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L-20089
FACTS: On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again. ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong? HELD:
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code
PE et. al vs. Pe G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962. FACTS: Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
HELD: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
However before the date set, Tina received a letter from Isko withdrawing from their agreement to marry in Church. Upon examination of the documents which Tina showed her father, the latter found out that they were not civilly married. Tina then also confessed to her father that she was pregnant. Then on June 9, 1955, Isko married another girl as Tina gave birth to their daughter on August 4, 1995. As a consequence, Tina filed a complaint before the SC charging Isko with immorality and asking for his disbarment. Isko admitted his relationship with Tina and acknowledged their daughter. For his defense, he denied that he deceived Tina into believing that they had been married civilly and insisted that Tina submitted to his desire voluntarily. ISSUE: Whether or not Isko should be disbarred? RULING Yes. Iskos defense cannot be believed. The truth is that all along he never intended to redeem Tinas honor. He had inveigled her into believing that they had been married civilly to satisfy his carnal desire. He himself admits that what prompted him to offer and propose marriage to her was to satisfy such desire. On the other hand, Tina has not gone far in educational attainment, having reached first year high school only, and does not have the slightest idea of a legal and valid marriage. Thus she fell an easy prey to a man like Isko, a lawyer who knows the intricacies of the law and the way to extricate himself from the mess he has brought about. Isko has not maintained the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of, and must be possessed by, members of the Bar. He is therefore disbarred from the practice of law and his name in the roll of attorneys stricken out .
Facts:
A barge being towed by tugboats "Bangus" and "Barbero" all owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corp. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge due to the swollen current of the Pasig after heavy rains days before. The Republic sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damages. Luzon Stevedoring claimed it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees; that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure; that plaintiff has no capacity to sue; and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation.
Issue: Whether or not the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure. Held: There is a presumption of negligence on part of the employees of Luzon Stevedoring, as the Nagtahan Bridge is stationary. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. Luzon Stevedoring knew the perils posed by the
swollen stream and its swift current, and voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient. It is thus liable for damages.