Introduction to Transmission Planning Assignment: Read these notes and also the appendix.

1.0 Overview of bulk electric power planning Figure 1 below illustrates information flow for an advanced Independent System Operator (ISO)/Market Operator (MO). Note the planning functions on the right-hand-side. It is quite complex.

Construction of new electric generation and transmission is a capitalintensive activity. In addition, it is generally not possible to quickly build generation or transmission. A full time-table for design and construction of such facilities usually requires at least 2-3 years and

more frequently 3-5 years or more. Therefore, any organization that intends to invest in new generation or transmission must have the ability to access large quantities of money with significantly delayed payback revenue stream. There are planning needs at the distribution level but those needs focus mainly on the distribution wires or cables and often make use of the available roadside utility right-of-way. We will focus on the bulk electric power system planning needs. These are more complicated for two reasons. 1. Bulk electric power system planning involves both generation (or resource planning), as well as transmission planning, and there usually exist complex interdependencies between the two. Efforts at planning one of them without consideration of the plans for the other will typically result in less desirable plans in terms of reliability or in terms of economics, or in terms of both. 2. Bulk electric power system planning often involves acquisition of new land, either for power plants of for transmission right-of-way. This in itself is a socially complex issue that involves many constituencies, most of whom have at best a laymans understanding of electric power engineering and economics. Such people must be contacted, educated about the needs, and given time to respond with concerns. The acronym NIMBY, which means Not In My Back Yard was coined to reflect a common position taken by many people and communities when confronted with the possibility of a new power plant or transmission line located nearby their living or working location. There are many reasons for this position, but possibly the most common are aesthetic, environmental, and health. Planning involves simultaneous economic and reliability evaluation of alternatives. Either one may motivate interest in or the need for new investment. 2.1 Economic issues:

Two economic issues that have always been important in making planning decisions are 1. What is the investment cost of each alternative? 2. How is the yearly operational cost impacted by each alternative? k

o There are short-term, mid-term, and long-term load forecasting methods. o One may forecast actual load for a particular time (or times), or one may forecast peak load for a particular time interval. o Steps that are common to most load forecasting procedures: Data preprocessing: classification of loads: residential, commercial, industrial, other by geographical area reduction of highly correlated inputs outlier detection General model identification: Trend-line extrapolation, regression, time series, neural network, expert system Specific model form: e.g., what kind of regression model, time series model, or nn structure to use? Model estimation: tune various parameters of the specific model Diagnostic checking: check to determine whether model is correct For example, in regression, the general approach is: Let y(t-k) represent the historical loads. Let x represent the time variables (season, week, time-ofday) and the weather variables (current temperature or maximum temperature for today, forecasted temperature for tomorrow, past average temperatures, or difference between average and forecasted temperature). Then we have that y(t)=f(x,y,t) y(t) is the load at time t. f is a function chosen from one of the following: linear function: y(t)=a+bt modified exponential model: y(t)=a+bct Gompertz model: y(t)=e(a+bct)

 Logistic model: y(t)=1/(a+bct) Model estimation done by least squares or maximum likelihood Load duration curve: A critical issue for planning is to identify the total load level for which to plan. One extremely useful tool for doing this is the so-called load duration curve, which is formed as follows. Consider that we have obtained, either through historical data or through forecasting, a plot of the load vs. time for a period T, as shown in Fig. 1 below.
Load (MW)

Time

Fig. 1: Load curve (load vs. time) Of course, the data characterizing Fig. 1 will be discrete, as illustrated in Fig. 2.

Load (MW)

Time

Fig. 2: Discretized Load Curve We now divide the load range into intervals, as shown in Fig. 3.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Load (MW)

Time

Fig. 3: Load range divided into intervals This provides the ability to form a histogram by counting the number of time intervals contained in each load range. In this example, we assume that loads in Fig. 3 at the lower end of the range are in the range. The histogram for Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Count

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Load (MW)

Fig. 4: Histogram Figure 4 may be converted to a probability mass function, pmf, (which is the discrete version of the probability density function, pdf) by dividing each count by the total number of time intervals, which is 23. The resulting plot is shown in Fig. 5.
0.391 0.348 0.304 0.261 0.217 0.174 0.130 0.087 0.043 0

Probability

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Load (MW)

Fig. 5: Probability mass function

Like any pmf, the summation of all probability values should be 1, which we see by the following sum: 0.087+0.217+0.217+0.174+0.261+0.043=0.999 (it is not exactly 1.0 because there is some rounding error). The probability mass function provides us with the ability to compute the probability of the load being within a range according to:

Pr(Load within Range) =

Pr( Load = L)

L in Range

We may use the probability mass function to obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) according to:

Pr(Load Value) =
From Fig. 5, we obtain:

L Value

Pr( Load = L)

Pr(Load 1) = Pr( Load = L) = 1.0

L1
L2

Pr(Load 2) =

Pr( Load = L) = 1.0

Pr(Load 3) = Pr(Load 4) =

L3

Pr( Load = L) = 1.0 Pr( Load = L) = 1.0

Pr(Load 5) =

L5

Pr( Load = L) Pr( Load = L)

L2

= 0.217 + 0.217 + 0.174 + 0.261 + 0.043 = 0.912 Pr(Load 6) =

L6

= 0.217 + 0.174 + 0.261 + 0.043 = 0.695 Pr(Load 7) =

Pr( Load = L) = 0.174 + 0.261 + 0.043 = 0.478 Pr(Load 8) = Pr( Load = L) = 0.261 + 0.043 = 0.304
L6 L8

Pr(Load 9) =

L9

Pr( Load = L) = 0.043

L 10

Pr(Load 10) =
1 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 0

Pr( Load = L) = 0

Plotting these values vs. the load results in the CDF of Fig. 6.

Probability(Load > L)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 L (MW)

Fig. 6: Cumulative distribution function The plot of Fig. 6 is often shown with the load on the vertical axis, as given in Fig. 7.
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

L (MW)

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0

Probability(Load > L)

Fig. 7: CDF with axes switched If the horizontal axis of Fig. 7 is scaled by the time duration of the interval over which the original load data was taken, T, we obtain the load duration curve. This curve provides the number of time intervals

that the load equals, or exceeds, a given load level. For example, if the original load data had been taken over a year, then the load duration curve would show the number of hours out of that year for which the load could be expected to equal or exceed a given load level, as shown in Fig. 8.
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

L (MW)

876 1752 2628 3504 4380 5256 6132 7008 7884 8760

Number of hours that Load > L

Fig. 8: Load duration curve Load duration curves are useful in a number of ways. They provide guidance for judging different alternative plans. One plan may be satisfactory for loading levels of 90% of peak and less. One sees from Fig. 8 that such a plan would be unsatisfactory for 438 hours per year (or 5% of the time). They identify the base load. This is the value that the load always exceeds. In Fig. 8, this value is 5 MW. They provide convenient calculation of energy, since energy is just the area under the load duration curve. For example, Fig. 9 shows the area corresponding to the base load energy consumption, which is 5MWx8760hr=43800 MW-hrs.

11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

L (MW)

876 1752 2628 3504 4380 5256 6132 7008 7884 8760

Number of hours that Load > L

Fig. 9: Area corresponding to base load energy consumption They allow illustration of generation commitment policies and corresponding yearly unit energy production, as shown in Fig 10, where we see that the nuclear plant and fossil plant #1 are base loaded plants, supplying 26280 MWhrs and 17520 MWhrs, respectively. Fossil plant #2 and gas plant #1 are the mid-range plants, and gas plant #2 is a peaker.
Gas plant #2 Gas plant #1

11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

L (MW)

Fossil plant #2 Fossil plant #1 Nuclear plant

876 1752 2628 3504 4380 5256 6132 7008 7884 8760

Number of hours that Load > L

Fig. 10: Illustration of Unit commitment policy Load duration curves are also used in reliability and production costing programs in computing different reliability indices. Power flow program: This well known tool is perhaps the bread and butter of the planner since it enables the study of steady-state network performance for various planning alternatives, under

different possible conditions expected in the future, for normal states and for contingency states. Voltage instability program: This is usually a variation of the power flow program that enables the development of so-called P-V or Q-V curves, often referred to as nose curves. In its most evolved form, the program is called a continuation power flow program. Transient instability program: Dynamic security assessment involves detection of transient instability, transient voltage dips, and oscillatory instability, within the first 20 seconds or so following a faulted condition. This tool is often referred to as a time domain simulator. Reliability criteria: Bulk electric system reliability begins with planning. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), maintains an extensive set of standards that address system adequacy and security, system modeling data requirements, system protection and control, and system restoration. These standards are located at www.nerc.com/~filez/pss-psg.html. In addition to planning standards, individual regional councils may develop their own regional planning criteria. These are evaluated to ensure that the regional criteria are consistent with NERC's planning standards. A fundamental part of these standards is the disturbance-performance table contained in the part on adequacy and security. This table is based on the planning philosophy that a higher level of performance (or lower level of severity) is required for disturbances generally having a higher frequency (or higher probability) of occurrence. This table is given below. The criteria given in it must never be violated when planning the system.

Some other tools that, although not always used, are generally useful in the planning process, are described in what follows: Reliability index evaluation program: A reliability index evaluation program provides probabilistic indices to characterize the reliability level of the power system. o Common indices include Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE), Expected Energy Not Served (EENS), Frequency of Load Interruption, and Expected Duration of Load Interruption.

o The simplest of such programs model only generation, but most also model transmission. o The indices may be given at the system level, the regional level, or the bus level. o These programs provide a good quantitative evaluation of reliability which can be utilized together with economic criteria to select alternatives. o These programs operate using either contingency enumeration or Monte Carlo simulation. In these programs, load is shed (after generation has been redispatched) in order to avoid exceeding constraints. o No commercial grade reliability evaluation program models dynamic security constraints, and I am not aware of any that model voltage instability constraints (although there may be one of the latter). Therefore, the only constraints modeled in these programs are ones due to overload and low voltage. Production costing program: This program calculates a generation systems production costs (costs of generating power) together with generation reliability indices for long-range generation planning decisions. Such programs incorporate fuel costs and heat rates together with probabilistic models of the load and each generators availability. Such programs were developed before deregulation and typically were designed to handle large number of generation units operating under a centralized economic dispatch. Because of the computational requirements of methods required to handle the probabilistic nature of the models (convolution), such programs usually do not represent the network. A modern day version of the production costing program is the time domain market simulator. This program provides assessment of each alternative in terms of its effect on operating costs, or equivalently, in terms of its effect on market efficiency. Such a tool needs to chronologically calculate hour-byhour production costs while recognizing the constraints on the dispatch of generation imposed by the transmission system. One such tool developed by GE (MAPS) uses a detailed electrical model of the entire transmission network, along with generation shift factors

determined from a solved AC load flow, to calculate real power flows. This tool captures the economic penalties of re-dispatching generation to satisfy transmission line flow limits and security constraints. 3.0 Comments on resource planning The pre-deregulation resource (generation) planning problem differed from that of today. In the old days, The amount of new resources required was almost entirely dictated by forecasted load growth. Generation decisions were made based on the criterion of long-term minimum cost, where the principal decision variables were: o Usage (peaker or base load) o Size o Fuel type (coal, gas, nuclear) o Site availability and related transmission availability The actual decision would be made based on an economic analysis of the alternatives using data characterizing each alternatives decision variables, including: o Investment cost, expected plant life, and salvage value o Plant heat rate (efficiency) and expected fuel cost Production costing programs would usually be used in this decision process. The transmission planning process, although lagging behind the resource planning process, was usually an integral part of it. In addition to generation interconnection needs, clearly a transmission planning issue, power purchase agreements must be evaluated together with new generation alternatives, because it could occur that a long-term power purchase agreement with another utility could replace or supplement construction of new resources. The integrated resource planning approach consisted largely of the above together with consideration of demand-side alternatives and/or renewable resources.

A key feature to the above is that the entire process was done under the one roof of the vertically integrated utility company. In contrast, the totality of resource planning today is done by many different entities. The main criterion used by many of these entities is that the long-term payback must be profitable to the facility owner. Another significant difference between the old resource planning process and the new is the amount of uncertainty in expected revenues. The revenues of the old utility came as a result of the prices the regulators allowed the utility to charge their 30bs.th

6. Final decisions are made after performing detailed cost analysis of constructing plants at the various sites and detailed transmission analysis of operational costs and potential revenues. Final comment on capacity markets: To be completed. We will spend no more time on resource planning, simply recognizing that it has been largely relegated to the invisible hand of the market, and the market seems to have responded. 4.0 Transmission ownership and control There are a number of terms that are used in reference to transmission ownership and control. Some of these are defined below [1]: Independent system operator (ISO): A organization that operates a transmission system but is not an affiliate of an entity that owns or operates generation, transmission, or distribution assets and has no interests in trading that is carried out in wholesale or retail electricity markets. Transco: An independent organization that owns and operates a transmission system. A Transco differs from an ISO in that an ISO does not own the transmission resources. A Transco combines the functions of system operations and transmission ownership, asset management, and maintenance. Independent transmission company (ITC): A for-profit company that owns but does not operate transmission assets and is not affiliated with or in common ownership with generation, distribution, or retail businesses or facilities. Regional transmission organization (RTO): An entity responsible for certain system operations, market administration, and transmission functions, and meeting specified criteria in accordance with FERC orders. Specifically, FERC requires that RTO be responsible for (a) congestion management, (b) ancillary services, (c) administration of a balancing market, (d) OASIS administration including total

transmission capacity (TTC) and available transmission capacity (ATC) calculations, (e) security coordination, (f) market monitoring, and (g) regional transmission facility planning, and (g) tariff administration and design. Some clarifications about the relation between these terms: An RTO may be either an ISO or a Transco. An ISO is not an RTO unless it has all of the responsibilities of an RTO, especially the planning function. In the US, the FERC has consistently discouraged the existence of Transcos, insisting that the system operator needs to be independent of any interest in profiting from generation, transmission, or generation. Nonetheless, there are some organizations within the US that seem to fit the definition of a Transco at this point in time. Internationally, the National Grid Company (NGC) in the U.K., and Stattnet in Norway are clearly Transcos, and it appears that Italy has also formed a Transco. An important benefit to the Transco model is that that there is closer coordination between operation and management and planning of the facilities. It is unclear whether this benefit outweighs the potential of such organizations to make decisions in operating the system that are inappropriately biased by their interest in maintaining and planning the facilities. Figure 12 illustrates the independent transmission companies in the US as of May 2004. Figure 13 illustrates the ISOs and those organizations that have been approved by FERC to be RTOs in the US, as of May 2004 (circled).

Fig. 12: ITCs in the US [2]

Fig. 13: ISOs and RTOs, (circled ones are approved RTOs) [2]

5.0 Recovery of transmission costs When transmission pricing was first implemented, there were 2 parts. A fixed part was based on the cost of the investments and a variable part based on usage. For example, some transmission service companies based the usage part on the MW-mile scheme, where the charge was proportional to the product of MW flowing on each line and the length of each line on which it flowed. Today, transmission pricing is more typically broken into 3 parts: Congestion charge Base charge Interconnection charge 5.1 Congestion charge In studying the real-time electricity market and the locational marginal pricing (LMPs) system on which it is based, we saw that network constraints cause LMPs to increase. The additional revenues paid by market participants as a result of these LMPs are clearly related to the influence of the transmission system. But in what way? If we return to the notes on the linear programming optimal power flow, at the end, it is recalled that we studied the below example, where line 3 was constrained to 0.3 pu, and we increased the bus 3 load by 0.01 pu (1 MW).

Pg1=0.5pu 1 PB2=0.1197 PB1 = -0.0393 PB5=0.4197 Pd2=1pu

Pg2=1.1803pu

2 PB3 =0.3

PB4 = 0.4590 Pg4=0.4984pu

Pd3=1.1787pu

Fig. 11: System before bus 3 load increase of 1 MW

Pg1=0.5pu 1 PB2=0.1222 PB1 = -0.0443 PB5=0.4222 Pd2=1pu Pg2=1.1778pu

2 PB3 =0.3

PB4 = 0.4665 Pg4=0.5109pu

Pd3=1.1887pu

constraint, a load increase at one bus will incur a different cost than a load increase at another bus. The nodal prices at the various buses were Bus 1: 12.432 Bus 2: 12.11 Bus 3: 12.647 Bus 4: 12.540 In investigating differences among the nodal prices, we stated further that: The comparison shows that in order to supply an additional MW at bus 3, the generation levels of 2 different units had to be modified. Specifically, Unit 2 was decreased from 1.1803 to 1.1778, a decrease of 0.0025 per unit (0.25 MW) and Unit 4 was increased from 0.4984 per unit to 0.5109 per unit, an increase of 0.0125 (1.25 MW). Thus, Unit 4 was increased enough to supply the increased load at bus 3 and the decreased generation at bus 2. In fact, it is not possible to supply additional load at bus 3 with only a single unit increase. We will always have to compensate for the load AND redispatch to compensate for the additional flow on the branch 3. As a result, the nodal price at bus 3 is a function of the generation costs at those buses that are used in the particular redispatch that achieves the minimum cost. It should be clear that, although the nodal prices change as a function of transmission constraints, the new nodal prices are still entirely a function of system generator production costs. That is, they are NOT a function of the investment, operation, or maintenance costs related to the transmission equipment. We will, in the remainder of these notes, refer to these three costs as transmission costs. We will refer to the additional costs associated with the increased nodal prices as congestion costs.

Although the congestion costs do not reflect actual transmission costs, they do represent additional revenues brought in by the market operator. For example, consider the situation of Fig. 12, and compute the total payments made to the generation owners and the total revenues from the loads. Table 1 below summarizes: Table 1: Summary of payment/revenue stream from Fig. 12 nodal price, Generators Loads $/MWhr MW Payment,$ MW Revenues,$ 12.432 50.00 621.60 0 0 12.110 117.78 1426.32 100.00 1211.00 12.647 0 0 118.87 1503.35 12.540 51.99 640.67 0 0 2688.59 2714.35

Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Total

The additional revenues collected for this one hour, $2714.35$2688.59=$25.76, is the settlement surplus collected by the market operator. This amount may not seem like much money, but it can be significantly larger for larger systems; in addition, of course, it is just 1 hour and taken over an extended period of operation, can represent a large financial resource. In most mature electricity markets, the settlement surplus are used to pay the holders of financial transmission rights (FTRs), also known as transmission congestion contracts (TCC) in New York and fixed transmission rights (also using the acronym FTR). FTRs are tradable property rights defined, directionally, between any two connected nodes, and denominated in MWs. Ownership of a node j to k FTR for an amount Pjk in MWs for particular hour entitle the FTR holder to the difference between the nodal prices of bus j and bus k, paid by the market operator from the funds accumulated from the hourly settlement surpluses. The FTRs do not confer an exclusive right to use line j-k but simply remunerate their holder if congestion occurs.

FTRs are important financial instruments in an electricity market because they allow market participants to hedge against the uncertainty created by the effect of transmission constraints on nodal prices. If a market participant is concerned that a particular path will be heavily constrained, resulting in a situation where that market participant will see very undesirable prices, then that market participant can purchase FTRs for that transmission path. If the congestion occurs, the market participant will still see the undesirable prices. Independently, if they hold FTRs to the constrained path, they will receive an amount equal to Pjk(j-k). Two closely related questions naturally arise in regards to the FTR market. 1. What is the price to purchase them? 2. Who owns them initially? The first question is easily answered by an auction. Thus, the price paid is entirely determined by the market desire for them. Question 2 arises from question 1 because if there is no FTR ownership in advance of the first auction, then who receives the auction proceeds? Thus, it is necessary that an initial FTR owner be assigned. In regards to existing transmission facilities, question 2 has been a difficult one for the industry. The basic issue is that transmission owners, load serving entities, and existing transmission contract holders all feel that the initial FTR should belong to them, and all have a legitimate claim. Solutions worked out in regards to this issue have been rather complex and are detailed in [1] pp. 153-156. In regards to new transmission facilities, however, question 2 is simpler [1]. If investment cost of the new facilities is included in mandatory transmission access (base) charges payable by all users, then the associated FTRs are allocated to those paying the access charges.

If investment is market-based and not included in mandatory access (base) charges, the investors receive the associated FTRs.

5.2 Base charge This base transmission service charge is generally determined based on a postage stamp or license plate approach where the charge equals the total cost of transmission facilities in the service area, per year, divided by the peak load, subject to a cost-of-service rate of return approved by local regulators. Such transmission service charges range from $15/kWyear to $25/kw-year. Transmission customers may purchase transmission service in at least two different forms: Firm service: Such service is guaranteed as long as the physical facilities are operational. This price also includes the cost of any upgrades to the network made necessary by the service. Non-firm service: Such service is subject to curtailment when congestion arises. The price does not include the cost of upgrades to the network since usually none are made for this service.

5.3 Interconnection charges Whenever new generation is constructed, there is cost to build new facilities and reinforce existing ones in order to interconnect the unit with the system. The same is true for so-called merchant transmission, which is new transmission built by entrepreneurial developers (typically market participants) where the developers take the entire usage or revenue risk. 6.0 The transmission planning process

Assignment (to be completed in your groups): You are assigned to develop three detailed flow charts of the transmission planning process using three different resources. These resources are given on the web page under www.ee.iastate.edu/~jdm/ee458/ee458schedule.htm. These resources are: - Transmission planning process used at Ontario Hydro - Transmission planning process used at PG&E - Transmission planning process used at ??? Each person in your group should take one of these and work alone developing the flow chart. Then the entire group should come together and compare flow charts. You should turn in the flow charts together with a statement of the differences and similarities between the transmission planning processes used at these three companies. 7.0 Appendix: Industry comments on transmission planning An e-mail message was sent to a number of different transmission planning engineers around the country asking the question What overall topics would you think would be good for fresh undergraduate to see if they were preparing to come into your group there? The soliciting e-mail message, together with the responses, are given below. Names and company affiliation of responders have been removed.
XXXX: I used to work in PG&Es transmission planning department during 1980s and now I am a university professor at Iowa State University. I think transmission planning has changed significantly since I did it. I am teaching a course this semester at ISU called "Economic systems for electric power planning." The course is about optimization, basics of economics, nodal pricing, electricity markets, and planning. I am teaching the course with two other faculty, one is an economist. There are about 35 students in the course. You can find the schedule of topics at http://www.ee.iastate.edu/~jdm/ee458/ee458schedule.htm.

In regards to planning, I will concentrate on transmission planning. What overall topics would you think would be good for fresh undergraduate to see if they were preparing to come into your group there? I realize you do not want to spend much time on a reply to this question, so just a 2-3 high-level bullets that come immediately to mind would be appreciated. Thanks. Jim McCalley Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering Iowa State University 515-294-4844 (v) -----------------------------------------------------Jim Here are some points: Transmission planning is part of an overall process to supply the customer load in the most cost effective manner. Transmission facilities provide the trade-off between resource that are closed to the load and those that are far away. Success in transmission planning is measured by the number of problems solved in the most cost-effective manner and not by the number, sizes and costs of transmission projects proposed. Transmission planning is a process to make investment decisions, as compared to operations, which guard against the next worst contingency. Transmission planning process anticipate future problems over a planning horizon by comparing simulations of system performances under various reasonable adverse system conditions with those required by the Planning Standards. A potential problem exists when simulated system performance do not meet the Applicable Standards. In North America, utilities adhere to the North America Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Planning Standards in addition to Regional Standards (e.g., WECC) and local Standards, as appropriate. Because planning standards determines future investments, they represent a trade-off between costs and risks. It is not always necessary to get rid of all transmission constraints transmission reinforcements should be made where the benefits (enable the standards to be met or provide economic benefits) outweigh the cost. Some people may want to tag on environmental benefits such as enabling the transfer of renewable resources. However, such environmental benefits (reduce emission) must be off-set by the environment impacts of building more transmission lines, especially if they may be stranded because the resources either do not develop or developed in other locations. ----------------------------------------------------------------Jim, In taking a few minutes to read the information on the link you provided, it sounds like an interesting and timely course. I think it will hit upon a item which we struggle with continually - which is the identification of transmission projects which will be enough of a band-aid to grant an entity transmission service versus implementing a more strategic solution (usually more costly and time prohibitive to grant the original

transmission service request). A typical struggle is the decision to re-conductor a line versus building another line - which tends to make stability limits more prevalent. A couple of additional topics that immediately come to mind for your consideration for the limited time you will have: Project prioritization with deterministic versus probabilistic planning techniques Stability constraints caused by concentration of generation near fuel sources (gas lines) with inadequate transmission paths(including transient, small signal, voltage stability) One more bullet item that I can't believe I forgot to include: the impact of load models on TP study results. As we are planning closer to the edge, our load model assumptions are critical - for both loadflow type analysis and stability analysis. A new graduate engineer with an appreciation of load modeling issues would have a huge "leg up" on the majority of new graduates. Thanks - I appreciate the opportunity for the input. I hope that helps Jim, Some topics you might want to include in your course:

Optimal Power Flow (Introduction to power flow software i.e, PTI's PSS/E) Basic Transmission Equipment Ratings Calculations (Industry standards such as IEEE 738 and CIGRE 22.12) Introduction to the role of Regional Transmission Operators (RTO's) such as MISO, NYISO, PJM and their respective interconnection processes, day-ahead markets, Installed Capacity (ICAP) Market, Transmission Congestion Charge (TCC), Transmission Service Charge (TSC). Static and Dynamic Line Thermal Ratings (CAT-1 System and EPRI's Dynamic Thermal Conductor Rating Software)

I hope the above topics are helpful. Good luck. Good evening Jim, Glad to reply and give my opinion for content. 1) Overview of how Planning fits into the control of the Bulk Electric Power Grid.......things to discuss would be how there are 3 main aspects to the control operator's responsibility. The other two are Operations and Markets. 2) I would focus one session on how running generation plants is done and how the market signals that are given influence this day-to-day(or minute to minute) operation. I would stress in this the transmission facilities vital link in this for it to work. 3) I would discuss how Load flow, Short Circuit, & Dynamic analysis works, the measures for establishing if a plant and transmission facility is viable to be built and how a Generation interconnection process Queues are used, like we use, in these efforts. Understanding of power flows (Stevenson, Gross, or similar). (AC vs. DC power flows - for the purpose of your discussion I would stik to DC flows.

Optimal Power Flow (OPF) vs. power flow (e.g., PowerWorld, PSS/E, PSLF) Transmission Planning vs. System Operations (Emphasis on System Operations rather than planning - my background is planning but in the world where LMP is king, day to day operations rules the day. This is, of course, from a practical standpoint. Good luck, and I hope this helps. Jim, The primary planning tasks we do are running PSSE contingency load flows for identifying system weak areas in terms of overload, low voltage, transmission congestions, ATC, TRM and CBM requirements. Flowgates limitations and management is another important aspect. Load forecasts, capital budget planning, project cost/benefit anaylysis for ranking and justification purposes are daily routine works. Voltage stability and angular stability are also important. From time to time short circuit fault analyses are performed for relay setting purposes. Hope this will give you enough material for three classes. Thanks and best, Jim - Hi! I would break it down into the separate elements of what we are planning, as each has a different approach. Resource Planning - ensure sufficient MWs are available to serve the load; 1day/10 year rule of thumb criteria; need for more capacity than you have load due to maintenance and forced outages; typical reserve margins are 1218% depending on system configuration (need a higher amount if you have large generation plants remote from load vs a lower margin if you have highly dispersed small generation plants with few transmission constraints); uses spreadsheet analysis and LOLE programs. Transmission Planning - ensure sufficient facilities to move power from where it is generated to where it is required to serve load reliably; bulk transmission (moves power long distances/between markets), area transmission (moves power from the bulk system down to specific load areas), subtransmission (moves power from defined areas to specific load centers' distribution system); voltage level is a function of distance the power needs to be moved and the density of the load; deterministic criteria driven (for the loss of any single element of the bulk system, no load will be shed); use powerflow programs. Electric System Reliability Planning - ensure sufficient support systems so the facilities (generation and transmission) can be operated in a reliable and secure manner; determine protection schemes, special operating measures, back-up systems, etc.; use stability analysis, nose curves, etc. I always like to insert (especially when economists are involved and there are discussions of markets) that you can have reliability as an output from markets when you are talking about resource planning, but transmission reliability is the platform that markets are built on. Hope that helps and good luck,

3.1 INTRODUCTION Transmission expansion planning is the process of deciding how and when to invest in additional transmission facilities. It is complicated under any electric industry structure because resulting decisions can affect any stakeholder owning or operating interconnected facilities and are necessarily driven by predictions of uncertain futures characterized by changes in load and generation, and by potential of component unavailability from forced or scheduled outage. These decisions have significant consequences on the reliability and economy of the future interconnected power system; in addition, they usually involve large capital expenditures and complex regulatory processes, especially if they require obtaining right-of way, and so represent high financial commitment to investors. Previous to deregulation when electric utilities were vertically integrated, overseeing generation, transmission, and distribution under one management structure, the necessary coordination between the highly interdependent functions was carried out in an intentionally integrated fashion, often involving the same people, targeting the objectives of the organizations management to whom the analysts and decision-makers reported. Transmission enhancements that affected multiple utilities were handled through bilateral coordination or through well-structured coordinating bodies. The utility paid for transmission upgrades and recovered regulatory-approved costs through customer rates. The most significant uncertainties faced by planners were load growth and component forced outage (due to a fault or failure), uncertainties for which historical data can be used in deriving associated probability distributions. Under deregulation, the number of organizations involved in generation planning and transmission planning is significantly increased, each with their own objectives. Generation is planned by a multiplicity of companies seeking to maximize their individual profits through energy sales, while transmission is planned by transmission owners seeking to maximize their profits through transmission services, all overseen and coordinated by a centralized authority seeking to ensure grid reliability and market efficiency. The increased number of

stakeholders requires procedures for coordinating among them the necessary analyses, decisions, and financial implications; in addition, it motivates the need for incentives so that organizations perceive transmission investment and ownership to be attractive. The number and nature of uncertainties have increased as well [i]. In addition to load uncertainty and component forced outages, planners must account for uncertainty in generation and transmission installation, in generation commitment and dispatch schedules, in wheeling (point-to-point power transactions), and in component economic outages due to financiallymotivated decision on the part of the component owner. Although electricity markets have been operating in the U.S. since the early 1990s, it has only been recent that planning procedures and investment incentives have begun to mature. As a result, transmission investment has been inhibited during the early deregulation years, as indicated in Fig. 1 [ii], which compares U.S. annual average growth rates of transmission and load during three periods of time from 1982 to 2012, and Fig. 2 [iii], which compares U.S. investment trends in distribution, transmission, and generation from 1925 to 2020. The figures show transmission growth and investment at its lowest point during the period 1992-2002.

Fig. 1: Annual avg. growth rates of transmission, load [ii] Fig. 2: Capital investment as percentage of revenues [iii] From an engineering perspective, there are four options for expanding transmission: (1) build new transmission circuits, (2) upgrade old ones, (3) build new generation at strategic locations, and (4) introduce additional control capability. Although all of these continue to exist as options, options (1)-(3) are more capital-intensive than option (4); rightof-way acquisition can sometimes prohibit option (1), and option (3) as a transmission solution is almost always considered secondary to energy market profitability. Option (4), control, although not always viable, is attractive when it is viable since it is relatively inexpensive, requires no right of way, and when not part of generation facilities, affects energy market operation only through the intended transmission expansion. Although considerable work has been done in planning transmission in the sense of options (1)-(3), there has been relatively little effort towards planning transmission control options in the sense of option (4), yet the ability to consider these devices in the planning process is a clear need to

the industry [iv, v, vi, vii]. Our interest therefore focuses on designing systematic control system planning algorithms. There are 4 types of control technologies that exist today: generation controls, powerelectronic based transmission control, system protection schemes (SPS), and mechanically switched shunt and series devices (capacitors, reactors, and phase-shifters). Of these, the first two exert continuous feedback control action; the third and fourth exert discrete open-loop control action. Thus, power system control is hybrid [viii, ix] in that it consists of continuous and discrete control. Since power systems are already hybrid, and since good solutions may also be hybrid, assessment of control alternatives for expanding transmission must include procedures for gauging cost and effectiveness of hybrid control schemes. Our emphasis is on the most promising and least expensive of the discrete control options, series and shunt capacitor switching; the aim is to provide flexible and inexpensive transmission expansion via reconfigurable switching of these controls in response to network disturbances that can occur. In this chapter, we target planning methods and investment implications for enhancing transmission via discrete control. In Section 3.2, we summarize current market-based planning procedures because, owing to their recent development, the literature is relatively sparse on this topic; in addition, this summary illuminates the environment in which the methods described in this paper are intended for use. Section 3.3 describes and clarifies one particularly complex planning issue that is at the heart of our work: transmission limits. Section 3.4 provides engineering models capable of identifying solutions to planning problems. Section 3.5 analyzes electricity market efficiency under two types of transmission expansion options, new lines and control, resulting in the interesting conclusion that electricity markets allowing only control-based expansion are efficient, whereas markets that allow new transmission lines are not. Section 3.6 concludes. 3.2 PLANNING PROCESSES

A transmission planning study is an economic and engineering analysis of a transmission network to identify problems associated with expected future conditions together with solutions to those problems. Such a study may be motivated by the likely prospect of a single significant network change, e.g., the proposal of a large generation facility. However, it is essential to conduct planning studies periodically to account for normal load growth, retirement of old facilities, and changes in maintenance and operating policies. As a result, minimum planning frequency has generally been yearly, projecting conditions 5-10 years ahead. Order 2000 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) stipulated that regional transmission organizations (RTOs) have ultimate responsibility for both transmission planning and expansion within its region [x]. An RTO is an organization, independent of all generation or transmission owners and load-serving entities, that facilitates electricity transmission on a regional basis with responsibilities for grid reliability and transmission operation. Organizations approved or under consideration by FERC for approval as an RTO are shown in Fig. 3 [xi] as the white ovals. Two primary issues for RTO-based planning are coordinating plans of multiple stakeholders and provision of investment incentives including articulation of a costrecovery path for transmission investors.

Fig. 3: Existing and Proposed RTOs [xi]

FERC also issued an important ruling in 2003, called Order 2003 [xii], which required public utilities to file revised open access transmission tariffs containing standard generator interconnection procedures and a standard agreement that the Commission is adopting in this order These procedures, described in Order 2003, were encapsulated in a diagram contained in an appendix of Order 2003 [xiii]. Figure 4a provides a simplified version of this diagram.

Fig. 4a: Simplified Illustration of FERCs Interconnection Procedures In the remainder of this section, we describe some aspects of a planning process and cost-recovery approach used by one RTO, PJM Interconnection, based largely on [xiv,xv], and characterized by Fig. 4b.

Fig. 4b 3.2.1 Engineering analyses and cost responsibilities Each planning cycle begins with an information gathering stage where RTO engineers solicit information from a full range of stakeholders including independent power producers (IPPs), interconnected transmission owners (ITOs) and transmission developers (TDs) proposing development plans, load serving entities (LSEs), and all regional reliability councils, independent system operators (ISOs), and transmission owners and operators within and adjoining the RTO network. Project queues are developed of proposed generation and transmission projects based on receipt of an interconnection request. Queued projects are assigned one of the following status indicators, in order of study sequence: feasibility study, impact study, facility study, interconnection service agreement (ISA), being built, or built. A baseline analysis of system reliability is performed by the RTO; this analysis models expected load growth and known transmission and generation projects, but it models development projects in the queue depending on their status. If a project has proceeded to the stage of facility study, its associated system upgrades are modeled. If a project has proceeded to the stage of ISA, it could be turned on in the

basecase, even it has not been built. Power flow, voltage, time-domain (stability), and short-circuit studies are conducted to evaluate the reliability according to applicable criteria and to identify baseline expansion projects necessary to satisfy violated criteria that cause unhedgeable congestion (unhedgeable congestion is described in Section 3.2.3 below). An initial feasibility study is performed for each interconnection request to provide a rough approximation of the transmission-related costs necessary to accommodate the interconnection in order to enable the developer to make an informed business decision, at which point the developer either drops out of the queue or signs a system impact study agreement. System impact studies are performed for each interconnection request remaining in the queue. System impact studies provide a more detailed assessment of interconnection requirements, revealing necessary enhancements. Such enhancements may include direct connection attachment facilities (required for new generation to get to the bus) and/or network reinforcements to mitigate network impact effects that the proposed transmission development may have on the power system. Each interconnection project bears the cost responsibility for its own direct connection attachment facilities. The cost responsibility for network reinforcements is allocated among parties based on the percent impact which a given project has on a system element requiring upgrade. In the power flow cost allocation method, upgrade costs are allocated based on each partys MW impact on the need for the system upgrade, as determined by distributed slack power transfer distribution factors [xvi], defined as the MW impact on a line when transferring 1MW of power from the new generating bus to all the rest of the generating buses. Such an approach is appropriate for cost allocation for new or re-conductored lines, for example. The shortcircuit cost allocation method, applicable to upgraded circuit breakers, allocates costs in proportion to the fault level contribution of each proposed IPP. Identified network reinforcement costs, for a given capacity, are highly dependent on location, and developers have strong incentives to identify development locations that minimize these costs.

3.2.2 Cost Recovery for Transmission Owners In addition to the investment or capital costs, transmission owners also incur ongoing costs due to operations and maintenance, administration, debt amortization, depreciation, and taxes. Transmission cost-recovery of all of these costs is accomplished in three primary ways. xvii Network integration transmission service charges [ ]: Network customers are so designated because they pay a transmission charge computed as the summation of their daily peak load multiplied by the annual network integration transmission service rate (in the zone in which the load is located) divided by 365. Typical service charges at the time of this writing range from 11,020-32,114 $/MW-year in the PJM area. Each transmission owner computes these service rates based on their annual transmission revenue requirements, which range from $12 million to $1.6 billion in the PJM area. Point-to-point transmission service charges [xvii]: Point-to-point customers obtain transmission service between a point of delivery to a point of receipt. Service may be firm (curtailed last) or non-firm (curtailed first); the calculation procedure for service charges, which is the same in both cases (but non-firm rates are less), is to multiply the capacity reserved by the rate. The published yearly firm rate at the time of this writing is $18.88/kw-year. Total firm charges are allocated to the transmission owners in proportion to their annual revenue requirements. Total non-firm charges are allocated to the firm point-topoint and network transmission customers based on percentage shares of their firm and network demand charges, respectively. xviii Auction revenue rights (ARRs) [ ]: ARRs are entitlements allocated annually to firm transmission service customers (which can include transmission owners) that entitle the holder to receive an allocation of the revenues from the annual FTR auction. FTRs are financial instruments that entitle the holder to rebates of congestion charges paid by firm transmission service cust

must be uneconomically dispatched to avoid overload. That is, whenever congestion exists on the transmission system between sink and source points specified in a particular FTR, such that the locational marginal price (LMP) at the sink point (point of delivery) is higher than the LMP at the source point (point of receipt), the holder of that FTR receives a credit equal to the MW reservation specified in the FTR and the difference between the LMPs at the two specified points. (We assume that readers are familiar with LMPs, which are fundamental to understanding electricity markets. Basic treatment of LMPs may be found in [xix, xx, xxi].) 3.2.3 Economically motivated expansion As described in Section 3.2.1, interconnection requests are placed in a study queue and motivate analysis to identify network expansion requirements and associated costs and cost responsibilities. Allowance is also made that unhedgeable congestion be identified and placed in the analysis queue by RTO engineers, and any transmission expansion resulting from this is referred to as economically motivated expansion. Congestion refers to the power flowing on a constrained circuit, i.e., a circuit for which the power flowing on it equals the transmission limit (transmission limits are addressed in Section 3.3). Hedgeable congestion is power flow on a constrained circuit for which FTRs have been purchased or for which economic local generation (defined in the footnote below1 per Schedule 6 of [xxii]) is available. Therefore, unhedgeable congestion is power flow on a constrained circuit for which FTRs have not been purchased and economic local generation is unavailable. Key to whether a constraint driven by unhedgeable congestion should be queued as a project or not is the cost-benefit analysis, i.e., the cost of the congestion to be relieved in comparison to the cost of the
Economic local generation is defined in shall mean the amount of generation capacity (in MW) (other than units that are running out of merit order at an offer-capped price pursuant to Section 6 of Schedule 1 of the Operating Agreement) that is online and available to affected load at each bus subject to the constraint, excluding generation at each bus that has a powerflow distribution factor on the constraint of less than 3%, at prices (as determined from generators day-ahead price bids into the PJM Energy Market, provided that a price bid of zero shall be attributed to self-scheduled units) no greater than the PJM system marginal price.
1

transmission solution that relieves it. Because the cost of the transmission solution can not be determined until a study is completed to identify that solution, proxies to this cost, called thresholds, are provided. To facilitate comparison to the cost of congestion, these thresholds are given in units of dollars/month. For example, at PJM, the identified thresholds are based on voltage levels and are $100k/month for facilities operating at voltages greater than 345 kV, $50k/month for voltages operating at voltages of 100kV-345 kV, and $25k/month for facilities operating at voltages less than 100kV [xv]. The congestion cost to use in the comparison is the monthly unhedgeable congestion cost of a particular constraint. This cost is the sum of the hourly unhedgeable congestion costs for each hour during the month that the constraint is binding. The hourly unhedgeable congestion costs are the hourly gross congestion costs (hedgeable plus unhedgeable congestion costs) that were not hedged. The hourly gross congestion costs are computed as the product of the shadow price (Lagrange multiplier) of the constraint, which represents the incremental reduction in congestion costs achieved by relieving the constraint by one MW, and the total affected load during each hour. The total affected load in each hour for a constraint is computed as the sum of the loads at each bus multiplied by the appropriate distributed slack power transfer distribution factor. In theory, every load bus in the network should be considered, but in practice, there is very little loss of accuracy if load buses are included that have distribution factors above a certain percentage, e.g., 3%. Thresholds are the first step to identifying recommended economically motivated expansion. The identification of a path for which unhedgeable congestion exceeds threshold means that a market window has opened and market participants have the ability to propose projects through the queues for relieving the constraint. If no market solution to the congestion is present after one year, then a more detailed cost-benefit analysis is performed. 3.2.4 Further reading

This section has provided a highly condensed view of existing planning processes for electric transmission systems as reported by PJM. Another reference useful in study of the PJM implementation includes [xxiii]. Although other implementations of RTO-based planning processes share some similarities with that of PJMs, significant differences exist. Some other implementations at the time of this writing include that of the New York ISO [xxiv], ISO-New England [xxv], Cal-ISO [xxvi, xxvii], the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) [xxviii, xxix], and the Midwest ISO [xxx]. A different but equally important view on transmission expansion, from a pure transmission company, is provided in Section I of [xxxi] and [xxxii]. Some additional recommended reading includes [xxxiii] which provides historical context and reviews some of the other implementations and [xxxiv] which also surveys some of the other implementations. A book on related policy and strategy was also recently published [xxxv]. 3.3 TRANSMISSION LIMITS The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), maintains an extensive set of planning standards [xxxvi] that address system reliability, system modeling data requirements, system protection and control, and system restoration. These standards require that under normal operating conditions, also called pre-contingency conditions, Level A performance requirements be met such as circuit loadings are within continuous ratings and voltage magnitudes lie within a specified range, e.g., 0.97-1.05 pu. In addition, reliability standards require that under contingency conditions, specified disturbance-performance criteria are met. A fundamental part of the reliability standards is the disturbance-performance table. This table is based on the planning philosophy that a higher level of performance (or lower level of severity) is required for disturbances having a higher occurrence likelihood. Typical disturbance -performance criteria are shown in Table 1. This table is similar in principle to NERCs table [xxxvii], where, for example, performance Level B requires that loss of a single element (an N-1 contingency) result in performance where: (a) transient criteria require

Table 1: Example of Typical Disturbance-Performance Criteria that voltage dips may not Performance Requirements exceed 25% of preTransient Criteria Post-transient criteria contingency levels for any Minimum Transient voltage Loading Post Perf. transient within transient Level dip criteria, V frequency time, they may not exceed Disturbance emergency voltage ratings dev,V 20% for more than 20 fault or 3F fault w/loss of max 5% Yes B - max V Dip - 25% cycles (0.333 sec), and SLG 1 generator or 1 circuit or DC duration of - max duration of V monopole freq<59.6 hz dip exceeding 20% is 6 cycles frequency transients may is 20 cycles max w/ or w/o delayed clearing 10% Yes C - max V Dip - 30% not exceed 59.6 hz for more SLG duration of or 3F fault w/loss of 2 - max duration of V hz freq<59.0 or 2 circuits or DC dip exceeding 20% than 6 cycles, and (b) post- generators is 6 cycles bipole is 40 cycles Extreme events such as 3F fault Evaluate for risks and consequences transient criteria require that with delayed clearing w/loss of D 2 or more components voltage deviations remain within 5% of pre-contingency voltages, and all circuit loadings within their applicable ratings. Level C criteria applies to the less likely loss of two components (an N-2 contingency), but its performance criteria is less restrictive. Level D applies to very rare events with no explicit performance criteria specified, leaving the engineer to make a judgment. A voltage instability criterion is usually applied in planning studies, but to maintain simplicity, such a criterion is not indicated in Table 1. Key to understanding power system flow limitations is the fact that limits on operating conditions (such as flows) can be imposed by violation of either Level A criteria or the contingency-driven Levels B or C criteria. In the case of Level A violation, transmission enhancements identified to relieve the violation must operate under normal conditions. In the case of Level B or C violation, transmission enhancements identified to relieve the violation (which is a post-contingency violation) need operate only following the contingency; thus, they may be active before the contingency as well, or they may not. Yet regardless of whether the constraint is in the normal or in the contingency condition, and regardless of whether the relieving transmission enhancement is active in the pre- and post-contingency state, or only in the postcontingency state, the effect of the transmission enhancement is to relieve the limitation in the pre-contingency state. The significance of this observation lies in the fact that nodal-priced-based electricity markets operate almost all the time under the normal condition. Enhancements to raise transmission limits associated with Level A
1 2

violations also affect the electrical characteristics of the network seen and thus the flows seen by the market. On the other hand, it is possible to raise transmission limits associated with Levels B or C violations so that the electrical characteristics of the network seen by the market do not change. This is done through the provision of a control that actuates only following the occurrence of a contingency with intention to eliminate the violation; most system protection schemes (SPS) [xxxviii] (in contrast to local protection which functions to isolate faults) are of this nature as are switched capacitors [xxxviii, xxxix, xl]. Many types of SPS, and all switched capacitors, are discrete-event controls. Switched capacitors are most common as switched shunt devices, in which case they alleviate mainly voltage violations, but they may also be switched as series devices, in which case they may alleviate both voltage and flow-related violations2. In this chapter, we explore the engineering and economic considerations for expanding transmission capability using switched shunt and series capacitors. References [1] F. Woolf, Global Transmission Expansion; Recipes for Success, 2003 by Penn Well Corporation, Tulsa Oklahoma. [2] D. Owens, Challenges for Expanding Transmission Infrastructure, June 14, 2004, at http://www.psc.state.sc.us/SEARUC/presentations/Owens.PPT
[i] M. Buygi, G. Balzer, H. Shanechi, and M. Shahidehpour, Market-based transmission expansion planning, IEEE Transactions On Power Systems, Vol. 19, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 2060-2067. [ii] E. Hirst, U.S. Transmission Capacity: Present Status and Future Prospects, 2004, at www.ee.iastate.edu/~jdm/ee458/TransmissionCapacityFinal_Herst.pdf. [iii] M. Shahidehpour, Investing in expansion: the many issues that cloud transmission planning, IEEE Power and Energy Magazine, Jan/Feb. 2004, pp. 1-18. [iv] L. Dale, Reactive compensation using static VAR compensators-a planning case study using security constrained techniques, International Conf. on AC and DC Power Transmission, Sept. 17-20, 1991, pp. 50 54.
Series capacitor compensation has two effects that are not of concern for shunt capacitor compensation. First, series capacitors can expose generator units to risk of sub-synchronous resonance (SSR), and such risk must be investigated. Second, series capacitors also have significant effect on real power flows. In our work, we intend that both shunt and series capacitors be used as contingency-actuated controls (and therefore temporary) rather than continuously operating compensators. As a result, the significance of how they affect real power flows may decrease. However, the SSR risk is still a significant concern. To address this issue, the planner must identify a-priori lines where series compensation would create SSR risk and eliminate those lines from the list of candidates.
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REFERENCES

[v] R. Koessler, J. Mountford, L. Lima, and J. Rosende, The Brazilian interconnected system: a study on transfer limits, reactive compensation and voltage collapse, Proc. of the IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, Vol. 3, Jan. 28-Feb. 1, 2001 pp. 1147 1153. [vi] P. Pourbeik, R. Koessler, and B. Ray, Tools and techniques for analyzing voltage stability related reliability challenges, Proc. on the IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition, Vol. 1, Sept. 12 2003,pp. 417 421. [vii] A. Hammad and M. El-Sadek, Prevention of transient voltage instabilities due to induction motor loads by static VAr compensators, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 4, Issue 3, Aug. 1989, pp. 1182 1190. [8] M. S. Branicky, ``Modeling Analysis and Control of Hybrid Systems'', PhD Thesis Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. [9] Tomlin, C.J.; Lygeros, J.; Shankar Sastry, S.; A game theoretic approach to controller design for hybrid systems, Proceedings of the IEEE, Volume: 88 Issue: 7 , Jul 2000 , Page(s): 949 -970 [x] Regional Transmission Organizations, Docket No. RM99-2-000; Order 2000 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), issued Dec. 20, 1999; www.ferc.gov/legal/ferc-regs/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf. [xi] www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [xii] Final Rule - Order 2003, Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Docket No. RM02-1-000, Issued July 24, 2003. [xiii] Flow Chart of the Large Generating Facility Interconnection Process, in Appendix A to the Final Rule Order 2003 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures. [xiv] Schedule 6 of Operating agreement of PJM Interconnection L.L.C., June 22, 2005, at www.pjm.com/documents/agreements.html. [xv] PJM Manual 14B: Generation and Transmission Interconnection Planning, Revision: 05, June 23, 2005, at www.pjm.com/contributions/pjm-manuals/manuals.html. [xvi] T. Wu, Z. Alaywan, A. Papalexopoulos, Locational Marginal Price Calculations Using the Distributed-Slack Power-Flow Formulation, IEEE Transactions On Power Systems, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 2005. [xvii] PJM Manual 27: Open Access Transmission Tariff Accounting Revision, Revision 46, May 01,2005 at www.pjm.com/contributions/pjm-manuals/manuals.html. [xviii] PJM Manual 06: Financial Transmission Rights, Revision 7, April 15, 2005, at www.pjm.com/contributions/pjm-manuals/manuals.html. [xix] F. Schweppe, M. Caramanis, R. Tabors, and R. Bohm, Spot Pricing of Electricity, Boston, Kluwer Academic Press, 1988. [xx] N. Rau, Optimization principles: practical application to the operation and markets of the electric power industry, John Wiley, 2003. [xxi] D. Kirschen and G. Strbac, Power system economics, John Wiley, 2004. [xxii] Operating agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., June 22, 2005, at http://www.pjm.com/documents/downloads/agreements/. [xxiii] P. Jaskow, Transmission Policy In The United States, Utilities Policy, 13: 95-115, 2005. at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1003 [xxiv] New York Independent System Operator, Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Manual, September 1999, at http://www.nyiso.com/public/documents/manuals/planning.jsp. [xxv] ISO New England Planning Procedures, at http://www.iso-ne.com/rules_proceds/isone_plan/index.html. [xxvi] Z. Alaywan, Understanding the California Firm Transmission Rights, at www.caiso.com/aboutus/articles/. [xxvii] Z. Alaywan and T. Wu, Effects of Firm Transmission Rights on Transmission Revenue Allocation in California, at www.caiso.com/aboutus/articles/. [xxviii] S. Jones, ERCOT ISO Experience with Transmission Operating and Planning Criteria in a Competitive Environment, Proc. of the 1999 IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, Vol. 1, July 18-22, 1999, pp. 140142. [xxix] Public Utilities Commission of Texas, P.U.C. SUBST. R. 25.101, Transmission Planning, Licensing and CostRecovery for Utilities within the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Effective data, April 13, 2005. [xxx] Midwest ISO Transmission Expansion Plan (MTEP) 2005, June 2005, at www.midwestiso.org/plan_inter/expansion.shtml [xxxi] American Transmission Company 2004 10-Year Assessment Update, March 2005, at www.atcllc.com/IT2b.shtml. [xxxii] American Transmission Company Planning Criteria, Document number PLG-CR-0001-v08, July 5, 2005.

[xxxiii] S. Harvey, W. Hogan, and S. Pope, Electricity Market Design and Structure: Working Paper on Rate and Transition Issues in Standardized Transmission Service and Wholesale Electric Market Design, Submission to the Federal Regulatory Commision, Docket No. RM01-12-000, May, 2002. [xxxiv] E. Hirst and B. Kirby, Transmission Planning and the Need for New Capacity, at http://certs.lbl.gov/NTGS/ISSUE_4.PDF. [xxxv] F. Woolf, Global Transmission Expansion; Recipes for Success, 2003 by Penn Well Corporation, Tulsa Oklahoma. [xxxvi] Standards of the North American Reliability Council, located at www.nerc.com/~filez/pss-psg.html. [xxxvii] NERC Planning Standards, Section I System Adequacy and Security, Standard S1. [xxxviii] System Protection Schemes in Power Networks,'' by Task Force 38.02.19, chaired by Daniel Karlsson and Xavier Waymel, A technical brochure for International Conference on Large High Voltage Electric Systems (CIGRE), January, 2001. [xxxix] W. Mittelstadt, C. Taylor, M. Klinger, J. Luini, J. McCalley, and J. Mechenbier, Voltage Instability Modeling and Solutions As Applied to the Pacific Intertie, International Conference on Large High Voltage Electric Systems (CIGRE), June 1990. [xl] N. Miller, R. D'Aquila, K. Jimma, M. Sheehan, G. Comegys, Voltage stability of the Puget Sound system under abnormally cold weather conditions, IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Aug. 1993, pp. 1133 1142.