Promising, Consent, and Citizenship: Rawls and Cavell On Morality and Politics

Promising, Consent, and Citizenship: Rawls and Cavell on Morality and Politics Author(s): Stephen Mulhall Source: Political
Theory, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 171-192 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191944 . Accessed: 22/01/2014 04:26
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ANDCITIZENSHIP PROMISING,CONSENT, RawlsandCavellonMorality andPolitics

STEPHENMULHALL University ofEssex
toelucidate AN EARLIER ARTICLE' I attempted anddefend Stanley of jusfice2-a critique Cavell's recentcritiqueof JohnRawls's theory from the ofwhat Cavellcalls"moral mounted In perspective perfectionism." I failed thisessayI return to that becauseI feelthat to dispel topic, entirely ofidiosyncrasy theappearance andeccentricity that Cavelltakesfewpains ofhiscritique andthat I didso inpart to avoidinhisdevelopment byfailing it.In particular, I failed toemphasise to contextualise thedegree to properly of Rawls's first whichCavell's recent book is a successor critique to,and a reiteration criticisms of an earlypaperof perhaps of,his much-earlier is primarily Rawls's that devoted to issuesin moral and I also philosophy, to explore thequestion ofwhether failed Cavell'scriticisms ofA Theory of be applicable to Rawls'smost Justice recent might book,PoliticalLiberalism.By rectifying theseimbalances andomissions, I hopeto reinforce my earlier that Cavell'scritique focuses conclusion-namely, uponan aspectof thatis fundamental to Rawls's visionof morality justice as fairness and and thatremains constant politicsquite generally, his career, throughout hisrecent including espousalofa purely political liberalism.
IN
MORALITY: PROMISING, PUNISHING, AND PLAYING GAMES In his 1955 essay,"Two Concepts of Rules"3(hereafter TCR), Rawls's immediate goal is to defendutilitarianism againstthe objectionthatit conflicts with moral elementary principles relating topunishing andpromising,forexample, that itis notan acceptable reasonforbreaking a promise that itis bestonthewholenottokeepit.He doesso bydrawing a distinction
POL1TICALTHEORY,Vol.25 No. 2, April1997 171-192 ? 1997Sage Publications, Inc.
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individual acts ofpromising orpunishing between and the "social institution orpunishing, andthen that ofpromising utilitarianism orpractice" arguing as a whole rather than thepractice individual is designed tojustify acts within course ofhisargument, healsodraws performed it.Inthe ananalogy andgames. This him toargue between such that practices permits submitting a particular would a utilitarian defence for be no more breaking promise than toleavethe field after one'sthird strike ina game intelligible refusing that itwould bebetter onthe whole ofbaseball onthe toallow four grounds to constitute out"-an argument which accounts for our strikes "striking the of and about utilitarianism But suspicions compatibility promise-keeping. he cannevertheless dismiss those that a utilitarian suspicions, byarguing ofpromising as a whole would defence ofthe bejustas feasible as practice tothe three-strike inthe onedirected convention ofbaseball; inthe case game ofpromising, for oneneedonly a practice outthat example, point which denies to thepromisor, as a defence, anygeneral to theutilitarian appeal principle hasthe utilitarian great ofallowing advantage the future tobetied down andplans tobecoordinated inadvance. Rawls takes these arguments toshow the ofthe distinction andheends importance hisessay they deploy, indiagnostic mode, byoutlining two very different ofthe conceptions logical of status of the rules human one-which Rawls thinks practices: philosophers areprone to assume-serves to obscure theimportance ofthedistinction between andindividual practices whereas theother-to which he is acts, committed-makes clear itsnecessity anditslogical basis. Cavell's concern the primary involves assumption that underlies the whole course ofRawls's argument-that andpunishing promising arepractices or socialinstitutions. Rawlsdefines his quasi-technical term "practice" as follows:
Anyform ofactivity specified bya system ofrules which defines offices, roles, moves, defenses andso on,andwhich penalties, givesthe activity itsstructure. As examples one maythink ofgamesandrituals, trials andparliaments. (TCR, p. 3, fn1)
What Rawls'sclaimthat justifies promising can be added to this listof that itfits this examples, definition "beyond question"?
Thisis shown bythefact that theform ofwords "I promise" is a performative utterance whichpresupposes thestage-setting of thepractice and theproprieties defined by it. (TCR, p. 30)
Butsoare"I warn, beseech, bet, pick, accuse, forgive you," "I commend him toyou," "I withdraw, protest" performative utterances. Are they allpractices?
ANDCIT1IENSHIP CONSENT, Mulhall /PROMISING,
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between of as social actions, onesoccurring be thought Theycan certainly are a social and there definite particular ways of persons against ground, do will be them-not competently performing performing justanything you areconventional as well as social,that Butthisshowsonlythat them. they this itdoes notshowthat onemight call a logicorgrammar; havewhat they a set of that defines of rules offices, roles,moves, is specified by a system arealso andrevenge andso on.Comforting, threatening, defences, penalties, whohas beeninjured ofa grammar socialactions possessed (onlysomeone but can be comforted), can takerevenge, onlysomeonewho is suffering in forms(e.g., revenge, although theycan take highlyinstitutionalised ofcrime andredress), havenot certain that societies legalconcepts developed andtakerevenge neednotdo so (I can be injured uponher, they byanother, anduninstitutionalised in highly ways). unexpected a promisor were then could ofpromising IfRawls'sanalysis correct, being areestablished unlike other offices that butitis obviously be calledan office, Unliketheoffice of pitcher or such as gamesor law-courts. in practices for it(no oaths), there is no specialprocedure entering prosecuting counsel, ortraining for for routes yourself it,andso on. no established beingselected tohold, andone itis onethat adult is competent Ifitis an office, anynormal initwith herself to anyone with shecan holdsimply that respect byputting whom shemight ofrelationship. whom a certain form create, sheis in,orwith is a practice Thesameholdsfor theideathat with certain specified promising In learning what a promise learn what defences it defences. is,we do indeed orcompetent toenter, should we failtokeepit.But is appropriate andwhere, to promising theseare notdefences as opposedto other supposed specific the are defences we learn in learning to defend any ofour practices; they just conductthatcomes to grief-thoseexcuses,explanations, justifications Cavellcalls"elaboratives") that make upthebulk ofmoral defence per (what se. Someonewhohas notyetgrasped does notsimply lack thosedefences theinformation needed toparticipate ina specific socialinstitution; for ifshe wereunaware ofthevarious human actions can be excused, waysin which in whatsensewouldshe understand orjustified, whata human defended, action is? Sucha person wouldlacka mastery ofsocialintercourse perse, a without which she wouldnotqualify as a responsible and autonomastery mousmember ofsociety. Whatis goingwrong herecan perhaps mostclearly be seen if we turn to Rawls's parallelanalysisof punishing as a practice or social briefly ForCavell,unlike institution. punishing is orincludes a clear case promising, of a socialinstitution; but"theinstitution ofpunishment" can be conceived intwovery different ways.
/April 174 POLITICAL THEORY 1997 ofiteither ona par with institutions lawand Wemay beconceiving like kinship systems, hives orgalaxies, dimenwhich societies from religion, institutions distinguish general ofwhich ofhuman will bedescribed; orwemay sions interms any community beings ona parwith ormonotheism or be thinking ofitas a specific institution, monogamy which isdistinguished interms of one from ordeath institutions suttee by stoning, society atan earlier orfrom thesamesociety another society, stage. (TheClaim ofReason, hereafter Oxford: OUP,1979, pp.299-300; CR)
canofcourse onespecific institution utilitarianism On Cavell'sview, justify overanother, and is notmeant of punishment butit cannot, the to,justify the of as such-since utilitarian institution general punishment only justifican only is itsdeterrent utilitarians the cationfor punishment effect, justify ofpunishment that is compatible with that lightest system effect andso must be committed to abolishing it altogether wherever in principle feasible. themerits of that it shouldbe clearthat Whatever Rawls's view, however, ofpromising as a practice treats it as ifit wereone specific social analysis be compared as if it might to or replacedby another institution, such of revenge institution be superseded (in theway an institution might by a forCavell,promising is moreakinto one of the legal system), whereas, of life might be generaldimensions by means of whichhumanforms from theactivities andinteractions ofbees and stars. distinguished Human to objects, follow beingsmakeandbreak promises, justas they point rules, makethreats, issueorders, andmakeandbreak topoint this out friendships; is notto engagein comparative orcomparative sociology anthropology, but to compile remarks aboutthenatural ofmankind. history To see this,we need onlytryto imaginealtering or removing such oflife. We canimagine dimensions ofourform someone urging a reform of ofrevenge a giveninstitution orpunishment, orevenurging that theinstitube left behind tionof revenge butwhatmight itmeanto urgea altogether, reform ofthe"practice" (letalonethesupercession) ofpromising? Andhow onejustify that as itnowstands? might "practice" Rawlsoffers thefollowing justification:
Thepoint ofthe istoabdicate practice one's title toact inaccordance with utilitarian and inorder considerations that the prudential future betied may down and plans co-ordinated inadvance. There areobvious utilitarian advantages inhaving a practice which denies tothe promisor, asa defence, any general appeal tothe utilitarian principle inaccordance with which the itself bejustified. practice may (TCR, p. 16)
This secondsentence is notobviously comprehensible. Forsince(as Rawls is of it part theconcept ofpromising emphasises) that onedoes notkeepor breakpromises on general utilitarian there wouldbe no promise grounds,
Mulhall /PROMISING,CONSENT,AND CITI1ZENSHIP 175
onthe apart from a knowledge ofthat fact ofthe would-be part so promisor; tojustify we could not individual actions intelligibly attempt under falling that tothat fact. Thefirst sentence makes concept the byappeal "advantages" of the"practice" of promising rather more rather appear less optional, than are.Forabdicating fundamental, one'stitle they to actupon really utilitarian andprudential considerations is not, as itwere, justoneinstitutional ourplans for thefuture; wayofcoordinating thevery existence of andthe human coherence ofindividual society, our conduct, depends upon so doing. Suchabdication is notone specific human buta institution, for institution precondition atall.Moreover, any among persons byisolating as the ofthe such abdication ofpromising, point Rawls "practice" implies is the oreven that the promising human central, only, wayinwhich beings do so abdicate; butanyhuman has exactly commitment this and effect, is by no means theonlywayin which promising human create beings commitments.
There areanynumber ofways, other than for promising, toa course committing yourself ofaction: theexpression anddeclaration ofanintention, the ofan impression, giving not someone's correcting a courseof conduct on thebasis of misapprehension, beginning which else hastaken someone andso on. (CR,p. 298) action,
There is nothing sacred about that isnot promising sacred about expressingan intention, or anyother wayofcommitting oneself (a category to which-insofar as any utterance carries with itimplications orcommitments ofthe kind analysed by Austin, and Wittgenstein, Grice, amongst others-we must assign anyandall linguistic Promises areimportant acts). when itis important tobeexplicit about one's commitments, but that does not make our andvarious many nonexplicit commitments lessreal any orconstraining. In other words, Rawls'sanalysis makes promising appear bothless fundamental and more special than itreally is.Asa result itmakes promising tobe more appear likea game than itreally is. About competitive games, much that Rawls into hisdefinition packs ofa practice holds true. There are defined clearly offices; what counts as a move inthe game, andso howone might adjudicate over disputes whether a given action counts as a move, is settled inadvance bya system ofrules (the rules ofplay), and onecaneasily imagine over disputes possible reforms ofthe game's rules-over baseball's three-strikes-and-out orsoccer's rule, offside rule-disputes towhich utilitarian considerations would bepertinent. Even with respect togames, howRawls's ever, analysis rigidifies the reality ofpractices. On hisaccount, whenever a person is questioned orchallenged about a action that is defined particular orspecified bya practice, andthat challenge
THEORY/ 1997 176 POLITICAL April
is notdirected atthepractice as a whole, he"must assume that thequestioner know that heis engaged initordoesn't know what the either doesn't practice oftheaction is specified is" (TCR, p. 27). Sincetheform bya rulethat helps to the to definethe practiceas a whole (since it is only by reference of thepractice thathis actionis the actionit is), the only stage-setting hecangivefor thespecific action is tocitetherelevant and justification rule, raisea question someonecan onlyintelligibly aboutthat actionif specific he is engaging areeither aboutthepractice in orignorant they that ignorant in it.The example he is engaging Rawlsgivestobackthis from up is drawn baseball.
ifa batter In a game ofbaseball, were toask"CanI havefour itwould be strikes?", what rule told rule assumed that hewasasking the when what the he was;andif, was, hemeant that occasion hethought itwould onthe were tosaythat onthis bebest whole him four strikes rather than this bemost for tohave would taken as ajoke. three, kindly iffour Onemight that baseball would be a better were contend strikes allowed game ofthree; onecannot instead but picture the rules as a guide towhat isbest onthe whole and their inparticular toparticular cases, question cases asparticular applicability cases. (TCR, p. 26)
Here we are touching of rulesthat uponthepractice conception Rawls hisessaybyrecommending overthesummary concludes conception (which to what is beston thewhole), rulesas guides anditshould pictures be clear how thisconception be thought to underline thedistinction might between as a wholeandjustifying theindividual justifying practices actions that occur His batter is questioning as partof them. an actionwhoseform is partly ofthe definitive ofbaseball, andwith practice tothis respect particular (highly implausible) example,Rawls's claim thatthisquestionshows the questioner'sincompetence or ignorance is surelytrue.But does thatclaim to all questioning generalize ofall actions that onemight think ofas defined orspecified ofbaseball? bythepractice Theproblem is that "action defined bythe practice" is ambiguous: itcould is required refer to anyaction that bytherulesofthegame,oritcouldrefer toanyaction that doesnot violate those rules (anyaction within the legitimate ofplay).The point limits is that mostlegitimate movesin thegamearenot required bytherulesofplay:onlyinsituations where no alternative moveis open to herdo thedefining rulesof play dictate whata player mustdo, of coursethey although alwaysdictate how she must actifheractionis to count as a legitimate movein thegame.Ifaccordingly, at a certain point in thegame, shechoosestotry tostealsecond basewhen itwas opentohernot to do so, and heractionconforms to therulebook's specification of what
Mulhall /PROMISING, ANDCITIZENSHIP 177 CONSENT,
countsas stealing secondbase, herdecisionso to act can nevertheless be or otherwise competently challenged (e.g., as short-sighted, illselfish, anditcannot then considered), be answered competently the simply byciting rulethat defines what itis to steala base. In one sense,of course, sucha challenge is notdirected at theplayer's ofthedefining rulesofthegame;itrather grasp criticises hergrasp ofwhat one might call itsstrategic itmight be thought that do principles-and they notdetermine what itis toplaythegamebut rather what itis toplaythegame well. But no one who grasped a game'sdefining rulesand yetshowedno graspof itsstrategies wouldcount as a competent as Cavellputsit, player; "a certain ofthegameis required inorder mastery tobe saidtoplaythegame atall" (CR,p. 304). Accordingly, a query about a player's action that is based its of upon violation a game's principles of play can be thought of as a tohergrasp ofwhat itis toplaythe challenge game-of something that helps to define thepractice ofbaseball. In general, "notknowing then, whata gameis" is notsynonymous with "not knowing the rules ofthe the game";so itis not casethat every intelligible challenge to a particular actionspecified can be satisfactorily bya practice answered its defining by citing rules.Rawls's analysisof gamesfailsto accommodate this itis as ifhepresupposes fact; that action every performed as partof a game mustbe determined thansimply by (rather beingin accordance the with) rules ofthat defining game-as ifevery moveina game is prescribed by itsrulebook.Andbecausehe leavesno roomforstrategic rulesin his visionof games,he loses sightof whatis perhaps themost fundamental fact about them-that within what we must games, do is ideally completely specified andradically marked off from what we ought orshould notdo, so that we might focusexclusively on thelatter.
Itisas though within the prosecution ofa game, weareset free toconcentrate allofour consciousness andenergy onthe human very quests for utility andstyle: ifthe moves and rules canbetakenfor then wecangive granted, ourselves over totally todoing what will win and win, ideathat applause. (The freedom isachieved through subjection tothe lawis fully true tothe conduct ingames.) (CR,p.308)
The point ofa gamelies notintheframework ofprescription that makesup itsrulesofplay, butin thespacetherulesofplaydefine; within that space, thosewhocan marry a grasp ofstrategy tothenecessary talent andphysical whocan see what condition, ought to be doneandarein a position to do it, aresetfree to achieveforms ofhuman excellence. Rawls'svisionofgames mistakes the framework for thespace,the prescriptive means for thecelebraendsthey tory subserve.
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is thatRawls's understanding Cavell's view,therefore, of gamesis as of thephenomena he erroneously treats as his understanding as erroneous andpromising. Butthe most fateful togames-namely, analogous punishing that howan action is is itssuggestion erroneous ofthat implication analogy and evaluated in moralterms is determined in advanceby to be described akinto a system ofrules. Partofwhat willbe called"rules" in a something howdisputes over what counts as a moveinthe booksettle game'srule game, whencertain or not a givenactionso countsare to be settled whether areopentothose whomake andwhat ordefences eventualities arise, penalties common Without this couldnot sucha move. prearranged knowledge, games couldnotdo what do. Butmoral andumpires andreferees be practised, they inthis andmoral conflict cannot cannot be practised be settled conduct way, to the rules of a reference to An by anything analogous defining practice. a is to a move in a game, actionsuch as making promise notanalogous what wasdone-what"move" becauseinsuchcontexts, wasmade, precisely in advancebut is rather what"defence" offered-isnot settled an open question.
willexactly A moral debate over the orkeeping ofa promise concern such breaking as whether what questions whether yousaidwas(tantamount to)a (serious) promise, from it(orperhaps you were succumbed totemptation really prevented keeping only or what waslikely tohappen, tohave intimidation), whether, knowing you ought made it, whether didwhat waspossible toalleviate the for the you consequences promisee. (CR, p. 295)
As we saw earlier, inmoral competence argument is a matter ofknowing whichdefences, excuses,and justifications it is appropriate to enter and butalthough therelevance of a particular when, consideration is notup for discussion or argument, theprecise to be attached weight to it is-and this secondquestion is typically thecoreofanyrealmoral dispute, in which an defence bemet appropriate may bya pertinent counter, andthen bya pertinent responseto thatcounter, and so on. So, although any responsible and autonomous member ofsociety must know howtomake a promise, andknow that a promise amounts tomaking making a commitment, andknow that one does notbreak orkeepparticular promises on general utilitarian grounds, it does notfollow that whohasmadea promise anyone andthen failed tokeep itis necessarily tomoral subject condemnation. Everything willdepend upon thenature ofthecompeting considerations, theefforts madebythepromisor to warnthoserelying on herpromise, and so on; in fact, iftheimmediate consequencesof keepingthe promisewere sufficiently severe,and the did everything promisor possibleto mitigate thenegative consequences of
ANDCITIZENSHIP 179 Mulhall /PROMISING, CONSENT,
her andsheenters her inthe atthe breaking promise, justification right way then itwould not beobviously right time, toour moral sensibiliparadoxical ties for her toexcuse her action inutilitarian terms. moral discourse isnot anarena inwhich individuals take For Cavell, then, whose andconsequences andmake moves are uppositions responsibilities rather onewithin which anindividual comes tofix the inadvance, but fixed sheis prepared totake andothers for which position responsibility attempt is something canrespect. whether that Moral todecide position they agents make a final where willstand andhow must judgment concerning they they ofothers, and those the different stances must conform will regard judgments callselaboratives, but ofwhat Cavell arenot tothe logicorgrammar they andknown inadvance. orprinciples determined byrules agreed upon ofas the thinks common wecanseewhat Cavell thread Bynow, perhaps, ofgames, and them inRawls's portrayal punishing promising. Byanalysing ofhistechnical definition ofa practice, atthe ofwhich interms heart lieshis ofhuman ofdefining herigidifies these forms conception rules, life, reducing inwhich the ofour them toarenas andscope precise range responsibilities inadvance are fixed and our role inthem byimpersonal principles, restricting to thecarrying-out of thefixed of an officeholder. responsibilities With this means that hestresses the respect togames, constraining framework of andvirtues therules ofplayto theexclusion ofthefreedoms that those constraints make With topunishing, itmeans that hisfocus possible. respect thesocialspecificity ofitsinstitutional manifestations is upon rather than as a response to wrongdoing uponitsspecies-specificity andguilt. With itmeans topromising, that heregards oneamongst respect of many ways the commitments that make human social interaction creating possible as if itwere modifiable ofinteraction; a unique but mode inshort, Rawls treats as ifthey were contracts. promises legal
About these Rawls about everything says offices, defences, moves etc., istrue; the details of "offer," "acceptance," "consideration," "misrepresentation," etc.,areelaborately the is definitive, anda given specified, practice conflict canbeadjudicated (umpired). involves a whole This, however, at society, oneinwhich wayoflooking all human are pictured as contractual rather relationships than personal, within which one's arefrom the outset commitments, liabilities, responsibilities and not limited, total, orat in the course ofbeing determined. Westill relate tooneanother anyrate always as incertain but insofar as westand defined roles with toone persons, only socially respect Thepicture is made ifwe include another. clearer the that the suggestion central idea the LawofContract is that ofa bargain. underlying English (CR, p. 299)
It would notbe difficult to linkthis liberal vision ofmorality to the ofsociety rationalization that sociologists havecharacterized interms ofa
THEORY 180 POLITICAL 1997 /April
between andGesellschaft, distinction andthereby tothecomGemeinschaft of liberalism. munitarian But it might to critique provemoreilluminating this ofmyessaybyadopting conclude section thediagnostic modeofwhich Rawls makesuse at theend of his own,and ask: whyshouldsomeone bothpromising and the morallife more generally in this misrepresent a conception someone ofrules particular way?How orwhy that might adopt himto contractualize both ourpersonal encourages andour responsibilities interpersonal relations? To think ofthecommitments towhich human andaction speech givesrise of defining as fixedby a system rulesensures that thosecommitments are in advance,and limited limited in impersonal of human ways; to think as exhaustively determined relationships of sociallydeby ouroccupation fined roleslimits in advancetherange anddepth oftheir claimsuponus as On Cavell'sview, thereality persons. is that thereach ofsuchcommitments andrelationships is alwaysinthecourse ofbeing andso must in determined, fact be fixed ofthemoral life byus. So Rawls'svision makes the effectively self'scommitments andrelationships less fluid andmoreevident than they really are,andthereby ofa selfthat conjures up a fantasy is more more fixed, andmore invulnerable to itself than transparent itreally is. Takefirst Rawls'sconception oftheself'scommitments. The concept of human action is tiedtotheconcept ofelaboratives becausetheindependence oftheworldandthepreoccupations of themindineluctably drive a wedge between an agent what thinks ofherself as doing andwhat sheactually does; that gap is onlymadebearable byhercapacity to excuseor explainit,and to contribute to determining thereby whatshe is answerable for(e.g., by theactualconsequences characterising of whatshe did or failedto do as unforeseen or unforeseeable, as inadvertent or accidental, as heedlessly or unwillingly entrained). By subjecting personal answerability forone's actionsto impersonal Rawls trades limits, one kindof humanfreedom for another: herestricts the potential individuality ofourelaborations, andso our personal contribution tofixing that for which we areanswerable, buthe also restricts thecapacity ofworld andmind torequire suchelaboration ofus,to putin question anysettled sensewe might have of whatwe are or can be responsible for, andso ofwhowe are.He transforms oneperson's determination of thelimits of hervulnerability as an agentintoan objective and foreseeable limitation uponhuman vulnerability as such, andthereby attenuatestheself'ssenseof exposure to itsworldand to theopacity of itsown In short, motivations. theself's capacity by restricting forself-definition, Rawlsfortifies itscapacity for self-possession. A similar trade-off hiscontractualization grounds ofhuman relationships. their By regarding range andextent as fixed byimpersonal rules defining the
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NSHIP 181
socialroleswe occupy, us oftheresponsibility Rawlsrelieves ofhaving todefine andredefine their constantly limits as our moral with relationships and alter others under thepressure of newcircumstances develop and actions. wecanregard unforeseen our tocontinue toinhabit Instead, ability the same moral universe as purely a function ofour success inapplying the rules ofour moral and defining discontinuation as the result practices, any of a certain kind ofimpersonal In neither casedo we discover incompetence. about theparticular other with whom we aredealing, something orabout moral encounter is nolonger a matter ofexploring ourselves; anddefining thepositions we feelabletooccupy, andso ofdefining ourselves. Sucha vision rules out that accrue from any advantages might relations interpersonal ofgreater orintimacy, but italsorules out depth that any disadvantages might accrue from claims that others any deeporintimate make us.For may upon thekeyanxiety consequent tothedevelopment upon ofa remaining open more with personal others is that more of theselfmust relationship be inorder todo so. Onceagain, exposed Rawls sacrifices the self's potential self-definition for toitsdesire for self-possession.
POLITICS: CONSENTANDCITIZENSHIP A Theory ofJustice
InhisCarus Lectures, Cavell argues that Rawls's contractual vision ofthe moral life carries over into hisvision ofpolitics andsocial justice, as that is presented inA Theory ofJustice (hereafter Ti). Tobegin with, section 52 of ATheory ofJustice deploys unaltered entirely the idea of promising asa social institution orpractice that wehavespent so much time criticising here. In other that words, account early ofthis human isdeemed activity byRawls to fit into the wider neatly that heisconstructing theory inthis much later book. But can it be shown that thiswider theory itself embodies an unduly contractual notion ofthe political life? InA Theory ofJustice, something wemight that callthe conversation of occurs attwo justice points. There isthe conversation eventual citizens must haveabout thefairness oftheoriginal inwhich position theprinciples of are justice and there chosen, isalsothe conversation actual citizens must have injudging the degree towhich those principles areembodied intheactual ofwhich society arepart. they Thefirst, founding conversation is meant to establish the faimess ofthe principles required inthe second conversation, tomeasure the towhich degree existing social institutions diverge from ideal
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Thefirst conversation aims toattain reflective between justice. equilibrium andthose ofour intuitions about that survive some setofprinciples justice but how is the second conversation tobeconducted? Rawls upon reflection, ofdepartures from theidealis left measure to "the saysthat importantly ofthedegree as a matter of tobe understood butis ultimately intuition" with "the that characterize a well-ordered society's compliance principles and that "those who resentfavourable under society circumstances," express toshow certain ofsociety] must beprepared state ment [atthe existing why them" orhowothers haveinjured areunjust institutions (TJ, pp.245,246, remarks that the second conversation ofjustice also and533).These imply and and that ifaninitial ofintuitions involves a matching principles judgment is being cannot be backed an injustice that perpetrated ultimately up by interms of to(orarticulated then itmust be reference of)a principle justice, the ofus towhom accusation wasvoiced canthink andthose of rejected, and"our conduct ourselves reproach" (TJ, p.422). [a]sbeyond hisgeneral tothe As Rawls explicitly acknowledges, approach question ofsocial onthe tradition contract carries ofsocial justice theory. Byaiming towithin itarefair, the that areagreed structure toensure that any principles tomembership ofany us reason to consent oftheoriginal position gives andthus makes those central toany that embodies society them, principles whether our actual atany moment toassess deserves attempts society given Inother the ourcontinued that allegiance. words, emphasis upon principles tothefirst conversation ofjustice carries is central tothesecond through ofjustice, andthis hasvery conversation specific consequences.
The idea ofdirecting consent totheprinciples on which society is basedrather than, as it were,to society as such,seemsto be or to lead to an effort to imagine confining or I givemysociety-toimagine the consent proportioning that thesocialcontract notonly I maywithdraw ineffect that from states when the myconsent society public institutions I haveforegone ofjusticelapsein favour ofwhich certain natural rights (ofjudgement andredress), butthat thecontract inprinciple, might, specify howfarI mayreduce my consent orjudicially). (in scope or degree)as justiceis reduced (legislatively Butmy intuition is that is notthus orproportionable myconsent modifiable (psychological exile is notexile): I cannot focussed on thesuccessesor gracesof society; keep consent it reachesintoevery corner of society's failure or ugliness. (Conditions Handsome and
Unhandsome, pp.107-8)
OnRawls's ofpolitical principles-based understanding consent, a society's with its of partial compliance principles justice must amount toits distancing itself from its members-the degree ordepth ofthe distancing being proportional tothe ofitsnoncompliance degree with those principles. OnCavell's ofpolitical such understanding consent, partial compliance may rather pre-
with it-as revealing sent itself as a senseofcompromise byitorconspiracy to which I havegiven thedegree to injustice. myconsent in thepolitical ofmembership commuIn effect, Rawls's interpretation of promising, is too contractual; he undernity, just likehis interpretation ofthe commitments andresponsibilities towhich andextent stands thenature inadvance rules orprinciples. they openus as settled byimpersonal defining of distancing us from it appearas an This has theeffect society, making is indeed central totheteaching ofthesocialcontract effect that artifact-an ofdenying is equallycentral butitalso has theeffect that myth, something of how deeplywe experience to itsteaching-itsarticulation ourselves as as being inoridentified with joinedtosociety, implicated it,andso as having inshort, itssensethat consented toit.He misses, ourconsent alwaysalready as suchas much as itis toanyprinciples is tosociety itmight be uponwhich founded. ForCavell,theclassicalcontract theorists (particularly Rousseau)do not ofourconsent is determinable think that thefull reach tosociety in advance in terms ofspecific of whether or we not explicitly or principles, regardless or whether insteadwe can legitimately think of tacitly agreedto them, ourselves as ifwe haddoneso. On hisview, these rather theorists from begin that we think ofthissociety as ours, thedatum that we recognize ourselves anditsarrangements, as party tosociety butthat we do notalways recognize for ourselves as responsible thespecific lacksoffreedom, and inequalities, absenceof fraternity that sustain. Faced with thesecircumstances, they we needtodiscover howfar ourconsent for what itmakes reaches, us responsito continue ble,andto whatwe areprepared to consent; thecontent ofour itssubstance, anditsrange arenot inadvance consent, settled ofsuch practical instances of thesecondconversation ofjusticebutare rather one of their central ofwhat be determined must topics, part bythem. A better senseofwhat suchdetermination involves willappear ifwe look morecloselyat how,according to Cavell,themyth of thesocial contract conceptualises consent. WhatI consent political to whenI consent to the socialcontract is notmere obedience tothegovernment, butmembership of a political andfor community, Cavell,that has twoimplications:
I recognize First, that the principle ofconsent itself; which means that I recognize others tohave consented with me, andhence that I consent topolitical equality. Second, that I the recognize society and its government, soconstituted, asmine; which means that I am not answerable toit, merely but for it.So far, then, as I recognize myself tobeexercising my for responsibility it, my obedience toitis obedience tomy own laws; citizenship in that caseis the same as my autonomy; the polis isthe field within which I work out my political anditis the identity creation of(political) freedom. (CR,p. 23)
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as an arena inwhich theselfdefines orcreates here Politics appears itself; is an aspect ofhuman as such, andinsofar as I political autonomy autonomy I must think of myself as shaping or exercise mypolitical responsibilities, Butthisprocessof self-definition is essenforming my(political) identity. field within which itcanalonebe achieved the is constituted tially communal; andthey as I recognize only insofar others, recognize me,as fellow-members; andsinceI cannot consent tothe sincethe polisis a community, polisas mine that else who givestheir without consent can equally recognizing anyone I must viewthelawsoftheperfected claimitas their mine own, polisas both work outmypolitical alone. andours.I cannot identity is to speakfortheothers In other to speakforoneself words, politically whom to association, anditis to consent tobe spoken with for youconsent inmutuality for someone whospeaks bythem-as someone speaks you, your for andbeing mind. others for ispart ofthe content Speaking spoken byothers of politicalconsent; thatconsent is a condition of speaking for granting Butthen oneself thefundamental politically. ofwithdrawing "disadvantage" one's consent becomesclear:itwouldamount to having nothing (political) tobeing voiceless. Without a political tosay, politically commurecognizing as yours, which meansmaking answerable foritandallowing nity yourself to speak foryou, thereis no such thing others as politicalidentity, no of working outthat This is whythe possibility aspectof one's autonomy. of us as deeplyjoined to society;to talkof social contract thinks myth as having amounts tothinking membership itan advantage "advantages" to existpolitically, tohavea political self. It willtherefore be newsto a socialcontract hardly theorist that, despite thespecific of mostactualpolitical imperfections will communities, they the rarely ofwithdrawing outweigh disadvantages one'sconsent from it.This means themodeofpolitical that discourse that is likely todominate everyday lifeis that ofdissent-not anundoing political ofconsent, buta dispute about itscontent, a dispute within itoverwhether present arrangements arefaithful to it.It amounts to declaring whilst that, thepolitical community continues tobe yours, itdoesnotinthis respect speakfor you;itamounts toan attempt to exercise your tomakethelaws ofthepolisyour responsibility own,ones forwhich tobe answerable. youareprepared Nevertheless, ifatsomepoint thedegreeof society's distance from itsideal becomesintolerable, thena withdrawal ofconsent mayappear unavoidable. Since,however, that too is a kindof political act,it mustinvolvespeaking bothforyourself and for others: you mustsay both"It is not mineany longer"(I am no longer responsible for it,itno longer speaksfor me) and"Itis no longer ours"(not what we bargained we no longer for, recognize theprinciple ofconsent init, theoriginal "we" is no longer boundtogether byconsent butbyforce, and
/PROMISING, Mulhall ANDCITIZENSHIP 185 CONSENT,
Itis,ineffect, so nolonger a last-ditch tore-found the exists). attempt political to restore itsfaithfulness to theoriginal community, contract an byforcing ofitspresent acknowledgement faithlessness. ofconsent anddisputes aboutitscontent areexercises Bothwithdrawals ofone'spolitical voiceandso constitute ofwhat Cavellcallsthesecond part ofjustice.In both inthem areattempting conversation cases,those engaged thesubstance and rangeof their consent-todiscover to determine what areprepared totake tothe position they upwith respect present arrangements In determining what areanswerable for ofsociety. they politically speaking, limits of their work out the andso thelimits of they political identification, means the limits ofthe their which with political identity-which community Inshort, consent toassociate. andredefine the they they explore, define, depth andtheextent ofthose oftheir them. Insofar as they membership joinedwith must continue to claima political that voice,they acknowledge they speak for andthat others butwhothose others others areis nomore speakfor them, knowable a priori than the andsubstance oftheir Inthese consent. range ways, a modeofeducation: political intercourse constitutes itpresupposes that the of myself finding and forming the finding and forming requires of my with relations others. From Cavell'sperspective, Rawlsmultiply distorts thereality ofpolitical He assumes intercourse. that those whoexercise their voiceaccordpolitical of thesocial contract ing to theterms myth possess a settled and shared of thepreexisting of their limits knowledge sincethisconsent consent, is directed atthe that found their rather principles than atsociety society as such. This implies their that is notso much political identity found or formed by theirintercourse withothersas confirmed or reaffirmed; its depthand totheterms ofthesocialcontract, extent-which, according means the depth of their identification withsociety and theextent of thosewho sharethat identification-is never opento exploration orfurther definition (orredefinition) through political or activity engagement in thecommunity, butis entirely or self-evident transparent in advanceof any particular political discussion or encounter withothers. In short, the(political)self,like the moral is entirely self, obvioustoitself. As we have seen,it further implies that consent can be thought of as a matter ofdegree andas entirely proportional tothe degree ofsociety's success in implementing itsfounding principles. Thiseliminates whatis surely not an uncommon aspectof political phenomenology-the sense that at least someofsociety's failures ofjusticeimplicate itsmembers, that amongst the worst oftheill consequences attendant uponsocialinjustice is thefact that itis donein ourname, andthat no mere personal recitation orreiteration of ourcommitment to principles ofjusticecan eradicate ourresponsibility for
/April 1997 THEORY 186 POLMICAL
is being done.Forifwe think ofpolitical consent as consenting tohave what a political a political voice meansallowing others voice,and if having to theparticular then speakinyour name, youcannot pickandchoosebetween of your as it things they say as representative political mind-you cannot, to society butwithdraw consent from consent somesubset ofthe were, your said and donein its(and so in your)name, as ifyour things mind political and to the terms of the was partly public of partly private. According myth there is no suchthing as a private ofyour thesocialcontract, part political as a private nosuchthing modeofpolitical To distance mind, speech. yourself from either yoursociety's withdraw imperfections, youmust entirely your which means voiceentirely-becoming consent, losing your political politiwith all the"disadvantages" that callyvoiceless, oryoumust show accrues; do notspeakfor that your society's representatives youbyspeaking (differfor dissenting which means those ently) yourself-by politically, addressing with tobe incommunity that youtake youandclaiming your present political arefaithless to your You willthen find out arrangements original compact. howmany ofthose areonesfor youaddress whom youcanspeak, andthereby fixthe limits ofyour provisionally andthelimits ofyour political community political identity. of political By thinking consent as directed toward Rawls's principles, visionof politics further entails that thosewhocharge that society is now faithless toitsoriginal intolerably contract (those whoprepare orherald, for, their withdrawal ofconsent) canonly do so ifthey canshowthat legitimately their hasbeenradically society faithless toitsprinciples. What this perspectiveobliterates is the that this possibility faithlessness taketheform might of hersociety's failing togiveher a voiceinher own(political) history. Theidea hereis onethat is given inMarx'stalk(inTheCritique expression ofHegel's Philosophy ofRight) of "a social group that is thedissolution of all social of a sphere that has a universal groups, character becauseof itsuniversal andlaysclaimto no particular sufferings right becauseitis theobjectofno injustice particular butofinjustice ingeneral." Itis central toMill's description ofourtimes as anepoch (inOnLiberty) inwhich everyone whoexercises their tasteanddecidesa courseofconduct thinks first ofconformity, "until their by not following own nature, theyhave no nature to follow."The is notthat a fair problem ruleorprinciple has beenunfairly appliedin their is rather case; theproblem that thewholeframework ofprinciples interms of whichtheymustconduct thesecondconversation ofjusticeis experiencedas so pervasively and systematically unresponsive to their suffering that itappears tostifle toconstitute them, a vocabulary inwhich nothing that canbe saidtruly their speaks mind, gives expression totheir experience. Their senseis that as it presently society stands threatens their political identity
/PROMISING, ANDCITIZENSHIP 187 Mulhall CONSENT,
becausethey can no longer itsinstitutions as onesin which recognize they be expressive of their lead a lifethat senseof who might might genuinely are. they think of theright to lead a lifeof one's own as a Insofar as one might fundamental ofliberal suchan appealcouldbe saidto principle democracy, ofprinciple, butitsground lies notin society's be a matter failure to apply ofjustice,butin one of its member's of one of theprinciples experience butofpolitical andtherefore pain-individual pain, origin, acknowledged by she has consented, forwhichshe bears thesufferer as something to which it threatens of responsibility. hersense of some measure Since,however, and sinceitspolitical entails that shemust thoseshe identity, origin regard ofherpolitical takesto be fellow members as implicated in its community shecan onlytakeup that imposition, personal responsibility bythreatening herconsent-which meansclaiming that to withdraw is no longer society hers andno longer those sheregards as herfellows theirs, byineffect asking whether cancontinue toconsent tothewaythings arewhen they oneofthose withwhomtheytakethemselves to be in community characterises their present political as ones in whichshe can onlyexercise arrangements her voiceinthis andina senseself-punishing, radical, to way-callingattention ofhervoicebyrefusing refusal society's hervoice. society On Cavell's view,such a challenge and rangeof our putsthe extent in question; political commitments presuming upona shared identification withsociety, it asks us to recognize an unusualbutradicalthreat to the of a fellowmember well-being and challenges us to acknowledge our inthat implication threat-which wouldmeantaking onthe responsibility of ourmind aboutit,demonstrating speaking that society's representatives do notspeakfor us when they maintain that threat, andthereby beginning todo whatwe can todeflect oreliminate it.Sincethis appealdoes notbase itself on principles, suchactioncould notresemble that required to respond to politicaldissent-no readjustment of political to its framework reality of willsuffice, principles butonlyan openness totheneedtore-found society, tothepossibility that faithfulness toitsfounding principle ofmutual consent that itsfounding might require ofjusticebe transformed principles from the ground up. In thiscontext, personal misery aims to provoke impersonal andifthat shame, shame inpolitical results action, itmayshowtothesufferer that hersociety is notyet entirely faithless toitsoriginal compact, andso not of continued yetentirely undeserving consent. Of course,thepersonso addressed may choosenot torespond; hemay think that the challenge is based notonmisery butonenvy, oris otherwise incompetently leveled, andhemay be right. But on Cavell's view,any suchchallenge is notdismissable as in advance, incompetent purely byreference to itsform; ourpolitical com-
188 POLITICAL 1997 THEORY/ April
are notso narrowly mitments to one another or so impersonally defined, We mustrather to thespecific of each such discharged. respond qualities andifwe decidetodismiss that is ourpersonal challenge, one,then responthat is the positionwe choose to take up withthisparticular sibilityof our community. would-befellowmember Since her addressputs in sense of identification withus, thenour negative questionhercontinued ofourcommunity-and response redefines thelimits in so doing, itfurther fixesour sense of who we are, politically On Cavell's view, speaking. to define in sucha wayas to therefore, by choosing political relationships makethem orabovesuchreproaches, Rawlshasmadethem beyond unduly narrow and superficial. Moreparticularly, he has helpedto ensure that his willbe unresponsive idealpolitical to anycalls for community revisions of to its its founding sense that inevitable vision, any faithlessness might taketheform ofviolating theidentity sometimes ofitsmembers rather than theirrights. Rawls's overlycontractual of consentomitsits conception ofourconsent to envisage embodiment transformations in thesubstance of ourconsent, andso totransformations ofourselvesandoursociety. PoliticalLiberalism ofargument, this itis notdifficult Against background tosee what Cavell in methodology might make of the shifts and emphasisattendant upon Rawls'srecent ofhistheory representation ofjusticeas fairness as a species ofpolitical A keycomponent liberalism. ofRawls'sdefinition ofthepurely realmis his conception political of its concerns as relating to theperson understood as a citizen-an aspectoftheperson's purely identity that is to be sharply from those that distinguished her depend upon membership ofsuband supra-political communities suchas churches, professional bodies,and tradeunions, and thatis a function of herembeddedness in certain basic political, institutions. social,andeconomic Themore precisely Rawlsdefines theduties andobligations he associates with citizenship, themore evident it is likelyto appearto Cavell that Rawls is attempting thereby to limit the responsibilities andcommitments ofpolitical existence or identity to those of citizenship-or moreprecisely, themorecontractual his conception of turns outto be. The problem citizenship is not, ofcourse, that Rawlshas a sense of thedistinctiveness strong of thedemands placeduponus in our political relationships-as opposedto thosethat flowfrom other kindsof association oridentification with others (religious, moral, aesthetic, professional,andso on). The problem is rather that he conceives ofthose distincas ifthey demands tively political insofar as we stand apply only ina certain
ANDCITIZENSHIP 189 Mulhall I PROMISING, CONSENT,
to one another-asifcitizenship werea rolewith sociallydefined respect defined specialkindof institutionally orpractice-based office rather thana ofhuman existence basicdimension andrelationship that is essentially open orpartly undefined in advance. This contractualizing form in the emphasis appearsin itsmostgeneral for the realm of the We third of Rawls's criteria specifying political. have mentioned hisconception ofcitizenship anditsrelation already tothebasic ofsociety, restricts institutions buthisthird criterion that anypolitical theory to resources that are availablein thepublic aimsto deal with suchmatters that is intended culture ofthesociety towhich toapply. political This theory meansthat itmust notdrawuponelements ofanyparticular comprehensive orconceptions ofthegood-on painoffailing doctrines torespect properly theequalright ofall itscitizens tochoosehowtolivetheir lives.This freely restriction Rawls'sconviction derives from that Western liberal democracies existina condition ofreasonable their members aresubject tothe pluralism; burdens ofjudgment ofquasi-conceptual (a variety factors that make reasonable disagreement overfundamental moral issuesinevitable), anda variety of competing and reasonable of the good have accordingly conceptions established Sincereasonable significant citizens areboundto dissupport. ofthese agreeoverwhich comprehensive doctrines toadopt, andsincethey areequally bound toacknowledge this canonly the fact, freedom they respect andequality oftheir fellow citizens byagreeing notto utilize their coercive arejustifiable political powerin waysthat to oneofthese onlybyreference controversial comprehensive conceptions. Thisspecification ofwhat counts as a legitimate political theory-namely, a purely as opposed political toa comprehensive one-bases itsdefinition of thepoliticalrealm,and so of politicalidentity and citizenship, uponthe presupposition that theboundary between purely political valuesand conand comprehensive ceptions onescan be sharply and objectively settled in advance ofeveryday political debate (i.e.,before engaging inthe second kind of conversation aboutjustice),and it assumesfurther (on pain of selfthat thiscan be settled condemnation) in waysthat do notthemselves draw ofcontroversial uponelements comprehensive doctrines. On closerinspection, bothassumptions however, appear excessively demanding anddistortiveofthereality ofpolitical debate. Let us imagine, forexample, someone whoaccepts Rawls'sdescription ofmodern societies as existing inthecondition ofreasonable pluralism, and whofurther accepts that thevery great valueofa society organised alongthe lines of justice as fairness generally outweigh any values thatmight be furthered bythe political imposition ofany particular reasonable comprehen-
I April 1997 190 POLMCALTHEORY
feelthat fundaSuch a person nevertheless certain sive conception. might this generalcalculationof costs and mentalpolitical issues overturn thespecific value at stakein theissue is of benefits-that comprehensive as tojustify a localsuspension ofthegeneral ofthe suchimportance priority values.One obvioussuchissueincontemporary is relevant political society whoregard abortion as murder, no citation ofthe Forthose that ofabortion. willoutweigh their accrue from a liberal conviction general gainsthat polity that thestateshouldgiveno support to thosewhoengagein that practice. of purely a defender What,then,might politicalliberalism say to such citizens? Rawlssaysthis:
weconsider the interms ofthree ... that values: question important political Suppose for human the ordered ofhuman the over duerespect life, reproduction society time, in some andfinally ofwomen including thefamily the as equalcitiform, equality that reasonable balance ofthese three values willgivea zens.... NowI believe any todecide woman a duly whether ornot toend her qualified right pregnancy during the for this is that first trimester. Thereason atthis ofpregnancy the early stage political ofthe ofwomen isoverriding ... any value doctrine that comprehensive leads equality ofpolitical values that inthe first toa balance trimester is excluding duly qualified right anddepending tothat extent ondetails ofitsformulation, itmay unreasonable; alsobe
Liberalism cruelandoppressive. (Political [hereafter PL], p. 243,fn32)
Itis hard toavoidtheconclusion that the voiceofthe ofabortion opponent stifled. No hint thequestion has herebeenfirmly that ofabortion emerges is becauseformanyit involves thedestruction of a human "troubled," life; Rawls says impliesthatthisconcern everything in(whether religiously ornot)is somehow flected irrelevant-that politically of anysuchopponent musteither abortion be failing to acknowledge theimportance of political for women oris somehow equality committed toan unreasonable balancing of that valuewithothers. Even if we acknowledge political that thisis no more than a sketch ofa possible argument, theskeleton ofassumptions itlays baremakesitclearthat evensuchtroubled issuesas these do notsuggest to theboundary Rawlsthat between what is andwhat is nota political valueis that thepoint oftheprocess opentoquestion, ofpolitical debate is precisely to worktoward answers to suchquestions, and that in so doingbothour ofthepolitical realm conception andourconception ofourselves as citizens is subject to further provisional definition. What will only heighten the sense of misery and rage producedin ofabortion opponents thepoint bythis passage, that crystallizes their sense ofvoicelessness, is itsseemingly untroubled use oftheideaofwhat is andis notreasonable. Wesawearlier that this ideais utilised byRawlstodefine the
andcomprehensive andthat between itmust do boundary concerns political that Its itself overtones so without breaching boundary. epistemological thekind ofimpersonality anda priori certainly characsuggest precision anditsroleis equally ofRawls's characteristic: teristic the contractualism, ofexcluding ofthe reasonable function as a means impersonal limits from ofpolitics the that Cavell the hasinterpreted as characteristic realm quality realm ofmorals ofthe but that Rawls's contractarian account ofthat realm ofa multitude ofdifferent but represses-the reasonable availability equally Inother Rawls useshisideaofthe reasonable toensure positions. as words, realm ofpolitics as possible that the need not with far the grapple possibility ofreasonable disagreement. a closer reveals that this move is Unfortunately, inspection exclusionary itmay more than Forwhat is "reasonable" controversial is more appear. a anepistemological than notion for inpart moral itis defined Rawls; byan ofthe ideaofthe burdens ofjudgment, acceptance but it quasi-conceptual anacceptance alsorequires ofa very ofsociety: specific conception
Reasonable ... are not moved as such but desire for bythe general good its own persons a social inwhich sake world as free and cancooperate with others onterms they, equal, allcanaccept. (PL, p. 50)
In other reasonable the is anelement words, ofRawls's ideaofsociety as a offair between system free cooperation andequalpersons; itis anaspect of hispurely political but nevertheless substantive morally conception ofsocial fairness. Butthen hecannot invoke itas the ofa supposedly pivot objective ornoncontroversial defence ofthis ofsociety conception against those who oreven itsvalue might question itsbasicterms for outright; then he reject either ina circle would bearguing (taking for granted onecentral part ofwhat is supposed tobe inquestion) orhe would be forced toreach beyond the limits ofthe purely political todefend hisconception ofsociety (including itsconception ofwhat is reasonable) as part ofa comprehensive conception ofhuman well-being. Itseems, that then, Rawls canonly giveanappearance ofimpersonality anddefinitiveness tohisconception ofthe political realm; hisvision ofhow anylegitimate political theory must conduct itself certainly issuesin a conception ofthe political relationships as clearly defined intheir extent and but range, because only hepresents a controversial conception ofthe limits ofthe as ifitwere purely political beyond reasonable disagreement. Taking upa fixed onsuch anissue position is not, ofcourse, morally orrationally but incompetent, bypresenting the matter as ifitwere impersonally fixed in Rawls advance, avoids the tobear obligation the personal responsibility that
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goeswith themaking ofthat anditsconsequent decision, ofthelimits fixing of thepolitical community. FromCavell's pointof view,Rawls's constant tendency to contractualize humanmoraland politicalrelationships here reaches itsapotheosis.
NOTES
1. "Perfectionism, Politicsand the Social Contract: Rawls and Cavell on Morality and Politics," Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 2, no. 3 (September 1994). 2. Mounted in S. Cavell,Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1990). 3. In ThePhilosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-32.
Stephen Mulhallis aformier PrizeFellowofAllSoulsCollege,Oxford, and is currently readerinphilosophy at Essex University. His publications include Liberals and Communitarians (2d ed.,Blackwell, 1996),Stanley Cavell(1994),andHeidegger and"Being andTime"(1996).

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Promising, Consent, and Citizenship: Rawls and Cavell On Morality and Politics

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