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Criterion

October/December 2008 Volume 3, Number 4

Editorial Suicide Terrorism at the Islamabad Marriott How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts? Jinnah & Muslims of India The Haroon Report Notes on Pakistans Trade and Idustry Policy Some Thoughts on Democracy Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check Essays Pakistan: Religion, Terrorism And Democracy

Shahid Javed Burki A.G. Noorani A.G. Noorani Faizullah Khilji

10 43 64 76

Kazi Anwarul Masud 103 Talat Farooq 124

K.S. Dhillon 151

Publisher S. Iftikhar Murshed Editor-in-Chief S. Mushq Murshed Executive Advisers S. Mashkoor Murshed Riaz Khokhar Aziz Ahmad Khan Faizullah Khilji Editors Talat Farooq (Executive) Navid Zafar (Research) Iffat Rashed

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Editorial SUICIDE TERRORISM AT THE ISLAMABAD MARRIOTT

The carnage at the Islamabad Marriott on 20 September has been described as Pakistans 9/11. It was nothing of the sort. 9/11 ignited a nationwide resolve in the US to defeat terrorism no matter what the cost. In the seven years since that fateful day which transformed global politics, there has never been a repetition of the tragedy on American soil. The Pakistan story has been entirely different. In the absence of a sustained popular outrage that translates itself into a national effort to combat terrorism, incidents such as that at the Marriott keep occurring with dreadful frequency. It is Pakistan that has been the foremost victim of terrorism. According to one estimate on average twelve Pakistanis die every day because of terrorist violence. Despite this, the Prime Ministers adviser on interior affairs, Rehman Malik, announced a suspension of military operations during Ramadan in the tribal areas from 31 August. The response to this ill-advised decision was violence. President Asif Ali Zardaris 6 September electoral triumph was marred by tragedy. A suicide bomb attack in Peshawar that day resulted in more than thirty deaths. This was the third such incident in the brief nineteen day interlude between former president Pervez Musharrafs resignation on 18 August and the election of his successor. A day after Musharraf stepped down a suicide bomber killed thirty civilians at a hospital in Dera Ismail Khan and on 21 August at least seventy people lost their lives in suicide bombings

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at the Ordnance Factories in Wah. An abortive attempt was made to assassinate Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in early September. In 2003 terrorism claimed 189 lives in Pakistan, by 2007 the figure soared to 3500. The findings of the Worldwide Incident Tracking System of the US Governments National Counterterrorism Centre, reveal that there have been more than 393 terrorist attacks in Pakistan since January. This terrorism-related statistical nightmare becomes even more startling when the parallel erosion of the writ of the state, not only in the tribal areas but also in the settled regions of the country, especially in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), is factored in. In his article featuring in the The News of 28 September, Dr. Farrukh Saleem observed that an area covering some 11,000 square kilemetres between the Tochi River in the north and the Gomal River to the south has been lost to the de facto Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, while in the NWFP at least 20 of 24 districts have strong militant presence. The print and electronic media have reported extensively on recent public executions and floggings. The inescapable reality is that vigilante justice, under the pretence of enforcing the Sharia, has replaced the law of the land. The terrorist threat to Pakistan is real and much more than the mere reiteration of slogans such as democracy is the best revenge is required. Democracys revenge can only be exacted if the government wakes up from its slumber and galvanizes public opinion in support of a nationwide effort to combat and defeat terrorism. There has been little effort to explain to the people that the war on terror is Pakistans war. Conspiracy theories about hostile foreign elements whose sole purpose is to destroy Pakistan and defeat Islam are churned out incessantly by the main political parties. The common demand is that what has been agreed to with the Americans by the previous and present governments must be made public. There is a refusal to recognize the truth that the terrorist attacks in the country have been perpetrated by none other than
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Pakistanis all of whom profess to be Muslims. On 8 September interior adviser Rehman Malik, announced that all suicide bombers and their handlers were Pakistan nationals and were being financed from within the county. Rehman Malik also declared that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaida are hand-in-glove. The implication is that the difference between the two outfits is not thicker than a thin sheet of paper. The storyline, and that is precisely what it was, spewed forth ad nauseam during the Musharraf era was that the TTP and Al Qaida were different entities. Thus the military effort in the tribal areas was focused on the latter while little was done to rein in the Taliban. The consequence is that the writ of the state has been eroded not only in the tribal areas but also in the settled districts of the NWFP. No less revealing is the statement of the NWFP Governor, Owais Ghani, that southern Punjab provides a fertile breeding ground for extremists and suicide bombers. Banned outfits with fanciful Islamic names continue to function with abandon. It has now become undeniable that the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a Pakistani extension of Al Qaida as is the Jaish-e-Mohammad in Swat. Through all this the government has been a passive bystander. Mullahs continue to preach extremist venom from mosques, the madrassah reforms announced by Prime Minister Gillani is still in the drawing board stage, and some television talks show hosts continue to extol the Taliban. The result of government inaction, according to a recent report, is that 70 illegal mosques and seminaries have been established in the last few months in Islamabad alone. It is no less disconcerting that the seminaries associated with the Lal Masjid in Islamabad have been returned to the same Mullas whose links to Al Qaida are widely known. Unless the state takes decisive measures to arrest the rapid erosion of its writ and re-establishes its sovereignty, demarches and protests about external intrusions into the tribal areas will become meaningless. The government has left the initiative to the army and the silver lining to this otherwise dismal situation is that military action in the last several
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weeks is yielding results. This has prompted tribesmen to move against the Taliban. Tribal leaders have been raised militias who are active in the Khyber Agency and Bajaur. This trend, which is also evident in Buner, Shabqadar and Dir, needs to be broadened and deepened. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the leader of the Jamat-i-Islami, is distressed with this development and feels that it will lead to civil war in the tribal areas. He needs to be reminded that the number of deaths in the first ten months of this year alone is many times more than the fatalities in the PakistanIndia war of 1965. Yet another positive development is the reported split within the TTP in North Waziristan. The breakaway faction, the Maqami Tehreeke-Talban led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, is of the view that the TTP should stop attacking the Pakistan military and only focus its efforts in support of the Afghan Taliban and against the foreign forces in that country. The government has yet to articulate a well-thought-through policy aimed at restoring normalcy in the tribal areas. It claims that its approach is based sequentially on dialogue, development and deterrence. This socalled 3-D formula is a non-starter unless it is sequenced to start with deterrence. Dialogue presupposes a suspension of military operations and this, as demonstrated in the past, only provides the militants the space to regroup and resume the hostilities with ever greater vengeance. A dialogue should not even be contemplated till the insurgents surrender their weapons. This has already been rejected by the TTP. The second plank in the governments formula namely, development, is easier said than done because it is not possible to initiate development projects without the restoration of normalcy. The last measure envisaged is deterrence should dialogue and economic inducements fail to pacify the region. This is tantamount to putting the cart before the horse. Dialogue can only be productive if undertaken from a position of strength. If the purpose of the in-camera briefing to the joint session of the National Assembly and the Senate was to generate a nationwide resolve to combat and defeat terrorism, the proceedings initially indicated that it would be an abject failure. Though terrorism is like a dagger at the heart
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of the county and capable of draining away its lifeblood, a majority of parliamentarians did not even bother to attend some of the deliberations. According to one reckoning barely seventy out of more than four hundred members of parliament thought it worthwhile to participate in all the meetings. The absentees included members of the ruling coalition. Furthermore, the response of the political parties to the grave threat faced by the country was demonstrably pathetic and this was not confined to the opposition. For instance, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party the JUI (F) is a component of the governing coalition, declared during the in-camera session that only dialogue and development can bring peace to the tribal areas and, obviously overestimating his own importance, offered to mediate between the government and the Taliban. He was not even willing to consider deterrence as a policy ingredient. Against this backdrop, it was remarkable that the in-camera joint session of the parliament unanimously adopted a 14-point resolution on the war against terrorism. Since conflicting views were vehemently articulated on this national issue of overarching importance, the document is conspicuous by its masterly ambiguity and is, therefore, susceptible to varied interpretations, In the context of Pakistans turbulent parliamentary experience, the consensus resolution is a rarity and, if deftly handled, provides the government the opportunity to replace its fumbling inaction by a vigorous policy synthesizing sequentially, deterrence, dialogue and development. The following six formulations in the document are relevant and warrant brief comment: (i) Dialogue will be encouraged with all those elements willing to abide by the Constitution of Pakistan and the rule of law. The implication is that dialogue must be preceded by an end to militancy. (ii) The challenge of militancy and extremism must be met through developing a consensus and dialogue with all genuine stakeholders. This precludes the possibility of any dialogue or
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negotiations with militant groups who have not severed their links with Al Qaida or other terrorist outfits. (iii) That the state shall establish its writand that the military will be replaced as early as possible by civilian law enforcing agencies The withdrawal of the Pakistan army from the area as a precondition for talks is therefore ruled out. (iv) We need an urgent review of our national security strategy and revisiting the methodology of combating terrorism in order to restore peace and stability in Pakistan and the region through an independent foreign policy. The national security concepts of all countries are in constant need of review and are founded on ground realities. Foreign policy has to be based on national selfinterest and does not preclude cooperation with any country for achieving shared objectives. (v) That Pakistans sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be safeguarded. The nation stands united against any incursions and invasions of the homeland, and calls upon the government to deal with it effectively. This is in line with universally accepted norms of interstate relations and applies equally to intrusions into the country by terrorist groups or organizations. (vi) That Pakistans territory shall not be used for any kind of attacks on other countries and all foreign fighters, if found shall be expelled from our soil. This empowers the government to take firm action on cross-border intrusion into Afghanistan by militants. These elements of the unanimously adopted parliamentary resolution provide the government the opportunity to generate countrywide support for the fight against terrorism. This entails openness and not selective closed-door briefings to a privileged few. There has to be public involvement; only then will there be a realization that the gravest threat to Pakistans existence is from within the country. Last October there was public outrage when the Newsweek cover carried the headline:The
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Most Dangerous Nation in the World Isnt Iraq. Its Pakistan. It is, however, the unpleasant truth that the epicenter of global terror, the foremost challenge of the contemporary era, is located in the countrys tribal areas. Soon after assuming his responsibilities as Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, stated that the war on terror can be fought and won only with the support of the people. This will send a clear message to the militants that they may be able to capture a post, a town or even a region but they will never be able defeat a people. The inescapable reality is that the war on terror is Pakistans war.

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HOW TO DEVELOP THE AFGHANPAKISTAN TRIBAL BELTS?


Shahid Javed Burki*

Abstract
(The Taliban regime which established control over most of Afghanistan from 1996-2001 sought to restore peace to that troubled country which had degenerated into warlord zones. Their harsh rule, typified by the imposition of their own understanding of Islam, was inward looking. Should the resurgent Taliban succeed in establishing themselves in even a few parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the fallout would be dangerous. In the words of the author, their focus would primarily be on what the most radicalized components of radical Islam see as the ultimate cause: an all out jihad against the West. To preempt such an eventuality, it is essential to promote economic and social development in the epicenter of the insurgency namely, Pakhtun areas. Editor.) Introduction This study aims to disentangle some of the elements in the evolving situation in the areas along Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These areas have once again begun to draw the attention of the international community. Several different strategies are being proposed and some are being followed to deal with the insurgents who are fanning out from these areas. They are challenging the forces deployed by the United States and NATO to aid the Afghan government in its attempt to curb the renewal of violence in their long-troubled country. Given the experience with Al Qaeda in the 1990s that culminated in the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001, it is clear that the rapidly
* Shahid Javed Burki is a former Finance Minister of Pakistan and Vice President of the World Bank.

How to Develop the Afghan-Pakistan Tribal Belts?

deteriorating situation in southern Afghanistan and some of the areas in Pakistan that border Afghanistan poses a serious threat to the rest of the world. It needs to be addressed. This paper develops two interlocking themes. It suggests that the growing unrest in the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is the result of a combination of several developments. A 2005 World Bank report prepared for the second major international conference to obtain pledges for the rebuilding of Afghanistan states: sources of insecurity are complex ranging from anti-government groups linked to the former Taliban regime, groups linked to Al-Qaeda, remnants of militias allied to commanders, and criminal groups often associated with the narcotics trade.1 It is important to draw distinctions between the various groups who are becoming increasingly restive. To apply epithets such as the resurgent Taliban or the re-energized Al-Qaeda to the people at the center of the growing turmoil is to confuse the picture. This way of labeling the disaffected does not help to understand the dynamics of the problem and does not help to nd the right strategy to deal with it. The second theme builds on the differences among the various ethnic groups in the country. This theme is used to develop a strategy that is likely to be more successful than the approaches being currently tried. This paper will suggest that in addressing the developing problem, the West along with Afghanistan and Pakistan, must concentrate a good deal of their collective attention on the economic, social and ultimately the political development of the areas that are now becoming the center of a new conict. The use of force alone or greater emphasis on it than on development wont produce the desired results. And, while focusing on these areas, it is important to recognize that they are inhabited by the Pakhtun tribal people who trace their valued traditions to pre-Islamic days. Social capital, as economists have recently discovered, is an important contributor to economic development and growth. There is some social capital present in the Pakhtun tribal belt along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It should be put to use to improve economic conditions in these areas. This paper has ve parts in addition to this introduction and a
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conclusion. The rst provides a quick overview of the economic performance of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the early 2000s followed, in the second section, by a description of the Pakhtuns and the areas generally referred to as the tribal belt in which the members of this ethnic group live. This belt straddles the 1500 miles long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The third section briey discusses the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the last 60 years from 1947, when Pakistan became an independent state, to the present. The fourth section is an overview of the current situation as seen by the West. The fth proposes a plan of economic and social development that will treat the tribal belt as a contiguous and socially homogenous area in the throes of a great deal of chaos, confusion and turmoil. This section will also provide some ideas on how the international community could work together to bring comprehensive development to the tribal belt. 1. The Afghan and Pakistani Economies and the Pakhtun Tribal Belt Afghanistan: An often quoted study from Louis Dupree in 1980 said that statistics in Afghanistan are wild guesses based on inadequate data. Because of the poverty of data, it is not possible to accurately describe Afghanistans current economic situation and its recent economic history. Nonetheless, some rough guess-estimate can be made. For instance a report issued by the World Bank in 2004 identied ve episodes of growth in the country since the 1960s.2 The country started at a level of per capita GDP similar to that of other developing countries in the 1960s. However, with GDP growth of only 2 percent in real terms, income per capita declined and there was a signicant increase in the incidence of poverty. During the second period, the rst part of the 1970s, there was a slight increase in per capita income. In the third period the 1980s growth uctuated in the early part of the decade and became sharply negative in the latter part as the war against the Soviet Unions occupation of the country grained momentum. The fourth period in the 1990s is the least documented. This period can be divided into two sub-periods. From 1992 to 1995, the civil war led to a further fragmentation of the country. Growth was higher in
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the areas around Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and around Kandahar in the west where local authorities were strong enough to maintain stability, and trade with Central Asia and Iran stimulated economic activity. The Pakhtun provinces did not see any growth in this period. From 1995 to 2001, the Taliban regime maintained a higher degree of control on the country resulting in some growth and some improvements in the quality of life of the very poor, particularly in the Pakhtun belt. Since 2001, the government headed by President Hamid Karzai is attempting economic reconstruction with donor support. With the end of a four year long drought in 2002, the economy in 2002-03 grew by an estimated 28.6 percent after contracting by 9 percent in 2001. It continued to increase after that large bounce, growing by 16 percent in 2003-04 and 8 percent in 2004-05. The World Bank and the IMF expect the economy to expand by 8-10 percent a year for the next two to three years. (See Table 1.) Table 1: Afghanistan: Growth in Gross Domestic Product
Level (current $ million) 1975 Agriculture Industry Services Total Population (m) GDP per capita Read GDP growth 1,196 373 798 2,367 14.0 169 2002-03 2,105 976 967 4,084 21.8 182 28.6 199 15.7 253 8.0 299 14.0 4,585 5,971 7,282 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Source: Stephanie Guimbut, Structure and Performance of the Afghan Economy, The World Bank, 2004, p. 2, and the source for Table 2.

In 2002, the size of the economy was estimated at $4 billion (in that years prices) and income per head at $186. Since 1975, the country had added 8 million people to its then population of 14 million. The size of the economy grew to $7.3 billion by 2005-06, an increase of 78 percent in current terms over the three year period following the beginning of recovery. The structure of the economy also changed signicantly
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with the share of agriculture declining by 15 percentage points with a corresponding increase in the sector of services. (See Table 2 below)

Table 2: Structure of the Economy


GDP Structure (% of total) 1975 51 16 34 100 2002 52 24 24 100 2004 37 24 38 99

Source: The World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006.

While the aggregate economic statistics suggest signicant improvement in the situation since the end of the Taliban regime, three facts about the state of the economy need to be underscored. One, poppy cultivation and trade in poppy products has made a signicant contribution to economic recovery. Afghanistan is now the source of 90 percent of the heroin sold on the streets of Europe and the United States. Opium use has also penetrated the societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Opium GDP is estimated by the United Nations and some experts at 2.6-2.7 percent of total drug-inclusive GDP and 36 percent of the licit GDP of Afghanistan. It is now the major source of income and employment for the people in the Pakhtun belt. Two, the benets of economic recovery and growth have been highly skewed. Most of the benets have been captured by the people living in and around Kabul or in the northern areas contiguous with the states of Central Asia. With benets seen from the perspective of various ethnic groups, the Tajiks have been the principal beneciaries while the Pakhtuns have gained the least. Savings are almost non-existent in the Pakhtun belt and people are augmenting their meager incomes by selling their assets. According to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, average family debt is now four times the household
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income. This is one of the major reasons for discontent against the government and the NATO forces. Third, not-counting the contribution made by the cultivation, handling and processing of poppy, growth in the formal economy has not produced a signicant number of jobs, particularly for the young. Unemployment is very high, at 33 percent of the working age population by the governments own estimates. Of those who have jobs, only 13.5 percent receive a steady and secure stream of income. The situation is particularly severe in the Pakhtun provinces. How to sustain economic growth which was a consequence of recovery from a long period of stagnation during the period of pronounced political turmoil? That economies sharply rebound once conict subsides has been the experience of most post-conict societies. For growth to be sustained beyond the period of recovery and for growth to rely on legal rather illegal activities requires a carefully articulated strategy that incorporates the need to accommodate the groups involved in insurgency. That this should be done was recognized by the international community that rst removed the Taliban from power and then assumed the task of rebuilding the war-torn nation. But the efforts made did not prove equal to the task, particularly in the Pakhtun areas. This model of political development and economic revival supported by the international community had two parts. In the rst the emphasis was on creating a viable political structure in the country. This was the focus of the international meeting at Bonn in 2002 that placed Hamid Karzai, a Pakhtun politician, in power as president and laid the ground for the convening of a national assembly (the shura), writing a new constitution, and holding a new set of elections to the national assembly and for choosing a president. These steps were taken on time. These steps constituted impressive development in a country that had seen so much political chaos for so long. This set the stage for the second step in building a viable Afghan nation-state by setting the economy on the path of sustained development over a longer period of time. That was the aim of the second major international conference held in London in January 2006.
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A detailed agenda for reconstruction and development was agreed to at the London meeting. Titled the Afghanistan Compact, it provided 27 benchmarks to be achieved within the next ve years. The compact was built around three pillars: (i) Security; (ii) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and (iii) Economic and Social Development. The strategy provided a vision of development based on private-sector-led growth supported by a lean state which would use the budget as its key policy instrument and aid coordination tool. However, missing from the strategy was a regional development component directed explicitly at the Pakhtun tribal belt that borders on Pakistan. This was a surprising and telling omission reecting the absence of a strong political voice for the Pakhtun tribal belt in the corridors of power in Kabul. This paper attempts to ll the gap by adding a regional development component to the strategy. Pakistan: We need not discuss at length Pakistans economic situation since more is known about it than is the case for the Afghan economy. A report issued in May 2008 by the Lahore-based Institute of Public Policy provided details about the current economic situation in the country and suggested some measures for addressing the problems Pakistan faces.3 For our purpose we need to refer to some salient features that affect the region being studied in this paper. The Pakistani economy grew rapidly from 2003 to 2007. By 2003, the country had completed the IMF funded program to stabilize the economy and to set the stage for a high rate of growth. In the 2003-07 period, Pakistans GDP increased at an annual average rate of 7 percent. However, the Pakhtun areas made up of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Balochistan province, grew at a considerably slower rate. This was in part because of the poor physical and human endowment of these areas. A rate of growth slower than other regions of the country contributed to the migration of even more people to the more develped parts of Pakistan, in particular the mega-city of Karachi. It also resulted in increasing the incidence of joblessness and poverty. The Pakhtun areas are now amongst the poorest in Pakistan. (See Table 3 below.)

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The economic turmoil confronting Pakistan since the end of 2007 has further exacerbated the situation in the Pakhtun areas which rely on remittances from Pakhtuns working in the major cities or have gone to the Middle East. The resultant slow down and economic disruption is contributing to the growing disaffection and is undoubtedly facilitating the recruitment efforts of the insurgent groups. Table 3: Regional Disparities: The Case of the Tribal Belt
Pakistan Irrigated area as % of cultivated area Cultivated area as % of total area Literacy rate % in 1998 Male Female Primary enrollment rate (%) Population/Doctors Population/Bed 82.00 37.21 45.00 56.50 32.60 86.00 1404 1737 NWFP 52.00 30.09 37.30 52.80 21.10 81.00 5054 1594 FATA 40.00 17.42 17.42 29.50 3.00 38.00 7670 2290

Source: Power point presentation provided by the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C.

2. The Pakhtuns and the Tribal Belts Pakhtuns (also Pashtuns, Pathans) are an ethno-linguistic group, characterized by the use of a common language, Pashto, and adherence to Pakhtunwali, a pre-Islamic indigenous code of honor and culture. According to a legend, they embraced Islam following conversion to that religion by Qais Abdur Rashid who is said to have met the Prophet Muhammed in Mecca. Rashid had four sons who migrated in four different directions toward Swat, Lahore, Multan and Quetta. They carried with them the religion of Islam and Pukhtunwali, the communitys code of honor. More is known about the make up of the Pakhtun tribal society its code of behavior and its system of values than about the economy of
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the areas in which these people live. Much of the information comes from the writings of dozens of British administrators who worked on the Pakistani side of the tribal area. They left behind in books, pamphlets and articles detailed descriptions about the way the Pakhtun society was organized. Its reputation for cohesion is not because of a strong Pakhtun identity but because of the strong commitment to the various clans and tribes into which the community is divided. There are half a dozen large tribes into which the 40 million or so Pakhtuns are divided. Most of the major tribes have presence on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border. It is from the largest of these, the Durranis, that several Afghan monarchs of the previous centuries came. President Hamid Karzai, is also a Durrani as was the NWFP chief minister and the federal information minister during the Pervez Musharraf presidency. The Durranis are divided into several large clans of which the Popalzai, Barakzai, Alizai, Achakzai, and Alikozai are the most prominent. The tribe has some 7 million people of whom ve million are in Afghanistan and two million in Pakistan. This is the most urbanized and educated of the Pakhtun tribes. They live in the region west and southeast of Kandahar. The second largest Pakhtun tribe is the Ghilzai. They live in the region between Kandahar and Ghazni. Population estimates vary but they number about six million, equally divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Ghilzais work as herders as well as in construction and other jobs that allows them to travel. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader and head of the short-lived Taliban regime, belongs to this tribe. The Afridis and the Zakars are two other large tribes. The point of this brief reference to the tribal structure of the Pakhtun population is to emphasize why it is important to view the areas in which these people live as ethnically and socially cohesive. Although straddling across an international border between two independent and sovereign nations Afghanistan and Pakistan what happens to one segment of the population profoundly affects the other. This is one reason why any program of economic development should encompass the entire Pakhtun belt this is one of the main themes developed in this study. Before detailing an altogether different strategy that might work
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in the tribal belts in Afghanistan and Pakistan that straddle the 1893 Durand Line, we should rst develop a better understanding of these areas. There has been no population census in Afghanistan for several decades. It is therefore not known with any certainty as to how many people live in the country. In 2008, it would not be too far off the mark to say that the country has 37 million people. On the other side of the border, Pakistan has about 163 million people. Between 2 to 3 million Afghan refugees mostly Pakhtun but some Tajiks and Uzbeks as well have been living in Pakistan. Not all of them are in the refugee camps that were built near the cities on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. Together, therefore, Afghanistan and Pakistan have a population of 200 million. How many of these are Pakhtuns? Pakistans censuses does not dene people by their ethnicity. That notwithstanding, it is generally assumed that some 15 percent of the countrys population belongs to this ethnic group. This means about 25 million Pakhtuns live in Pakistan. More than two-fths of the Afghan population is said to be made up of this ethnic group this means about 14-15 million Pakhtuns live in that country. Pakistan, therefore, has almost twice as many Pakhtuns as does Afghanistan. The Taliban that emerged from the areas on the Pakistani side of the border from the hundreds of madrassas were all Pakhtun. The madrassas from which they came where they were Taliban or students were mostly established with the help of Saudi Arabian funds. Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI) of Pakistan, trained the students to become mujahideen, the freedom ghters. The forces that emerged from these seminaries were the product of a four-way association between three states and one group of people: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States. The Pakhtuns were the people in the middle of this enterprise.4 The Pakhtuns are among the worlds most restless people; this restlessness is produced in part by the difcult economic conditions that exist in the areas in which they live. The Pakhtun population in Pakistan is fairly widely dispersed. Karachi, with an estimated Pakhtun population of 3 million, has the largest number of Pakhtuns in the world, larger than Kabul, Kandahar, Peshawar and Quetta. While 40 million
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Pakhtuns live in Pakistan and Afghanistan, there are millions more in India, the Middle East, Britain and North America. The Pakhtun diasporas retain strong links with the homeland, sending substantial remittances perhaps as much as $2 billion a year to their dependents. This implies that they are certainly not as insular and ill-informed about global events as is erroneously presumed. The British during their rule in India, tried to bring the Pakhtuns under their administrative control. The Afghan wars they waged in the nineteenth century failed to achieve this objective. In 1893 they persuaded Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, then king of Afghanistan, to accept a line they drew on the map that left more Pakhtuns on the Indian side of the border than in Afghanistan. This is the Durand Line that still constitutes the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to the historian Vartan Gregorian, the Durand Line divided the allegiance of many tribes, without regard to the ethnography of the region. It demarcated a no-mans land, which became a haven for tribal chieftains and sometimes even for entire clans. Moreover, though the agreement pushed the British forward line to modify the basic features of tribal life or to set up some kind of permanent tribal authority that might in turn have affected the position of tribes in Afghanistan.5 It is this haven that is now the root of insurgency threatening not only peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan but in rest of the world as well. On what is now the Pakistani side of the border, the British divided the Pakhtun lands into two parts: the settled areas and the tribal areas. The settled areas were administered like all other parts of the British domain, by district ofcers who had wide administrative, magisterial and nancial powers. The legal and judicial systems followed those the British had introduced in other posts of their Indian domain and were based on common law. In the tribal areas, the British left administration in the hands of tribal maliks (chief is not a good translation of the word malik since, traditionally, maliks powers are constrained by the presence of a jirga a consultative body of elders) who used tribal laws to provide governance. These laws like most tribal laws allowed considerable autonomy to the people as long as they observed the traditions that governed relations between households, within households, and with
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respect to land, the only economic asset available to the people. This system worked well for the British. It was recognized that any serious digression would be punished by the authorities. If punishment was meted out it was usually followed by cash compensation. The British retained a lose control of these areas by the use of force applied by levees whose members were recruited from among the tribal people. It was also a tradition that each show of authority by the state would be followed by monetary compensation. Some of these levees were incorporated in the Frontier Corps which to some extent is spearheading the campaign against the insurgent groups. When Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the 1940s demanded the creation of Pakistan, it was not certain that, even if his demand was accepted, the new Muslim state he wished to create would include the tribal belt or even the NWFP. Jinnah agreed to a plebiscite in the NWFP which he handily won. He also agreed to the demands put forward by the tribal maliks. The tribes agreed to join Pakistan provided the central government did not disturb the arrangement the British had maintained during their almost century long presence in the area. Jinnah accepted the condition and the tribal areas became parts of Pakistan. For the purpose of this study, we dene the tribal belts on either side of the Afghan-Pakistan border as made up of 10 Afghan provinces with a total population of 5 million people (Table 4), and seven tribal agencies in Pakistan with a population of 3 million people (Table 5). It is not customary to regard the northern provinces of Nurestan, Kunar and Nangarhar as belonging to the Pakhtun belt since they have a large presence of other ethnic groups, have a signicant number of Shias in their population and are at some distance from Pakistans Pakhtun belt. But that is a mistake since they too have strong Pakhtun characteristics. Not much information is available about the belt on the Afghan side of the border other than rough estimates of population. In fact, for two provinces in the north Nurestan and Kunar even population estimates have not been made. Much greater information is available for the Pakistani areas. These show very low level of literacy; much lower for women than for men. Male literacy rates range between 23 percent for the Khyber agency and only 10.5 percent for Orakzai agency. The
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highest female literacy rate is in Kurram agency (only 4.5 percent) with the lowest, once again, in Orakzai (1.3 percent). It is safe to assume that the literacy levels are even lower in the bordering areas of Afghanistan. Table 4: The Afghan Tribal Belt
Province Nurestan Kunar Nangarhar Paktia Khost Paktika Zabol Kandahar Helmand Nimruz Total Area (sq Km) 7,727 6,432 4,152 19,482 17,343 54,022 58,584 41,005 208,747 Population 1,089,000 415,000 300,000 352,000 366,000 886,000 1,012,000 149,000 4,569,000 Density (persons per sq Km) 141.1 64.5 72/2 18.1 21.2 16.4 17.2 17.3 21.9 Language Pashto Nuristan Pashto Pashto Pashto Pashto Pashto Pashto Pashto, Balochi Pashto, Balochi

Source: Statistics from various government sources.

Table 5 below provides some basic data on the seven agencies that make up the Pakhtun tribal belt on the Pakistani side of the border. Table 5: Pakistans Tribal Agencies
North MohaKhyber Bajaur O r - Kurram W a mand 1/ 3/ akzai 4/ 5/ ziristan 2/ 6/ Established 1879 1951 2296 1973 1296 1973 1538 1892 3380 1910 4707 South W a Total ziristan 7/ 1896 6620 17,541

Area (Sq/Km) 2578 Population

535,000 332,000 597,000 225,000 448,000 361,000 430,000 2,928,000 4.2% 4.4% -2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 2.0% 3.9%

Population 3.9% growth

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Irrigated (Ha) 11,000 Literacy Male Female Health Nurses Doctors Bed Roads (Km) Area (Ha) Cultivated Forest 20,000 8,800 2,303 463 6,410 2,828 388 69,000 80,774 11,820 4,406 6,348 443 1,923 489 22,126 6,085 1,790 557 16,322 5,087 1,180 439 20,837 4,825 3,396 752 3,531 23% 39.9% 2.6% 11.3% 19.1% 1.9% 13.4% 22.3% 3.4% 10.5% 19.7% 1.3% 19.8% 33.3% 4.5% 15.9% 26.8% 1.5% 19.8% 32.5% 2.6% 16.5% 32.8% 2.2%

268,000 230,000 129,000 154,000 338,000 471,000 662,000 2,252,000 15,000 2,000 18,000 74,000 11,000 3,000 5,000 97.4% 72.5% 55.7% 2,000 91.7% 22,000 13,000 95.7% 68.8% 13,000 11,000 86.7% 80.5% 41.8% 16,000 2,000 169,000 38,000

Land use ___ 20.3% Drinking water

Source: Data provided by the Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C. Notes on Table 5.

Khyber has the Mullagori marble deposit, one of the largest in the world. 2 Extensive marble, dolomite, jade and serpentinite. Large outmigration to the Middle East and other parts of Pakistan. Remittances are a major source of income. Ranks the lowest in terms of development among the seven agencies. The agency is 100% rural. 3 Has 25 camps of Afghan refugees. Large marble and granite deposits. 4 Extensive migration to the Gulf and also to other parts of Pakistan. Has large coal deposits. 5 Extensive deposits of marble and precious stones. 6 The Agency has large copper deposits. While agriculture is the main source of income for the two belts, only a small fraction of the available land is cultivated. For the tribal agencies in Pakistan, only 17 percent of the land is under cultivation,
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some of which is irrigated. Farmers depend mostly on rainfall which is not enough to permit intensive cultivation and varies considerably from year to year. A very large number of people are pastoral, depending upon animal husbandry. They move their animals to where fodder is available. Afghan nomads move in large numbers to the Pakistani side of the border where winters are less severe. Both governments permit this movement of people with crossings made at many un-patrolled border points. These crossings were a regular feature of life not only in the settled areas of the NWFP but also in northern Punjab before they were disrupted by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the conicts that followed. Here it would be helpful to briey recall the history of Southern Afghanistan, dominated for centuries by ercely independent Pakhtun tribes. These tribes are Sunnis and have always been distrustful of the Shias. They value their autonomy. It was the attempt by the Afghan central government in 1978 to extend the authority of Kabul over the provinces that provoked a rebellion against the central authority. Kabul took that position under the pressure of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union sent in its troops to bring order to the country, and the rest, as they say, is history. If the southern provinces gain functioning autonomy and if the Sunni resentment increases in Iraq it will boil over to this part of Afghanistan. And if the re-energized Sunni tribes in Afghanistans south determine that their co-religionists have suffered enormously at the hands of the West in particular the United States they will direct their resentment towards these countries. In sum the Pakhtun belt that Afghanistan and Pakistan share presents a unique problem to the international community. It straddles a difcult, inhospitable, extremely under-developed terrain. It is inhabited by people who have preferred to be guided by an ancient code of behavior rather than by laws made by modern states for modern times. To this code that has existed even before Islam entered the area, they have added some aspects of the Islamic law, the Shariah. The combination of these two codes has produced a way of life that has been practiced for centuries. Among its many features the strongest are an abhorrence to accept outside interference in internal affairs, an equal amount of
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reluctance to be governed by a central authority that operates from a distant place, and condence in the ability of local leaders to provide protection to their communities and to provide an environment in which they can live according to their own laws and practices. The religion they have accepted and followed fuses Islam with Su tradition. The latter believes in using music, poetry and dance to celebrate great affection for the deity (Allah) and his messenger (the Prophet Muhammed). The Pakhtuns have followed these traditions for centuries even when they were on the move. 3. Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations It bothered Kabul that the British left the successor state of Pakistan with the Durand Line as its northern border. It argued that the Durand Line was an arrangement with the British and not with any successor state that replaced their domain. For several months, Kabul withheld recognition from Pakistan. In fact, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the entry of Pakistan into the United Nations. For three decades, Afghanistan promoted the creation of Pukhtunistan in Pakistan, a geographic entity that would include the Pakhtun population in that country. The concept behind that proposition was never fully dened. Would Pukhtunistan be a province in Pakistan? Would it be linked with the Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan to become an autonomous state sitting alongside multi-ethnic states of Afghanistan and Pakistan; or would it be merged with Afghanistan? Without being totally clear as to what it was seeking, Kabul kept the Pukhtunistan issue alive until the Soviet Union chose to invade the country in December 1979. When Pakistan became deeply involved in the multinational effort to evict the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the Pukhtunistan issue gradually faded away. However, Pakistan was now involved in the political life of its northern neighbor, reversing the nature of relations between the two countries. Previously Kabul had meddled in what Pakistan called its internal affairs. Now Pakistan was actively involved in Afghan politics. It played favorites in choosing the mujahideen groups that the United States was aiding to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
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It preferred the Pakhtun groups over those from the northern areas, in particular those dominated by the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. This alienated Ahamd Shah Masoud the charismatic Tajik leader who had developed strong relations with the United States as well as India.6 When the Soviet Union departed from the country, Pakistan, acting through its intelligence agency, the ISI, attempted to have the Pakhtuns in particular the group headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to take over Kabul. When that did not succeed, Pakistan helped the creation of the Taliban, a group assembled from the graduates of the seminaries established for the Afghan refugees on the Pakistani side of the border. The Taliban, with active assistance from Pakistan, were able to establish their control over the entire Afghan territory except a small sliver of land in the north that remained with Ahmad Shah Masouds Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was to become a pivotal force in the American invasion of Afghanistan in October-December 2001. The system the Taliban imposed on the country was highly primitive; based on an interpretation of Islam that was endorsed by Saudi Arabias Wahabis. It allowed no role to women outside their homes; it mandated cruel and barbaric punishments even for petty crimes; it declared the Wahabi-Sunni doctrine to be the state religion; it declared religious minorities to be second class citizens; and it destroyed symbols of other religions even if they were Afghanistans highly treasured reminders of the countrys past, such as the statues of Budha at Bamiyan. Shunned by the world the regime won recognition from only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE the Taliban welcomed the support of Osama bin Ladens Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, in turn, used the sanctuaries it obtained to train its foot soldiers and mount attacks on the United States assets around the globe, ultimately resulting in 9/11. The Americans fought the war against the Taliban with the help of the Tajik dominated Northern Alliance. In spite of the Bonn accord that brought in Hamid Karzai, a Pakhtun, as the president of the new government of Afghanistan, the Tajiks retained considerable inuence over policymaking. Tajik generals and their proxies did control the army as well as key secret policy and intelligence agencies hated by the Pashtuns, wrote Selig Harrison in an op-ed article for The Washington
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Post published in January 2007. The Taliban is effectively exploiting Pashtun dissatisfaction with Kabul recruiting many of its ghters from disaffected tribes in the Ghilzai branch of the Pashtuns who resent the favoritism Karzai has shown to higher status tribes such as his own Durranis. Mulla Omar, the key Taliban leaders is a Ghilzai.7 Pakistan continued to support the Pakhtuns, among them the remnants of the Taliban. In the meantime, excessive use of force by the United States increased resentment against the West and contributed to the reemergence of Taliban as a political force in the Pakhtun areas What is, therefore, inappropriately described as the advance of the insurgent Taliban into southern Afghanistan is infact a different surge that put the Taliban in virtual control of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The dynamics that propels this move is very different; on both sides of the border, it is gaining strength because of the resentment that is felt by the Pakhtuns for not being able to share power and spoils that come from being the rulers in Kabul. The support the insurgency receives from the Pakistani side of the border is for two reasons. There are still millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistans border areas. They have strong links with their tribal and clan associates on the other side. Second, there is growing resentment that Islamabad is attempting to impose a model of governance that is different from the one that was used for centuries in the areas in which the tribal code (the Pakhtunwali) and perceived Islamic values got blended into a system that had a wide acceptance. There is a growing perception that the government in Islamabad, then headed by President Pervez Musharraf, was under the inuence of the West in particular the United States to secularize the political system. This impression was reinforced because Islamabad resisted the attempts of the provincial government that then governed the NWFP to introduce Islamic laws in the areas under its administration. These laws sought to impose strict moral and cultural codes among the provinces people. The ruling coalition in the NWFP was dominated by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, JUI, a political party that subscribes to the orthodox (Deobandi) interpretation of Islam. The party has strong links with the clerical establishment in Saudi Arabia. It was also one of the constituents of the Mutahis Majlis-e-Amal, or MMA, the main opposition group in Pakistans national legislature in 2002-07.
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This mixing of strong feelings about Pakhtun nationalism, tribal rivalries within the Pakhtun community and the growing inuence of orthodox Islam on these people produced a heady brew. How to deal with this situation? Of the several approaches, four were attempted at various degrees of intensity. The rst one was to awe the Pakhtuns with the use of overwhelming force. The second was to use development in conjunction with the use of force. The third was to work within the tribal system and leave intra-community affairs to the traditional leaders who were to be allowed to operate within strictly drawn boundaries. The fourth was to put emphasis on well-planned economic and social development. The last approach is still evolving. The rst approach with some sprinkling of the second was the preferred option pursued by the United States as well as NATO. It was the basis of the plan offered by the Bush administration to President Pervez Musharraf on various occasions.8 The second is still being worked upon; it has never been fully deployed. The third approach was attempted by the Pakistan government and the British command in Helmand province of Southern Afghanistan. But that approach did not win favor with Washington. In September 2006, Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, then governor of NWFP, concluded an agreement with the tribal chiefs of North and South Waziristan according to which the area was to be emptied of all foreign ghters and no penetration of mujahideen was to be allowed into Afghanistan. In return, the Pakistan army was to pull back its personnel from the area. Islamabad had reached the conclusion that it was losing not only its soldiers in numerous clashes with the tribes, it was also losing their commitment to be a part of the Pakistani nation. But according to NATO and American ofcials based in Afghanistan, cross-border attacks have increased in North since Mr Orakzai orchestrated [the] peace deal. . . that allowed foreign and Pakistani militants to remain at large while the military scaled down operations. Western diplomats also expressed concern that the Al Qaeda is continuing to plot terrorist campaigns from the mountainous tribal areas and that the agreement has ensured the terrorists sanctuary.9 A report by the International Crisis Group said militants were creating a virtual mini state in North and
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South Waziristan. These misgivings about the Pakistani approach notwithstanding, the British military command in southern Afghanistan tried something very similar in an area for which they had the responsibility. Following bitter clashes in the summer of 2006 between British troops and tribesmen, the Musa Qila tribal council, acting with British approval and backed by Mohammed Daud, governor of Helmand province, negotiated a ceasere in September 2006. A 15-point peace agreement was the basis of the ceasere. The accord provided for an end to the tribal offensive, the withdrawal of British forces and the creation of a local militia that would replace the central government police. After peace prevailed for 35 days, the British pulled out on 17 October. However, three months later, militants overran the town of Musa Qila, detained police ofcers and tribal elders, seized weapons and government equipment and bulldozed part of the district ofces. According to one report, American ofcials in Afghanistan had opposed the agreement because it left the broader district of Musa Qila, a poppy growing region of Helmand, open to the Taliban. But the British commander in Helmand at the time demanded it as a way to release his men from a pointless and occasionally bloody siege of the town. Residents had welcomed the deal because it brought a temporary peace to the badly damaged town. But some had warned at the time that it was handing a victory to the Taliban.10 This brief overview of the approaches that have been tried in the recent past and have not produced the expected results leads us to conclude that this may be the right time to attempt a concentrated effort at improving the economic well-being of the tribal people. This is the subject of the fth section of the paper. 4. Resurgent Insurgents in the Pakhtun Belt and a Military Surge There was near consensus in late winter of 2006-07 among intelligence experts in the United States and the UK that the various strategies followed in the Pakhtun tribal belts had not worked and that the North Waziristan Agency had become the new training ground and command and control center for Al Qaeda. According to one report,
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the United States had also identied several new Qaeda compounds in North Waziristan, including what that ofcial said might be training operatives for strikes against targets beyond Afghanistan.11 Earlier John D. Negroponte, then director of national intelligence, told Congress in January 2007 that Al Qaedas core elements are resilient and that the organization was cultivating stronger operational connections and relationships that radiate outward from their leaders secure hide-out in Pakistan to afliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. How was the Al Qaeda able to re-establish itself? American ofcials and analysts said a variety of factors had come together to allow core Al Qaeda a reference to Mr. Laden and his immediate circle to regain some of its strength. The emergence of a relative haven in North Waziristan and the surrounding area has helped senior operatives communicate more effectively with the outside world via courier and the internet.12 Another reason for the failure of these agreements to produce the desired results was that they were not followed by intense development efforts. Had that been done, some of the resentments that contributed to the re-emergence of the Taliban would have been countered. That the model being pursued by the international community in Afghanistan was not producing the desired results was revealed by the ndings of a survey conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The CSIS report was funded in part by the US Agency for International Development. Some 1,000 ordinary Afghan citizens were interviewed. According to them, conditions in their country had deteriorated markedly since 2005 with rising violence, government corruption and misguided U.S. efforts. All this was contributing to growing unease among the population. The report said that the Afghans tend to be more negative in their outlook than ofcial statistics or media accounts would suggest. Public fear and frustration are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, Afghans are beginning to disengage from national governing processes and lose condence in their leadership, wrote the authors of the report. Dramatic changes are required in the coming weeks, or 2007 will become the breaking point.13

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The report recommended a new approach, with the focus of the international communitys efforts shifting towards economic development and giving local communities more control over aid money. It also suggested a shift in military strategy with less emphasis on major military operations in favor of rapid-response forces that can protect the citizenry during emergencies. NATO and the United States big army military operations and emphasis on foot soldier lls are doing more damage than good, said the report. The report was released in Washington on 23 February 2007. It echoed the comments made a few days earlier by the departing US commander in Afghanistan, Lt. General Karl W. Eikenberry. He told a congressional panel in his testimony that a point could be reached at which the government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people and the goal of establishing a democratic and moderate, self-sustaining state could be lost forever. How is the United States dealing with the rapid growth in the level of insurgency in Afghanistan, in particular in the countrys Pakhtun areas? On 15 February 2007 while deeply engaged in dening a new strategy for stabilizing Iraq and extracting the United States from that country without damaging the United States long-term strategic interests in the Middle East, President George W. Bush turned his attention towards Americas other war. The war in Afghanistan was not going well for the United States and for NATO. The Taliban, once believed to be fully defeated in late 2001, after only three months of Americas military campaign, were resurging in the southern parts of the country. The question before Mr. Bush as he spoke at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington-based think-tank, was the same he had begun to address in Iraq. How to save Afghanistan from once again plunging into chaos? As a newspaper account put it: the remarks to the American Enterprise Institute by the American president amounted to an unusually highprole acknowledgement of the precarious state of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, a country the administration long held as a foreign policy success story. The new American plan involved mostly increasing the manpower and re power available to the Western alliance. Washington planned to extend the tour of duty of 3,200 of its troops already engaged
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in the country. The US would like NATO to considerably strengthen its contingent and persuade some of the larger members of the Alliance to remove the caveats under which their personnel operate. France, Germany and Italy did not permit the deployment of their troops to the southern parts of Afghanistan. An effort will also be made to increase the size of the Afghan army from 32,000 to 70,000. After announcing in February 2006 that it will pull out 1,700 of its troops from southern Iraq, Britain announced that it will add 1,400 soldiers to its contingent in southern Afghanistan. President Bush asked Congress for $11.8 billion to pay for increased operations in the country. He promised that America would help build new roads that would spur economic development as well as control and eventually eliminate the production and trade of opium. And then there was to be a Pakistan component to the new Afghan strategy. This had three prongs. One, to improve relations between Presidents Hamid Karzai and Pervez Musharraf that had seriously soured. Two, to persuade Pakistan to become even more active in preventing inltration of Pakhtuns from its side of the border to join those of their clansmen on the other side. Pakistan already had 80,000 troops deployed on its side of the border. It had taken heavy casualties according to ofcial accounts, some 800 soldiers were killed and 3,000 wounded in the operations conducted in 2005-06. This was a larger toll than taken by the United States and its allies. But the United States was not satised by the amount of pressure Islamabad was exerting on the tribes in the Pakhtun belt that were providing support to the insurgents. On 26 February 2006 Vice President Dick Cheney paid an unannounced visit to Islamabad to get President Musharraf to do more. The White House was using as leverage the discomfort in the new Congress, now under the control of Democrats, about what was seen as Islamabads tepid support for the American and NATO efforts against the insurgents. Three, to allow the hammer and anvil work along the border with Afghanistan. In this the United States and NATO were to be the hammer with Pakistan to become the anvil which gathers the enemy to be struck down. Would the strategy work and save Afghanistan from once again becoming a failed state? The history of dealing with insurgencies has one
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important lesson to teach. Throwing more of the same into a worsening situation never pays. What did not succeed the rst time around was not going to succeed again even with the doubling or tripling of the effort. This was the lesson taught to the French in Algeria by the Algerian freedom ghters, to the United States in Vietnam by the Vietcong, and would possibly have been repeated for America in Iraq had Washington not changed its strategy dramatically in 2008. What will work is an entirely different approach that builds on the strengths of a society in turmoil rather than seeks to exploit its weaknesses. Accordingly, this paper will advocate a four-pronged approach that focuses on economic and social development with the promise of use of force remaining in the background. A carefully formulated program should be developed by the authorities on both sides of the AfghanistanPakistan border, in association with the representatives of the tribes. These tribes were cut into two by the drawing of the Durand Line of 1893. A Pakistan-Afghanistan council of elders should be formed to help formulate the plan and to help in its implementation. The council should oversee a softened rather than hardened Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan should not force the 2.5 million or so refugees that live on its side of the border to return to their country. It has threatened to do that out of frustration at the barrage of criticism it is receiving for not doing enough to prevent the Taliban for using its territory as a sanctuary. This strategy will be discussed in some detail in Section 5 below. 5. A Development Effort Focused on the Pakhtun Belts Could economics become the focus of inducing change in the tribal belts? Could the economic development of the two tribal belts, one each in Afghanistan and Pakistan, help to control the growing insurgency in the area and incorporate them fully into the administrative and political structures of the two countries? These objectives can be achieved but such an effort will require an approach signicantly different from the one being currently pursued by the West, in particular the United States. This approach is the basis of the Afghanistan Compact endorsed by the community of
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international donors in their meeting in London in January 2006. The donors committed $10.5 billion of assistance, to be provided as grant, for a set of objectives to be pursued by the government of Kabul. Most of the goals to be pursued will be either difcult to achieve or do not conform to the aspirations of the people at whom the program is aimed. At a special session of NATO foreign ministers held in Brussels on 26 January 2007, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the Bush administration will ask for $10.6 billion of additional funding from Congress, of which $8.6 billion will be spent on military equipment and training, and an additional $2 billion on reconstruction, with the money parceled out over two years. In the ve years since the US forces removed the Taliban government, the US had provided $14.2 billion to Afghanistan.14 Very little of this went to the Pakhtun belt. A similar approach is contemplated for FATA in Pakistan. The United States has two programmes it will fund at various stages of development, one for the general development of FATA and the other for economic opportunity zones where the products produced by the industries would be allowed duty-free access into the United States. These three programs one in Afghanistan and two in Pakistan may help bring about some development in the Pakhtun belts of the two countries and may persuade the young men of these areas to become participants in economic life rather than resort to arms to project their beliefs. However, a coordinated approach would yield better results. This paper recommends an approach that has a different set of objectives and a different mechanism for achieving them. Specically, this strategy has the following objectives: It should focus on bringing literacy to the Pakhtun areas with emphasis on educating women. It should assist with the development of small enterprises particularly in the sectors in which local skills exist. These include transport, metalworking, stone craft, carpet weaving and food processing. And it should place emphasis on trade. Would the people of the area be receptive to participating in these activities? Pakhtuns share three characteristics that make them good candidates for becoming the focus of a development effort. They have always found
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it easy to adopt new technologies. It is because of the skills they possess that they took so easily to the Russian made AK-47 and the American stinger missiles and rocket launchers. Small arm manufacture is a large business in the Pakhtun belts and employs thousands of people on both sides of the border. They have also been involved in trucking business. Their engineering skills come in handy in order to keep old equipment on the roads way beyond what would be considered as their normal lives. They know how to handle money which was why many of those who have settled outside their areas have entered nance money lending, money transfers, asset management. A century or so ago Rabindranath Tagore wrote Kabuliwala, the story of a Pakhtun money lender in his native Bengal. Furthermore, they also have a strong sense of community and community sharing, characteristics that have begun to appear as social capital in development literature. According to recent thinking, social capital how people relate with one another and how they use traditional institutions in their communities to regulate economic lives can contribute impressively to quickening the pace of development and moving backward communities towards modernization. Will a program drawn up specically for developing the Pakhtun tribal belt meet resistance because of the strict adherence to the Pakhtun code of behavior, the Pakhtunwali? Would the perceived low social status of women in Pakhtun society act as an inhibitor for a program that must necessarily focus on improving the social and economic status of women? Much of what is believed about the way male Pakhtun men treat women is not based on a correct reading of their society. The Pakhtun code has always assigned a strictly dened space to the women folk. One of the many contradictions with which the Pakhtuns live is that women are the custodian of Pukhtunwali the ancient code of behavior. The women do not see their status as low; only different. They actively participate in the economic life of their community; they join as herds people, grow crops, they tend orchards, and they look after the familys meager assets. While they manage the home, men are free to roam the world. The traditional Pakhtun woman does not wear the veil and mixes easily with men. What the Taliban did to women was not a part of the Pakhtun code, it was inuenced by the encroachment of
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Wahabism into the Pakhtun areas. Wahabi inuences were brought in through the seminaries that produced warriors for the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. And once Al Qaeda settled in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, it pushed Wahabi thought into the making of public policy. Accordingly the Taliban pursued a new code of behavior that was transplanted from the considerably more conservative tribal society of Saudi Arabia. This fusion between the Saudi family code and the Pukhtunwali took place in the hundreds of seminaries (madrassas) that were established all along the Pak-Afghan border by Pakistan with the help of the Saudis. The Americans provided military equipment and training to the young men who were enrolled in these institutions and trained as mujahideen to ght the Soviet occupying forces in Afghanistan. It also came in through the returning Pakhtun migrants from the Middle East where they had gone as contract workers in the many construction sites in the area. By adopting this new code, some Pakhtun elements were departing signicantly from their deeply embedded traditions. This raises the question whether those who succumbed to this way of life can be weaned back from it? In particular whether they would allow their women to be educated? The development of programs must have a large element aimed at increasing female literacy. There is ample anecdotal evidence available to suggest that once the Pakhtuns recognize that educating women have economic and social rewards, they are prepared to allow the girls to go to school. The reason why female literacy is abysmally low in the tribal areas is more a reection of the lack of economic opportunities available to the tribal society than a consequence of the tribal code of conduct. The antipathy shown by the Taliban towards girls education was an aberration in Pakhtun behavior. While the arrival of Wahabism in the area may impede female education, Islam does not hinder the development of small enterprises focusing on the skills that are available in abundance to exploit the ample natural resources of the area. As indicated in the notes to Table 5 above, there are considerable resources available in the tribal belt that could become the basis of small enterprise development. Small scale enterprises can also be established in some other sectors where
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skills and resources are present. These, as already indicated, include metal-working, small engineering, stone-craft and food processing. However, there are several constraints that will have to be dealt with before the full potential of this type of business development can be realized. These include the availability of capital, further development of the skills already possessed by the target population and marketing. The removal of these constraints should be an important part of the development strategy. This is where Pakistan should provide free access to the Pakhtun businesses and transport to the markets in India and the Middle East. Since the markets for the products of these enterprises are limited, promotion of trade must become an integral part of the development plan. It is giving access to the landlocked tribal belt that is of critical importance for the success of the proposed development program. Transit trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan is governed by two agreements; a bilateral arrangement signed in 1965 which allows Afghan goods to use the port of Karachi and transit through Pakistani territory before entering Afghanistan. The Afghan Trade and Transit Agreement (ATTA), allowed Pakistan to create a negative list of goods that could not transit its territory. The list was expanded over time and reached twenty-four, including some goods of vital interest to Afghanistan. The make-up of the negative list sometimes reected Pakistans desire to gain a favorable access for its own products to Afghanistan (e.g. textiles) and sometimes to deny Indian manufactures to gain markets in Afghanistan. ATTA was revised in 2003 after the establishment of the Karzai regime in Kabul with the number of exempted items reduced to only four. However, the revised agreement did not meet the standards set by the United Nations Global Facilitation Partnership of Transportation and Trade (GFP), according to which the corridor arrangements are a set of rules governing all aspects of transport and transit of good throughout a given route (corridor) backed by a treaty signed by all transit countries. Corridor agreements deal with a wide range of issues such as infrastructure, customs efciency, bottlenecks. Corridors are or should be backed by proper institutional and implementation mechanisms such as management structures that involve the governments (technical
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agencies) and the stakeholders (e.g., representatives of trade and related professions). Performance monitoring mechanisms (indicators) are also highly desirable.15 The Afghanistan-Pakistan agreement did not fully meet this denition. It was also subject to political pressure when Islamabad, at times irritated by what it perceived to be Afghan hostility towards it, closed its border thus halting the transit of both imports to and exports from Afghanistan. The most serious incident occurred in 1955 when Pakistan suspended ATTA to punish the government headed by Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan for its support to the Pakhtunistan issue. Pakistan has been more willing to allow its territory to be used for the development of Afghan trade with its northern neighbors (the countries in Central Asia) than with South Asia. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are active members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which also includes Iran, Turkey, and the Central Asian republics. A transit trade agreement concluded among the member states and Pakistan allows Afghanistan to import goods for onward movement to Central Asia. However, the full potential of regional trade will only be realized once India is allowed to use these corridors. Opening Afghanistan to regional trade should also be possible within the context of the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) that became operational on 1 January 2006. Afghanistan was invited to join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in November 2005. SAARC is responsible for overseeing the implementation and development of SAFTA. Afghanistan has still to formally join SAFTA. What should be the main objectives and components of the program suggested in this study? It should be formulated for the economic and social development of the Pakhtun population living in the tribal belt that straddles the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Its principal aim should be to provide productive employment to the young males who have few opportunities available to them in the licit economy.
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$10 billion development expenditure should be set aside for the program to be implemented over a ve year period; with expenditure scaled up, starting with $1.0 billion in the rst year and ending with $3.00 billion in the fth year. Sixty percent of the funds should be spent on small development schemes in four sectors (roads, water supply both drinking and irrigation schools and colleges, clinics and hospitals). Of the remaining, $3 billion should go into micro-nance and private equity schemes, and the remaining $1 billion should be spent on institution building including training of personnel. A multi-tiered project development and implementation institution mechanism should be established with its base made up of the tribal leaders in a cluster of no more than ten villages, a provincial or agency council, equally divided by the people chosen by the primary councils and government ofcials and chaired by the provincial governors (on the Afghan side) and the political agent (on the Pakistani side). The next tier in this set up should be a council of tribal elders chosen from the 17 provinces and agencies on both sides of the border. An advisory council representing the two countries Afghanistan and Pakistan should have the overall responsibility for overseeing the development of the program and its implementation. Some other nations with interest in the area such as the United States, Iran, India and Russia should be invited to join the council as observers. Indias inclusion is vital in order to promote greater regional trade and integration. The most important impact of the program proposed here would be to provide employment opportunities to the youth in the tribal belt. By making some simple assumptions and projecting the data available for the areas contiguous with Pakistan, it is possible to estimate the number of people who are looking for work, do not have employment opportunities available to them and would benet enormously from the implementation of the type of development program suggested in
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this paper. As indicated in Section 1, the two tribal belts have a total population of 7.5 to 8.0 million people. Of this about one-fourth are between the ages of 15 and 30, the age group most in need of jobs and most susceptible to being recruited as foot soldiers for movements such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Only one half of this cohort, or about a million have jobs; the remaining are either looking for work or are employed in the expanding drug trade. We estimate that by spending $ 2 billion a year on development with focus on the labour-intensive sectors, it should be possible to extend legal employment opportunities not only to the one million unemployed young men but also raise the level of productivity of those who are already employed. Conclusion It is clear to those who have followed developments in Afghanistan for decades that the return of chaos to Afghanistan and its spread to the restive tribal areas of Pakistan would contribute greatly to further destabilizing the already troubled Middle East. Most of what this descent into chaos would result in would go against the long-term interests not only of the United States but of the entire Western and Muslim worlds. There are some obvious consequences if such a situation indeed develops. If southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan were to be Talibanized if, that is, some provinces in that part of the country were to come under the full control of local leaders they will seek to free themselves further from the control of the already weakened government in Kabul. But Talibanization this time around will mean a different thing. In the mid-1990s, those who established control over most of Afghanistan did so to bring peace to that troubled country. They partially succeeded. The weapon they used was to impose on the people a government based on their reading of Islam. The regime that then emerged did so by beating a set of tribal warlords who, after helping to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, were ghting to advance their own limited agendas. This meant plundering the meager resources of the country to benet only themselves, their tribes and clans. None of these warlords had nation building or xing a broken state on their list of priorities.

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We can expect something quite different and something considerably more dangerous if the forces that now go under the name of resurgent Taliban are able to establish themselves in a few parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The new Talibans aims and governing philosophy will be very different from those that ruled earlier. This group will gain power, if they do, by overcoming a foreign force, not by beating down local rivals. For the rst Taliban regime, war against the West was a byproduct, an unwritten prelude to a drama that had an entirely local content. As has been documented in a number of studies of the rise of the rst generation of Taliban, their main objective was to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan after two decades of political chaos. This time the focus will primarily be on what the most radicalized components of radical Islam see as the ultimate cause: an all-out jihad against the West. Once having gained autonomy, they may fall under the inuence of those who are looking for a base from where radical Sunni Islam can begin to exert its inuence way beyond the common border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Quasi autonomous or even semi-autonomous southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan may not opt for the full adoption of the Taliban ideology. What they would do is to ght hard to retain control over their affairs. The not-so-apparent consequences of this development would reect the changes that are taking place in Iraq. If the sectarian violence in Iraq and Americas support for the rising power of the Shiite community in that country results in a bloody suppression of the Sunnis of Anbar and other areas of that countrys Sunni heartland, it will create a chain of events that will certainly have a bearing on the developments in the entire Muslim world in particular in those parts where Sunnis and Shiites have co-existed in relative harmony for decades if not for centuries. It is, therefore, in the interest of the international community not to allow the situation in Afghanistan to deteriorate any further. Promoting economic development in the Pakhtun areas the region most active in the growing insurgency has to be the most important part of the evolving strategy.

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References:
1 2 3 4 The World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Period FY07-08, Washington, D.C., April 2006. Stephanie Guimbut, Structure and Performance of the Afghan Economy, The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004. Institute of Public Policy, State of the Economy: Challenges and Opportunities , Lahore, 2008. Much has been written about this episode in the history of Afghanistan and Pakistan. See, for instance, Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004. and Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, New York, Viking, 2008. Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969, p. 158. For Pakistans relations with Ahmad Shah Masud See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London, I.B. Tauris, 2000 Selig Harrison, Discarding an Afghan opportunity, The Washington Post, January 30, 2007, p. A7. See Ron Suskind, Carlotta Gall, Roadside bomb kills doctor in a Pakistani border region, The New York Times, February 17, 2007, p. A7. Carlotta Gall and Taimoor Shah, Afghan-town overrun by Taliban, The New York Times, February 3, 2007, p. A7. Mark Mazetti and David Rhode, Terror ofcials see Qaeda chiefs regaining power, The New York Times, February 19, 2007, pp. A1 and A7. This was a 2-part series carried by the newspaper. Ibid. Seema Pate and Steven Ross, Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007. Molly Moore, Rice presses allies to boost Afghan aid, The Washington Post, January 27, 2007, p. A16. GFTT.org website.

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15

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JINNAH & MUSLIMS OF INDIA

A G. NOORANI*

Abstract
(Neither the British Governments statement of 3 June 1947, the Partition Plan which, both, the League and the Indian National Congress accepted, nor the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which they had vetted, contained even a perfunctory reference to the minorities. They were confined to the consequences of the partition the princely States, assets and liabilities and treaties etc. The gravest consequence the presence of minorities in both States was ignored. Surely if mere safeguards in the Constitution could protect the minorities, surgery was not necessary. No one was more aware of this than Jinnah; the record shows that before as well as after the establishment of Pakistan that awareness did not elude him. He was a lawyer with a keen understanding of political realities. It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power. Politics mean power and not relying on cries of justice or fair play or goodwill, Jinnah told the historic Lucknow session of the League on 15 October 1937. Author). The Resolution adopted by the session of the All India Muslim League at Lahore on 23 March 1940, demanding the partition of India on the basis of religion, is one of the most consequential documents in modern history. It led to the establishment of Pakistan on 14 August 1947. Yet, it is also one of the least understood documents ever. It was either lauded or condemned but never analysed. Within Pakistan debate ranged over the issues whether it envisaged one state or two, the partition of Punjab and Bengal and federal structure at the Centre.
* A.G.Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and noted columnist.

A.G. Noorani

The Congress was too indignant at the proposal to analyse it carefully. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi missed a fine opportunity of questioning Mohammed Ali Jinnah on its terms and implications when they met in Jinnah House at Mount Pleasant Road in Bombay from 9 to 27 September 1944. He asked questions like What is your definition of minorities? and some specific ones which Jinnah evaded or brushed aside (does not arise by way of clarification). Gandhi did not persist with the queries he had raised in his letter of 15 September. But on one important point Jinnah gave an answer on 17 September whose significance escaped attention. Gandhi had referred to para 2 of the Resolution which proposed adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities in both States. Jinnah replied that safeguards are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective States, viz. Pakistan and Hindustan not between the two States as an integral part of the agreement embodying the terms for the settlement of the communal question on the basis of partition of India, a surgery which Jinnah claimed would cure the disease.1 Neither the British Governments statement of 3 June 1947, the Partition Plan which, both, the League and the Indian National Congress accepted, nor the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which they had vetted, contained even a perfunctory reference to the minorities. They were conned to the consequences of the partition the princely States, assets and liabilities, treaties, etc. The gravest consequence the presence of minorities in both States was ignored. Surely if mere safeguards in the Constitution could protect the minorities, surgery was not necessary. No one was more aware of this than Jinnah; the record shows that before as well as after the establishment of Pakistan that awareness did not elude him. He was a lawyer with a keen understanding of political realities. It does not require political wisdom to realize that all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power. Politics mean power and not relying on cries of justice or fair play or goodwill, Jinnah told the historic Lucknow session of the League on 15 October 1937. To the Muslim University Union at
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Aligarh he elaborated, in a speech at the Strachey Hall on 5 February 1938 The only hope for minorities is to organize themselves and secure a denite share in power to safeguard their rights and interests. Without such power no Constitution can work successfully in India.2 In this, Jinnah was only too right. Constitutional protection alone is no solution; power or empowerment is necessary. He sought a coalition based sharing of power with the Congress but was rebuffed.3 Unfortunately partition led to protectionism in both states. Thus a close analysis of the Lahore Resolution is indispensable to an understanding of Jinnahs dilemmas and the situation he faced in 1947; as, indeed, did the minorities. It had ve paras. The rst two were preambular; the Government of India Act, 1935 was rejected but no revised plan would be acceptable unless it was framed with the consent of the Muslims. Para 3, popularly cited as para 1, said that no constitutional plan would be acceptable to them unless it was based on the basic principle of the partition which it dened. While para 4 on the safeguards was bandied about as a sop to the minorities, completely ignored was para 5. It authorized the Working Committee to frame a scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption nally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary. Dr. B. R. Ambedkar was one of the very few to ask what does the word nally which occurs in the last part of the Lahore Resolution mean?4 But neither he nor Gandhi nor any one else asked the League to produce the scheme it had promised in that para. One man who was aware of the linkage between the three operative paras was Sir Abdullah Haroon. His Committee, set up by the League, drew up a Report which harmonized the principle of partition with the effectiveness of the safeguards. Jinnah repudiated the entire exercise. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, author of an earlier draft which was drastically and unwisely pruned a day before the Resolution was passed,
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boldly repudiated the Lahore Resolution in a famous speech to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 11 March 1941. The resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted and the one that was nally passed.5 What he had in mind was an agency at the Centre, set up by mutual consent and with liberty to secede from it. Partition and safeguards ensuring empowerment would be linked in such a scheme Jinnah offered precisely such a proposal to the Cabinet Mission on 12 May 1946 and went on to accept its Plan of 16 May 1946. Both were based on sharing power. The Congress had other plans. Partition followed a partition that was delinked altogether from minority safeguards. It was a partition of the kind none had seen even in a wild nightmare. That disconnect between partition and protection reected a transformation in Jinnahs splendid record as a champion of the rights of minorities to one who espoused the cause of Provinces in which Muslims were in a majority, even to the neglect of safeguards for Muslim minorities. That record bears recalling. It is most instructive in revealing the political compulsions which shaped the course of a man of sturdy independence, sterling integrity and keen realism like Jinnah. Theories do not reckon with the record and lapse into denigration or adulation. Marguerite Dove deserves credit for highlighting Jinnahs role and self-perception as a mediator between Indian nationalism and Muslim opinion and interests.6 He asked the All Parties National Convention on the Nehru Report on 22 December 1928 would you be content if I were to say, I am with you? Do you want or do you not want the Muslim India to go along with you?7 The jibe about a nationalist who turned communalist is for the ignorant and malicious, Jinnah bore in mind both the interests at all times; the country as well as the communitys. They did not conict. He questioned the credentials of the 35 Muslims, led by the Aga Khan who waited on a deputation to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on 1 October 1906 in a letter which The Times of India did not publish but the Gujrati of Bombay did on 7 October. On 27 December 1906 at the Congress session in Calcutta he praised it for its stand against the Privy
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Councils ruling on Waqf-alal-aulad (which he succeeded in overriding by Legislation). The next day he said that there should be no reservation for any class or community.8 The Muslim League was established at Dacca on 31 December 1906. The Indian Musalman Association was launched to counter it at Calcutta on 8 January 1907. Nawab Syed Mohammed was its President. Jinnah was one of its three Vice Presidents.9 Jinnah was persuaded to join the League only on 10 October 1913. In the Congress, meanwhile, he moved a resolution against extension of separate communal electorates to local bodies but was careful to stress that those were his personal views. I do not represent the Muhamedan Community here nor have I any mandate from the Muhammedan Community.10 His outlook was revealed in a moving letter he wrote in January 1910. Hindus and Muslims should combine in one harmonious union for the common good, where we have to live together in every district, town, and hamlet; where our daily life is interwoven with each other in every square mile of one common country.11 It was in this spirit that the League led by Jinnah and the Congress led by his friend Bal Gangadhar Tilak agreed on a scheme of Reforms at a Joint Conference of the Congress and the League in Calcutta on 18 November 1916. Both parties held their annual sessions at Lucknow on 30-31 December 1916 and endorsed it; hence, the Lucknow Pact The Congress accepted separate electorates as well as larger number of seats to the delight of Muslims in provinces where they were in a minority but Jinnah had to scale down Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal with lasting consequences. Thirty years later in 1946, despite a convincing victory at the polls, the Nawab of Mamdot could not command a majority in the Punjab Assembly. Under the CongressLeague scheme Muslims got over-representation in the provincial legislatures in Bihar, Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces. Being aware of the dominant position of the Muslims in U.P., they were given 30 per cent of the seats there. The price paid for these concessions was that the principle of weightage for the minority community was also applied to Bengal and the Punjab, reducing Muslim representation in
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the Provincial Legislative Councils from 55 percent to 50 percent in the Punjab and to 40 percent in Bengal. The Lucknow Pact signied the increasing eagerness of the Congress to win Muslim co-operation in the nationalist movement. The Hindus of UP and the Punjab had misgivings regarding the Pact as they felt that their interests had been jeopardized to win Muslim co-operation. On the Muslim side, the Punjab and Bengal were the most vociferous provinces in their condemnation of the Pact.12 Prof. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi pointed out that weightage in the minority provinces were not of much use to the Muslims. They remained a minority, whereas the loss of majorities in two major provinces resulted in serious handicaps. Its full effect was felt after the elections of 1937 and 1945, when the Muslim League encountered grave difculties in forming ministries in the Punjab and Bengal.13 Jinnah faced a genuine problem besides the communitys views separate electorates were meant for a minority, not a majority. But a backward majority felt insecure in voting in joint electorates. When Sir Fazl-i-Husain opposed Jinnahs active entry into Punjab politics in 1936 he complained in the case of the Punjab the Muslim majority in the Provincial Assembly is nominal, and it is almost impossible to secure a Muslim majority through a separate control of elections.14 Hence, his preference for the secular, if Muslim dominated, Unionist Party. This is what Jinnah said as a witness appearing before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Bill, 1919, in reply to question No. 3808:The position of Bengal was this : In Bengal the Muslims are in a majority, and the argument was advanced that any section or any community which is in the majority cannot claim a separate electorate: separate electorate is to protect the minority. But the counter-argument was perfectly true that numerically we are in a majority but as voters we are in the minority in Bengal, because of poverty and backwardness and so on. It was said: Very well, then x 40 per cent, because if you are really put to test you will not get 40 per cent, because you will not be qualied as voters. Then we had the
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advantage in other Provinces. However to some critics Jinnah sacriced the interests of Punjab and Bengal to secure a better deal for Muslims in the Provinces where they were in a minority. It is not necessary to trace here the subsequent course of Indian politics from the perspective of Jinnahs efforts for a settlement and the Congress rebuffs. Marguerite Dove and Uma Kaura have done it with admirable succinctness and documentation. Jinnahs outlook was optimistic. He said at the Leagues session on 31 December 1917 Do you think that in the rst instance it is possible that the Government of this country can become a Hindu Government? Do you think that the Government can be conducted merely by the ballot box? Do you think that because the Hindus are in a majority they have therefore to carry a measure in the Legislative Council and there is an end of it? If 70 million Musalmans do not approve of the measure which is carried by a ballot box, do you think that it could be enforced or administered in this country? Do you think that the Hindu statesmen with their intellect, with their past history, will ever think of enforcing measures by the ballot box when you get Self-Government? Then what is there to fear? Therefore I say to my Musalman friends: Fear not. This is a bogey, which is put before you by your enemies to frighten you, to scare you away from co-operation and unity which are essential for the establishment of self-Government. This country has not to be governed by the Hindus and, let me submit, it has not to be governed by the Musalmans either, and certainly not by the English. It is to be governed by the people and the sons of this country. I, standing here believe I am voicing the feeling of whole of India demand the immediate transfer of a substantial power of the Government of the country.15 Over a decade later and despite his bitter experience over the Nehru Report he said in the Central Legislative Assembly on 7 March 1930, seventy millions of Mussalmans should not be afraid of facing the issue squarely and fairly no matter what the Government do and no matter what the Hindus do. You are seventy millions. What is the good
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of leaning upon the Government? What is the good of your appealing to the Hindus? Do you want concessions? I do not want concessions. What is the good? You are seventy million Mussalmans. Organise yourselves in this country, and you will be a power, and you will be able to dictate not only to the Government, but to the Hindus and to every one else your just rights. Show a manly attitude.16 Theorists are welcome to their sport. The record speaks for itself on the Congress arrogance of power when it formed ministries in the provinces of Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces, U.P., Bihar, Orissa, Assam and the N.W.F.P., Jinnahs crie de coeur at Aligarh on 5 February 1938 explains the change: At that time there was pride in me and I used to beg from the Congress.17 He had to devise an alternative to the federation. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, asked him to propound an alternative. Jinnah proposed partition but with enough qualications in the Lahore Resolution (the last para and the reference to territorial adjustments) to suggest that he was prepared to consider a power-sharing arrangement at the Centre. Jinnahs article in Time and Tide of London, on 19 January 1940, said: A constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a Constitution, the Muslims are ready to co-operate with the British Government, the Congress or any other party so that the present enmities may cease and India may make its place amongst the great countries of the world. That was power-sharing at the Centre in a united India, not partition. If Pakistan was proposed only two months later, it could not have been the last unalterable last word. The Lahore Resolution received a wild reaction, however; and Jinnahs offers of compromise in May 1946 were spurned by Gandhi and the Congress. Jinnah now began exerting every nerve to achieve Pakistan. He cut the umbilical cord between partition and safeguards for minorities and made little secret that they would have to fend for themselves. The speeches were revealing.

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28 December 1940: The Muslim minorities in the Hindu provinces would put up with their fate, but they would not stand in the way of Muslim majority provinces becoming free.18 10 March 1941: The creation of these independent states will be the surest guarantee for the fair treatment of the minorities. When the time for consultation and negotiation comes, the case of Muslims in the minority provinces will certainly not go by default.19A rare, if not solitary, assurance of safeguards dened in the pact on partition. 30 March 1941: In order to liberate 7 crores of Muslims where they were in a majority, he was willing to perform the last ceremony of martyrdom if necessary and let two crores of Muslims be smashed.20 1 July 1942: The only way for Britain to do justice is to hand over the Muslim homelands to the Musalmans and the Hindu homelands to the Hindus.21This was bad history. Islam came to Malabar in the South before it appeared in the north. Muslim homelands were spread all over India. The homelands theory, although more plausible there, played havoc in Sri Lanka with the notorious Cleghorn minute on Tamil homelands in the north and east. There was a yet graver aw in Jinnahs scheme. It was majoritarian and left no room for a composite culture or a secular setup. The winner took all Hindu rule in one part (Hindu India) Muslim rule in the other (Muslim India). There was another and equally consequential aw, based on the two-nation theory. Sample this speech at Aligarh on 2 November 1942: Three fourths of India go to Hindus and only one-fourth to Muslims. Where did this leave the minorities in both states? Worse, he added you will protect and safeguard our minorities in your zones and we will protect and guard your minorities in ours.22The implications are staggering. November 1945: Let 3/4ths of India belong to Hindus where they can rule as they wish and let Muslims have 1/4th of India where they are in a majority.23 3 April 1946, interview to the BBC:If Britain in Gladstones time could intervene in Armenia in the name of protection of minorities,
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why should it not be right for us to do so in the case of our minorities in Hindustan, if they are oppressed.24Britain was then the worlds strongest power. Even in 1946 Jinnah knew that Pakistan would be militarily weaker than India. 26 November 1946: exchange of population should be considered.25 14 December 1946:The differences between Hindus and Muslims are so fundamental that there is nothing that matters in life upon which we agree.26 The hostage theory was not absent from Jinnahs mind. He told Norman Cliff of the News Chronicle of London (12 April 1946) that Muslims in India were fortunate that there would be a corresponding minority of 25,000,000 Hindus in Pakistan.After the partition, Weldon James of Colliers Weekly reported (25 August 1947) that Jinnah said The minorities are in effect hostages to the requirement of mutual cooperation and good neighbourliness between the Governments of Pakistan and the Indian Union. In 1947 the two States did not enter into a Treaty on minority rights; but the fate of the hapless minorities depended on the state of Indo-Pak relations. This was not unforeseen, Jinnah had told the News Chronicle of London, on 15 February 1945 that the Hindus must trust their minorities to the Pakistan government and we must trust the Hindus with our Muslim minorities. Trust is a far cry from the adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards proposed in the Lahore resolution. But trust in good behaviour by their respective States, rather than effective safeguards, were all that the minorities could hope for. At his last press conference in Delhi on 14 July 1947 Jinnah said: Minorities, to whichever community they may belong, will be safeguarded. Their religion or faith or belief will be secure. There will be no interference of any kind with their freedom of worship. They will have their protection
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with regard to their religion, faith, their life, their culture. They will be, in all respects, the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste or creed. They will have their rights and privileges and no doubt, along with it goes the obligation of citizenship. Therefore, the minorities have their responsibilities also and they will play their part in the affairs of this State. As long as the minorities are loyal to the State and owe true allegiance and as long as I have any power, they need have no apprehension of any kind. You cannot have a minority which is disloyal and plays the role of sabotaging the State. That minority, of course, becomes intolerable in any State. I advise Hindus and Muslims and every citizen to be loyal to his State.27 On 22 July 1947 the Partition Council met with the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, in the Chair. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan represented the future Government of Pakistan, Vallabhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad represented the future Government of India. Baldev Singh represented the Sikhs. A Joint Communiqu recorded Both the Congress and the Muslim League have given assurances of fair and equitable treatment to the minorities after the transfer of power. The two future governments re-afrm these assurances. It is their intention to safeguard the legitimate interests of all citizens irrespective of religion, caste, or sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights, all citizens will be regarded as equal, and both the governments will assure to all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right to worship in their own way, and the protection of their language and culture. Both the governments further undertake that there shall be no discrimination against those who before 15 August may have been political opponents.28This fell far short of a formal agreement. The Muslim Leagues members in India now thoroughly demoralized, sought Jinnahs counsel before he left for Karachi. Mohammed Raza Khan, a prominent Leaguer from Madras ruefully recorded in his memoirs What Price Freedom (1969):About the end of July 1947, the Muslim members of the Central Legislative Assembly met Mr. Jinnah who was also the leader of the Muslim League Party in the Assembly. It was for the last time that they met him, for he was then arranging
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to leave for Karachi. It was their farewell meeting. Many members expressed concern about the future of the Muslims in India. When they sought his advice about their future, and that of the Muslim League, he refrained from saying anything specic. He, however, told them they had enough experience under his leadership, and they would have to evolve their own policy and programme. They had to decide things for themselves in the new set-up, and in the changed circumstances. But he made it clear, in no uncertain terms, that they should be loyal to India, and that they should not seek to ride two horses. It has, therefore, to be said in clearest terms that Mr. Jinnah did not give any positive directions or instructions to Indian Muslims as to their future.29 The most revealing encounter was between Jinnah and a delegation of the Coorg Muslims at 10 Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi on 25 July. He said : Muslims in India have nothing to be afraid of. They will still be several crores in number. They have made many sacrices along with the Muslims of the majority provinces. It is as a result of the sacrices made by all of them in India that we have been able to achieve Pakistan. While the Musalmans of the majority provinces will be in a position to wield authority and power and mould their destinies according to their genius, the Musalmans in India have yet to go through a number of ordeals, sufferings, and sacrices. Their future will remain dark for some years to come and thick clouds will be hanging over them. The only way out for them will be to become much more active, much more courageous, and work harder than ever before. Trusting in God they should always be up and doing and go forward undeterred by the discouraging circumstances around them. What they need rst is the correct leadership. If they could nd men who are possessed of high ideals and sterling character and men who could understand their difculties and men who are above board, it will be some consolation to start with. What you have to do is to maintain your identity and your individuality in the rst instance. You can adapt yourselves to the changing circumstances and environment, without sacricing your identity and individuality You must also avoid occasions of conict with the majority community and show by dint of your merit and intellectual capacity that you cannot be ignored
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under any circumstances. As regards your loyalty, you cannot but be loyal to your country. Just as I want every Hindu in Pakistan to be loyal to Pakistan, so do I want every Muslim in India to be loyal to India. There is no other alternative. You can be useful citizens of your country in two ways by becoming (i) educationally forward and (ii) economically sound, and thereby making yourselves indispensable to the country. To achieve this you have to devote much of your attention to the education of your young men and see that they are well equipped. You should prepare them for technical and professional careers. While you make progress educationally, you should at the same time continue your business activities so that you are economically strong. Without this you will not be able to keep pace with the march of events. Worse coming to worst, you will have a homeland in Pakistan which will give you a shelter whenever you need it. What is more, there will be adjustments between the two countries and there will be territorial safeguards for the protection of minorities on either side. All that you have got to do so is to nd the correct leadership in India, which will guide you and take you through your ordeals smoothly without involving you in a conict with the powers that be and provide opportunities for you to develop educationally and economically. So long as I am alive, I shall watch with great interest, care, and anxiety your struggles in India, your interests, and your future. I shall pray that God may come to your succour in times of your difculties and be with you to lead you to prosperity and happiness. Your sacrices in the making of Pakistan are great. How can we ever forget them or forget you? You and your sacrices will always be in my thoughts and feeling. May God be with you. Goodbye!30 That was inspiring but not particularly helpful. Jinnahs historic speech on 11 August 1947 at the inauguration of Pakistans Constituent Assembly as its President, is recalled still. It was delivered extempore and reected sincerity and spontaneity. The fundamentals he propounded are of abiding relevance. He advised tolerance and said We should begin to work in that spirit and in course
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of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on will vanish. No power can hold another nation , and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will nd that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but the political sense as citizens of the State.31 While this speech, notable for renunciation of the two nation theory (a nation of 400 million) came too late to provide redress, its signicance as an enunciation of a noble ideal cannot be underestimated. It is not necessary to recount here the fate that befell the minorities in both countries after the partition.32 Jinnahs anguish was sincere and deep. He was, pained and genuinely surprised at the situation that confronted him. His interview to Duncan Hooper of Reuters on 25 October 1947 reected his dismay at the Leagues decline in India. It bears quotation, in extenso : It is also very unfortunate that the Muslims in Hindustan are told threateningly that they must abjure the leadership of the League and declare their folly in having supported Pakistan and in believing in this fantastic two-nation theory, also that certain tests and standards of loyalty are demanded from them As for the twonation theory, it is not a theory but a factTo the Muslim minority and their leaders left in India, I have already conferred advice that they must reorganize themselves under their own chosen leadership as they have a very big part to play in safeguarding the rights and interests of many millions. They have already professed under my advice their loyalty to
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the Government of India and made their position clear on the very rst day when they attended the Indian Dominion Constituent Assembly. In spite of this, insidious propaganda is going on that they have been let down by the Muslim League and Pakistan is indifferent to what may happen to them. The Muslim minority in India have played a magnicent part in the achievement and establishment of Pakistan. They were fully alive to the consequences that they would have to remain in Hundustan as minorities but not at the cost of their self-respect and honour. Nobody visualized that a powerful section in India was bent upon the ruthless extermination of Muslims and had prepared a well organized plan to achieve that and I, therefore, while deeply and fully sympathising with their sufferings, urge upon Muslims in India to bear their trial with courage and fortitude and not get panicky and play into the hands of our enemies by hasty decisions or actions. They should not in their adversity be led away by mischievous propaganda of interested parties and hold the Muslim League and its leadership responsible for all their tribulations. They must hold on to their posts, and Pakistan, I can assure them, will not be a mere spectator of their sufferings. We are deeply concerned with their welfare and future, and we shall do everything in our power to avert the danger that they are facing. I sincerely hope that with the cooperation of the Indian Dominion we shall be able to secure a fair deal for them.33 But he made no effort whatever to seek Indias cooperation for a joint policy towards the minorities in India and Pakistan. On the contrary he scotched a move by H. S. Suhrawardy in that direction. That was but one of the three fateful decisions Jinnah took which harmed the interests of Indian Muslims instead of improving their lot. It was bad enough to nominate Choudhry Khaliquzzaman as leader of the Leagues Party in the Constituent Assembly of India in preference to the highly respected and sternly independent Nawab Mohammed Ismail. It was worse to reproach the pliant Choudhary for not toeing Pakistans line on Kashmir. Pakistans Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan. had, in a speech at the United Nations, spoken of the slaughter of Muslims. Khaliquazzaman issued a statement in reply on 20 September 1947. He was being cruelly taunted in India for his past. When he met Jinnah on 5 October 1947 he was taken to task for that statement.
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Mr. Jinnah came with my rejoinder to Sir Zafrullah Khans statement in his hand and read it to me, expressing surprise that it had been broadcast from India for three days. I reminded him that it was the statement of the Leader of the Opposition in the Indian Constituent Assembly and India had attached great importance to it. Thereupon he said, It has hurt us very much! I asked him how anything said by a Muslim citizen of India could bind down the Government of Pakistan or have any effect on it. Nevertheless as he was dissatised with my answer, I said I would not go back to India but would send in my resignation, to enable someone else who might have his condence to replace me and serve the Indian Muslims. Thereafter Shaheed Suhrawardy gave him the document which he had shown me at Delhi, to go through it. Mr. Jinnah looked at it and returned it to Shaheed without any comment. What pained me most in the Quaid-e-Azams reception of me was the fact that he had been mainly responsible for putting the burden of the leadership of Indian Muslims on my shoulders, but at the time of my interview with him, which was the last in my life, he did not realize my responsibilities towards the Indian Muslims, who were facing a situation never before experienced in their history of a thousand years.34He soon left India for Pakistan as did other League leaders like Hussain Imam and Z. H. Lari. Khaliquzzamans reference to the document which Huseyn Shaheed Surawardy gave to Jinnah and which Jinnah returned without any comment had a sad aftermath. Khaliquzzam revealed: Shaheed Suhrawardy came to see me one day at Ra Qidwais house and showed me a document concerning the Muslim minority in India and suggesting means for their protection. On the very rst page of this document there was remark in the handwriting of Gandhiji, It can be abridged. The question is whether Quaid-e-Azam would abide by it. After examining the document I asked Shaheed whether it had been approved by Mr. Jinnah. He asked me to come with him to see Gandhiji to discuss the matter. I said I had talked with him and I did not see any point in meeting him again.35 Suhrawardy, undeterred by Jinnahs indifference on 5 October, wrote
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to him on 8 October setting out detailed suggestions for improving the lot of the minorities. A revealing correspondence ensued which came to light only in 2001 on the publication of Jinnah Papers 1 October 31 December 1947.36Its core was a common policy towards the minorities, jointly implemented by both Governments. One has only to read some of the suggestions to realize that they would have provided substantial redress. They read: That it is not the intention of either of the Dominions to go to war and that both the Dominions renounce war for all time as a method of settings disputes. A declaration of guarantee to minorities of protection of life, property, etc. Representatives of both the Dominions (who may be called Peace Commissioners with diplomatic privileges) will be stationed in various parts of the Dominions and will do all they can to promote peace and harmony between the communities, acquaint themselves with the difculties and complaints of the majority and minority communities, keep themselves informed of incidents and remove all causes of suspicion and mistrust. They shall be assured safety of their persons and facilities to move wheresoever they deem it necessary to proceed for the discharge of their duties. In the services, there should be a mixture of Hindu and Muslim ofcers and steps should be taken for this purpose. Representatives of minorities should be included in the Ministries. The houses and properties of refugees are being dealt with in different manners in the two Dominions. There should be a common policy. Annexed to the letter was a draft Declaration. Gandhi wrote to Jinnah on 11 October 1947 after he had heard Suhrawardys report on his talks with Jinnah. He suggested In paragraph 2(4) of his letter dated the 8th October to you, I would add and will submit to a tribunal of permanent arbitration selected from Indians alone (i.e., from the members of the two Dominions). In paragraph 2(8) or in any other suitable place, I would like the following idea to be brought out: Each State will induce the refugees to return and occupy their respective homes. Apparently a misunderstanding crept up. Suhrawardy had told Jinnah, when they met on 8 October that Gandhi had made endorsements in pencil on his draft suggestions. Jinnah wrote to Suhrawardy on 16 October asking for that document, which was an exchange between two
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other persons. A day earlier Suhrawardy had written to Jinnah conveying Gandhis regret at the interpretation of the endorsement which in any event was his reaction but was not meant as a message to you Gandhi had however accepted Suhrawardys draft with two changes. So had Nehru, who mattered more as Prime Minister. Liaquat Ali Khan also agreed. You are the only one who can save the situation, Suhrawardy pleaded with Jinnah.37To Jinnahs request he replied on 17 October to say that the rst draft with the penciled comments had been destroyed. In any case Jinnah had the nalized text which Gandhi had endorsed. Jinnahs rejoined on 18 October that Gandhis letter to him of 11 October seemed to refer an earlier draft. But that hardly mattered. What mattered was the nal draft endorsed by Gandhi and Nehru. Jinnah could have suggested changes. He ignored the draft. He insinuated that the earlier draft was destroyed deliberately (in such a hurry). Given the stakes the interest of a minority whose cause he had fought for all his life, it is a pity that Jinnahs distrust beclouded his vision. Suhrawardy wrote to him, once again, on 28 October from Delhi, to point out that they were Gandhis immediate reactions and were not meant as a message to you The nal suggestions are now before you, and wait your approval or reactions I beg this of you with folded hands. Please do not leave us in the lurch we only want you to cooperate, with the Indian Union so that the minorities conditions improve.38 Far worse followed when the Council of the All India Muslim League met in Karachi on 14 and 15 December 1947 for its last session to split up the Party, Jinnah insisted, against the opposition of the Leaguers from India, that the Muslim League re-establish itself in India. Jinnah said There must be a Muslim League in Hindustan. If you are thinking of anything else, you are nished. If you want to wind up the League you can do so; but I think it would be a great mistake. I know there is an attempt. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and others are trying to break the identity of Muslims in India. Do not allow it. Do not do it. Hussain Imam then moved his amendment: In the resolution, in place of the All-India Muslim league, there shall be separate League organizations for Pakistan and the Indian Union, the word shall
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should be replaced by may. He said, People here do not know the difculties the Muslims are facing in India. They should be left free to decide their future according to the circumstances. No one supported his amendment. Jinnah said, I sympathize with Mr. Hussain Imam. He has not read the resolution properly. You should constitute the Muslim League in India. If you do not, you would go back to 1906. You are forty million; you can have a leader if not one, then two or more. We cannot give directives to you. When you are strong and Pakistan is developed, the settlement will come. Speaking next, Mr. Suhrawardy added: I oppose this resolution. I am amongst those who had proposed some time ago that the League should be split. So, some might be surprised at my opposition. But before we split, my concern is to do something practical about the protection of minorities. I say when our objective is achieved, then why should we not organize ourselves in such a manner that the minorities are given the opportunity, on a national basis, to join us in the same organization? If you do that in Pakistan, it would help us in the Indian Union. If you form a national body here it would strengthen the hands of Nehru and Gandhi. The AICC passed a very good resolution. We should also have passed a similar resolution. Abdur Rab Nishtar said, Our two friends want to nish the League. I say if the League exists, Islam exists, Musalmans exist. We shall never allow the League to be wound up. The protection of minorities in India depends on the strength of Pakistan. We shall do all to protect them. Liaquat Ali Khan supported Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. The resolution was passed with an overwhelming majority. Some ten members, including Suhrawardy and Mian Iftikharuddin, voted against it. Liaquat Ali Khan and Mohammed Ismail, President of the Madras Provincial Muslim League, were elected as convenors for the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Muslim League, respectively. It was
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decided to hold their sessions shortly at Karachi and Madras.39 Mohammed Ismail was not even a member of the Leagues Working Committee. Jinnah and his colleagues did not heed the interests of Indian Muslims voiced by their representatives. It was the State interests of Pakistan that moved them. Even those interests should have prompted a positive response to Suhrawardys draft. Sadly, rhetoric apart, Jinnah did nothing to protect the interests of Indian Muslims. The safeguards envisaged in the Lahore Resolution were not stipulated or negotiated with India at the time of the partition. The Lahore Resolution was torn apart at the very moment of its fulllment. As the record shows, it followed inexorably from a conscious separation of its two vital paragraphs in 1940 no sooner the Resolution was adopted. A promising draft Declaration as basis for an Indo-Pak accord was ignored. Khaliquzzam was reproached for not following Pakistans line and the Muslim League was foisted on Indian Muslims against the wishes of the Leaguers from India.

References:
1 2 3 Vide Jinnah-Gandhi Talks;S. Shamsul Hasan, Central Ofce, All India Muslim League, Daryaganj, Delhi; 1944. Pp. 18 and 24; underlining mine, throughout. Ahmed, Jamiluddin; Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah; Shaikh Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore; Vol. I; pp. 30 and 43, respectively. Kaura, Uma; Muslims and Indian Nationalism; Manohar, Delhi; 1977 and Dove, Marguerite; Fortied Future: The Conict over Congress Ministries in British India; Chanakya Publications, Delhi, 1987, an excellent but neglected work. Pakistan or the Partition of India; Thacker & Co., Ltd., Bombay; 1946; p.411 Menon, V.P.: The Transfer of Power in India; Orient Longmans; 1957; p.444. Dove p. 398. Pirzada, Sharifuddin, Syed; The Collected Works of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Vol. III; p.321. Pirzada; Vol I, pp. 1 and 4. Zakaria, Raq; Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics; p. 111. Pirzada; Vol. I, p. 17. Ibid.; p. 15. Kaura; pp. 20 -21. Qureshi; Hussain, Ishtiaq; The Struggle for Pakistan; University of Karachi, 1969; p. 47. Husain, Azim; Fazl-i-Hussain: A Political Biography; Longmans, Green & Co., 1946;

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 p.308. Pirzada; Vol. I, p.252. Pirzada, Vol. III, p.439. J. Ahmad; Vol, I, p. 39. J. Ahmad; Vol !, p. 216. Ibid., p. 242. Ibid., p. 246. Ibid., p.388. Ibid.; p.441. Ahmad; p. 256. Ibid.; p.286. Ibid.; p.371. Ibid.; p.389. Jinnah: Speechs and Statements 1947 -1948; Oxford University Press, Karachi; p.13. Noorani, A.G.; Muslims of India: A Documentary Record 1947-2000; Oxford University Press, New Delhi; 2003; p.35. Khan, Raza Mohammed; What Price Freedom, 1969; pp.321-2. Jinnah Papers; First Series, Vol. III; pp.694-7. Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-48; pp.28-29. Vide an excellent account in Vazira Fazile Yaqoobali Zamindar; The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees, Boundaries and Histories; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008. Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Research Society of Pakistan; Lahore; pp. 439-441. Khaliquzzaman, Chaudhry; Pathway to Pakistan; Longmans, Pakistan Branch; 1961; pp.410-412. Ibid., pp.409-10. Jinnah Papers 1October - 31 December 1947;First series; Vol VI, Government of Pakistan; pp.689-738. Ibid., p.712. Ibid., p.716. Pirzada; Foundations of Pakistan, All India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947; Vol. II pp.570-6.

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THE HAROON REPORT


A.G.Noorani*

Abstract
(The Haroon Report is the most neglected document in all the discourse on the Pakistan movement, but is second in significance only to the Lahore Resolution which it was intended to supplement. We have travelled a long way since. But even in the altered situation India and Pakistan can reflect on that precious nugget in paragraph 16 of the Haroon Report and apply its logic to the realities of 2008. Its core lesson is Indo-Pak cooperation on an institutional basis as sovereign States as equals. This was the core of the concerns which Jinnah articulated seventy years ago, in 1939. Author) The Haroon Report is the most neglected document in all the discourse on the Pakistan movement, but is second in significance only to the Lahore Resolution which it was intended to supplement. Its tragic fate reflects the course which events took. It still bears a profound relevance to the relations between India and Pakistan and to the state of the minorities in both countries. The Report touched the very core of the problem as it existed in 1940. Only the political skills of Mohammed Ali Jinnah could have managed the contradictions between the claims of the Muslim-majority provinces of British India and those of Muslims in other provinces. He performed the feat to emerge as the Quaid-i-Azam of the Muslims of the entire sub-continent. Compromises had to be made. Punjab was not happy with the Lucknow Pact of 1916, for instance. Imminence of independence made the dilemma acute. Secession
* A.G.Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar, legal expert and noted columnist.

The Haroon Report

ensured the independence of the Muslim-majority provinces from an allIndia federation. Their separation spelt problems for Muslims minorities elsewhere. Ayesha Jalal holds There were contradictions between Muslim interests in majority and minority provinces, and between an apparently separatist demand for autonomous Muslim states and the need for a centre capable of ensuring the interests of Muslims in the rest of India. At no point was Jinnah able to reconcile these contradictions. He came away from Lahore not with a coherent demand which squared the circle of these difficulties, but simply with the right to negotiate for Muslims on a completely new basis.1 Ayesha Jalals view is shared by many. The Haroon Report resolved the dilemma. Circumstances forced Jinnah to mould his strategy but he was always prepared to negotiate. The Congress was not, because accord implied sharing power. The Congress set its face against it. It never propounded an alternative which the Muslim League could reasonably be expected even to consider. The last paragraph of the Leagues Lahore resolution of 23 March 1940 on the partition of India was overlooked by politicians on both sides. This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption nally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary. That scheme of constitution was never framed, nor did the Congress ever demand that it be produced. The word nally clearly signied an interim centre during the transitional period. In December 1940 The Haroon Report addressed both these points. Its background and its aftermath provide lessons for today. In 1938, Sir Abdullah Haroon was not only Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference at Karachi but was the brains behind the resolution on partition moved by Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi. It envisaged the federation of Muslim States and the federation of non-Muslim States. Jinnah disapproved of it. With his tacit consent, Haroons draft was passed as modied on 9 October. It mentioned two nations but merely asked the League to review and revise the entire question of what should be a suitable
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Constitution of India and to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslims may attain independence.2 In 1965 Shaikh Abdul Majid said in a press interview that he was prepared for a centre with limited powers including safeguards for minorities. Sir Abdullahs ardour was not dampened. He wrote to the Aga Khan on 7 November 1938 We are seriously considering the possibility of having a separate federation of Muslims States and Provinces. 3 The League Council took a fateful step. On 4 December 1938 it set up the Foreign Committee with Sir Abdullah as Chairman. Its objective was propagation of the Leagues policies and programme in India and abroad. Later in the month the Leagues 26th Session at Patna authorized the President to adopt such a course as may be necessary with a view to exploring the possibility of a suitable alternative to the federation set up by the Government of India Act, 1935. But if not the Act, precisely what alternative did Jinnah propose, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, kept asking. Lord Linlithgow reported to the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, on 28 February 1939 on his meeting with Jinnah a couple of days ago I asked him what suggestions he had to make, to which he replied that, while he did not reject the federal idea, it must be a federation which would ensure an adequate equipoise between Muslim and Hindu votes, and in which there should be an appropriate balance between the communities. I asked him how he contemplated securing this, to which he replied that he had in his mind the manipulation of territorial votes and the adjustments of territorial divisions as to bring it about. He blushed a little as I pressed the implication of these suggestions upon him, but in the end maintained that at any rate his project for the carving up of this country was a better one than Sikandars.4 In plain words, a sharing of power on the basis of equality. The Leagues Working Committee set up another Committee when it met in Castle Mustafa at Meerut on 26 March 1939. Recalling the Patna resolution, it said the President with the concurrence of the Working Committee hereby appoints a Committee of the following
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gentlemen to examine various schemes already propounded by those who are fully versed in the Constitutional developments of India and other countries and those may be submitted hereafter to the President and report to the Committee their conclusions at an early date.5The members were Jinnah, as President, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan, Sir Abdullah Haroon, Khwaja Nazimuddin, and three others. Liaquat Ali Khan was appointed its Convenor. Only the day before, on 25 March 1939, when Liaquat Ali Khan spoke of dividing the country in a suitable manner he added If this is done, a limited and specic Federation would not only be easy but desirable. By then many proposals were aoat including that of dividing the country but Jinnah made plain to the Leagues Council on 8 April 1939 that the Committee was not pledged to any but was examining all of them to produce a scheme which would be in the best interests of the Muslims of India6 One which caught fancy was by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif of the Osmania University in Hyderabad. He wrote two monographs; The Cultural Future of India (1938) and the Muslim Problem in India (1939). He proposed cultural zones to achieve which transfer of population may be necessary and a centre. Sir Abdullah sought to stir a discussion and invited the Doctor to meet the Foreign Committee on 29 January 1939 when he was asked to prepare a scheme. He wrote a Foreword to the 1939 paper and donated Rs. 2,000 for its printing and circulation. No shrinking violet, Latif released his scheme to the press. Haroon had written to Jinnah on 22 April 1939 that Latifs scheme evoked lot of criticism in the press in the North. Apparently the Foreign and Constitutional Committees coordinated their work but as Aqeel-uz-Zafar Khan wrote in Dawn on 23 March 1989 the task of framing the constitutional proposals was mostly performed by the Foreign Committee. On 15 April 1939 Haroon intimated Liaquat Ali Khan regarding the holding of the meeting of the Sub-Committee at Lahore and requested him to issue a Press note to the public to the effect that any one desiring to send any scheme may do so till such and such date. Liaquat Ali Khan issued a circular letter to the Provincial Leagues on 7 July and again a reminder on 19 August urging them to send the views and suggestions of the Provincial Leagues
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on the schemes for the constitutional development of India as an alternative to the Government of India Act. On 27 July, Haroon wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan and stressed that he should impress the authors to send schemes as early as possible, to be considered by the SubCommittee in October 1939. This shows that his work had the sanction of the Muslim League. He felt that time was running out and urged Jinnah on 17 July 1939 that the Constitution Sub-Committee must nish its work by October so that a denite goal is placed before the people . The Lahore Session of the League ought to be a great success. Ayesha Jalal reveals that in an unpublished draft of the Working Committees resolution of 22 October 1939 immediate independence for India was demanded on the basis of a Constitution of a Confederation of free states in which the rights and interests of all communities shall be adequately safeguarded.7 Jinnahs article in Time and Tide (London) on 19 January 1940 said there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland . so that India may take its place among the great nations of the world. This was a mere two months before the Lahore Resolution. Events moved briskly to a nale. On 1 February 1940 the Foreign Committee met the authors of the various schemes, which were submitted to the League, under Sir Abdullahs Presidentship. He wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan the next day with a request to place the letter before Jinnah. It is truly a historic document. It propounded 5 points (a) The Muslims of India, who constitute ninety millions of people, are a separate Nation entitled to the same right of self-determination which has been conceded in respect of other Nations; (b) The Muslims of India shall in no case agree to be reduced to a position of minority on the basis of extraneous and foreign considerations, or for the sake of any political conveniences or expediencies; (c) That in order to make the Muslims right of selfdetermination really effective, the Muslims shall have separate National Home in the shape of an autonomous state; (d) That the Muslims living in the rest of India shall be treated as the Nationals of the aforesaid Muslim state and their rights and privileges shall be fully safeguarded; (e) That any scheme of Indian Reforms, interfering with these basic
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principles, shall be stoutly resisted by the Indian Muslim Nation, till it has achieved the aforesaid objectives.8 Two days later, on 4 February the Leagues Working Committee propounded its 5 points to guide the Constitution Committee. The following broad outline were agreed: (1) Mussalmans are not a minority in the ordinary sense of the word. They are a nation. (2) British system of democratic parliamentary system is not suitable to the genius and conditions of the people of India. (3) Those zones, which are composed of majority of Mussalmans in the physical map of India, should be constituted into independent Dominions in direct relationship with Great Britain. (4) In those zones where Muslims are in minority, their interests and those of other minorities must be adequately and effectively safeguarded and similar safeguards shall be provided for the Hindus and other minorities in the Muslim zones. (5) The various units in each zone shall form component parts of Federation in that zone as autonomous units.9 When Jinnah met the Viceroy on 13 March he warned him that if we could not improve on our present solution for the problem of Indias constitutional development, he and his friends would have no option but to fall back on some form of partition. The Leagues historic session was held at Lahore on 21 24 March 1940. It appointed a Committee to draft the main resolution on 22 March. It discussed a preliminary draft based on Sir Sikandars draft and the 5 points of 4 February. He had proposed (e) That the regions may, in turn, delegate to a Central agency, which for the convenience may be designated the Grand Council of the United Dominions of India, and on such terms as may be agreed upon, provided that such functions shall be administered through Committee on which all regions (dominions) and interests will be duly represented and their actual administration will be entrusted to the Units. (f) That no decision of this Central Agency will be effective or operative unless it is carried by at least a two-third majority. (g) That in the absence of agreement with regard to the constitution, functions and scope of the Grand Council of the United Dominions of India, cited above, the regions (dominions) shall have the right to refrain
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from or refuse to participate in the proposed Central structure. (h) That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards will be specically provided in the Centre for minorities in the Units, in the regions and in the Centre, in regard to the religious, cultural, economical, political, administration and other spheres. This did not affect sovereignty. It only provided for coordination.10The Subjects Committee dropped these provisions for a Centre. They do not gure in the Lahore Resolution as adopted by the session. Jinnah obviously did not wish to commit himself to any central agency ahead of negotiations. This explains Sikandars speech in the Punjab assembly on 11 March 1941. I have no hesitation in admitting that I was responsible for drafting the original Resolution. But let me make it clear that the Resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee, and there is a wide divergence between the Resolution I drafted and the one that was nally passed. The main difference between the two Resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution, which related to the Centre and coordination of the activities of the various units, was eliminated. He, however, continued to remain a Leaguer. 11Ayesha Jalal holds : By apparently repudiating the need for any centre, and keeping quiet about its shape, Jinnah calculated that when eventually the time came to discuss an all-India federation, the British and Congress alike would be forced to negotiate with organized Muslim opinion, and would be ready to make substantial concessions to create or retain that centre. The Lahore resolution should therefore be seen as a bargaining counter, which had the merit of being acceptable (on the face of it) to the majorityprovince Muslims, and of being totally unacceptable to the Congress and in the last resort to the British also. This, in turn, provided the best insurance that the League would not be given what it now apparently was asking for, but which Jinnah in fact did not really want.12 Sadly, Jinnah never reckoned with the reality that the Congress would prefer the partition of India, together with partition of Punjab and Bengal to a Union in which it would share power with him. Nehru said as much in his Prison Diary on 31 December 1943: It is better to
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have Pakistan or almost anything if only to keep Jinnah far away and reported to the Cabinet Mission in private on 10 June 1946 that Jinnah had no real place in the country.13 Jinnah evidently did not contemplate this possibility. The Haroon Reports best parts would have helped retrieve the situation. But Jinnah had another formidable sceptic to deal with, the Nawab of Chhatari, who wrote to Jinnah on 16 October 1940 even the Lahore resolution will not solve the problem because the Muslims in the minority provinces will suffer in any case. Jinnah assured him on 22 October the resolution made it quite clear that we cannot leave the Muslims in the Hindu provinces to their fate and asked him to come out with a denite scheme of his own which he promised to consider before making a nal decision in this regard.14Choudhary Khaliquzzanan was also restive despite his support to the Lahore resolution.15 Soon thereafter, Syed Abdul Latif went to town. He sent a letter to Haroon with a copy to Jinnah on 23 April containing his scheme for the consideration of the Constitution Committee. Basically he proposed a Centre, transfer of population and the rest. He wrote to Jinnah again on 30 May proposing a confederation as if the Lahore Resolution had not been passed. All this was for the benet, he wrote, of Sir Abdullah Haroons Committee. He was simultaneously urging the Congress leaders to accept his ideas.16 He sent Jinnah an amendment on 30 May which, he claimed, sought to implement the Lahore resolution and yet preserve the unity of India.17 The Constitution Committee set up in March 1939 apparently went into hibernation. The Foreign Committee did all the running, a fact well known to Jinnah and Liaquat. In November this Committee met again after a break of nine months, Jinnah was very patient with Latif. He wrote to him on 12 October Your scheme is fundamentally different from the basic principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the All India Muslim League, last March. This, Latif refused to appreciate although I tried to explain to you in our talk on 27th of September.18 Finally on 23 December 1940, Haroon submitted his Report to
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Jinnah as Chairman, Foreign Sub-Committee of the League. Clearly Latif swayed the Committee on many points. Unfortunately it went beyond the Lahore Resolution to include the princely States with special mention of Hyderabad, predictably. Transfer of population was not overlooked. Latifs hare-brained ideas marred the Report but it contained a precious nugget in paragraph 16 which read : The Lahore resolution of the League does not look forward to the proposed regional states assuming immediately as they are formed, powers of defence, external affairs, customs etc. This argues that there should be a transitional stage during which these powers should be exercised by some agency common to them all. Such a common coordinating agency would be necessary even independent of the above consideration, for under the third principle of the resolution, it will be impossible to implement effectively the provision of safeguards for minorities without some organic relationship subsisting between the states under the Hindu inuence. A federation is not to the taste of the Muslims, because they fear that the Hindus will, on the strength of their majority, dominate the Muslims. But since some common arrangement is essential to the fulllment of the provisions of the resolution, an agreed formula has to be devised whereby the Muslims shall have the control at the Centre on terms of perfect equality with the Non-Muslims.19 This agency would have solved Jinnahs dilemma of old. On relations between the two parts of India the Report said that the subjects to be assigned to this central machinery shall be (a) External relation, (b) Defence, (c) Communications, (d) Customs, (e) Safeguards for minorities and voluntary inter migration etc., subject to the following provision in respect of defence and intermigration. It went too far and cast an unfortunate gloss on paragraph 16. Each State would have its own army but, the Navy will be entirely under the Centre. The reference to intermigration reveals Latifs hand. There is every reason to believe that Jinnah the hard-headed lawyer would have separated the wheat from the chaff and used the nugget in paragraph 16 of the Report constructively if only it had been kept under
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wraps so as not to tie his hands. It was to be discussed by the Working Committee on 22 February 1941. On 18 February The Statesman reported the contents an obvious leak by a scheming member. The meeting was postponed. A member, Prof. Mohammed Afzal Hussain Qadri complained that the Report was not actually completed. But the unkindest cut came from Latif. He wrote testily to Sir Abdullah Haroon on 8 March insinuating that the Report was leaked from people in Delhi and opted out of the Committee. He now quibbled over the Reports ndings which he had found in order on 20 February. Worse still, he criticized the cry for Pakistan as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution. This was rank ingratitude to a man who had helped him as Sir Abdullah did all along.20 Latif sent a copy to Jinnah who gave him his deserts on 15 March 1941. But the snub was accompanied by a gross injustice. The Muslim League has appointed no such Committee as you keep harping upon.21 The record shows that this was simply not true. The Foreign Committee had acted with his full knowledge. Jinnahs exasperation was understandable. The next League session was due to be held in Madras in April, where the Lahore Resolution was to be incorporated into the Leagues Constitution. The embarrassment of a Committee of the League pouring cold water on some of its formulations was palpable. Jinnah, true to form, performed a surgical operation. He was later to call Latif a busy body not unjustly. Signicantly his relations with Sir Abdullah Haroon remained close till his death on 27 April 1942. Jinnah told the Lucknow session of the League in October 1937 all safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power. He said at the Aligarh Muslim Union on 5 February 1938 The only hope for minorities is to organize themselves and secure a denite share in power to safeguard their rights and interests. Without such power no Constitution can work successfully in India.22 Sir Abdullah also realized that the Lahore Resolutions paragraph on the minorities would be of no avail unless the last paragraph was
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eshed out to provide what Coupland called an agency centre in which Muslims would have a voice; two sovereign states linked by such an agency assuring minority rights. Note the tell-tale signs. The Cripps Mission (1942) le (802) in the Quaid-i-Azam Papers contains his correspondence with Cripps regarding the creation of a new Indian Union. It is embargoed.23 Jinnah played with his cards close to the chest. If you start asking for 16 annas in a rupee there is room for bargaining hence the omission of Sikander Hayats agency from the resolution. The Leagues Convention of Legislators passed a Resolution on 9 April 1946 removing all ambiguities from the Lahore Resolution. When the Cabinet Mission invited written proposals from both sides, Jinnah had only to send across this resolution. Instead, he sent altogether different proposals on 12 May 1946. Overlooked by supporters and critics, it envisaged a confederation tighter than paragraph 16 of the Haroon Report. He accepted the Missions Plan of 16 May for a federation. Jinnah had told the Mission on 25 April he would accept a Union based on groups of provinces if the Congress did the same. It sabotaged the Missions plan leaving Jinnah no option but to press for Pakistan in 1947. Fundamentally it did not wish to share power with the League.24 We have travelled a long way since. But even in the altered situation India and Pakistan can reect on that precious nugget in paragraph 16 of the Haroon Report and apply its logic to the realities of 2008. Its core lesson is Indo-Pak cooperation on an institutional basis as sovereign States as equals. This was the core of the concerns which Jinnah articulated seventy years ago, in 1939.

References:
1 2 Jalal, Ayeshah; The Sole Spokesman; Cambridge University Press, 1985; pp.59-60. Ahmed, Jamiluddin, ed.; Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement; Publishers United Ltd., Lahore, 1970p.257. Vide also Moore, R.J.; Endgames of Empire; Oxford University Press, 1988. P.113. Vide also Haroon, Daulat; Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon Hidayatullah; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2006.

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4 Hasan, Mushirul, ed.; Documents on the Movement for Independence of India; 1939 (Part 2); Indian Council on Historical Research; Oxford University Press; 2008; p.1760. Ahmad; p. 347. Sayeed, Khalid, B; Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948; Oxford University Press; 1968; p.108. Jalal; p.576 n.48. For the text vide Malik, Aslam, Muhammad; The Making of the Pakistan Resolution; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2001; pp.224-5. This is an excellent survey of those events, based on archival material. It is the best account on the work of the Committees. Ibid.; p.226. Ibid.; pp.228-229 for the full text. Menon, V.P.; The Transfer of Power in India; 1757, pp.443-458 for the text. Jalal, Ayeshah; The Sole Spokesman; p.57. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; First Series; Vol. 13; p.324. Malik; pp. 199-200. This is based on Quaid-i-Azam Papers, File 242 pp. 33-35. The texts merit close study. Malik; p.199. Jinnah Papers: Pakistan: The Goal Dened (1 January 31 August 1940; Third Series Vol. XV; edited by Z.H. Zaidi, Government of Pakistan; 2007; pp. 287 295. Ibid.; p.373. Bahadur, Nazir Yar Jung, Nawab (Ed); The Pakistan Issue; Sh. Muhammed Ashraf; 1943; p.62. A collection of Latifs correspondence with Jinnah and Congress leaders. Ibid.; pp. 73-92 for the text. Ibid.; pp. 92 and 96-99. Ibid.; p.100. Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din, ed.; Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah; Vol. I pp. 30 and 43 respectively. Moore, R.J.; Escape from Empire; Oxford University Press; 1983; p.54, bn.117. Mansergh, Nicholas, ed.; The Transfer of Power 1942-47; HMSO; Vol.VII covers the Cabinet Mission.

5 6 7 8

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NOTES ON PAKISTANS TRADE AND IDUSTRY POLICY: PREDICAMENT IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ECONOMY1
Faizullah Khilji*

Abstract
(The paper seeks to develop some understanding regarding Pakistan place in the world economy, with particular reference to the post 2nd world war evolution of the world trade regime. The changing international trade regime gures prominently in this discussion because trade is one of the principal means of interaction with the world economy. Thus the economic opportunities that the world has offered and continues to offer to economies such as Pakistan, and, secondly, Pakistans record of respond to and realising these opportunities to its advantage are considered. The point that emerges from the paper is that Pakistan is not producing the goods which are increasingly in demand in the world, and in its present state it is perhaps not quite geared up to do so. Pakistan does not compare well in terms of the pre-requisites that investors look for: credible legal and regulatory institutions, relatively good infrastructure, a labour force with some discipline and vocational or functional skills, and relatively few barriers to trade. Arguably Pakistans predicament is shared to some degree with the other large South Asian economies. Author). the pattern of trade can only be understood as being the outcome of some military or political equilibrium between contending powers.2 Economies evolve, and so, too, must economic policy.3
* Dr Faizullah Khilji is an economist and a former Chairman of the National Tariff Commision.

Notes on Pakistans Trade and Idustry Policy

Part 1: Introduction What should be Pakistans economic policies? This question is often asked, and one suspects that it is asked with an unspoken hope that there exist policies that hold forth some promise, and that these policies are such as could catapult the nation into the developed world, and that once these policies are in place not too much hard work is involved.4 The presumption is that Pakistans problem lies chiey in not following the right policies and the inference is that the principal issue, therefore, might be a knowledge gap about the identication of these right policies. In these well meaning conversations export-based successes of East Asian economies are cited in passing as the desirable outcome; and a frequent lament is the charge that post-Korean war success that South Korea has experienced is really based on its implementation of Pakistans 2nd 5 year plan, which the Koreans allegedly copied whilst a Korean delegation was visiting Islamabad! Thus the Holy Grail was lost. The charge of copying, however ill-informed, is nonetheless an amusing but sad comment on the self-condence of the nation, and strengthens the belief that the answer to the national problems lies chiey in missing knowledge. Hence the search and recovery mission must continue until the Holy Grail is found. This question of the right policies is not in itself the subject of these notes. The present notes have a more modest purpose. Any answer aimed at devising a set of policies today, however cursory the effort, presumes some understanding of two developments: rstly, the economic opportunities that the world has offered and continues to offer to economies such as Pakistan, and, secondly, Pakistans ability to respond to and realise these opportunities to its advantage. These notes seek only to develop some understanding regarding Pakistans place in the world economy, with particular reference to the post-2nd World War evolution of the world trade regime. The trade regime gures prominently in this discussion because trade is one of the principal means of interaction with the world economy. The write up that follows these introductory comments is in three parts. The next part discusses some aspects of the post-2nd World War
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evolution of the world economy. The context that is developed is then applied to an examination of Pakistans case. The nal part sums up the discussion and offers some concluding observations. Part 2: Some aspects of the postwar world economy One may briey recall the post-2nd World War trends in the world economy. The table below sets out average annual growth rates in GDP and exports for 1950-73, 1973-98, and 2000-06. World GDP and trade 1950-2006 (annual average compound growth rates in percent)
1950-73 GDP World North America Latin America Western Europe / Europe Eastern Europe, USSR / CIS Asia Asia, excl. Japan Japan Africa 5.18 9.29 4.45 5.34 4.91 4.03 5.33 4.81 4.84 Export volume 7.88 6.26 4.28 8.38 9.81 9.97 5.46 2.97 2.74 1.87 GDP 3.01 2.98 3.02 2.11 0.56 1973-98 Export volume 5.07 5.92 6.03 4.79 2.52 5.95 6.10 1.00 4.10 GDP 3.00 3.00 2.80 2.40 5.70 2000-06 Export volume 5.50 3.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 10.00

Sources: For 1950-73 and 1973-98 data, see Angus Maddison, The World Economy, A Millennial Perspective, OECD, Paris 2001, pp 126-127. For 2000-06 GDP data see United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects 2008, United Nations, New York, 2008. For 2000-06 export volume data see World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007, (Geneva, WTO, 2007).

The data in the above table makes one big point: in the sixty yearplus period that followed the end of the 2nd World War, world trade and output have expanded continuously, and trade has expanded noticeably faster than output and income. The world increasingly exchanges more
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goods for a given level of output and income. This implies increasing integration of the world economy. Trade has arguably been the engine of output growth. A number of factors have facilitated growth in trade. First among these is the reduction in trade barriers that the world has experienced over this period. This phenomenon is also commonly referred to as improvements in market access, or more broadly, as trade liberalisation. There has been continuous liberalisation of trade since the inception of GATT. Extensive and unparalleled multilateral negotiations have been undertaken to achieve this liberalisation. Beginning with 1947, twelve multilateral negotiating rounds have taken place. Of these twelve negotiating rounds, seven preceded the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round was a dening moment in postwar trade negotiation history. The Uruguay Round was a dening moment because it set up the World Trade Organization, being the fulllment of the postwar desire for an International Trade Organization (it may be recalled that the GATT at its inception was only a temporary three year arrangement to provide some time for completion of inter-governmental negotiations on the ITO Charter).5 It was also a dening moment because the developing countries were brought more fully into the fold of international trade negotiations. Henceforth the developing countries needed to have greater clarity in their goals, needed to be more knowledgeable about the subject as well as more participative in the discussions. The developing countries were encouraged to offer more and expect less at the negotiating table; and, indeed, to get less in way of special and differential treatment. Though in some respects the new status of developing countries was much closer to that of the developed ones, there is little doubt what they received at Marrakesh was an unusually tough bargain. Arguably, what made such an outcome possible was the changing geo-strategic map: the erstwhile Soviet Union, the very existence of which had amounted to an implicit bargaining chip for these developing countries, was in the process of evolving into a number of new states. With the end of the Soviet Union, the world of trade relations changed for all countries, but perhaps more so for the developing countries, especially with regard to concessions.
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Four negotiating rounds have followed the Uruguay Round with rather modest outcomes; the Doha round which began in 2000 and has yet to be concluded is the most recent of these four. The WTO membership now stands at 153,6 and it has been argued that the increase in membership and hence in the numbers at the negotiating table directly increases the time taken to negotiate a trade Round.7 The net effect of liberalisation efforts might well be summed up in the one statistic, pertinent for our purpose, that whilst at time of the inception of GATT the developed countries applied import tariffs averaging 40 per cent on the import of manufactures, today this gure stands sharply reduced at 4 per cent! This remarkable reduction in import tariffs on manufactures greatly assisted the industrialization efforts of a number of developing countries.8 Other factors too contributed to the remarkable growth in trade. A second factor was the changes brought about in the nancial system. The move towards nancial liberalisation began in the late 1960s among the developed market economies of the time, it continued apace in the decades that followed, and a liberal nancial regime was virtually a universal phenomenon by the late 1990s. A liberal nancial regime such as the one prevalent today makes it possible to hold, transmit and receive funds in almost any currency. Financial transactions take effect almost instantaneously. This has considerably facilitated payments and receipts on account of trade, and hence facilitated the growth in trade ows. The liberal nancial regime has also facilitated foreign direct investment, which is a topic touched upon below. A third factor contributing importantly to the growth in trade was the change in technology and techniques for transportation of goods. The innovations in transportation of goods, e.g., the development and the increasing use of the container, the development and use of larger and faster ships and aircraft, and improvements in port handling, have speeded up the delivery of goods and also brought down the relative cost of shipping goods. A fourth contributory factor, also of some importance, was the development in information technology. Information technology added great speed to exchange of transaction
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records, including particulars of goods and services, their shipment and payments and receipts. Information technology has also directly facilitated the delivery of certain services, of which the output of the media industry provides a good example, and hence aided the growth of trade in such activities. As is explained below, information technology has also importantly helped to foster the newer approaches to organising production and trade. Developments in transportation technologies and in information technology are often captured collectively in the picturesque phrase death of distance.9 The opening up of the world in this manner, liberalisation of trade and nancial ows, affected the nature of production. Traditionally, the typical large corporation, well established in its domestic market, would sell overseas through an agent, and in time it would set up a sales outlet of its own there. The next step could be to license manufacture of the product to a business in that overseas location, or to set up a fully or partially owned manufacturing facility there to meet the local demand. This pattern began to change as trade liberalised and transport costs, information costs, and shipping times came down. The calculus of protability, upon which private enterprise is founded, dictates that costs of production be kept to a minimum in competitive markets. Guided by this maxim, the development of the organisation of production took a particular direction in response to the changing opportunities offered by the world economy. With lowering of trade barriers and improvements in communications and development of nancial markets and commercial techniques, it became possible to separate the functions of research and development, design, manufacturing, assembly, packaging, and distribution, and to locate these functions in such manner as would minimize costs and hence yield the best return to the business. It became feasible and advantageous to develop and design the product in the home country, to produce most of the components in the lower wage economies, and also to assemble and package it there, to distribute it from those economies, and to market it from the home country. To exploit these opportunities implied investment by the corporation in the relevant developing countries. 10 It stood to reason, when looking for manufacturing locations among
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the developing countries, to go for those low wage locations where there were credible legal and regulatory institutions in place, infrastructure was relatively good, labour force was relatively disciplined and also vocationally or functionally educated, and barriers to trade the least.11 Those developing countries that were relatively better placed with regard to these considerations, or other developing countries that understood these emerging requirements, naturally responded with policies to suit those foreign investors who wished to locate production in low wage economies in order to avail themselves of the low cost of production and export the resulting output. For the developing economy receiving this investment, it meant a boost to the levels of employment and exports. As understanding of these new developments grew, developing countries put in place policies (chiey scal and monetary incentives applicable in special zones which had, or were provided with, the necessary infrastructure, etc.) to compete with each other to attract this investment with an in-built potential for exports. The late-comer developing countries naturally faced greater competition and higher benchmarks in terms of incentives to be made available. The above discussion helps to understand why cross-border longterm investment ows have grown steadily in the context of developing countries. Even in years when the global totals of foreign direct investment (often referred to as FDI) have slumped, the ows to developing countries have maintained some growth. These ows of foreign direct investment to developing countries are arguably the response by the international business to the opportunities offered by improved market access and are made possible by nancial liberalisation.

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FDI inows, global and by group of economies, 1980-2006 (Billions of dollars)

Source: United Nations, World Investment Report 2007 (United Nations, Geneva, 2007)

An illustration of the typical approach to organising production and trade in an internationally branded good today is perhaps seen in the manner in which Nike organizes its business. This example also helps in an understanding of the role of foreign direct investment. Nike does the research and development, as well as marketing, in its headquarters in the United States. It then uses its overseas partners and volume producers and vendors to implement its production and logistics functions. Overseas partners produce the high-end signature models. The volume producers (who manufacture for other brands as well) supply the standardised lines. At the same time potential partners are developed under tutelage for future purposes. In this Nike example, the partners are located in South Korea and Taiwan, volume producers are in South Korea and Vietnam, and potential sources are being developed in China, Indonesia and Thailand. Nike headquarters in the United States provides designs, technical expertise and specialty components to its partners. The partners and the volume producers provide other components, and put together the nished product.12 The ows and the structure of the networked production approach is illustrated in the diagram below:

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Diagram showing the organization of production by Nike


Market

Nike headquarters, USA. Research and development, coo rdinatio n and planning

Developed partners: production o f latest most recent statement products Exclusive relationships with Nike Locations: Taiwan and

Developing sources, future partners under tutelage Lo cations: Thailand, China and Indo nesia

Volume producers Production of standardized lines More vertically integrated than developed partners Also supply non-Nike brands

Locally su b-contracted materials and su bcomponents

Components materials subassemblies from develo ped partners and Nike

Internally developed materials and compo nents

Speciality co mponent, e.g., Nike airsole

Source: Peter Dicken, Global Shift, Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century, New York, The Guildford Press, 2003, p. 264

Note: This diagram is illustrative of the kind of relationships that might exist. It is taken from a 2003 publication, and actual relationships and locations could well have changed. There are variations on the Nike approach described above but the basic organisation usually involves locating the design research and marketing functions in the home country (though increasingly some of these might also be located elsewhere), and the production, packing and shipping tend to take place in lower cost locations. Also, it is worth pointing out and the diagram does make it clear, there is a ow of physical components between economies. Components ow between partners and volume producers, as well as between the latter

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two and the headquarters. Also, nished goods move from partners and volume producers; and technical advice and equipment may move from headquarters to partners and volume producers. The organization often grows in linkages and complexity in cases such as the electronics and automobile industries, as the products and number of parts and regulatory frameworks increase. Increasingly, it becomes obvious that in order to export one has to import. And this fact is borne out by the trade data, which shows that the bulk of the trade in manufactures is between afliated rms, and a good part is in components. To take one example, in the case of China, it is estimated that the share of foreign content in Chinas exports is at about 50 percent. This is an aggregate statistic giving the average for all manufactured exports, and there are variations across industries. Those industries that are likely labeled as relatively sophisticated, such as the industry producing electronic devices, have a particularly high foreign content (about 80 percent). There are also variations as between forms of rm ownership. Firms with foreign investment tend to have higher foreign content in their exports than domestic rms.13 The point is that in order to produce and export those manufactures that are experiencing rapid growth in demand and trade, one needs to import components in a substantial way. Frequently, an economy only produces a component or some components of the whole product. To facilitate such imports, the import regime must be as friendly to this kind of activity as is possible and also operate with some efciency. 14 Next consider the composition of the expanding trade between products. An even spread would be surprising. The rate of growth therefore differed as between the different categories of goods and services as global preferences changed, demand varied and supply capacities differed. New goods and services emerge with time, as indeed would be expected. New goods, it may be noted, by their very nature tend to be manufactured, rather than raw materials, minerals and metals, or agricultural produce. The data clearly establishes that trade in manufactured goods grew signicantly faster than that in other goods. The table below gives data in respect of goods which satisfy two conditions: rstly, the good has a signicant share in world export trade
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(signicant share is dened here as a share of not less than 0.5 percent of the world trade in 2006 by value); and, secondly, the export trade in this good has also experienced growth rates of 7 percent per annum or higher over 1995-2006. Thus the table below lists those goods which satised this twin criteria: a share in value of world export trade of not less than 0.5 percent in 2006, and an annual rate of growth in export value of 7 percent over the period 1995-2006. International trade: value and growth of exports of most dynamic goods 1995-2005 (values in million dollars and shares and growth rates in percentages)
SITC Description Value Share 1995 1995 Value 2006 Share Growth 2006 1995-2005

333 334 343 515 541 542 598 667 784 781 764 772

Crude petroleum & bituminous oil Heavy petroleum & bituminous oil Natural gas, liquefied or not Organo-inorganic compound acid salt Pharmaceuticals excluding medicines Medicines including veterinary Miscellaneous chemical products nes Pearls,precious semiprecious stone Motor vehicle parts and accessories Passenger cars and race cars Telecommunicate equipment part Electrical circuit equipment

205 936 4.08 92 143 34 754 1.82 0.69

739 769 7.22 367 380 3.58 124 630 1.22 79 424 66 327 0.77 0.65

12.52 12.69 12.66 11.22 9.84 17.06 7.35 8.13 7.05 7.35 10.36 7.14

26 785 0.53 26 368 45 340 29 574 39 711 0.52 0.90 0.59 0.79

204 917 2.00 63 291 90 140 0.62 0.88

112 746 2.23 232 452 4.60 121 662 2.41 66 460 1.32

232 528 2.27 485 053 4.73 351 538 3.43 141 877 1.38

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712 713 Non-electric engines excluding 714 718 723 763 761 821 872 874 Civil engineering plant & equipment Sound TV recorder or reproducer 26 243 29 635 21 475 0.52 0.59 0.43 0.48 0.90 0.38 68 174 68 992 62 160 57 225 97 185 52 431 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.95 0.51 9.34 7.16 12.21 8.82 7.52 10.17 7.23

Television video receive project 24 016 Furniture part; bedding furnishing Medical instruments appliances nes Measure analyze control device nes 45 209 19 085

52 692 1.04

110 458 1.08

The goods described in the above table are all those exports trade items that experienced a growth rate of not less than 7 percent per annum in value over 1995-2006, and also accounted for not less than 0.5 percent of the world export trade value in 2006. Source: United Nations, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006-07, (United Nations, Geneva, 2008), Table 3.2A, pp. 144-147.

A quick glance at the preceding table shows that with two exceptions (the understandable case of oil and related products, and the high income related goods category of precious and semi-precious stones), the high growth that the world export trade has experienced is entirely in manufactures. It is worth noting that of these manufactures, those which appear against SITC 700 and 800 codes are all engineering goods (some categories of chemicals and pharmaceuticals may be seen under SITC 500s, but the values in these cases pale in comparison with the values for the engineering goods exports). It may be noted that the approach to low cost production of dividing up the product into components and distributing the production of these components between low cost locations (discussed above with the aid of the Nike example) seems the natural thing to apply to the manufacture of these SITC 600s, 700s and 800s goods. 15 Economies that were part of the production network of the goods in the table above beneted, as indeed would be expected.
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Part 3: Reections on Pakistans situation South Asians, arguably because of the history of their colonialisation fresh in their consciousness, were not amongst the rst to seize the opportunities that an evolving world economy was creating to produce and sell via foreign afliations, cross-border investments and trade: it is indeed a documented fact that even though the trade of empire economies expanded faster than those outside the empire at the peak of the British empire, the colonized economies failed to industrialise.16 A case can indeed be made that colonization retarded industrialization, and this hypothesis has received some support recently from the proposition that the one colony that managed to stay out of the empire trade loop, i.e., the United States, did manage to industrialise successfully.17 Arguably, trade also has the power to impoverish, but the East Asian and ASEAN economies clearly beneted from foreign afliations and investment in the 2nd half of the twentieth century. When one considers Pakistans patterns of trade and industry, one nds that these patterns bear some resemblance to those of other South Asian economies, i.e., Bangladesh and India. Therefore to facilitate understanding, it may be worthwhile to consider the South Asian situation in its historical context. The rst point of note in any such comparison is that the export performance of the South Asian economies falls into a categorically different pattern from that of the East Asian and the ASEAN economies. The table below summarises this aspect: Selected Asian economies: Merchandise Exports at Current Prices (in millions of dollars)
Memo: share of manufactures in merchandise exports 1950 Bangladesh India Pakistan China 303 1 145 330 550 1973 358 2 917 955 5 876 2006 11 802 120 254 16 930 986 936 2006 92.1 68.0 81.4 92.4

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Japan Republic of Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 331 304 1 885 1 564 855 23 800 37 017 3 225 3 211 649 931 325 465 103 487 160 676 47 037 130 790 90.2 89.1 42.9 73.4 86.2 75.3

Sources: For 1950 and 1973 data, see Angus Maddison, The World Economy, A Millenial Perspective, OECD, Paris 2001, p 360. A point to note is that in 1950 though Bangladesh did not exist, Maddison does give separate data for that economy. One may assume that Maddison constructed the series for Pakistan and Bangladesh, making necessary adjustments to obtain consistency between 1950 and 1973. For 2006 data, see World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007, (WTO, Geneva, 2007).

The fact that the data in the above table is in current prices does not distort the comparative purposes for which it is used. The data in the above table is quite revealing, perhaps even startling. In 1950 India was the leading exporter amongst the Asian economies, well ahead of Japan and China. And, also in 1950, Pakistan and Bangladesh appear to be in the same league, export-wise, as Philippines and Thailand. By 1973, the year of the rst oil shock, and hence the rst major supply side shock to the world economy after the Korean war, India was visibly lagging behind China (Indias exports being one-half of the exports of China in that year), and Pakistan was equally trailing Philippines and Thailand, but Japan had clearly leapt well ahead of the pack. When one looks at the 2006 data though, the different patterns for the South Asians and the others are most striking. Indian exports are reduced to one-eighth of Chinas, Pakistan is similarly dwarfed by Thailand, and Bangladesh accounts for the lowest level of exports amongst all in the table. This is something of a puzzle. It is a puzzle because in 1950 the world was in the process of emerging from the debris of the 2nd World War. The war ravaged economies of continental Europe, China and Japan were in shambles. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc., were widely perceived as lacking in the essential prerequisites of development. South Asia with its hard
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infrastructure of well-functioning railways, telegraph and telephones, roads, ports, etc., in place, and its reputed soft infrastructure of colleges, universities and administrative services operating smoothly, held great promise.18 Calcutta was the second city in the British Empire! In actual fact, South Asia could not keep abreast in the export league even up to 1973, a period in which governments were generally seen as having a legitimate role in development of private enterprise, and importsubstituting-industrialisation was accepted as a respectable pursuit and the sensible policy to follow. The export performance (or the lack of it) in the post-1973 phase is a little easier to comprehend, as that period was one when market-friendly policies became the norm, and the vocabulary changed accordingly: import-substituting-industrialisation was now talked of as crony capitalism, and the development-oriented state (gentlemen at work, in Papaneks terminology19) was seen as a ne example of bloated bureaucracy.20 South Asia evidently failed to comprehend the seriousness of this shift in thinking. It thus failed to respond in time to the implied changes in policies that were taking place globally, and could not quite benet from the opportunities that the new global economy was creating. The above table also shows that in 2006 by far the bulk of the exports from South Asian economies, Pakistan included, are manufactured goods indeed. Manufactures account for a high percentage of South Asian exports, and this ratio is comparable with those of the leading Asian economies, i.e., China, Japan and Korea, as well as the ASEAN economies. But the manufactured exports of South Asian economies are not the most dynamic goods and these exports have not grown at anywhere near the rate experienced by the exports from East Asian and ASEAN economies. And the point of note therefore is that the element of manufactured goods in the total merchandise exports does not by itself offer any explanation or insight regarding the differences in export performance, as the ratio for this factor is generally similar as between East Asians and the South Asians.21 Next consider one aspect of import policy that impacts industrial activity and exports, i.e., market access. This aspect is important because manufactured exports of the rapidly growing category require a high
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level of imported inputs. The element of import tariffs is recognized as a critical one in according market access. The table below summarises some of the data in respect of the import tariff regime: Tariff regime for imports of non-agricultural goods 2006
Binding Average Duty SpeExports Share of manufacTariff coverage applied free im- cific ($ mil- tures in merchanpeaks* (%) MFN (%) ports* rates* lion) dise exports (%) Bangladesh 2.9 India Pakistan China Japan 69.8 99.1 100.0 99.6 14.9 16.4 14.0 9.0 2.8 6.6 6.8 7.9 5.8 8.2 6.7 2.4 7.3 55.1 15.9 22.7 55.4 3.1 20.6 0.1 6.0 0.1 0.4 2.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 17.4 37.6 10.7 40.2 13.0 0.8 1.6 3.0 23.8 1.5 17.0 11 802 92.1

120 254 68.0 16 930 81.4

986 936 92.4 649 931 90.2 325 465 89.1 103 487 42.9 160 676 73.4 47 037 86.2

Republic of 93.8 Korea Indonesia Malaysia 96.1 81.3

Philippines 61.8 Thailand 70.9

130 790 75.3

*share of six digit HS headings in percent Source: World Trade Organisation, World Tariff Proles 2006, (WTO, Geneva, 2007), pp. 14-19.

The above table shows that the average applied tariff on most favoured nation (MFN) basis is signicant in respect of the East Asian and ASEAN economies in comparison with South Asian economies. The East Asian / ASEAN economies also permit a substantial quantity of imports duty free relative to South Asian economies. Finally, the East Asian / ASEAN economies have far fewer tariff peaks, i.e., tariffs in excess of 15 percent than the South Asian counterparts. To further emphasize this latter point, it may be noted that the average industrial tariff is approximately 7 percent for the 34 economies that account for 95 percent of world trade.22 To conclude, the tariff regimes of the South Asian economies do not compare favourably with those of East Asian
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and ASEAN economies; indeed they are in a different category.23 It cannot escape notice in a review of exports and tariffs that there is something here that cuts across countries and governments. Over a time span of some sixty years the South Asians have changed governments several times and have also shifted gears in terms of policies. Regardless, the three South Asian economies display similar proles in terms of export performance and now tariffs. Equally, the East Asian and the ASEAN economies have experienced a number of governments of different hues over this relatively extended period, and, regardless of these differences, the East Asian / ASEAN experience appears broadly similar as between the different East Asian / ASEAN economies. To conclude, the East Asian / ASEAN experience has evolved into something distinct and different from the South Asian experience. Turning now to a discussion of Pakistans situation, the rst point to be noted is that Pakistan did not inherit much in way of industry in 1947; for example, the entire textile sector consisted of six rather modest size mills. It was only in the 1960s that manufacturing enterprises rst began to appear in context of a pre-dominantly state-directed effort to develop the countrys nascent private sector in an import-substitutingindustrialisation framework. The initial progress was encouraging, and also widely recognised at the time as a model case of government assisted private sector industrial development.24 The 1965 war on the South Asian mainland introduced a shift in development priorities. Pakistans industrialisation efforts were disrupted as a result and slowed down sharply. One important determining factor in the direction that Pakistans industrial development was to take in subsequent years was the policy shift of the early 1970s. Pakistan at this conjuncture embarked upon a programme of nationalisation of its banking and nancial services, its manufacturing industry (barring textiles), and its shipping, as well as some of the agricultural sector related industrial activities. With conservative governments coming into power in the United Kingdom in 1979 and the United States in 1981, the economic policies in the developed market economies increasingly became market oriented. The international
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nancial institutions naturally followed up on this thinking, and began to advise a market oriented policy stance in developing countries. (In due course this market friendly policy advice acquired the label of Washington Consensus.) The world economic policy establishment made a rm turn to the right. The winds of change were now gaining strength but Pakistan had already lurched leftwards;25 it was out of sync. Textiles, being the only major industrial activity open to the private sector, ourished. Pakistans private investors did not have the opportunity to invest in any other medium or large scale industrial activity as edible oil industry, chemicals industry, iron and steel industry, fertilizer industry, metals and minerals industry, automobile and engineering industries, etc., were all reserved for the state sector. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the need for privatization of state enterprise was increasingly emphasized by the multilateral nancial institutions pursuing the implementation of the Washington Consensus set of policies. Pakistan, as a user of these institutions, heeded such policy advice. But stagnancy in the industrial structure did not go away with the onset of privatization. A number of explanations are offered. One plausible explanation is that Pakistan traditionally protected certain industries and this protection continued a fortiori with privatization as the newly privatized industry sought space (i.e., chiey high tariffs on imports) to recover and establish. A further aspect of this line of thought is that these industries, having been set up in an import-substitution framework, catered to the domestic market, and they were unable to develop competitively in a global context - their size was restricted by the size of the domestic market and the possibility of economies of scale or world scale plants did not offer itself. These considerations froze the industrial structure in time. The decisions to switch back and forth between nationalisations and privatizations within a time span of 15 years or so were exacting a toll. Apart from the limitations set by the state in the industrial structure, the development of a vocationally or functionally educated and disciplined labour force did not receive the kind of attention from the policy makers that it deserved in the changing global economic environment, and this oversight also did not help in attracting investment. Low expenditures
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on education and health characterize national and provincial budgets over long periods, regardless of the political hue of the government in authority. An additional handicap from the investors perspective has been the insufcient priority attached to the relevant communications infrastructure: congestion at ports has increased with time, railways have had great difculty in keeping up with the growth in demand for their services and the railway hardware has not been maintained to operate with efciency. Finance was not easily forthcoming for the new entrepreneurs and new activities, and was frequently channeled into nonproductive activity leading to record bad debts.26 This lack of attention to the ingredients of a successful industrial policy was not helpful, and perhaps also hindered the realization of even those opportunities that neighbouring China the fastest growing economy in terms of output, exports and imports offered. Pakistan: structure of exports (in per cent)
2005 All food items Agricultural raw materials Fuels Ores and metals Manufactured products of which Chemical products Machinery and transport equipment Other manufactured products, chiefly textiles, clothing . Total value (million dollars) 12.0 1.5 4.2 0.4 81.8 . 3.0 1.8 77.0 100.0 16 050 2000 10.5 2.9 1.4 0.2 84.8 . 1.6 1.0 82.2 100.0 9 201 1995 11.8 3.8 1.0 0.2 83.0 . 0.7 0.5 81.8 100.0 8 158

Sources: United Nations, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006-07, (United Nations, Geneva, 2008), and World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007, (WTO, Geneva, 2007).

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A particularly alarming aspect is that the economy has been unable to reduce its reliance on cotton, cotton yarn and cotton textiles. These products account for an inordinate proportion of the countrys total industrial production as well as the bulk the nations exports. Two factors complicate this dependence. Firstly, world trade in cotton and cotton textiles is relatively stagnant, and for this reason production and export of these products is not perceived to show much growth in future. Hence these are not the products that would help in boosting national economic growth. To illustrate the point, the table below gives the growth rates for world export values relating to textile and clothing merchandise for the period 1995-2005: as may be seen these rates are negative in three cases, below ve percent in another seven cases, and only in one illdened case does the rate exceed 7 percent. In this last case, i.e., 658 made up textile articles, not elsewhere specied, the share in world trade is insignicant (that is below 0.5 percent in value in 2006). Growth in world exports of textile items (annual compound growth rates for value of exports)
SITC Description Growth 1995-2005

266 267 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 841 842

Synthetic fibres for spinning Man made fibre for spinning; waste Textile yarn Woven cotton fabrics Man-made woven fabrics Other woven textile fabrics Knitted or crocheted fabrics Tulle lace embroidery trim etc Special yarn and textile fabric etc Made-up textile articles Male clothing, woven Female clothing, woven

-0.29 1.09 1.73 2.68 -1.51 -0.27 4.65 5.62 2.91 8.38 2.45 5.13

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843 845 Male clothing, knitted crocheted Articles of apparel 4.82 6.71

Source: UN, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2006-07, Geneva 2008, Table 3.2A, pp. 144147.

The second aspect is that even though these products account for a large part of Pakistans production and trade, Pakistan does not have a prominent share of world trade in these products. Indeed a number of countries that do not produce cotton27 have a larger share in textiles as well as clothing. Thus we have a situation that is problematic in three ways: rstly, Pakistans exports rely heavily on a narrow range of goods and hence the economy is excessively exposed to changes in fortunes in that particular industry; secondly, these goods are facing stagnant demand and hence this sector is unlikely to show much growth in output, employment and export; and, thirdly, Pakistan is not a price maker in these goods and export prices are subject to gyrations in the world prices for these products. Thus the industrial sector and the economy to a large extent sink or sail with the fortunes of the textile and clothing industry! The charts below illustrate this dependence.
leading textile exporters 2006

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 % Share in world exports of textiles % Share in countrys merchandise exports

EU

China

US

Korea

Taipei

India

Turkey

Pakistan

Japan

Indonesia

Thailand

Canada

..

Mexico

Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007, (WTO, Geneva, 2007)

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Notes on Pakistans Trade and Idustry Policy

Pakistans share in world textile trade appears to be relatively modest, but quite unlike the two major exporters of textiles, i.e., EU and China, its reliance on textiles for export income is the highest in the world! The economy is highly vulnerable in this respect, and this vulnerability has increased with the change in the trade regime from a quota based system to a competitive one. The end of the Multibre Agreement in 2005 and quotas has increased the degree of competition in the system, beneting the more efcient producers. Pakistans textile sector would therefore need to signicantly enhance its efciency to remain competitive and hence retain its existing position.
leading clothing exporters 2006

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
EU China Hong Kong (domestic) US India Bangladesh Turkey Pakistan Mexico

% Share in world clothing exports % Share in countrys merchandise exports

Indonesia

Vietnam

Romania

Thailand

..
Morocco Tunisia

Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade Statistics 2007, (WTO, Geneva, 2007)

As the above diagram depicts, Pakistans vulnerability in exports of clothing is somewhat less than that in textiles. But when we combine the exports in clothing, a derivative of textiles, to that obtaining in textiles we get an alarmingly high rate of dependence on one set of goods, albeit at different stages of production, when it comes to industrial output and exports. There is another problem looming in the extremely competitive world of clothing, where, to repeat, economies often compete in face of

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stagnant demand, and hence any gain in exports by one country is likely to be at another countrys expense. There is evidence that establishes that buyers are increasingly demanding consistently good quality, and variety, as well as timely delivery, in addition to a competitive price.28 These factors of quality consciousness and timely delivery (and making commitments with a view to honouring the promises) would need to be woven into the economys textile sectors approach to exports and possibly in its work ethic and culture. Regard would also need to be paid to new designs in order to enhance the variety being made available. Part 4: Concluding remarks As stated earlier the task of identifying the right policies is beyond the scope of these notes. The point that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that Pakistan is not producing the manufactured goods which are increasingly in demand in the world. And in its present state it is clearly not quite geared up to do so. Pakistan does not compare well in terms of the prerequisites that investors look for: credible legal and regulatory institutions, relatively good infrastructure, a labour force with some discipline and vocational or functional skills, and relatively few barriers to trade. Arguably these propositions also apply in some degree to the other South Asian economies. The question that arises is what is it that has held back the policy makers of Pakistan, and more generally South Asia, from systematically undertaking the self-evident tasks of developing credible legal and regulatory institutions, a skilled and disciplined labour force, and reasonable infrastructure that compares with that of successful economies. In these notes one is considering a sixty year period. To repeat, this sixty year period has seen governments of different hues and shades in South Asia as well as East Asia and the ASEAN economies. Thus the deciencies mentioned in context of Pakistan and possibly South Asia in the preceding paragraph appear to have some resilience that cuts across different governments and possibly countries.

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Indeed, there is a notable inertia in South Asia when one makes a comparison with the East Asian and ASEAN economies. This inertia is pervasive and persistent; it is evident in practically all socio-economic indicators, be it neighbourly relations, national integration, health, education, industrialisation and exports, per capita income, etc. It is an inertia that the political gyrations and shifts in policies do not sufciently explain. And it is not the purpose of these notes to explore the reasons for these differences;29 in any event these reasons are surely not simple. They would appear to lie in the area of history, culture, and political economy.30 Finally, it also needs saying here that it is only this particular comparison with specic regions of East Asia and ASEAN that puts South Asia in the shade; South Asia could perhaps come out shining in comparisons with some of the other regions of the developing world. But there is nonetheless the disturbing fact that the South Asian region is home to the largest number of human beings in absolute poverty! In looking to the future, the importance of industrial development in the progress of a nation cannot be underestimated. But it is also a fact that the kind of direct support that could once be extended to help the national industry and its exports to develop is no longer permissible. Economies industrialised through protection, subsidy, and (in todays vocabulary) violation of intellectual property rights. Limited protection might still be possible for a time, but subsidies would in general be no longer permissible and would be contested as a violation of the countrys WTO commitments. Similarly violation of intellectual property rights would only bring opprobrium of the international organizations and eventual legal actions. The ladder that was historically used by countries such as Germany and United States to climb up in their respective industrialization phases has been kicked away, as Ha-Joon Chang has frequently asserted.31 Those setting out now would have to work harder than the precursors. Thus efforts by Pakistan, and indeed South Asia, to get within shouting distance of the East Asian league could only be a long haul enterprise.

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Annex 1 table Selected Asian economies: Foreign Direct Investment Inows (at current prices in millions of dollars)
2004 Bangladesh India Pakistan China Japan Republic of Korea Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 460 5 771 1 118 60 630 7 816 8 980 1 896 4 624 688 5 862 2005 692 6 676 2 201 72 406 2 775 7 050 8 337 3 965 1 854 8 957 2006 625 16 881 4 783 69 468 -6 506 4 950 5 556 6 060 2 345 9 751

Source: United Nations, World Investment Report 2007 (United Nations, Geneva, 2007).

References:
1 The writer gratefully acknowledges South Centres generosity in provision of ofce facilities in Geneva earlier this year (and thus facilitating this work), and Khalil Hamdanis efforts in bringing it about. The work also beneted from the authors discussions with Khalil on a number of issues covered in this paper. The writer is also grateful to Dr Rajesh Chadha, Professor Ali Khan, Dr S M Naseem and Dr Eric Rahim for helpful and pertinent comments. Ronald Findlay and Kevin ORourke, Power and Plenty, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2007). This book gives a systematic account of the development of international trade over the last 1000 years. Remark attributed to the late Hyman Minsky. Posing the question in this form is also a reection of a period in which examples of European reconstruction under Marshall Plan and East Asian development under the state were the norms. The belief at the time was that it was the state and not the market that would help bring prosperity to societies. See for example discussion in Douglas A Irwin, The Creation of GATT, mimeo, December 2007. Number of members as at the date of writing, i.e., August 10, 2008 Interestingly, the prediction regarding the duration of a trade round with a WTO membership of 150 is approximately 105-110 months! See gure 10.2 in Steven

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Brakman, et. al., Nations and rms in the global economy, (Cambridge, Cambridge, 2006), p 278. For example, one empirical analysis of measurable causes of rapid growth in trade, vis a vis growth in output over the period 1980-2002 shows reduction in tariffs to be one of the two major explanatory factors (the other being productivity growth in turn caused by for a large part, one would argue, by developments in information technology). See Mark Dean and Maria Sebastia-Barriel, Why has world trade grown faster than world output, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn 2004, pp 310-330. The recent rise in energy prices has meant the cost of fuel and hence shipping has increased. The increased shipping costs would impact on the organisation of production and trade. Some of the consequential effects are becoming visible. See discussion in appendix 2. See discussion in Sven W Arndt and Henryk Kierskowski, Fragmentation, (OUP, Oxford, 2001). Some of these well known considerations have been re-afrmed in a recent survey. See UNCTAD, Occasional Note, Worldwide Survey of Foreign Afliates, UNCTAD/WEB/ ITE/IIA/2007/5 (United Nations, Geneva, 2007). This description is based on the account given in Peter Dicken, Global Shift, Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century, New York, The Guildford Press, 2003. Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei, How Much of Chinese Exports is Really Made In China? Assessing Domestic Value-Added When Processing Trade is Pervasive, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper No. 14109, June 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14109. Also see discussion in Leonard K Cheng and Henryk Kierzkowski, Global Production and Trade in East Asia, (Kluwer, London, 2001). This very fragmentation of production (also sometimes referred to as slicing up the production chain) is in itself a cause for increasing trade ows, as components ow back and forth. A considerable amount of this trade is naturally within afliated rms. For some examples see, Leonard K Cheng and Henryk Kierzkowski, Global Production and Trade in East Asia, (Kluwer, London, 2001), op cit. See Kris James Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier, Trade and Empire, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 13765, January 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/ w13765. See Gregory Clark, Kevin H. ORourke and Alan M. Taylor, Made in America? The New World, the Old, and the Industrial Revolution, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14077, June 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13765. Also see Duncan K Foley, The Economic-Historical Roots of US Foreign Policy, mimeo, November 2007 for a discussion of trade that impoverished the colonies. The subject of these notes though is not to explore directly what went wrong. Therefore this latter aspect would not be explored further here. Gustav F Papanek, Pakistans Development (Harvard, Cambridge 1968). For this interesting change of vocabulary, see discussion in Bruce Cumings, The American Ascendency, mimeo, 1999. An argument has been made that the East Asian and ASEAN manufactures are in the category of highly differentiated complex goods exports. Such exports it is hypothesized are aided greatly by having credible legal institutions. See Daniel Berkowitz and Johannes Moenius, Law, Trade and the Asian Miracle, Paper prepared for the 2008 AJPEA Symposium in Hong Kong, June 4, 2008.

10 11

12 13

14

15 16

17

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22 23 Finanacial Times July 20, 2008, Doha deal would aid many European farmers, report by Patrick Messerlin Quite contrary to the direction the world is taking, Pakistan raised its tariffs again in the FY 2009 budget announced in June 2008. Therefore Pakistans tariff regime is a little more restrictive today than the 2006 data in the table would suggest. See for example discussion Gustav F Papanek, Pakistans Development (Harvard, Cambridge 1968), and Gustav F Papanek, Development Policy: Theory and Practice, (Harvard, Cambridge, 1968). Papaneks point of view may have also beneted from his position as a member of the Harvard Advisory Group then assisting Pakistan in formulation and implementation of economic policy. There is an interesting but unconrmed narrative that the Pakistani policymakers had mentioned their goal to nationalize a good part of the economy well in advance of the actual move in the presence of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En Lai. The old man is reported to have been a little taken aback, and is said to have spent an unscheduled hour or more politely making an effort (he was keeping poor health) to dissuade his hosts by explaining the many problems that arise in getting efcient output from the state sector. A comparison of some of these indicators as between economies may be seen in World Bank, Doing Business 2008, (World Bank, Washington DC 2008). Pakistans production of cotton being the one factor that is suppose to give its textile industry the edge over the textile and clothing industries of other countries. See for example Meenu Tewari, The role of price and cost competitiveness in apparel exports, post-MFA: a review, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, November 2005. Some explanations have been offered for the East Asian economic success, including the claim that it was the advice held forth by the multilateral nancial institutions that explains the East Asian performance. See World Bank, The East Asian Miracle, Washington DC 1994. It is not the intent here to suggest that all of East and Southeast Asia has one history, culture or political economy. Nonetheless there may be common features which distinguish these regions from South Asia in terms of development priorities, work culture and work ethic. Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism, (Bloomsbury, London, 2007), and Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, (Anthem, London, 2002).

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SOME THOUGHTS ON DEMOCRACY


Kazi Anwarul Masud *

Abstract
(Ideally democracy and the rule of law should reinforce each other. However this has not always been the experience of developing societies because the elected majority often betrays the trust reposed on them by the people. Unbridled power exercised by politicians can degenerate into brute majoritarianism and result in plunder and anarchy necessitating the proclamation of emergency. The author believes that the challenge for emergent democracies lies in finding the correct intersection between electoral democracy with constitutional and liberal democracy. Editor). Democracy is the best revenge, lamented a grief stricken Bilawal after the assassination of his mother, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan. Rarely has an utterance from so young a mind had so profound an impact in shaping the immediate future of a country. Democracy, writes Francis Fukuyama, is the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power.1 It is the bedrock of liberalism and is closely associated with the historical evolution of democracy. Thomas Jefferson asserted, while framing the American Declaration of Independence, the right of the people to alter or abolish a government and to institute new government. It is said that the essence of a constitution embodies neither the national government nor even the supreme law but the sovereign right of the people to alter their government or supreme law at will. Given the success of democracy in India since independence, for example, former colonies regaining freedom from colonial rule were
* Kazi Anwarul Masud is a former secretary and ambassador of Bangladesh.

Kazi Anwarul Masud

naturally attracted to the democratic model that, at least in theory, gave power to the people. Some countries in our neighborhood have been more successful than others. In Bangladesh people are currently as anxious about the inationary spiral as they are about the opportunity to cast a vote every ve years. Undoubtedly people do not want guided democracy foisted on them by a moderate oligarchy unfettered by any accountability as in Pakistan till recently, according to South Asian expert Stephen Cohen.2 In developed countries the electorate is acutely conscious of their incomes, taxes, holidays, health facilities, educational opportunities for their children and national security in choosing their representatives to the legislature and presidency. This awareness of the material wellbeing of the people could be seen as mercantile and bereft of idealism. Professor Adrian Leftwich quotes G. Kitchings observation that materially poor societies cannot produce the democratic life which is an essential prerequisite for the creation of socialist democracies.3 Only economic growth, insists Leftwich, through industrialization can provide the platform on which democratic values, institutions, and process can be sustained. This argument is furthered by S.M.Lipset that democratic political development is dependent on a combination of economic, social and cultural factors which are unlikely to exist in underdeveloped economies.4 In such analysis one can nd a close relationship between modernity as a precondition for democracy because in the Max Weberian sense politico-administrative arrangements of modernity being legalrational is distinct from political traditionalism such as patrimonialism where power and authority are personalized and unaccountable. One can also discern in this thought process the validity of the preconditions for democracy that Francis Fukuyama thinks are necessary for sustaining the democratic process, the most important being a reasonably high level of economic development. Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea are cases in point. But then, these countries represent only 2 percent of the total population of the south and one commentator observed that while they turned into tigers by adopting structural adjustment programs and the orthodox perspective of development, the generation of economic growth through promotion of free-market principles; most of the followers of these principles turned into turkeys instead of tigers. At the same time Fukuyamas claim of the end of history
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occasioned by the collapse of the Soviet system has been criticized as astonishingly arrogant inasmuch as it ignores other possible modes of social and economic organization that may better serve humanity. Religion and Democracy One may question whether religion can act as a barrier to the spread of democracy. Skepticism has been expressed about Samuel Huntingtons5 fourth wave of democracy in the Greater Middle East spurred by President Bushs promise to do so in the light of a democracy decit in many member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Western skepticism about sustainable democracy in the Muslim countries is not only due to the comparatively low level of economic development that Francis Fukuyama considers as one of the essential ingredients of democracy but also due to their suspicion that Islam does not preach the principle of giving unto Caesar what is Caesars and unto God what is Gods. In other words the separation of the church and the temporal power is blurred in Muslim countries. Beside historical rivalry between the Muslims and the Christians, a thesis successfully propagated by Princeton University historian Bernard Lewis,6 that the struggle between the Muslims and the Christians started from the rst Arab incursions in the eighth century to the nal Turkish retreat in the twentieth century is referred to by the Muslims as war against the indels. Therefore, writes Lewis 7 the American President is the successor in the long line of rulers from the Byzantine emperors of Constantinople, the Holy Roman Emperors of Vienna and all who represent the land of the unbelievers. Samuel Huntington appears to agree with Lewis thesis that the West is facing a need and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations the perhaps irrational but historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, on secular present, and worldwide expansion of both. It is doubtful that in the absence of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the writings of Bernard Lewis and of Samuel Huntington would have received the width of attention of the western policy makers, particularly of the Bush administration. One can safely assume that these attacks had expedited Bush National Security Strategy of 2000 (NSS) and its follow up on Afghanistan.
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The NSS document declared that President Bushs foreign policy aims would be: (a) to promote human dignity through political and economic freedom; (b) to provide security against terrorism and weapons of mass destructions; and (c) to engage in conict areas and with allies. While the aims were laudable the most worrisome aspects of the NSS were the concepts of American exceptionalism and the doctrine of preemption. The document declared the US National Security Strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reects the union of our values and our national interests. The American unilateralism that followed was not reassuring to its Atlantic partners. Europeans found arch-conservative Robert Kagans 8 suggestion that the real division of labor should consist of the Americans making the dinner and the Europeans doing the dishes. In Robert Kagans view World War II destroyed European nations as great powers and the subsequent relinquishment of European colonies denoted perhaps the most signicant retrenchment of global inuence in human history. Added to these was Europes loss of strategic centrality due to the end of the Cold War. To the dismay of the American policy makers the end of the Cold War did not see the emergence of a European superpower but instead saw a declining Europe which chose to be indolent in place of taking the advantage provided by the disappearance of the Soviet Union. It appeared that Europe thought the brutal laws ruling the Hobbesian world were matters of the past and the Kantian world of perpetual peace was just round the corner. End of the Cold War could have triggered American isolation as there was no great enemy to defeat or any antithetical ideology to confront. The world was confronted with the worrying aspect of the Bush NSS document i.e., the doctrine of preemption. Bushs doctrine has expanded the relatively noncontroversial concept of true preemption, allowed under the UN Charter which could be legitimized if undertaken against an imminent, specic, near certain attack. The most basic reference to the legality of any war under the UN Charter is under articles 42 and 51 i.e., either one is acting in self-defense or with the authority of the UNSC. War in any other form would be illegal and unjust. Professor Michael Walzer of Princeton University9and the author of the seminal work Just and Unjust War expounded six propositions while discussing
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his theory of aggression. His propositions included the existence of an international society of independent states; the international society has law establishing rights of its members particularly rights of territorial integrity and sovereignty; any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state constituted aggression and would be a criminal act; aggression was justied by two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by the victim and any other member of the international society; nothing but aggression can justify war; and once the aggressor has been militarily repulsed it can also be punished. Walzer argues that as with domestic crimes, use of force would require actual or imminent boundary crossing, invasion and physical assault. Otherwise resistance to aggression would have no determinate meaning. He emphasizes that a wrong must be received by the victim for him to take recourse to force. The Walzerian concept presupposes war between states which was also in the minds of the framers of the UN charter. They could not have foreseen the devastating role played by non-state actors; the problem of failing and failed states; and the technological nature of the threat. Critics of the Bush doctrine have asserted that it represents a major redirection of policy and a radical revision of existing security rules. It has been argued that preemptive military actions reect policy failures and not triumph of superior values or virtues. Besides, repeated usage of military might where the responsibilities of being the judge, jury and executioner remain with a single country, one has to be aware of the warning sounded by former Russian President Vladimir Putin, the danger that the current system of international security will collapse... If we allow international law to be replaced by the law of the st according to which the strongest has the right to do whatever he wants and is not limited by anything in choosing means to achieve his goals, then one of the basic principles of international law will be called into question, the principle of the inviolability of the states sovereignty. Then nobody or no country of the world would be safe. The basic argument remains that terrorism cannot be fought by terrorist means because it would more likely serve the interest of the terrorists who depend on the victims instinctive impulse to retaliate and thereby compounding the problem and changing the complexion of the original scenario for the worse.
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Europeans were concerned over Americas drifting away from the post- Cold War system of international rules and institutions. European unease was not lessened when President Bush announced: America has and intends to keep military strength beyond challenge thereby making the destabilizing arms race of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits. As opposed to such hegemonic intentions, the Europeans favour a globalist approach to foreign affairs relying on international cooperation as a means to deal with multiple challenges. The essence of Europeanism is to subject inter-state relations to the rule of law which is disparaged by Robert Kagan as reective of European military weakness and Europes fear that American unilateralism will perpetuate the Hobbesian world in which Europe becomes increasingly vulnerable. This foray into US-European differences was necessary to explore whether democracy as we understand is possible should its practice by some be considered as a threat to the US. Democracy, after all, denotes independence of actions according to the perceived interest of the nations concerned. US ire with President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is a case in point though the US has reasons to be angry with Chavezs description of President Bush as the devil in the UNGA and with Iranian president Ahmednijad for walking over the US ag on his way to vote in the elections under which he became the president of Iran. Failed States and Democracy Any discussion on democracy would be incomplete without also examining the question of failed states because they are the antithesis to a democratic way of life. Helman and Ratner described failed nations as utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community. William Olsen expanded the denition by including states facing serious internal problems that threaten their continued coherence or signicant internal challenges to their political order. The events of 9/11 have brought the problem of failed and failing states into sharp focus as they are vulnerable to ingress by non-state actors, warlords and terrorists. It is, therefore, important to understand the dynamics of the nation-states failure as being central to the war on terrorism. Robert Rotenberg10 nds failed states as tense, deeply conicted and
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marked by intense and enduring violence against the government or the regime. Such instability is caused by appalling living standards, decaying infrastructure, greed of rulers, patronage-based system of extraction from ordinary citizens etc. Effectively failed and failing states are unable to deliver political continuity, security, education, health services, economic opportunities, law and order, a judicial system and infrastructural facilities to its citizens. It is often fallaciously assumed that failed states are generally asphyxiated dictatorships like the Talibans Afghanistan, Mobutus Zaire or Barres Somalia. Though these were undoubtedly failed states, some are adorned with democratic institutions though awed. As Robert Rotberg explains, if legislatures exist at all they are rubber stamp machines. Democratic debates are noticeably absent. The judiciary is derivative of the executive rather than being independent and citizens know that they cannot rely on the judicial system for redress or remedy especially against the government. The bureaucracy has long lost its sense of professional responsibility and exists only to carry out the orders of its political masters. Indeed promotions to higher positions or transfers to coveted posts largely depend on passing the DNA tests for loyalty to the party in power. Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 11enumerated some of the characteristics of failed states. In general terms, Straw said, a state failed when it was unable : (a) to control its territory and guarantee security to its citizens, (b) to maintain the rule of law, promote human rights, and provide effective governance, and (c) to deliver public goods to its people (such as economic growth, education and health care etc.). In Straws analysis it is possible to identify indicators of each of these elements of failure. For example, the security criteria can be assessed by determining whether there are areas beyond the control of the government or where there is a presence of signicant ethnic, religious or inter-group conicts. On governance, the indicators could include the ability of the government to implement policies; the extent of corruption able to distort optimum implementation of decisions; the ability of the people to inuence governmental decisions without resorting to violence; and the presence of institutions to facilitate peaceful transference of power.
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As regards the economy, the indicators could include the stability of the states economy; its dependence on certain industries or on the agricultural sector; effective economic management; per capita GDP; literacy; life expectancy etc. Apart from the horric events like that of 9/11, Jack Straw believes that continual fear and danger of violent death, in Hobbesian terminology, is fuelled by the fact that over the past decade wars in and among failed states have killed about eight million people and have displaced another four million, most being civilians. Since failed states by denition denote un-governability, the consequent rampant criminality gives rise to sweeping despair and hopelessness. But when national un-governability becomes global it starts to adversely affect the neighboring countries and, as 9/11 demonstrated, even powerful distant lands. The Oslo Conference on the root causes of terrorism found, among others, failed or weak states leaving a power vacuum for exploitation by terrorist organizations to maintain safe havens, training facilities, and launching terrorist attacks. Because of the direct causal relationship between failing states and terrorism having been established long before 9/11, Boutros Ghali in 1992 addressed the issue of reduced signicance of sovereignty in the post-Cold War world and the concomitant possibility of UN intervention in the domestic affairs of member states. He suggested that such intervention would be appropriate in the face of a collapsed domestic governing authority, displaced populations and gross violations of human rights or when developments in failed states threaten international peace and security. More often than not state failures are man-made. Leadership decisions and leadership failures have destroyed states and contributed to the fragility of existing institutions. Mobutus kleptocratic rule and Robert Mugabes obduracy are two such examples. But since Robert Kagans prescription of military solution to security issues does not have universal appeal, one could heed Jack Straws advice 12 to take recourse to a range of tools some developmental and some diplomatic to strengthen states prone to failure. Doing so is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Because prevention of state failure is imperative, it hoped that the UNSC debates and the Madrid conference on Iraq had impressed upon the high and mighty that the multilateral
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approach rather than display of muscularity held the key to real peace and prosperity of the world. New Sovereigntists and Democracy Democratic order is also threatened if the leaders of the international community remain disdainful towards the rule of law being supreme in the conduct of inter-state and intra-state affairs. The increasing inuence of a group of people in the US policy making apparatus has caused concern particularly among the developing nations who are unable to maintain the newly emerging concept of sovereignty as enunciated in the principles of the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to protect. This group of people described by Professor Peter Spiro13 as the new sovereigntists consists of highly credentialed academics who have developed a coherent blueprint for defending American institutions against the alleged encroachment of international ones. One of them, Jeremy Rubkin14 of Cornell University, advances the deterministic argument for safeguarding the sovereignty and security of the American constitution on the ground that the US is fully sovereign. The argument is advanced that US sovereignty is absolute, illimitable and nondissipatory as opposed to sovereignty of most countries of the world that are now pooled, e.g., in the EU, or circumscribed by international agreements/covenants. The new sovereigntists do not apologize but, on the contrary, fully endorse the US rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, and the administrations failure to submit the Kyoto Protocol on global warming for Senate ratication. They nd most international laws as too amorphous to warrant US consent, too intrusive on domestic affairs as well as unenforceable while the international law making process is considered unaccountable. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of new sovereigntism is the notion that the US can opt out of international regimes because of its unquestioned power and its duty to uphold the US constitution. That these arguments smack of arrogance and can be proved to be invalid have not impressed their proponents. They are convinced that the wealth and the might of the US offering, as it does,
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markets and other cooperative arrangements would compel the rest of the world to conform to American positions even if the US were to remain aloof from various international undertakings. Though the opening salvo of the new sovereigntists was red during the early days of the Clinton administration, they gained power and inuence when George W Bush became president and appointed many of them as members of his administration. Though the new sovereigntists and their supporters might have succeeded in launching the Iraq invasion, the global opprobrium generated by the illegal war removed the veil of inherent contradiction in the concept of new sovereigntism. While the new sovereigntists demanded American exception from subordination to international law, there has been an increased awareness both in the West and the East of transformation from the Westphalia concept of sovereignty through greater interdependence among the countries of the world. David Held 15 of the London School of Economics observes our mutual interconnectedness and vulnerability has grown so rapidly that we no longer live in a world of discreet national communities. Instead we live in a world of overlapping communities where trajectories of other countries are heavily enmeshed with each other. David Held further asserts that any assumption of sovereignty being indivisible, illimilitable, exclusive and a perpetual form of public power is now defunct. Accordingly states can be judged, along with the communities they embody, by generally accepted standard of civilized behavior. They can be scrutinized if the states were to claim shared membership of a political community for which curtailment of the abuse of political power is an essential prerequisite. The territorial integrity and inviolability assured by the UN Charter was not absolute and was made conditional by the UN Charter which provides for intervention. Though Iraqs alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction was advanced as the pretext for its invasion, the real reason for the attack, as President Bush later publicly admitted, was regime change. Though the brutality of the Saddam regime is not contested, the Iraq invasion has proved that external and domestic behavior of a government is now a determinant for the exercise of sovereignty. If it violates internationally accepted norms, other states can intervene.

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Paul Taylor, 16 of the London School of Economics, analyzing the dialectical quality of sovereignty in the post-Cold War period, observes that sovereignty is increasingly being seen as conferring on states the obligation to be accountable to the international community. Being licensed to practice as a state, Taylor adds, carries with it the condition of the government being prepared to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the international community, continued adherence to the terms under which it holds the license. In other words, the rights and obligations of sovereignty are vested in a government which is the ultimate guardian of the popular interests and which cannot renounce these interests because it is sovereign. This concept is coterminous with Tony Blairs17doctrine of international community containing explicit recognition of mutual dependence of states in pursuit of shared goals and values, democracy and human rights being core goals and values. Though Blair recognized the centrality of the UN in a world ruled by law and international cooperation he called for reforms particularly of the Security Council and advocated the need for humanitarian intervention because acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter, and human rights abuse resulting in massive ows of refugees into neighboring states threaten international peace and security. 9/11 terrorist attacks and democracy The terrorist events of 9/11 described by Condoleezza Rice as the violent expression of a global extremist ideology, an ideology rooted in the oppression and despair of modern Middle East gave Islam, basically a religion of peace, a bad name in the West. France is believed to have about ve million Muslims and twice as many reside in various West European nations. Though many of these foreigners were invited to come by the host countries to shore up the devastated economies after the Second World War, the process of integration of these heterogeneous elements, particularly of the second and third generation immigrants, has been painful and often conictual. The race riots in France that spread to other West European countries resulted in some political parties calling for the expulsion of the rioters to their native lands that these children of immigrants had never seen. The tension from the failure of racial integration was fuelled by the murder of Theo van Gogh
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at Amsterdam and the unfortunate speech by Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg in Germany. Whatever might have been the object of the Popes speech its timing coupled with the publication of an unsavory cartoon of Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper did not help bridge the widening divide between the Muslims and the people of other faiths living in Europe. Although united in the war on terrorism, the world was against the invasion of Iraq. In the UN Security Council, France, Russia and China opposed the attack. They wanted the USs unipolar moment to be replaced by a multipolar world in lieu of the bipolar geopolitical global architecture that had ceased to exist after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union. The question many posed in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion was the extent to which the US move was inuenced by religion as it has been said that religion has always been a major force in US politics, policy, identity, and culture. Religion shapes the nations character, helps form Americas ideas about the world and inuences the ways Americans respond to events beyond their borders. Yale Professor Paul Bloom 18 had concluded that religion was bred in the bone and was intrinsic to human psyche contrary to Marxian analysis of religion as the opiate of man and the Freudian interpretation of religion as an explanation for the pains human being undergo on earth and their ultimate defeat in death to an unseen entity. Walter Russell Mead of the Council of Foreign Relations has demonstrated the inuence of the different strains of Christianity on US politics including during the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. One must, however, keep in mind that politics in the west is not propagated on grounds of religion and the recent religious underpinning that one can see in the west is a response to the horric events of 9/11. In underdeveloped societies where the political community is fragmented into opposed religious, ethnic, racial, and ideological groups, more familiarly known as identity politics,, and the democratic structure is fragile, religion-based politics can invite instability. In Bangladesh, it is believed, that corporations run by religious fundamentalists make an annual net prot of twelve billion takas of which ten percent is used by them for organizational purposes like carrying out regular
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party activities, providing remuneration and allowances to about half a million party cadres and running armed training camps. The number of primary schools since the liberation of Bangladesh has doubled while that of dakhil madrasas has increased eightfold. Concern about the possible rise of Islamic extremists who look for areas of weakness has been expressed by western countries. The Delhi based South Asia Intelligence Review in a report linked increasing activities of Islamist extremists with the then ruling coalition in Bangladesh. Analyzing the state of sectarianism in Pakistan, the Brussels based International Crisis Group observed that sectarian conict in Pakistan was the direct consequence of the pre-democracy state policies of islamisation and marginalisation of secular democratic forces. Cooption and patronage of religious parties by successive military governments have brought Pakistan to a point where religious extremism threatens to erode the foundation of the state and society. Secularism and democracy This brings in the question whether secular politics can be practiced in developing countries without people being dubbed as atheists or agnostics. The modern guru of secularism, George Jacob Holyoake (1817-1906), described secularism as a quest for development of the physical, moral and intellectual nature of man to its highest possible degree as an immediate duty of life. In this quest, Holyoake contended, theology was inadequate, unreliable and unbelievable. Secular knowledge is manifestly that kind of knowledge which is founded in this life and is capable of being tested by the experiences of this life. In India, while Mahatma Gandhi and Maulana Azad spoke of secularism from the perspective of religion, Pundit Nehru was the rst in the subcontinent to accept the western concept of secularism. Democracy and corruption In some developing countries politicians are more vocal about various rights and freedom enumerated in national and international laws and conventions that may, if misused, be counterproductive to improving the economic condition of the country. It is possible that these politicians,
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once they have acquired power, become aware of the existential nancial limitations that providing the basic needs of the people is not possible with the limited means at their disposal. Besides lacking the commitment and the dedication of politicians of the golden age, they indulge in the conduct of public affairs for private gains. Consequently a nexus built around the politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen breeds corruption. This, in turn, distorts the free market mechanism now universally accepted as a better way to achieving not only economic progress but also the consequent development of a democratic system for which the people are believed to be so eager. The corruption thus generated by the unholy alliance between big business, the bureaucracy and the politicians puts the poor at a disadvantage in seeking justice through the legal system. In effect, justice becomes for sale and the poor are unable to pay the price. The rule of law so essential for democracy is, therefore, non-existent. In Marxian analysis, the impoverished majority have nothing to sell but themselves in contrast to the ever burgeoning wealth of the few. Inevitably the process of accumulation of wealth is corruption-ridden. Yves Menay 19ascribed four invariant characteristics of corruption: (a) violation of social rules and norms; (b) secret exchange among political, social and economic markets; (c) illegal access given to individuals and groups to the process of political and administrative decision making; and (d) the resultant tangible benets to the parties involved in the transaction. By any denition corruption is illegal and, in the rst instance, results from collusion between political and moneyed elites, the former abuses public positions of trust for private gains by both parties. Unfortunately the return of democracy in some developing countries in the 1990s saw no effective steps taken to control corruption. It is well known that Transparency International, Business International, Political Risk Services and the World Economic Forum have consistently labeled one LDC as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The World Bank devised a formula to describe corruption: c-m-d-a-s where c stands for corruption, m for monopoly, d for discretion, a for accountability and s for salary. Thus corruption tends to ourish where poorly paid public ofcials have a lot of discretion to perform monopoly functions with very little accountability. Aminur Rahman, Gregory Kishunko and
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Kapil Kapoor prepared a background paper20 for a World Bank report on corruption in which they agreed with Gunar Myrdal that speed money (money paid to speed up administrative decisions) not only distorts the mechanism of efcient allocation of resources through the establishment of perverse patron-client relationship between bureaucracy and the private sector but also encourages corrupt ofcials to delay the process of decision making in anticipation of more bribes thus effectively practicing blackmail. They argue that corruption also diverts foreign investment from sectors like health and education to infrastructure because the scope of corruption in the latter area is more. In any case as successive World Bank ofcials and donor representatives have pointed out time and again, pervasive corruption reduces the ow of foreign investment. The GDP loss should be seen in the context of global interpersonal inequality in which the rich become richer and the poor, poorer. In most underdeveloped societies the corrupt inevitably prevail because they have the money to buy inuence while those in power have no compunction about plundering the state resources that they had pledged to safeguard. One has seen in some developing countries rich in mineral resources total anarchy in administrative and nancial management only to benet the few. The people were astounded at the scale of kleptocracy indulged in by the rich and the powerful while the gap between the rich and poor both in rural and urban areas continued to widen. When some of these reckless plunderers were put behind bars or were publicly named, people on the streets rejoiced not because of class conict, as a Marxist would like to believe, or due to acrimony they felt against the so-called rich, but as an expression of satisfaction that the rule of law had nally prevailed. The corrective measures against corruption in most countries have also highlighted the fact that the societal hierarchy that had been established between the rich and the poor was not entirely based on honest hard work but on theft. Except the type of explosive agitations that caused the fall of Bastille or the Bolshevik revolution, in the modern age democracy takes ages for the corrective actions necessary for nationwide peace and prosperity to take root.

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Understandably no one has questioned the legitimacy of the governments that took the corrective measures. Interruptions of the democratic process to serve the interests of the people have happened many times in the past. As an example one can recall that early in 1861 during the American civil war, President Lincoln received credible information that Maryland was moving towards secession. Though the American constitution did not authorize the president to impose either martial law or suspend various constitutional rights, President Lincoln, against the advice of the leading legal authorities of the day, authorized suspension of habeas corpus in the event that Maryland moved towards rebellion or secession. The crux of the argument was that preservation of the union overrode otherwise binding constitutional and democratic requirements. In other words, the welfare of the people is the supreme law that justies even what Professor Michael Byers21 of Duke University would term exceptional illegality that can be justied on the basis of political and moral legitimacy. The breakup of the Soviet empire, democratization of Eastern Europe, and the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia did ensure the welfare of the people and all these events occurred with the explicit consent of the people concerned. James Bakers and the European Unions conditions given to the breakaway states for recognition as independent states that included peaceful separation, mutual recognition of old state boundaries etc., were aimed to forestall illegal secession and consequent anarchy. One may recall that Bangladesh was recognized as an independent country only after it became apparent that the people of then East Pakistan wanted separation from then West Pakistan as people alone and not ethnic or linguistic groups can secede. That was the reason, besides African orthodoxy, that only former colonies could claim independence, and why Biafra was denied international recognition in terms of its freedom from Nigeria. The crux of the argument here is the supremacy of the welfare of the people which under no circumstances can be subverted. Non-elected governments and democracy One may, however, question as to how and who will decide what constitutes welfare of the people. The answer will be different under different circumstances. In some developing countries, providing basic
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needs to the people at affordable prices would have higher priority than political rights as is generally understood. But then again political rights may have to be given precedence because of the need for accountability by the people entrusted with providing basic necessities. Modernization theorists are deeply interested in social justice because they believe that democracy accompanied by extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth gives rise to awed democracy. It would, perhaps, be relevant at this point to dene the term development. Generally it encompasses economic growth and the level of afuence or even social development. Many political sociologists believe that democratic political development depends upon a combination of economic, social and cultural prerequisites. As mentioned earlier, the supply of economic goods may satisfy some people deeply mired in poverty and, therefore, can be justied as having assured their welfare. Examples of successful command economies can be given in its defense. But this bureaucraticauthoritarianism or development dictatorship the terms coined by G. O. Donnell and A.J.Gregor can hardly satisfy the theorists engaged in the political aspect of modernization who insist that equality is the ethos of modernization. Democracy at all times must ensure democratic accountability in the sense of obligations of the ofce holders to the electorate and constitutional accountability in the sense of being accountable to others in similar position. Developmental democracy is a stage of evolution in liberal democracy in which self-development is to be considered as a universal right. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen considers development as a fundamental right as does another Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz 22 who advocates policies that can promote what he calls moral growth growth that is sustainable, that increases living standards not just today but for future generations as well and that leads to a more open, tolerant society with more social justice and solidarity rather than one with deep rifts and cleavages. He is uncomfortable with Simon Kuznets argument that inequality is inevitable at the early stages of development and that of Arthur Lewis (both are Nobel laureates) that inequality is necessary to generate savings to fuel economic growth. He, however, agrees with Benjamin Friedman that democracy is less sustainable in poor countries and he argues that if President Bush is sincere in his
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advocacy of spreading democracy in the Greater Middle East, then the US should honour the commitment made by the developed countries to provide 0.7 percent of GDP as development assistance to the needy countries. But the western promise of loans/grants is closely associated with the practice of market economy by the recipient country which may not automatically guarantee growth, social justice and efciency. The multidimensional development process till the 1990s had two broad schools: orthodox or mainstream perspective and critical alternative perspective.23 The orthodox view of development advocated for the south to proceed along the path followed by the north emphasizing industrialization and adoption of scientic technology. The success of development was measured by the increase in gross national product. US economic historian, Walt Rostow, argued that the development process would start with traditional society that would be mainly agrarian and would culminate in modern industry-based society. The critical development perspective disagreed with the orthodox approach and put more emphasis on holistic human development in contrast to the acquisition of wealth by a minority at the expense of the majority of the population. No wonder poverty has been dened not only in terms of money but also includes the insecurity and the voicelessness of the poor. The critical alternative perspective received encouragement from a contribution of the Dag Hammarskjld Foundation whose model of development included: (1) need-oriented (2) endogenous (3) self-reliant (4) ecologically-sound and (5) based on structural transformation development. This brings in the question of political egalitarianism that is seen as the ideal of equal political inuence to mean specically the insulation of political inuence from differential wealth or social rank. The search is not only for deliberative democracy but also to ensure justice so that all individuals have political equality in the sense that they have equal resources to inuence decisions regarding the collective property of the society.

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Forms of Democracy Electoral democracy is dened as any regime in which governmental ofces are lled as a result of contested elections. Only if the opposition is allowed to compete, win, and assume ofce is a regime democratic. Scholars have put three preconditions essential for a regime to be called electoral democracy that are ex- ante uncertainty, ex- post irreversibility, and repeatability. In other words self-inicted coup detat, even if supported by the people at its initiation, poses the possibility of becoming a democracy without demos. When Peruvian President Fuji Moro had a presidential coup detat the US Secretary of State James Baker rebuked him by saying that one cannot have democracy by destroying it. Another American politician in the 1920s had advised that democracy decit can only be rectied by more democracy. The question, however, remains whether the verdict of the people received through elections is to be given supreme value and is to be regarded as the arbiter of decisions taken by those elected. If so then one has to judge rigorously the quality of democracy and of the demos in any given country. One has to ensure whether minimalist expression of democracy through electoral democracy should not be improved to the maximalist version by including liberal and deliberative democracy as well. While the centrality of elections is recognized as the principal agent of democracy, the liberal democrats would prefer a political system as democratic when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to rule. Liberal democrats, writes Professor Maxwell Cameron, go beyond electoral democracy through insistence on the establishment of liberal rights to guarantee free ow of information before the elections; and as political scientist Giovanni Sartori put it he who delegates his power can also lose it; elections are not necessarily free, and representation is not necessarily genuine. Liberal democrats, therefore, would not like to lose freedom. Since the rule of law is integral to any democratic setup and is
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indispensible for safeguarding fundamental rights, a constitutional state must ensure the subservience of all citizens, without discrimination, to the law. But then such a situation may give rise to tension between constitutionalism and majoritarianism. In Bangladesh, for instance, plunder and anarchy as a result of the brute majoritarianism exercised by the alliance government, resulted in the declaration of emergency. Under these circumstances, the supremacy of the rule of law becomes preferable. If one were to look back to the US presidential elections of 2000 then one would notice the respect shown by Al Gore and the American people to the Supreme Courts decision declaring George Bush as the winner in the presidential elections. It is, however, undeniable that underdeveloped societies lack legal culture. The decisions of the courts are not always regarded as supreme and primordial loyalties, as invariant characteristic of tribal societies, are more preponderant. In these societies, particularly where poverty is endemic and corruption is pervasive, caution has to be exercised in giving unfettered authority to those elected. Giovanni Sartoris observation that elections may not be necessarily free and representation may not be necessarily genuine, therefore, has merit. Furthermore, elections are not the only aspects of democracy. Deliberations outside the parliament should also be heeded. Unfortunately the institutions that would support liberal and deliberative democracy are still fragile in Bangladesh and strengthening of these institutions have a long gestation period. Conclusion The challenge for democracy, particularly in developing societies, is to nd the correct intersection between electoral democracy and constitutional and liberal democracy. In the case of Bangladesh, one hopes that the people will not again be confronted with broken promises and that there will not be a return to the ice age of a political system where the old game of plunder will be played out as before. One hopes that the lessons of history will not be lost on the politicians and they will devote themselves to the task that the people entrust them with.

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References:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Fukuyama, Francis; The End of History and the Last Man. Cohen, Stephen; The Idea of Pakistan. Leftwich, Adrian; On Primacy of Politics in Development. Lipset, S.M., The Political Man. Huntington, Samuel; The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order. Lewis, Bernard; The Crisis of Islam. Ibid. Kagan, Robert; Power and Weakness. Walzer, Michael; Just and Unjust War. Helman and Ratner. Willam Olsen. Rotenberg, Robert, New Nature of National State Failure, The Washington Quarterly, summer, 2002. Jack Straws advice, Failed and Failing States, 6 September 2002. Ibid. Spiro, Peter; The New Sovereigntists, Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2000. Rubkin, Jeremy. Held, David; Violence, Law and Justice in Global Age, article in a publication of the Social Research Council. Bloom, Paul; Gods Country Foreign Affairs, International Crisis Group. Girling, John; Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy. Rahman, Aminur, et.al.; Estimating the Effects of Corruption Implication for Bangladesh. Byers, Michael. Stiglitz, Joseph; The Ethical Economist, Foreign Affairs. Thomas, Caroline and Reader, Melvyn; Development and Inequality Issues in World Politics, 1997.

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PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE: A REALITY CHECK


Talat Farooq*

Abstract
(This article is a reality check on the performance of Pakistan Muslim League in general and Pakistan Muslim League (N), in particular with regard to parliamentary democracy, strengthening of political institutions and promotion of provincial and regional harmony. Jinnahs Muslim League played a significant role in the creation of Pakistan without compromising on its fundamental principles. Post partition, however, it was unable to uphold the value system of its antecedents. The paper aims to highlight the consequences of their traditional relationship with the establishment and the conservative and religious segments of the society. The main argument pertains to PML (N)s apparent break with its pro establishment past since its ouster from power in 1999 and its joining hands with the lawyers movement in 2007 in an ostensible bid to strengthen democratic institutions. Is the change real or is it yet another political gimmick to settle the score? Author). At the first turning of the second stair I turned and saw below The same shape twisted on the banister Under the vapor in the fetid air Struggling with the devil of the stairs who wears The deceitful face of hope and despair T.S. Eliot
* Talat Farooq teaches at the Bahria University, Islamabad. She is also a poet and social worker.

Pakistan Muslim League: a Reality Check

The Charter of Democracy (COD), to which the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML (N) along with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), is a signatory, notes that the Pakistani nation has experienced the most devastating and traumatic experiences under military dictatorships that played havoc with the nations destiny and created conditions disallowing the progress of our people and the flowering of democracy.1 The COD pledges to draw upon lessons from history and bear in mind that the military dictatorship and the nation cannot coexist.2 The hapless nation, desperate to nd honest leadership, chose to believe that these obvious verities were being afrmed with sincerity and, from October 2007 onwards, Nawaz Sharif emerged as the most popular politician in Pakistan. Public opinion swung in his favor, despite his controversial past, as his approval ratings skyrocketed.3 The 2008 PML (N) election manifesto reiterated the partys strong commitment to parliamentary democracy in keeping with the vision of the countrys founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.4 Nawaz Sharif returned from eight years in exile and his strong stance visa-vis the restoration of the pre-3 November judiciary, unconstitutionally red by Pervez Musharaf, won him many supporters. The lawyers Long March in June 2008 for the restoration of the deposed judges was given unambiguous support, in word and deed, by Nawaz Sharif on behalf of the PML (N). However, after the resignation of Pervez Musharaf in August 2008, the PML (N) seems to have mellowed its stance on the judges issue. Though the PML (N) withdrew from the coalition government at the centre, it has not renounced its partnership with the PPP in the all important province of the Punjab where it continues to be predominant in the provincial coalition led by chief minister Shahbaz Sharif. This raises doubt whether the PML (N)s resignation from the federal cabinet was prompted by genuine indignation or motivated by political expediency. This softening of reaction is not surprising. The party seems to be returning to the ageold traditional pragmatism that it has followed since the inception of Pakistan. The Muslim Leagues declining popularity graph after the death of Jinnah can be attributed to the partys increasing loss of contact with the masses. It aligned itself with the power circles instead. The reason was simple; the leadership of the PML was dominated by feudal lords and
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the independent merchants who linked the preservation of their narrow personal and class interests with that of the state being run with the help of the British trained civil service. Between 1958 and 1962 the League was ofcially defunct. The new versions of PML created by Ayub Khan in 1962 and Mohammad Khan Junejo in 1986, had little in common with the original objectives and composition of PML. Over the years, as the state became synonymous with the military-bureaucracy nexus and later with the military-mullah alliance, factions of PML threw their weight behind such power structures instead of working toward the betterment of the masses by building strong democratic institutions. This pattern continued unabated under Musharraf, who was fervently supported by the PML (Quaid-i-Azam) faction till his ouster in August 2008, despite his massive unpopularity with the people of Pakistan. PML (N) deviated from the pro-establishment trend after the 1999 military coup. Its leadership began to show signs of political maturity, giving hope to the people in the midst of a judicial crises in 2007. The civil society joined the lawyers struggle and the Long March of June 2008 saw thousands of people on the street. Despite big crowds and suffocating heat no untoward incident took place as the caravan moved from city to city. The march culminated in a huge gathering in Islamabad. It was a clear indication that the civil society of Pakistan is ripe for peaceful agitation to win the democratic rights long denied to them. The PML(N), at the forefront of this march, did not cash in on the opportunity that could have resulted in a national movement for empowerment of the common man. Once again it failed to establish and maintain contact with the masses even though it gave the impression of understanding the pulse of the nation. The PML (N) showed signs of independence from the establishment during its stint in power in the 1990s when its leadership initiated dialogue with India and later when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Jehangir Karamat resigned in the wake of certain controversial public statements. The show of independence culminated, rather unwisely, in the sacking of the new COAS, General Pervez Musharraf, thereby providing justication for yet another military takeover. The Musharrafled coup in October1999 resulted in incarceration and then deportation
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of the PML (N) leadership to Saudi Arabia; the Sharif family remained in exile till 2007. During the years of exile, the party gradually gained in political stature as it initiated a long and sustained opposition to the dictatorial regime of Musharraf in contravention of its traditional pro-establishment reputation. The apparent change of heart paid off and the PML (N) made a comeback in the 2008 general elections by riding the tide of popular sentiment pertaining to the independence of judiciary and condemnation of Musharraf and his extra-constitutional measures. The question is whether this change of heart is fundamental or a mere aberration? Giving in to Zardaris somersaults on the judiciary issue and meekly relinquishing the much aunted goal of the restoration of the deposed judges after Musharrafs resignation in August 2008, has cast doubts on the partys credibility. It seems to give credence to the suspicion that the PML (N) stood by the lawyers only to get even with Pervez Musharraf. Keeping in mind the vengeful politics of the Nawaz government of the 1990s, the impression does not seem farfetched. Some are of the view that perhaps all deliberations on the judges issue were nothing more than a cover up for a power struggle for adjustment of seats in the by-elections between the PPP and the PML (N).Whatever the case, a feeling of disillusionment with the PML (N) has crept in and letters criticizing the negative role of the PML (N) vis-a-vis the lawyers movement have begun to appear in newspapers.5 Why has the nation lost faith so quickly? The answer can be found in the historical failings of the PML since 1947.The skeletons in the cupboard of the party credited with the creation of Pakistan, continue to haunt the psyche of the Pakistani nation, if not always consciously then surely at the subconscious level. In order to understand the growing disillusionment of the people with the PML (N) one needs to go back in history. The British colonial state structure was all powerful and kept the political institutions deliberately weak. Pakistan not only inherited the colonial structure but also preserved and strengthened it. The proestablishment policies of the contemporary PML factions are in keeping with the traditionally indecisive and regressive role played by the PML
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after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. The history of the Pakistan Muslim League cannot be covered here in its entirety. This article would restrict itself to certain signicant components of the PMLs performance with regard to the following aspects of post independence political development. State and Religion Provincial and Regional Harmony Parliamentary Democracy State and Religion The All India Muslim League (AIML) emerged as a political force in the subcontinent on the basis of representing and safeguarding the interests of the Muslims in India. Initially it aimed for a free India with separate Muslim electorates to ensure stronger provincial and central representation. Later it set forth the goal of a separate Muslim homeland. Dening Muslim identity through religion became important in order to garner the support of the Muslim majority states since its strongest support emerged from the Muslim minority and not majority areas. The Muslim nationalists coalesced into the Indian Muslim League and drew strength from the two-nation concept central to which was the demand for Pakistan. Prior to independence, Jinnahs resort to Islam was aimed at giving a united face to the movement to gather the divided Muslim constituents. During the 1945-46 election campaign, Jinnah and most of his close associates appealed to the Muslim sentiment through Islamic rhetoric even though they themselves were secularists.6 Although the AIML was able to win over prominent locals in its struggle for a separate Muslim homeland, it was unable to evolve consensus on the role of religion in matters of the state and the issue remained unresolved till independence.7 By appealing to the religious sentiments of the Indian Muslims, substantial political mileage was gained by the AIML. After independence, the modernists as well as the Su elements in Pakistan opposed the formation of a theocratic state while the religious parties, who had been against the very creation of Pakistan, espoused Islamization as their mission. Due to the political exigencies of the time, Jinnahs aims vis--vis the role of religion in the state remained
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somewhat ambiguous. However, there could be no doubt, keeping his personality in mind, that his ideas would be based on rational and liberal outlook. General Zia-ul-Haqs orthodox approach to the issue in 1979 led to the resurrection of Jinnah as an Islamic leader. This was outrageous because while Jinnah was a Muslim he had no Islamic leanings. He could perhaps be termed as the most Westernized political leader in Indian Muslim history [who] was culturally and socially far more at ease with the high society of cosmopolitan Bombay and metropolitan London than with those who he led and represented.8 Jinnahs approach to the role of religion in the future Pakistani state was more complex than one would like to believe. Pakistani liberal opinion refers to Jinnahs oft-quoted speeches that substantiate his vision of a secular, though Muslim majority, state. Jinnah was unequivocal in his secular leanings when he declared: You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. You will nd that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.9 In none of his speeches pertaining to the status of the non-Muslims does Jinnah envision Pakistan as a theocratic state that would implement the Islamic law of jizya or that would accord the status of zimmi to the non-Muslims.10 Jinnah was no Islamic theologian or historian and therefore his references to the establishment of an Islamic state cannot be understood outside the political and historical context. It is, however, undeniable that Jinnah was vague and ambiguous on this issue. On the one hand he espoused the idea of a secular state while on the other, in view of disquiet in the ranks of the AIML vis-vis Jinnahs lack of a clear-cut stance on the establishment of an Islamic state, he promised the Pir of Manki Sharif the enforcement of
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shariah in Pakistan in exchange for his support in the election of 1946.11 Again, while addressing the Tribal Areas, Jinnah said: The government of Pakistan has no desire whatsoever to interfere in any way with the traditional independence of the Tribal Areas. On the contrary, we feel as a Muslim State [emphasis added], we can always rely on [the] active support and sympathy of the tribes. 12 It may be surmised that Jinnah, a man of honor and integrity, opted for ambiguity on the issue to enlist and maintain support of a coalition of feudal lords, tribesmen, pirs and Muslim elites. It would not have been politically expedient to campaign openly for a secular state especially while competing with Nehrus secular Congress party. He must have hoped that a liberal, secular Pakistan would one day follow once the messy business of partition was over with, and it was unnecessary to raise the issue of secularism now.13 According to Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah was rst and foremost a thorough bred constitutionalist who had no doubt that the Pakistanis would choose a moderate, democratic and forward-looking state.14 The heightened spirit of nationalism prior to partition subsided after independence because of grave problems related to refugees, nances and military assets. The challenge was to revitalize the Pakistan Muslim League by formulating a dynamic program under the supervision of dedicated and visionary leadership. Jinnahs personality served as a rallying point during his lifetime and, later, Liaquat Ali Khan was able to command respect because of his close association with Jinnah. Nonetheless, despite being privy to the secular and liberal leanings of Jinnah and his vision for a democratic Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan soon after Jinnahs death gave in to the demands of the religious elements. The passage of the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 and the support given to it by Liaquat Ali Khan provided the mullahs a much needed foothold in the future politics of Pakistan. It also laid the foundation for the future PML-mullah alliances. Later, the manipulation of the concept of Islamic ideology and its linkage with national security issues enabled the military-bureaucracy combine to remain at the helm of affairs at the cost of parliamentary democracy. The resolution clearly
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enunciated that sovereignty belonged to God and that the authority delegated by Him to the people of Pakistan is a sacred and divine trust. No such mention had been made in the Lahore Resolution of 1940 which merely asked for autonomy and sovereignty for Muslim majority areas where religious, cultural, economic and other interests would be safeguarded.15The Pakistan National Congress, the main opposition party in the Constituent Assembly, was against the Objectives Resolution on the ground that mixing of religion and politics would reduce the minority communities to the status of serfs.16 The Muslim League leadership, with the exception of Mian Iftikharud-din, generally supported the resolution.17 Liaquat Ali Khan failed to complete the task of framing the constitution and it was taken up by Khawaja Nazimuddin, the new Prime Minister and the then president of the PML. He presented the Basic Principles Committee Report on 22 December 1952. The most controversial recommendation pertained to the creation of Boards of Ulemas, at the central and the provincial levels, with the authority to review all proposed legislations and to amend or expunge those they deemed repugnant to Islam. The recommendation virtually gave the Maulvis the power to veto the work of the legislature18 and received scathing criticism from the opposition for giving sweeping powers to a handful of persons who could monopolize the right to interpret the Quran for the whole nation.19 The religious avor of the report was the result of a few meetings between the Ulemas and members of the Nazimuddin cabinet. Nazimuddin thus allied with the orthodox ulemas for short term political goals.20 The said report was followed by a series of controversies, deepening the constitutional chaos. Soon the anti-Qadiani movement erupted and as it gained momentum the PMLs provincial government under Mian Mumtaz Daultana virtually capitulated to the demands of the agitators to excommunicate the Qadianis, thereby encouraging the Islamist elements.21He had earlier established a department of Islamic Studies that employed six ulemas and four of them actively participated in the anti-Ahmadi movement. 3,700 PML workers joined the agitation with the blessings of the Punjab Chief Minister.22 The connivance of the Muslim League with the religious elements for political gains was
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prompted by the hope of refurbishing their legitimacy at a time when grave and intractable problems faced the nation at home and abroad.23 The constitutional turmoil was eclipsed by the anti-Qadiani movement and its violent fallout. It also facilitated the rst military intervention into the political affairs of Pakistan as martial law was imposed in Lahore in March 1953. If the PML leadership had any vision for a progressive Pakistan and the strength of character to strive for it, they would not have opted for short term political personal gains at the cost of national prosperity. The PMLs support to the anti-Qadiani movement violated the spirit of the modernist reformism of the Aligarh movement aimed at reconciling the workings of a modern democratic nation state with that of the Islamic concept of sovereignty of God. The demand for the creation of Pakistan was very much an Aligarh enterprise,24opposed by both the orthodox school of Deoband and the Jamaat-i-Islami. The Deobani-Bralevi relations have always been uneasy with the Deobandi fundamentalists condemning the saint and shrine practices encouraged by the pirs of the Barelvi sect. The orthodox ulemas, in united India, lacked the support of the rural voters. The mass mobilization of the Muslims would not have been possible without the inuence of the pirs in 1946-4725 who, in view of their popularity amongst the Muslims of India, played a signicant role in popularizing the movement for Pakistan.26 The pirs retained their inuence after independence and threw their weight behind Ayub Khan in the presidential elections of 1965, by forming the Jamiat-i-Mashaikh.27 The Jamaat-i-islami attained its greatest inuence during the Zia era although their attempts to turn Pakistan into an ideological state could not succeed in view of discord within the ranks of the ulemas. The factions of the new Muslim League supported both the dictators in clear violation of the ideas of Jinnah pertaining to the role of religion in the Pakistani state. During the Ayub era, the Convention Muslim league was created to support a liberal dictator whose relations with the orthodox mullah were strained even as he turned to the Barelvi School for support. Similarly, the Musharraf regime relied on the PML (Q) to support its policies in view of opposition
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from the religious parties after 9/11. To oppose Zulqar Ali Bhutto in the 1977 elections, the Muslim League joined the religious parties to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNAs tone was religious despite secular parties in their midst; it was funded by those affected by Bhuttos nationalization policies.28 Bhutto eventually had to step down as Zia took over and Pakistan reverted to military rule as a result of the religious sentiment unleashed during the PNA campaign against Bhutto, and this time military rule was beholden to Islamists as never before.29The marginal inuence of the religious elements since 1947 received an enormous boost from Zia who elevated them to a vanguard role. While the educated elite despised the policies of Zia-ul-Haq, the industrial class of the Punjab provided support. This rising industrial elite of the 1980s provided an urban support base for the PML under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif, a protg of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.30 The civil-military bureaucracy engineered Nawaz Sharifs political elevation in 1990 in view of his power base in the Punjab and because of his Islamic and pro-establishment credentials.31Nawaz Sharifs government continued Zias policies of overt Islamization of the society by making it mandatory for female artists and news readers of the state owned Pakistan Television to cover their heads and by continuing to support the mullahs demand for the Shariah Bill, held in abeyance since 1988. However, in the face of hard ground realities Nawaz Sharif favored the UN proposal of a broad based government in Afghanistan and annoyed the mullahs by refusing to support their man, Gulbadin Hekmatyar. Furthermore, while he paid lip service to the pro-shariah elements in the Assembly, he did not adopt a pro-Saddam stance during the Gulf War of the 90s, thereby annoying his religious allies. Although Nawaz Sharif took these steps against the wishes of his religious partners he did not come out with a clear anti-mullah stance and has continued the policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound; a political tactic that has done nothing to impart a sense of direction to the nation and has, in fact, further confounded the religious issue. While the PML (N) has come out with an open anti-military stance
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after 1999, it has so far failed to unequivocally condemn the Taliban and their sympathizers. Contrary to the liberal inclinations of Jinnah, the PML has, throughout history, lacked progressive credentials, forging close relations with forces that perpetuate the status quo and unabashedly associating with the mullah-military and military-bureaucracy alliances. Its leadership and core members have traditionally comprised of landed gentry and wealthy industrialists. The PMLs conservative leanings and the political exigencies have, since independence, obviated its clear stance regarding the role of the mullah in clear violation of Jinnahs ideal of an Islamic state minus theocracy. This ambiguity has not helped the image of the Muslim League. From the anti-Qadiani movement through support of Zias policies to the present, where the various factions of PML have yet to condemn the violent Taliban in strong terms, the PML has failed to give priority to the wishes of the common man. The post-partition history of Pakistan Muslim League is rooted in the politics of pragmatism rather than upholding of ideals that had mobilized people to create a free country in 1947. The COD and the manifesto of the PML (N) solemnly pledge to evolve and strengthen parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. So far the political will to realize this elusive dream is conspicuous by its absence. Parliamentary Democracy The future of parliamentary democracy depends on the solid foundations laid in the past. In India, for example, one witnessed parliaments where no party was able to hold its majority. Since democracy was allowed to run its course without the shock therapy of extra-constitutional intervention, India, despite its baggage of poverty and social problems, has made progress on the national and international fronts. Pakistans experience has been entirely different. A major reason for the failure of democracy to take root in Pakistan has been the prevalent feudal system with its peculiar political mores. The Muslim League, dominated by the landed gentry prior to partition,
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made no effort to replace or at least balance the power of the landlords with that of the middle class educated men and women, the cornerstone of any democratic setup. The landlords in the League prevented, with the blessings of the civil servants, any basic reforms in the countrys social structure,32 thereby obstructing the evolution of a potent political culture capable of producing and nurturing middle class political leadership. Prior to independence, the landlords and the titled gentry consolidated their hold on the party. In the League Council, for example, out of 503 members the landlords numbered 163.33A large number had huge landholdings and post-partition their tenants served as voters, thereby effectively eliminating the genuine need for election campaigns that ensure contact with the masses. The Muslim League was in no position to implement land reforms. Feudal politics has, over the years, depoliticized the bulk of agricultural population and spawned a political culture of hostility and bigotry. The earlier leadership of PML was reluctant to allow the formation of any other political party, equating opposition to the Muslim League with opposition to the creation of Pakistan. Liaquat Ali Khan, in view of the gravity of the various post independence problems, discouraged the emergence of political parties. He sincerely believed this would create chaos in the new state whereas a healthy opposition would have offered an alternative program to the common man and initiated the system of checks and balances sorely needed to supervise the conduct of the party in power.34The more politically savvy and motivated parties of East Pakistan should have been allowed to make a constructive contribution in this regard. After Liaquat Ali Khans assassination, the PML could not regain its strong position due to its political inconsistencies and lack of party discipline. It became the handmaid of the government,35 supporting military and civil bureaucracy and colluding with the religious elements. Its loss of prestige came glaringly into focus as Ghulam Mohammad, a civil servant raised to the post of governor general, dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin while he was president of the PML; the party, instead of protesting, readily accepted the premiership of Mohammad Ali
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Bogra, who was then ambassador in Washington. The rise of Ghulam Mohammad and the Leagues soft reactions to his condemnable actions amply displayed the lack of political will in the party. Different factions of the PML have, over the years, supported military regimes and bureaucratic powers to run the country or allowed themselves to be used as tools by military dictators. Between 1958 -1962 when the League was ofcially defunct, Ayub Khan promulgated the presidential form of government and created the Convention Muslim League that supported him in his election against Fatima Jinnah. The other half, the Council Muslim League, joined the united front of other parties, including the Jamaat-i-islami, to oppose Ayub Khan. Similarly the Muslim League-Junejo, that won the party-less elections of 1985, was handpicked by Zia-ul-Haq. Later when Junejo was dismissed, Nawaz Sharif, as provincial chief of the PML, welcomed the sacking of the PML government. His approval of Zias deplorable action was duly rewarded and he was made the caretaker chief minister of the Punjab.36 After Zias death the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was assembled by Pakistans intelligence agencies in 1988 to counter the PPP in the general elections. The largest party within the coalition was the PML and its most resourceful leader was Mian Nawaz Sharif. As the military wanted its agenda to be perceived as having public approval it supported Nawaz Sharif in the elections campaigns of 1988 and 1990. Later, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS and Lt.General Assad Durrani, the erstwhile ISI chief, admitted to ISI funding of IJI before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Sharifs tenure as prime minister reected a dichotomy between Sharifs wish for economic growth-based policies and his deal with the military to allow it a free hand in matters related to national security.37 As the PML (N) gradually upped its anti-military ante after Sharifs ouster by Musharaf in 1999, the PML-Q emerged as a staunch supporter of Pervez Musharaf. The president of the party Ch. Shujaat Hussains father, Ch. Zahoor Ilahi, was a supporter of Ayub Khan before he fell out with the Nawab of Kalabagh, Ayubs governor. He later opposed Bhutto and supported Zia. After Zahoor Ilahis assassination, his family continued to support the Islamization policies of Zia and remained loyal
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to the PML while it was close to the military. After the PML fell foul with the army in 1999, Shujaat and his close associates parted ways with Nawaz Sharif to support Musharaf under the banner of the PML-Q. They were duly rewarded with a resounding victory in the general elections of 2000.38 Both the Nawaz and Quaid-i-Azam factions of the present PML are associated with landlords and the wealthy industrial class. Both have so far failed to reach out to the grass root level and involve the civil society in working toward viable solutions to the contemporary problems facing the country, in particular terrorism. Sitting on the opposition benches in the 2008 National Assembly, both factions of the PML are expected to educate the people and help build consensus on issues of national importance. So far they have failed to accomplish this fundamental task to contribute toward the strengthening of parliamentary democracy. The enactment of the Eighth Amendment in the constitution during the Zia era changed the rules governing the president-prime minister relationship. Article 58(2) (B) has been invoked since then with impunity to dismiss elected governments. The strengthening of the executive at the cost of the legislature has become the bane of the Pakistani politics. Nawaz Sharif, after coming to power in 1997, repealed the Amendment and restored the 1973 imbalance in favor of the prime minister instead of restoring a proper balance between the two. This he would have done were he a statesman. 39 To be fair, the collapse of the parliamentary system in Pakistan cannot be entirely attributed to the misdeeds of the politicians. The institutional balance shift from politicians to the military-bureaucracy alliance began to take shape after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. The political culture was deliberately undermined and the colonial conguration was reinforced through consolidation of authority under bureaucratic and army auspices.40 Moreover, a pliant judiciary resorted to the doctrine of necessity to validate military takeovers. The politicians, and particularly the Muslim League, however, do not stand exonerated. The decentralization of authority was undermined not
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only by the hardnosed nancial constraints and existential insecurities but also because the League lacked the devotion and commitment to reach out to the public. It lacked the political will to gain popular inter-provincial support, thereby allowing the state to rely on militarybureaucracy nexus for authority. The Muslim League lacked a well dened future role in the postindependence scenario unlike the Congress that was an organized and well disciplined party with distinctly dened social and economic ideals, with regular membership, which would subscribe to its objects and work for their realization.41 The post-partition Muslim League leadership failed to determine any denite objectives with concrete strategies for implementation while the Congress had already chosen economic uplift as its main target in independent India.42 The economic crises leading to food insecurity in Pakistan in the 1950s can be attributed to the governments defective planning and absence of progressive economic policies.43 Internal disputes and power struggle and the large scale bogus enrolment to augment factional strength accelerated the downward slide.44 In the NWFP the factional strife was headed by Pir of Manki Sharif; in Sind by Ghulam Ali Talpur. In the Punjab the Mamdot-Daultana rivalry was destabilizing the party and in East Pakistan Bhashani and Suhrawardy created the divisions. 45 In this environment of conict and disharmony the Muslim League was unable or unwilling to effect intraparty reforms urgently needed to initiate and help evolve a political culture in the country. From 1947 to 2008 every coup has been welcomed by politicians opposed to their rivals ousted by the coup and thus, without exception, every signicant politician has managed to ride rough shod on the fundamentals of the (parliamentary) system.46As Pakistan grapples with the fallout of the war on terror, the question arises whether the politicians of Pakistan are nally willing to take the rst step on the long road to parliamentary democracy? Do they possess the required temperament to do so and also educate the masses on these lines? The PML (N) has so far been unable to pressure Zardari to relinquish the
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controversial powers accruing to him from the constitutional distortions and deviations enacted by previous military-dominated regimes. Does the PML leadership possess the political acumen and will to initiate organized actions in this direction? The past record of PML (N) in government does not generate hope for the future. While in power, Nawaz Sharif seemed torn between initiating economic growth and supporting the establishment. To his credit he did try to strengthen the civilian government by initiating dialogue with India against the wishes of the establishment, for instance. However, the attack on the Supreme Court on 28 November 1997 by his ministers, parliamentarians and PML workers, (that secured the ouster of the Chief Justice and the president in one go), symbolized the status quo orientation of the party. As Lawrence Ziring points out Nawaz Sharifs performance in government during the 90s was reminiscent of the authoritarian model of Zias period that facilitated military intervention into domestic politics.47 Parliamentary democracy is all about devolution and dispersion of power. Without provincial autonomy and acceptance of regional diversity, democratic institutions remain at the mercy of chaos and instability. Provincial and regional harmony, the fundamental block of nation building, cannot be achieved in the absence of dispersion of power to the grass root level. The establishment, in the name of national security, has never favored autonomous provinces. The PML (N) in supporting reactionary forces with parochial interests has obviated inter provincial concord. By doing so it has perpetuated the post Jinnah Liaquat thought process of the Pakistan Muslim League. Provincial and Regional Harmony The Lahore Resolution of 1940 envisaged that the Muslim majority areas in India should be grouped to constitute autonomous provinces. The principal driving force behind the creation of Pakistan was the particularisms of Muslim provinces.48 Post-partition, the Muslim League supported the creation of strong central authority ostensibly to unite the diverse populace of the country. Debates on Khawaja
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Nazimuddins Basic Principles Report in the constituent assembly demonstrated there was conict regarding the issue of parity and power sharing between the two wings of the state. Pakistan inherited the regions with unique historical traditions, a factor that proved to be crucial in shaping its post-colonial experience. For example, while the Sindhi sentiment against immigrants was temporarily buried in the religious mobilization of the freedom movement it re-emerged later giving rise to nationalist leaders like G.M Syed. Similarly the Baloch-Pukhtoon ethnic violence of the 1980s had its roots in colonial history and was not just the product of the Afghan war. The Pakhtunistan issue and the alienation of East Pakistan from the centre are also part of the same historical backdrop.49 The Punjabs political importance was recognized right from the outset with Liaquat Ali Khan shifting his ofce from Karachi to Lahore during the campaign for the March 1951 Punjab Provincial Assembly elections.50 The colonial inheritance of the Punjab ensured abundance in agriculture, industry and army recruitment. The continuation of the British policy of allotting land to servicemen resulted in convergence of interests between landlords and the military.51 The secession of East Pakistan bolstered the big brother status of the Punjab which further spawned the anti-Punjabi feelings in the minority provinces. The biraderi (kinship group) system forms an important locus of political authority especially in the central areas of the Punjab.The PML failed to check the trend because of weak institutionalization at the local level.52 The struggle to frame a constitution started from the very inception of Pakistan under the rule of the PML. Both Liaquat Ali and Khawaja Nazimuddin dragged their feet and failed to accomplish the task. The delay was linked to the politicians inability to settle the question related to power sharing and parity between the provinces. The public and the press attributed the inordinate delay to internal bickering and political intrigue and factionalism. This incompetence of the League leadership paved the way for the dismissal of the constituent assembly by governor general in 1954.53 Ayub Khan, through introduction of Basic Democracy chose to
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tighten the stranglehold of the centre around the provinces. By extending bureaucratic patronage, politically and economically, he aimed to bolster central authority without being constrained by parties and politicians with provincial bases of support. 54 Ayubs government, like those before him, ignored social diversities of the state and focused instead on administrative centralization. The power of the state lay in its selective grant of political privilege to pliable socio-economic groups.55 The inability of the PML senior leadership to lay the foundations of a democratic political culture created the vacuum that the more organized military and civil service readily lled to the detriment of provincial autonomy and regional harmony. The language controversy can be quoted as yet another example of the incompetence and shortsightedness of the Muslim League. Urdu had come to symbolize Muslim political unity in united India from1900 onwards. After partition, Liaquat Ali Khan refused to grant Bengali equal status with Urdu as the ofcial language of the state although only 7 percent of the population spoke Urdu as their mother tongue.56The language controversy alienated the Bengalis and efforts to employ Urdu as part of nation building efforts proved counterproductive. The Muslim League failed to recognize the sensitivity of the issue and Nazimuddin, during his visit to Dacca in January 1952, declared Urdu to be the only state language of Pakistan. The PML, in the face of rising provincialism, failed to act wisely and realistically. In the words of Ian Talbot: The national political elite refused from the outset to accord any legitimacy to Bengali grievances. They were at best dismissed as inspired by misguided provincialism, at worst they were seen as evidence of the existence of an Indian fth column in Dacca.57 By the time the constituent assembly agreed to make both Urdu and Bengali as ofcial languages of Pakistan, irreparable damage had been done to the PML image. The PML failed to discern the mood of the people on the issue related to One Unit. The general public in East Pakistan and smaller provinces was opposed to the idea of One Unit. The League lacked well-knit organization that could serve as a link between the centre and the provinces. The open general conventions that served as a forum for party-masses contact were not held during the rst nine years after
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independence.58 In March 1949 when the idea of One Unit was aired in the constituent assembly by Firoz Khan Noon, it was endorsed by Yusuf Khattak, the general secretary of the PML. Later, the One Unit plan received a huge push after the Leagues defeat in East Pakistan. The defeat could logically translate into a clear preponderance of the Bengalis in the national parliament of the future. Bengali dominance of the national legislature would have made perfect nonsense of a strong centre, even if it remained under the control of an administrative bureaucracy and army drawn primarily from western Punjab.59 In the backdrop of such developments the army and the bureaucracy used pliable politicians like Daultana and Yusuf Khattak of the PML to promote their institutional interests.60 The One Unit was enforced, against the will of the Bengalis and other smaller provinces, on 14 October 1955. It had serious ramications as the concept of articial unity was highly resented by East Pakistan and the smaller provinces of West Pakistan.61The arrangement had to be reversed by Yahya Khan. Over the decades, Pakistan has not been able to forge provincial harmony. After the debacle and resultant secession of East Pakistan, ethnic clashes in Sind and Baluchistan have been repressed by the state. The post-1971 state response is based on fear of ethno-nationalist movements like the one that dismembered the country. In the recent years the leaders of the Oppressed Nationalities Movement (PONAM) have been insisting that the Constitution of Pakistan is decient in meeting the aspirations of the people belonging to the minority provinces. They are critical of the existing system of allocation of resources of the state and point out that there is intense resentment towards the presence of the army in Baluchistan and its acquisition of vast tracts of land for the Gwadar Port. The absence of infrastructure and basic facilities like clean drinking water, health and educational facilities in the far-ung areas result in poverty and low literacy. The exclusive provincial resources are managed by the federal government and the people of the smaller provinces are not compensated accordingly.62 The direct and indirect military interventions in domestic politics have hindered the natural evolution of a political culture of accommodation and tolerance.Thus, Benazir was allowed to become
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the prime minister in 1988 only after Sharif was hoisted by the military to the chief ministership of the Punjab to ensure he controlled the provincial government and fuelled the confrontation with Benazir so as to provide the army and the ISI with additional leverage for inuencing domestic politics.63 The inability of the PPP to do well in the Punjab in particular opened the disconcerting prospect of the federal government facing strong opposition by the IJI in the majority province.64 The PML thus played a major role in tacitly supporting the designs of the military pertaining to political leverage. The absence of accommodation and the tussle between the provinces and centre have been the two dominant factors of Pakistani politics. After Benazirs return to power Punjab was at the forefront of this tussle. There were provocations on both sides. The IJI government in the province with Nawaz Sharif as the Chief Minister kept the temperatures boiling. The party propaganda laced with anti-Sindhi sentiments projected the image of the IJI as the protector of Punjabi interests. The PMLs posing as the upholder of provincial autonomy lacked conviction.65 According to Aitezaz Ahsan, the then PPP Federal Interior Minister, Had Nawaz Sharif been in the centre he would have been the greatest opponent of provincial autonomy.66 The tussle between the IJI and PPP took on the complexion of a personal vendetta between Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz was unable to forgive her for her administrations alleged victimization of the Sharif family during 88-90.Nor was he able to rise above his rancor against the nationalization of Ittefaq Foundries by Zulqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s. He initiated cases of alleged corruption against Benazir and her spouse during his stints as the prime minister of the country. In 2007 he joined hands with the same allegedly corrupt politicians in the name of national reconciliation and democracy. While in power, Nawaz Sharif did introduce a number of populist actions for poverty alleviation and social uplift such as xing the minimum wage and the Yellow Cab Scheme. These actions have been censured for lack of substance and long term vision. His privatization program was criticized for inherent lack of accountability and eventually led to allegations of nancial mismanagement.67 His popularity increased as Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in Chaghai in May 1998. None of this
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can obscure the fact, however, that he adopted a confrontational mode of governance toward an equally provocative centre during Benazirs time and demanded greater provincial powers while continuing to defy the central authority.68 It is also worthwhile to note that while the different factions including the PML (N) have often entered into alliances with regional and religious parties their leaders have refrained from openly condemning the abuse of human rights that occurs regularly within the provincial jurisdiction of landed aristocracy, waderas, pirs and tribal chiefs. To this day the smaller provinces remain aggrieved and their feeling of alienation has begun to give way to violence and insurgencies. As the war rages in NWFP and FATA and gas pipelines are blown up in Baluchistan, the PML (N) leadership has yet to unambiguously denounce extremist violence and suicide bombings or offer any viable solutions to the problems of Sind and Baluchistan Conclusion It is undeniable that after independence, Pakistan was beset with multiple grave problems including the rehabilitation of refugees and genuine existential concerns. The initiation of a viable political institution, however, should have been included in the Muslim Leagues list of priorities. It is no less true that the highly organized militarybureaucracy axis inherited a colonial structure that was too powerful and beyond the control of the edgling political institutions. Yet, there is no justication for the Muslim Leagues transformation into a proestablishment party. Instead of adopting a principled stance it chose to undermine the aspirations of the people of Pakistan and the vision of the countrys founding father. Successive PML factions and governments have perpetuated this sordid tradition. In view of the chequered history of the Pakistan Muslim League in general and that of the PML (N) in particular, it seems likely that the post-1999 anti-establishment stance of its leadership was based on anti-Musharraf sentiment; that the congeniality of the PML (N)
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leadership toward traditional political opponents, their offers of national reconciliation and verbal support for democratic institutions were in fact nothing more than slogan mongering. Now that the personal vendetta has translated into poetic justice, have the daggers been sheathed once again? Is it farfetched to wonder whether Musharrafs departure has dampened the passion for high-minded catchphrases and the PML leadership has relapsed into complacency, conveniently reverting to its traditional mould of doublespeak? Nawaz Sharif departed for London within a few days of Musharrafs ouster without initiating concerted efforts to mobilize the public or the media to press for the restoration of the pre-3 November judiciary. There were no calls for processions to protest the injustice meted out to the Chief justice of Pakistan; nor were any jalsas held to pressurize the PPP-led government into honoring its word. Could it be surmised that by relinquishing the demand for Musharrafs accountability, Nawaz Sharif has tacitly indemnied the extra-constitutional measures of a dictator thereby making a mockery of the Charter of Democracy? His actions give weight to the stories related to dubious deals with the establishment. Was the threat of the dormant corruption cases the deciding factor? The long and unrelenting opposition to the Musharraf regime offered by the PML(N) leadership for almost nine years revived peoples hopes for the future of the political institutions of the country. The civil society of Pakistan, by participating peacefully in the lawyers long march this year, proved its willingness to mobilize for democracy. In keeping with its past record, the PML (N) failed to avail this golden opportunity to widen its vote bank and to initiate and implement a meaningful change in the political culture of Pakistan. With their government secure in the all important province of Punjab, the breakup with the governing coalition in the centre can hardly be counted as a sacrice. Their lukewarm reaction to Zardaris reneging on solemn commitments makes one wonder if the new face of the PML (N) is but a mask to hide the real intentions pertaining to a single point Musharraf-specic agenda? Did they actually fail to see through the intentions of the PPP leadership or could it be that the ostensible change of heart is not a watershed but an anomaly? If the apparent transformation is motivated by egotistical issues, the PML (N)
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will not be able to deliver on its promises of parliamentary democracy, provincial and regional harmony and the creation of a progressive state. The Muslim League, which spearheaded the movement for the emergence of Pakistan, has fragmented and failed. Is the time ripe for a new middle class-led political party to emerge - a party that has the vision and the will to realize the original, pre-independence ideals that inspired the creation of Pakistan?

References:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 http://www.google.com ,accessed on 9 October 2008 Ibid. The International Republican Institute Poll, http://www.google.com, accessed on 11 October 2008 Ibid. See News Post, The News, Islamabad, 1st October 2008 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard books (Pvt) Ltd.,2005, p.7 Ibid., pp 4-5 Pervez Hoodbhoy, www.google.com, accessed on 20 September 2008 Aug 11, 1947,Jinnahs address to the First Constituent Assembly Pervez Hoodbhoy, www.google.com, accessed on 20 September 2008 Ibid. Jinnahs Address to the people of the Tribal Areas, 31 July1947. Pervez Hoodbhoy, www.google.com, accessed on 20 September 2008 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p ? Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, pp 143-144 B.K.Dittas speech Constituent Assembly Debates (1949), Vol.3,No.3,p.45 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, p.143 Ibid.,p.147 Ibid.,p.148 Ibid. Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, New York: Praegor, 1980, p.38 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, p. 49 Syed Anwar, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, Lahore: Vanguard Books,1984, pp.94-95

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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, p.28 Ibid.,p.30 Ibid. Ibid. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard books (Pvt) Ltd.,2005, p.117 Ibid., p.129 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, p.110 Ibid., p.292 Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military rule or Peoples Power, New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1970, p.43 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, pp 138-139 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.179? Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: National Publishing House, 1963, p.138 A.B.S Jafri, , The Political Parties of Pakistan, Karachi: Royal Book Company,2002, p.89 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard books (Pvt) Ltd.,2005, p.281 http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia, accessed on 10 October, 2008 A. G. Noorani, The Parliamentary System in South Asia, Criterion, vol.2.no.3,p84 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,p23? The Civil and Military Gazette, August 5, 1947 Ibid. Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, p 49 Ibid. pp 138-139 Ibid., p.183 A. G. Noorani, The Parliamentary System in South Asia, Criterion, vol.2.no.3,p.78 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in 1989: The Politics of Stalemate, Asian Survey, vol.30, no.2. pp. 127-129 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp 23-24 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, pp 1314 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,p 145 Ian Talbot Ian, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, p.15 Ibid.,p.30 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, pp.164-165 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,p.303 Ibid.

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56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, p.26 Ibid.,p.133 Keith Callard, Pakistan : A Political Study, London : George Allen and Unwin,1957,p.40 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,pp 197-198 Ibid.,p198 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Rule of Muslim League and Inception of Democracy, Lahore : Jang Publishers , 1997, p 158 http://www.google.com, accessed on 11October2008 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard books (Pvt) Ltd.,2005, p.203 Ayesha Jalal, , The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistans Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990,p.327 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, pp.300301 Herald,20, no.10,p.89 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, New York: St. Martins Press, 1998, pp.319320 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard books (Pvt) Ltd.,2005, p.204

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PAKISTAN: RELIGION, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY


K.S. Dhillon*

The full significance of the terrorist strike at the heavily guarded Marriott hotel in Islamabads maximum security and restricted-entry zone on 20 September 2008 needs to be assessed more realistically than is being done by political and strategic analysts in South Asia, especially so far as its symbolic value for Islamist militants active in the area is concerned. Not only is it a blatant attack on the still fragile democratic polity that the countrys untested politicians recently stitched up with great difficulty due to the many inbuilt contradictions between the overall political objectives of the two principal players, Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, it is also a major challenge to Pakistans very existence as a civilized and self-confident member of the comity of nations. In another sense, it is a telling reflection on Pakistans ability and willingness to operate as a dependable ally in the worlds fight against global terrorism. It also places a big question mark on the countrys ability to survive as a moderate Islamic state. The message sought to be conveyed by the assailants is loud and clear: they care neither for religion nor democracy, not to speak of universally recognized canons of social contract and concord. As the second most powerful military and nuclear power in South Asia, such happenings in Pakistan are fraught with complex and perilous consequences to the peoples of the entire region. This is why all of us in this part of the world, but more so in India, itself hugely threatened by
* K.S.Dhillon is a former director general of police in the Indian states of Punjab and Madhya Pradesh, a former vice chancellor of Bhopal University and a Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

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assorted militancies and insurgencies, are deeply concerned. What is at stake is the peace and stability of all of us in the region and not merely in Pakistan. Clearly, all South Asians are acutely vulnerable to such attacks and are thus in a state of grave and imminent risk at the hands of the mushrooming terrorist groups of various hues and complexions. We, in India, are no strangers to such horrendous events, now almost on a weekly basis. That a large truck laden with a massive quantity of deadly explosives was able to pass unhindered through a highly secured area, housing the parliament, presidential and prime ministerial mansions and important foreign missions. To strike at the heavily protected Marriott hotel, is in itself a depressing commentary on the way matters of high security are handled in that country. Not that our own security agencies are markedly more competent in guarding our backyards in such situations. The TV grabs of the attack and the chaotic manner in which the security personnel reacted to the suicide assault in Islamabad, as in Delhi about the same time, do not depict the South Asian security forces in a favourable light. For a security apparatus that has been faced with such threats for years, in both cases, it was a disgraceful display of botched counterterrorism strategies and operations. Whether you call it Pakistans 9/11 or compare it to the attack on Indias parliament in December 2001 in which nine policemen and a parliament staffer were killed, the storming of Marriott is more than anything else a criminally blatant endeavour to demolish one of the major power symbols of the country. Although the number of deaths, around 60, was far below the 150-plus fatalities in the attack on the late Benazir Bhutto welcome procession in Karachi on 18 October last year, politically and strategically, this attack holds a much higher symbolic value to the terrorist organizations, operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The choice of the Marriott as a bombing target may also have been inspired by the fact that many foreigners patronize the five-storey, 290room hotel that was also reportedly being used for a covert operation by US Marines, who were seen, according to media reports, unloading
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a truckload of steel boxes on the night of 17 September. The truck belonged to the US embassy. It was also on the same day that Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani met the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, in Islamabad to ask him to end his forces military incursions into Pakistan. The Marriotts physical proximity to the countrys power centres and to several television and radio stations lends it a special strategic prominence and although most of the casualties were Pakistani citizens including hotel guests, security guards, hotel workers and drivers, about a dozen foreigners, among them American, German and Vietnamese citizens, besides the Czech Ambassador were also killed. The timing of the attack was also clearly meant to send a message to the Pakistani establishment in no uncertain terms as it sought to put into the shade the newly elected Presidents maiden address to the joint parliamentary session consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate a few hours earlier, in which he vowed to battle Jihadi elements with a view to restoring the moderate and liberal character in tune with the aspirations of the people as expressed in the February parliamentary elections. Stray reports also indicate that the suicide bombers earlier target may have been the Parliament house itself but tight security at that venue ahead of the presidential address might have led to a last minute strategic shift to the Marriott. Also, the attackers timed the strike to coincide with Iftar, a traditionally peaceful time of daily thanksgiving, when Muslims end their dawn-to-dusk fast during the holy month of Ramzan. The obvious inference from this chain of events is that the Islamist terrorists are capable of striking at will even in a strategically sealed area in the heart of Pakistans capital, and neither democracy nor religion mean anything to them. No one seems to have claimed clear responsibility but the attack is obviously the handiwork of Pakistani Taliban, closely allied with Al-Qaeda, and, as mentioned above, deeply entrenched in FATA. It will be recalled that on 3 September helicopter borne US troops actually landed in Angoor Adda in Waziristan and attacked a building where Al Qaida operatives are said to have been staying. After Asif Zardari was sworn in as president on 6 September, a
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series of strafing missions by US drones were carried out in the area. These incursions have caused a great deal of resentment and outrage in the nation, setting off fears that its sovereignty and territorial integrity are under attack. Promptly responding to public opinion, the government warned the Americans of retaliatory action if they continued to violate Pakistani air space. However, such threats of retaliation against the mighty Americans make little sense, given Pakistans client state status and heavy dependence on the US, both in economic and military terms. Understandably, there is no dearth of emotionally charged people in Pakistan, who are eager to fight the US and resist with all that it takes her supposed hegemonic designs. Such US strikes, apparently goaded by the need to boost the morale of the Republican party in preparation for the November elections, lay bare the arrogant and thoughtless approach of the US to national sensitivities and gravely undermine Pakistans fledgling democracy, viewed by many as the only hope for winning the war on terror. It is by now reasonably certain that the Pakistani people rightfully belong to a moderate Islamic variety and are extremely distrustful of the growing appeal of fundamentalist Islam through many Mullahdominated religious schools and seminaries. Her nascent democracy faces an ominous threat at the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements on Pakistans western borders as also in its heartland. We all know how reluctantly and half-heartedly Pakistan discarded its Taliban allies, the successors of the Mujahideen it supported in Americas covert war against the USSR. In the wake of 9/11, Pervez Mushrrafs military regime aligned itself with the US, apparently in the face of widespread public resentment and antagonism in the country. The American attack on Afghanistan soon after 9/11 drove Taliban elements across the border into Pakistans north-western tribal areas where they have ethnic, linguistic and historic ties. Their Al Qaeda friends, who have developed close ties in the area through matrimony and a shared hatred for a common enemy (America), joined them. It is thus no coincidence that Pakistan experienced its first suicide bombing in 2002. The new government that assumed office after the February 2008
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elections seems to feel that it has inherited a war largely perceived by the Pakistani people as a proxy war on behalf of the US. This has to be rectified otherwise the fight against the rising tide of militancy and terrorism in that country cannot succeed. Simultaneously, the six month old democratic government has to set its own house in order, resolve the inter-party incongruities and do all it can to strengthen its credibility ratings with the people, who alone can fortify its hands in the fight against Al Qaeda and Taliban elements, posing a very grave threat indeed to Pakistan and its neighbours, especially India and Afghanistan, not to mention the more distant targets in the US and Europe. For Pakistan, it is indeed a battle for its survival as a modern, moderate and democratic Islamic state. She has, therefore, to be doubly sure that all elements of the state apparatus, both civilian and military, are involved in the formulation and implementation processes of a transparent, effective, viable and durable counterterrorism policy and its operational repercussions. A military-only option is clearly not the answer, it has not succeeded in any terrorist-threatened region, Palestine and Iraq included. There has to be a political strategy and a road map for meeting the challenge of terrorism, whether of the Islamist, secessionist or any other variety. That is why it is imperative that a political government must lead the nation in fighting all threats to peace and order in society and indeed to its very survival. For, only a democratic polity can represent and live up to the hopes and wishes of its people and effectively battle anti-national forces. In the February 2008 elections, the Pakistani people made their preferences evident in no uncertain terms by rejecting dictatorship and right wing Islamic ideologies. They voted overwhelmingly for change from past policies i.e., military interference in governance and the politics of hate as well as religious bigotry and, more significantly, for reining in the intelligence agencies, which have historic ties with the Mujahideen and their Taliban successors. Implicit in this vote for change is the need of establishing peace with Pakistans eastern and western neighbours, India and Afghanistan. During a recent visit to Pakistan, this writer noticed widespread support among all sections of the people for the system of democracy.
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They also appeared to firmly believe that fundamentalism and army rule is not in the best interests of their nation. In fact, they deeply and sincerely envy India for her enduring staying power as a vibrant democracy with a strictly apolitical army, firmly under civilian control. In areas where the Pakistan government has been able to enlist local support against the Taliban, there are clear signs of the Islamist groups losing steam, though the frequent heavy-handed military approach continues to undermine this support and enhance the capacity of the Taliban to blunt counterterrorist operations. Driven by the US, the Pakistani army has been bombing Bajaur, the northern-most tribal agency sandwiched between Afghanistans Kunar province and the settled areas of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan since early August. Some 300,000 people are estimated to have fled the fighting to take refuge in badly-run relief camps around the cities of Mardan and Peshawar. A human rights activist, who visited these camps recently, reports that the displaced people want to live as Pakistani citizens, enjoying the same rights as other Pakistani citizens, be governed by the laws and Constitution of Pakistan and not the colonial era Frontier Crimes Regulation that is still in force there. They want to experience the fruits of development such as schools, hospitals, secure jobs as well as better and safer future for their children. They claim that they do not support the Taliban and, in fact, loathe the practices and the system of governance offered by them. Approximately 50 kilometers northwest of Islamabad is situated the small township of Tarbela, the headquarters of Pakistans Special Operation Task Force (SOTF). Recently, 300 American personnel, officially labeled as a training advisory group, are reported to have landed at this station. There is reason to believe, however, that there is more to this operation than what meets the eye. It will be recalled that in the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif allowed a special CIA cell to operate from the same facility, to track and apprehend Osama bin Laden. They left after Pervez Musharraf came to power. Now, the US has bought several square kilometers of land at Tarbela. Not long ago, 20 large containers arrived at the site to be unloaded only by Americans; no one else was allowed in the vicinity. Huge quantities of special arms and ammunition as well as tanks and armored vehicles are believed to have
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been brought into the country in these containers. All this activity surely cannot be merely related to training programmes. Obviously, all such hush-hush activity at Tarbela is in preparation for an all-out offensive in NWFP and beyond to storm Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries and it is not unlikely that more American troops will soon be inducted into the area for an effective push against the so far illusive adversary. Pakistans recent offer to enter into ceasefire agreements with militants in the North and South Waziristan tribal areas were not only summarily rejected, but followed with widespread attacks on security forces in the area and then the Marriott attack. It appears that the US, concerned at the continued failure of the Pakistani establishment to come to grips with Islamist terrorist groups, spawned chiefly by al Qaeda elements in FATA as well as in other parts of the country and the logistical support that they continue to extend to their colleagues across the porous borders to nourish insurgency in Afghanistan, has decided to take matters more resolutely in its own hands. This will make the still fragile democratic dispensation even more insecure and unpopular and damage its ability to combat insurgency and terrorism. All South Asian nations, especially India, a fast growing regional power, need to readjust their priorities in the area of foreign policy to allay any Pakistani apprehensions and assure that countrys people and establishment that they mean no harm to them and are, in fact, greatly interested in securing their position as a democratic and moderate Islamic state. As the largest and most powerful nation in the region, India should offer all necessary help to its neighbour in battling Jihadi terrorism. We will, thereby, also reinforce our own security in that sphere. This will also be in the long term interest of all the South Asian nations.

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