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Fichte's Idealism Author(s): John Lachs Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1972), pp. 311-318 Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009458 . Accessed: 21/07/2011 11:40
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?American Volume

Philosophical 9, Number

Quarterly 4, October 1972

IV. FIGHTE'S

IDEALISM

JOHN LACHS
is usually classified as an idealist, yet T^ICHTE * is rarely the precise nature of his idealism examined. Idealism is frequently taken as the view that only minds and their states are real. The temper of our times is such that this theory appears to need no refutation. The that the suggestion is nothing but a state of your mind Ohio Turnpike
or mine, or even of some supermind, no less than

the Leibnizian idea that it consists of an infinite collection of harmonized souls, seem to us to be
manifestly absurd and to warrant serious exam?

ination only of the persons who are so deluded

suppose them true.

as to

to classify Fichte It would, of course, be wrong as an idealist in any such popular or easy sense. He that there is a watershed does maintain question for all of philosophy: the answer to this determines the total of one's complexion philosophical or not objects The is whether thought. question exist independently of the self. There are only two answers to this question, and of the two possible one is The right. only dogmatist, incorrectly, asserts the absolute and independent existence of the world of objects. The idealist, by contrast, maintains that no object can exist independently of
some self.

The central concept in Fichte's thought, then, is that of the self. What does he conceive to be the nature of selfhood ? a reasonable account Without of this, his idealism is certain to remain vacuous. In attempting to determine his position on this and a variety of other issues I shall be relying primarily on the 1794 version of the Wissenschafts translation of lehre, the first complete English which was published last year.1 The most convenient and most obvious starting Fichte's point in developing thoughts on the self well be his famous may aphorism, "Was f?r sich nicht ist ist kein ich"?what is not conscious of itself is no self.2 Self-consciousness is a necessary condition of selfhood: nothing that lacks the ability to reflect on itself can qualify as a self. Fichte affirms in a variety of places and in a variety of that self-consciousness ways his conviction pre? of objects. This view may supposes consciousness well be open to argument, but it is not my present to dispute it. I shall merely note that a purpose self must be or at least must have the ability to be conscious of both objects and itself. But even this is not enough for full-fledged selfhood: the in? attentuated of consciousness tellectual, property
can never be enough to constitute the essence of a

Fichte does not think that the world of objects, what we normally call the physical world, is in any sense the creature of some finite individual self, group of selves, or the infinite individual we call or "God." Such might be the view of "dogmatic" own pro? absolute idealism which, by Fichte's fession, is in sharp contrast with what he calls his to the critical idealist "critical idealism." According both finite individual selves and the correlative world of physical objects are the resultants of a self. Much of the interest of single, unconditioned derives from his fundamental Fichte's metaphysics claim that the undifferentiated primordial being a self. The that is the source of all is actually of his idealism hinges entirely on his plausibility to this claim. substantiate ability
1 Johann * Science, G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, ibid., p. 98. ed. and

real being. then, are the conditions both necessary What, and sufficient for a given existent's being a self? Are they to be consciousness and creativity? Or a or with certain cognition along organization structure of the elements of the being? Or the and reflective activity of conscious? presentational ness in conjunction with the of all purposiveness the activities of the being and the purposiveness of their union? Characteristically, Fichte has given to the problem, and equally ample thought he infuriates his readers by not characteristically answer his in any or disclosing systematic
straightforward manner.

The magnitude of the reader's frustration may be evident from the fact that perhaps the best place
and John Lachs (New York, 1970). Science hereafter.

tr. by Peter Heath

3"

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hints on the nature of the self is in the Part III ("Foundation of the obscure chronically of the Practical") of the Wissen Knowledge Fichte discusses the schaftslehre of 1794. There the activities of the absolute self in their purity; to this that pertain activities and features a to must be reflected, ego greater or primordial lesser degree, in all finite individuals. The absolute but has two divergent self, Fichte maintains, two drives. The fundamental interdependent lines of activity; drives give rise to two divergent and since it is impossible to distinguish agent from activity on this level, the self is properly said to be acts. constituted of these two sets of non-temporal The first activity of the self is its striving to fill out infinity. The practical drive urges the self on to to an affirmation of itself infinite self-expansion, limit. The second activity and its own law without or self-consciousness. The is that of reflection theoretical drive urges the self on to know itself as a unitary, being. Using Fichte's self-expansive we conceive the practical could model physical activity of the self as a line stretching outward from a center to infinity. By contrast, theoretical activity may be conceived as a line reverting back to it is important to the center; but throughout that the center is not to be thought of remember as any substantial or substantive being. The two are reflection activities pre? interdependent: it restricts which the activity supposes outgoing the effusive and turns back upon the self, while to relies on the other of self-assertion activity it with the and to present its direction define for relevant
obstacles it must overcome.

activities define two closely interrelated These that is both self the nature of the self. Anything assertive and reflective must be a self; nothing
that lacks these characters can qualify as one.

is nothing but what I have previously Reflectiveness and identified as a referred to as self-consciousness If we combine it of selfhood. condition necessary with expansive or assertive activity, we have the of selfhood as necessary and sufficient conditions also it. And conceives Fichte this, incidentally, thinks that, at gives us the clue to why Fichte and the self-consciousness least primordially,
consciousness of objects are necessarily connected.

and the oscillation itself, ensuing a manner in of outside the (Schweben), speaking on it, is what Fichte self, yet totally dependent calls the imagination. It is in this field of that the presentations of which the imagination are generated. consists world The empirical unavoidable conflict of the primordial activities manifests itself to the self in the form of the feeling in turn, are the of frustration and inability. These, source of the feeling of necessity or constraint our in which the accompanies, experience, of external In this the way, presentation objects. of itself is inseparable from the self's consciousness of external objects : the very activity consciousness of reflection is the cause, or at least a part of the of objects. cause, of the generation What we have laboriously disentangled from the obscure parts of Fichte's work can also be found stated by him with the greatest clarity. Unfortu? even the clearest and most however, nately, on man never is lost the Latin who learned elegant the language. The meaning of some of Fichte's plainest statements becomes evident only after one has gone through some of his obscurest deductions: them is often their clarity after one has understood no less annoying than their vagueness had been before the light dawned. In a variety of places Fichte reminds us that the self is what it does, that in their it consists of nothing beyond its activities If we add to this his oft dialectical relation. statement that the self posits itself and repeated posits itself as positing, we have in an embryonic form everything that we have said so far. For is nothing but the self-assertive activity of positing the self; and to posit the self as positing is to think it as engaged in it, to reflect on it, to know The characteristic very essence of the activity. self, therefore, is summed up by saying that it is something that both posits and knows that it does. But have we helped clarify by introducing the can we no Not if of ? better concept give positing account it stands for of the mysterious activity than the few commentators who have written on the problem is one of Fichte in English. Possibly translation : no English word captures the richness of the German The German word original.
"setzen" is ordinarily translated as "to set,"

renews

that is simple if we bear in mind The explanation he thinks of reflection as an activity that restricts act of the self and drives it the infinite outgoing are pri? itself. Since both activities back upon
mordial, neither can overwhelm the other: no

sooner

is the assertive

activity

restricted

than

it

"to place," or "to establish." Its root significance is creative activity, an activity that can show itself in It may be the simple physical various modalities. an object act of placing in some location, the children into the activity of bringing biological zu setzen), or the in die welt world (Kinder

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of action complex socio-political exceptionally some to throne the den Thron person (auf raising setzen). What we have in each case is practical or creative; it is always activity that is productive
purposive and often voluntary.

as the infinite potency-in of dogmatists, is his all-creative Substance. Viewed from the of the act, dynamically, standpoint consistent act that
Substance or God is Natura naturans, an indeter?

infinite creative agency. Viewed minately statically, is not from the point of view of the deed, Substance or God The activity "setzen" denotes, however, isNatura naturata, an infinitely determinate, eternal only practical. The word may be used to express wider modal act and auf order. Since and etwas, agreement (sich opposition productive completed etwas setzen), as well as the propositional attitudes deed are indistinguishable in the primordial, infinite potency-in-act of supposing and affirming. Its connection with the and since no temporal lag intellectual and the intelligible is further confirmed its end, creative energy and from separates activity we are it in the German word find of created overtone world the by inseparably one.3 is richness of "setzen" I do not wish tominimize for law, "Gesetz." The the difference between to this amphibious it is Fichte and Spinoza. But I also do not wish character: due precisely to or underplay at home in the realms of theory and overlook instructive similarities. equally : Positing, as the absolute ego's practice. Fichte takes advantage of the ambiguity primordial activity, is clearly analogous to what he uses the word to denote an activity that is both in Spinoza I have called potency-in-act. And the relation of Spinoza's cognitive and creative and represents the unity of reason and will, the theoretical and the practical. God as creative act to God as created modal order once at has a clear analogue The word in the relation, in Fichte, of is, therefore, "positing" as inadequate to expressing is the absolute ego to the empirical world of subjects what revealed and and objects. The progression from indeterminate conveyed by the word "setzen." "Affirmation" the volitional "assertion" come close to capturing is present in infinity to infinite determinateness refers to, and both systems: it is by this gradual determination Fichte element in the activity a central part of is certainly in both, finite "self-affirmation" are that, fragmented beings what he means when he says that the self "setzt" And there is agreement that the generated. and the cognitive itself. But both the creativity self-determination of the absolute is a progressive action implied or suggested by "setzen" are lost of its nature. two The necessary consequence are and we can safely say in the word "affirmation," thinkers in consonance even on the funda? that there is no word in ordinary neo-Platonic dictum that determination or, for that mental is comes in that the self-determination of the absolute, matter, any extraordinary English negation: Fichte designates closer. What to itself of ever more by this difficult by its application specific is at once a self-negation and self then, is a fundamental word, cognitive-conative predicates, limitation. act, an activity. It is a purposive and productive source act whose of all that real. is the is We may view Fichte's creativity interesting theory of If we keep this inmind, it comes as no surprise that thetic judgments in the light of its relation to the Fichte thinks the organ of positing is reason itself. emanation scheme that is one of his neglected, or at least little understood, versions of the in its primordial unity is thus conceived as Reason generation source of all, totally the infinite and intelligent of everything finite from the infinite ego. A thetic act. For in its creative, to him, is one that consists absorbed judgment, all-encompassing according to use lack of a better substitute, I shall continue of the affirmation of the existence of a subject to stand for Fichte's "setzen." the word without any reference to a predicate. The prime "posit" But it is important to remember that I shall refer example he gives is the judgment "I am." Now it is to the cognitive-conative clear that the being of the absolute self would have by this word activity to be affirmed whose nature I have briefly indicated. in a thetic judgment, and the a no act. a judgment is Its model of such is that it leaves the Positing non-temporal peculiarity is the Aristotelian doubt of its subject unrelated to any other concept of activity or concept in and which and thus indeterminate. This is the process agent, product, concept, "energeia" totally coincide. This infinite indeterminacy of the absolute ego; yet on act, and deed indistinguishably sooner is the in Spinoza, whom of activity to the self ascribed appears concept indeterminacy than it becomes Fichte frequently praises as the greatest and most Even as general a inapplicable.
3I acknowledge 1957) my indebtedness for this interpretation of Spinoza to H. F. Hallett's excellent Benedict de Spinoza (London

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as and limits indeterminateness of the the very indeterminateness the first step toward its self constitutes primordial The finite world of inevitable total determination. selves and physical objects naturally empirical of the self-determination flows from the necessary in of and Part II absolute ego, ("Foundation of the Theoretical Wissenschaftslehre Knowledge") in of 1794 Fichte displays considerable ingenuity development. tracing this dialectical Fichte and An obvious between dissimilarity to fact the is due historical of of course, Spinoza, of Kant between them. Spinoza the presence strove to deduce the eternal modal order from the substance. By contrast, activity of his primordial to deduce an infinity of Fichte no longer wishes of beings, but only the structures and categories to not this I will stop interesting explore experience. to my main purpose here. I point; it is peripheral predicate determines;
have set out to examine the nature and to deter?

To does repeatedly, that the say, as Fichte an sense not is in absolute individual ego any the question. On the person does not eliminate it only raises the additional contrary, problem of how anything could be a self without displaying at least some of the determinate tendencies, attitudes, and intentions that are the hallmarks of individual personality. I think I can detect in Fichte three major lines of for his idealistic conclusion. Nowhere argument does he develop these arguments in detail. Their are clear enough and he hints outlines, however, at them in a variety of places. I shall consider them
in turn.

critical the tenability of Fichte's mine idealism, to reach a stage where and I have now managed his terms have been, I hope, adequately clarified, and where we can set him a fundamental and, I think, disastrously destructive question. effort in deducing Fichte spends considerable as principles of unity in conceived the categories, the of from the self-postulation experience, self. It should be evident, therefore, that absolute or self itself is sub-categoreal the primordial
pre-categoreal. of it as, in a We cannot say of it, for example,

starts from the premiss that The first argument the task of philosophy is to give an account of the nature and of origin experience. Fichte appears to be of the opinion that this can be attempted in In the first attempt we proceed only two ways. from the side of the object or unthinking thing, in the second from the side of the subject or self. as he insists in the First Introduction Accordingly, to the Wissenschaftslehre, there are only two possible at? which dogmatism, philosophical positions: a to from world of deduce tempts experience or independently existing things-in things themselves, and idealism, which attempts to display as the result of the operation of an experience two theories are contradictory: active self.4 The at most one of them can be true and at least one of
them must be. Fichte makes no secret of the fact

that it is a substance,
sense,

even

though we must
enduring.

think
No

non-temporally

thinks we can never account for lived experience by reference to things or objects alone. that he
some In places he goes so far as to assert that a

in the world of ex? that is applicable predicate in its to it is univocally; applicable perience in a being, which may be affirmed primordial to it at is applicable thetic judgment, no predicate all. I shall not discuss here Fichte's apparent in conceiving of the of this principle violation absolute self as the cause of the world of objects. Spinoza at least realized a part of the limitation on what we may of the primordial predicate as his infinite and conceived potency-in-act being a sense nor physical, in neither mental although for the source of both. The question fundamental idealism that thus arises is the following: Fichte's reason can we offer for thinking conceivable What as a self? If of the primordial agency-activity there is good reason for thinking of it that way, it may be difficult to escape Fichte's critical idealism; if there is none, his central views will surely appear
as unwarranted 4 Science, dogmas. gff. op. cit., pp.

which such an account attempts dogmatism two attempts If only false. demonstrably
explanation other must are possible, be the two are contradictory,

is at the the

and one of them

clearly

is demonstrably
correct.

inadequate,
For this

reason,

idealism primordial
This

is the only tenable philosophy existent must be a self.

appears to me to have

and
no merit.

argument

First of all, even ifwe grant that one of the tasks of is the relatively vague one of explaining philosophy we have and origin of experience, the nature reason to doubt claim that this the remarkable can be done in two ways only: either by sole reference to things and their laws or by reducing all to selves and their operations. This is surely a and excludes by edict far more gross simplification It is this views than it permits. philosophical to the that Fichte leads oversimplified picture

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IDEALISM

315

that idealism and dogmatism mistaken thought are true contradictories and that hence by dis? can we establish the latter proving incontrovertibly the former. The contradictory of the proposition that in explaining the source and structure of we need no reference to anything experience their that and the laws govern beyond things that such reference is behavior is the proposition that we need and not the proposition necessary, reference to selves only. Even if we were to stay within Fichte's unreasonable dichotomy, thing?self could the most that the refutation of dogmatism show is that some concepts or laws other than to things are necessary those relating exclusively
to give an adequate account of human experience.

This would leave the door wide open to a variety of dualisms, among them the highly critical and ex? sort held by Kant, who viewed attenuated perience as a unity of elements derived from self and thing.5 and Let me wipe the slate clean, however, matter to decided be the entire by an permit On Fichte's of refutation dogmatism. adequate own interpretation of the such a demonstration be tantamount would of dogmatism inadequacy to a proof of his idealism, and even on a less it would tend to increase charitable rendering truth of his position. the probable substantially however, one looks in vain through Unfortunately, It is, in Fichte's works for the demonstration.
fact, not even seriously attempted, much less

self as giving added subjects from an absolute to this and Since argument. point poignancy self and lacks self-consciousness that nothing can be the ground of a self, nothing affirmation that is bereft of these features of selfhood can serve as an ultimate principle. His deduction aims at establishing that an ego, by contrast, is able to generate both selves and things, and thus amply qualifies as the ultimate source of all. I cannot make myself believe that this argument has anything to recommend it. First and foremost, I am entirely at a loss as to why anyone should think it evident that a self cannot have its source in the not-self. I do not propose to argue here that of it can or does, even though the entire weight I this thought supports hypothesis. evolutionary that if no shall content myself with the comment good reasons are presented for accepting it, Fichte's an is simply self-evident putatively premiss or not of whether The issue dogma. arbitrary things can function as the source of selves is at the of idealism: the bold very heart of the problem serves only to start the claim that they cannot
controversy, not to resolve it.

in the in a bold about-face And accomplished. work in which he claims the demonstrable falsity of dogmatism, Fichte asserts that ultimate philoso?
phical positions are susceptible neither of proof of

Fichte was no less vocal in avowing belief in the view that things cannot give rise to selves than he was silent about his reasons. Although it is idle to speculate on what these might have been, it is to make two brief remarks. The first appropriate is that his reasons could not have been of the sort that supported Berkeley's that objects conviction cannot generate For thought of spirits. Berkeley causation as the exclusive property of minds ; for him physical objects were impotent. By contrast,
Fichte in no way restricts causal activity to selves :

nor
personal

of

disproof:
and as a interest,

the

view

we

adopt,
is a and

without

evidence

starting-point, commitment,

function disposition.6

I shall
proceed Here than

come

back

to this point
second

later and

now

to Fichte's

his reasoning a version of the

argument. to perhaps amounts previous argument

no more stated in

the material mode. Whatever else there may be in the world, it is generally agreed that there are at least some selves. Now Fichte thinks it evident that no self can ever come from an unfeeling, If all is to have a simple, not-self. unthinking source of source and the unitary only conceivable an ego is another one, it clearly follows that the can view primordial reality must be a self. We to and Fichte's deduce finite objects attempt
6 Fichte effort and devotes considerable 6 First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, ingenuity Science,

he thinks of causation and of following Kant as universally second reciprocity applicable. My and more positive comment is that what might be conviction behind Fichte's that the not-self can causal generate no self is simply the time-honored maxim that decrees of the like the impossibility emergence coming from the unlike. The putative or selfhood of mind, from the consciousness, is surely a paradigm of thoughtless and inanimate the generation of the like from the unlike. To some it may also seem to demonstrate the absurdity of such In there is any generation. reality, however, absurd about if and Fichte's it, argument nothing is to be grounded in this maxim of causation, we are perfectly justified in asking for the grounds for it. The blow of the hammer does not resemble the
that Kant held no such view.

to show to the attempt op. cit., pp. 12-16.

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pain it causes, nor the brain of Shakespeare a page of the causal of manuscript. The vast majority we the creation of like by involve know sequences are we to do with a maxim that unlike; what decrees all this impossible ? Let me, however, forget all that has been said: let us suppose that Fichte has proved, as he has not, that the source of every self is itself or another. to show that the ultimate Would this be adequate existent must be an ego? Clearly not. This by to itself leaves the door wide open, once again, dualism: it is perfectly compatible with the view
that there are two ultimate existents, say, a

act is more creative like the self primordial a like the self self than of expansiveness a a or tree of ? We of gas healthy expansiveness search in vain for Fichte's answer to this question. or It is clear that reference to the self's voluntary no is the of avail: self-assertiveness intelligent
absolute ego's expansiveness is unavoidable and

transcendental ego and a transcendental object. Fichte thus needs an additional principle, viz., the one that maintains that all is to have a single source. Yet why should we accept this principle? Surely not because unity is boldly asserted to be a demand of reason. This may well be the demand at work of reason in a tight little mind perpetually or on the children his world, imposing discipline but it is surely no demand of universal reason. And even if it were, would it not be a begging of the an unwarranted of the assumption question, idealist principle that reason shapes the world?the we were to very principle under examination?if are met? that its demands say invariably third argument. This is I now come to Fichte's never explicitly stated by him, but it appears to me to be behind what he says in a number of passages. start with that the primordial We the assertion must Such an in creative engage activity. being and self-assertive since it is essentially activity, expansive, resembles far more closely the activity of a self than that of some thing or not-self; self
assertiveness is in fact, as we noted, one of the

and the self-expansion of a tree is law-governed merit the in little there is purposive. Similarly, to see in each tree's that professes approach growth a pale replica of the ego's actions. These are different, and either one can be activities considered a pale or imperfect version of the other, on what features we select for emphasis. depending Fichte loads the dice by using the word "setzen" this suggests, without for the primordial activity: that the activity view the evidence for, being in of the self. But what the sphere properly belongs reason have we to suppose is that the activity and that "setzen" is not self-like or self-connected name for or question-begging merely a misleading it? As best I can see, none at all. that Fichte's I must conclude, therefore, for the view that the primordial being arguments their short of establishing is a self fall altogether
conclusion. As we have seen, each suffers from a

marks of the ego. If the argument were correct, it would not of course prove that the ultimate source show of all is actually a self. It would, however, must resemble that such an unconditioned being un? than it resembles selves far more closely con? this may conscious or inactive things?and ceivably be all that Fichte needs to establish his idealism. un? This argument hinges on a fundamental that the activities of justified assumption, namely the self are the paradigm of creative activity. Fichte clearly wants to stop short of the extreme position of asserting that only selves can engage in causally creative endeavor; since he does, he has to justify his the dialectical self-expansive/self taking of all limiting activity of the self as the model we that the should creative say agency. Why

the first fails variety of faults, but most blatantly an unprovided demon? it presupposes because it must the second because stration, rely on an and the third maxim of causation, unacceptable the question it begs because by a prejudiced this of activity. Does selection of the paradigm I do not defense? leave Fichte entirely without think so. It would be open to him to use a version if not to attempt to show that of his third argument, the ultimate being is a self, then at least to justify our supposing it to be that for the sake of increasing the version of This argument regulative knowledge. is well known in the history of idealism, and the likely reason why Fichte made no reference to it is that he thought it both valid beyond all reasonable the with intertwined and doubt inextricably and post-Kantian of Kantian entire enterprise is transcendental philosophy. The usual argument that since we know the self and its structures and activities best of all, we must use them as our model for understanding everything else. Fichte, however,
might subscribe to a somewhat stronger version.

His acceptance of Kant's theory that all intelligible lead him structure is due to mental activity might to the view that all we ever know is the self, its structures and activities and therefore have in fact
no choice but to use them as our models.

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Now I can find nothing wrong with using the But an activity of this sort presupposes a free and self as our model in the attempt to see how far it the ego. The highest interest of man, independent or will take us and what of very possibility demands, therefore, unsuspected important morality can have one's the primacy of the ego and its total primordial insights it might provide. One of determination opinions about the ultimate value of this model, independence by objects. This but when all is said and done there is no substitute makes idealism, and with it belief in the primacy of to push for the actual the the self, a demand of morality, full-scale Fichte concludes. attempt idealist program as far as it will go. Surely this is But he refuses to stop even here and indicates that all the justification needs for having whoever does not acknowledge Fichte and exercise his a deduction of of the finite world freedom does not truly or for long possess it. And attempted not to possess freedom is not to be a self, but a mere self. It is an subjects and objects from a primordial a that de? and fact such to subscribe to important interesting thing. For this reason, failure to a theoretical error: it is a is possible, duction and his having managed idealism is not merely it is a tribute to his dialectical skill. But complete practical act which disqualifies one from member? is one thing, its the possibility of the deduction is not a ship in the kingdom of ends. The dogmatist It is person who is simply wrong; truth or bearing on the real world another. he is simply not a well worth keeping inmind that the way we choose person. two deductions, between to think that this argument It is difficult is say those of Spinoza and not by finding is normally but nonsense. It is a peculiar sort of Fichte, logical or anything dialectical indeed that sees the greatest requirement slips in the one and none or fewer in morality more on the other. Philosophers man as have or self-assertion the notoriously every imposed an idealist than and exercise of his native But this is sense, logical good though powers. peculiarity on the basis of the regulative deduction proceeding to when the claim that nothing compared singular it practical under discussion is clearly possible, life determines or should determine one's principle beliefs about what may well be severely at odds with reality. is, and that a single wrong can So much for the weaker version of the regulative us of selfhood and turn us into opinion strip to The version, stronger according principle. things. which our only models for understanding the world The ultimate problem here, however, is the easy are the cognitive, conative, and affective activities confusion between the absolute ego and the finite of the self appears, and excessive selves of individuals. Fichte devotes considerable by contrast, It without to attention the deduction of the world of objects, reason, assumes, question-begging. good that all forms, are mental. and activities but almost none at all to the deduction of finite structures, to the self and such pre-eminence By according subjects. To establish his idealism, he would have to prove that the unconditioned thinking of it as the source of all order, if not of all being is a self. we were not idealism? as he that the demand of to, reality, tacitly affirming Showing, attempts And if such tacit affirmation what is disavowed, to is think of individual selves as un? morality reason could conceivably be proposed for saying conditioned and free does not in the least contribute that the activity of gravitation or the orderliness in to proving this. Good sense impels us to believe in the growth of poison ivy reveal somehow the marks the existence of a variety of finite selves; but if of intellect ? are more one none there can serve of them, than me on Let some a conclude as the primordial with remarks unity from which all flows. If, claim characteristic, though typically exaggerated, however, all individual selves are to share a single of Fichte's. Acceptance of ultimate transcendental philosophical ego, the analogy, central to Fichte's or is a matter inclination of personal entire enterprise, between our finite selves and this positions con? he maintains. his interest, Now, argument ego inevitably primordial collapses. And even if most the and interest exalted of this near disaster could be averted, what account tinues, highest or the free should we give of the relation, so peculiar on this every ego is that of self-affirmation exercise of the intelligent creative powers of the to individual self? To this view, of transcendental self. This activity of self-creation and self-develop? not to this question, alone, Fichte provides though ment is the source of all morality no answer. and goodness. Vanderbilt University Received October 28, igyi

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QUARTERLY

BIBLIOGRAPHY
are readily out an edition of his collected in German. His available works works son, I. H. Fichte, brought has now been This 8 vols. Berlin, Veit). by the variorum Gesamtausgabe {S?mmtliche Werke. supplanted 1845-1846 F. Fromann, der Wissenschaften Gannstatt: Akademie of the Bayerischen {Werke. Stuttgart-Bad 1964). There der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehre o? Grundlage available is a readily Verlag, 1961. No English (1794) by F. Meiner reprint of Fichte's and metaphysical of the collected exists. A substantial number works edition epistemological writings Fichte's in remain, Science Science in fact, of Knowledge. of Knowledge, untranslated. Translated An incomplete and inaccurate rendering Tr?bner). and John A Lachs. of new, the Grundlage complete New York: London, by A. E. Kroeger. and translated edited by Peter Heath Introductions also the First and Second body and critical of scholarly or most to the thesis relevant appeared translation in 1889 (The (J. G. Fichte,

Appleton-Century-Crofts, list is a selection

incorporates 1970) is a substantial There from those most and Hubert, Julius Kuno Dieter Willy Drechsler, Fischer, Henrich,

to the Wissenschaftslehre. on Fichte in German. literature of this article.

The

following

interesting 1910. Pichetes

Friedrich Dannenberg, Der Begriff und die Bedeutung derErfahrung in derFichteschenPhilosophie.Weida

Lehre vom Bild. Kohlhammer, 1955. Stuttgart: C. Winter, Vol. 6. der neuern Philosophie. 1897-1904. Heidelberg: : a.M. Frankfurt Fichtes Klostermann, 1967. urspr?ngliche Einsicht. aus der Kantischen der Fichteschen Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte Wissenschaftslehre Geschichte Die 1968. Buchgesellschaft, in der Fichteschen des Absoluten Philosophie bis Hegel. T?bingen: Mohr, 1961. Wissenschaftslehre. Ansbach: C.

i. Th. : Thomas

Kabitz, stadt: Wissenschaftliche H. Kerler,

Philosophie. Br?gel,

Darm?

Dietrich Richard

1917.

Kroner, und Spinoza.

Von Kant

Entwicke lung und in ihremVerh?ltnisse zur Johann H. Loewe, Die Philosophie Fichtes :Nach demGesummtergebnisseihrer
1862. W. Nitzschke. Stuttgart: & Reichard, Berlin: Reuther G. Fichte: Dreizehn 1905. Vorlesungen. Medicus, J. a.M.: Klostermann, nach dem Ding. Frankfurt und Fichtes Frage Kants 1936. Noll, Baldwin, on Fichte's that is worth literature little critical is very In English there reading. metaphysics : of enlightenment be consulted, books may any great hope though without Kant Fritz Robert Charles Ellen Fichte. Adamson, Edinburgh Science Fichte's C. Everett, 1881. W. and London: Blackwood, A Critical Study. Chicago: Griggs Philosophical of Knowledge: New York: Macmillan, 1906. of Fichte's Philosophy. Principle Grinn & Co., Boston: 1895. of Knowledge. of Fichte's Doctrine by far the most adequate English account treatment of Fichte of is in F. H.

The

following

four

Classics,

1892.

B. Talbot, The Fundamental The Unity ?Anna B. Thompson, in English, histories of philosophy Among is virtually useless. The most recent

in Coppleston, of 1794

A is an

History ofPhilosophy (Garden City: Doubleday,

and most

1965.Vol. 7, Part I). The article in P. Edwards' Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy

interesting the Wissenschaftslehre

unpublished doctoral dissertation WO

I shall mention Xavier L?on, two recent only et son temps. Fichte however, remarkable one who

(Walter E. Wright,
works 2 vols. in French Paris:

Self andAbsolute in thePhilosophy ofFichte, Vanderbilt University,

: Colin, 1954.

?Armand in Fichte's

A. Philonenko, La Libert?Humaine dans la Philosophie deFiente. Paris: Vrin,

On texts the whole, A directly. But, as exist is interested of the the stature text one major scholar of Kuno seeks

1966. (A very thoughtful work.)

perspective. sustained

in dealing with alas, on the work in droves

to the will do best by proceeding systematic philosophy can help to put Fichte in the proper historical Fischer as careful one commentary and in vain the aid of even

of other

thinkers.