact- e en if the cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child- the same was e5tinguished by its pre-natal death- since no transmission can taBe place from one that lacBed )uridical personality. It is no answer to in oBe the pro isional personality of a concei ed child under Article CG of the !i il !ode because the same Article e5pressly limits such pro isional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subse.uently born ali e. ,his is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them- as distinguished from the in)ury or iolation of the rights of the deceased- his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not e5pect either help- support or ser ices from an unborn child- they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal de elopment of the spes hominis that was the foetus- i.e.- on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss- and the disappointment of their parental e5pectations *!i il !ode- Art. 221?+- as well as to e5emplary damages- if the circumstances should warrant them *Art. 222G+. %.elu8 vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA <6/& C ! L PERSONAL TY ' en if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead- a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumpti e death is necessary in order to contract a subse.uent marriage- a mandatory re.uirement which has been precisely incorporated into the "amily !ode to discourage subse.uent marriages where it is not pro en that the pre ious marriage has been dissol ed or a missing spouse is factually or presumpti ely dead- in accordance with pertinent pro isions of law. %Navarro vs. Domagtoy, .RN *TAE35E/6<<, Auly /3, /335& ,he fact that the Ludge who solemni(ed the marriage did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemni(ed without a marriage license- there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemni(edE the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts and the :ocal !i il >egistrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract- will not absol e him from liability. By solemni(ing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemni(ing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying with the formal re.uisites of marriage and under Article C*2+ of the "amily !ode of the 7hilippines- he shall be ci illy- criminally and administrati ely liable. %Cosca vs. Au!ge Palaypayon, 11 SCAD ;13& DOM C LE AND RES DENCE $omicile In Article <G of the =!! was construed in 8ng s >epublic as an indi idual@s Ipermanent homeJE a place to which whene er absent for business or pleasure- one intends to return and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. $omicile includes the twin elements of the Ifact of residingJ and the animus manendi. >esidence implies the factual relationship of an indi idual to a certain place. ,he essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that the former in ol es the intent to lea e when the purpose for which the resident has taBen up his abode ends. 8ne may seeB a place for purposes such as pleasure- business or health. If a person@s intent be to remain- it becomes his domicile. It is thus normal for an indi idual to ha e different residences in arious places. %owe era person can only ha e a single domicile unless he successfully abandons his domicile in fa or of another domicile of choice. *Romual!e8E*arcos vs. Commission on Elections, 40< SCRA 266& REQU S TES OF MARR A%E A marriage under a license is not in alidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully or fraudulently obtained without pre)udice to the prosecution of the parties and the solemni(ing officer does not ha e to in estigate whether or not the license has been properly issued. %People vs. ,elen+ ,he absence of any formal re.uisites of marriage shall generally render the marriage oid ab initioE and while an irregularity in the formal re.uisites shall not affect the alidity of the marriage- the party responsible for their irregularity shall be ci illy- criminally- administrati ely liable. %Cosca vs. Au!ge Palaypayon, 11 SCAD ;13&

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In order to classify a marriage in articulo mortis- the law does not re.uire that the party who is at point of death must die immediately after the celebration of the marriage. All that is necessary is that the parties- including the person solemni(ing the marriage must be con inced that there was imminent danger of death %"oria vs. BeliF, .RN "E3661, Aune 46, /31<& !O D AND !O DA0LE MARR A%ES ,he senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of se5ual cooperation for the procreation of children is e.ui alent to psychological incapacity. Absence of finding as to the one who refused to ha e se5 is immaterial because the action to declare a marriage oid may be filed by either party- e en the psychologically incapacitated one. %Chi *ing Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 455 SCRA 240& WorBing on the assumption that 7epito and =orma ha e li ed together as husband and wife for fi e years without the benefit of marriage- that fi e-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as Mhusband and wifeM where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to alidate the union. In other words- the fi e-year common-law cohabitation period- which is counted bacB from the date of celebration of marriage- should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. ,his <-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characteri(ed by e5clusi ity / meaning no third party was in ol ed at any time within the < years and continuity / that is unbroBen. 8therwise- if that continuous <-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire fi e years- then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to ha e common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who li ed faithfully with their spouse. %Ninal vs. ,aya!og, .R No. /22;;<, *arch /0, 4666& "or Article 2C of the "amily !ode on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply- the following re.uisites must concurH 1. ,he man and woman must ha e been li ing together as husband and wife for at least fi e years before the marriageE 2. ,he parties must ha e no legal impediment to marry each otherE 2. ,he fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriageE C. ,he parties must e5ecute an affida it stating that they ha e li ed together for at least fi e years 1and are without legal impediment to marry each other4E and <. ,he solemni(ing officer must e5ecute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the .ualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage **an8ano vs. Sanche8 ..R. No. *TAE66E/243, *arch 6<, 466/+ 9nder the "amily !ode- there must be a )udicial declaration of the nullity of a pre ious marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article CG of the "amily !ode is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effecti ity of the "amily !ode regardless of the date of the first marriage. #aid Article is gi en retroacti e effect insofar as it does not pre)udice ested or ac.uired rights in accordance with the =ew !i il !ode and other laws. %Atien8a vs. ,rillantes, 402 SCRA 24& A distinction should be made between the case of a woman who was already 2 or C months pregnant at the time of marriage and one who is already 6 or ? months pregnant. In the formerconcealment is possible and conse.uently- the marriage can be annulled by reason of fraud. In the latter concealment is not possible. According to medical authorities- e en on the <th month of pregnancy- the enlargement of a womanNs abdomen is still below the umbilicus- that is to say- the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may- if noticed- be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womanNs abdomen reaches a height abo e the umbilicus- maBing the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If- as claimed by plaintiff- defendant is Mnaturally plumpM- he could hardly be e5pected to Bnow- merely by looBing-

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whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage- more so because she must ha e attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. %A)uino vs. Deli8o, ..R. No. "E/1<12, Auly 4;, /356& LE%AL SEPARAT ON An action for legal separation which in ol es nothing more than the bed-and board separation of the spouses is purely personal. Being personal in character- it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. %"apu8 Sy vs. Eufemio, 02 SCRA /;;& ,he mere circumstance that defendant told the "iscal that she MliBed alsoM to be legally separated from her husband- is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. !onfession of )udgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to )udgment or files a pleading e5pressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand. %ere there was only an e5tra)udicial admission and =8, a confession of )udgment. Ket- e en supposing that the abo e statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of )udgmentinasmuch as there is e idence of the adultery independently of such statement- the decree may and should be granted- since it would not be based on her confession- but upon e idence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a )udgment based e5clusi ely or mainly on defendantNs confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto- any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess )udgment- purposely to pre ent the gi ing of the decree. %Dcampo vs. Blorenciano, "E/2112, Be#ruary 42, /356& FUD C AL OF DECLARAT ON OF NULL TY Fo4 8548oses o2 4e;a44ia1e) t@e onl< le1all< a66e8taAle Aasis 2o4 de6la4in1 a 84evio5s ;a44ia1e an aAsol5te n5llit< is a 2inal D5d1;ent de6la4in1 s56@ 84evio5s ;a44ia1e void) w@e4eas) 2o4 8548oses ot@e4 t@an 4e;a44ia1e) ot@e4 eviden6e is a66e8taAle? %#omingo &s. C!' Pa4ties to t@e ;a44ia1e s@o5ld not Ae 8e4;itted to D5d1e 2o4 t@e;selves its n5llit<) 2o4 t@e sa;e ;5st Ae s5A;itted to t@e D5d1;ent o2 t@e 6o;8etent 6o54ts and onl< w@en t@e n5llit< o2 t@e ;a44ia1e is so de6la4ed 6an it Ae @eld as void) and so lon1 as t@e4e is no s56@ de6la4ation) t@e 84es5;8tion is t@at t@e ;a44ia1e eBists 2o4 all intents and 8548oses? T@e4e2o4e) @e w@o 6o@aAits wit@ a wo;an not @is wi2e) Ae2o4e t@e D5di6ial de6la4ation o2 n5llit< o2 t@e ;a44ia1e) ass5;es t@e 4is9 o2 Aein1 84ose65ted 2o4 6on65Aina1e? %,eltran &s. People .une /0 /000'

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CUSTODY OF M NOR C$ LDREN In all cases in ol ing the custody- care- education and property of children- the latterNs welfare is paramount. ,he pro ision that no mother shall be separated from a child under se en *?+ years of age- will not apply where the !ourt finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 8ne compelling reason to separate a child from the mother is when she has a common-law *or Ili e-inJ+ relationship with another man. #uch a scenario will not afford the minor child that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and de elop into an upright and moral-minded person. In all contro ersies regarding the custody of minors- the foremost consideration is the moral- physical and social welfare of the child concerned- taBing into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. *Cervantes vs. Ba ar!o, .RN ;3311, Aanuary 4;, /3<3&

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In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child- courts are mandated by the "amily !ode to taBe into account all rele ant considerations. If a child is under se en years of agethe law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. ,he presumption is strong but it is not conclusi e. It can be o ercome by Mcompelling reasons.M If a child is o er se en- his choice is paramount but- again- the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion- the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent- or e en to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. %Espiritu vs. CA, .RN //1506, *arch /1, /331& PROPERTY RELAT ONS ,he pro isions of the "amily !ode highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conser ation of the con)ugal partnershipE for the husband@s duty is to protect and safeguard- if not augment- not to dissipate it. ,his is the underlying reason why the "amily !ode clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the souses must be those that redound to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership@s liability is to Ithe e5tent that the family is benefited.J In the case at bar- while the husband is solidarily liable with AI$!- such liability under the "amily !ode is restricted by Article 122*1+ so that debts fro which the husband is liable may not be charged against the con)ugal partnership. *Ayala Investment an! Development Corp. vs. CA, 4<5 SCRA 4;4& In donations propter nuptias the marriage is really a consideration- but not in the sense of being necessary to gi e birth to the obligation- which maBes the fact that the marriage did not taBe place a cause for the re ocation of such donations- thus taBing it for granted that there may be a alid donation propter nuptias e en without marriage- since that which has not e5isted cannot be re oBed. ,he marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which- as such presupposes the e5istence of the obligation which may be resol ed or re oBed- and not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation. %Solis vs. ,arroso, .RN 4;323, Dcto#er 26, /34<& ,he words in Article 161 of the =ew !i il !ode Mall debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the con)ugal partnership Mdo not re.uire that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the con)ugal partnership from the husbandNs transaction-M but it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership.M %.E Tractors vs. CA, .RN 1;064, Be#ruary 4<, /3<1& 9nder Article 123 of the "amily !ode- the aggrie ed spouse may petition for )udicial separation of property either on the ground of abandonment without )ust cause or on the ground of failure to comply with obligations to the family. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse without the intent to return- followed by prolonged absence without )ust cause- and without- in the meantime- pro iding in the least for ones family although able to do so. ,here must be absolute cessation of marital relations- duties and rights- with the intention of perpetual separation. *PastoraEAo vs. CA, 4/5 SCRA 534& PROPERTY RE% ME OF UN ONS " T$OUT MARR A%E ,he donation made between parties guilty of adultery at the time of the donation is oid. Article 3? of "! pro ides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons li ing together husband and wife without a alid marriage- for otherwise the condition of those who incurred guilt would run out to be better than those in the legal union. ,he property relation cannot be considered to be go erned by the law on co-ownership for failure of spouse to pro e that she contributed money to the purchase price of the real property. It should belong to con)ugal partnership. 9nder article 1C3 of "!- only the properties ac.uired by both of the parties through their actual )oint contribution of money- property- or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respecti e contributions. Actual contribution is re.uired in Article 1C3 of "!- in contrast Art 1C? of "!- which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family are regarded as contribution to the ac.uisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or worB or industry. If actual contribution of the party is not pro ed- there will be no co ownership and no presumption of e.ual shares. %Agapay vs Palang, <1 SCAD /01&

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9nder Article 1C3 of the "amily !ode- a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each other- but who nonetheless li e together con)ugally- may be deemed co-owners of a property ac.uired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its ac.uisition. %ence- mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a coownership. %Tumlos vs. Bernan!e8, .RN /2;516, April /4, 4666& FAM LY $OME 9nder Article 162 of the "amily !ode- it is pro ided that Ithe pro isions of this !hapter shall also go ern e5isting family residences insofar as said pro isions are applicable.J It does not mean that Articles 1<2 and 1<2 of the "amily !ode ha e retroacti e effect such that all e5isting family residences are deemed to ha e been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effecti ity of the "amily !ode and are e5empt from e5ecution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effecti ity of the "amily !ode. Article 162 simply means that all e5isting family residences at the time of the effecti ity of the "amily !ode- are considered family homes and are prospecti ely entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the "amily !ode. Article 162 does not state that pro isions of chapter 2- ,itle A ha e a retroacti e effect. %*anacop vs. Court of Appeals 4;; SCRA 50& PATERN TY AND F L AT ON %usband died on Lanuary 1- 19C3. ,he boy whose legitimacy is in .uestion was born on Lune 1?- 19C2. ,hat boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of said husband and his wife- he ha ing been born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. ,hat presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to ha e had access to his wife during the first 12G days of the 2GG ne5t preceding the birth of the child. ,he fact that the wife has committed adultery cannot o ercome this presumption. ,he fact that the husband was seriously sicB is not sufficient to o ercome the presumption of legitimacy. Lust because tuberculosis is ad anced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of se5ual intercourse. ,here are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act e en in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to be more inclined to se5ual intercourse. %An!al vs. *acaraig, <3 P-I" /51& According to Article 16? of the "amily !ode- the child shall still be legitimate- although the mother may ha e declared against his legitimacy. ,his law liBewise applies to such instances where the mother may ha e been sentenced as an adulteress. ,here are three reasons for this pro isionH

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1. In a fit of anger- or to arouse )ealousy in the husband- the wife may ha e made this declarationE 2. ,he child should not be under the mercy of the passion of the parents. ,hus- the husband whose honor has been offended- being aware of his wife@s adultery- may ha e obtained from the latter by means of coercion- a confession against the legitimacy of the childwhich- in reality- may only be a confession of guilt. 8r the wife out of engeance or spite- may declare the child as not her husband@s although the statement is false. 2. Where the woman cohabits during the same period with two men- nobody can determine who is really the father of the child ,he modern rule is that- in order to o erthrow the presumption of legitimacy- it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could ha e enabled the husband to be the father of the child. #e5ual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not dispro ed- unless such presumption is rebutted by e idence to the contraryE where se5ual intercourse is presumed or pro ed- the husband must be taBen to be the father of the child. %*aca!ang!ang vs. CA, /66 SCRA ;3& Blood grouping test can establish conclusi ely that the man is not the father of the child but not necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child. It may ha e some probati e alue if the blood type and the combination in the child is rare. ,hus- it is now up to the discretion of the )udge whether to admit the results. *Aao vs. CA, /14 SCRA 213&

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PROOF OF F L AT ON ,o be sufficient recognition- the birth certificate must be signed by the father and mother )ointly- or by the mother alone if the father refuses- otherwise- she may be penali(ed. And if the alleged father did nothing in the birth certificate- the placing of his name by the mother- or doctor or registry is incompetent e idence of paternity of the child. If the birth certificate is not signed by the alleged father- it cannot be taBen as record of birth to pro e recognition of the child- nor can said birth certificate be taBen as a recognition in a public instrument. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents- they are e idence only to pro e the administration of the sacraments on the dates specified- but not the eracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to the bapti(ed person@s BinsfolB. %Reyes vs. CA, .RN 2312;, *arch /3, /3<1& I!ontinuousJ does not mean that the concession of status shall continue fore er but only that it shall not be of intermittent character while it continues. ,he possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own- directly and not through othersspontaneously and without concealment though without publicity. ,here must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own- by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. %*en!o8a vs. CA, 46/ SCRA 5;1& T@e 8ate4nal a22e6tion and 6a4e ;5st not Ae att4iA5ted to 854e 6@a4it<? KS56@ a6ts ;5st Ae o2 s56@ a nat54e t@at t@e< 4eveal not onl< t@e 6onvi6tion o2 8ate4nit<) A5t also t@e a88a4ent desi4e to @ave and t4eat t@e 6@ild as s56@ in all 4elations in so6iet< and in li2e) not a66identall<) A5t 6ontin5o5sl<?L %.ison &s. C!' T@e SC in Lim &s. C!) 45led t@at 8etitione4 was t@e 2at@e4 o2 @is ille1iti;ate 6@ild4en Ae6a5se t@e eviden6es 6onvin6in1l< s@ow t@is? $en6e) it was t@e 8etitione4 w@o 8aid t@e Aills 2o4 t@e @os8italiGation o2 t@e ;ot@e4 w@en s@e 1ave Ai4t@? $e was t@e one w@o 6a5sed t@e 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e na;e o2 t@e 6@ild 5sin1 @is s54na;e in t@e Ai4t@ 6e4ti2i6ate? $e also w4ote @andw4itten lette4s to t@e ;ot@e4 and t@e 6@ild statin1 @is 84o;ise Kto Ae a lovin1 and 6a4in1 @5sAand and 2at@e4 to Aot@ o2 <o5?L T@e4e we4e also 8i6t54es o2 t@e 8etitione4 on va4io5s o66asions 65ddlin1 t@e 6@ild? LE% T MAT ON =atural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimated. 9nder Article 269- =!!- only natural children can be legitimated. !hildren born outside of wedlocB of parents who- at the time of the conception of the former- were not dis.ualified by any impediment to marry each other- are natural children. #ince the children were born when there was a alid subsisting marriage of their father with another woman- they cannot be natural. :egitimation is a right granted by law only to natural children who- because their parents could ha e legally married at the time they were concei ed- cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate children once their parents do marry after their birth. ,his is because said parents can marry any time- there being no legal impediment pre enting them from alidly contracting marriage. ,he situation obtaining respecting legitimate children and legitimated natural children is certainly distinct from that respecting adulterous children because the parents of adulterous children are admittedly incapacitated to marry each other at the time said children were concei ed. It may easily be said- thus- that to interpret the law as allowing adulterous children to be put on e.ual footing with the legitimate children- would be putting a premium on adulterous relationships- which is frowned upon by the society itself. %De Santos vs. Au!ge Angeles, 55 SCAD 1/6& ADOPT ON ,he fact that a dual relationship will result *sister-brother- by natureE parent and child- by fiction of law+ is immaterial. After all- such double relationship may occur in other cases- e.g. persons who are already related by blood or affinity may still marry- as long as the relationship does not fall under the cases where a marriage is prohibited by law. %Santos vs. Repu#lic, 4/ SCRA 2;3&

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If an alien adopts a "ilipino child- our !i il !ode cannot confer on the child the nationality of the adopter. ,his would be a matter of foreign law. %Chin "eng vs. .alang, /60 P-I" /61<& "@e4e t@e 8etition 2o4 ado8tion was 14anted a2te4 t@e 6@ild @ad s@ot and 9illed a 1i4l) t@e SC did not 6onside4 t@e 4et4oa6tive e22e6t to t@e de64ee o2 ado8tion so as to i;8ose a liaAilit< 58on t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents a6645in1 at t@e ti;e w@en t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents @ad no a6t5al o4 8@<si6al 65stod< ove4 t@e ado8ted 6@ild? Ret4oa6tive e22e6t ;a< 8e4@a8s Ae 1iven to t@e 14antin1 o2 t@e 8etition 2o4 ado8tion w@e4e s56@ is essential to 8e4;it t@e a6645al o2 so;e Aene2it o4 advanta1e in 2avo4 o2 t@e ado8ted 6@ild? To @old t@at 8a4ental a5t@o4it< @ad Aeen 4et4oa6tivel< lod1ed in t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents so as to A54den t@e; wit@ liaAilit< 2o4 a to4tio5s a6t t@at t@e< 6o5ld not @ave 2o4eseen and w@i6@ t@e< 6o5ld @ave 84evented wo5ld Ae 5n2ai4 and 5n6ons6ionaAle? %"amargo &s. C! /01 S 234' t was ;ont@s a2te4 t@e e22e6tivit< o2 R?A? No? (33+ t@at @e4ein 8etitione4 2iled an a6tion to 4evo9e t@e de64ee o2 ado8tion 14anted in 1'.3? 0< t@en) t@e new law) @ad al4ead< aA4o1ated and 4e8ealed t@e 4i1@t o2 an ado8te4 5nde4 t@e Civil Code and t@e Fa;il< Code to 4es6ind a de64ee o2 ado8tion? Consistentl< wit@ its ea4lie4 84ono5n6e;ents) t@e Co54t s@o5ld now @old t@at t@e a6tion 2o4 4es6ission o2 t@e ado8tion de64ee) @avin1 Aeen initiated A< 8etitione4 a2te4 R?A? No? (33+ @ad 6o;e into 2o46e) no lon1e4 6o5ld Ae 854s5ed? t is still notewo4t@<) @oweve4) t@at an ado8te4) w@ile Aa44ed 24o; seve4in1 t@e le1al ties o2 ado8tion) 6an alwa<s 2o4 valid 4easons 6a5se t@e 2o42eit54e o2 6e4tain Aene2its ot@e4wise a6645in1 to an 5ndese4vin1 6@ild? Fo4 instan6e) 58on t@e 14o5nds 4e6o1niGed A< law) an ado8te4 ;a< den< to an ado8ted 6@ild @is le1iti;e and) A< a will and testa;ent) ;a< 24eel< eB6l5de @i; 24o; @avin1 a s@a4e in t@e dis8osaAle 8o4tion o2 @is estate? %Lahom &. Sibulo 5.R. 6o. 378141 .uly 37 /008' SUPPORT ,he wife- who is forced to lea e the con)ugal abode by her husband without fault on her part- may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other remedy notwithstanding the pro isions of Article 1C9 of the !i il !ode gi ing the person who is obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fi5ed pension or by recei ing and maintaining in his own home the one ha ing the right to the same. Article 1<2 of the !i il !ode gi es the instances when the obligation to gi e support shall cease. ,he failure of the wife to li e with her husband is not one of them. A husband cannot- by his own wrongful act- relie e himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by lawE and where a husband by wrongful- illegal and unbearable conduct- dri es his wife from the domicile fi5ed by him- he cannot taBe ad antage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. %.oitia vs. Campos Rue!a& If the wife commits adultery- she loses the right to be supported. #o if the wife claims support and the husband sets up adultery as a defense- he should be allowed to introduce preliminary e idence as to why support should not be granted. %*angoma vs. *aca!aeg an! ,autista, 36 P-I" 16<&

San 0eda Colle1e o2

PARENTAL AUT$OR TY 7arental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced e5cept in cases authori(ed by law. ,he right attached to parental authority- being purely personal- the law allows a wai er of parental authority only in cases of adoptionguardianship and surrender to a childrenNs home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another- such as a friend or godfather- e en in a document- what is gi en is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. ' en if a definite renunciation of parental authority is manifest- the law still disallows the same. ,he father and mother- being the natural guardians of unemancipated children- are duty-bound and entitled to Beep them in their custody and company. %SagalaEEslao vs. CA, 455 SCRA 2/;&

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

Property
CLASS F CAT ON OF PROPERTY "urther analysis of Article 22C will show that in the case of immo ables by destination- the !ode re.uires that they be placed by the owner of the tenement- in order to ac.uire the same nature or consideration of real propertyE but in cases of immo able by incorporation- such as houses- trees- plants- etc.- the !ode nowhere re.uires that the attachment or incorporation be made by the owner of the land. ,he only criterion is the union with the soil. It follows from the foregoing that a true building is immo able or real property- whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. *"a!era vs -o!ges, 0< D. 12;0, Septem#er 42, /314& Do able e.uipment to be immobili(ed in contemplation of the law must be first Iessential and principal elementsJ of the industry or worBs without which such industry or worBs would be Iunable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.J ,he tools and e.uipments in .uestion- by their nature- are not essential and principal elements of petitioner@s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucBs. ,hey are merely incidentals / ac.uired as mo ables and used only for e5pediency to facilitate andFr impro e its ser ice. ,he pro ision also re.uires that the industry or worBs be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. ,he e.uipment in .uestion are destined only to repair or ser ice the transportation business- which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land. %*in!anao ,us Company vs. City Assessor an! Treasurer, .R No. "E/;<;6, Septem#er 43, /354& PROPERTY N RELAT ON TO T$E PERSON "$ERE T 0ELON%S As property of public dominion- the >oppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collecti e ownership for general use and en)oymentan application to the satisfaction of collecti e needs- and resides in the social group. ,he purpose is not to ser e the state as a )uridical person- but the citi(ens. ,he >oppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article C2G of the =!! as property belonging to the state and intended for some public ser ice. ,he fact that the >oppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual embassy ser ice does not automatically con ert it to patrimonial property. A property continues to be part of public domain- not a ailable for pri ate appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the go ernment to withdraw it from being such. %"aurel vs. .arcia, /<; SCRA ;3;& P4o8e4ties o2 t@e lo6al 1ove4n;ent w@i6@ a4e devoted to 85Ali6 se4vi6e a4e dee;ed 85Ali6 and a4e 5nde4 t@e aAsol5te 6ont4ol o2 Con14ess? $en6e) lo6al 1ove4n;ents @ave not t@e a5t@o4it< w@atsoeve4 to 6ont4ol o4 4e15late t@e 5se o2 85Ali6 84o8e4ties 5nless s8e6i2i6 a5t@o4it< is vested 58on t@e; A< t@e Con14ess? A4ti6le ,+, o2 t@e Civil Code la<s down t@e Aasi6 84in6i8le t@at 84o8e4ties o2 85Ali6 do;inion devoted to 85Ali6 5se and ;ade availaAle to t@e 85Ali6 in 1ene4al a4e o5tside t@e 6o;;e46e o2 ;an and 6annot Ae dis8osed o2 o4 leased A< t@e lo6al 1ove4n;ent 5nit to 84ivate 8e4sons? %9acasiano &s #io:no 5R6 1;;<7 !ugust 30 311/' ,he rights o er the land are indi isible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. ,he classification must be categorical- the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case- the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral once the mining claims were perfected. It would not become agricultural- e en if only partly so- )ust because it was enclosed with a fence and was culti ated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. %Repu#lic vs. CA, .R No. "E0232<, April /1, /3<<&. O"NERS$ P "e st4ess a1ain t@at 8ossession and owne4s@i8 a4e distin6t le1al 6on6e8ts? Owne4s@i8 eBists w@en a t@in1 8e4tainin1 to one 8e4son is 6o;8letel< s5ADe6ted to @is will in a ;anne4 not 84o@iAited A< law and 6onsistent wit@ t@e 4i1@ts o2 ot@e4s? Owne4s@i8 6on2e4s 6e4tain 4i1@ts to

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t@e owne4) one o2 w@i6@ is t@e 4i1@t to dis8ose o2 t@in1 A< wa< o2 sale? Att<? Ped4o %a46ia and @is wi2e Re;edios eBe46ised t@ei4 4i1@t to dis8ose o2 w@at t@e< owned w@en t@e< sold t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< to t@e Ma18a<o s8o5ses? On t@e ot@e4@and) 8ossession is de2ined as t@e @oldin1 o2 a t@in1 o4 t@e enDo<;ent o2 a 4i1@t? Possession ;a< Ae @ad in one o2 two wa<s) 8ossession in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 and 8ossession o2 a @olde4? One w@o 8ossesses as a ;e4e @olde4 a69nowled1es in anot@e4 a s58e4io4 4i1@t w@i6@ @e Aelieves to Ae owne4s@i8) w@et@e4 @is Aelie2 Ae 4i1@t o4 w4on1? T@e 4e6o4d s@ows t@at 8etitione4 o6658ied t@e 84o8e4t< not in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 2o4 @is sta< was ;e4el< tole4ated A< @is 8a4ents? Conse:5entl<) it is o2 no ;o;ent t@at @e was in 8ossession o2 t@e 84o8e4t< at t@e ti;e o2 t@e sale to t@e Ma18a<oEs? t was not a @ind4an6e to a valid t4ans2e4 o2 owne4s@i8? %5arcia &s C! 5R6 388370 !ugust 30 3111' ,he principle that Ithe owner or lawful possessor of thing has the right to e5clude any person from the en)oyment and disposal thereof for this purpose- he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or pre ent an actual or threatened unlawful physical in asion or usurpation of his propertyJ is inapplicable to the case at bar. "or ha ing been gi en 2G days within which to acate the lot- complainant did not- within said period in ade or usurp said lot. #he had merely remained in possession thereof- e en though the hacienda owner may ha e become its copossessor. !aisip- et al did not Irepel or pre ent in actual or threatened physical in asion or usurpationJ. ,hey e5pelled ;loria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession e en before the action for forcible entry was filed against them- despite the fact that the sheriff had e5plicitly authori(ed them to stay in said property within the period and had e5pressed the iew that he could not oust them therefrom within the period without )udicial order therefore. %Caisip vs. People, .R No. "E4<;/5, Novem#er /<, /3;6& ,he doctrine of self-help enunciated by Art. C29 can only be e5ercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost- the owner must resort to )udicial process for the reco ery of the property. %.erman *anagement an! Services, Inc. vs. CA, .R No. ;54/5, Septem#er /0, /3<3& ,he law recogni(es in the owner the right to en)oy and dispose of a thing- without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of an owner- to enclose on a fence their property. Article C2G of the !i il !ode pro ides that Ie ery owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls- ditches- li e or dead hedges or by any other means without detriment to ser itudes constituted thereonJ. A person has a right to the natural use and en)oyment of his own property- according to his pleasure- for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule- therefore- there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner- although such acts incidentally cause damage or an una oidable loss to another- as such damage or loss is damnum abs.ue in)uria. When the owner of property maBes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used- such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case- nobody can complain of ha ing been in)ured- because the incon enience arising from said use can be considered as a mere conse.uence of community life. %Custo!io vs. CA, .R No. //5/66, Be#ruary 3, /335& It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Ad)oining landowners ha e mutual and reciprocal duties which re.uire that each must use his land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recogni(e the right of an owner to build structures on his land- such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to ad)oining landowners and can withstand the usual and e5pected forces of nature. If the structure causes in)ury and damage to an ad)oining landowner- the latter can claim indemnification for the in)ury or damage suffered. %An!amo vs IAC, /3/ SCRA /31& ACCESS ON CONT NUA ,he owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another- is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the alue of his building- under article C<2. ,he owner of the land- upon the other hand- has the option- either to pay for the building or to sell his

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


land to the owner of the building. But he cannot- as respondents here did- refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remo e it from the land where it is erected. %e is entitled to such remo al only when- after ha ing chosen to sell his landthe other party fails to pay for the same. %Ignacio vs. -ilario, .R ND. "E/;1, April 26, /305& 9nder the terms of Articles CC3 and <C6 of the !i il !ode- it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the alue thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. ' en this second right cannot be e5ercised if the alue of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the alue of his impro ement- Article <C6 gi es him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. ,here is nothing in the language of these two articles which would )ustify the conclusion that- upon failure of the builder to pay for the alue of the land- when such is demanded by the landownerthe latter becomes automatically the owner of the impro ements. When the builder in good faith fails to pay the alue of the land when such is demanded by the landowner- the parties may resort to the following remediesH *1+ ,he parties may decide to lea e things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee- and should they disagree as to the amount of the rental- then they can go to court to fi5 that amountE *2+ #hould the parties not agree to assume the relation of lessor and lessee- the owner of the land is entitled to ha e the impro ement remo edE and *2+ ,he land and the impro ement may be sold at public auctionapplying the proceeds first to the payment of the alue of the land and the e5cess- if anydeli ered to the owner of the impro ement in payment thereof. %Bilipinas Colleges, Inc. vs. Tim#ang, .R No. "E/4</4, Septem#er 43, /313& ,he !i il !ode confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. 8ne of these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property ac.uires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially. Whate er is built- planted or sown on the land of another- and the impro ements or repairs made thereon- belong to the owner of the land. Where- howe er- the planter- builder- or sower has acted in good faith- a conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the impro ements without causing in)ustice to the owner of the land. In iew of the impracticability of creating what Danresa calls state of Iforced co-ownershipJ- the law has pro ided a )ust and e.uitable solution by gi ing the owner of the land the option to ac.uire the impro ements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to e5ercise the option because his right is older and because- by the principle of accession- he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. %,ernar!o vs. ,ataclan, .R No. 00565, Novem#er 4<, /32<& When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was howe er made in good faith- then the pro isions of Article CC3 should apply to determine the respecti e rights of the parties. When the court adopted the IworBable solutionJ and ordered the owner of the land to sell to pri ate respondents- the part of the land they intended upon- it depri ed the petitioner of his right to choose. #uch ruling contra ened the e5plicit pro isions of Article CC3 to the effect that Ithe owner of the landSshall ha e the right to appropriateSto oblige the one who builtSto pay the price of the landSJ the law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. ,hus- the right to appropriate the worBs or impro ements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner. %Ignao vs. IAC, .R ND. ;4<;5, Aanuary /<, /33/& Article CC3 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder- sower- or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. =e ertheless- the pro ision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article CC3 is to a oid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties in the main agree that Articles CC3 and <C6 of the !i il !ode are applicable and indemnity for the impro ements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. %Pecson vs. CA, .R No. //1</0,*ay 45, /331&

CIVIL LAW

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

,he registered owner is not presumed to Bnow the metes and bounds of his own land- and therefore is not in bad faith if he mistaBenly builds on an ad)oining land. ,here is no .uestion that when petitioner purchased the land- the buildings and other structures were already in e5istence. Article <2? of the !i il !ode presumes good faith by the builder of the encroaching structures- the latter should be presumed to ha e built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to be en)oyed in the same character in which it was ac.uired- until the contrary is pro ed. ;ood faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his- and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in title. ,he good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made Bnown to the possessor- by e5traneous e idence or by suit for reco ery of the property by the true owner. %Technogas vs. CA, .R No. /6<<30, Be#ruary /6, /33;& ACCESS ON NATURAL A664etion Aene2its a 4e8a4ian owne4 w@en t@e 2ollowin1 4e:5isites a4e 84esent# &1/ t@at t@e de8osit Ae 14ad5al and i;8e46e8tiAleH &+/ t@at it 4es5lted 24o; t@e e22e6ts o2 t@e 6544ent o2 t@e wate4H and &3/ t@at t@e land w@e4e a664etion ta9es 8la6e is adDa6ent to t@e Aan9 o2 a 4ive4? T@e a88ellate 6o54t 6on2i4;ed t@at t@e a664etion on t@e weste4n Aan9 o2 t@e Ca1a<an Rive4 @ad Aeen 1oin1 on 24o; 1'1' 58 to 1'-( o4 2o4 a 8e4iod o2 ,' <ea4s addin1 3* @e6ta4es o2 land to 84ivate 4es8ondentEs 84o8e4t<? T@e 84ivate 4es8ondentsM owne4s@i8 o2 t@e a664etion to t@ei4 lands was not lost 58on t@e s5dden and aA458t 6@an1e o2 t@e 6o54se o2 t@e Ca1a<an Rive4 in 1'-( o4 1'-' w@en it 4eve4ted to its old 1'1' Aed) and se8a4ated o4 t4ans2e44ed said a664etions to t@e ot@e4 side o2 t@e 4ive4? A4ti6les ,3' and ,-3 o2 t@e New Civil Code a88l< to t@is sit5ation? %!gustin &s. -!C 5R6 <<0;2=;< .uly 2 3110' A664etion is t@e 84o6ess w@e4eA< t@e soil is de8osited w@ile all5vi5; is t@e soil de8osited on t@e estate 24ontin1 t@e 4ive4Aan9? T@e owne4 o2 s56@ estate is 6alled t@e 4e8a4ian owne4? T@e all5vi5;) A< ;andate o2 A4t? ,3. o2 t@e Civil Code is a5to;ati6all< owned A< t@e 4e8a4ian owne4 24o; t@e ;o;ent t@e soil de8osit 6an Ae seen A5t it is not a5to;ati6all< 4e1iste4ed 84o8e4t<? %6a&arro &s. -!C 5R6 <43<< February 3/ 311;' QU ET N% OF T TLE 7rescription cannot be in oBed for it is aphoristic that an action to .uiet title to property in one@s possession is imprescriptible. ,he rationale for this rule is that the owner of a real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is in aded or his title is attacBed before taBing steps to indicate his right. 7ossession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. #o it has been determined that an owner of real property in possession has a continuing right to in oBe a court of e.uity to remo e a cloud that is a continuing menace to his title. %Pingol vs. CA, .RN /64363, Septem#er 5, /332& CO>O"NERS$ P P54s5ant to A4ti6le ,'3 o2 t@e Civil Code) it ;a< Ae ded56ed t@at sin6e a 6o>owne4 is entitled to sell @is 5ndivided s@a4e) a sale o2 t@e enti4e 84o8e4t< A< one 6o>owne4 wit@o5t t@e 6onsent o2 t@e ot@e4 6o>owne4s is not n5ll and void? $oweve4) onl< t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e 6o>owne4> selle4 a4e t4ans2e44ed) t@e4eA< ;a9in1 t@e A5<e4 a 6o>owne4 o2 t@e 84o8e4t<? T@e 84o8e4 a6tion in 6ases li9e t@is is not 2o4 t@e n5lli2i6ation o2 t@e sale o4 2o4 t@e 4e6ove4< o2 t@e t@in1 owned in 6o;;on 24o; t@e t@i4d 8e4son w@o s5Astit5ted t@e 6o>owne4=s w@o alienated t@ei4 s@a4esH A5t t@e D ! S ON o2 t@e 6o;;on 84o8e4t< as it 6ontin5ed to 4e;ain in t@e 8ossession o2 t@e 6o>owne4s w@o 8ossessed and ad;iniste4ed it? Neit@e4 4e6ove4< o2 8ossession n4 4estit5tion 6an Ae 14anted sin6e t@e de2endant A5<e4s a4e le1iti;ate 84o84ieto4s and 8ossesso4s in Doint owne4s@i8 o2 t@e 6o;;on 84o8e4t< 6lai;ed? %,ailon=Casilao &s C! 5R6 L=;43;4 !pril 32 3144' =o prescription shall run in fa or of a co-owner against his co-owner or co-heirs so long as he e5pressly or impliedly recogni(es the co-ownership. !o-owners cannot ac.uire by prescription

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the share of the other co-owners- absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. An action for partition does not prescribe. Article C9? pro ides that the assignees of the coowners may taBe part in the partition of the common property and Article C9C that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property- a pro ision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. %Del ,anco vs. IAC, .R No. ;4530, Decem#er /, /3<;& ,he fact is clear that the co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when the coowners drew up a subdi ision plan and actually occupied their respecti e portions in the plan- a title issued accordingly. Where co-owned property had been subdi ided already- a right of legal redemption by a co-owner does not arise e en though con eyance tooB place before partition agreement and appro al by he intestate court thereof as to the portion under intestate proceedings. %Caro vs.Court of Appeals, .R No. "E0566/, *arch 41, /3<4& An action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. "irstthere is the issue whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. #econd- assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue- there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be di ided between plaintiff and defendant*s+ / i.e.- what portion should go to which co-owner. "unctionally an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and of segragation and con eyance of a determinate portion of the property in ol ed. ,his is sustained by public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions. *Ro)ue vs. IAC, .R No. ;1<<5, August 26, /33<& An< 6o>owne4 ;a< 2ile an a6tion 5nde4 A4ti6le ,(. not onl< a1ainst a t@i4d 8e4son) A5t also a1ainst anot@e4 6o>owne4 w@o ta9es eB6l5sive 8ossession and asse4ts eB6l5sive owne4s@i8 o2 t@e 84o8e4t<? n t@e latte4 6ase) @oweve4) t@e onl< 8548ose o2 t@e a6tion is to oAtain 4e6o1nition o2 t@e 6o>owne4s@i8? T@e 8lainti22 6annot see9 eB6l5sion o2 t@e de2endant 24o; t@e 84o8e4t< Ae6a5se as 6o>owne4 @e @as a 4i1@t o2 8ossession? T@e 8lainti22 6annot 4e6ove4 an< ;ate4ial o4 dete4;inate 8a4t o2 t@e 84o8e4t<? %#+ 5U-! &s. COUR" OF !PP+!LS 5.R. 6o. 3/04<7 October 4 /008' POSSESS ON In e)ectment cases- the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the property in ol ed- independent of any claim of ownership. Anyone of the litigants who can pro e prior possession de facto may reco er such possession e en from the owner himself. ,his rule holds true regardless of the character of a party@s possession- pro ided that he has in his fa or priority in time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully e)ected by a person ha ing a better right by either accion publiciana or accion rein idicatoria. 7rior possession o er the property- howe er- is not synonymous with his right of ownership o er the same. >esolution of issue of possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership. "orcible entry is merely a .uieting process and ne er determines the actual title to an estate. %Somo!io vs. CA, ..R. No. <45<6, August /2, /330& >espondent ;ue arra- ha ing been unlawfully depri ed of the diamond ring in .uestionwas entitled to reco er it from petitioner who was found in possession of the same *Article <<9 of the !i il !ode+. ,he only e5ception the law allows is when there is ac.uisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale- in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. ,he right of the owner cannot be defeated e en by proof that there is good faith in the ac.uisition by the possessor. ,he right of the owner to reco er personal property ac.uired in good faith by another is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. 7ossession in good faith does not really amount to title- for the reason that Article 1122 of the !ode pro ides for a period of ac.uisiti e prescription for mo ables through Iuninterrupted possession for four years in good faith. ,he title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership- but is merely a presumpti e title sufficient to ser e as a basis for ac.uisiti e prescription. Article <<9 assumes that where the possessor is as yet not the ownerE for it is ob ious that where the possessor has come to ac.uire indefeasible title by- let us say- ad erse possession for the

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necessary period- no proof of loss or illegal depri ation could a ail the former owner of the chattel. %e would no longer be entitled to reco er it under any condition. %De .arcia vs. CA, ..R. ND. "E 46450, Aanuary 26, /3;/& t is :5ite 6lea4 t@at a 8a4t< w@o @as lost a ;ovaAle o4 @as Aeen 5nlaw25ll< de84ived t@e4eo2 6an 4e6ove4 t@e sa;e 24o; t@e 84esent 8ossesso4 even i2 t@e latte4 a6:5i4ed it in 1ood 2ait@ and @as) t@e4e2o4e) title t@e4eto 2o4 5nde4 t@e 2i4st senten6e o2 A4ti6le 33' o2 t@e Civil Code) s56@ ;anne4 o2 a6:5isition is e:5ivalent to title? T@e4e a4e t@4ee 4e:5isites to ;a9e t@e 8ossession o2 ;ovaAle 84o8e4t< e:5ivalent to title) na;el<# a/ t@e 8ossession s@o5ld Ae in 1ood 2ait@H A/ t@e owne4 vol5nta4il< 8a4ted wit@ t@e 8ossession o2 t@e t@in1H and 6/ t@e 8ossession is in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4? Undo5Atedl<) one w@o @as lost a ;ovaAle o4 w@o @as Aeen 5nlaw25ll< de84ived o2 it 6annot Ae said to @ave vol5nta4il< 8a4ted wit@ t@e 8ossession t@e4eo2? n t@e 6ase at Aa4) t@e4e was a 8e42e6ted 5n6onditional 6ont4a6t o2 sale Aetween 84ivate 4es8ondent and t@e o4i1inal vendee? T@e 2o4;e4 vol5nta4il< 6a5sed t@e t4ans2e4 o2 t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e ve@i6le in t@e na;e o2 t@e 2i4st vendee> even i2 t@e said vendee was 4e84esented A< so;eone w@o 5sed a 2i6titio5s na;e J and li9ewise vol5nta4il< delive4ed t@e 6a4s and t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4e1ist4ation to t@e vendeeEs alle1ed 4e84esentativeH title t@e4eto was 2o4t@wit@ t4ans2e44ed to t@e vendee? %Ledesma &s C! 5R6 4<023 September 3 311/' ,he respondents- by their own admission are in possession of the disputed land. ,here is no e idence that they were possessors in bad faith. %owe er- their good faith ceased when they were ser ed with summons to answer the complaint *Article <23- !i il !ode+. As possessors in bad faith from the ser ice of the summons they Ishall reimburse the fruits recei ed and those which the legitimate possessor could ha e recei ed.J %Cor!ero vs. Ca#ral, "E25;<3, Auly 41, /3<2& USUFRUCT 9sufruct gi es a right to en)oy the property of another with the obligation of preser ing its form and substance. 8nly the )us utendi and )us fruendi o er the property is transferred to the usufructuary. ,he owner of the property maintains the )us disponendi or the power to alienateencumber- transform- and e en destroy the same- although he cannot alter the property@s form or substance- or do anything which is pre)udicial to the usufructuary. ,here is no doubt that the owner may alidly mortgage the property in fa or of a third person and the law pro ides that- in such a case- the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor- and should not the immo able be attached or sold )udicially or the payment of the debt- the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whate er the latter may lose by reason thereof. %-eme!es vs. CA, ..R. No. /6;/24, Dcto#er <, /333&

San 0eda Colle1e o2

EASEMENTS An ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa< t@o51@ it ;a< Ae a88a4ent) is neve4t@eless) dis6ontin5o5s o4 inte4;ittent and t@e4e2o4e 6annot Ae a6:5i4ed t@4o51@ 84es64i8tion) A5t onl< A< vi4t5e o2 a title? %Ron>uillo &s Roco 5R6 L=30<31 February /4 3124' ,he owner of the dominant estate may alidly claim a compulsory right of way only after he has established the e5istence of four re.uisites- to witH *1+ the *dominant+ estate is surrounded by other immo ables and is without ade.uate outlet to a public highwayE *2+ after payment of the proper indemnityE *2+ the isolation was not due to the proprietor@s actsE and *C+ the right of way is claimed at a point least pre)udicial to the ser ient estate. Additionally- the burden of pro ing the e5istence of the foregoing prere.uisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. 9nder Article 6<G- it shall be established upon two criteriaH *1+ at the point least pre)udicial to the ser ient estateE and *2+ where the distance to a public highway may be the shortest. 'ach case must be weighed according to its indi idual merits- and )udged according to the sound discretion of the court. %Consta#ella Corp. vs CA, ..R. No. <61//, Aanuary 41, /33/&

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Article 6<1 of the !i il !ode pro ides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate- and may accordingly be changed from time to time. ,his is taBen to mean that under the law- it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may ary from time to time. #ince the easement to be established in fa or of petitioner is of continuous and permanent nature- the indemnity shall consist of the alue of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the ser ient estate. ;enerally- the right of way may be demandedE *1+ when there is absolutely no access to a public highway- and *2+ when- e en if there is one- it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. %Encarnacion vs. CA, ..R. No. ;;54<, *arch //, /33/& Article 6<G of the !i il !ode e5plicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least pre)udicial to the ser ient estate and insofar as consistent with this rule- where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. ,he criterion of least pre)udice to the ser ient estate must pre ail o er the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of )udicial appreciation. Where the easement may be established on any of se eral tenements surrounding the dominant estate- the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. %owe er- if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement- the way which will cause the least damage should be used- e en if it will not be the shortest. %Guimen vs CA, .R No. //422/, *ay 43, /335& T@e 2a6ts o2 t@e 6ase Aea4s s522i6ient ind5AitaAle 84oo2s t@at t@e 84o8e4ties 6on6e4ned @ad intended and @ad indeed 6onstit5ted a vol5nta4< ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa< ove4 Man1<an Road) and li9e an< ot@e4 6ont4a6t) t@e sa;e 6o5ld Ae eBtin15is@ed onl< A< ;5t5al a14ee;ent o4 A< 4en5n6iation o2 t@e owne4 o2 t@e do;inant estate? %La )ista !ssociation &s C! 5R6 12/2/ September 2 311;' Article 63C of the !i il !ode is a new pro ision. A reading of Article 63C shows that the duty of an ad)acent owner not to depri e the ad)acent land or building of sufficient lateral or sub)acent support is an absolute one. It does not depend upon the degree of care and precaution made by the proprietor in maBing the e5ca ation or building on this land. ' en if the ad)acent owner had taBen the proper care and precaution- if the ad)acent land or building is depri ed of sufficient lateral or sub)acent support- as a result of which it is damaged- we belie e that the ad)acent owner shall be liable for the damage caused. %De Aesus vs -o@mart Corp. No. 00/3/ER, August 4<, /3;0& DONAT ON A donation which purports to be one inter i os but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donee@s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still ali e. In the instant case- the donees did not get the possession of the property donated. ,hey did not ac.uire the right to the fruits thereof- or any other right of dominion o er the property / this would accrue to them only after 1G years from Dontinola@s death. ,hey were therefore simply Ipaper ownersJ of the donated property. Indeed- the donation in .uestion was a donation mortis causa- contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor@s demise. %Sica! vs. CA, ..R. No. /41<<<, August /2, /33<& Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its alidity- the necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected- as in the case at bar. It is actually the act of registration that operates to con ey registered land or affect title thereto. %.on8ales vs. CA, .R No. //6221, Aune /<, 466/& ,he stipulation in the contact pro iding for the automatic re ersion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance is alid. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach without going to court. 9pon the happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance with the condition of the contact- the donation is automatically re oBed without need of a )udicial declaration to that effect. %De "una vs. A#rigo, ..R. No. 1;011, Aanuary /<, /336&

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8nce a donation is accepted- the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation- the same must not be contrary to law- morals- good customs- public order and public policy. ,he condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated- which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. #uch a prohibition against alienation- in order to be alidmust not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time. %Roman Catholic Arch#ishop of *anila vs. CA, ..R. No. ;;041, Aune /3, /33/& As found in ,olentino@s !ommentaries and Lurisprudence on the !i il !ode- Iall crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for re ocation.J 7etitioner@s attempt to categori(e the offenses according to their classification under the >e ised 7enal !ode is therefore unwarranted considering that illegal detention- threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the >e ised 7enal !ode. %E!uarte vs CA, .R No. /61300, Be#ruary 3, /335&

Wills and Succession


CONCEPT OF SUCCESS ON ,he right to a person@s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death- and do not est in his heirs until such time. 7roperty which $oTa !atalina *decedent+ had transferred or con eyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. %ad she died intestate- only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death de ol ed to her legal heirsE and e en if those transfers were- one and all- treated as donations- the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or re ocation of a decedent@s gifts inter i os does not inure to the respondents *nephews and nieces of $oTa !atalina+ since neither they nor the donees are compulsory or forced heirs. %*ariano "ocsin, et al. vs. CA, ..R. No. <3;<2, Be#ruary /3, /334& FORMAL T ES OF " LLS 6O"!R-!L W-LL "ailure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages would ha e been fatal defect were it not for the fact that- in this case- it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatri5 and her instrumental witnesses. %Ta#oa!a vs. Rosal, //< SCRA /31& T@e lan15a1e 5sed in t@e attestation 6la5se li9ewise need not e&en be :nown to the attesting witnesses? A4t? (*3 ;e4el< 4e:5i4es t@at) in s56@ a 6ase) t@e attestation 6la5se s@all Ae inte484eted to said witnesses? %Caneda &s. C! /// SCR! ;43' Attestation clause which does not state that the testament Iwas signed by the witnesses in the presence of one another and the testatorJ renders the will oid. 8mission which can be supplied by an e5amination of the will itself- without the need of resorting to e5trinsic e idencewill not be fatal and correspondingly- would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. %owe er- those omissions which cannot be supplied e5cept by e idence aliun!e would result in the in alidation of the attestation clause and ultimately- the will itself. While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses- it certainly cannot be conclusi ely inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affi5ed their respecti e signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since- as petitioners correctly obser ed- the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed- but it does not pro e that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. ,he e5ecution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on arious days

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or occasions and in arious combinations- the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effecti ity. "urthermore- the rule on substantial compliance in Article 3G9 cannot be in oBed or relied on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the te5t of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would pro ide the data not e5pressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted te5tual re.uirements were actually complied with in the e5ecution of the will. In other words- the defects must be remedied by intrinsic e idence supplied by the will itself. %Cane!a vs. CA, 444 SCRA ;</& In our opinion- the attestation clause is fatally defecti e for failing to state that Antero Dercado caused Atty. "lorentino La ier to write the testatorNs name under his e5press direction- as re.uired by section 613 of the !ode of !i il 7rocedure. ,he herein petitioner *who is appealing by way of certiorari from the decision of the !ourt of Appeals+ argues- howe er- that there is no need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. "lorentino La ier is a surplusage. 7etitionerNs theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmarB- the latter ha ing been held sufficient by this !ourt in se eral cases. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Dercado or e en one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection- we are not prepared to liBen the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmarB- and the reason is ob ious. ,he cross cannot and does not ha e the trustworthiness of a thumbmarB. %.arcia vs. "acuesta& In the case at bench- the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial e idence produced by petitioner. ,he will and its codicil- upon inspection by the respondent court- show in blacB and white or more accurately- in blacB and blue-that more than one pen was used by the signatories thereto. ,hus- it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelie e petitionerNs claim that both testamentary documents in .uestion were subscribed to in accordance with the pro isions of Art. 3G< of the !i il !ode. %Cal!e vs. CA, 422 SCRA 2;5& ,he notary public before whom the will was acBnowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acBnowledge before himself his ha ing signed the will. ,o acBnowledge before means to a owE to own as genuine- to assent- to admit- and IbeforeJ means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. !onse.uently- if the third witness were the notary public himself- he would ha e to a ow- assent or admit his ha ing signed the will in front of himself. ,his cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acBnowledge his participation in the maBing of the will. ,he function of a notary public is- among others- to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. ,hat function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting witnesses. "or then he would be interested in sustaining the alidity of the will as it directly in ol es himself and alidity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the ery purpose of the acBnowledgement. Which is to minimi(e fraud would be thwarted %Cru8 vs. (illasor, 10 SCRA 2/& Article 3G3 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who- for one reason or another- are incapable of reading their wills. #ince Al arado *testator+ was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil due to his Ipoor-J Idefecti e-J or blurred ision- there can be no other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of the term IblindJ as it is used in Article 3G3. In the case at bar- as testified to by the three instrumental witnesses- the notary public and by the lawyer who drafted the 3-paged will who were present in the e5ecution- the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead- the lawyer who drafted the will read the same aloud in the presence of the testator- the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. ,he latter four followed the reading with their own respecti e copies pre iously furnished them. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial re.uirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will- formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which- when taBen into account- may only defeat the testator@s will. %Alvara!o vs. .aviola, ..R. No. ;0531, Septem#er /0, /332&

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?OLO5R!P?-C W-LL A reading of Article 312 of the !i il !ode shows that its re.uirement affects the alidity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will- but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions- the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. #uch failure- howe er- does not render the whole testament oid. :iBewise- a holographic will can still be admitted to probate- notwithstanding noncompliance with the pro isions of Article 31C. %A ero vs. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 0<<& If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is a ailable- the will cannot be probated because the best and only e idence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But a photostatic copy or Qero5 copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. %Ro!elas vs. Aran8a, //3 SCRA /5& 8rdinarily- when a number of erasures- corrections- and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will ha e not been noted under his signature- the will is not thereby in alidated as a whole- but at most only as respects the particular words erased- corrected or interlined. %owe er- when the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial pro ision- which was altered by substituting the original heir with another- but which did not carry the re.uisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator- the effect must be that the entire will is oided or re oBed for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain alid. %7ala@ vs. Relova, /24 SCRA 42;& As a general rule- the IdateI in a holographic will should include the day- month and year of its e5ecution. %owe er- when as in the case at bar- there is no appearance of fraud- bad faithundue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date I"'B.F61J appearing on the holographic will is a alid compliance with Article 31G of the !i il !ode- probate of the will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance. %RoFas vs. De Aesus, /20 SCRA 401& ,he law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. ,he only re.uirements are that the date be in the will itself and e5ecuted in the hand of the testator. ,hese re.uirements are present in the sub)ect will. %"a#ra!or vs. CA, /<0 SCRA /;6& We are con inced- based on the language used- that Article 311 of the !i il !ode is mandatory. ,he word MshallM connotes a mandatory order. We ha e ruled that MshallM in a statute commonly denotes an imperati e obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word Mshall-M when used in a statute is mandatory.M :aws are enacted to achie e a goal intended and to guide against an e il or mischief that aims to pre ent. In the case at bar- the goal to achie e is to gi e effect to the wishes of the deceased and the e il to be pre ented is the possibility that unscrupulous indi iduals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator. #o- we belie e that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased. An e5hausti e and ob)ecti e consideration of the e idence is imperati e to establish the true intent of the testator. %Co!oy vs. Calugay, .RN /420<5, August /4, /333&

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PRO0ATE OF " LLS In a proceeding for the probate of a will- the court@s area of in.uiry is limited to an e5amination of- and resolution on- the e5trinsic alidity of the will- the due e5ecution thereof- the testatri5@s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the re.uisites or solemnities prescribed by law. ,he intrinsic alidity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the

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will has been duly authenticated. %owe er- where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic alidity of the will be passed upon- e en before it is probated- the !ourt should meet the issue. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will- nothing will be gained. 8n the contrary- this litigation would be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record- in the e ent of probate or if the court re)ects the will- probability e5ists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic alidity or nullity of the will. >'#9:,H waste of time- effort- e5pense- plus added an5iety. %Nugui! vs. Nugui!, /; SCRA 003& n 6epomuceno &s C! %381 SCR! /0;' t@e Co54t 45led t@at Kt@e 6o54t 6an in:5i4e as to t@e int4insi6 validit< o2 t@e will Ae6a5se t@e4e was an eB84ess state;ent t@at t@e Aene2i6ia4< was a ;ist4ess? T@e 2a6t t@at t@e will @as Aeen allowed wit@o5t o88osition and t@e o4de4 allowin1 t@e sa;e @as Ae6o;e 2inal and eBe65to4< is not a Aa4 to t@e 84esentation o2 a 6odi6il) 84ovided it 6o;8lies wit@ all t@e 2o4;alities 2o4 eBe65tin1 a will? t is not ne6essa4< t@at t@e will and 6odi6il Ae 84oAated to1et@e4 as t@e 6odi6il ;a< Ae 6on6ealed A< an inte4ested 8a4t<? T@e< ;a< Ae 84oAated one a2te4 t@e ot@e4? &9acam &s. 5atmaitan <0 Phil 824' ,he employment of un!ue influence by %eracio was not Imutually repugnantJ to fraud as petitioner insists- for it was the means employed by %eracio to defraud his brothers and sisters of their share in $on !ayetano@s estate. ,here was frau! because $on !ayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with !o- Barredo and :im was a second will re oBing the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. %ad he been aware that it was a second will- and if it were prepared at his own behest- he would not ha e denied that he made it. %e would probably ha e caused it to be probated while he was still ali e- as he did with his first will %Revilla vs. CA 4/; SCRA 1<2& PRETER T ON 7reterition consists in the omission on the testator@s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein- or- though mentioned- they are neither instituted as heirs nor are e5pressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned- Article 3<C of the !i il !ode may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator- although she is compulsory heir. #tated otherwise- e en if the sur i ing spouse is a compulsory heir- there is no preterition e en if she is omitted from the inheritance- for she is not in the direct line. %owe erthe same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Airginia A. "ernande(- whose legal adoption by the testator has not been .uestioned by the petitioner. 9nder Article 29 of 7.$. =o. 6G2- Bnown as the !hild and Kouth Welfare !ode- adoption gi es to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and maBes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were depri ed of at least their legitimate. =either can it be denied that they were not e5pressly disinherited. %ence- this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. %Acain vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /11 SCRA /66& 7reterition is the omission of the heir in the will- either by not naming him at all or- while mentioning him asfather- son- etc.- by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him e5pressly- nor assigning to him some part of the testator@s estate. Whether the testator ga e a legacy to a person- whom he characteri(ed in the testamentary pro ision as not related to him- but later this person was )udicially declared to be his acBnowledged natural child- the case is not a case of preterition but a case of completion of legitime. ,he institution in the will would not be annulled. ,here would be no intestacy. %A8nar vs. Duncan, /; SCRA 136& SU0ST TUT ON OF $E RS #cae ola- Daura- and ,ra iesas construe Udegree@ as designation- substitution- or transmission. ,he #upreme !ourt of #pain has decidedly adopted this construction. "rom this point of iew- there can be only one transmission or substitution- and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Danresa- Dorell- and #anche( >oman howe er- construe the word Udegree@ as generation- and the present !ode pro iding that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree

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Ufrom the heir originally instituted.@ ,he !ode thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. "rom this- it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. ,hese are the only relati es who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary. %Ramire8 vs. Ramire8, ..R. No. "E4;314 Be#ruary /1,/3<4& Indeed- legally speaBing- Drs. %odges@ will pro ides neither for a simple or ulgar substitution under Article 3<9 of the !i il !ode nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 362 thereof. ,here is no ulgar substitution therein because there is no pro ision for either *1+ predecease of the testator by the designate heir or *2+ refusal or *2+ incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance- as re.uired by Article 3<9E and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because obligation is imposed thereby upon %odges to preser e the estate or any party thereof for anyone else. %PCI ,an$ vs. Escolin, .. R. Nos. "E4;<56E35 an! "E4;325E2;, *arch 43, /3;0& MODAL NST TUT ON ,he institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 332 is what is Bnown in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution- the testator states *1+ the ob)ect of institution- *2+ the purpose or application of the property left by the testator or- *2+ the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A ImodeJ imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 8n the other hand- in a conditional testamentary disposition- the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. ,he condition suspends but does not obligateE and the mode obligates but does not suspend. ,o some e5tent- it is similar to a resolutory condition. ,hen- too since testamentary disposition are generally acts of liberality- an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt- the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. %Ra#a!illa vs. CA, 220 SCRA 142& NTESTATE SUCCESS ON Article 992 of the =ew !i il !ode is not applicable because in ol ed here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father- which is prohibited by the aforesaid pro ision of law. >ather- it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father- the latterNs share in or portion of- what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister- ' arista. As opined by the !ourt of Appeals- the law in point in the present case is Article ??? of the =ew !i il !ode- which pro ides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. #ince ' arista died ahead of her brother "rancisco- the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. #ubse.uently- when "rancisco died- his heirs- namelyH his spouse- legitimate children- and the pri ate respondent- Loselito- an illegitimate child- inherited his *"ranciscoNs+ share in the estate of ' arista. It bears stressing that Loselito does not claim to be an heir of ' arista by right of representation but participates in his own right- as an heir of the late "rancisco- in the latterNs share *or portion thereof+ in the estate of ' arista. ,he present case relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent ' arista- ownership of which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of ' arista. ,here is no legal obstacle for pri ate respondent Loselitoadmittedly the son of the late "rancisco- to inherit in his own right as an heir to his fatherNs estatewhich estate includes a one-third *1F2+ undi ided share in the estate of ' arista. %Dela *erce! vs. Dela *erce!& COLLAT ON We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the abo e pro isions e5pressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly obser ed- the phrase Msa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muliM merely described the donation as Mirre ocableM and should not be construed as an e5press prohibition against collation. ,he fact that

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a donation is irre ocable does not necessarily e5empt the sub)ect thereof from the collation re.uired under Article 1G61. We surmise from the use of such terms as MlegitimeM and Mfree portionM in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer- and we may also presume he understood the legal conse.uences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose- gi en the precise language of the document- that he would ha e included therein an e5press prohibition to collate if that had been the donorNs intention. Anything less than such e5press prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1G62. ,he suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion of the decedentNs estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the .uestion here- nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. ,he sole issue is whether or not there was an e5press prohibition to collate- and we see none. ,he intention to e5empt from collation should be e5pressed plainly and une.ui ocally as an e5ception to the general rule announced in Article 1G62. Absent such a clear indication of that intention- we apply not the e5ception but the rule- which is categorical enough. %De Roma vs. CA, "E05362, Auly 42, /3<;& PART T ON Article 1G<6 of the !i il !ode of 1339 authori(es a testator to partition inter i os of his property- and distribute them among his heirs- and that this partition is not necessarily either a donation nor a testament- but an instrument of a special character- sui generis- which is reco erable at any time by the causante during his lifetime- and does not operate as a con eyance of title until his death. It deri es its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the property- limited only by the creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. ,hat such partition is not go erned by the rules of wills or donations inter i os is a conse.uence of its special nature. %*angEoy vs. CA, /00 SCRA 22& Article 1G3G of the =ew !i il !ode allows a person to maBe a partition of his estate either by an act inter i os or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not pre)udice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance- the partition by the parent- as pro ided in Art. 1G3G- is a case e5pressly authori(ed by law. Art. 1G3G of the !i il !ode clearly gi es a person two options in maBing a partition of his estateE either by an act inter i os or by WI::. When a person maBes a partition by will- it is imperati e that such partition must be e5ecuted in accordance with the pro isions of the law on willsE howe er- when the person maBes the partition of his estate by an act inter i os- such partition may e en be oral or written- and need not be in a form of will- pro ided that the partition does not pre)udice the legitime of compulsory heirs. %Chave8 vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /3/ SCRA 4//&

CIVIL LAW

Obligations and Contracts


SOURCES OF O0L %AT ONS While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers- it should ne ertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its e.uipment if such flaws were at all disco erable. In this connection- the manufacturer of the defecti e appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier- and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relie e the carrier from liability. ,he rationale of the carrierNs liability is the fact that the passenger has no pri ity with the manufacturer of the defecti e e.uipmentE hence- he has no remedy against him- while the carrier usually has. %Necesito vs. Paras, "E/6561, Aune 26, /31<& NATURE AND EFFECT OF O0L %AT ONS

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It is a5iomatic that in reciprocal obligations- neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. It will not do- howe er- to dispose of the contro ersy by simply declaring that the contract between the parties had not been alidly cancelled and was therefore still in force- and that Agcaoili could not be compelled by the ;#I# to pay the stipulated price of the house and lot sub)ect of the contract until and unless it had first completed construction of the house. In this case- the !ourt cannot re.uire specific performance of the contract in .uestion according to its literal terms- as this would result in ine.uity. ,he pre ailing rule is that in decreeing specific performance e.uity re.uires not only that the contract be )ust and e.uitable in its pro isions- but that the conse.uences of specific performance liBewise be e.uitable and )ust. ,he general rule is that this e.uitable relief will not be granted if- under the circumstances of the case- the result of the specific enforcement of the contract would be harsh- ine.uitable- oppressi e- or result in an unconscionable ad antage to the plaintiff. In the e5ercise of its e.uity )urisdiction- the !ourt may ad)ust the rights of parties in accordance with the circumstances obtaining at the time of rendition of )udgment- when these are significantly different from those e5isting at the time of generation of those rights. %Agcaoili vs. .SIS, .. R. No. 26615, August 26, /3<<& K NDS OF O0L %AT ONS A stipulation pro iding for the term of lease as Ifor as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increasesJ is in alid because it is a purely potestati e condition and it lea es the effecti ity and en)oyment of the leasehold rights to the sole and e5clusi e will of the lessee. Dutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no e.uality e5ists between the lessor and lessee since the life of the contract is dictated solely by the lessee. %"ao "im vs. CA, /3/ SCRA /16& RESC SS ON OF O0L %AT ONS 7etitioner@s breach of the agreement does not warrant a resolution of the contract. While it is true that in reciprocal obligations- such as the contract of purchase and sale in this case- the power to rescind is implied and any of the contracting parties may- upon non-fulfillment by the other party of his part of the obligation- resol e the contract- rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract. >escission may be had only for such breaches that are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the ob)ect of the parties in maBing the agreement. ,he two aforementioned conditions that were breached by petitioners are not essential for the fulfillment of the obligations to sell on their part but merely an incidental undertaBing. ,he rescission of the contract may not be allowed on this ground alone. %Ang vs. CA, /;6 SCRA 4<5&

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A4ti6le 11'1 4e2e4s to D5di6ial 4es6ission? t does not a88l< i2 t@e4e is an eB84ess sti85lation to 4es6ind) in w@i6@ 6ase s56@ sti85lation ;5st 84evail? T@e4e is not@in1 in t@e law w@i6@ 84o@iAits t@e 8a4ties 24o; ente4in1 into an a14ee;ent t@at violation o2 t@e te4;s o2 t@e 6ont4a6t wo5ld 6a5se its 6an6ellation wit@o5t 6o54t inte4vention? Said sti85lation is in t@e nat54e o2 2a65ltative 4esol5to4< 6ondition %!ngeles &s. Calasan* 382 SCR! 8/8'? ,he rule that the in)ured party- can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation- and cannot ha e both. applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment. If- as in this case- the fulfillment has become impossible- Article 1191 allows the in)ured party to seeB rescission e en after he has chosen fulfillment. %AysonESimon vs. A!amos, /2/ SCRA 023& Well settled is the rule- as held in pre ious )urisprudence that )udicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract pro ides that it may be cancelled for iolation of any of its terms and conditions. %owe er- e en in the cited cases- there was at least a written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. ,he act of a party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made Bnown to the other. In other words- resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made e5tra)udicially unless successfully impugned in !ourt. If the debtor impugns the declaration it shall be sub)ect to )udicial determination. %Aison vs. Court Df Appeals, /50 SCRA 223&

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In reciprocal obligations- the obligation of one is a resolutory condition of the obligation of the other- the non-fulfillment of which entitles the other party to rescind the contract. It does not apply to a case where there are two separate and distinct obligations- each independent of the other. %Songcuan v. IAC, /3/ SCRA 4<& O0L %AT ONS " T$ A PER OD T@e onl< a6tion t@at 6an Ae ;aintained is an a6tion to as9 t@e 6o54t to 2iB t@e d54ation o2 t@e te4; o4 8e4iod? T@e 25l2ill;ent o2 t@e oAli1ation itsel2 6annot Ae de;anded 5ntil a2te4 t@e 6o54t @as 2iBed t@e 8e4iod 2o4 6o;8lian6e t@e4ewit@) and s56@ 8e4iod @as a44ived? $oweve4) s56@ te6@ni6alit< need not Ae ad@e4ed to w@en a 84io4 and se8a4ate a6tion wo5ld Ae a ;e4e 2o4;alit< and wo5ld se4ve no ot@e4 8548ose t@an to dela< %,orromeo &s. C! 7; SCR! <2'? O0L %AT ONS " T$ A PENAL CLAUSE Where a contract of sale of real property imposes a Ispecial conditionJ upon the endee to construct a house thereon and complete at least <GP of such construction within two years otherwise the surety bond would be forfeited in fa or of the endor- such special obligation is in reality an obligation with a penal clause and the obligor@s liability may be mitigated pursuant to Art 1229 of the =!!- considering that the penalty is intended not to indemnify the endor for any damage it might suffer as a result of a breach of contract- but rather to compel performance. %*a$ati Development Corp vs. Empire Insurance Co., 46 SCRA 11;& LE%AL TENDER ;ranting that petitioner had ne er encashed the checB- his failure to do so for more than ten *1G+ years undoubtedly resulted in the impairment of the checB through his unreasonable and une5plained delay. While it is true that the deli ery of a checB produces the effect of payment only when it is cashed- pursuant to Art. 12C9 of the !i il !ode- the rule is otherwise if the debtor is pre)udiced by the creditorNs unreasonable delay in presentment. ,he acceptance of a checB implies an undertaBing of due diligence in presenting it for payment- and if he from whom it is recei ed sustains loss by want of such diligence- it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or obligation for which it was gi en. It has- liBewise- been held that if no presentment is made at allthe drawer cannot be held liable irrespecti e of loss or in)ury unless presentment is otherwise e5cused. ,his is in harmony with Article 12C9 of the !i il !ode under which payment by way of checB or other negotiable instrument is conditioned on its being cashed- e5cept when through the fault of the creditor- the instrument is impaired. ,he payee of a checB would be a creditor under this pro ision and if its non-payment is caused by his negligence- payment will be deemed effected and the obligation for which the checB was gi en as conditional payment will be discharged. %Papa vs. A.>. (alencia an! Co., Inc., .RN /61/<<, Aanuary 42, /33<& In the case at bar- the checB in ol ed is not an ordinary bill of e5change but a managerNs checB. A managerNs checB is one drawn by the banBNs manager upon the banB itself. It is similar to a cashierNs checB both as to effect and use. A cashierNs checB is a checB of the banBNs cashier on his own or another checB. In effect- it is a bill of e5change drawn by the cashier of a banB upon the banB itself- and accepted in ad ance by the act of its issuance. It is really the banBNs own checB and may be treated as a promissory note with the banB as a maBer. ,he checB becomes the primary obligation of the banB which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon demand. ,he mere issuance of it is considered an acceptance thereof. If treated as promissory note- the drawer would be the maBer and in which case the holder need not pro e presentment for payment or present the bill to the drawee for acceptance. ' en assuming that presentment is needed- failure to present for payment within a reasonable time will result to the discharge of the drawer only to the e5tent of the loss caused by the delay. "ailure to present on time- thus- does not totally wipe out all liability. In fact- the legal situation amounts to an acBnowledgment of liability in the sum stated in the checB. In this casethe ;ueco spouses ha e not alleged- much less shown that they or the banB which issued the managerNs checB has suffered damage or loss caused by the delay or non-presentment. $efinitelythe original obligation to pay certainly has not been erased. %The International Corporate ,an$

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%no@ >NIDN ,AN7 DB T-E P-I"IPPINES& vs. Sps. Brancis S. .ueco an! *a. "u8 .ueco, ..R. No. /0/35<. Be#ruary /4, 466/& 8n the issue of prescription- 7!IBanB claims that the action of "ord had prescribed because of its inability to seeB )udicial relief seasonably- considering that the alleged negligent act tooB place prior to $ecember 19- 19?? but the relief was sought only in 1932- or se en years thereafter. ,he statute of limitations begins to run when the banB gi es the depositor notice of the payment- which is ordinarily when the checB is returned to the alleged drawer as a oucher with a statement of his account- 29 and an action upon a checB is ordinarily go erned by the statutory period applicable to instruments in writing. 8ur laws on the matter pro ide that the action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. %ence- the recBoning time for the prescripti e period begins when the instrument was issued and the corresponding checB was returned by the banB to its depositor *normally a month thereafter+. Applying the same rule- the cause of action for the reco ery of the proceeds of !itibanB !hecB =o. #= GC36? would normally be a month after $ecember 19- 19??- when !itibanB paid the face alue of the checB in the amount of 7C-?C6-11C.C1. #ince the original complaint for the cause of action was filed on Lanuary 2G- 1932barely si5 years had lapsed. ,hus- we conclude that "ordNs cause of action to reco er the amount of !itibanB !hecB =o. #= GC36? was seasonably filed within the period pro ided by law %Philippine Commercial International ,an$ %formerly INS>"AR ,AN7 DB ASIA AND A*ERICA& vs. Court of Appeals an! Bor! Philippines, Inc. an! Citi#an$, N.A ..R. No. /4/0/2. Aanuary 43, 466/& E7T N%U S$MENT OF O0L %AT ONS Pa<;ent is a ;ode o2 eBtin15is@in1 an oAli1ation? A4ti6le 1+,* o2 t@e Civil Code 84ovides t@at 8a<;ent s@all Ae ;ade to t@e 8e4son in w@ose 2avo4 t@e oAli1ation @as Aeen n a 6ont4a6t involvin1 4e6i84o6al oAli1ations) t@e 45les on w@en a 8a4t< ;a< Ae de6la4ed in de2a5lt a4e 2o5nd in A4ti6le 11-'# KA4t? 11-'? T@ose oAli1ed to delive4 o4 to do so;et@in1) in654 in dela< 24o; t@e ti;e t@e oAli1ee D5di6iall< o4 eBt4aD5di6iall< de;ands 24o; t@e; t@e 25l2ill;ent o2 t@ei4 oAli1ation?B B B n 4e6i84o6al oAli1ations) neit@e4 8a4t< in654s in dela< i2 t@e ot@e4 does not 6o;8l< o4 is not 4ead< to 6o;8l< in a 84o8e4 ;anne4 wit@ w@at is in65;Aent 58on @i;? F4o; t@e ;o;ent one o2 t@e 8a4ties 25l2ills @is oAli1ation) dela< A< t@e ot@e4 Ae1ins? T@e 8a<;ents we4e 8548o4tedl< ;ade to a Ns58e4viso4N o2 t@e 84ivate 4es8ondent) w@o was 6lad in an SMC 5ni2o4; and d4ove an SMC van? $e a88ea4ed to Ae a5t@o4iGed to a66e8t 8a<;ents as @e s@owed a list o2 65sto;e4sM a66o5ntaAilities and even iss5ed SMC li:5idation 4e6ei8ts w@i6@ loo9ed 1en5ine? Un2o4t5natel< 2o4 8etitione4 F4an6is6o C5laAa) @e did not as6e4tain t@e identit< and a5t@o4it< o2 t@e said s58e4viso4) no4 did @e as9 to Ae s@own an< identi2i6ation to 84ove t@at t@e latte4 was) indeed) an SMC s58e4viso4? T@e 8etitione4s 4elied solel< on t@e ;anMs 4e84esentation t@at @e was 6olle6tin1 8a<;ents 2o4 SMC? T@5s) t@e 8a<;ents t@e 8etitione4s 6lai;ed t@e< ;ade we4e not t@e 8a<;ents t@at dis6@a41ed t@ei4 oAli1ation to t@e 84ivate 4es8ondent? %Culaba &s. C! 5.R. 6o. 3/24</ !pril 32 /007' =o ation of a contract cannot be presumed. In order that an obligation may be e5tinguished by another which substitutes the same- it is imperati e that it be so declared in une.ui ocal terms or that the old and new obligation be on e ery point incompatible with each other. ,he legal doctrine is that an obligation to pay a sum of money is not no ated in a new instrument by changing the term of payment and adding other obligation not incompatible with the old one. It is not proper to consider an obligation no ated as in the case at bar by mere granting of e5tension of payment which do not e en alter its essence. %.arcia vs. CA, /3/ SCRA 032& Novation in w@ateve4 2o4; it ;a< Ae) w@et@e4 s5ADe6tive o4 oADe6tive) ;5st @ave to Ae wit@ t@e 6onsent o2 t@e 64edito4? T@e4e 6an Ae novation wit@o5t t@e 6onsent o2 t@e deAto4 &eB84o;ision/ A5t t@e4e 6an neve4 Ae novation wit@o5t t@e 6onsent o2 t@e 64edito4? T@e 4eason is t@at a new 6ont4a6t is Aein1 64eated Aetween t@e new 64edito4 and t@e new deAto4? An agreement is needed for the effect of an e5traordinary inflation to be taBen into account to alter the alue of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which as a rule- is always the determinati e element- to be aried by agreement that would find reason only in the super ention of e5traordinary inflation or deflation.

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Doreo er- in his concurring opinion in the same case- Lustice !laudio ,eehanBee statedH MI concur in the result with the obser ation that the statements in the main opinion re the applicability or non-applicability of Article 12<G of the !i il !ode should be taBen as obiter dictasince said article may not be in oBed nor applied without a proper declaration of e5traordinary inflation or deflation of currency by the competent authorities. %*o#il Dil Phils. vs. CA, /<6 SCRA 51/& '5traordinary inflation e5ists when Nthere is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the 7hilippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the alue of said currency- and such decrease or increase could not ha e been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. While appellantNs oluminous records and statistics pro ed that there has been a decline in the purchasing power of the 7hilippine peso- this downward fall of the currency cannot be considered Me5traordinary.M It is simply a uni ersal trend that has not spared our country. %Bilipino Pipe an! Boun!ry vs. NA?ASA, "E02005, *ay 2, /3<<& Where a timely and alid tender of payment is made pursuant to the e5ercise of a right it is sufficient- without consignation- to preser e such right. !onsignation referred to in Art 12<6 of the !i il !ode is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said pro ision refers to consignation as one of the means for the payment or discharge of a debt whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises. ,he lessee merely e5ercised a right of option and had no obligation to pay said price until e5ecution of the deed of sale in his fa or- which the lessor referred to do. %Brancisco vs. ,autista, /34 SCRA 2<<& An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed howe er that in maBing a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase. ,his statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or e5ercise of the right to repurchase. %GuiHo vs. CA, 43/ SCRA 403& ,he deposit of the rentals with the banB is not the consignation contemplated by law. What the law re.uires is the deposit of the thing due at the disposal of )udicial authority before whom the tender of payment shall be pro ed in a proper case. %Ercillio vs. CA, /34 SCRA /52& An indi idual who is not a forced heir- creditor or party to a contract of sale made during the life of the grantor cannot bring an action to annul said oluntary deed of sale to the grantee because under the law- an action to annul a contract entered into with all the re.uisites mentioned in Art. 1261 whene er they are tainted with the ice which alidate them in accordance with law may be brought- not only by any person principally bound or who made them but also his heir to whom the right and obligation arising from the contract are transmitted. %Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana, "E44;, Decem#er 43, /316& AUTONOMY OF CONTRACTS !ontracting parties may establish such stipulations- clauses- terms and conditions as they may deem con enient- pro ided they are not contrary to law- morals- good customs- public orderor public policy.M %owe er- where one of the conditions stated in a contract is a prohibition to sell to third parties- the same is contrary to public policy because it irtually amounts to a perpetual restriction on the right of ownership- specifically the ownerNs right to freely dispose of his properties. Any such prohibition- indefinite and unlimited as to time- so much so that it shall continue to be applicable e en beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the contract- iswithout doubt- a nullity. %"eal v. IAC, ..R. No. "E51041, Novem#er 1, /3<;& Article 12<? of the !i il !ode is confined to the enforcement of stipulations in fa or of third persons. ,he history of the doctrine and the meaning of the word stipulation re.uire that the benefit claimed by a third person must be one intended to be conferred upon him by the parties. ,he article does not lend its aid to an incidental benefit which a third person may ha e in the performance of the contract. ,he intent of the contracting parties to benefit a third person must be clearly e5pressed. %>y Tam an! >y 'et vs. "eonar!, 26 Phil. 0;/& CONSENT

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,he acceptance of an offer must therefor be un.ualified and absolute. In other words- it must be identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds. ,his was not the case herein considering that petitionerNs acceptance of the offer was .ualified- which amounts to a re)ection of the original offer. %"im$et$ai Sons v. CA, 411 SCRA 545& An o22e4 ;ade inter praesentes ;5st Ae a66e8ted MMED ATELY? 2 t@e 8a4ties intended t@at t@e4e s@o5ld Ae an eB84ess a66e8tan6e) t@e 6ont4a6t will Ae 8e42e6ted onl< 58on 9nowled1e A< t@e o22e4o4 o2 t@e eB84ess a66e8tan6e A< t@e o22e4ee o2 t@e o22e4? An a66e8tan6e w@i6@ is not ;ade in t@e ;anne4 84es64iAed A< t@e o22e4o4 is NOT EFFECT !E 0UT A COUNTER> OFFER w@i6@ t@e o22e4o4 ;a< a66e8t o4 4eDe6t? %9albarosa &s. C! et al. 5.R. @ 3/2;<3 !pril 80 /008' MUTUAL TY OF CONTRACTS ,he binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two settled principlesH*1+ that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the partiesE and *2+ that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential e.uality. Any contract which appears to be hea ily weighed in fa or of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result is oid. Any stipulation regarding the alidity or compliance of the contract which is left solely to the will of one of the parties- is liBewise- in alid. %Alme!a v. CA, 415 SCRA 434& STATUTE OF FRAUDS As 6o44e6tl< 2o5nd A< t@e a88ellate 6o54t) t@e o6658ation and 6onst456tion o2 t@e i;84ove;ents ;ade A< 8etitione4s on t@e dis85ted 84o8e4t< a4e 6lea4 a6ts o2 4ati2i6ation and en2o46e;ent? n ot@e4 wo4ds) t@e e4e6tion o2 t@ese st456t54es on t@e s5ADe6t lot indi6ates t@at t@e lease 6ont4a6t was al4ead< in e22e6t? T@e Stat5te o2 F4a5ds a88lies onl< to eBe65to4< and not 6o;8leted) eBe65ted o4 8a4tiall< eBe65ted 6ont4a6ts? T@5s) w@e4e as in t@is 6ase) one 8a4t< @as 8e42o4;ed @is oAli1ation) o4al eviden6e will Ae ad;itted to 84ove t@e a14ee;ent? %Camara &s. 9alabao 5.R. 6o. 327<20. .uly 83 /008' A contract need not be contained in a single writing. It may be collected from se eral different writings which do not conflict with each other and which- when connected- show the parties- sub)ect matter- terms and consideration- as in contracts entered into by correspondence. A contract may be encompassed in se eral instruments e en though e ery instrument is not signed by the parties- since it is sufficient if the unsigned instruments are clearly identified or referred to and made part of the signed instrument or instruments. %,B Corporation v. CA, 4<< SCRA 45;& An e5ception to the unenforceability of contracts pursuant to the #tatute of "rauds is the e5istence of a written note or memorandum e idencing the contract. ,he memorandum may be found in se eral writings- not necessarily in one document. %"im$et$ai Sons v. CA, 416 SCRA 142& RESC SS ON n 6o5ntless ti;es t@e4e @as Aeen 6on25sion Aetween 4es6ission 5nde4 A4ti6les 13(1 and 11'1 o2 t@e Civil Code? T@4o51@ t@is 6ase we a1ain e;8@asiGe t@at 4es6ission o2 4e6i84o6al oAli1ations 5nde4 A4ti6le 11'1 is di22e4ent 24o; 4es6issiAle 6ont4a6ts 5nde4 C@a8te4 - o2 t@e law on 6ont4a6ts 5nde4 t@e Civil Code? "@ile A4ti6le 11'1 5ses t@e te4; 4es6ission) t@e o4i1inal te4; 5sed in A4ti6le 11+, o2 t@e old Civil Code) 24o; w@i6@ A4ti6le 11'1 was Aased) was 4esol5tion? Resol5tion is a 84in6i8al a6tion t@at is Aased on A4ea6@ o2 a 8a4t<) w@ile 4es6ission 5nde4 A4ti6le 13(3 is a s5Asidia4< a6tion li;ited to 6ases o2 4es6ission 2o4 lesion 5nde4 A4ti6le 13(1 o2 t@e New Civil Code? %Ri&era &s. #el Rosario 5.R. 6o. 377187. .anuary 32 /007'

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Sales
A0SOLUTE AND COND T ONAL SALES A deed of sale- e en though denominated as a I$eed of !onditional #aleJ is absolute in nature in the absence of stipulation that the title to the property sold is reser ed in the endor or that the latter has the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon the non-payment within a fi5ed period. %Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, /1< SCRA 2;1& O0FECT OF A CONTRACT OF SALE :ands ac.uired by free or homestead patent shall not only be incapable of being encumbered or alienated e5cept in fa or of the go ernment- but shall not also be liable to the satisfaction of debt within the prohibiti e period of fi e *<+ years. ,his prohibition is mandatory and any sale made in iolation thereof is null and oid. ,his is true e en if the sale in ol ed is not oluntary- such as a )udicial sale. "or the purpose of compliance with the law- it is immaterial that the satisfaction of debt by alienation or encumbrance was made oluntarily or not. %Artates vs. >r#i, 2; SCRA 231& A bilateral promise to buy and sell and the agency to sell- entered into within fi e *<+ years from the date of the issuance of the homestead patent is in iolation of the 7ublic :and :aw although the e5ecution of the sale was deferred until after the e5piration of the fi e-year prohibitory period. ,o all intents and purposes- there was an actual sale perfected during the period of prohibition e5cept that it was reciprocally demandable thereafter. ,he stipulation deferring the effects of the sale was merely a de ice to circum ent the prohibition. ,hereafter- a compromise agreement wherein a grantee of a public land promised to sell the same and entered into within the prohibitory period of fi e years is null and oid ab initio. %-eirs of Enri)ue =am#ales vs. CA, /46 SCRA <3;& A 6ont4a6t o2 sale o4 8546@ase o2 1oods to Ae delive4ed at a 25t54e ti;e) i2 ente4ed into wit@o5t t@e intention o2 @avin1 an< 1oods 8ass 24o; one 8a4t< to anot@e4) A5t wit@ an 5nde4standin1 t@at at t@e a88ointed ti;e) t@e 8546@ase4 is ;e4el< to 4e6eive o4 8a< t@e di22e4en6e Aetween t@e 6ont4a6t and t@e ;a49et 84i6es) is ille1al? S56@ 6ont4a6t 2alls 5nde4 t@e de2inition o2 K25t54esL in w@i6@ t@e 8a4ties ;e4el< 1a;Ale on t@e 4ise o4 2all in 84i6es and is de6la4ed n5ll and void A< law? &A4t? +*1() NCC/ &Onapal Phil. Commodities -nc. &s. C! O1''3P/ CONTRACT OF SALE vs? A%ENCY TO SELL When one undertaBes to deli er a thing at a stipulated price to another who is to pay the price in a moment agreed upon- such constitutes the essential features of a contract of sale and e5cludes the legal conception of an agency or order to sell. ,he contract entered into by the parties was that the plaintiff was to furnish the defendant with the beds which the latter might order at a stipulated price and that the defendant was to pay the price in the manner agreed upon. ,his contract contains the essential features of a contract of sale unliBe in an agency whereby the agent recei es the thing to sell it and does not pay its price but deli ers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a third person and if he does not succeed in selling itreturns it. %Guiroga vs. Parsons -ar!@are Company, 2< Phil 16/& CONTRACT OF SALE vs? CONTRACT FOR A P ECE OF "ORK #elling or distribution is an essential ingredient of manufacturing. Danufacture- thereof- of products for the general marBet in ol es the sale and distribution thereof and cannot be regarded as contract for a piece of worB- which the manufacturing of goods especially upon the special order of customers- and not for the general marBet. A contract for the sale of an article which the endor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general marBet- whether the same is on hand at the time or not is a contract for the sale of goods %Concrete Aggregates, Inc. vs. Court Df TaF Appeals, /<1 SCRA 05/&. PERFECT ON OF CONTRACT OF SALE

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A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. ,his is so because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price such that a difference or disagreement in the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. $efiniteness as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal property. In the case- nothing on the agreement mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the installments were to be paid. %Toyota Sha@, Inc. vs. Court Df Appeals, 400 SCRA 24/& EQU TA0LE MORT%A%E One w@i6@ la69s t@e 84o8e4 2o4;alities) 2o4; o2 wo4ds) o4 ot@e4 4e:5isites 84es64iAed A< law 2o4 a ;o4t1a1e) A5t s@ows t@e intention o2 t@e 8a4ties to ;a9e t@e 84o8e4t< s5ADe6t o2 t@e 6ont4a6t as se654it< 2o4 a deAt and 6ontains not@in1 i;8ossiAle o4 6ont4a4< to law &Cachola &s. C! /04 SCR! 71</ PROM SE TO 0UY AND SELL !S ACCEPTED UN LATERAL PROM SE TO 0UY OR TO SELL While it is true that under Art. 122C of the !i il !ode- the general rule regarding offer and acceptance is that- when the offeror gi es to the offeree a certain period to accept- the offer may be withdrawn at anytime before acceptance when the option is not founded upon consideration distinct from price. ,his general rule must be interpreted as modified by the pro ision of Article 1C?9 which applies to a Ipromise to buy and sellJ specifically. ,his rule re.uires that a promise to sell to be alid- must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price- which means that the option can still be withdrawn- e en if accepted- if the same is not supported by any consideration. %South@estern Sugar an! *olasses Co. vs. Atlantic .ulf An! Pacific, Co., 3; SCRA 403& ,he acceptance of an offer to sell a determinate thing for a price certain creates a bilateral contract to sell and to buy. ,he offer- upon acceptance- ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser. If an option is gi en without consideration- it is a mere offer of contract of sale- which is not binding until accepted. If- howe er- acceptance is made before a withdrawalit constitutes a binding contract of sale e en though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration. %At$ins, 7roll an! Company vs, Cua -ian Te$, /64 SCRA 30<& ,here is no conflict between Articles 122C and 1C?9. An accepted unilateral promise to sell partaBes the nature of an option- which- although not binding as contract in itself because of lacB of separate consideration- generates a bilateral contract of purchase and sale upon acceptance. Article 122C of the !i il !ode which presumes the e5istence of a consideration in e ery contract applies to contracts in general- whereas the second paragraph of Article 1C?9 thereof refers to sales in particular and more specifically to an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell. %Sanche8 vs. Rigos, 01 SCRA 25<& An e5tension of the period to redeem the property after the redemption period granted by the 7resident and Danager of a banB after the e5piration of the redemption period could only relate to the matter of resale of the property- not redemption. ' en if it were to be understood as an e5tension of the period of redemption- the banB is not bound by the promise not only because it was not appro ed or ratified by the Board of $irectors but also because- and more distincti ely- it was a promise not supported by a consideration distinct from the repurchase price. %Natino vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /3; SCRA 242& In a unilateral promise to sell- where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise before the acceptance by the creditor- the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to buy because upon the acceptance by the creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor- there is already a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and the price which is certain. In which case- the parties may reciprocally demand performance. An optional contract is a pri ilege e5isting only in one party / the buyer. "or a separate consideration paid- he is gi en the right to purchase or not- a certain merchandise or property- at any time within the agreed period- at a fi5ed price. It is the duty of the endor to remain open the offer until the agreed period e5pires.

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,he purchaser is then gi en the option to decide to purchase or not and may not be compelled to e5ercise the option to buy before the term e5pires. %Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 443 SCRA 56& O0L %AT ON OF T$E !ENDEE TO PAY T$E PR CE A grace period granted the endee in case of failure to pay the amountFs due is a right not an obligation. ,he grace period must not be liBened to an obligation- the non-payment of whichunder Article 1169 of the !i il !ode- would still generally re.uire )udicial or e5tra-)udicial demand before IdefaultJ can be said to arise * ,ric$to@n DevIt Corp vs. Amor Tierra DevIt Corp. 1;SCRA02;+ R %$T OF F RST REFUSAL In the instant case- the right of first refusal is integrated in the contract of lease. ,hus- it is incorrect to say that there is no consideration in an agreement of right of first refusal. ,he contractual stipulation is part and parcel of the whole contract of lease. %ence- the consideration for the lease includes the consideration for the right of first refusal. >escission is a relief allowed for the protection of one of the contracting parties and e en third persons from all in)ury and damage the contract may cause or to protect some incompatible and preferred right by the contract. %E)uatorial Realty Development vs. *ayfair Theater Inc., 450 SCRA 0<2& ,he basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller- or offer to purchase of any prospecti e buyer. 8nly after the optionee fails to e5ercise its right of first priority under the same terms and within the period contemplated- could the owner alidly offer to sell the property to a third person- again- under the same terms as offered to the optionee. %Parana)ue 7ings Enterprises, Inc. v. CA .R No. ///12<, Be#ruary 45, /33;& A right of first refusal means identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee and all other prospecti e buyers and a contract of sale entered into in iolation of a right of first refusal of another person- while alid- is rescissible. %Riviera Bilipina, Inc. v. CA .R No. //;211, April 1, 4664& "$O 0EARS T$E R SK OF LOSS ,he disappearance or loss of property which the owner intended or attempted to sell can only interest the owner- who should suffer the loss- and not a third party who has ac.uired no rights nor incurred any liability with respect thereto. In the case- the sale was not perfected for failure of the owner to comply with the condition. It follows that the loss of the essel should be borne by the owner. %Roman vs. .rimalt, 5 Phil 35& ,he issuance of sales in oice does not pro e transfer of ownership of the thing sold either actually or constructi ely. In all forms of deli ery- it is necessary that the act of deli ering whether constructi e or actual be coupled with the intention to transfer ownership and to deli er the thing. Article 1C96 of the !i il !ode which pro ides that in the absence of an e5press assumption of risB by the buyer- the things sold remain at the seller@s risB until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer. %Nor$is Distri#utors, Inc. vs. CA, /32 SCRA 530& RECTO LA" In sales on installments- where the action instituted is for specific performance and the mortgaged property is subse.uently attached and sold- the sale thereof does not amount to a foreclosure of the mortgage- hence- the seller-creditor is entitled to deficiency )udgment. ,he attachment and subse.uent sale on public auction of the property was merely an incident to an ordinary ci il action and cannot be considered as e.ui alent to the remedy of foreclosure. %Southern *otors, Inc. vs. *oscoso, 4 SCRA /52& If the guarantor should be compelled to pay the balance of the purchase price- the guarantor will in turn be entitled to reco er what she has paid from the debtor- endee pursuant to Article 2G66 of the !i il !ode- so that ultimately- it would be the endee who will be made to bear the payment of the balance of the price- despite the earlier foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.

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,hus- the protection gi en by Article 1C3C would be indirectly sub erted- and public policy o erturned. ,herefore- foreclosure of the chattel mortgage releases the guarantor. %Pascual vs. >niversal *otors Corp., 5/ SCRA /4/& DEL !ERY AS A MODE OF TRANSFERR N% O"NERS$ P ,he e5ecution of a public instrument is e.ui alent to the deli ery of the thing which is the ob)ect of the contract- but in order that this symbolic deli ery may produce the effect of traditionit is necessary that the endor shall ha e had such control o er the thing sold that- at the moment of the sale- its material deli ery could ha e been made. %A!!ison vs. BeliF an! Tioco, 2< Phil 060& 8wnership is not transferred by perfection of the contract of sale but by deli ery- either actual or constructi e. ,his is true e en if the purchase has been made on credit or payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer of ownership as long as the property sold has been deli ered. 8wnership is ac.uired from the moment the thing sold was deli ered to the endee- as when it is placed in his control and possession. %Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. vs. Aal@in!or *anufacturers Inc., 02 SCRA 046& ART CLE 1,'1 ,he prohibition mandated by paragraph 2 of Article 1C91 in relation to Article 1CG9 of the !i il !ode does not apply where the sale of the property in dispute was made under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Act no. 212<- as amended. 9nder #ection < of such Act- the title of the mortgagee-creditor o er the property cannot be impeached or defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser of his own sale. %Biestan vs. CA,, /<1 SCRA ;1;& ART CLES 13*- AND 33' ,he right of the owner to reco er personal property ac.uired in good faith by another is based on his being dispossessed without his consent. ,he common law principle that where one of the two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another- the law imposes upon the party who by his misplaced confidence- has enabled the fraud to be committed cannot be applied to a person unlawfully depri ed co ered by an e5press pro ision of the !i il !ode specifically Article <<9. Between a common law principle and a statutory pro ision- the latter must pre ail. %Concurring opinion of Austice Teehan$ee& 9nlawful depri ation is not merely contained in the specific sense of depri ation by robbery or theft but e5tends to all cases where there has been no alid transmission of ownership- including depositary or lessee who sold the same. It e5tends to all cases where there has been no alid transmission of ownership. %Di8on vs. Suntay, 0; SCRA /56& 7ossession of mo able property ac.uired in good faith is e.ui alent to a title. %ence- where there was a perfected contract of sale- it cannot be said that there is unlawful depri ation so as to warrant reco ery from a purchaser in good faith without reimbursement. %EDCA Pu#lishing An! Distri#uting Corp. vs. Santos, /<0 SCRA 5/0& DOU0LE SALE ,he first purchaser is necessarily a purchaser in goo! faith. #uch good faith subsists and continues to e5ist e en if the first purchaser subse.uently is informed of the e5istence of a second sale. ,he go erning principle here is Jfirst in time, stronger in rightJ. ,he Bnowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer@s good faith and the right to register first. But con ersely- Bnowledge gained by the buyer of the first sale defeats his rights e en if he be the one to register first as he then acts in bad faith. It has to be noted that Bnowledge is tantamount to registration. %Car#onell vs. Court Df Appeals, 53 SCRA 33&

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Where one of two conflicting sales of a piece of land was e5ecuted #efore the land was registered- while the other was an eFecution sale ma!e after the land had been registered- what should apply is #ection 2<- >ule 29 *not Article 1<CC+ which pro ides that purchaser of e5ecution sale ac.uires only the rights of the )udgment debtor to the property as of the time of the le y. ,herefore- a prior sale- although unregistered cannot be deemed to be automatically cancelled upon subse.uent issuance of the ,orrens title o er the land. %Dagupan Tra!ing Co. vs. *acam, /0 SCRA 33& &nowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subse.uent purchaser maBes him a purchaser in bad faith which itiates his title and creates no right as against the first purchaser. ,he Bnowledge contemplated here must be continuing- from the time of ac.uisition until the title is transferred to him by registration a failing registration by deli ery of possession. ,he second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lacB of Bnowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as pro ided by law. %Cru8 vs. Ca#ana, /43 SCRA 515& As between two purchasers- the one who registered the sale in his fa or has a preferred right o er the other who has not registered his title- e en if the latter is in actual possession of the immo able property. %Tane!o vs. Court Df Appeals, 414 SCRA <6& Article 1<CC does not apply to land not registered under the ,orrens system. ,he pro isions in Act =o. 22CC should be made applicable- which states that registration of instruments affecting unregistered lands is without pre)udice to a third party with a better right. ,his is because the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff@s e5ecution sale only steps into the shoes of the )udgment debtor- and merely ac.uires the latter@s interest in the property sold as of the time the property was le ied upon. %Ra!io@ealth Binance Co. vs. Palileo, /3; SCRA 401& Where a person claims to ha e superior proprietary rights o er another on the ground that he deri ed his title from a sheriffNs sale registered in the >egistry of 7roperty- Article 1<CC of the !i il !ode will apply only if said e5ecution sale of real estate is registered under Act C96. 9nfortunately- the sub)ect property was still untitled when it was already ac.uired by banB *first buyer+ by irtue of a final deed of con eyance. 8n the other hand- when the second buyer purchased the same property- it was co ered under the ,orrens #ystem. At the time of the e5ecution and deli ery of the sheriffNs deed of final con eyance the disputed property was already co ered by the :and >egistration Act and the 8riginal !ertificate of ,itle was liBewise already entered in the registration booB of the >egister of $eeds as of April 1?- 193C. ,hus- from said date- the sub)ect property was already under the operation of the ,orrens #ystem. 9nder the said system- registration is the operati e act that gi es alidity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. Doreo er- the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relie ing the land of all claims e5cept those noted thereon. Accordingly- the second buyer in dealing with the sub)ect registered land- were not re.uired by law to go beyond the register to determine the legal condition of the property. ,hey were only charged with notice of such burdens on the property as were noted on the register or the certificate of title. ,o ha e re.uired them to do more would ha e been to defeat the primary ob)ect of the ,orrens #ystem which is to maBe the ,orrens ,itle indefeasible and alid against the whole world. %Naa@an Community Rural ,an$ v. CA& 0REAC$ OF "ARRANTY As a general rule- there is no implied warranty in a sale of second hand goods. %owe erthis general rule is not without e5ceptions. Article 1<62 of the !i il !ode states that Iwhere the buyer e5pressly or by implication maBes Bnown to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are ac.uired and it appears that the buyer relied on the seller@s sBill or )udgment- there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. In the certification that the machine was in A1 condition must be considered an e5press warranty and their binding on the seller. #uch condition or certification was a condition sine .ua non for the release of the petitioner@s loan which was used for the payment of the purchase price. #eller must be bound by it. %*oles vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /53 SCRA ;;;&

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While it is true that Article 1<?1 of the !i il !ode pro ides for a prescripti e period of si5 months for a rehibitory action- a cursory of the preceding ten articles will re eal that said rule may be applied only in case of implied warranties. In case of e5press warranty- the prescripti e period is the one specified in the warranty and in the absence of such period- the general rule on rescission of contracts which is four *C+ years shall apply. %(illostas vs. Court Df Appeals, 4/6 SCRA 036& R %$T OF REDEMPT ON Where the true intention of the parties show that the transaction shall secure the payment of the debt- such a transaction shall be presumed to be an e.uitable mortgage under paragraph 6 of Article 16G2. #ettled is the rule that to create the presumption enunciated by Article 16G2- the e5istence of one circumstance is enough. %Ramos vs. Court Df Appeals, /<6 SCRA 521& While in ordinary sales for reason and e.uity a transaction may be in alidated on the ground of inade.uacy of price or when such inade.uacy shocBs one@s conscience as to )ustify the courts to interfere- such does not follow when the law gi es to the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction- upon the theory that the lower the price- the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption. And so it was aptly said that when there is the right to redeem- inade.uacy of the price should not be material because the )udgment debtor may redeem the property. %De "eon vs. Salva!or, 25 SCRA 15;& !o-heirs may redeem the shares sold by any of their co-heirs within 2G days from written notice of the sale. %owe er- strict application of this legal mandate would amount to in)ustice when there is an actual Bnowledge though no written notice is gi en. In such case- mere technicality should not defeat the purpose of the law- i.e. to notify the redemptioners whose actual $no@le!ge is e)uivalent to notice. %Alon8o vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /16 SCRA 413& A formal offer to redeem- accompanied by a bona fide tender of payment of redemption price is not essential where the right to redeem is e5ercised through a )udicial action within the redemption period and simultaneously depositing the redemption price. ,he filing of action itself is e)uivalent to a formal offer to re!eem. ,here is actually no prescribed form for an offer to redeem to be properly effected- what is paramount is the a ailment of the right to legally redeem within the fi5ed period. %"ee Chuy Realty Corp. vs. Court Df Appeals, 416 SCRA 135& While it is true that written notice by the endor is re.uired by law under Article 1622- it is e.ually true that the same Article 1622 does not prescribe any distincti e method for notifying the redemptioner so long- therefore- as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof- the 2G days for redemption starts running and the redemptioner has no real cause to complain. %Etcu#an vs. Court Df Appeals, /0< SCRA 1<;&

San 0eda Colle1e o2

Lease
When rental is paid monthly and the term had not been e5pressly agreed upon- the lease is understood under Article 163? to be terminated or terminable from month-to-month. An e5tension by the contract of lease may only be sought by the tenant before- not after- the termination of the lease. %'e$ Seng Co. vs. Court Df Appeals, 461 SCRA 261& Although the lease is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated at the end of e ery month- in the absence of proper notice to acate- the lease continues to be in force and cannot be deemed to ha e e5pired as of the end of the month automatically. =either can the non-payment of the rent be ground for termination without a demand to pay and to acate. %'ap vs. Cru8, 46< SCRA 534& An e5press agreement which gi es the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is fre.uent and- sub)ect to statutory restriction alid and- binding. ,his option which is pro ided in the same lease agreement is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from

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any other pro ision of the lease carrying an undertaBing on the part of the lessor to act conditioned on the performance by the lessee. It cannot be a oided on the ground that it lacBs mutuality. And while the lessee has the right to choose to continue the lease or not- and the lessor accepts- both parties are bound by the new lease contract. %Allie! ,an$ing Corporation vs. Court Df Appeals, 4<0 SCRA 21;& B7 3?? erased the distinction between oral and written leases in so far as e5piration of the lease period as a ground for )udicial e)ectment is concerned. ,herefore- the lease- although orally e5ecuted- may be for a definite period if it paid on a monthly basisE therefore- the period is from month to month. ,herefore- finally- any e5press e5ception of 7$ =o. 2G- )udicial e)ectment lies when the lease is for a definite period or when the fi5ed or definite period agreed upon has e5pired. %-eirs Df Bausta Dimaculangan vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /;6 SCRA 232& B7 2< e5pressly sanctions banB deposits as a sufficient and alid alternati e to )udicial consignation. :ease on a month-to-month basis can be alidly terminated by the lessor at the end of any gi en month upon prior notice. ,he lessor is granted the right to e)ect the lessee- being an e5cepted case under the >ental !ontrol :aw- after prior notice of such termination and demand to acate the leased premises. %In!uctivo vs. Court Df Appeals, 443 SCRA 2<6& #tipulations in a lease contract e5pressly warranting that the leased premises shall be used e5clusi ely by the lessee for a specific purpose and that the lessee shall not directly or indirectly assign its right of lease o er the leased premises are consistent with Art. 16C9 of the !i il !ode which pro ides that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor- unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. It has been held that the consent of the lessor is necessary because the assignment of the lease would in ol e the transfer- not only of rights- but also of obligations. It constitutes a no ation by a substitution of the person of one of the parties. %,angayan v. CA, 4;< SCRA 2;3&

CIVIL LAW

Partnership
CONCEPT OF PARTNERS$ P While it has been held that as between themsel es the rights of the stocBholders in a defecti ely incorporated association should be go erned by the supposed charter and the laws of the state relating thereto and not by the rules go erning partners- it is ordinarily held that persons who attempt- but fail- to form a corporation and who carry on business under the corporate name occupy the position of partners inter se. %owe er- such a relation does not necessarily e5ist- for ordinarily persons cannot be made to assume the relation of partners- as between themsel es- when their purpose is that no partnership shall e5ist- and it should be implied only when necessary to do )ustice between the partiesE thus- one who taBes no part e5cept to subscribe for stocB in a proposed corporation which is ne er legally formed does not become a partner with other subscribers who engage in business under the name of the pretended corporation- so as to be liable as such in an action for settlement of the alleged partnership and contribution. A partnership relation between certain stocBholders and other stocBholders- who were also directors- will not be implied in the absence of an agreement- so as to maBe the former liable to contribute for payment of debts illegally contracted by the latter. %Pioneer Insurance vs. CA, .RN <0/3;, Auly 4<, /3<3& It is true that the complaint also states that the plaintiff is Mrepresented herein by its Danaging 7artner ;regorio Araneta- Inc.M- another corporation- but there is nothing against one corporation being represented by another person- natural or )uridical- in a suit in court. ,he contention that I;regorio Araneta- Inc.J can not act as managing partner for plaintiff on the theory that it is illegal for two corporations to enter into a partnership is without merit- for the true rule is that Mthough a corporation has no power to enter into a partnership- it may ne ertheless enter into a )oint enture with another where the nature of that enture is in line with the business authori(ed by its charter.M %A.*.T. ?ason an! Co., Inc. vs. ,olanos, "E0321, *ay 4<, /35<&

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,hey were co-owners pure and simple. ,o consider them as partners would obliterate the distinction between a co-ownership and a partnership. ,he petitioners were not engaged in any )oint enture by reason of that isolated transaction. ,heir original purpose was to di ide the lots for residential purposes. If later on they found it not feasible to build their residences on the lots because of the high cost of construction- then they had no choice but to resell the same to dissol e the co-ownership. ,he di ision of the profit was merely incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership which was in the nature of things a temporary state. It had to be terminated sooner or later. %D#illos vs CIR, "E5<//<, Dcto#er 43, /3<1& ,he legal concept of a )oint enture is of common law origin. It has no precise legal definition- but it has been generally understood to mean an organi(ation formed for some legal purpose. It is in fact hardly distinguishable from the partnership- since their elements are similar / community of interest in the business- sharing of profits and losses- and a mutual right of control. ,he main distinction cited by most common law )urisdictions is that the partnership contemplates a general business with some degree of continuity- while the )oint enture is formed for the e5ecution of a single transaction- and is thus of a temporary nature. ,his obser ation is not entirely accurate in this )urisdiction- since under the !i il !ode- a partnership may be particular or uni ersal- and a particular partnership may ha e for its ob)ect a specific undertaBing. It would seem therefore that under 7hilippine law- a )oint enture is a form of partnership and should thus be go erned by the law of partnerships. ,he #upreme !ourt has howe er recogni(ed a distinction between these two business forms- and has held that although a corporation cannot enter into a partnership contract- it may howe er engage in a )oint enture with others. Doreo er- the usual rules as regards the construction and operations of contracts generally apply to a contract of a )oint enture. %Aur#ach v. Sanitary ?ares *anufacturing Corp., /<6 SCRA /26& O0L %AT ONS OF T$E PARTNERS It is not disputed that the prohibition against an industrial partner engaging in business for himself seeBs to pre ent any conflict of interest between the industrial partner and the partnership- and to insure faithful compliance by said partner with his prestation. ,here is no pretense- howe er- e en on the part of appellants that appellee is engaged in any business antagonistic to that of appellant company- since being a Ludge of one of the branches of the !ity !ourt of Danila can hardly be characteri(ed as a business. %Evangelista + Co. vs. A#a! Santos, "E 2/5<0, Aune 4<, /3;2& Abo e all other persons in business relations- partners are re.uired to e5hibit towards each other the highest degree of good faith. In fact the relation between partners is essentially fiduciary- each being considered in law- as he is in fact- the confidential agent of the other. It is therefore accepted as fundamental in e.uity )urisprudence that one partner cannot- to the detriment of another- apply e5clusi ely to his own benefit the results of the Bnowledge and information gained in the character of partner. And this rule has e en been applied to a renewal taBen in the name of one partner after the dissolution of the firm and pending its li.uidation. %Pang "im vs. "o Seng, .RN /52/<, Dcto#er 4/, /34/ & 7arenthetically- the appelleesN statement that the beneficial right o er the fishpond in .uestion is the Mspecific partnership propertyM contemplated by Art. 1311 of the !i il !ode- is incorrect. A reading of the said pro ision will show that what is meant is tangible property- such as a car- trucB or a piece of land- but not an intangible thing such as the beneficial right to a fishpond. If what the appellees ha e in mind is the fishpond itself- they are grossly in error. A fishpond of the public domain can ne er be considered a specific partnership property because only its use and en)oyment-ne er its title or ownership-is granted to specific pri ate persons. %Deluao vs Casteel, "E4/365, Decem#er /<, /35<& In short- while the liability of the partners are merely )oint in transactions entered into by the partnership- a third person who transacted with said partnership can hold the partners solidarily liable for the whole obligation if the case of the third person falls under Articles 1322 or 1322. ,he obligation is solidary because the law protects him who in good faith relied upon the authority of a partner- whether such authority is real or apparent. ,hat is why under Article 132C of

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the !i il !ode all partners- whether innocent or guilty- as well as the legal entity which is the partnership- are solidarily liable. 8ur construction of the article *Article 1?9?- =!!+ is that it relates e5clusi ely to the settlement of the partnership affairs- among the partners themsel es and has nothing to do with the liability of the partners to third personsE that each one of the industrial partners is liable to third persons for the debts of the firmE that if he has paid such debt out of his pri ate property during the life of the partnership- when its affairs are settled he is entitled to credit for the amount so paid- and if it results that there is not enough property in the partnership to pay himthen the capitalist partners must pay him. %"a Compania *aritima vs. *uHo8, 3 P-I" 245 & *Article 1?9?- =!!+ is susceptible of two different interpretations of which that gi en it in the !ompaTia Daritima case- supra- i.e.- that it relates merely to the distribution of losses among the partners themsel es in the settlement of the partnership affairs and has no reference to partnership obligations to third parties- appears to us to be the more logical. ,here is a marBed distinction between a liability and a loss- and the inability of a partnership to pay a debt to a third party at a particular time does not necessarily mean that the partnership business- as a whole- has been operated at a loss. ,he partnership may ha e outstanding credits which for the moment may be una ailable for the payment of debts- but which e entually may be reali(ed upon and yield profits more than sufficient to co er all losses. Bearing this in mind it will be found that there in reality is no conflict between the two articles .uotedE one speaBs of liabilities- the other of losses. %Pacific Commercial Co. vs. A#oiti8 + *artine8, .RN 4166;, *arch 4, /345 & I,he partnership has a )uridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners.J #ince the capital was contributed to the partnership- not to petitioners- it is the partnership that must refund the e.uity of the retiring partners. #ince it is the partnership- as a separate and distinct entity- that must refund the shares of the partners- the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other words- it can only pay out what it has in its coffers- which consists of all its assets. %owe erbefore the partners can be paid their shares- the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After all the creditors ha e been paid- whate er is left of the partnership assets becomes a ailable for the payment of the partners@ shares. *AI::A>'A: s. >ADI>'R- ;.>. =o. 1CC21C- Luly 1C- 2GG2+ D SSOLUT ON ,he heir ordinarily *and we did not say MnecessarilyM+ becomes a limited partner for his own protection- because he would normally prefer to a oid any liability in e5cess of the alue of the estate inherited so as not to )eopardi(e his personal assets. But this statutory limitation of responsibility being designed to protect the heir- the latter may disregard it and instead elect to become a collecti e or general partner- with all the rights and pri ileges of one- and answering for the debts of the firm not only with the inheritance but also with the heirNs personal fortune. ,his choice pertains e5clusi ely to the heir- and does not re.uire the assent of the sur i ing partner. ,he Articles did not pro ide that the heirs of the deceased would be merely limited partnerE on the contrary- they e5pressly stipulated that in case of death of either partner Mthe copartnership . . . will ha e to be continuedM with the heirs or assigns. It certainly could not be continued if it were to be con erted from a general partnership into a limited partnership- since the difference between the two Binds of associations is fundamentalE and specially because the con ersion into a limited association would lea e the heirs of the deceased partner without a share in the management. %ence- the contractual stipulation does actually contemplate that the heirs would become general partners rather than limited ones. 8f course- the stipulation would not bind the heirs of the deceased partner should they refuse to assume personal and unlimited responsibility for the obligations of the firm. ,he heirs- in other words- cannot be compelled to become general partners against their wishes. But because they are not so compellable- it does not legitimately follow that they may not oluntarily choose to become general partners- wai ing the protecti e mantle of the general laws of succession. And in the latter e ent- it is pointless to discuss the legality of any con ersion of a limited partner into a general one. ,he heir ne er was a limited partner- but chose to be- and became- a general partner right at the start. %.o)uiolay vs. Sycip, "E//<06, Decem#er /6, /352&

CIVIL LAW

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While an unregistered commercial partnership has no )uridical personality- ne erthelesswhere two or more persons attempt to create a partnership failing to comply with all the legal formalities- the law considers them as partners and the association is a partnership in so far as it is a fa orable to third persons- by reason of the e.uitable principle of estoppel. It results that if the law recogni(es a defecti ely organi(ed partnership as de facto as far as third persons are concerned- for purposes of its de facto e5istence it should ha e such attribute of a partnership as domicile *for purposes of the !hattel Dortgage :aw+. %*cDonal! vs. National City ,an$ of Ne@ 'or$& What is important for present purposes is that- not only the retiring partners but also the new partnership itself which continued the business of the old- dissol ed- one- are liable for the debts of the preceding partnership. In #ingson- et al. . Isabela #aw Dill- et al.- the !ourt held that under facts ery similar to those in the case at bar- a withdrawing partner remains liable- to a third party creditor of the old partnership. ,he liability of the new partnership- upon the other hand- in the set of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar- is established in Article 13CG of the !i il !ode. %'u vs. N"RC, .RN 3;4/4, Aune 26,/332& ,he birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on the mutual desire and consent of the partners. ,he right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the ery foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued e5istence is- in turn- dependent on the constancy of that mutual resol e- along with each partnerNs capability to gi e it- and the absence of a cause for dissolution pro ided by the law itself. Aerily- any one of the partners may- at his sole pleasure- dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. %e must- howe er- act in good faith- not that the attendance of bad faith can pre ent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages. In passing- neither would the presence of a period for its specific duration or the statement of a particular purpose for its creation pre ent the dissolution of any partnership by an act or will of a partner. Among partners- mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows them to ha e the power- although not necessarily the right- to dissol e the partnership. An un)ustified dissolution by the partner can sub)ect him to a possible action for damages. %Drtega vs CA, .RN /6340<, Auly 2, /331& L M TED PARTNERS$ P ,o establish a limited partnership there must be- at least- one general partner and the name of at least one of the general partners must appear in the firm name. But neither of these re.uirements has been fulfilled. ,he general rule is that those who seeB to a ail themsel es of the protection of laws permitting the creation of limited partnerships must show a substantially full compliance with such laws. A limited partnership that has not complied with the law of its creation is not considered a limited partnership at all- but a general partnership in which all the members are liable %Tec$ Seing + Co. vs Ao Chung Cang, .RN /3<3, Septem#er 5, /342&

San 0eda Colle1e o2

!gency
,he management contract was a contract of lease of ser ices. In both agency and lease of ser ices- one of the parties binds himself to render some ser ice to the other party. Agencyhowe er- is distinguished from lease of worB or ser ices in that the basis of agency is representation- while in the lease of worB or ser ices- the basis is employment. Agency is a preparatory contract- as agency does not stop with the agency because the purpose is to enter into other contracts. ,he most characteristic feature of an agency relationship is the agent@s power to bring about business relations between his principal and third persons. ,he agent is destined to e5ecute )uridical acts. :ease of ser ices contemplate only material acts. %Nielson + Co. vs. "epanto Consoli!ate! *ining Co., "E4/56/, Decem#er /;, /355 & A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immo able is transmitted or ac.uired either gratuitously or for a aluable consideration. ,he

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e5press mandate re.uired by law to enable an appointee of an agency *couched+ in general terms to sell must be one that e5pressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. "or the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate- a power of attorney must so e5press the powers of the agent in clear and unmistaBable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used con eys such power- no such construction shall be gi en the document. It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent 7ere( a portion of petitionerNs land through a compromise agreement- Aillamil-'strada acted without or in ob ious authority. ,he sale ipso )ure is conse.uently oid. #o is the compromise agreement. %Cosmic "um#er Corp. vs. CA, .RN //02//, Novem#er 43, /335& ,he difficulty in distinguishing between contracts of sale and the creation of an agency to sell has led to the establishment of rules by the application of which this difficulty may be sol ed. ,he decisions say the transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the essence of sale. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and maBes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price and not merely as an agent who must account for the proceeds of a resale- the transaction is a saleE while the essence of an agency to sell is the deli ery to an agent- not as his property- but as the property of the principal- who remains the owner and has the right to control sales- fi5 the price- and terms- demand and recei e the proceeds less the agentNs commission upon sales made. %7er + Co., "t!. vs. "inga!& ,he sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under Article 13?9 is a oluntary and independent contract- and not an auction sale resulting from e5tra)udicial foreclosure- which is precipitated by the default of a mortgagor. Absent that default- no foreclosure results. ,he stipulation granting an authority to e5tra)udicially foreclose a mortgage is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same cause or consideration for the mortgage and forms an essential or inseparable part of that bilateral agreement. ,he power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates e5clusi ely the representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latterNs own protection. ,hat power sur i es the death of the mortgagor. It matters not that the authority to e5tra)udicially foreclose was granted by an attorney-infact and not by the mortgagor personally. ,he stipulation in that regard- although ancillary- forms an essential part of the mortgage contract and is inseparable therefrom. =o creditor will agree to enter into a mortgage contract without that stipulation intended for its protection. %,icol Savings + "oan Assoc. vs. CA, .RN <1264, *arch 2/, /3<3&

CIVIL LAW

"rust
,he MmistaBeM or MfraudM that results in an implied trust being impressed upon the property in ol ed- may be the mistaBe or fraud of a third person- and need not be a mistaBe or fraud committed directly by the trustee himself under the implied trust. Accordingly- in the instant casean implied trust was established upon the land ac.uired by Atty. 7ascua e en though the operati e mistaBe was a mistaBe of respondent trial )udge. A constructi e trust- otherwise Bnown as a trust eF maleficio- a trust eF !elicto- a trust !e son tort- an in oluntary trust- or an implied trust- is a trust by operation of law which arises contrary to intention and in in itum- against one who- by fraud- actual or constructi e- by duress or abuse of confidence- by commission of wrong- or by any form of unconscionable conduct- artificeconcealment- or .uestionable means- or who in any way against e.uity and good conscience- either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not- in e.uity and good conscience- hold and en)oy. It is raised by e.uity to satisfy the demands of )ustice. %owe er- a constructi e trust does not arise on e ery moral wrong in ac.uiring or holding property or on e ery abuse of confidence in business or other affairsE ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared only on wrongful ac.uisitions or retentions of property of which e.uity- in accordance with its fundamental principles and the traditional e5ercise of its )urisdiction or in accordance with statutory pro ision- taBes cogni(ance. It has been broadly ruled that a breach of confidencealthough in business or social relations- rendering an ac.uisition or retention of property by one person unconscionable against another- raises a constructi e trust. And specifically applicable to the case at bar is the doctrine that a constructi e trust is substantially an appropriate remedy against un)ust enrichment. It is raised by e.uity in respect of

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property- which has been ac.uired by fraud- or where- although ac.uired originally without fraudit is against e.uity that it should be retained by the person holding it. %Sumaoang vs. RTC Au!ge, .RN ;</;2, Dcto#er 45, /334& Before a person can sue for the benefit of another under a trusteeship- he must be Itrustee of an e5press trust.J *,he pro ision in the >ules of !ourt regarding representati e parties+ does not apply in cases of implied trust- that is- a trust which may be inferred merely from the acts of the parties or from other circumstances. %PA" vs. -eal! "um#er Co.& As differentiated from constructi e trusts- where the settled rule is that prescription may super ene- in resulting trust- the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust. 8nce the resulting trust is repudiated- howe er- it is con erted into a constructi e trust and is sub)ect to prescription. A resulting trust is repudiated if the following re.uisites concurH a+ the trustee has performed une.ui ocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui )ui trustE b+ such positi e acts of repudiation ha e been made Bnown to the cestui )ui trustE and c+ the e idence thereon is clear and con incing. In ,ale . !ourt of Appeals- the !ourt categorically ruled that an action for recon eyance based on an implied or constructi e trust must perforce prescribe in ten *1G+ years- and not otherwise- thereby modifying pre ious decisions holding that the prescripti e period was four *C+ years. After all- so long as the trustee recogni(es the trust- the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition- and ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. ,here is no running of the prescripti e period if the trustee e5pressly recogni(es the resulting trust. #ince the complaint for breach of trust was filed by respondent-spouses two *2+ months after ac.uiring Bnowledge of the sale- the action therefore has not yet prescribed. %DI "aco vs. Co Cho Chit, .RN 1<6/6, *arch 2/,/332& A resulting trust is an Iintent-enforcingJ trust- based on a finding by the court that in iew of the relationship of the parties their acts e5press an intent to ha e a trust- e en though they did not use language to that effect. ,he trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties. %owe er- if the purpose of the payor of the consideration in ha ing title placed in the name of another was to e ade some rule of the common or statute law- the courts will not assist the payor in achie ing his improper purpose by enforcing a resulting trust for him in accordance with the Mclean handsM doctrine. ,he court generally refuses to gi e aid to claims from rights arising out of an illegal transaction- such as where the payer could not lawfully taBe title to land in his own name and he used the grantee as a mere dummy to hold for him and enable him to e ade the land lawse.g.- an alien who is ineligible to hold title to land- who pays for it and has the title put in the name of a citi(en %Ramos vs. CA, 424 SCRA 20<& An action for recon eyance of a parcel of land based on an implied or constructi e trust prescribes in ten years- the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title o er the property- but this rule applies only when the plaintiff- or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property- since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property- the right to seeB recon eyance- which in effect seeBs to .uiet title to the property- does not prescribe. ,he reason for this is that- one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereofmay wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacBed before taBing steps to indicate his right- the reason for the rule being- that his undisturbed possession gi es him a continuing right to seeB the aid of a court of e.uity to ascertain and determine the nature of the ad erse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title- which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. %(!a !e Ca#rera v. CA, 45; SCRA 223& Credit "ransactions LOAN) MORT%A%E AND COMMODATUM

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,he chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant@s land simply stood as a security for the fulfillment of appellant@s obligation co ered by the fi e promissory notes- and the loss of the crops did not e5tinguish his obligation to pay- because the account could still be paid from other sources aside from the mortgaged crops. %Repu#lic vs .ri al!o, "E46406, Decem#er 2/, /351& It was indeed a patent error on the part of the ,rial !ourt to hold the deeds of real estate mortgage as contracts of guaranty- gi ing to the mortgagors the benefit of e5cussion. A mortgage is clearly and completely different from a guaranty. A real estate mortgage- on the other hand- is a contract embodied in a public instrument recorded in the >egistry of 7roperty- by which the owner of an immo able *or an alienable real right imposed upon immo ables+ directly and immediately sub)ects it- whoe er the possessor may be- to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. MIt is a contract in which the debtor guarantees to the creditor the fulfillment of a principal obligation- sub)ecting for the faithful compliance therewith a real property in case of nonfulfillment of said obligation at the time stipulated.M While both a contract of guaranty *or suretyship+ and one of mortgage ha e as their ob)ect the assurance or guarantee of the performance of a particular principal obligation- in a contract of guaranty- no property is gi en for this purpose at allE reliance is solely placed on the sol ency or credit of the guarantor or surety. In a mortgage- howe er- it is property+ immo able or mo ablethat is specifically encumbered and sub)ected to that function of assuring or guaranteeing the satisfaction of that principal obligation. It is the property- rather than the indi idual financial capacity of the guarantor or surety- that is chiefly relied upon to answer for or guarantee the payment of the debt. Indeed- the rule is that a third party creating a mortgage o er his property to guarantee the obligation of a principal debtor- may not be held personally liable for the obligationhis liability being limited to the alue of the property mortgaged. It is of the essence of contracts of mortgage that when the principal obligation becomes due- the things in which the pledge or mortgage consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor. ,he action or proceeding against the guarantor or surety is a personal one- and in personam. ,hat against the mortgagor is a real action- as well as .uasi in rem. %Distileria "imtuaco vs. IAC& ,he Dortgagor and Dortgagee ha e no right to wai e the posting and publication re.uirements under Act. =o. 212<. =otices are gi en to secure bidders and pre ent a sacrifice of the property. !learly- the statutory re.uirements of posting and publication are mandated- not for the mortgagor@s benefit- but for the public or third persons. :acB of republication of notice of foreclosure sale made subse.uently after the original date renders such sale oid %PN, vs. Nepomuceno Pro!uctions Inc., ..R. No. /230;3 Decem#er 4;, 4664&. n a 6ont4a6t o2 6o;;odat5;) one o2 t@e 8a4ties delive4s to anot@e4 so;et@in1 not 6ons5;aAle so t@at t@e latte4 ;a< 5se t@e sa;e 2o4 a 6e4tain ti;e and 4et54n it? An essential 2eat54e o2 6o;;odat5; is t@at it is 14at5ito5s? Anot@e4 2eat54e o2 6o;;odat5; is t@at t@e 5se o2 t@e t@in1 Aelon1in1 to anot@e4 is 2o4 a 6e4tain 8e4iod? T@5s) t@e Aailo4 6annot de;and t@e 4et54n o2 t@e t@in1 loaned 5ntil a2te4 eB8i4ation o2 t@e 8e4iod sti85lated) o4 a2te4 a66o;8lis@;ent o2 t@e 5se 2o4 w@i6@ t@e 6o;;odat5; is 6onstit5ted? 2 t@e Aailo4 s@o5ld @ave 541ent need o2 t@e t@in1) @e ;a< de;and its 4et54n 2o4 te;8o4a4< 5se? 2 t@e 5se o2 t@e t@in1 is ;e4el< tole4ated A< t@e Aailo4) @e 6an de;and t@e 4et54n o2 t@e t@in1 at will) in w@i6@ 6ase t@e 6ont4a6t5al 4elation is 6alled a 84e6a4i5;? Unde4 t@e Civil Code) 84e6a4i5; is a 9ind o2 6o;;odat5;? %P!.UAO &s. COUR" OF !PP+!LS 5.R. 6o. 37<8<7 .une 8 /007' REDEMPT ON After said foreclosure and sale- what remains is the right ested by law in fa or of the ,olentinos to redeem the properties within the prescribed period. ,his right of redemption is an absolute pri ilege- the e5ercise of which is entirely dependent upon the will and discretion of the redemptioners. ,here is- thus- no legal obligation to e5ercise the right of redemption. #hould they choose not to e5ercise it- nobody can compel them to do so nor will such choice gi e rise to a cause of action in fa or of the purchaser at the auction sale. In fact- the relationship between said purchaser and the redemptioners is not e en that of creditor and debtor.

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8n the other hand- if the redemptioners choose to e5ercise their right of redemption- it is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. It stands to reason therefore- that redemptions should be looBed upon with fa or and where no in)ury is to follow- a liberal construction will be gi en to our redemption laws as well as to the e5ercise of the right of redemption. We are not- by this decision- sanctioning the use of a checB for the payment of obligations o er the ob)ection of the creditor. What we are saying is that a checB may be used for the e5ercise of the right of redemption- the same being a right and not an obligation. ,he tender of a checB is sufficient to compel redemption but is not in itself a payment that relie es the redemptioner from his liability to pay the redemption price. In other words- while we hold that the pri ate respondents properly e5ercised their right or redemption- they remain liable of course- for the payment of the redemption price. %Bortuna!o vs. CA, .RN ;<11, April 41, /33/& PLED%E ,he !ourt of Appeals found that the deeds of assignment were contracts of pledge- but- as the collateral was also money or an e5change of Mpeso for peso-M the pro ision in Article 2112 of the !i il !ode for the sale of the thing pledged at public auction to con ert it into money to satisfy the pledgorNs obligation- did not ha e to be followed. All that had to be done to con ert the pledgorNs time deposit certificates into cash was to present them to the banB for encashment after due notice to the debtor. ,he encashment of the deposit certificates was not a pacto commissorio which is prohibited under Art. 2G33 of the !i il !ode. A pacto commissorio is a pro ision for the automatic appropriation of the pledged or mortgaged property by the creditor in payment of the loan upon its maturity. ,he prohibition against a pacto commissorio is intended to protect the obligor- pledgoror mortgagor against being o erreached by his creditor who holds a pledge or mortgage o er property whose alue is much more than the debt. Where- as in this case- the security for the debt is also money deposited in a banB- the amount of which is e en less than the debt- it was not illegal for the creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtorsN o erdue obligation- with the latterNs consent. %'au Chu vs. CA, .RN ;<1/3, Septem#er 45, /3<3& NTEREST A mere offer to pay- not accompanied or promptly followed by consignation in court of the amount tendered but refused by the creditor- is not sufficient to cause cessation of the running of interest. ,hus- in :lamas s. Abaya- the #upreme !ourt stressed that a written tender of payment alone- without consignation in court of the sum due- does not suspend the accruing of regular or monetary interest. %*asantol Rural ,an$, Inc. vs. CA, .RN 3;/24, Decem#er /6, /33/&

San 0eda Colle1e o2

When an obligation- not constituting a loan or forbearance of money- is breached- an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the !iscretion of the court at the rate of 6P per annum. =o interest- howe er- shall be ad)udged on unli.uidated claims or damages e5cept when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly- where the demand is established with reasonable certainty- the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made )udicially *Art. 1169- !i il !ode+ but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made- or where the pleadings of the plaintiff in the trial court did not spell such amounts with certitude- the interest shall begin to run only from the date the )udgment of the court is made *at which time the .uantification of damages may be deemed to ha e been reasonably ascertained+. ,he actual base for the computation of legal interest shall- in any case be- on the amount finally ad)udged. When the )udgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and e5ecutorythe rate of legal interest- whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2- abo e- shall be 12P per annum from such finality until its satisfaction- this interim period being deemed to be by then an e.ui alent to a forbearance of credit. %Eastern Shipping "ines Inc. v. CA, .RN 3;0/4, Auly /4, /330& USURY LA"

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We agree with petitioners that the stipulated rate of interest at <.<P per month on the 7<GG-GGG.GG loan is e5cessi e- ini.uitous- unconscionable and e5orbitant. %owe er- we can not consider the rate MusuriousM because this !ourt has consistently held that !ircular =o. 9G< of the !entral BanB- adopted on $ecember 22- 1932- has e5pressly remo ed the interest ceilings prescribed by the 9sury :aw and that the 9sury :aw is now Mlegally ine5istentM. =e ertheless- we find the interest at <.<P per month- or 66P per annum- stipulated upon by the parties in the promissory note ini.uitous or unconscionable- and- hence- contrary to morals *Mcontra bonos mores-M+ if not against the law. ,he stipulation is oid. ,he courts shall reduce e.uitably li.uidated damages- whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are ini.uitous or unconscionable. !onse.uently- the !A erred in upholding the stipulation of the parties. >ather- we agree with the trial court that- under the circumstances- interest at 12P per annum- and an additional 1P a month penalty charge as li.uidated damages may be more reasonable. %*e!el vs. CA, 433 SCRA 0</& While the 9sury :aw ceiling on interest rates was lifted by !entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G<nothing in the said circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to le els which will either ensla e their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. %Solangon v. Sala8ar, .RN 3;0/4, Auly /4, /330& !entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G<- $ecember 1G- 1932 does not apply to all Binds of obligations *e.g. from a contract of sale+ and all Binds of monetary )udgment. ,he )udgments spoBen of and referred to are )udgments in litigation in ol ing loans or forbearance of any money- goods or credits- or to cases where money is transferred from one person to another and the obligation to return the same or a portion thereof is ad)udged. Any other Bind of monetary )udgments which has nothing to do with nor in ol ing loans or forbearance of any money- goods and credits does not fall within the co erage of the 9sury :aw for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted by the !entral BanB. ,hus- where the decision sought to be e5ecuted is one rendered in an action for damages for in)ury to persons or loss of property- the law applicable is Article 22G9 of the !i il !ode. %Boo! Terminal, Inc. v. CA, 454 SCRA 223& !entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G< which tooB effect on Lanuary 1- 1932- and remo ed the ceiling on interest rates for secured and unsecured loans - regardless of maturity- cannot be made to retroacti ely apply to a contract e5ecuted earlier while the 9sury :aw was in full force and effect. It is an elementary rule of contracts that the laws- in force at the time the contract was made and entered into go ern it. A !entral BanB !ircular cannot repeal a law. 8nly a law can repeal another law. ,hus- retroacti e application of a !entral BanB !ircular cannot- and should notbe presumed. %Birst *etro Investment Corp. vs. Este Del Sol& ESCALAT ON CLAUSES It is now- clear that from Darch 1?- 193G- escalation clauses to be alid should specifically pro ideH *I+ that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Donetary BoardE and *2+ in order for such stipulation to be alid- it must include a pro ision for reduction of the stipulated interest Uin the e ent that the applicable ma5imum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the Donetary Board.@ 'scalation !lauses are not basically wrong or Nlegally ob)ectionable so long as they are not solely potestati e but based on reasonable and alid grounds. %ere- as clearly demonstrated abo e- riot only the increases of the interest rates on the basis of the escalation clause patently unreasonable and unconscionable- but also there are no alid and reasonable standards upon which the increases are anchored. %Spouses Alme!a vs CA, 415 SCRA 434& DEPOS T A contract for the rent of safety deposit bo5es is not an ordinary contract of lease of things but a special Bind of depositE hence- it is not to be strictly go erned by the pro isions on deposit. ,he pre ailing rule in the 9nited #tates is that the relation between a banB renting out safe deposit bo5es and its customer with respect to the contents of the bo5 is that of bailor and bailee. ,husH

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Where a safe-deposit company leases a safe-deposit bo5 or safe and places therein his securities or other aluables- the relation of bailee and bailor is created between the parties to the transaction as to such securities or other aluablesE the fact that the safe-deposit company does not Bnow- and that it is not e5pected that it shall Bnow- the character or description of the property which is deposited in such safe-deposit bo5 or safe does not change that relation. ,hat access to such safedeposit bo5 can be had only by the use of a Bey retained by the lessee *whether it is the sole Bey or one to be used in connection with one retained by the lessor+ does not operate to alter the foregoing rule. %CA AgroEIn!ustrial Devt Corp vs. CA, 4/3 SCRA 045& %UARANTEE A 15a4ant< ;a< Ae 1iven to se654e even 25t54e deAts) t@e a;o5nt o2 w@i6@ ;a< not Ae 9nown at t@e ti;e t@e 15a4ant< is eBe65ted? T@is is t@e Aasis 2o4 6ont4a6ts deno;inated as 6ontin5in1 15a4ant< o4 s54et<s@i8? A 6ontin5in1 15a4ant< is one w@i6@ is not li;ited to a sin1le t4ansa6tion) A5t w@i6@ 6onte;8lates a 25t54e 6o54se o2 dealin1) 6ove4in1H a se4ies o2 t4ansa6tions) 1ene4all< 2o4 an inde2inite ti;e o4 5ntil 4evo9ed? t is 84os8e6tive in its o8e4ation and is 1ene4all< intended to 84ovide se654it< wit@ 4es8e6t to 25t54e t4ansa6tions wit@in 6e4tain li;its) and 6onte;8lates a s566ession o2 liaAilities) 2o4 w@i6@) as t@e< a6645e) t@e 15a4anto4 Ae6o;es liaAle? Ot@e4wise stated) a 6ontin5in1 15a4ant< is one w@i6@ 6ove4s all t4ansa6tions) in6l5din1 t@ose a4isin1 in t@e 25t54e) w@i6@ a4e wit@in t@e des64i8tion o4 6onte;8lation o2 t@e 6ont4a6t o2 15a4ant<) 5ntil t@e eB8i4ation o4 te4;ination t@e4eo2? A 15a4ant< s@all Ae 6onst45ed as 6ontin5in1 w@en A< t@e te4;s t@e4eo2 it is evident t@at t@e oADe6t is to 1ive a standin1 64edit to t@e 84in6i8al deAto4 to Ae 5sed 24o; ti;e to ti;e eit@e4 inde2initel< o4 5ntil a 6e4tain 8e4iodH es8e6iall< i2 t@e 4i1@t to 4e6all t@e 15a4ant< is eB84essl< 4ese4ved? $en6e) w@e4e t@e 6ont4a6t states t@at t@e 15a4ant< is to se654e advan6es to Ae ;ade N24o; ti;e to ti;e)N it will Ae 6onst45ed to Ae a 6ontin5in1 one? %P?-L-PP-6+ ,LOO9-65 9-LLS -6C. &s COUR" OF !PP+!LS 5R 6o. 37/843 OC"O,+R 32 /008' CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CRED TS ,hose pro isions may be seen to classify credits against a particular insol ent into three general categories- namelyH *a+ #pecial preferred credits listed in Articles 22C1 and 22C2*b+ 8rdinary preferred credits listed in Article 22CCE and *c+ !ommon credits under Article 22C<. ,urning first to special preferred credits under Articles 22C1 and 22C2- it should be noted at once that these credits constitute liens or encumbrances on the specific mo able or immo able property to which they relate. Article 22C2 maBes clear that these credits Mshall be considered as mortgages or pledges of real or personal property- or liens within the pur iew of legal pro isions go erning insol ency.M It should be emphasi(ed in this connection that Mduties- ta5es and fees due 1on specific mo able property of the insol ent4 to the #tate or any subdi ision thereofM *Article 22C1 114+ and Mta5es due upon the 1insol entNs4 land or building *22C2 114+M stand first in preference in respect of the particular mo able or immo able property to which the ta5 liens ha e attached. Article 22C2 is .uite e5plicitH M1,4a5es mentioned in number 1- Article 22C1 and number 1- Article 22C2 shall first be satisfiedM ,he claims listed in numbers 2 to 12 in Article 22C1 and in numbers 2 to 1G in Articles 22C2- all come after ta5es in order of precedenceE such claims en)oy their pri ileged character as liens and may be paid only to the e5tent that ta5es ha e been paid from the proceeds of the specific property in ol ed *or from any other sources+ and only in respect of the remaining balance of such proceeds. What is more- these other *non-ta5+ credits- although constituting liens attaching to particular property- are not preferred one o er another inter se. 7ro ided ta5 liens shall ha e been satisfied- non-ta5 liens or special preferred credits which subsist in respect of specific mo able or immo able property are to be treated on an e.ual basis and to be satisfied concurrently and proportionately. 7ut succinctly- Articles 22C1 and 22C2 )ointly with Articles 22C6 to 22C9 establish a two-tier order of preference. ,he first tier includes only ta5es- duties and fees due on specific mo able or immo able property. All other special preferred credits stand on the same second tier to be satisfied- pari passu and pro rateE out of any residual alue of the specific property to which such other credits relate.

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!redits which are specially preferred because they constitute liens *ta5 or non-ta5+ in turntaBe precedence o er ordinary preferred credits so far as concerns the property to which the liens ha e attached. ,he specially preferred credits must be discharged first out of the proceeds of the property to which they relate- before ordinary preferred creditors may lay claim to any part of such proceeds- the alue of the specific property in ol ed is greater than the sum total of the ta5 liens and other specially preferred credits- the residual alue will form part of the Mfree propertyM of the insol ent-i.e.- property not impressed with liens by operation of Articles 22C1 and 22C2. if- on the other hand- the alue of the specific mo able or immo able is less than the aggregate of the ta5 liens and other specially preferred credits- the unsatisfied balance of the ta5 liens and other such credits are to be treated as ordinary credits under Article 22CC and to be paid in the order of preference there set up. In contrast with Articles 22C1 and 22C2- Article 22CC creates no liens on determinate property which follow such property. What Article 22CC creates are simply rights in fa or of certain creditors to ha e the cash and other assets of the insol ent applied in a certain se.uence or order of priority. 8nly in respect of the insol entNs Mfree propertyM is an order of priority established by Article 22CC. In this se.uence- certain ta5es and assessments also figure but these do not ha e the same Bind of o erriding preference that Articles 22C1 =o. 1 and 22C2 =o. 1 create for ta5es which constitutes liens on the ta5payerNs property. %Repu#lic vs. Peralta, /16 SCRA 2;& "orts and #amages NE%L %ENCE In order that there may be reco ery for an in)ury- howe er- it must be shown that the in)ury for which reco ery is sought must be the legitimate conse.uence of the wrong doneE the connection between the negligence and the in)ury must be a direct and natural se.uence of e entsunbroBen by inter ening efficient causes. In other words- the negligence must be the pro5imate cause of the in)ury. "or- negligence- no matter in what it consists- cannot create a right of action unless fit is the pro5imate cause of the in)ury complained of. And the pro5imate cause of an in)ury is that cause- which- in natural and continuous se.uence- unbroBen by any efficient inter ening cause- produces the in)ury- and without which the result would not ha e occurred. %St. *aryIs Aca!emy vs. Carpitanos ..R. No. /02252& ATTRACT !E NU SANCE ,he attracti e nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water- artificial as well as natural- in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other that the mere water and its location. ,he reason why a swimming pool or pond or reser oir of water is not considered an attracti e nuisance is thatE I=ature has created streams- laBes and pools which attract children. :urBing in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to Bnow the dangerE and if the owner of pri ate property creates an artificial pool on his own property- merely duplicating the worB of nature without adding any new danger- he is not liable because of ha ing created an attracti e nuisance.J %-i!algo Enterprises, Inc. vs. ,alan!an 3/ Phil 0<<& EMER%ENCY RULE 9nder the Jemergency ruleK adopted by this court- an indi idual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is re.uired to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to a oid the impending danger- is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertaBe what subse.uently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution- unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. In this )urisdiction- contributory negligence of the plaintiff merely results in mitigation of liability. 9nder this rule- contributory negligence is defined as conduct on the part oft the in)ured party- contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered- which falls below the standard to which he is re.uired to conform for his own protection.

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While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflecti e thought or the opportunity to ade.uately weigh a threatening situation is absent- the conduct which is re.uired of an indi idual in such cases is dictated not e5clusi ely by the suddenness of the e ent which absolutely negates throughful care- but by the o er-all nature of the circumstances %(alen8uela vs. CA 412 SCRA 262& SPEC AL RULES #ince negligence may be a felony and a .uasi delict and re.uired discernment as a condition of liability- either criminal or ci il- a child under nine years of age is by analogyconclusi ely presumed to be incapable of negligenceE and that the presumption of lacB of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child o er nine but under fifteen years of age is rebuttable one- under our law. ,he rule therefore is that a child under nine years if age must be conclusi ely presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. *Larco DBtg !orp et al s. !A- ;>= 129?92- $ecember 21- 1999+ ,he law fi5ed no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to ha e the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and conse.uences of his own acts- so as to maBe it negligence on his part to fail to e5ercise with due care and precaution in the commission of such actsE and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do- for in the ery nature of things the .uestion of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their conse.uencesE and the age at which a minor can be said to ha e such ability will necessarily ary in accordance with the arying nature of the infinite ariety of acts which may be done by him. %Taylor vs. *anila Electric Railroa! an! "ight Co. /5 Phil <& When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things re.uiring professional sBill- he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to e5hibit the care and sBill of one ordinarily sBilled in the particular worB which he attempts to do. %Cullion Ice Bish An! Electric Co. vs. Phil *otors Corp 11 Phil /43& AFF RMAT !E DUT ES AND M SCELLANEOUS ACT ! T ES $octors are protected by a special rule of law. ,hey are not guarantors of care. ,hey do not e en warrant a good result. ,hey are not insurers against mishaps or unusual conse.uences. "urthermore- they are not liable for honest mistaBes of )udgment. Whether of not a physician has committed an Iine5cusable lacB o precautionJ in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care obser ed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the ad anced state of the profession at the time of treatment of the present state of medical science. %Dr. Ninevetch Cru8 vs. CA 4<4 SCRA /<<& 9nder the captain of the ship doctrine- the surgeon is liBed to a ship captain who must not only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the essel. ,he head surgeon is made responsible for e erything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are under his physical control but also those wherein he has e5tension of control. %Ramos vs. CA ..R. No. /40210, Decem#er 43, /333& ,here is no employer-employee relationship between $:#D! and $rs. ;utierre( and %osaBa which would hold $:#D! solidarily liable for the in)ury suffered by petitioner 'rlinda under Article 213G of the !i il !ode because of the following reasonsH 1+ a hospital does not hire or engage the ser ices of a consultant- but rather- accredits the latter and grants him or her the pri ilege of maintaining a clinic andFor admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that he or she possesses the necessary .ualifications- such as accreditation by the appropriate boarde idence of fellowship and referencesE 2+ it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the consultant@s fee for ser ices rendered by the latteE 2+ a hospital does not dismiss a consultantinstead- the latter may lose his or her accreditation or pri ileges granted by the hospitalE and C+

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when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital- it is the doctor who prescribes the treatment to be gi en to said patient. ,he contract between the consultant an! the patient is separate and distinct the contract between the hospital an! the patient. ,he first has for its ob)ect the rendition of medical ser ices by the consultant to the patient- while the secon! concerns the pro ision by the hospital of facilities and ser ices by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. *Ramos vs. CA .R No /40210, April //, 4664+ ,he general principle is that the iolation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an in)ury by the inter ention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident- in the manner in which it happened- was the ery thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to pre ent. ,o consider the iolation of the ordinance as the pro5imate cause of the in)ury does not portray the situation in its true perspecti eE it would be more accurate to say that the o ercrowding at the stairway was the pro5imate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to pre ent by re.uiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. %*erce!es *. Teague vs. Elena Bernan!e8 1/ SCRA /</& DOCTR NE OF RES PSA LOQU TUR Where the thing which caused the in)ury complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his ser ants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who ha e its management or control use proper care- it affords reasonable e idence- in absence of e5planation by defendant- accident arose from want of care *$octrine of >es Ipsa :o.uitur+. %Africa vs. CalteF, "E/43<5, *arch 2/, /355& ,he defendant@s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the re.uisites for the application of res ipsa lo.uitur. 8nce the plaintiff maBes out a prima facie case of all the elements- the burden then shifts to defendant to e5plain. ,he presumption may be rebutted or o ercome by other e idence and- under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption- such as that of due care or innocence- may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to e5plain or pro e its defense to pre ent the presumption or inference fro arising. ' idence by the defendant of say- due care- comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established. %D.*. Consun i, Inc. vs. CA ..R. No. /2;<;2, April 46, 466/& ,he doctrine of res ipsa lo.uitur is not applicable if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. As early as 191G- the #upreme !ourt already e5plained that the doctrine merely creates a prima facie case- and applies only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is something in oBed in fa or of the plaintiff in the absence of proof. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstance under which the in)ury occurred- the creati e reason for the doctrine disappears. %S.D. *artine8, et al. vs. ?illiam (an ,us$ir$ ..R. No. "E153/& DOCTR NE OF LAST CLEAR C$ANCE ,he doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a reco ery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter- by e5ercising reasonable care and prudence- might ha e a oided in)urious conse.uences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. ,he doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant- who had the last fair chance to a oid the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the conse.uences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. %Pantranco North EFpress vs. ,aesa citing Dng vs. *etropolitan ?ater District an! Picart vs. Smith& ! CAR OUS L A0 L TY ,he ci il liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children li ing with them- may be seen to be based upon the parental authority ested by the !i il !ode upon such parents. ,he ci il law assumes that when a minor li ing with its parents commits a tortuous actthe parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to super ise

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the child who is in their custody and control. 7arental liability is in other words- anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. ,he parental dereliction is- of course- only presumed and the presumption can be o erturned under Article 213G of the !i il !ode by proof that the parents had e5ercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to pre ent the damage. %*acario Tamargo vs. CA 463 SCRA 1/<& As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student ob)ecti e- in the e5ercise of a legitimate student right- and e en in the en)oyment of a legitimate student pri ilege- the responsibility of the school authorities o er the student continues. Indeed- e en if the student should be doing nothing more than rela5ing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and en)oying the ambience and atmosphere of the school- he is still within the custody and sub)ect to the discipline of school authorities under the pro ision of Article 213G. %Ama!ora vs. court of Appeals, /56 SCRA 4;0& It had been stressed that Article 213G plainly pro ides that the damage should ha e been caused or inflicted by pupils or students or the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. %owe er- this material situation does not e5ist in the present case for- as earlier indicated- the assailants of !arlitos were not students of the 7#BA- for whose acts the school could be made liable. %Philippine School of ,usiness A!ministration vs. CA, 461 SCRA ;43& DOCTR NE OF RESPONDEAT SUPER OR ,he case at bar is clearly within the co erage of Articles 21?6 and 21??- in relation to Article 213G- of the !i il !ode pro isions on .uasi-delicts. ,he responsibility imposed by this article arises by irtue of a presumption )uris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article- deri ed from their failure to e5ercise due care and igilance o er the acts of subordinates to pre ent them from causing damage. =egligence is imputed to them by law- unless they pro e the contrary. ,hus- the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if it is pro ed that the persons who might be held responsible under it e5ercised the diligence of a good father of a family *diligentissimi patris familias+ to pre ent damage. It is clear- therefore- that is it not representation- nor interest- nor e en the necessity of ha ing somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons de oid of personality- but it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by ci il bond uniting the actor to them- which forms the foundation of such responsibility. ,he abo e rule is- of course- applicable only where there is employer-employee relationship- although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry- the employer under Article 213G is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasBs. But- it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. 8nce this is done- the plaintiff must show- to hold the employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasB when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant- as employer- may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and super ision of employees. ,he diligence of a good father of a family re.uired to be obser ed by employers to pre ent damages under Article 213G refers to due diligence in the selection and super ision of employees in order to protect the public. %*etro *anila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals .R. ND. //55/;, Novem#er /5, /33<& ,he responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their duties is primary- that is- the in)ured party may reco er from the employers directlyregardless of the sol ency of their employees. 'mployers may be relie ed of responsibility of the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of their assigned tasBs only if they can show that Ithey obser e all the diligence of a good father of a family to pre ent damage.J "or this purpose- they ha e the burden of pro ing that they ha e indeed e5ercised such diligence- both in the selection of the employee who committed the .uasi-delict and in the super ision of the performance of his duties. In the

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selection of prospecti e employees- employers are re.uired to e5amine them as to their .ualifications- e5perience- and ser ice records. 8n the other hand- with respect to the super ision of employees- employers should formulate standard operating procedures- monitor their implementation- and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. %*etro *anila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals .R. ND. //55/;, Novem#er /5, /33<& ,he liability imposed by Art. 213G arises by irtue of a presumption )uris tantum of nerligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder- deri ed from their failure to e5ercise due care and igilance o er the acts of subordinates to pre ent them from causing damage. Article 213G is hardly applicable in the case under consideration because the pri ate respondent being engaged in rent-a-car business was only the o@ner of the car leased to its client. As such- there was no iculum )uris between them as employer and employee. %B.> Insurance Corporation vs. CA ..R. No. //<<<3, *arch 42, /33<& In an action based on .uasi delict- the registered owner of a motor ehicle is solidarily liable for the in)uries and damages caused by the negligence of the dri er- in spite of the fact hat the ehicle may ha e already been the sub)ect of an unregistered $eed of #ale in fa or the another person. 9nless registered with the :and ,ransportation 8ffice- the sale / while alid and binding between the parties / does not affect third parties- especially the ictims of accidents in ol ing the said transport e.uipment? %E)uita#le "easing Corporation vs. Suyom ..R. No. /02256& ,he main aim of motor ehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens- or that any damage or in)ury is caused by the ehicle on the public highwaysresponsibility therefore can be fi5ed on a definite indi idual- the registered owner. ,he registered owner is not allowed by law to pro e the real owner of the ehicle. Were a registered owner allowed to e ade responsibility by pro ing who the supposed transferee or owner is- it would be easy for him- by collusion with others or otherwise- to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person- or to the one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or in)ury done. %,A Binance Corporation vs. CA, ..R. No. 3<4;1, Novem#er /2, /334& #amages ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMA%ES In computing the award for loss of income- only net earnings- not gross earnings- are to be consideredE that is- the total of the earnings less e5penses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income- less li ing and other incidental e5penses. When there is no showing that the li ing e5penses constituted a smaller percentage of the gross income- we fi5 the li ing e5penses at half of the gross income. ,he life e5pectancy should not be based on the retirement age of go ernment employeeswhich is pegged at 6<. In calculating the life e5pectancy of an indi idual for the purposes of determining loss of earning capacity under Article 22G6*1+ of the !i il !ode- it is assumed that the deceased would ha e earned income e en after retirement from a particular )ob. %Smith ,ell Do!@ell Shipping Agency Corp. vs. ,or a, .RN /0266<, Aune /6, 4664& LOSS OF PROF TS When it is shown that a plaintiff@s business is a going concern with a fairly steady a erage profit on the in estment- it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through defendant@s wrongful act not occurred- it would ha e continued producing this a erage income Iso long as is usual with the things of that nature.J When in addition to the pre ious a erage income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been remo ed- there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profit has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant. 7rofits are not e5cluded from reco ery because they are profitsE but when e5cluded- it is on the ground that there are no criteria by which to estimate the amount with certainty on which

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the ad)udications of courts- and the findings of )uries should be based. %Algarra vs. San!e as, 4; Phil. 4<0 citing ,righam vs. Carlisle& NOM NAL DAMA%ES =ominal damages cannot co-e5ist with actual or compensatory damages. %Armovit vs. Court of Appeals, /<0 SCR 0;5& TEMPERATE DAMA%ES Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly pro ed. 8ur rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of litigation- the in)ury suffered as a conse.uence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can be li.uidated. %owe er- these pro isions neglect to taBe into account those situations- as in this case- where the resulting in)ury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising from the in)ury- while certain to occur- are difficult to predict. In these cases- the amount of damages which should be awarded- if they are to ade.uately and correctly respond to the in)ury caused- should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and pro ed- up to the time of trialE and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not- from the nature of the case- be made with certainty. In other wordstemperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the in)ury is chronic and continuing. And because of the uni.ue nature of such cases- no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are pro ided for. ,he reason is that these damages co er two distinct phases. As it would not be e.uitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration of )ustice - for the ictim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and in oBe their aid in seeBing ad)ustments to the compensatory damages pre iously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. ,he amount gi en as temperate damages- though to a certain e5tent speculati eshould taBe into account the cost of proper care %Ramos vs. CA, .R No. /40210 Decem#er 43, /333&. Land "itles and #eeds 9CD*PI"ED ,'L ATT'. CIRIACD CR>=: FRAUD A title issued pursuant to a patent under administrati e proceeding is as indefeasible as a title secured in a )udicial proceeding. But e en after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the patent- the go ernment may still initiate an action for re ersion of the land to the public domain if the land is titled through fraud or misrepresentation as when the applicant stated that the sub)ect land is e5clusi ely possessed by him when in truth it o erlaps the land of an ad)acent owner. %Repu#lic of the Philippines vs. CA an! -eirs of ,ullongan, 411 SCRA 221&. ;enerally- a forged deed is oid but it can be the root of a alid title if registered in the name of the forger then transferred to an innocent purchaser for alue absent any showing that the buyer had any part in the anomaly. %ence- the rights of the innocent purchaser for alue must be respected. ,he proper recourse of the true owner is to bring an action for damages against the party who caused the fraud. %E!uarte vs. CA, 412 SCRA 23/&. A party depri ed of his land by confirmation of title through actual fraud may seeB for reopening of a decree of registration within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration. Before the e5piration of the one-year period from the entry of the decree- the court retains control of the decision which- after hearing and actual fraud was pro ed to e5ist- may ad)udicate the land to any party entitled thereto. %-eirs of *anuel RoFas an! Trini!a! De "eon vs. CA, 4;6 SCRA 263&.

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Actual fraud or e5trinsic fraud proceeds from the intentional deception produced by means of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. '5trinsic fraud pre ents the party from presenting his entire case to the court. %-eirs of *anuel RoFas an! Trini!a! De "eon vs. CA, 4;6 SCRA 263&. "raud is e5trinsic or collateral where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case the effect of which pre ents a party from ha ing a trial- a real contest or from presenting his case to the court- or where it operates upon matters pertaining- not to the )udgment itself- but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is no fair submission of the contro ersy. Accordingly- use of forged document or per)ured witness are not e5trinsic fraud as it does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. %Strait Times, Inc. vs. CA, 430 SCRA ;/0&. !onstructi e trust is created in e.uity in order to pre ent un)ust enrichment. ,hus- one who- by fraud- duress or abuse of confidence- obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not- in e.uity and good conscience- so hold has no alid title to said property and therefore cannot dispose of the same. %ence- a widower who ad)udicates the entire con)ugal property to himself holds the childrenNs share in the property in trust. %*ar)ue8 vs. CA, 266 SCRA 512&. A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Any false statement in the application for a land patent shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the same e en after the lapse of one year from issuance of said patent pursuant to #ection 1G1 of the 7ublic :and Act wherein an action may be undertaBen for the re ersion of the land to the public domain. %Brancisco ,aguio vs. Repu#lic, et al., 26/ SCRA 016&. %OOD FA T$H NNOCENT PURC$ASER FOR !ALUE 8ne who deals with property co ered by the ,orrens system of registration need not go beyond the title to determine the condition of the property. %"egar!a vs. CA, 4<6 SCRA 504&. A person dealing with registered land has the right to rely on the ,orrens certificate of title without the need of in.uiring further. %ence- a purchaser who buys property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full fair price for the property is a buyer in good faith. %San!oval vs. CA, 456 SCRA 4<2&. A person in good faith and for alue is defined as one who buys property of another without notice that some other person has a right to- or interest in- such property and pays a full and fair price of the time of the purchase or before he has notice that other person has a right to- or interest in- the property. As a rule- he who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for alue has the burden of pro ing said assertion. As is the common practice in the real estate industry- an ocular inspection of the premises is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually taBes and should he find out that the land is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who is not in actual possession- it is incumbent upon the purchaser to erify the e5tent of the occupantsN possessory rights. %Spouses Sonya *athay an! Ismael *athay, Ar. vs. CA, 431 SCRA 215&. An >,! court sitting as a land registration court may determine the alidity of an ad erse claim. 7urchaser in good faith and for alue is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same on the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. %.SIS vs. CA, 406 SCRA ;2;&. O"NERS$ P = POSSESS ON An action for recon eyance of a parcel of land based on constructi e or implied trust prescribes in 1G years recBoned from the issuance of title or date of registration. ,his rule applies only when plaintiff or party enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property- but if he is in possession thereof- the right to seeB recon eyance- which in effect is an action to .uiet title- does not prescribe. %Ca#rera vs. CA an! Belicio, et al., 45; SCRA 223&.

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A partyNs failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to another partyNs possession of a parcel of land in a span of 2G years is contrary to his claim of ownership. %-eirs of Teo!oro Dela Cru8 vs. CA, et al., 43< SCRA /;4&. ,orrens system does not est title because it is not recogni(ed as a mode of ac.uiring ownership. While registered land under the system maBes the title thereto imprescriptible- the same may be lost by laches caused by a partyNs inaction or passi ity in asserting his rights o er the disputed property. %Santiago vs. CA, 4;< SCRA <62&. ,a5 declaration and ta5 receipts become strong e idence of ownership ac.uired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. %Dclarit vs. CA, 422 SCRA 23&. PU0L C LANDS A title may be confirmed under #ection C3 of the 7ublic :and Act *7:A+ only if it pertains to alienable lands of the public domain but unless such assets are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable- occupation thereof in the concept of owner- no matter how long- cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A was clarified by 7$ 1G?2 that said section applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. %De Dcampo vs. Arlos, 202 SCRA ;/5& #ales patents fraudulently obtained are in alid and the #tate should initiate the suit to reco er the property thru the #olicitor ;eneral and not by a supposedly aggrie ed party who has no personality to initiate such litigation. %De Dcampo vs. Arlos, 202 SCRA ;/5& ,he >egalian $octrine which forms part of our land laws is a re ered and long standing principle. It must howe er be applied together with the constitutional pro ision on social )ustice and land reform- and must be interpreted in a way as to a oid manifest unfairness and in)ustice. But when the land of public domain is in danger of ruthless e5ploitation- fraudulent titling or other .uestionable practice- a strict application of the law is warranted. %Director of "an!s vs. Buntilar, /04 SCRA 1;& >ules on confirmation of title do not apply unless the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation by the '5ecuti e branch of the go ernment. %ence- possession of forest lands no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership. %-eirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Borestry, /45 SCRA 53& >A 32?1 Bnown as Indigenous 7eoples@ >ights Act *I7>A+ that grants to indigenous cultural communities the ownership of ancestral lands and domains held by them under nati e title are undisputably presumed pri ate lands because they ha e been held that way since before the #panish con.uest or as far as memory reaches. ,he #tate by recogni(ing the right of tribal "ilipinos to their ancestral lands and domains has effecti ely upheld their right to li e in a culture distinctly their own as enunciated in Article III of the !onstitution- hence- the I7>A :aw is in consonance with and not iolati e of the !onstitution. %Cru8 vs. Sec. of DENR, et al., 20; SCRA /4<& If public land was titled but turned out to be forest land instead of agricultural land- the one year period to file a re iew of the decree does not apply. 8n the contrary- the land may re ert to the public domain upon petition of the #olicitor ;eneral. %Repu#lic vs. CA an! -eirs of Ri#aya, 41< SCRA 442&. Absent any publication in any newspaper of general circulation- the land registration court cannot alidly confirm and register the title of the applicant. 7ublication of the notice of initial hearing in the 8fficial ;a(ette is not enough to confer )urisdiction to the court because the law re.uires publication also in a newspaper. ,he word MshallM denotes an imperati e and thus indicates the mandatory character of the statute that publication shall be in the 8fficial ;a(ette and a newspaper of general circulation. %Director of "an!s vs. CA, 4;5 SCRA 4;5&. Pe4iods 4e:5i4ed in 8ossession and o6658ation o2 85Ali6 land to :5ali2< as 6lai;ant#

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#ection C3*b+ of the 7:A - $ecember 1- 1926 - those who by themsel es or through their predecessors-in-interest ha e been in open- continuous- e5clusi e and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ac.uisition of ownership e5cept as against the go ernment since Luly 26- 139C. >A 19C2 - Lune 22- 19<? - amended #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A by prescribing opencontinuous- e5clusi e and notorious possession and occupation for at least 2G years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. 7$ 1G?2 - Lanuary 22- 19?? - amended further #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A by stating that these pro isions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which ha e been in open- continuous- e5clusi e and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ac.uisition of ownership since Lune 12- 19C<. *#ee also #ection 1C of 7$ 1<29+ Accordingly- the period of 2G years of open- continuous- e5clusi e and notorious possession and occupation would not suffice to confer title to a settler- particularly so when the 7resident reser es said public land for a public purpose. %Repu#lic Dpol National Secon!ary Technical School vs. Nicanor Dol!ol, 431 SCRA 213&. "oreshore lands or submerged areas which may be reclaimed under >A 1399 by local go ernments are part of the public domain which could only be sub)ect of reclamation by the national go ernment under 7$ 2-A. ,he authority granted to local go ernments to undertaBe reclamation pro)ects was a mere grant by the so ereign which- in the e5ercise of police powermay be withdrawn as shown in 7$ 2-A. *>epublic s. !A and 7asay !ity- et al. *!ultural !enter+299 #!>A 199+. 9nder #ection 1G1 of the 7:A- an action for re ersion to the public domain of land fraudulently titled may be initiated e en after the lapse of one year as said action is not barred by prescription. %Brancisco ,aguio vs. Repu#lic, et al., 26/ SCRA 016&. ,he go ernmentNs prolonged inaction for 2G years whereby it failed to correct and reco er the increased area in the land of a pri ate party militates against its cause as it is tantamount to laches which is the failure or neglect for unreasonable length of time to do that which by e5ercising due diligence could ha e been done earlier. While the general rule is that the #tate cannot be put in estoppel by the mistaBes and errors of its officials and its agents- this is sub)ect to e5ception if it would operate to defeat the effecti e operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. ,he go ernment must not be allowed to deal dishonorably with its citi(ens and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing. %Repu#lic vs. CA an! St. Au!e Enterprises, 26/ SCRA 2&. DECREE OF RE% STRAT ON As long as a final decree has not been entered by the :>A and the period of one year has not yet elapsed from the date of entry of such decree the title is not finally ad)udicated and the decision of the court in the registration proceedings continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. %Ramos vs Ro!rigue8, 400 SCRA 0/<&. When the court decision has become final and the court directs the :>A to issue a decree of registration- the :>A is not legally obligated to follow the courtNs order when the land sought to be registered is disco ered to ha e been already decreed and titled in the name of another. %Ramos vs Ro!rigue8, 400 SCRA 0/<&. CERT F CATE OF T TLE A title o er registered land cannot be defeated e en by ad erse- open and notorious possession nor prescriptionE neither could ownership be pro en thru ta5 payment receipts or ta5 declarations as they are not conclusi e e idence of ownership. %Cervantes vs. CA an! Brancisco, 214 SCRA 0;& Indefeasibility of title does not attach to a ,orrens title secured by fraud and misrepresentation. %,aguio vs. Repu#lic, 26/ SCRA 016&

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,he issue of alidity of title- i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be raised in an action e5pressly initiated for that purpose. 8therwise stated- a collateral attacB impugning the alidity of the title in a suit for reco ery of ownership is an indirect challenge to the final )udgment and decree of registration. %(illanueva vs. CA an! Santiago, 21/ SCRA /4& ,itle once registered under the ,orrens system should not thereafter be altered- changedmodified or diminished e5cept in a direct proceeding permitted by law as pro ided in #ection C3 of 7$ 1<29 disallowing collateral attacB of a ,orrens title. %Seville vs. NatIl DevIt Co., 21/ SCRA //4& ,orrens title ac.uires the character of indefeasibility one year from the entry of the decree of registration. %ence- e en if the decision of the land registration court has reached finality- the court still retains control and may alter or modify the same if the decree of registration has not been issued by the :>A. %Divina vs. CA, et al., 214 SCRA 14;& >eal purpose of ,orrens system of registration is to .uiet title to land and put a stop to any .uestion of legality of title e5cept claims which ha e been recorded in the certificate of title at the time of registration. ' ery registered owner and e ery subse.uent purchaser for alue in good faith holds title to land free from all encumbrances- e5cept those pro ided by law. %ence- a registered owner who e5ecuted a deed of sale in fa or of another without any consideration *e5cept their common-law relationship+ and caused the registration of said con eyance alidly transmits the property which can be con eyed to an innocent purchaser for alue. %.loria Cru8 vs. CA an! Romy Su8ara, 4</ SCRA 034&. Where 2 certificates of title purport to co er the same land- the certificate bearing the earlier date pre ails. %ence- in cases where two certificates co er the same land- a certificate of title is not conclusi e e idence of title if it is shown that the land had already been registered and an earlier certificate is in e5istence. %*?SS vs. CA, 4/1 SCRA ;<2&. !ertificate of title merely confirms or records the title already e5isting and ested. ,hey cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud nor to permit one to enrich himself at the e5pense of another. %ence- one who loses his property and re iew of decree is no longer a ailable- the e.uitable remedy of recon eyance may be resorted to. %Es)uivas vs. CA, 4;4 SCRA <62&. A land registration proceeding is in rem and therefore a decree of registration issued thereafter is binding upon and conclusi e against all persons including the go ernment. A decree of registration that has become final shall be conclusi e not only on .uestions actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that ought to be litigated or decided in land registration proceedings. %Teofilo Cacho vs. CA, 453 SCRA 213&. A certificate of title is not conclusi e e idence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in e5istence. Where two titles ha e been issued on different dates to two different persons for the same parcel of land- e en if both are presumed to be titleholders in good faith- it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should pre ail. Assuming that there was regularity in registration leading to the issuance of title- the better approach is to trace the original certificate from which the certificates of title in dispute were deri ed. #hould there be one common original title- the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must pre ail absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration. %Spouses Sonya *athay an! Ismael *athay, Ar. vs. CA, 431 SCRA 215&. ' ery person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. ,hus- all the property of the marriage are presumed to belong to the con)ugal partnership unless it be pro ed that it pertains e5clusi ely to the husband or wife. %-eirs of the Spouses ,enito .anico vs. CA, 4</ SCRA 031&. When the certificate of title is issued in the name of the original buyer on installment who died before completion of payment- the heirs who continued the installment payments may in oBe #ection 1G3 of 7$ 1<29 to correct the error and ha e the land registered in their names. %Ernesto

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


Da@son, et al., vs. Register of Dee!s of Gue8on City an! RTC, GC, 431 SCRA ;22, citing the case of Cru8 vs. Tan, 32 Phil 20<&. LAC$ES :aches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and une5plained length of time to do that which by e5ercising due diligence could or should ha e been done earlier or negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time- warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. %*argolles vs. CA, 426 SCRA 3;&. AD!ERSE CLA M ,he purpose of the annotation of ad erse claim is to protect the interest of a person o er real property where the registration of such right or interest is not otherwise pro ided under the ,orrens system. Dere registration of ad erse interest does not maBe such claim alid nor is it permanent in character because )udicial determination of the issue of ownership is still necessary. %.ar#in vs. CA, 412 SCRA /<;&. While the law states that the ad erse claim is effecti e within 2G days- the annotation thereof remains and cancellation is necessary- otherwise the inscription will continue as a lien on the title. ,o limit to 2G days the effecti ity of an ad erse claim will defeat the ery purpose for which the law pro ides for the remedy of inscription of the ad erse claim. %ence- a sheriffNs le y on property already co ered by an ad erse claim is considered subser ient to said claim. %Sa onas vs. CA, 416 SCRA ;2;&. A court sitting as a land registration court may determine the alidity of an ad erse claim and- if found to be in alid- order the cancellation of said ad erse claim. %.SIS vs. CA, 406 SCRA ;2;&. A notice of ad erse claim annotated on the title of a registered owner remains alid e en after the lapse of thirty *2G+ days. As long as no petition for its cancellation has been filed- the notice of ad erse claim remains. A hearing must first be conducted wherein the parties are gi en the opportunity to pro e the propriety or impropriety of the ad erse claim. %ence- the cancellation automatically being done by the >egister of $eeds after the lapse of 2G days from registration is improper. %Rogelio Duarte vs. CA, et al., 43< SCRA 2<<&. L S PENDENS 8nce annotated upon the original copy of the title- the notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation ser ing as a warning that one who ac.uires an interest o er said property does so at his own risB. %'u vs. CA, 41/ SCRA 163&. ,he notice of lis pendens is but an incident in an action. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructi ely ad ice or warn all people who deal with the property that they deal with it at their own risB and whate er rights they may ac.uire in the property are sub)ect to the result of the action. %-eirs of *aria *arasigan vs. IAC, /14 SCRA 412&. RECONST TUT ON >econstitution of lost or destroyed certificates in the office of the >$ can be done only thru )udicial proceedings. =otice of hearings shall be sent to the >$ and the :> !ommissioner. When it is conceded that some deficiencies e5ist in the formal re.uisites for the issuance of a transfer certificate of title co ering a parcel of land with an increased or e5panded area- and where the >egister of $eeds noting such facts has recommended the cancellation of the certificate of title pursuant to :>! !ircular =o. 16?- there is a serious or substantial contro ersy as to the ownership of the e5panded area. ,his Bind of contro ersy can only be heard in the e5ercise of the courts@ general )urisdiction- the proper remedy would be a petition for declaratory relief under #ection 6C of the >ules of !ourt. %Santos vs. A)uino, .R No. 24303, Nov. 4<, /3<6&.

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In reconstitution of allegedly lost certificate of title- greatest caution must be e5ercised in acting on such petitions- especially when it is filed after an ine5plicable delay of 2< years. It is mandatory thatH Aside from publication- actual and personal notice be duly ser ed to indispensable partiesi.e. the actual owners and possessors of the land in ol edE ,he land has in fact been pre iously registered under Act C96 but the corresponding certificate of title has been lost or destroyed. In other words- the title is no longer subsisting. ,he reconstitution of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of >A 26 denotes the restoration of the instrument which is supposed to ha e been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. !ourts must proceed with e5treme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles under >A 26- and should not only re.uire strict compliance therewith but also establish the identity of e ery person who files the petition. If filed by some other person than the registered owner- no effort should be spared to assure itself of the authenticity and due e5ecution of petitionerNs authority to institute the proceedings. It should a oid itself being unwittingly used as a tool of swindlers and impostors robbing someone of his title. %-eirs of Pe!ro Pinoto vs. -on. Au!e Dulay, .R No. 1<530, Auly 4, /336&. T@e essential 4e:5i4e;ents in t@e 4e6onstit5tion o2 title a4e t@e 2ollowin1# 1. =otice of petition should be published in the 8fficial ;a(ette and posted on the main entrance of the pro incial and municipal building where the land is situatedE 2. ,he notice should state the number of the lost or destroyed title- the name of the registered owner- occupants or persons in possessionE the names of ad)oining owners and interested partiesE the area and boundaries of the property and stating the date on which all interested parties must appearE 2. !opy of the notice must also be sent by registered mail or otherwise to e ery person named therein or to the occupant or ad)oining owners whose addresses are Bnown- at least 2G days prior to the hearingE and 4. At the date of the hearing of the petition- the petitioner must submit proof of publicationposting and ser ice of notice as re.uired by the court. * Calalang vs. Registry of Dee!s of Gue8on City, 42/ SCRA <<M Drtigas vs. (elasco, 420 SCRA 011+. FUR SD CT ON ,he distinction between general )urisdiction ested in the >,! and the limited )urisdiction when acting as a land registration court has been eliminated by #ection 2 of 7$ 1<29. %ence- the >,!s now ha e authority to act on .uestions after original registration with power to hear and decide substantial and contentious issues to a oid multiplicity of suits. %Ignacio vs. CA, 405 SCRA 402&. ,he land registration court has no )urisdiction to ad)udicate the issue regarding the e5istence or non-e5istence of tenancy relationship under >A 23CC *Agricultural >eform !ode- as amended by >A 6239+ since e5clusi e )urisdiction o er such relationship was ested by law in the !ourt of Agrarian >elations- now the >egional ,rial !ourt pursuant to B7 129. %Duano vs. CA, 42; SCRA /44&. 7$ 1<29 abolished the difference between the general )urisdiction of regular courts and the limited )urisdiction of the land registration court such that pursuant to #ection 2 of 7$ 1<29- the court may issue a writ of possession to effectuate the result of a ta5 sale- citing the leading case of A eria s. !aguioa- 1C6 #!>A- where it was declared that a land registration court has )urisdiction to decide contentious and substantial issues after original registration. %Cloma vs. CA, 420 SCRA 551&. =o oluntary instrument shall be registered by the >egister of $eeds unless the ownerNs duplicate certificate is presented together with the instrument e5cept in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown.

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San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


Any lien annotated on the pre ious certificate of title which subsist should be incorporated in or carried o er to the new ,!,. %"eticia "igon vs. CA an! Iglesia ni 7risto, 400 SCRA 532&. E7PROPR AT ON 9nder >A ?2?9- lands for sociali(ed housing are to be ac.uired by the go ernment in the following orderH 1. go ernment lands 2. alienable lands 2. unregistered lands or idle lands C. pri ately owned lands When pri ately owned lands are to be e5propriated- two conditions must be complied withnamelyH 1. resorted to only when other modes are e5hausted 2. lands owned by small property owners are e5empt from e5propriation for social housing. %City of *an!aluyong vs. Aguilar, et al., 216 SCRA 0<;&

CIVIL LAW

KA;on1 ot@e4 t@in1sL


Land "itles and #eeds RESTR CT ON ON ACQU S T ON OF REAL PROPERTY 1. #ale of lands to aliens is oid as it iolates the !onstitution- which disallows aliens to ac.uire lands. Both endor and endee are in pari delicto and the !ourts will not allow protection to either party. ,he go ernment may annul the sale at anytime because prescription does not run against the go ernment *:ee s. >epublic of the 7hilippines- 266 #!>A+. 2. =atural-born "ilipino citi(ens who ha e lost their "ilipino citi(enship may now ac.uire not more than 2 hectares of land if it is rural and not more than <GGG s.uare meters if residential. *>A 31?9+ EFFECT OF P?D? 13+' ON SPAN S$ T TLES 1. !annot be used as e idence to pro e title *'state of $on Dariano de #an 7edro- 26< #!>A+ 2. ,he same may be registered under the system of registration for unregistered land. *Act 22CC+ 2. ,hose not registered under the :>A are not considered registered at all.

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Red Notes in Civil Law

EFFECT OF P?D? 13+' ON T$E SYSTEM OF RE% STRAT ON OF UNRE% STERED LAND 1. In oluntary transaction liBe attachment and the liBe on unregistered land may now be registered in the >egister of $eeds. 2. Any .uestion regarding registration in the >egister of $eeds may now be ele ated by way of consulta to the :and >egistration Administration. PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF RE% STRAT ON OF LAND UNDER T$E LRA 1. Purpose / the legislati e intent in pro iding a system of mode of publicity so that persons dealing with real property thereby ac.uire security against instruments- the e5ecution re ealed. %ence- a permanent record of landholdings and registration is to afford a may search records and of which has not been transactions thereon is

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maintained in order to pre ent fraudulent claims to land by concealment of unregistered transactions. 2. +$$ect / >ecording of con eyance constitute notice to all whereas- it is presumed that the purchaser has e5amined e ery document of record *;arcia s. !ourt of Appeals- 9< #!>A 23G+. 3. Real Purpose o$ "orrens System / to .uiet title already e5isting and to stop fore er any .uestion as to its legality. 8nce title is registered- the owner may rest secure without waiting in the portals of the !ourt to a oid possibility of losing his land. *!hing s. !ourt of Appeals- 131 #!>AE =ational ;rains Authority s. !ourt of Appeals- 1<? #!>A+ O0FECT OF RE% STRAT ON D# ect of registration / 8nly real property is the ob)ect of registration. While land literally means the bare soil of the earth- it includes whate er may be found on its surface and under it. But forest land- e en if it is stripped of trees and forest co er are not susceptible of pri ate ownership much less of registration by pri ate persons unless reclassified or released from forest to alienable and disposable land of the public domain by official proclamation *$irector of "orest Danagement s. Aaleriano- 129 #!>A+. T$E D FFERENT MODES OF ACQU R N% LAND T TLES 1. 2. 2. C. 7ublic grant such as homestead patent- free patent or sales patent under !A 1C1. 7ri ate grant liBe donation- sale- etc. Ad erse possession or prescription Accretion / to the owners of the land ad)oining banBs of ri ers belong the accretion- which they gradually recei e from the effects of the current of the ri ers and not from the sea *Ignacio s. $irector of :ands- 1G3 7hilE Binoloy s. Danalo- 19< #!>A+. #hould accretion taBe place while application for registration is pending- there is a need for filing a new application for registration of the additional land and not merely awarding the application *!ureg s. IA!- 1?? #!>A+. <. In oluntary alienation / such as e5propriation proceedings- escheat- e5ecution sale- ta5 sale. 6. $escent or de ice / testate and intestate succession. ?. >eclamation / under the 7hilippine :aw of Waters- only the go ernment may initiate reclamation pro)ects *;o ernment s. !abangis- <2 7hil 112+. 9nder >A 1399- the national go ernment granted to municipalities and chartered cities the authority to undertaBe and carry out reclamation pro)ects but was re oBed by 7.$. 2-A and only the national go ernment may undertaBe such pro)ects *>7 s. 7asay city- et al.- 299 #!>A 199 / !ultural !enter+. T TLE 0Y EMANC PAT ON PATENT OR %RANT UNDER P?D? +. AND RA --3. >A 66<? did not repeal or supersede 7.$. 2?. While >A 66<? co ers all public and pri ate agricultural lands- 7.$. 2? co ers rice and corn lands *#igre s. !ourt of Appeals+. LANDS SU0FECT OF OR % NAL RE% STRAT ON 1. 7ri ate lands / lands segregated from general mass of the public domain by any form of grant by the #tate and which are in possession of the original grantee or their successors in interest. 2. 7ublic agricultural land to which claimants ha e ac.uired incomplete title within the contemplation of section C3 of the 7ublic :and Act. !AR OUS MET$ODS OF 0R N% N% LANDS UNDER T$E OPERAT ON OF T$E TORRENS SYSTEM 1. Ludicial / oluntary and compulsory a. Aoluntary / #ec 1C-29 7.$. 1<29 b. !ompulsory / instituted in !ourt by the #tate under the !adastral Act

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


*Act 22<9+ 2. Administrati e / where go ernment grants- alienates- or con eys lands by way of patent- said grant- deed- or instrument must be registered in the >egister of $eeds so as to be co ered by the :and >egistration Act. *#ec 1G2- 7.$. 1<29+ EFFECT OF FA LURE TO RE% STER LAND UNDER T$E TORRENS SYSTEM OF RE% STRAT ON >ecording is not indispensable to pro e ownership- under Art. ?G9- =!!- property not recorded in the >egister of $eeds will not pre)udice third persons pro ided it is not registered in the name of third persons and that he has been in .uiet andpeaceful possession thereof. 7ossession here is in accordance with Art. <2C- =!!- which contemplates not only material but also symbolic possession *Vuimson s. >osete- 3? 7hil. 139+. NATURE OF LAND RE% STRAT ON PROCEED N%S In rem- based on the generally accepted principle underlying the ,orrens system wherein all the world are made parties defendants. >elatedly- a decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed conclusi e not only on .uestions actually contended and determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated in the land registration proceedings *!acho s. !ourt of Appeals- 269 #!>A+ NATURE OF FUR SD CT ON OF RTC O!ER RE% STRAT ON OF T TLE 1. >,! e5ercises plenary )urisdiction o er all applications for any registration including impro ement and interest thereon and o er all petitions filed after original registration *Ignacio s. !ourt of Appeals- 2C6 #!>AE A eria s. !aguioa- 1C6 #!>AE 7=B s. International !orporate BanB- 199 #!>A+ 2. $elegated )urisdiction / >A ?691 allows inferior courts to hear and determine land registration cases where there is no contro ersy or where the alue of the property does not e5ceed 71GG- GGG. FUNCT ONS OF T$E RE% STER OF DEEDS 1. ;eneral function / $uty to register instrument presented for registration with all re.uisites for registration being present. 2. Dinisterial functions / %e performs ministerial functions with reference to registration of deeds- encumbrances- instruments and the liBe *Baranda s. ;ustilo- 16< #!>A+. %e cannot e5ercise personal )udgment and discretion when confronted with the problems of whether to register an instrument on the ground that it is in alid as this is a function of the court *Almirol s. >egister of $eeds of Agusan- 22 #!>A+. "$EN MAY RE% STER OF DEEDS DENY RE% STRAT ON OF !OLUNTARY NSTRUMENTS 1. Where there are more than one copy and owner@s duplicate and not all are presented. 2. When the document on its face bears infirmity. 2. When the alidity of the instrument sought to be registered is in issue pending in !ourt *Balbon s. >egister of $eeds of Ilocos sur- 23 #!>A+. 9ay an applicant whose predecessor in interest was denied registration now apply $or the registration o$ the same landB Kes- pro ided that he has ac.uired an imperfect title thereto by open- continuouse5clusi e- notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership *$irector of :ands s. 7astor- 1G6 #!>AE $: Danagement Bureau s. !ourt os Appeals- 2G< #!>A+ =ature of proceedings in land registration under 7.$. 1<29 and the 7ublic :and Act *!A 1C1+ =ature of proceedings in land registration under 7.$. 1<29 and the 7ublic :and Act *!A 1C1+ particularly #ection C3 thereof are the same in that both are against the whole world- both taBe the nature of )udicial proceedings and the decree of registration issued under both laws are conclusi e and final- and the proceedings therein are go erned by the same court procedure and laws of e idence.

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What is the re.uired period of possession and occupation necessary to be pro ed? #ince Lune 12- 19C<- under #ection 1C- 7.$. 1<29 as interpreted by the #upreme !ourt in >7 s. $oldol- 29< #!>A. "$AT S T$E PER OD " T$ N "$ C$ TO SECURE FUD C AL CONF RMAT ON OF T TLE OR ADM N STRAT !E LE%AL IAT ON OF T TLEC 9nder >A 91?6- the period within which to file petitions for )udicial confirmation or administrati e legali(ation of title had been e5tended to $ecember 21- 2G2G. EBtent o2 84oo2 4e:5i4ed o2 an a88li6ant 2o4 4e1ist4ation 1. :and is alienable and disposable *$irector of :ands s. Buyco- 216 #!>A+. 2. 8pen- continuous- e5clusi e- and notorious possession of the land since Lune 1219C< *#ec 1C- 7.$. 1<29 and >7 s. $oldol+ under a bona fide claim of ownership. MAY PR !ATE CORPORAT ONS APPLY FOR RE% STRAT ON OF PU0L C LANDSC 7ri ate corporations or associations are not allowed by the 19?2 and 193? !onstitution but the prohibition does not apply if at the time of registration proceedings- the land was already pri ate lands *$irector of :ands s. IA! and A!D' 7lywood- 1C6 #!>AE =ati idad s. !ourt of Appeals- 2G2 #!>A+. $O" S POSSESS ON PRO!EDC 1. 9nder #ec C3- 7:A possession must be accompanied by occupation since the two words are separated by the con)unction A=$- hence possession must not be by mere fiction or constructi e possession. 2. =ature of possession / it is open when it is patent- isible- apparent- notorious and not clandestine. !ontinuous when not interrupted or occasional. '5clusi e when possessor had e5clusi e dominion o er the land and appropriate it to his own benefit *$irector of :ands s. !A and Danlapa(- 2G9 #!>A+. PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF PU0L CAT ON 1. !onfers )urisdiction o er the land applied for upon the court. 2. ,o charge the whole world with Bnowledge of the application and in ite them to taBe part in the case and assert and pro e their right to the property. a. %owe er- publication is ne er meant to dispense with the re.uirement of mailing and posting which are mandatory and )urisdictional *>7 s. Darasigan- 193 #!>A 219+. b. Also- publication once in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory and )urisdictional *$irector of :ands s. !ourt of Appeals- 2?6 #!>A+. c. A defecti e publication depri es the !ourt of )urisdiction and therefore lacBs authority o er the whole case and all its aspects *7o s. >7- CG #!>AE >egister of $eeds of Dalabon s. >,! Dalabon- 131 #!>A+. d. Where actual publication of notice of initial hearing was after the hearing itself or where the 8fficial ;a(ette containing the notice was released for publication only after said hearing- the publication is defecti e *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals- 226 #!>A+. EFFECT OF ORDER OF DEFAULT All persons and the whole world e5cept only those who had appeared and filed pleadings in the case are bound by said default order *!achero s. Dar(an- 19G #!>A+. "$EN S DEFAULT ORDER MPROPERC

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San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


Where oppositor filed opposition but did not appear on date of initial hearing- it was improper for the court to declare him in default and the remedy is not appeal but certiorari *$irector of :ands s. #antiago- 16G #!>AE 8mico Dining s Aalle)os- 62 #!>A+. 0URDEN OF APPL CANT N LAND RE% STRAT ON PROCEED N%S %e must show that he is the real and absolute owner of the property in fee simple and o ercome the presumption that the land is a part of the public domain *>7 s. :ee- 19? #!>AE $irector of :ands s. #ayo- 191 #!>A+. In petitions for confirmation of imperfect title it is re.uired to show that the applicant is in open- continuous- e5clusi e and notorious possession and occupation of the land under bona fide claim of ownership within the period re.uired by law *since Lune 12- 19C< or earlier+. ' en if there is no opposition- applicant must pro e his claim and submit his e idence and not rely on the weaBness of the e idence of the opposition *$irector of ands s. Buyco- 216 #!>A+. PROOF OF DENT TY OF LAND MAY CONS ST OF J 1. #ur ey plan appro ed by $irector of :ands *>epublic !ement !orp. s. !ourt of Appeals- 193 #!>A+. 2. ,racing cloth plan and the blue print copies thereof *$irector of :ands s. >eyes- 63 #!>AE %eirs of Isabel ,esalora- 226 #!>A+. 2. ,echnical description duly signed by ;eodectic 'ngineer *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals2G1 #!>A+. C. ,a5 $eclaration / if there are discrepancies of area and boundary in ,a5 $eclaration and technical description such differences are common as measurements in ,a5 $eclarations are based on more estimation rather than computation *$irector of :ands s. "ontillas- CG2 #!>A+. "$AT E! DENCE S NECESSARY TO PRO!E O"NERS$ PC 1. $ocumentary e idence / must not only pro e the identity of the land but also genuineness of title *>epublic !ement !orp. s. !ourt of Appeals- 193 #!>A+. a. ,a5 declaration and real ta5 payments / not conduci e proof of ownership but indicia of possession *8rdoTe( s. !ourt of Appeals- 133 #!>AE $irector of :ands s. IA!- 19< #!>A+. b. 7residential issuance and legislati e acts *>7 represented by Dindanao Dedical !enter s. !ourt of Appeals- ?2 #!>AE International %ardwood W Aeneer !orp. s. 9ni ersity of the 7hilippines- 2GG #!>A+. c. #panish title / already inapplicable and may not be used as e idence *Intestate 'state of $on Dariano de #an 7edro- 26< #!>A where 7.$. 392 was applied+. 2. ,estimonial e idence showing among others possession and occupation of the land in the manner and period prescribed by law. PROOFS NOT SUFF C ENT TO ESTA0L S$ PR !ATE R %$TS OR O"NERS$ P 1. !ompromise agreement among the parties where they agreed that they ha e rights and interest o er the land and allocated portions to each of them. 2. #ur ey plan appro ed by $irector of :ands *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals- 1<C #!>A+. ORDER OF TR AL SAME AS ORD NARY C ! L ACT ON 8rder of trial inland registration cases is the same as ordinary ci il action *>ule 2G- 199? >ules of !ourt+. #ec 2C 7.$. 1<29 e5pressly states that the >ules of !ourt are applicable to land registration cases. 0asis o2 6o54t D5d1;ent #ection 29 7.$. 1<29 pro ides that all conflicting claims of ownership in the land shall be determined by the court. Ludgment< of the court shall be based on the e idence presented by the parties A=$ reports of :>A and Bureau of :ands. ,he court is empowered to wield its )udicial power

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

to compel :>A to speed up the in estigation and submission of is report and recommendation *>amos s. >odrigue(- 2CC #!>A+. PROPERTY SU0FECT OF ADFUD CAT ON 0Y T$E COURT 8nly property claimed by applicant can be ad)udicated by the !ourt- hence if he asserts ownership and submits e idence only for a portion of a lot- the inclusion of a portion of a lot not claimed is oid * Almar(a s. Arguelles- 1<6 #!>A+. REPORT OF LRA AND LAND MANA%EMENT 0UREAU REQU RED TO 0E CONS DERED TO%ET$ER " T$ E! DENCE PRESENTED If submitted later but not beyond one year after the issuance of decree- the !ourt may still cause a change in the decision *;ome( s. !ourt of Appeals- 163 #!>AE >amos s. >odrigue(- 2CC #!>A+. "$EN MAY "R T OF POSSESS ON " LL SSUE A writ of possession in land registration cases is a mere part )udgment incident. ,he )udgment carries with it deli ery of possession which is inherent in ownership and it may issue e en if there is an appeal *Aencilao s. Aano+. Writ of possession does not prescribe and >ule 29 of the >ules of !ourt regarding enforcement of )udgment by motions in ci il cases has no application in land registration proceedings *%eirs of !ristobal Darcos s. $e Banuuar- 2< #!>A+. E22e6t o2 De64ee o2 Re1ist4ation It binds the land- .uiets title thereto and it is conclusi e upon all persons- including the go ernment and bars re-litigation after 1 year *Klarde s. :ichauco- C2 #!>A+. M N STER AL DUTY OF LRA $uty of :>A to issue decree of registration is ministerial- hence :>A cannot e5ercise discretion but is duty bound to refer matter to the court per #ec 6*2+ 7.$. 1<29. %owe er- :> Administrator is not bound to issue decree if land had earlier been registered *>amos s. >odrigue(2CC #!>A+. EB6e8tions to inde2easiAilit< o2 title a2te4 one <ea4 24o; date o2 ent4< o2 de64ee 1. When a alid title already co ers the land *>eg. 8f $eeds s. 7=B- 12 #!>A+. 2. :and not capable of registration *Dartine( s. !ourt of Appeals- <6 #!>A+. 2. "raudelent registration where :>A could not be used to perpetuate fraud *Bonales s. IA!166 #!>A+. D ST NCT ON 0ET"EEN !OLUNTARY AND N!OLUNTARY RE% STRAT ON 1. Aoluntary / Innocent purchaser for alue becomes registered owner the moment he presents and files a duly notari(ed document *deed of sale+ and the same is entered in the primary entry booB and at the same time presents duplicate owner@s copy and pays registration fees because what remains to be done lies not in his power to perform *;arcia s. !ourt of Appeals- 9< #!>A+. 2. In oluntary / mere entry in the primary entry booB sufficient notice to all e en if owner@s duplicate copy is not presented to >egister of $eeds. EFFECT OF RE% STRAT ON N RD >egistration of the document in the >egister of $eeds is the operati e act that transmits title. Absent such registration con eyance does not bind the land *Aillalu( s =eme- ? #!>A+. ,his rule also applies to sale on e5ecution or foreclosure *!empillo s. !ourt of Appeals- 129 #!>AE 7=B s. !ourt of Appeals- 93 #!>A+.

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

CIVIL LAW

NDEFEAS 0 L TY OF T$E CERT F CATE OF T TLE Buyers and mortgages not re.uired to go beyond certificate of title. ,hey are only charged with notice of burden on property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title *Ibarra s. Ibarra- 1<6 #!>AE Bel Air Aillage Association s. $ionisio- 1?C #!>A+. When there is nothing on certificate of title to indicate any cloud or ice in ownership or encumbrance thereon- the purchaser is not re.uired to e5plore further than what the certificate of title indicates in .uest for any hidden defect *!enteno s. !ourt of Appeals- 129 #!>AE 7ino s. !ourt of Appeals- 193 #!>A+. E7CEPT ON TO T$E RULE T$AT 0UYERS NEED NOT %O 0EYOND T$E FACE OF T$E T TLE 1. When purchaser neglects to maBe necessary in.uiries and closes his eyes to facts which should ha e put a reasonable man on his guard *'gao s. !ourt of Appeals- 1?C #!>A+. 2. ,ransactions with banBs and other financial institutions *=a arro s. #econd :aguna $e elopment BanB- ;.>. =o. 129 C23- "ebruary 2GG2E $ela Derced s. ;#I#- 26< #!>AE ,omas s. ,omas- 93 #!>A+. 2. When buyer relied upon rights of endee based on annotated transaction *;uererro s. !ourt of Appeals- 29 #!>AE #antiago s. !ourt of Appeals- 2C? #!>A+.

Con$licts o$ Law Nationalit< Law T@eo4< / :aws relating to "amily rights and duties or to the status- conditionand legal capacity of persons are binding upon citi(ens of the 7hilippines e en though li ing abroad *Art. 1<- !i il !ode+. By analogy then- the status- condition and legal capacity of a foreigner so)ourning in the 7hilippines shall be go erned by his national law. A4ti6le +1 o2 t@e Fa;il< Code re.uires that when either or both parties contracting marriage are foreigners- they shall submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by their diplomatic or consular offices before a marriage license can be obtained. If a license is issued without the certificate of legal capacity- the subse.uent marriage will still be alid without pre)udice to the appropriate ci il- criminal or administrati e action against the party responsible for the irregularity in the formal re.uisite. As a rule- the alidity of aAsol5te divo46e is not recogni(ed in the 7hilippines because of public policy considerations. But an American who consented to a di orce from a "ilipino wife- cannot claim any interest in the property of his "ilipino spouse in the 7hilippines on the ground that the di orce is not alid here. #ince under his national law the alidity of di orce is recogni(edhe ceased to become the spouse of the "ilipino. Also- a ;erman national who obtained a di orce in his country- cannot file adultery charges against his "ilipino wife as he can no longer be considered an offended spouse. In both instances- the status of a foreigner shall be go erned by his national law. A 2o4ei1ne4 ;a< ado8t in t@e P@ili88ines pro ided that- in addition to the .ualifications re.uired of "ilipino adopters- the following re.uirements are presentH diplomatic relationsE 2 years continuous residence prior to application and until issuance of decreeE legal capacity to adopt under his national lawE and his national law allows adoptee to enter his country. nte4>6o5nt4< ado8tion is a socio legal process for the adoption of a "ilipino !hild by a foreigner or a "ilipino permanently residing where the petition is filed- the super ised trial custody undertaBen- and the decree of adoption issued outside the 7hilippines.

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,he 2o4;al validit< o2 a 6ont4a6t of go erned by the law of the place of e5ecution *le5 loci celebrationis or le5 contractus+E capacity to contract by the national law of the contracting paryE intrinsic alidity by the law intended by the parties to go ern *le5 intentionis+ pro ided that said law must ha e a substanti e relationship or connection to the transaction- contract or partiesE and the performance by the law intended or by the law of the place of performance *le5 solutionis+. Cont4a6ts 2o4 nte4national Ai4 T4ans8o4tation / When a passenger files 2 causes of action arising from a.+ theftFslashing of his luggageE and b.+ shabby treatment or humiliation he suffered from airline personnel- the rules and limits pro ide in the Warsaw !on ention will apply only to the first cause of action but not to the second. ,he Warsaw !on ention is not applicable to cases of malice- bad faith- bumping off- barbaric acts- humiliation- and other tortsE it does not regulate or e5clude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier- or misconduct of its employees- or for some other e5ceptional type of damages. nt4insi6 validit< o2 will and 6a8a6it< to s566eed are go erned by the national law of the decedentH "ormal or e5trinsic alidity of a will e5ecuted by a.+ "ilipino abroad / go erned by law of place of e5ecution or 7hilippine lawE b.+ Alien abroad / go erned by his national law- law of place of residence- or 7hilippine lawE c.+ Alien in the 7hilippines / go erned by his national law or 7hilippine law.

SU%%ESTED ANS"ERS TO T$E +**, 0AR E7AM NAT ON QUEST ONS N C ! L LA"
QUEST ON NO? A. Dr. RK lost 71GG-GGG in a card game called >ussian poBer- but he had no more cash to pay in full the winner at the time the session ended. %e promised to pay 7Q- the winner- two weeBs thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two months- so 7Q files in court a suit to collect the amount of 7<G-GGG that he won but remained unpaid. Will the collection suit against RK prosper? !ould Drs. RK file in turn a suit against 7Q to reco er the 71GG-GGG that her husband lost? >eason. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? 1/ T@e s5it A< P7 to 6olle6t t@e Aalan6e o2 w@at @e won 24o; IY will not 84os8e4? Unde4 A4ti6le +*1, o2 t@e Civil Code) no a6tion 6an Ae ;aintained A< t@e winne4 2o4 t@e 6olle6tion o2 w@at @e @as won in a 1a;e o2 6@an6e? Alt@o51@ 8o9e4 ;a< de8end in 8a4t on aAilit<) it is 25nda;entall< a 1a;e o2 6@an6e? +/ 2 t@e ;one< 8aid A< IY to P7 was 6onD51al o4 6o;;5nit< 84o8e4t<) t@e wi2e o2 IY 6o5ld s5e to 4e6ove4 it Ae6a5se A4ti6le 11.&./ o2 t@e Fa;il< Code 84ovides t@at losses in 1a;Alin1 o4 Aettin1 a4e Ao4ne eB6l5sivel< A< t@e lose4>s8o5se? $en6e) 6onD51al o4 6o;;5nit< 25nds ;a< not Ae 5sed to 8a< 2o4 s56@ losses? 2 t@e ;one< we4e eB6l5sive 84o8e4t< o2 IY) @is wi2e ;a< also s5e to 4e6ove4 it 5nde4 A4ti6le +*1- o2 t@e Civil Code i2 s@e and t@e 2a;il< needed t@e ;one< 2o4 s588o4t? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER to QA &+/#

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


A? +/ M4s? IY 6annot 2ile a s5it to 4e6ove4 w@at @e4 @5sAand lost? A4t?+*1, o2 t@e Civil Code 84ovides t@at an< loses in a 1a;e o2 6@an6e ;a< 4e6ove4 @is loss 24o; t@e winne4) wit@ le1al inte4est 24o; t@e ti;e @e 8aid t@e a;o5nt lost? T@is ;eans t@at onl< @e 6an 2ile t@e s5it? M4s? IY 6annot 4e6ove4 as a s8o5se w@o @as inte4est in t@e aAsol5te 6o;;5nit< 84o8e4t< o4 6onD51al 8a4tne4s@i8 o2 1ains) Ae6a5se 5nde4 A4t 11.&./ o2 t@e Fa;il< Code) losses a4e Ao4ne eB6l5sivel< A< t@e lose4>s8o5se? T@e4e2o4e) t@ese 6annot Ae 6@a41ed a1ainst aAsol5te 6o;;5nit< 84o8e4t< o4 6onD51al 8a4tne4s@i8 o2 1ains? T@is Aein1 so) M4s? IY @as no inte4est in law to 84ose65te and 4e6ove4 as s@e @as no le1al standin1 in 6o54t to do so? B. ,Q filed a suit for e)ectment against B$ for non-payment if condominium rentals amounting to 71<G-GGG. $uring the pendency of the case- B$ offered and ,Q accepted the full amount due as rentals from B$- who then filed a motion to dismiss the e)ectment suit on the ground that the action is already e5tinguished. Is B$@s contention correct? Why or why not? >eason. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# B. 0DEs 6ontention is not 6o44e6t? T7 6an still ;aintain t@e s5it 2o4 eDe6t;ent? T@e a66e8tan6e A< t@e lesso4 o2 t@e 8a<;ent A< t@e lessee o2 t@e 4entals in a44ea4s even d54in1 t@e 8enden6< o2 t@e eDe6t;ent 6ase does not 6onstit5te a waive4 o4 aAandon;ent o2 t@e eDe6t;ent 6ase? &Spouses Clutario &. C! +1- SCRA 3,1 O1''+P/? QUEST ON NO? A. $istinguish briefly by clearly betweenH 1. *utuum and commo!atum. 2. #ubstitute parental authority and special parental authority. 2. !i il obligation and natural obligation. C. Ine5istent contracts and annullable contracts. <. $omiciliary theory and nationality theory of personal law. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? T@e distin6tions a4e as 2ollows# 1. n mutuum) t@e oADe6t Ao44owed ;5st Ae a 6ons5;aAle t@in1) t@e owne4s@i8 o2 w@i6@ is t4ans2e44ed to t@e Ao44owe4 w@o in654s t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e sa;e 6ons5;aAle to t@e lende4 in an e:5al a;o5nt) and o2 t@e sa;e 9ind and :5alit<? n commodatum) t@e oADe6t Ao44owed is 5s5all< anon>6ons5;aAle t@in1) t@e owne4s@i8 o2 w@i6@ is not t4ans2e44ed to t@e Ao44owe4 w@o in654s t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e ve4< t@in1 to t@e lende4? +? n s5Astit5te 8a4ental a5t@o4it<) t@e 8a4ents lose t@ei4 8a4ental a5t@o4it< in 2avo4 o2 t@e s5Astit5te w@o a6:5i4es it to t@e eB6l5sion o2 t@e 8a4ents? n s8e6ial 8a4ental a5t@o4it<) t@e 8a4ents o4 an<one eBe46isin1 8a4ental a5t@o4it< does not lose 8a4ental a5t@o4it<? T@ose w@o a4e 6@a41ed wit@ s8e6ial 8a4ental a5t@o4it< eBe46ise s56@ a5t@o4it< onl< d54in1 t@e ti;e t@at t@e 6@ild is in t@ei4 65stod< o4 s58e4vision? S5Astit5te 8a4ental a5t@o4it< dis8la6es 8a4ental a5t@o4it< w@ile s8e6ial 8a4ental a5t@o4it< 6on654s wit@ 8a4ental a5t@o4it<? 3? Civil oAli1ation is a D54idi6al ne6essit< to 1ive) to do and not to do? t 1ives t@e 64edito4 t@e le1al 4i1@t to 6o;8el A< an a6tion in 6o54t t@e 8e42o4;an6e o2 s56@ oAli1ation?

CIVIL LAW

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

4.

A nat54al oAli1ation is Aased in e:5it< and nat54al law? T@e4e is no le1al 4i1@t to 6o;8el 8e42o4;an6e t@e4eo2 A5t i2 t@e deAto4 vol5nta4il< 8a<s it) @e 6annot 4e6ove4 w@at was 8aid? neBistent 6ont4a6ts a4e 6onside4ed as not @avin1 Aeen ente4ed into and t@e4e2o4e) &oid ab initio. T@e< do not 64eate an< oAli1ation and 6annot Ae 4ati2ied o4 validated) as t@e4e is no a14ee;ent to 4ati2< o4 validate? On t@e ot@e4 @and) ann5llaAle o4 voidaAle 6ont4a6ts a4e valid 5ntil invalidated A< t@e 6o54t A5t ;a< Ae 4ati2ied? n ineBistent 6ont4a6ts) one o4 ;o4e 4e:5isites o2 a valid 6ont4a6ts a4e aAsent? n ann5llaAle 6ont4a6ts) all t@e ele;ents o2 a 6ont4a6t a4e 84esent eB6e8t t@e 6onsent o2 one o2 t@e 6ont4a6tin1 8a4ties was vitiated o4 one o2 t@e; @as no 6a8a6it< to 1ive 6onsent?

3? Do;i6ilia4< T@eo4< 8osits t@at t@e 8e4sonal stat5s and 4i1@ts o2 a 8e4son a4e 1ove4ned A< t@e law o2 @is do;i6ile o4 t@e 8la6e o2 @is @aAit5al 4esiden6e? T@e Nationalit< T@eo4<) on t@e ot@e4 @and) 8ost5lates t@at it is t@e law o2 t@e 8e4sonEs nationalit< t@at 1ove4ns s56@ stat5s and 4i1@ts? B. $, and D, were prominent members of the fre.uent tra elers@ club of "Q Airlines. In %ong &ong- the couple were assigned seats in Business !lass for which they had bought ticBets. 8n checBing in- howe er- they were told that they were upgraded by computer to "irst !lass for the flight to Danila because the Business #ection was o erbooBed. Both refused to transfer despite better seats- food- be erage and other ser ices in "irst !lass. ,hey said they had guests in Business !lass they should attend to. ,hey felt humiliatedembarrassed and e5ed- howe er- when the stewardess allegedly threatened to offload them if they did not a ail of the upgrade. ,hus they ga e in- but during the transfer of luggage- $, suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arri al in Danila- they demanded an apology from "Q@s management as well as indemnity payment. When none was forthcoming- they sued the airline for a million pesos in damages. Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? '5plain briefly. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# B. F7 Ai4lines 6o;;itted A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t w@en it 5814ade DT and MT) ove4 t@ei4 oADe6tions) to Fi4st Class Ae6a5se t@e< @ad 6ont4a6ted 2o4 05siness Class 8assa1e? $oweve4) alt@o51@ t@e4e is a A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t) DT and MT a4e entitled to a6t5al da;a1es onl< 2o4 s56@ 8e65nia4< losses s522e4ed A< t@e; as a 4es5lt o2 s56@ A4ea6@? T@e4e see;s to Ae no s@owin1 t@at t@e< in6544ed s56@ 8e65nia4< loss? T@e4e is no s@owin1 t@at t@e 8ain in DTEs a4; and w4ist 4es5lted di4e6tl< 24o; t@e 6a44ie4Es a6ts 6o;8lained o2? $en6e) t@e< a4e not entitled to a6t5al da;a1es? Mo4eove4) DT 6o5ld @ave avoided t@e alle1ed inD54< A< 4e:5estin1 t@e ai4line sta22 to do t@e l511a1e t4ans2e4 as a ;atte4 o2 d5t< on t@ei4 8a4t? T@e4e is also no Aasis to awa4d ;o4al da;a1es 2o4 s56@ A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t Ae6a5se t@e 2a6ts o2 t@e 84oAle; do not s@ow Aad 2ait@ o4 24a5d on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e ai4line? &Cathay Paci$ic &. )as>ue*) 3'' SCRA +*. O+**3P/? $oweve4) t@e< ;a< 4e6ove4 ;o4al da;a1es i2 t@e 6a5se o2 a6tion is Aased on A4ti6le +1 o2 t@e Civil Code 2o4 t@e @5;iliation and e;Aa44ass;ent t@e< 2elt w@en t@e stewa4dess t@4eatened to o22load t@e; i2 t@e< did not avail o2 t@e 5814ade? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# 2 it 6an Ae 84oved t@at DTEs 8ain in @is a4; and w4ist o66asioned A< t@e t4ans2e4 o2 l511a1e was 6a5sed A< 2a5lt o4 ne1li1en6e on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e ai4lineEs stewa4dess) a6t5al da;a1es ;a< Ae 4e6ove4ed? T@e ai4line ;a< Ae liaAle 2o4 ;o4al da;a1es 854s5ant to A4t? ++1' &1*/ i2 t@e 6a5se o2 a6tion is Aased o2 A4ti6le +1 o4 an a6t 6ont4a4< to ;o4als in view o2 t@e @5;iliation s522e4ed

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Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2

2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS


A< DT and MT w@en t@e< we4e se8a4ated 24o; t@ei4 15ests and we4e t@4eatened to Ae o22loaded? QUEST ON NO? A. >= and $D- without any impediment to marry each other had been li ing together without benefit of church blessings. ,heir common-law union resulted in the birth of RD=. ,wo years later- they got married in a ci il ceremony. !ould RD= be legitimated? >eason *<P+

CIVIL LAW

SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? IMN was le1iti;ated A< t@e s5Ase:5ent ;a44ia1e o2 RN and DM Ae6a5se at t@e ti;e @e was 6on6eived) RN and DM 6o5ld @ave validl< ;a44ied ea6@ ot@e4? Unde4 t@e Fa;il< Code) 6@ild4en 6on6eived and Ao4n o5tside o2 wedlo69 o2 8a4ents w@o) at t@e ti;e o2 t@e 2o4;e4Es 6on6e8tion) we4e not dis:5ali2ied A< an< i;8edi;ent to ;a44< ea6@ ot@e4 a4e le1iti;ated A< t@e s5Ase:5ent ;a44ia1e o2 t@e 8a4ents? B. $r. A:Q is a scientist honored for worB related to the human genome pro)ect. Among his pioneering efforts concern stem cell research for the cure of Al(heimer@s disease. 9nder corporate sponsorship- he helped de elop a microbe that are and digested oil spills in the sea. =ow he leads a college team for cancer research in D## #tate. ,he team has e5perimented on a mouse whose body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor. !alled Ioncomouse-J it is a life-form useful for medical research and it is a no el creation. Its body cells do not naturally occur in nature but are the product of man@s intellect- industry and ingenuity. %owe er- there is a doubt whether local property laws and ethics would allow rights of e5clusi e ownership of any life-form. $r. A:Q needs your ad iceH *1+ whether the reciprocity principle in pri ate international law could be applied in our )urisdictionE and *2+ whether there are legal and ethical reasons that could frustrate his claim of e5clusi e ownership o er the life-form called IoncomouseJ in Danila? What will be your ad ice to him? *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# B. &1/ T@e 4e6i84o6it< 84in6i8le in 84ivate inte4national law ;a< Ae a88lied in o54 D54isdi6tion? Se6tion 3 o2 R?A? (+'3) t@e ntelle6t5al P4o8e4t< Code) 84ovides 2o4 4e6i84o6it< as 2ollows# K!ny person who is a national or who is domiciled or has a real and e$$ecti&e industrial establishment in a country which is a party to any con&ention treaty or agreement relating to intellectual property rights or the repression o$ un$air competition to which the Philippines is also a party or eCtends reciprocal rights to nationals o$ the Philippines by law shall be entitled to bene$its to the eCtent necessary to gi&e e$$ect to any pro&ision o$ such con&ention treaty or reciprocal law in addition to the rights to which any owner o$ an intellectual property right is otherwise entitled by this !ct. %n'D To ill5st4ate# t@e P@ili88ines ;a< 4e24ain 24o; i;8osin1 a 4e:5i4e;ent o2 lo6al in6o48o4ation o4 estaAlis@;ent o2 a lo6al do;i6ile 2o4 t@e 84ote6tion o2 ind5st4ial 84o8e4t< 4i1@ts o2 2o4ei1n nationals &6itiGens o2 Canada) SwitGe4land) U?S?/ i2 t@e 6o5nt4ies o2 said 2o4ei1n nationals 4e24ain 24o; i;8osin1 said 4e:5i4e;ent on Fili8ino 6itiGens? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# Re6i84o6it< 84in6i8le 6annot Ae a88lied in o54 D54isdi6tion Ae6a5se t@e P@ili88ines is a 8a4t< to t@e TR PS a14ee;ent and t@e "TO? T@e 84in6i8le involved is t@e ;ost>2avo4ed nation 6la5se w@i6@ is t@e 84in6i8le o2 non>dis64i;ination? T@e 84ote6tion a22o4ded to intelle6t5al 84o8e4t< 84ote6tion in t@e P@ili88ines also a88lies to ot@e4 ;e;Ae4s o2 t@e "TO? T@5s) it is not 4eall< 4e6i84o6it< 84in6i8le in 84ivate inte4national law t@at a88lies) A5t t@e ;ost> 2avo4ed nation 6la5se 5nde4 85Ali6 inte4national law? &+/ T@e4e is no le1al 4eason w@< Kon6o;o5seL 6annot Ae 84ote6ted 5nde4 t@e law? A;on1 t@ose eB6l5ded 24o; 8atent 84ote6tion a4e Kplant &arieties or animal breeds or

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

essentially biological process $or the production o$ plants and animalsD &Se6tion ++?, ntelle6t5al P4o8e4t< Code) R?A? No? (+'3/? T@e Kon6o;o5seL in t@e 84oAle; is not an essentiall< Aiolo1i6al 84o6ess 2o4 t@e 84od56tion o2 ani;als? t is a 4eal invention Ae6a5se its Aod< 6ells do not nat54all< o6654 in nat54e A5t a4e t@e 84od56t o2 ;anEs in1en5it<) intelle6t and ind5st4<? T@e A4eedin1 o2 on6o;o5se @as novelt<) inventive ste8 and ind5st4ial a88li6ation? T@ese a4e t@e t@4ee 4e:5isites o2 8atentaAilit<? &Se6 +') PC/ T@e4e a4e no et@i6al 4easons w@< D4? AD7 and @is 6olle1e tea; 6annot Ae 1iven eB6l5sive owne4s@i8 ove4 t@ei4 invention? T@e 5se o2 s56@ 1eneti6all< ;odi2ied ;o5se) 5se25l 2o4 6an6e4 4esea46@) o5twei1@s 6onside4ations 2o4 ani;al 4i1@ts? T@e4e a4e no le1al and et@i6al 4easons t@at wo5ld 245st4ate D4? AL7Es 6lai; o2 eB6l5sive owne4s@i8 ove4 Kon6o;o5se?L Ani;als a4e 84o8e4t< 6a8aAle o2 Aein1 a884o84iated and owned? n 2a6t) one 6an own 8et do1s o4 6ats) o4 an< ot@e4 ani;al? 2 wild ani;als a4e 6a8aAle o2 Aein1 owned) wit@ ;o4e 4eason ani;als te6@nolo1i6all< en@an6ed o4 6o4458ted A< ;anEs invention o4 ind5st4< a4e s5s6e8tiAle to eB6l5sive owne4s@i8 A< t@e invento4? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# T@e oncomouse is a @i1@e4 li2e 2o4; w@i6@ does not 2all wit@in t@e de2inition o2 t@e te4; Kin&ention.D Neit@e4 ;a< it 2all wit@in t@e a;Ait o2 t@e te4; K manu$actureD w@i6@ 5s5all< i;8lies a non>livin1 ;e6@anisti6 84od56t? T@e oncomouse is a Aette4 4e1a4ded as Edisco&eryD w@i6@ is t@e 6o;;on 8at4i;on< o2 ;an? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# T@e EoncomouseD is a non>8atentaAle invention? $en6e) 6annot Ae owned eB6l5sivel< A< its invento4? t is a ;et@od 2o4 t@e t4eat;ent o2 t@e @5;an o4 ani;al Aod< A< s541e4< o4 t@e4a8< and dia1nosti6 ;et@ods 84a6ti6ed on said Aodies a4e not 8atentaAle 5nde4 Se6? ++ o2 t@e PC? QUEST ON NO? !

San 0eda Colle1e o2

A. LA- owner of a parcel of land- sold it to 77. But the deed of sale was not registered. 8ne year later- LA sold the parcel again to >>- who succeeded to register the deed and to obtain a transfer certificate of title o er the property in his own name. Who has the better right o er the parcel of land- >> of 77? Why? '5plain the legal basis for your answer. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? t de8end on w@et@e4 o2 not RR is an inno6ent 8546@ase4 2o4 val5e? Unde4 t@e To44ens S<ste;) a deed o4 inst45;ent o8e4ated onl< as a 6ont4a6t Aetween t@e 8a4ties as eviden6e o2 a5t@o4it< to t@e Re1iste4 o2 Deeds to ;a9e t@e 4e1ist4ation? t is t@e 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e deed o4 t@e inst45;ent t@at is t@e o8e4ative a6t t@at 6onve<s o4 a22e6ts t@e land? &Se6? 31) P?D? 13+'/? n 6ases o2 do5Ale sale o2 titled land) it is a well>settled 45le t@at t@e A5<e4 w@o 2i4st 4e1iste4s t@e sale in 1ood 2ait@ a6:5i4es a Aette4 4i1@t to t@e land? &A4t? 13,,) Civil Code/?

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Pe4sons dealin1 wit@ 84o8e4t< 6ove4ed A< To44ens title a4e not 4e:5i4ed to 1o Ae<ond w@at a88ea4s on its 2a6e? &Or>uiola &. C! 3(-) SCRA 3*1) O+**+PH #omingo &. Roces ,*1 SCRA 1'.) O+**3P/? T@5s) aAsent an< s@owin1 t@at RR 9new aAo5t) o4 o51@t to @ave 9nown t@e 84io4 sale o2 t@e land to PP o4 t@at @e a6ted in Aad 2ait@) and Aein1 2i4st to 4e1iste4 t@e sale) RR a6:5i4ed a 1ood and a 6lean title to t@e 84o8e4t< as a1ainst PP? B. !Q e5ecuted a special power of attorney authori(ing $K to secure a loan from any banB and to mortgage his property co ered by the owner@s certificate of title. In securing a loan from DbanB- $K did not specify that he was acting for !Q in the transaction with said banB. Is !Q liable for the banB loan? Why or why not? Lustify your answer. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? C7 is liaAle 2o4 t@e Aan9 loan Ae6a5se @e a5t@o4iGed t@e ;o4t1a1e on @is 84o8e4t< to se654e t@e loan 6ont4a6ted A< DY? 2 DY late4 de2a5lts and 2ails to 8a< t@e loan) C7 is liaAle to 8a<? $oweve4) @is liaAilit< is li;ited to t@e eBtent o2 t@e val5e o2 t@e said 84o8e4t<? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# C7 is not 8e4sonall< liaAle to t@e Aan9 loan Ae6a5se it was 6ont4a6ted A< DY in @is 8e4sonal 6a8a6it<? Onl< t@e 84o8e4t< o2 C7 is liaAle? $en6e) w@ile C7 @as a5t@o4iGed t@e ;o4t1a1e on @is 84o8e4t< to se654e t@e loan o2 DY) t@e Aan9 6annot s5e C7 to 6olle6t t@e loan in 6ase DY de2a5lts t@e4eon? T@e Aan9 6an onl< 2o4e6lose a4e not s522i6ient to 8a< t@e loan in 25ll) t@e Aan9 6annot 45n a2te4 C7 2o4 t@e de2i6ien6<? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# "@ile as a 1ene4al 45le t@e 84in6i8al is not liaAle 2o4 t@e 6ont4a6t ente4ed into A< @is a1ent in 6ase t@e a1ent a6ted in @is own na;e wit@o5t dis6losin1 @is 84in6i8al) s56@ 45le does not a88l< i2 t@e 6ont4a6t involves a t@in1 Aelon1in1 to t@e 84in6i8al? n s56@ 6ase) t@e 84in6i8al is liaAle 5nde4 A4ti6le 1((3 o2 t@e Civil Code? T@e 6ont4a6t is dee;ed ;ade on @is Ae@al2 &Sy=(uco &. Sy=(uco ,* P@il? -3, O1'+*P/? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# C7 wo5ld not Ae liaAle 2o4 t@e Aan9 loan? C7Es 84o8e4t< wo5ld also not Ae liaAle on t@e ;o4t1a1e? Sin6e DY did not s8e6i2< t@at @e was a6tin1 2o4 C7 in t@e t4ansa6tion wit@ t@e Aan9) DY in e22e6t a6ted in @is own na;e? n t@e 6ase o2 Rural ,an: o$ ,ombon &. C!) +1+ SCRA) &1''+/) t@e S584e;e Co54t) 5nde4 t@e sa;e 2a6ts) 45led t@at Ein order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property eCecuted by an agent it must upon its $ace purport to be made signed and sealed in the name o$ the principal otherwise it will bind the agent only. -t is not enough merely that the agent was in $act authori*ed to ma:e the mortgage i$ he has not acted in the name o$ the principal. 6either is it ordinarily su$$icient that in the mortgage the agent describes himsel$ as acting by &irtue o$ a power o$ attorney it in $act the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand and seal to the mortgage. "here is no principle o$ law by which a person can become liable on a real estate mortgage which she ne&er eCecuted in person or by attorney in $act.D QUEST ON NO? ! A. $78 went to a store to buy a pacB of cigarettes worth 722<.GG only. %e ga e the endor >>A- a 7<GG-peso bill. ,he endor ga e him the pacB plus 72?<.GG change. Was there a discount- an o ersight- or an error in the amount gi en? What would be $78@s duty- if any- in case of an e5cess in the amount of change gi en by the endor? %ow is this situational relationship between $78 and >>A denominated? '5plain *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#

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A. T@e4e was e44o4 in t@e a;o5nt o2 6@an1e 1iven A< RRA? T@is is a 6ase o2 solutio indebiti in t@at DPO 4e6eived so;et@in1 t@at is not d5e @i;? $e @as t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e P1**?**H ot@e4wise) @e will 5nD5stl< en4i6@ @i;sel2 at t@e eB8ense o2 RRA? &A4t? +13,) Civil Code/ ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# DPO @as t@e d5t< to 4et54n to RRA t@e eB6ess P1** as t45stee 5nde4 A4ti6le 1,3- o2 t@e Civil Code w@i6@ 84ovides# -$ property is ac>uired through mista:e or $raud the person obtaining it is by $orce o$ law considered a trustee o$ an implied trust $or the bene$it o$ the person $rom whom the property comes. T@e4e is) in t@is 6ase) an i;8lied o4 6onst456tive t45st in 2avo4 o2 RRA? B. 8L was employed as professional dri er of DD ,ransit bus ownd by Dr. B,. In the course of his worB- 8L hit a pedestrian who was seriously in)ured and later died in the hospital as a result of the accident. ,he ictim@s heirs sued the dri er and the owner of the bus for damages. Is there a presumption in this case that Dr. B,- the owner- had been negligent? If so- us the presumption absolute or not? '5plain. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? Yes) t@e4e is a 84es5;8tion o2 ne1li1en6e on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e e;8lo<e4? $oweve4) s56@ is 4eA5ttaAle? T@e liaAilit< o2 t@e e;8lo<e4 s@all 6ease w@en t@e< 84ove t@at t@e< oAse4ved t@e dili1en6e o2 a 1ood 2at@e4 o2 a 2a;il< to 84event da;a1e &A4ti6le +1(*) Civil Code/? "@en t@e e;8lo<ee 6a5ses da;a1e d5e to @is own ne1li1en6e w@ile 8e42o4;in1 @is own d5ties) t@e4e a4ises t@e (uris tantum 84es5;8tion t@at t@e e;8lo<e4 is ne1li1ent) 4eA5ttaAle onl< A< 84oo2 o2 oAse4van6e o2 t@e dili1ne6e o2 a 1ood 2at@e4 o2 a 2a;il< & 9etro 9anila "ransit &. C! ++3 SCRA 3+1 O1''3PH #elsan "ransport Lines &. CF! Construction ,1+ SCRA 3+, O+**3P/? Li9ewise) i2 t@e d4ive4 is 6@a41ed and 6onvi6ted in a 64i;inal 6ase 2o4 64i;inal ne1li1en6e) 0T is s5Asidia4il< liaAle 2o4 t@e da;a1es a4isin1 24o; t@e 64i;inal a6t? QUEST ON NO? !

San 0eda Colle1e o2

A. AB! loaned to D=8 7CG-GGG for which the latter pledged CGG shares of stocB in QKR Inc. it was agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with 1GP yearly interest within four years- the pledgee is authori(ed to foreclose on the shares of stocB. As re.uired- D=8 deli ered possession of the shares to AB! with the understanding that the shares would be returned to D=8 upon the payment of the loan. %owe er- the loan was not paid on time. A month after C years- may the shares of stocB pledged be deemed owned by AB! or not? >eason. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A. T@e s@a4es o2 sto69 6annot Ae dee;ed owned A< A0C 58on de2a5lt o2 MNO? T@e< @ave to Ae 2o4e6losed? Unde4 A4ti6le +*(( o2 t@e Civil Code) t@e 64edito4 6annot a884o84iate t@e t@in1s 1iven A< wa< o2 8led1e? And even i2 t@e 8a4ties @ave sti85lated t@at A0C Ae6o;es t@e owne4 o2 t@e s@a4es in 6ase MNO de2a5lts on t@e loan) s56@ sti85lation is void 2o4 Aein1 a pactum commissorium. B. As an agent- A: was gi en a guarantee commission- in addition to his regular commission- after he sold 2G units of refrigerators to a customer- %, %otel. ,he customer- howe er- failed to pay

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for the units sold. A:@s principal- $>BI- demanded from A: payment for the customer@s accountability. A: ob)ected- on the ground that his )ob was only to sell and not to collect payment for units bought by the customer. Is A:@s ob)ection alid? !an $>BI collect from him or not? >eason. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? No) ALEs oADe6tion is not valid and DR0 6an 6olle6t 24o; AL? Sin6e AL a66e8ted a 15a4antee 6o;;ission) in addition to @is 4e15la4 6o;;ission) @e a14eed to Aea4 t@e 4is9 o2 6olle6tion and to 8a< t@e 84in6i8al t@e 84o6eeds o2 t@e sale on t@e sa;e te4;s a14eed 58on wit@ t@e 8546@ase4 &A4ti6le 1'*.) Civil Code/ QUEST ON NO? ! A. 7% and :A are %& !hinese. ,heir parents are now "ilipino citi(ens who li e in Danila. While still students in D=# #tate- they got married although they are first cousins. It appears that both in %& and in D=# #tate first cousins could marry legally. ,hey plan to reside and set up business in the 7hilippines. But they ha e been informedhowe er- that the marriage of first cousins here us considered oid from the beginning by reason of public policy. ,hey are in a dilemma. ,hey don@t want to breaB 7hilippine law- much less their marriage ow. ,hey seeB your ad ice on whether their ci il status will be ad ersely affected by 7hilippine domestic law? What is your Ad ise? *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? M< advise is as 2ollows# T@e 6ivil stat5s o2 P$ and L! will not Ae adve4sel< a22e6ted A< P@ili88ine law Ae6a5se t@e< a4e nationals o2 $on1 Kon1 and not Fili8ino 6itiGens? 0ein1 2o4ei1ne4s) t@ei4 stat5s) 6onditions and le1al 6a8a6it< in t@e P@ili88ines a4e 1ove4ned A< t@e law o2 $on1 Kon1) t@e 6o5nt4< o2 w@i6@ t@e< a4e 6itiGens? Sin6e t@ei4 ;a44ia1e is valid 5nde4 $on1 Kon1 law) it s@all Ae valid and 4es8e6ted in t@e P@ili88ines? B. In a class suit for damages- plaintiffs claimed they suffered in)uries from torture during the martial law. ,he suit was filed upon 7resident 'D@s arri al on e5ile in %I- a 9.#. state. ,he court in %I awarded plaintiffs the e.ui alent of 71GG billion under the 9.#. law on alien tort claims. 8n appeal- 'D@s 'state raised the issue of prescription. It argued that since said 9.#. law is silent on the matter- the court should applyH *1+ %I@s law setting a two-year limitation on tort claimsE or *2+ the 7hilippine law which appears to re.uire the claims for personal in)ury arising from martial law be bought within one year. 7laintiffs countered that pro isions of the most analogous federal stature- the ,orture Aictims 7rotection Act- should be applied. It sets ten years as the period of prescription. Doreo erthey argued that e.uity could toll the statute of limitations. "or it appeared that 'D had procured !onstitutional amendments granting himself and those acting under his direction immunity from suit during the tenure. In this case- has prescription set in or not? !onsidering the differences in the cited laws- which prescripti e period should be appliedH one year under the 7hilippine law- two years under %I@s law- ten years under 9.#. federal law- or none of the abo e. '5plain. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# B. T@e US Co54t will a88l< US law) t@e law o2 t@e $orum) in dete4;inin1 t@e a88li6aAle 84es64i8tive 8e4iod? "@ile US law is silent on t@is ;atte4) t@e US Co54t will not a88l< P@ili88ine law in dete4;inin1 t@e 84es64i8tive 8e4iod? t is 1ene4all< a22i4;ed as a 84in6i8le

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

in 84ivate inte4national law t@at 84o6ed54al law is one o2 t@e eB6e8tions to t@e a88li6ation o2 2o4ei1n law A< t@e 2o45;? Sin6e 84es64i8tion is a ;atte4 o2 84o6ed54al law even in P@ili88ine D54is845den6e) &Cadalin &. PO+!G6LRCG ,rown and Root -nternational +3( SCRA .+1 O1'',P/) t@e US Co54t will a88l< eit@e4 $ o4 Fede4al law in dete4;inin1 t@e a88li6aAle 84es64i8tive 8e4iod and not P@ili88ine law? T@e Restatement o2 A;e4i6an law a22i4;s t@is 84in6i8le? QUEST ON NO? ! A. A "ilipino couple- Dr. and Drs. BD- Lr.- decided to adopt KA- and orphan from #t. !laire@s orphanage in =ew KorB !ity. ,hey lo ed and treated her liBe a legitimate child for they ha e none of their ery own. %owe er- BD- Lr.- died in an accident at sea- followed to the gra e a year later by his sicB father- BD- #r. 'ach left a si(able estate consisting of banB deposits- lads and buildings in Danila. Day the adopted child- KA- inherit from BD- Lr.? Day she also inherit from BD- #r.? Is there a difference? Why? '5plain. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? Y! 6an in@e4it 24o; 0M) F4? T@e s566ession to t@e estate o2 0M) F4? is 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine law Ae6a5se @e was a Fili8ino w@en @e died &A4ti6le 1-) Civil Code/? Unde4 A4ti6le 1*3' o2 t@e Civil Code) t@e 6a8a6it< o2 t@e @ei4 to s566eed is 1ove4ned A< t@e national law o2 t@e de6edent and not A< t@e national law o2 t@e @ei4? $en6e) w@et@e4 o4 not Y! 6an in@e4it 24o; 0M) F4? is dete4;ined A< P@ili88ine law? Unde4 P@ili88ine law) t@e ado8ted in@e4its 2o4; t@e ado8te4 as a le1iti;ate 6@ild o2 t@e ado8te4? Y!) @oweve4) 6annot in@e4it) in @is own 4i1@t) 24o; t@e 2at@e4 o2 t@e ado8te4) 0M) S4?) Ae6a5se s@e is not a le1al @ei4 o2 0M) S4? T@e le1al 2i6tion o2 ado8tion eBists onl< Aetween t@e ado8ted and t@e ado8te4? &"eotico &. #el )al 13 SCRA ,*- O1'-3P/? Neit@e4 ;a< @e in@e4it 24o; 0M) S4? A< 4e84esentin1 0M) F4? Ae6a5se in 4e84esentation) t@e 4e84esentative ;5st Ae a le1al @ei4 not onl< o2 t@e 8e4son @e is 4e84esentin1 A5t also o2 t@e de6edent 24o; w@o; t@e 4e84esented was s588osed to in@e4it &A4ti6le '.3) Civil Code/? B. Dr. Q, and Drs. K, ha e been married for 2G years. #uppose the wife- K,- died childlesssur i ed only by her husband- Q,. What would be the share of Q, from her estate as inheritance? Why? '5plain. *<P+

San 0eda Colle1e o2

SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? Unde4 t@e Civil Code) t@e widow o4 widowe4 is a le1al and 6o;85lso4< @ei4 o2 t@e de6eased s8o5se? 2 t@e widow is t@e onl< s54vivin1 @ei4) t@e4e Aein1 no le1iti;ate as6endants) des6endants) A4ot@e4s and siste4s) ne8@ews and nie6es) s@e 1ets t@e enti4e estate? QUEST ON NO? 7 A. ,he parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest is 12P and it can be increased if there is a law that would authori(e the increase of interest rates. #uppose 8B- the lender- would increase by <P the rate of interest to be paid by ,K- the borrower- without a law authori(ing such increase- would 8B@s action be )ust and alid? Why? %as ,K a remedy against the imposition of the rate increase? '5plain. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? O0Es a6tion is not valid?

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T@e deAto4 6annot Ae 4e:5i4ed to 8a< t@e in64ease in inte4est t@e4e Aein1 no law a5t@o4iGin1 it) as sti85lated in t@e 6ont4a6t? n64easin1 t@e 4ate in t@e aAsen6e o2 s56@ law violates t@e 84in6i8le o2 ;5t5alit< o2 6ont4a6ts? ALTERNAT !E ANS"ER# Even i2 t@e4e was a law a5t@o4iGin1 t@e in64ease in inte4est 4ate) t@e sti85lation is still void Ae6a5se t@e4e is no 6o44es8ondin1 sti85lation to de64ease t@e inte4est d5e w@en t@e law 4ed56es t@e 4ate o2 inte4est? B. $on- an American businessman- secured parental consent for the employment of fi e minors to play certain roles in two mo ies he was producing at home in DaBati. ,hey worBed at odd hours of the day and night- but always accompanied by parents or other adults. ,he producer paid the children talent fees at rates better that adult wages. But the social worBer- $'B- reported to 8#W$ that these children often missed going to school. ,hey sometimes dranB wine- aside from being e5posed to drugs. In some scenes- they were filmed naBed or in re ealing costumes. In his defense- $8= contended all these were part of artistic freedom and cultural creati ity. =one of the parents complained- said $8=. %e also said they signed a contract containing a wai er of their right to file any complaint in any office or tribunal concerning the worBing conditions of their children acting in the mo ies. Is the wai er alid and binding? Why or why not? '5plain. *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? T@e waive4 is not valid? Alt@o51@ t@e 6ont4a6tin1 8a4ties ;a< estaAlis@ s56@ sti85lations) 6la5ses) te4;s and 6onditions as t@e< ;a< dee; 6onvenient) t@e< ;a< not do so i2 s56@ a4e 6ont4a4< to law) ;o4als) 1ood 65sto;s) 85Ali6 o4de4) o4 85Ali6 8oli6< &A4ti6le 13*-) Civil Code/? T@e 8a4entsE waive4 to 2ile a 6o;8laint 6on6e4nin1 t@e wo49in1 6onditions det4i;ental to t@e ;o4al well>Aein1 o2 t@ei4 6@ild4en a6tin1 in t@e ;ovies is in violation o2 t@e Fa;il< Code and LaAo4 laws? T@5s) t@e waive4 is invalid and not Aindin1? T@e C@ild LaAo4 Law is a ;andato4< and 84o@iAito4< law and t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e 6@ild 6annot Ae waived as it is 6ont4a4< to law and 85Ali6 8oli6<? QUEST ON NO? 7 A. B8=I and A==' met while worBing o erseas. ,hey became sweethearts and got engaged to be married in =ew Kear@s ' e aboard a cruise ship in the !aribbean. ,hey tooB the proper license to marry in =ew KorB !ity- where there is a "ilipino consulate. But as planned- the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the =orwegian-registered essel in a pri ate suit among selected friends. BacB in Danila- A==' disco ered that B8=I had been married in Bacolod !ity < years earlier but di orced in 8slo only last year. %is first wife was also a "ilipina but now based in #wede. B8=I himself is a resident of =orway where he and A==' plan to li e permanently. A==' retains your ser ices to ad ise her on whether her marriage to B8=I is 7hilippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances? *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# A? 2 0ON 5s still a Fili8ino 6itiGen) @is le1al 6a8a6it< is 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine Law &A4t? 13 Civil Code/? Unde4 P@ili88ine Law) @is ;a44ia1e to ANNE is void Ae6a5se o2 a 84io4 eBistin1 ;a44ia1e w@i6@ was not dissolved A< t@e divo46e de64eed in Oslo? Divo46e oAtained aA4oad A< a Fili8ino is not 4e6o1niGed? 2 0ON was no lon1e4 a Fili8ino 6itiGen) t@e divo46e is valid? $en6e) @is ;a44ia1e to ANNE is valid i2 6eleA4ated in a66o4dan6e wit@ t@e law o2 t@e 8la6e w@e4e it was 6eleA4ated? Sin6e t@e ;a44ia1e was 6eleA4ated aAoa4d a vessel o2 No4we1ian 4e1ist4<) No4we1ian law a88lies? alid under

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College of Law

San Beda CIVIL LAW

2 t@e S@i8 Ca8tain @as a5t@o4it< to sole;niGe t@e ;a44ia1e aAoa4d @is s@i8) t@e ;a44ia1e is valid and s@all Ae 4e6o1niGed in t@e P@ili88ines? As to t@e se6ond :5estion) i2 0ON is still a Fili8ino) ANNE 6an 2ile an a6tion 2o4 de6la4ation o2 n5llit< o2 ;a44ia1e to @i;? B. In his lifetime- a 7aBistani citi(en- A$I:- married three times under 7aBistani law. When he died an old widower- he left behind si5 children- two sisters- three homes- and an estate worth at least 2G million pesos in the 7hilippines. %e was born in :ahore but last resided in !ebu !ity- where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest children now li e and worB. ,wo of his oldest children are farmers in #ulu- while two middle-aged children are employees in Ramboanga !ity. "inding that the deceased left no will- the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings before the >egional ,rial !ourt of !ebu !ity. two other siblings ob)ected- arguing that it should be in Lolo before a #hari@a court since his lands are in #ulu. But A$I:@s sisters in 7aBistan want the proceedings held in :ahore before a 7aBistani court. Which court has )urisdiction and is the proper enue for the intestate proceedings? ,he law of which country shall go ern succession to his estate? *<P+ SU%%ESTED ANS"ER# 0? n so 2a4 as t@e 84o8e4ties o2 t@e de6edent lo6ated in t@e P@ili88ines a4e 6on6e4ned) t@e< a4e 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine law &A4ti6le 1-) Civil Code/? Unde4 P@ili88ine law) t@e 84o8e4 ven5e 2o4 t@e settle;ent o2 t@e estate is t@e do;i6ile o2 t@e de6edent at t@e ti;e o2 @is deat@? Sin6e t@e de6edent last 4esided in CeA5 Cit<) t@at is t@e 84o8e4 ven5e 2o4 t@e intestate settle;ent o2 @is estate? $oweve4) t@e s566essional 4i1@ts to t@e estate o2 AD T a4e 1ove4ned A< Pa9istani law) @is national law) 5nde4 A4ti6le 1- o2 t@e Civil Code?

11,

Law

San 0eda Colle1e o2