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I am deeply honored to be asked to deliver the 12th Dr. Eric Williams Memorial Lecture, and I thank the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, and its Governor, Winston Dookeran, for the invitation to do so. Prime Minister Williams, scholar and statesman, was a bold thinker. One of the arresting statements he made which caught my attention, in his magisterial work From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean, 14921969, is the observation that "in intellectual, as in political matters, the Caribbean is a geographical expression. There is no history of the Caribbean area as a whole." [1] With that book, published in 1970, there now exists such a history. With his example of broad perspective and clear perception in mind, I am emboldened to say: "There is no diplomacy of the Caribbean as a whole." However, there can be. One is developing. It can develop faster. It must do so, because it is needed. That is my subject and my theme.

GREAT POWERS AND SMALL COUNTRIES - POWER AND LAW For the big states of the world, the surest, if not perhaps the ideal, means of selfpreservation is the use of power. The term "great power" - the name associated with the largest countries in the international system at least since the Congress of Vienna reveals the centrality of power in the very identity of the big states. It is not always an attractive image. Henry Kissinger has written of Russia at that time: "Russia's raw physical power was made all the more ominous by the merciless autocracy of its domestic institutions."[2] What the term, "great power," essentially means is that the country thus classified is capable, if necessary, of protecting itself and of defending its interests - by acting alone. "Small countries" is a correlative, or counterpart, term. By definition, as well as usually in reality, a "small country" is one that cannot protect itself by it own efforts. Small

countries require allies - or to be allies. By adding themselves to coalitions they can hope either to contribute to the counterbalancing of a threatening great power or to secure their safety by jumping on the bandwagon of the threatening power. "Balancing" and "bandwagoning" - these two basic alternative strategies are called in contemporary political science. For small states, I believe that neither strategy is appropriate. The very smallest states in the international system - those 1.5 million or less in population [3] - can hardly rely on power at all, their own or that of others, because they do not have enough of it to contribute to the game. They are, as Dr. Williams historically described the West Indian countries, Europe's and America's "pawns."[4] They are not the knights, the bishops, or the rooks of international chess - but merely the pawns, counting for only "1" each in points. Although they have little inherent strength of their own, they can, sometimes, hold positional advantages. But they have limited range, and can rarely enter into large, complicated, and strategic international power plays. The greatest chance of safety and survival for small states lies, I submit, in law, in institutions, and, especially, in diplomacy. International politics is not really like chess. It is fundamentally a normative order. Even chess has its framework and rules. The new diplomacy, unlike the old (of the Congress of Vienna period), will increasingly be a rule-governed discourse. In order to succeed well in diplomacy, a state must be completely sovereign - not merely in the sense of having legal independence and international recognition but in the full sense of national self-possession. A nation-state in today's world must be confident of its own identity, know its political and other interests, recognize both its strengths and its weaknesses, and have the support of an informed and united public. Sovereignty is not just a juridical concept. It encompasses self-determination of every kind - political, economic, social, cultural, and emotional. A state must be able to determine itself in order to make commitments to others.

The small countries of the Caribbean. to be relied upon when and if all else fails. coupled with growing internal political unrest. From the "summit" level to lower-level technical meetings. establish the persona of that country in the world. and sometimes the responsibility.[5] These are such as would test the capacity of even the greatest of the great powers. more precisely. and to international organizations. I would reverse this and say that such diplomacy is the highest and truest expression of the state. less important as an influence than "market forces" or "civil society. Without a well-ordered and effective government. effective engagement in the international diplomatic system is simply crucial. must be sovereign in order to participate. there is not likely to be success or even much involvement in diplomacy. to others." It is the state that makes agreements. nongovernmental organizations." as if the general citizenry of a country or. the fate of the government of Indonesia. I mention this because nowadays one hears expressions such as "citizen diplomacy. It is short-sighted to consider the state. to be a secondary factor. The key to participation in that system is government. This is. for instance. as it happens. to bind a nation. It is only the state that has the authority. Critics may say that formal diplomacy is the last refuge of the state.Diplomacy is by definition a system of sovereign states. even to gain for itself "fast track" negotiating authority to engage decisively in international trade talks. face a daunting array of diplomatic challenges in the realm of economic negotiations. of whatever size. Now it is economic negotiations. is not doing perfectly: it does not seem able. that are most important in international relations. Particularly for small states. could substitute for the state in international relations. as many do now. for example. joining and even pooling sovereignties. . not merely its "image. the representatives of a country to other countries. the Cold War is over. I believe. A state. and of a nation as a community in a world of national communities. Consider." Active participation in the diplomatic system can also be a country's best safety net. a profound mistake. not military talks. the sole surviving superpower. The United States. Today. where the personal regime of President Suharto has just been overturned in part because of external economic-policy pressure.

The trade-diplomacy agenda further includes the vast and unprecedented task of completing hemispheric negotiations. Caribbean. due to expire on the not-too-far-distant date of February 29. [6] I would add to the list as well. the negotiations that must inevitably occur to end the United States trade and investment embargo of Cuba.equivalent perhaps to a couple of years at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy! . It hopes to supervise and perhaps also to conduct many of the negotiations in which Caribbean countries are now and will be involved. in concert with the larger African. the RNM is being led by Sir Shridath Ramphal as Chief Negotiator. be a wonderful training experience for young Caribbean diplomats and officials who will be involved in it . looking toward a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. followed by the participation of Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina as an observer at the ACP/EU Council of Ministers Meeting in Barbados earlier this month." In the context of the region's relations with Europe. 2000.[7] The investment of resources. though it is of course not on any official international program. The sheer variety and complexity of this list of tasks of economic diplomacy must seem almost overwhelming. in this grand and ambitious regional undertaking should pay dividends for years to come. is forcing this issue.The Caribbean economic-policy negotiating agenda includes. It will. started in Miami in 1994. and Pacific (ACP) group. The recent request of Cuba to join the Lomé Convention. Created at the CARIFORUM level (with Suriname and also Haiti and the Dominican Republic included). human as well as financial and by public authorities as well as private contributors. the implementation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and CARICOM Single Market and Economy. for the European Union's fourth Lomé Convention. incidentally. within the region. it includes negotiations to find a satisfactory successor arrangement. In the context of Caribbean relations with North America. it includes the persistent question of "NAFTA parity. and to bring Cuba into a Caribbean-wide trading area and back into the fold of the Inter-American System. one important instrument for the management of this complicated process has been set up with the newly established Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM). Fortunately.

in Europe. especially as in the dominantly Anglophone area of the United States and English-speaking Caribbean we are deficient in the ability to talk with. What I am suggesting is that the countries of the Caribbean now face a "Marshall Plan"-type challenge in figuring out how to structure their . our increasingly numerous Spanish. economic relations in the period after World War II. not just one. What is needed. Other languages. law. of course. a senior American diplomat who served as U. he had worked to help establish the Marshall Plan .[8] A negotiator today often must really know what he or she is talking about in several areas.S.the European Recovery Program and. I shall offer at least part of a new analytical framework for the study of diplomacy.your economic relationships with not only the larger Caribbean region itself but also the new Europe and the rest of the world. with particular reference to the situation of small states. in the late 1940s. calls "pluri-disciplinary" instruction (precisely neither "generalist" nor "specialist" . Ambassador to France and to the Soviet Union. particularly.S. Arthur Hartman. in terms of training.a conventional distinction which he faults).and French-speaking neighbors and conationals. Paul Leifer. and it can be a defining one. Very early in his career. My hope is that this structured analysis will prove useful to practitioners of small-state . too.I am here reminded of something a student at the Fletcher School once told me about her father. The kind of diplomatic skill required for this task should be not only in economics but also in politics and. are needed. is what Dr. It is a historic moment for you. SIX TYPES OF DIPLOMACY FOR SMALL STATES I should like now to proceed to talk more explicitly about the problem of "Diplomacy and Small States. the entity that later became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. the Director of the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna. She said to me that one of "Arthur Hartman's greatest regrets" was that he had not been able in his own subsequent career to offer to the young diplomats and officials under his supervision the kind of challenge that he had been given at a comparable stage when helping to build the framework for U." In so doing.

and sometimes." This is traditionally practiced by professional diplomats. there is "quiet diplomacy. Quiet diplomacy thus usually takes place elsewhere. the High Commissioners of the Commonwealth Caribbean states in London. particularly between mother and daughter countries. somewhat generalizes these bilateral Commonwealth relationships a bit. the individual items are "matched" by an opposing. The manner of quiet diplomacy is usually respectful. such diplomacy. as they seek to define and secure their places in today's world. there is mutual understanding and regard. that have the greatest chances of producing results. First. as well as specific strengths and skills. even with limited numbers of personnel and other means to employ. and a capacity for close. I believe. This is the kind of diplomacy long practiced by. and priorities. or counterpart. With negotiations now going on all around them. diplomatic type. out of touch. even intimate partnership." such as the ones that notably obtain between former British colonies. The diplomatist can select among these in accordance with his or her country's particular circumstances. or template. therefore. are especially pertinent to small states. Inherently bilateral. to help them in designing strategies.diplomacy as well as to theoreticians. Its practitioners are a country's representatives stationed abroad . even deferential perhaps. and combinations thereof. though it is more commercially oriented. in the Caribbean and elsewhere around the globe. The six types of diplomacy I shall discuss are ones that I think of as coming in three "pairs." In each pair. normally those regularly accredited to governments in foreign capitals. In part because of a shared history. for example. creating a "special" mini-community. including those of the Caribbean. This diplomacy can be "quiet" because its small-state . The voice of a Caribbean or other small Commonwealth state in dialogue with Great Britain is not that of power but rather that of reason. What I shall do is to identify. The presence of the West India Committee in London. six different types of diplomacy that. traditions. perhaps mixed with sentimental tones. and briefly to describe and illustrate. often involves "special relationships. and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. diplomats need a pattern.

The "Western Hemisphere" is the rubric for some of the most important trade and economic discussions. Ambassadors from Caribbean countries in Washington sometimes meet together to coordinate their efforts. The same is true of the World Bank. institutionally centered in Washington. Increasingly. the Inter-American System.are made there. the old metropole. diplomatic relations have developed similarly. a somewhat problematical one. the context for contact has been mainly limited to the ACP framework. it is also the case that the Caribbean "still has friends" in Europe. It has been well pointed out that Caribbean countries ought. Pertinent committees and also certain special groups within Congress. is also becoming important for Caribbean countries. including the White House. the emphasis has been on seeking economic development assistance and maintaining non-reciprocal trade preferences. This means that the Organization of American States as well as the Inter-American Development Bank are important institutions to know and deal with. in . and so on to those diplomats who are believed to have the most influence in those various places. is Brussels. In dealing with the EU." for example . Congress is approached. one being the Black Caucus. notably the Miami process leading toward a possible FTAA.[9] To some degree Caribbean-U. a delegation from which is currently visiting Trinidad and Tobago. Increasingly. Washington probably is an even more important diplomatic center for the Caribbean states than is London. to congressional committees. informally assigning tasks of representation to the White House. A newer diplomatic focus for Caribbean states that I would mention."NAFTA parity. Nowadays.S. Although it is probably true that the post-colonial era of "special relationships" is coming to an end. although other agencies of the administration are dealt with too. As in London (from which some Caribbean diplomats come in order to treat with the European Union). the contact in Washington is with the State Department. for many of the most important decisions affecting Caribbean interests . Formally.practitioners already "have the ear" of the larger country. therefore. to key officials. can be very important sources of practical support as well as sympathetic understanding.

" so that others. Such public expression can cause confusion and increase contention.in "class action" suits. "open.to secure redress of some particular offense. may be given to know that grievances have been felt and that demands are being made." This is a still-current style of diplomacy that is somewhat reminiscent. Public newspaper and other media may even be relied upon by protest diplomats as the principal channels of communication." Because protest diplomacy is open and public. of course. Its operating assumption. occasionally with unfortunate consequences. too.addition. It is also. Originally. so to speak. it happens. into making the decision that is desired. a kind of special pleading. Now individual countries are dealt with similarly. by mobilizing opinion. or win a "break" of some kind. Its basic stance is confrontational. The language of protesting diplomacy in such cases tends to be rhetorical. as the days of generous ACP benefits may be numbered. is that "the squeaky wheel gets the grease. and fully reciprocal economic relations with the EU and its members may soon become de rigueur. should they develop ties with more of the influential EU member states on the Continent. That is much less possible now in the era of broad international trade negotiations dominated by the World Trade Organization (WTO). when "sovereignty" was the main objective of most Caribbean states. has been to seek better terms within preferential trade systems. and logically contrasting. historically. when the goals thus are limited. rather . This brings me to the next. to a greater or lesser degree. So. with regard to other matters.[10] This is good advice. The second type is "protest diplomacy. the European Commission. on the outside. or simply to try to get a marginally better deal. to cultivate the central executive body of the European Union. The actual objectives of protest diplomacy may be. in order to try to pressure a government. to remedy an injury. that statements are made that go beyond or are at variance with what has been said in official and confidential exchanges. for everyone. and therefore have to respond similarly . of the pre-independence period. quite limited . in the early days of independence. diplomatic type. as mentioned. in part so as to be able to use these relationships in Brussels.[11] The main subject matter of Caribbean quiet diplomacy. this was most often done on a one-to-one basis.

"[13] He no doubt made his point. there are well- . and exaggerated distinctions between "West" and "East" and also between "North" and "South" were drawn. Diplomatic protests.than reasonable. on the basis of damaged interests or a sense of violated principles. protest diplomacy is associated with polarization .although. In the UN there is a recognized "group system. in numbers. The third type is "group diplomacy." In the General Assembly. the organizational carrier of this style of diplomacy was the Non-Aligned Movement. The EU position was "alarming. Sympathizers provide a kind of emotional confirmation and sometimes even provide parallel support with action. I doubt that this technique was as effective. for the next pair of diplomatic kinds. when the basic pattern of international relations was polarized ideologically.[12] protest diplomacy was in its heyday. attract attention. They can win a following. the Dominican Republic. of the European Commission's proposals for a successor arrangement for Lomé IV. private or public. protest diplomacy can just seem noisy. or a sounding board. Now. Yet it must be kept in reserve. as throughout the "Third World" during that time. it typically implicates others. It makes a moralistic appeal. or at least obscurity and a kind of safety." The operative principle here is that there is strength. It expresses indignation. as it would have been in an earlier day. against "unfair" treatment. Patterson. A recent use of protest diplomacy was the strong denunciation made by Jamaica's Prime Minister P. Though protest diplomacy can be bilateral. if only as hearers. it probably more often has been the effect of international polarization than a cause of it. but they also can lead to a falling out. however. in the post-Cold War world. Generally. such as the United Nations. J. historically. He was speaking following a caucus with leaders of CARICOM." he said. and Haiti after a summit meeting in Grenada in March 1998. During the long Cold War period. as chairman of CARICOM's committee on international negotiations. Group diplomacy is particularly in evidence within international organizations. Today. It "smacked of an outdated colonial relationship. In the Caribbean context. as an instrument in the small-state diplomat's kit bag. Prime Minister Patterson was particularly critical of the European Commission's proposed conditionalities regarding human rights and governance.

as he reflected: "It proved to be impossible to conduct serious negotiations at UNCLOS III until these special-interest groups were formed. on the negative side." In fact. "it enabled countries to join forces with other countries with which they shared a common interest. from small-state Singapore. for one. Overall group consensus is a goal as well as the method. to take probably the most famous case. such as. like those of the Caribbean. particularly when the new principle of a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was being defined. served with distinction as the President of the Third UNCLOS. such geographical and political groupings often have controlled the votes. the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. as a vote-rich area. based mainly on geography. On the positive side. in practical terms. Ambassador Tommy Koh. is a desirable ally in this context." which the G77 advocated in the 1970s. he explained. . it can prove difficult to gain particular. There is a tendency toward the lowest common denominator . Such unrealistic goals can only be voted for. has said of the UNCLOS "group system" that it had both positive and negative effects. with whom I have collaborated in a study of global diplomacy. They also had a great deal at stake. In this way. in specific functional contexts."[15] From the point of view of participating countries. made into workable international law. They seldom can be legislated.established regional groups. are an illustration of utopian envisioning. played a major part. in non-binding resolutions. the Caribbean countries such as Jamaica. he acknowledged. The ideological dreams of the "New International Economic Order. individual national advantages in such group-dominated settings. which can mean a set of unfulfillable aspirations. In the General Assembly and most of the other larger UN bodies. Koh.or. Group diplomacy can be more effective. "once a group had adopted a common position. In this setting. the highest. consisting of an even larger number of developing countries from many regions. There is also the so-called Group of 77."[14] However. Island states had a natural advantage and interest. sometimes. The small-state Caribbean. it was often difficult for the group to modify its position. a country could acquire a bargaining leverage that it would not have had if it had operated alone.

The Caribbean delegation that took part in the EUACP meeting in Brussels in late March no doubt also firmly upheld the principle that the ACP must negotiated with "as a single grouping. Prime Minister Patterson. suggested that a somewhat . The European Union. with the aim of expressing a "clear and firm message" of Caribbean resolve to maintain ACP unity. following the gathering in Grenada. I believe.The enduring advantage of the group-diplomacy concept. Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister Basdeo Panday was to visit France. experienced in these matters. The African. inter-continental "strategic alliances" with other countries and interests can perhaps still be formed. to exercise some quiet diplomacy on behalf of the cause of ACP group solidarity."[17] It will be impressive . Havelock RossBrewster." he has advised. and in founding the Group itself. Sir Alister McIntyre. In response to this. may prove very difficult. the current holder of the EU Presidency . even far outside their own geographical region. including a separate scheme for the Caribbean. As part of the same strategy.if this broad-group strategy succeeds. is that it enables countries to join forces with others. however. recalls with pride "the leadership that CARICOM countries gave in developing a common ACP position in negotiations on LOMÉ I. Dominica's Prime Minister Edison Charles visited Sweden." one that has particular current relevance for Caribbean diplomacy. either generally or with regard to specific issues.but surprising. Other missions were planned for some African countries." The "key factor. and Pacific grouping of developing countries interacting with the European Union is a major example of "groupness. that gave CARICOM its position of leadership was "the expertise that the region was able to offer the Group as a whole.[16] Such a repetition of leadership. Caribbean. as well as in negotiating the Georgetown Declaration on intra ACP cooperation. Within the ACP negotiating context.there. for one. Ambassador of Guyana to the European Union." This example "needs to be repeated in future negotiations. perhaps. appears to be determined to deal with the ACP membership by negotiating separate regional economic partnership agreements and free trade zones. and to gain added bargaining leverage thereby. facing the incalculable costs of its own future enlargement. planned to make a visit to Great Britain." as he notes. as Ambassador Koh pointed out. has. under current circumstances .

there are also many others. for instance. Today.[19] The traditional middle-level diplomatic players . The emphasis is entirely on individual distinctiveness.has been incurred. Malaysia. Niche diplomacy. the Netherlands. the idea of "niche diplomacy" is that countries' foreign policies."customised" relationship between the Caribbean and Europe might not be a bad thing. so called. Resources should be invested wisely in it.in terms of high-level official attention and exertion if not large financial outlay . though it may not require super-ordinate power. It is not inconceivable that some of the world's smallest countries too. somewhat like their business products.) By concentrating their limited resources and energies on certain specific objectives. including small states of the Caribbean area." This novel concept recently has been developed by a number of scholars. old and new. and intrepidly taking the initiative ("rolling the dice. and somewhat in contradistinction. A concept closely akin to marketing. and Turkey. not at all on group conformity. such diplomatically active countries. (Of course. South Africa. Recent examples are the leadership role that Canada has played in sponsoring and continuing to promote an International Convention to Ban Landmines and the more behind-the-scenes role that smaller Norway has been intermittently playing to foster peace between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. with a particular focus on the diplomacies of the middle powers. Australia. has its costs. In the cases of both the Ottawa process and the Oslo process. significant expense .include Canada. including the more recently emerged. and the Scandinavian countries. and rooks. bishops." as I recently heard Canada's Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy say). can occupy secure and influential places on the international scene in accordance with a highly differentiated kind of division of labor. can sometimes make decisive contributions.the knights. so to speak . there is "niche diplomacy. in the form of the political "market" for niche-diplomatic products. groups are needed to provide support. even without decisive power. middle-powered diplomatic forces of.[18] Fourth. can find ways to project themselves onto the international . one of them being Andrew Fenton Cooper at the University of Waterloo in Ontario.

One such might be. One can think of various international initiatives that Caribbean countries have taken and might currently or in the future take that would qualify as niche diplomacy. With the International Seabed Authority. An example of an earlier Caribbean diplomatic achievement in the environmental field is the 1994 Barbados Declaration and Plan of Action on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. The support of the public. from one governmental administration to another. one can imagine that the Jamaican government will be interested in advancing initiatives in the oceans-policy field. popular backing.a traditional but also a very modern service sector. make it more likely that a national "brand-name" initiative in diplomacy will have intellectual substance to it. Altruism does not always make sense. I do not myself know enough about that industry to suggest exactly . in which Caribbean countries have a direct stake as well as strong interest. one can conceive of highly visible initiatives that might be taken. that correlate closely with basic national and probably also regional interests. authorized under UNCLOS. For Trinidad and Tobago.50 per passenger charge that Grenada. and the active involvement of nongovernmental organizations. as part of a larger OECS solid waste management project conditionally assisted by international funding. One instance might be international policy leadership in the tourism field . and political continuity. if and only if diplomatic initiatives are devised. with the Caribbean's sandy beaches and clear waters being jeopardized by global warming and ship-borne and other pollution. very precisely. Such efforts might make sense for them. for instance. In the environmental area too. There should also be a close connection between the external posture of a country and its internal position when engaging in niche diplomacy. such as the US$1. an effort to universalize the idea of a modest environmental levy on cruise ships. and not just broader affinities or moralities. with difficulty. with its well-established petroleum refining industry and exciting new oil and gas discoveries. there may be policy "niches" in the sphere of energy diplomacy that will need to be filled. Some of these might be of a very hard-headed kind.stage in this fashion. claiming some of the limelight for themselves. has recently succeeded in negotiating with Carnival Cruise Lines. Here is a case where civil society and public opinion are vitally important. to be located in Kingston. I would suggest.

" It occurred to me when I recently read a reference. Its effort to "sell" its policy position in that diplomatic market is highly public and well-known. Rather." This term implies greater daring and risk-taking and perhaps also imagination and innovation than does "niche diplomacy.[20] And then. government. I intend by it the highly aggressive. Such diplomacy. But will it be successful? It might not be unless. Niche diplomacy poses dilemmas like this.S. the contacts that Caribbean states such as Jamaica have developed with Castro's Cuba would so qualify. might be viewed as "rational business decisions.what these might be. as he briefly explains it. and may require tradeoffs. there is the as-yet-unmentioned topic of bananas. to "enterprise theory" where. From the perspective of the U. and entrepreneurial activity that "steals" international advantages . The inclusion of Cuba in the new Association of Caribbean States (ACS) is a kind of regionalized version of such assertive diplomacy -an amalgam of "enterprise diplomacy" and "group diplomacy." By the light of this theory. in an essay on Caribbean affairs by Professor Anthony Bryan.the diplomatic march." Cuba's being allowed to join the ACP grouping and also being accepted as a new member of CARICOM would further assert the reality of Cuba's international . the Caribbean banana-producing countries form an alliance by engaging in "direct negotiations with the countries of the Central American Common Market on the banana question and on the proposed Caricom-CACM free trade agreement. Fifth. there is "enterprise diplomacy. Mona Campus. has a transgressive quality. competitive. has suggested. It often involves some disregard or even outright defiance of prevailing norms if not actual infringement of majorityenforced rules."[21] But that wider strategy might reduce the "niche-ness" of its agricultural and diplomatic product. particularly Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms. Now. for my final pair of contrasting diplomatic types. as it were. for instance."[22] By "enterprise diplomacy. "economic activity takes place across a spectrum of business that is both legitimate and illegitimate. of course." I do not mean illegal international activity as such (though there might be some dangerous tendency toward that). like the business-organizational activity that it resembles. as Professor Norman Girvan of the University of the West Indies. with which the Caribbean is well identified. decisions to open up offshore financial havens that ensure secrecy.

and they may in fact force these companies' and individuals' home countries to offer much the same in terms of services. an older example which might be retrospectively characterized as "enterprise diplomacy" is the liberalized system that Panama long has maintained for registering ships . including the United States. including a substantial part of the U. much the same could be said about. The undoubted financial success of the Panamanian shipregistry regime does put competitive pressure on others.[25] In the international economic-policy field. Enterprise diplomacy can be dubious. however. In the realm of financial services. though it was very important to continue efforts to make that country a democracy.[24] Should the Caribbean effort to open wider relations with Castro's Cuba succeed." one is tempted to say) of the entire industry. U. in talking with reporters.in which case the enterprising state's advantage could be partially or wholly lost in time. . that Cuba's admission to CARICOM was something that would have to be decided upon by CARICOM itself. whose change of a comparatively rigid policy might produce a beneficial liberalization (or "Liberian-ization. But it does not necessarily enhance a country's reputation.S.presence. It also brings revenues. said. Prime Minister Owen Arthur stated: "My expectation is that Cuba will soon take its place in the ACP as a member of the Caribbean group. the Cayman Islands and some other Caribbean polities that have set up offshore tax havens. Thus international financial norms may be changed -. when she was in Trinidad and Tobago the month before to meet with Caribbean Foreign Ministers. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Such a flexible (some would say even lax) system draws attention. the result would be nothing less than a diplomatic revolution in our common region. say. and help clear a path for the United States to alter its Cuban policy. In welcoming Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina and his observer delegation to the ACP/EU Council Meeting in Barbados in early May."[23] As for Cuba's membership in CARICOM. giving a new sense of completeness to the Caribbean and a new coherence to our international relations.S. merchant fleet. These enterprising governments do provide what companies and wealthy individuals are asking for. and have reaped significant rewards therefrom. The benefits may last.a system that has attracted ship owners from all over the world.

Now.the exemplary effect is almost violent. Sixth. and. This emanation of a criminal menace from Colombia and elsewhere can cause intimidation and. A certain notoriety often is entailed by entrepreneurial demonstration. "flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or importance. to that extent. for example. As I am myself an American diplomatic historian. I believe. the force of example. in response. it is effective. proceeds not through negotiation but through demonstration effects. governmental) concern. This may be welcome or unwelcome. One must in fairness remember of Roosevelt's international constabulary idea that it came nearly a generation before the Wilsonian idea of collective security and the League of Nations was established.that of the international drug cartels operating in the greater Caribbean region." and his suggestion. especially by the governments of the countries where the drug traffic originates." as I have called it.S. in Haiti."Enterprise diplomacy. It is something to be reckoned with. to see in this early twentieth-century American doctrine interventionism ." In response to the increasingly serious drugtrafficking challenge. and problems like money-laundering that may be related to it. To cite a completely negative case . a corrective to it.in dealing with what Teddy Roosevelt called "flagrant cases" - . of "the exercise of an international police power. for the opposite of entrepreneurship." Such an international authority need not be one."[26] But I am not going to invoke the Roosevelt Corollary! However. and today should not be one. most notoriously in Colombia . what I would do. there is "regulatory diplomacy. is to note the historical originality of Roosevelt's concept of an "international police power. a high order of technical international cooperation is necessary so as to uphold the rule of law. Paradoxically. I perhaps inescapably think of President Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 phrase. The basic notion does have potential as we see. that is unilaterally exercised. closer to home. It is not wholly far-fetched. in the international efforts to build up a non-military policing capacity in Bosnia-Herzegovina or. and sometimes even the capacity of small states to govern. those governments' very weakness in the face of drug entrepreneurship heightens their own influence. to some degree. as I believe has not been done before. as a source of international (including U.

country. some consider the multilateral action in Haiti to have been unwarranted (even if needed) interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign. In short. Chile. a retired American diplomat of long experience in hemispheric affairs. was laid with Resolution 1080. provides that. it can serve to assure adherence to international norms which." The cornerstone of this incipient regime. in case of "any sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states. if small. Bloomfield. that the OAS foreign ministers have in the Haitian and also several other cases "not only condemned the overthrow as illegal and called for a prompt return to democratic rule. almost with a sense of awe (as he knows Latin American and Caribbean anti-interventionist sensibilities well). as it is known." an emergency meeting of OAS foreign ministers will be convoked within ten days to decide upon a collective response. By carefully setting and strictly monitoring internationally agreed-upon rules. if openly ("flagrantly") violated.[27] To be sure. followed by help from CARICOM peacekeepers and others. The Santiago Commitment. not to collect debts or "keep out" the Europeans but rather to defend human rights and to safeguard democratic institutions in the Hemisphere. or regulatory system."[28] What I have here broadly termed regulatory diplomacy. regulatory diplomacy. Small states . in 1991.precursors of present-day collective interventionist policies. to restore the duly elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 1994 is the leading contemporary case of intervention under both global-organizational and regional-organizational auspices. Ambassador Bloomfield comments. can engender internal unrest or even violent disorder. The military action of the United States. Haiti was not an easy case. conducted in a timely and consistent way. approved by the Organization of American States General Assembly in Santiago. can work to prevent the deterioration of law and order in situations that might otherwise invite the application of sanctions and even military intervention. I would argue. The Haitian experience was a serious test for what Richard J. can help to make military action unnecessary. but have resorted to economic and political sanctions to back up their demands. characterizes as an emerging "inter-American regime to defend democracy.

S. he stated: "We must band together to defeat the criminal syndicates and drug traffickers that prey upon open societies and put our children and or very social fabric at risk." In the Plan of Action also agreed upon in Bridgetown." Mr.an unprecedented meeting of a U. A SUMMATIVE EXAMPLE OF SMALL STATE DIPLOMACY: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO.affirmed the signers' conviction that "stable and prosperous economies. THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY. and none is too small to make a real difference.S. AND AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT . though one would wish that the content of it could have been different. When President Bill Clinton met with a group of Caribbean leaders at the Caribbean/U."[30] There could hardly be a clearer example of what I have called regulatory diplomacy." Accordingly. President with Caribbean leaders taking place in the region itself . and multi-agency collaboration. searching for "creative and innovative ways to improve our justice systems and the cooperation between them. Clinton and the other leaders resolved to join together against those forces by. the leaders candidly recognized "limitations in the laws and law enforcement agencies of the Caribbean region. buttressed by the rule of law. are bulwarks against the forces of transnational crime.alone may be especially hard pressed to deal with such challenges to their public tranquillity. Among the most frontal challenges to domestic and even international peace and security in the Caribbean is that of narco-terrorism. or of its ethos." He then said: "No nation is so strong that it needs no help from its friends. resource strengthening. they pledged to work together in "modernizing crime control laws" and also "strengthening the institutional capacities of these agencies through technical assistance. as not only Haiti in recent times within the larger Caribbean area has borne witness. inter alia."[29] The common Declaration of Principles that resulted from the Barbados Summit . Summit in Barbados in May 1997.

in which the small states of the world arguably have a bigger stake than do the great powers . Most often. and. It demonstrates as well considerable enterprise. one which incorporates elements of virtually all the six paired types of diplomacy that I have heretofore described. is the "key" to diplomatic success for small states. All are necessary to know. I would emphasize. No single one of these. singly refocused the world's attention on this long-suspended endeavor. and certainly is wider. and gives some signs even of protest diplomacy. as will be seen. It has involved active participation in international group efforts. among other challenges. . to cope with a problem that may be greater. following the mixed experiences of the ad hoc Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). but it also reflects an awareness of a country's distinctive niche. and the judicial systems of Caribbean countries generally. its very nature is regulatory. Originally proposed after World War II. acting within the context of the United Nations system. It proposed that efforts be resumed to draft an ICC statute for an international judicial body that would be capable of dealing with. In 1989 the government of Trinidad and Tobago. including those of the Caribbean area. and to use when and if circumstances call for them. the idea of an ICC was provisionally given form when in 1948 the UN General Assembly asked the International Law Commission to examine the possibility of establishing an International Criminal Court on a permanent basis. The example I have in mind shows earmarks of quiet diplomacy. some combination of diplomatic methods and foreign-policy strategies is in order. The divisions of the Cold War blocked further progress toward that goal. than their capacities or jurisdictions as small states. Eric Williams Memorial Lecture with a broader example of Caribbean creativity in international diplomacy. or particular national interest.I should like to conclude the Dr. The example I here cite is the current diplomatic effort . Such an international judicial body would be expected to provide a supplement and complement to the Trinidadian judicial system. the increase in crimes of international drug trafficking. This Trinidadian initiative thus served both a national and an international interest.

there it was. May 14-15. a sign saying: "The Government of The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago welcomes Delegates to the Workshop on Mechanisms for the Development of International Criminal Justice. there is clear evidence today of a world philosophical movement toward creating an international judicial mechanism for making individuals. A broad coalition of some sixty-five "like-minded states" working in the Preparatory Committee to draft an ICC statute has kept up the diplomatic momentum. American official support.Parliamentarians for Global Action." One of the speakers invited to that conference was David J. when I arrived at Piarco Airport. for the ad hoc international tribunals now examining war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda . leaving aside the less-well-defined crimes of aggression. the European Parliament. and crimes against humanity should be covered (provisionally.though with some reservations regarding respect for the role of the UN Security Council . or perhaps for all time. in particular over whether only the three "core" crimes of genocide. 1998 . The government of the United States is clearly committed . war crimes.to the project of establishing a International Criminal Court on a permanent basis. Among the various regional bodies or groupings that have made statements of support for establishment of a permanent ICC are the Southern African Development Community. accountable for what they do before the law. a group of twenty-five African countries meeting in Dakar in February 1998. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues.While there remain major differences between members of the UN over the proper scope of a permanent ICC. including a noteworthy Caribbean element. as well as states. including funding. Scheffer. and drug trafficking). from a telephone call to the U. in this deliberative process.S. the Rio Group of Latin American states. that the government of Trinidad and Tobago has just hosted a meeting of justice ministers from Latin American and other countries to discuss the project of an International Criminal Court and related issues involved in assuring respect for the rule of law in this region and around the world. the U. terrorism. There is a strong regional component. I understand.S. State Department. Indeed. and the Caribbean Community.

the way forward has been shown . as well as maintaining peace. there will be a long-awaited Diplomatic Conference to consider a "consolidated" draft text of an ICC statute. regulation of Internet gambling). situations in which leverage can be exercised.a rules-based international order . 1970).summit meetings. the large voices of small-state Caribbean representatives. former Prime Minister of Dominica. The contexts in which such opportunities will arise in today's world are more and more likely to be diplomatic ones .is testimony to its interest in securing justice. 11. Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1994). informed and eloquent (and increasingly in languages besides English). the diplomatic process will be complex. A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability. which was launched at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Edinburgh in October 1997. leading others.. and many other international gatherings. and a final positive result may in fact never come. which they cannot acquire. May small sovereign states like Trinidad and Tobago continue through diplomacy to emphasize law . [2] Henry Kissinger. There are. negotiations via the Internet) [31] regarding completely new topics (e. in Rome. sessions of international organizations.rather than an equilibrium based on power. Starting next month. and such opportunities for skillful bargaining probably should not be missed. Notes [1] Eric Williams. ad hoc diplomatic conferences. The book was prepared by a nine-member Advisory Group of eminent persons chaired by Dame Eugenia Charles. Publishers. of course. 75. including some perhaps of entirely new kinds (e. The cut off figure of one million or less was taken as the criterion for . From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean. In these.by the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. through law. 1492-1969 (New York: Harper & Row.g. [3] This is the new quantitative definition of "small state" used in the 1997 Commonwealth report. Although many issues remain. will surely be heard..g.

By the upward-revised 1. "Diplomacy: Profession in Peril?" Wilton Park Occasional Paper 1 (Steyning." Richard L." Caricom Perspective. [6] For an analysis of the continuing Miami Summit process. March 1998). ." 503rd Wilton Park Conference. 11. Bernal. "Securing Our Future. Small Caribbean States. The University of the West Indies. 1998). twenty-eight of these are in the Commonwealth and fortytwo are in the developing world. 1 (1998). 5-6.. A Supplementary Comment by Dr.. Diplomacy for the 21st Century: "Re-Crafting the Old Guild. "Smallness and Vulnerability. [8] Quoted in Alan K. 98. Winston Dookeran drew attention. U.: Wilton Park Conferences.5 million test. Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of International Relations. From Columbus to Castro. with regard to the interests of the smaller economies of the Caribbean. Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society. Bernal. 67 (June 1997).K. 14-15."small state" in the 1985 Commonwealth report. to the likelihood that the FTAA would be "devoid of any special trade and tariff advantages unless we use the Summit process to bring our unique characteristics to the fore" (p. Augustine. Thirty-two small states are islands. see From Talk to Action: How Summits Can Help Forge a Western Hemisphere Community of Prosperous Democracies." an excerpt from the 1997 Commonwealth report. "CARICOM States and the FTAA: Adequacy of Preparation. there are at present fortynine independent states. Participation and Negotiating Structure. Small Caribbean States and the Challenge of International Trade Negotiations (St. [7] Sir Shridath Ramphal. Jamaica's Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the FTAA Working Group on Smaller Economies. Henrikson. [5] Anthony Peter Gonzales. A Policy Report by the Leadership Council for Inter-American Summitry (Miami: North-South Center. University of Miami. Richard L." in Gonzales. Dr. 1998). similarly reflects that it is "at the stage of conceptualization" that the Caribbean region "stands the best chance of effectively impacting on the process. ed. no. in Commonwealth Currents. 20). no. [4] Williams. West Sussex. ed.

47-63." [14] T. 1998. May 7. T. ed. February 13. Human rights. "East-West Rivalry in Latin America: `Between the Eagle and the Bear. Francisco Granell (Director. 1998).: Scholarly Resources Inc. Michael. the rule of law and good governance (all values which have been part of our political ethos even before some EU member states) are apparently to be part of a system of virtual EU certification of ACP states." in Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and Architecture of Global Diplomacy. 2 (April-June 1992). Nassau. North-South Agenda Papers 27 (Miami: North-South Center.. Del. Bahamas. Sherbourne Conference Centre. [12] Alan K. "Commonwealth Caribbean Diplomacy: A New Strategy for the New World Order. [11] As Dr. no. Henrikson (Wilmington. the . Del. 15. 261-90. "Towards 2000: The Caribbean Confronts Changing Trends in International Trade. not based on dialogue.. 1986). 1997). Alan K. Directorate-General for Development. [13] "Caricom Denounces EU Lomé Proposals. no. "it is important to remember that the Uruguay Round and WTO rules put differentiated. at the 23rd ACP/EU Council of Ministers Meeting. 1." Caribbean Insight (April 1998). Cf.. Henrikson. University of Miami. 1 (First Quarter. democracy. B.: Scholarly Resources Inc. "Negotiating a New World Order for the Sea." Caribbean Affairs 5." Presentation to UK/Caribbean Forum. 2. 1998: "This structure of the negotiations is even more unpalatable when what seems to be contemplated by the overall agreement is a political regime with a high degree of intrusiveness into ACP policy frameworks in the social and political spheres. Robert W. but apparently based on dictation. Bryan. also idem. Prime Minister of Barbados. St. Koh. ed.[9] Anthony T. Clawson (Wilmington.'" in East-West Rivalry in the Third World: Security Issues and Regional Perspectives." Caribbean Affairs 8. Cf. the statement in the opening-ceremony address by the Rt. 1986). European Commission) notes. 18. Owen Arthur. 40. 42. [10] Paul Sutton and Anthony Payne. Trading Places: The Caribbean Faces Europe and the Americas in the Twenty first Century. Barbados. non-reciprocal schemes like Lomé in doubt. Hon.

Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War (London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1997). Michael D.in the case of the very small states . [16] Alister McIntyre. Alan K.C. [20] I note that when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was here in early April. 1997 (Basseterre. [21] Norman Girvan." The Inter American Agenda and Multilateral Governance: The Organization of American States (Washington. 46-72. Across. which has produced a variety of subregional arrangements. Kitts: Governor's Office. "Time to Take in the Begging Bowl? The Caribbean in post Lomé Europe.pooling leverage in order to deal with larger powers. she signed a bilateral energy agreement with Trinidad and Tobago. 4. "Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within.: The Inter American Dialogue. Bryan." Caricom Perspective. Henrikson. 1998). ed. [15] Koh. Domínguez." ibid. Cooper. Desch." [18] Havelock Ross Brewster. 5." Dialogue: A Policy Bulletin of Caribbean Affairs 1. [19] Andrew F. and . no. 1997). The Second Sir Arthur Lewis Memorial Lecture." 42. and Outside Institutions. "has actually helped in the negotiations of consensus. Antigua. 15-17. 34.. and Andrés Serbin (Albany: State University of New York Press.observation by the Inter-American Dialogue Study Group on Western Hemisphere Governance that the "variable geography" of the Western Hemisphere. [22] Anthony T." in From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment. Jorge I. November 12. "Negotiating a New World Order for the Sea. 44. Reinterpreting Caribbean Development. Eastern Caribbean Central Bank). St. St. no. John's. D. 67 (June 1997)... "The State of the Region: Trends Affecting the Future of Caribbean Security. "The Importance of Negotiation Preparedness: Reflections on the Caribbean Experience. in that it has permitted coordination of positions and views. ed. regarding such matters as price forecasting and oil and gas technologies. 1 (July/August 1994). . [17] "Caricom Denounces EU Lomé Proposals. in order to confer with the Caribbean Foreign Ministers.

: InterAmerican Development Bank. "Malta and the European Union: Experience in Maximising Negotiating Capacity for Possible Entry into the Union. and Serbin. 1997 (Washington. Dookeran (Washington.C. 8. "The United States. ed. [25] The obstacle that the Cuban problem poses for wider U.S. "The Impact of Information Technology on Preparation and Support of Small State Participation in Economic Negotiation. [26] Quoted in Williams. May 9. Kappeler is Director of the Diplomatic Studies Programme at the Graduate Institute of International Studies. 126. 22. and the Post-Cold War International Order." Kappeler. [29] "Common Values. Winston C. D. and a former Director (and subsequently Chairman of the . 54-57.'" Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7." in Gonzalez. the Caribbean Basin. eds.C.. [27] Alan K.. From Pirates to Drug Lords. Geneva." Express. 197-228.. Bridgetown. 3. Henrikson. April 5. [30] Ibid. May 7. 1998. Domínguez. [31] It is pointed out by Professor Dietrich Kappeler that "Information Technology is creating an entirely new situation for small States desirous to become or remain active participants in international negotiations. 1996)." in ibid. [28] Richard J. "Security in the Greater Caribbean: What Role for Collective Security Mechanisms?" in Desch.[23] Address to the Opening Ceremony of the 23rd ACP/EU Council of Ministers Meeting. 422. From Columbus to Castro.: United States Information Agency. 143. ed. Barbados. Henrikson.. [24] Kathleen Maharaj. 1997. "The United Nations and Regional Organizations: `King Links' of a `Global Chain. 1 (Fall 1996).-Caribbean cooperative relations is discussed in Alan K. Small Caribbean States. Common Dreams. Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean. Switzerland. 1997). no. see also idem. "Albright Gives T&T Top Marks.. Bloomfield." remarks at reception for Caribbean leaders at the Governor General's residence. 1998. 151-54. D." in Choices and Change: Reflections on the Caribbean. May 10.

University of Malta.edu). which has a specialized Unit for Information Technology and Diplomacy (Website: www.Board) of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies. .diplomacy.