Oceans K

1AC
The NOAA says there is only one ocean. The divisions between them are unclear and continually contested to this day. A multiplicity of oceans is simply a variety of constructs made by humans. NOAA 13 [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, last revised 7 September 2013,
http://www.oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/howmanyoceans.html] While there is only one global ocean, the vast body of water that covers 71 percent of the Earth is geographically divided into distinct named regions. The boundaries between these regions have
evolved over time for a variety of historical, cultural, geographical, and scientific reasons. Historically, there are four named oceans: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic. However, most countries including the United Statesnow recognize the Southern (Antarctic) as the fifth ocean. The Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian are known as the three major oceans. The Southern Ocean is the 'newest' named ocean. It is recognized by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as the body of water extending from the coast of Antarctica to the line of latitude at 60 degrees South. The boundaries of this ocean were proposed to the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000. However, not all countries agree on the proposed boundaries, so this has yet to be ratified by members of the IHO. The U.S. is a member of the IHO, represented by the NOS Office of Coast Survey.

The social constructions of various oceans block us from fully interrogating t he ocean in itself and treats the ocean as a nation-state. Steinberg 2001 (Philip E., Professor of Political Geography @ Durham Universitys department of
Geography, The Social Construction of the Ocean, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 18) Leaving aside for the moment any further critique of the realist conception of either the state or international relations (both of which are taken up again later in this chapter), it is argued here that the military history perspective is deficient for much the same reason as the commercial history perspective: Both perspectives are premised upon a denial of the oceans long history as a space that continuously has been regulated and managed. Even those who stud the history of sea power from an explicitly social angle-such as Modelski and Thompson (1988), who trace the rise and fall of maritime powers as indicators of world-systemic long cycles and the shifting fortunes of individual countries fail to investigate the ocean itself as a space within which the social contest is played out. Rather than being a neutral surface across and within which states have vied for power and moved troops, the sea, like the nation-states themselves, has been socially constructed throughout history. Although in the modern era the sea has been constructed outside the territory of individual states, it has been constructed as a space amenable to a degree of governance within the state system. Indeed, as Thomson (1994) has shown, this construction of the sea has played an important role in the construction of modern norms of international relations. As was the case with Harlows definition of the sea as unregulatable transport space, the very act of defining the sea as a space of anarchic military competition both reflects and creates specific social construction of both ocean-space and land-space.

The resolutions focus on relations between nation-states reflects a desire for coherent, unified national identity. This is impossible because every social body is filled with a multitude of perspectives. A focus on interstate relations is a mask for the violence that allowed the nation-state to exist in the first place. The inability of the United States to ever become a truly unified identity is translated into the creation of threats and dangers that we measure ourselves against. Shapiro 97 (Michael, Professor of PoliSci at Hawaii, Violent Cartogrophies, p. 149-150.)
The complicity of social sciences, psychology, and psychiatry in the idea that there is a normal and cohesive American character type served ultimately to help depoliticize issues of racism, sexism, class, repression, and other forms of antagonism with a discourse on deviance and irrationality. The repression of difference at the level of institutional politics was therefore reinforced with a conceptual repression. Nevertheless, the forces of fragmentation persist, and those that are particularly threatening to representational practices of selfhood and nationhood as coherent and undivided are, among other things, peripheral sexualities (hence the recent furor over gays in the military, a conflict at the level of models of individuality) and various social antagonisms (hence the recent struggle over entitlements). Adding a dimension to Herman Melvilles insights about the masks of history, Slavoj Zizek has argued, with a Lacanian frame, that the drive for coherent identity at either individual or collective levels is necessarily always blocked. As this drive to overcome incompleteness is played out at the collective level, the imposed story of coherence is a mask that covers a void. The fact of social antagonism is displaced by a myth of undividedness. And rather than facing the disjuncture between fact and aspiration, the dissatisfaction is turned outward, becoming an enjoyment in the form of a disparaging model of enemy-others, dangerous character types, and outlaw nations. As Zizek notes, it is not an external enemy that prevents one from achieving an identity with oneself; that coherence is always already impossible. But the nonacceptance of that impossibility produces fantasy in the form of an imaginary scenario the function of which is to provide support filling out the subjects constitutive void. When this kind of fantasy is elaborated at the level of the social, it serves as a counterpart to antagonism. It is an imagination of a unified and coherent society that supposedly came into being by leaving a disordered condition of struggle behind. This mythologizing of origin, which constructs the society as a naturally bounded and consensual community, is a political story that those seeking legitimacy for a national order seek to perpetuate. But the disorder continues to haunt the order. The mythic disorder of the state of nature, supposedly supplanted by the consensual association as society comes into being, continues to haunt the polity. It is displaced outside the frontiers and attributed to the Other.

In short, the anarchic state of nature is attributed to relations between states. This displacement amounts to an active amnesia, a forgetting of the violence that both founds and maintains the domestic order; it amounts to a denial of the disorder within the order. This tendency to deny domestic disorder in general and to overcome more specifically the disorder and antagonisms in post-Vietnam War America stresses between generations, between military and civilian order, between the telling of imperialist tales and the telling of postcolonial ones has been reflected in the media of post- Gulf War America. The triumphalists after the Gulf War have been attempting to write out of the U.S. history the post-Vietnam agonism in which tensions within the order were acknowledged. They seek to banish a politics of interpretation and self-appraisal that was part of both the official and popular culture during the post-Vietnam period. This was especially evident in the orchestration of Norman Schwarzkopfs career as a media personality.

The politics of borders rely on the instrumental management of populations to establish national identity. This requires outsiders, who are tortured and exterminated. This violence collapses politics and makes life meaningless.

Dillon 99 (Michael J.[ Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster]) The Scandal of the Refugee,". Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 109-110.
The scale of the politically instrumental deliberate, legal, and policy- initiated manufacture of estrangement in world politics necessarily calls into question, therefore, the very moral and political foundations and accomplishments of the modern age, particularly those of the state and the international system of states. In such circumstancesand given the vaunted political and moral claims made on behalf of states and of the international state system, as well as of so-called international societywe seem increasingly left not knowing to what symbolic space, to what understanding of the human way of being, we can entrust what we variously call freedom and humanity. Modern politics, the politics of modernity, continuously undermines, however, its own most violent, most intense, most totalizing attempts to securely free humanity. And this is not because of some technical deficiency on its partthe global politics of modernity is the expression of politics as techne. It is because it is not realizable. In the process the modern expression of identity politics, while thus disclosing something also about the modern worlds response to strangeness as such, provides a powerful intimation that the reception that the modern we accords the strangeness of the human way of being is what the very (dis)order of political modernity itself calls into question. Specifically, modern political subjectification creates its own peculiar form of political abjection. Originally applied to French Huguenots who fled to England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 and therefore a direct function of early modern absolutist understandings of the entailments of stable, legitimate, and authoritative political order, and their consequencesthe refugee is precisely the figure that identities the political abjection of the modern age. Abject means cast out; abjection means also the act of expelling. It marks the failure of the political subject to be a pure political subject even in the act of trying to realize that ideal. Marking the porosity of limits of that which seeks to be the self-same, it is the waste that continuously disturbs identity, system, and order because as the outside produced by the inside, it continuously irrupts in a way that erodes the cry parameters by which the inside seeks to be defined. That which the effort to subjectify creates, its production marks the impossibility, the abject failure, of what modern political subjectification idealizes and aims to realize. For the political practices of burning, chasing, raping, expelling, degrading, murdering, humiliating, terrorizing, excoriating, removing burying, hiding, suppressing, and devastating invent and re invent the very waste they name and exorcise in the process of continuously reinagurating as politics, a certain imperative of political unity and malleable uniformity. Waste, as Ricoeur noted, is not waste with out its wasting processes: its protocols of purgative production. Neither is it undifferentiated since its processes of production are themselves Plural. Abjectionthe systems own self-produced and self-producing perturbation is neither inside nor outside but the in-between, the boundary or limit that enacts the differentiation. Abjection is (inter)national politics, and as (inter)national politics, it insists on a preoccupation with the inter anterior to the national.

In this instrumental society, assuming academics address policy-makers is anachronistic. Geopolitics is better understood as discourse used to manage the population the plan speaks to nothing.
Gerard Toal - PhD, Professor, Government and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University - September 1994 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 19, Number 3, pp. 259-272 Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship and strategy [nfb] First, it is frequently assumed that geopolitics represents a problematic that can be described as advice to the prince. Geopolitics involves using geography as an aid to

statecraft. From the evidence of the usages discussed in this paper, however, this formula inadequately described the performative range of geopolitics. The very concept of advice to the prince, exemplified by Mackinder (1942, 150) in his famous image of an airy cherub whispering in the ear of the statesman, is an archaic medieval one, anachronistic not only in the age of huge foreign policy bureaucracies and postmodern information flows but also in a culture where traditional Cartesian assumptions about the unity of the human subject are being overturned (Grosz 1990, 1-5). Geopolitics is better understood not as advisors and princes but as discourses and subjectivities. A more appropriate framework for understanding geopolitics as a type of knowledge is perhaps Foucault's (1991) concept of governmentality', the ensemble of rationalities concerned with the governing of territorities and populations that emerged in the eighteenth century. Perhaps geopolitics marks a particular expression of governmentality in the twentieth century, a governmentality concerned with the task of hegemonic management, Hegemonic managerialism produces its own rationalities and informational projects. Among them are those we have examined: (i) the survey and surveillance of objects (regions, minerals, issues like energy) deemed strategic; (ii) writings on the art of conducting statecraft in turbulent times (which includes the art of self-government, how a statesman should conduct himself); and (iii) the divination of the (meta)physics of earth and space as causal forces in international affairs that enables hegemonic managers to see into the future and thereby organize their priorities. Such projects are not specific to geopolitics; rather geopolitics is one gathering point for their expression and operation.

Our advocacy is constant criticism of borders to community all identity is performatively created through the stories we tell. Rejecting their representations of national unity helps break down violent exclusion. This process is the only ethical approach to international relations Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg.173-180)
To claim membership in a particular tribe, ethnicity, or nationthat is, to belong to a peopleone must claim location in a particular genealogical and spatial story. Such stories precede any particular action aimed at a future result and provoke much of the contestation over claims to territory and entitlement an to collective recognition. To the extent that they are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility, identity stories tend to escape contentiousness within ongoing political and ethical discourses. To produce an ethics responsive to contestations over identity claims and their related spatial stories, it is necessary to intervene in the dominant practices of intelligibility. Michel Foucault was calling for such intervention when he noted that the purpose of critical analysis is to question, not deepen, existing structures of intelligibility. Intelligibility results from aggressive, institutionalized practices that, in producing a given intelligible world, exclude alternative worlds. We must, Foucault said, make the intelligible appear against a background of emptiness, and deny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible spaces?
Like Foucault, Derrida claimed that a recognition of practices of exclusion is a necessary condition for evoking an ethical sensibility. His in sights into the instability and contentiousness of the context of an utterance, in his critique of Austin, provides access to what is effectively the protoethics of ethical discourse, the various contextual commitments that determine the normative implications of statements. To heed this observation, it is necessary to analyze two particular kinds of contextual commitments that have been silent and often unreflective predicates of ethical discourses. And it is important to do so in situations in which contending parties have something at stakethat is, by focusing on the ethics of encounter. Accordingly, in what f ollows, my approach to the ethical locates ethics in a respect for an-Others identity performances with special attention to both the temporal or narrative dimension and the spatial dimension of those performances. Moreover, to produce a critical political approach to the

ethics of the present, it is necessary to oppose the dominant stories of modernity and the institutionalized, geopolitical versions of space, which support existing forms of global proprietary control, for both participate unreflectively in a violence of representation.

The ethical sensibility offered in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas provides an important contribution to the ethics-as-nonviolent encounter thematized in my analysis. Levinas regarded war, the ultimate form of violence, as the suspension of morality; it renders morality de risory, he said. Moreover, Levinass thought fits fh general anti Clausewitzian/antirationalist approach to war th in prior chapters, for Levinas regard ed a strategically oriented politicsthe art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means which is enjoined as the very essence of reasonas opposed to morality. In order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued that philosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, is one that resists encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinass notion of infinite respect for an alterity that always evad es complete comprehension may be (an issue I discuss later), it nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of representation, with discursive control over narratives

Said emphasized the ethicopolitical significance of systems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control over stories: The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them. Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geo
of space and identity, which is central - to my analysis. Edward

political map of states, the more general discourses of international affairs and international relations continue to dom inate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructed

within a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on crossboundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography. To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific
imagination, it is nevertheless the case that the cartographers categoriess J. B. Harley has put it, art the basis of the morality of the 11 here emerges most icantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a topographical amnesia. Effacements of older maps

in contemporary namings and configurations amount to a non- recognition of older, often violently displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences of this neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating spatial unconscious and a historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a radical circumspection of the kinds of persons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State citizenship has tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses such as the ethics of international affairs.
The dominance and persistence of this discursive genre, an ethics predicated on absolute s tate sovereignty, is evident in a recent analysis that has attempted to be both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes. Despite these acknowle dged sensitivities, the analysis proceeds within a discourse that reinstalls the dominance of geopolitical thinking, for it remains within its cartography and conceptual legacy Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers go on to reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of intervention as a reaffirmation of a sove reignty discourse, they refer to the Persian Gulf War on the one hand and insurgencies on the other. As I noted in chapter i, Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramatically

when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and
unmapping the geostrategic cartography of international relations; Nietschmann refers to the Third World War, which is hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the mapa war in which only one side of the fighting has a name. Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armed struggles as part of the war In his mapping, only 4 of the struggles involved confrontations between states, while 7 involv e states against nations.

In order to think beyond the confines of the states orientation, it is therefore necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moral thinking and thereby grant recognition outside of modernitys dominant political identities. - This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory. As applied at any level of human interaction, the familiar neo-Kantian ethical injunction is to seek transcendent values. Applied to the inter state or sovereignty model of global space more specifically, this approach
seeks to achieve a set of universal moral imperatives based on shared values and regulative norms.

This dominant tradition has not yielded guidance for specific global encounters because it fails to acknowledge the historical depth of the identity claims involved in confrontations or collisions of difference difference that includes incommensurate practices of space

and conflicting narratives of identity. The tradition depends instead on two highly abstract assumptions. The first is
that morality springs from what humanity holds in common, which is thought to yield the possibility of a shared intuition of what is good. The second is that the values to be apprehended are instantiated in the world and are capable of being grasped by human consciousness, wherever it exists. As Hegel pointed out in one of his earliest remarks on Kantian moral reasoning, Kants sys tem involves a conversion of the absoluteness of pure identity. . . into the absoluteness of content. Because, for Kant, the form of a concept is what determines its rightness, there remains in his perspective no way to treat conflicts among specific matters.17 A brief account of an encounter between alternative spatial imaginar ies helps to situate the alternative ethical frame to be elaborated later. It is provided by the reflections of the writer Carlos Fuentes after an un anticipated encounter with a Mexican peasant. Lost driving with friends in the state of Morelos, Mexico, Fuentes stopped in a village and asked an old peasant the name of the village. Well, that depends; an approach that assails such totalizations with the aim of providing an ethics of enco unter. Levinas and the Ethics of the Face to Face Fuentess experience and the conclusions he draws from are elaborately prescripted in the ethical writings of Levinas, for wh om the face-to-face encounter and the experience of the Other as a historical trace are crucial dimensions of an ethical responsibility. To

confront Levinas is to be faced with an ethical tradition quite different from those traditionally applied to issues of global encounter. In Levinass ethical thinking and writing, morality is not an experience of value, as it is for both the Kantian tradition and Alasdair Maclntyres post-Kantian concern with an anthropology of ethics, but a recognition of and vulnerability to alterity. This conception of vulnerability to alterity is not a moral psychology, as is the case with, for example, Adam Smiths notion of interpersonal sympathy. It is a fundamentally ethical condition attached to human subjectivity; it is an acceptance of the Others absolute exteriority, a recognition that the other is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence. According to Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as a difference that cannot be subsumed into the same, into a totalizing conceptual system that comprehends self and Other. For relations with Others to be ethical they must therefore be nontotalizing. Rejecting ontologies that homogenize humanity, so that self-recognition is sufficient to constitute the significance of Others, Levinas locates the ethical regard as a recognition of Others as enigmatically and irreducibly other, as prior to any ontological aim of locating oneself at home in the world: The relations with the other... [ not arise within a totality nor does it establish a totality, integrating me and the other. Ontologies of integration are egoistically aimed at domesticating alterity to a frame of understanding that allows for the violent appropriation of the space of the Other :
My being in the world or my place in the sun, my being at home, have not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third-world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? 23 To be regarded ethically, the Other must remain a stranger who

disturbs the being at home with oneself. The ethical for Levinas is, in sum, a nonviolent relationship to the as infinitely other. we recall the problematic presented in chapter 5, it should be
evident within a Levinasian ethical perspective, one would, for example, accept Ward Justs perpetually enigmatic Vietnam rather than endorse Norman Schwarzkopfs domesticated version.

We cannot stand idly by . The resolution must be kritiked in order to generate any kind of solvency.
Natsu Taylor Saito 06 (prof. of law at Georgia State University College of Law, CROSSING THE LINE? EXAMINING CURRENT U.S. IMMIGRATION & BORDER POLICY: Border Constructions: Immigration Enforcement and Territorial Presumptions, The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, Winter 2007 issue, lexis nexis)
The fact that borders are sociopolitical constructs means not only that borders are constructed and capable of being changed, but that fortifying them, or even simply accepting the status quo, is a social and political choice that we make, and we remain responsible for the consequences of so choosing. We bear that responsibility whether we vigorously defend and promote enhanced border security or simply live in a state of denial, 257 refusing to take options seriously because we prefer to believe that the status quo is right, natural, and inevitable. We can, if we choose, truly have a "government of laws, and not of

men." 258 We might even find that we prefer to live in such a society, but we will only find out if we are willing to question the premises that we are continually asked to take for granted.

2AC

A2: Framework
Their framework is ethically atrocious, tying debate to the state ignores the vast majority of violence which occurs at the local level they write these indigenous struggles off the map, legitimating their destruction Shapiro, 99 (Michael, J[Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii] The Ethics
of Encounter: Unreading, Unmapping the Imperium Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 61.
For example, a recent analysis in this discursive genre, one that is both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that conflict has increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes, nevertheless has reinstalled the dominance of geopolitical thinking by remaining within its cartography and conceptual legacy. Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of intervention as a reaffirmation of a sovereignty discourse, they refer to the Persian Gulf War on the one hand and insurgencies on the other. As Bernard Nietschmann has shown, the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and unmapping geostrategic cartography of international relations, Nietschmann refers to the Third World War, which is hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map, a war in which only one side of the fighting has a name. Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann maps 120 armed struggles as part of the war. Only four of his wars involve confrontations between states; seventy-seven involve states against nations. In order to think beyond the moral boundaries constituted by a state sovereignty commitment, it is necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moral thinking and thereby grants recognition outside of modernitys dominant political identities. This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory.

Their framework is not neutral, its a tool to monopolize perspectives in debate. The state is not the natural center of politics, coding it into academic conversations blocks out the voices of oppressed groups reject this exclusion with your ballot Shapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xviii-xix)
In recent years, challenges to domestic authority structures and instabilities in global jurisdictions have highlighted inadequacies of traditional political discourses of comparative politics and international relations. It is less the case, however, that these discourses have been made invalid by changes in the political situations to which they referred than it is that their adequacy was always limited. For a while they were adequate to the legitimation needs of the dominant political forces. They contained political conversations within the problematics that served the centralizing authorities of nation-states and the dominance of states in global exchanges. Nevertheless, those involved in the productions of these discourses have largely operated with the illusion that they offer a universal perspective. They have thought of themselves as serving disinterested knowledge rather than dominant tendencies. But the official discourses of the state and their complicit academic echoes have effectively overcoded various social and cultural segments ethnicities, mobilized womens groups, indigenous peoples, and stateless tribal groups whose interests, affiliations, resistances, and actions have failed to achieve political articulation. To the extent that these affiliational groupings have appeared in mainstream political discourses, they have usually been quarantined within the administration of social problems.

What has been attenuated of late is the smugness that has attended the state power configuration. The assumption that bordered state sovereignties are the fulfillment of a historical destiny rather than a particular, and in some quarters controversial, form of political containment has been challenged. The instabilities in global units to review the partialities of the voices that have monopolized the interpretation of political identity and space and to create a discursive frame that can enunciate alternatives. To appreciate this invitation, however, it is necessary both to treat more specifically the idea of political discourse and to map the sites of alternative voices whose addresses have not appeared in the directories provided by mainstream political science disciplines. Aspects of this mapping are provided in the essays collected in this volume. What this introduction provides is a framing for what the alternative voices imply.

A2: Cap K
Perm: Do both. Our advocacy is to radically deconstruct the resolutions notion of oceanic borders. Borders have been historically been used as a tool of colonialization which has been a well-known manifestation of capitalism.
Agathangelou & Ling 04 (Anna M.[Lecturer at the University of Houston-Clear Lake and
Director of Global Change Institute], L.H.M.[ Associate Professor Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School]) Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11. International Studies Quarterly Volume 48 Issue 3 Pg. 520.
Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their significance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past to rationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the "West." George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed against America but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizational discipline against all "terror." (The Bush administration's semantic shift from "terrorism" to "terror" offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an "international coalition" against terrorism for Bush; "global jihad," for bin Laden ; and,

Representations Key
Traditional sources of foreign policy knowledge are insignificant in comparison to representations they permeate culture and shape everyday life Ferguson 1997 (Kennan; Professor of Governmental and International Affairs, University of South Florida; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 180)
To map is to designate members of social classes ( in the broadest sense of that tem), as well as national peoples, through an aesthetic discrimination in relation to others. These Heigeggerian paradigms enable a different model of the ways in which we understand foreign cultures. The traditional Kantian mentalistic direct representation(e.g., the way people are described in a text book) becomes far less important than the constitution of selves in relation to incarnations of other cultures in everyday life. The immediate and commonplace aspects of cultural itemsthe things valuedaugment relations with alterity; the artifactual is far more important than the intellectual in determining these relations. To determine the American understanding of Africa, for example, most academics study canonical texts of foreign policy like state department bulletins or administration policy statements. These are not unimportant sources, but they are insignificant and tangential to Americans common lives. More germane to the U.S. comprehension of other peoples are the aesthetic associations with them, the everyday relationships between our lives and other cultures : using African clothing styles, displaying native crafts, wearing handmade jewelry, or viewing imagery of their ways of life in National Geographic. Through these cartographic creations, ties of the world rather than the significant players in issues of international affairs. Paul Simon is thus a far more important American-international diplomat than whoever happens to the American representative to the United Nations at a particular time, because he has far more control over representations of Africanness. It is as important to examine everyday interactions with aesthetic judgments of the cultures as to study the ways those cultures are represented by disciplines like international relations.

Boundaries are formed through individual discourse. Imagining new laws delineates the proper role for individuals within society this round is key Pavalakovich-Kochi & Morehouse & Wastl-Walter, 04 (Vera [Director of the Regional
Development Program @ University of Arizona], Barbara J.[Professor of Geography at the University of Arizona], Doris PhD [Director of the Department of Geography of the University of Bern] (Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries Pg. 32-33)
As this exploration of boundaries and borderlands has emphasized, the concept of socially produced space is one of the most powerful theories at the disposal of the borderlands scholar, for the process of producing space, as played out in the regimes of knowledge that structure our world, frequently entails the drawing of boundaries. Drawing upon Foucaults idea of regimes of power, the persistent use of boundaries to produce space-and spatializing differencesuggest that the existing, spatially informed structures of power and knowledge are alive and well. Entire systems of law, in fact use boundaries as a foundation for enforcement of public and private will. It is not so much the drawing of boundaries, however, that embeds formally delineated spaces in the political, economic, and social structures of society; rather it is the reproduction of the boundaries, and the space enclosed within, through institutionalized processes, regimes of power (Keely, 1990) and the everyday actions of individuals. To carry the argument further, and assuming an active role for individual agents, it may then be observed that boundaries, as (re)produced through discrete discourses and actions, are plastic. They change in location, length, function and value depending on who is exerting greatest influence at that moment. Every decision and action that accepts the rules and functions of a given boundary reproduces that boundary. Every decision and action that challenges the boundary rules and functions also challenges the legitimacy of the boundary, for that purpose. An accretion

of challenges, as happened in former East Germany can result in the erasure of the contested boundary.

Language Key to Borders

Boundaries are powerful metaphors which allow the state to secure itself from outsiders Pavalakovich-Kochi & Morehouse & Wastl-Walter, 04 (Vera [Director of the Regional
Development Program @ University of Arizona], Barbara J.[Professor of Geography at the University of Arizona], Doris PhD [Director of the Department of Geography of the University of Bern] (Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries Pg. 33)
Boundaries, then, are perhaps best understood as rules and practices, material demarcators of edges, and barriers to flows; they are also abstract metaphors that are useful for articulating, and spatializing, concepts and perceptions of difference. Boundaries provide the edges needed to contain space and its contents, and to protect that space from outside penetration. They sever what was formerly a unitary space, regulate and filter flows, and of great importance, they provide legitimation and a material location for engaging in surveillance and enforcement.

Maps are the key entry point to understand cultural representations Casino Jr. & Hanna 06
(Vincent J. Del, Doctor of Liberal Studies and Geography California State University, Stephen P., Dept. of Geography University of Mary Washington, Beyond the Binaries: A Methodological Intervention for Interrogating Maps and Representational Practices, ACME EJournal of International Critical Cartographies, p. online)
When does the moment of map production end? At the time when the printing press stops rolling, or the crayon leaves the page, or when a yahoo map stops loading, or perhaps when the finished map is found embedded between columns two and three of the New York Times? Or, maybe, production never stops. Maybe maps are constantly produced and (re)produced as is suggested through the democratization of production in participatory GIS. Such questioning of production, however, should be accompanied by similar questions about consumption. When is a map first consumed? After it leaves the hands of its authors? Do authors not consume their own representation, see themselves in its images, reconstruct their own desires through this object, or dare we say subject? Still, many critical cartographers (Black, 1997; Harley, 1988; Harley, 1989; Harley, 1990; Wood, 1992) maintain an implicit duality between production and consumption, author and reader, object and subject, design and use, representation and practice. They still focus on how maps are produced in particular social, political, and economic contexts; or, they concentrate on the consumption and use of these particular objects in their post-production phase. Yet, maps, to borrow from Gibson (2001)2, are in state of becoming. As such, maps stretch beyond their physical boundaries; they are not limited by the paper on which they are printed or the wall upon which they might be scrawled. Each crease, fold, and tear produces a new rendering, a new possibility, a new (re)presentation, a new moment of production and consumption, authoring and reading, objectification and subjectification, representation and practice. Maps are thus not simply representations of particular contexts, places, and times. They are mobile subjects, infused with meaning through contested, complex, intertextual, and interrelated sets of socio-spatial practices. As Deleuze and Guarttari suggest, the map has multiple entryways (ibid., 12) and a myriad number of possibilities because it operates at the margin and center simultaneously. Maps are also not, as some may argue (e.g., Harley, 1989), fixed at the moment of production, a result of the hegemonic authority embedded by the mapmaker in/on the representation. Thus, while maps may be infused with power, and thus ripe for deconstruction, it is not enough to demythologize the map (c.f., Sparke, 1995). Instead, maps ought to be theorized as processes, detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant

modification. It is therefore appropriate to say that maps, as representations, work (Wood, 1992). As we contend, representations, such as maps, work because they help make connections to other representations and to other experienced spaces (Hanna et al., 2004, 464) suggesting that maps do, indeed, provide multiple entryways into how they are produced and consumed as well as how they are used, interpreted, and constituted.

A2: Representations dont Matter

Our perception of security threats is influenced by cultural forces. Examining representations is crucial to accurately understanding modern violence Dalby 98
(Simon, professor of political science, Geopolitics and Global Security: Culture, Identity, and the pogo syndrome, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.295-309) Most cultural identities include a crucial ethnocentric formulation in their celebrations of the value of being a we. In their formulations of security problems as caused by Others, what is silenced is that possibility that, the Walt Kelly cartoon character Pogos famous formulation, the enemy is us. I irreverently call this the POGO syndrome because it suggests that the security problematic can eb understodd in geopolitical term as the persistence of (P)olitical (O)rganizations to (G)enerate (O)thers! A sensitivity to these processes is crucial to the further understanding of the contradictions in the policies of global security premised on an uncritical adoption of the identities of modernity. The appellation global does not provide an exception to these matters, however, fondly some practitioners of the term might hope that is assigns them the universal more high ground. Modern geopolitical practices of division, administration and rule are intrinsically violent; the popular representations of Others are part the unsettling answer (Alexander 1996). So too is the implication that intellectual property rights, exerpt knowledge and the finer points of the World Trade Organizations practices may be the most important focal point for a consideration of many of the practical causes of global insecurity. None of this is to deny that there are many dangers in the modern world, or that violence is an unfortunate fact of political life that cannot be ignored. But it makes a huge difference how such matters are represented, who is defined as a threat to what geopolitical entity and the how the possibilities for political action are defined (Dalby 1996a). Getting beyond the current formulations of global security will require reconsiderations of the modern geopolitical identities whose consumption can be secured by this technical expertise. It requires a recognition that the simplifications of geopolitical representations are usually an important part of the practices that make violence possible. By asking questions about the production of geopolitical representations that portray the poor and the marginal as threats to the affluent, critical geopolitics makes the crucial point that conceptualizing matters in terms of global priorities, as current discourses so frequently do, elides the specific contexts of insecurities and obscures the causal dimensions of contemporary violence. Which is why this chapter concludes with the POGO syndrome: It emphasizes the importance of understandig identity as problematic and potentially self-destructive. It also points to the intellectual necessity of distancing oneself from ones fondest-held fears to look again at ones identity in the light of its being rendered strange.

A2: Borders/Exclusion Non-UQ

Exclusion has always existed but that doesnt make it inevitable the plans attempt to contrive community through totalizing knowledge is part of the problem Dillon 99 (Michael J.[ Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster]) The Scandal of the Refugee,". Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 106-107.
Because the constitution of any social group or political community is a matter of the exercise of inclusions and exclusions does not mean that one set of inclusions and exclusions is the same as any other. Nor is it true that because there have always been people who have been outcasts we can legitimately concentrate on the native and the home, and thus forget about the stranger and the outside. On the contrary the we is integrally related, because formed by, this relationship with the alien. Given the horrors inflicted on the alien, it is understandable, indeed almost orthodox, to deny difference and urgently champion an all-encompassing inclusion so as to mitigate or eradicate the terrors of exclusion.

A2: No Alternative
Alternative forms of mapping exist indigenous peoples of America had dynamic pictures rather than fetishizing imaginary lines Shapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 138)
As a result of all three essays in this section, we are able to see global space as ambiguous, contested, and temporally unstable. Modern maps are wholly inadequate to such comprehensions. Ironically , the maps of various tribes of indigenous peoples of the Americas, peoples whom the conquering Europeans failed to recognize as coherent cultures, were dynamic rather than static. They included pictorial narratives that demonstrated the contested history of spaces rather than fetishizing victories with the fixed jurisdictional lines common to present maps. The essays in this section are functional equivalents of such indigenous cartographies, for they render mobile, fragile, and contestable what traditional political discourses tend to naturalize, pacify and dehistoricize.

Mapping is not natural, its an attempt to encode natural human flows and enforce the domain of states this can be challenged Ferguson 1997 (Kennan; Professor of Governmental and International Affairs, University of South Florida; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 170)
Antithetical to codings, argue Deluze and Guattari, are flows. Capital, cultures, identities, human bodies all flow over the surface of the earth in assorted ways and at various speeds. Each is motile, and each resists the inscriptions that states want and need to force upon them. Nomads follow and exhaust flows; the socius tries to capture and contain them(148). Society codes imposing meanings to control and delimit these flows (185). Mappings are forms of overcoding cultures, of trying to freeze them to whatever can serve as an anchor. Territorialization, in other words is the attempt to control, limit and affix meaning to flows .

A2: Advocacy causes Violence

Even if our advocacy still allows political violence, it will always be less extremegenocide is only possible in the world of the aff Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 202)
In the case of ethnography, we find a practice that is close to a con stituent element in Levinass idea of ethics, the need for a proximity beyond distancing modes of representation. Investigators who have combined a philosophical and an ethnographic interest have noted that in contrast to modern industrialized societies, various tribal peoples have practiced a radically nonrepresentational mode of encounter with alterity. For example, speaking of the Hurons of the seventeenth century as represented in the writings of the French Jesuits, Michael Pomedli dis cerned what he calls an excursive rather than a discursive approach to Others. As I noted in chapter 2, instead of appropriating alterity to a preexisting discursive system, the Hurons closed the distance through practices of incorporationadopting, consuming/eating, and so on. While the Hurons certainly practiced extreme violencecruel tor tures and killings of enemy/Othersat the same time they resisted a certain violence of representation, thereby perhaps avoiding the more totalizing or genocidal forms of violence that more representationally oriented cultures have practiced on Others whom they have identified, within their cartographic and narrative frames, as less worthy of moral solicitude.

Advoccy Solves Ethnic Violence

Recognizing a multiplicity of identity within the state opens up political association and resolves inter-group violence Rygiel 98
(Kim, no quals given, Stablizing Boarders: Geopolitics of national identity construction in Turkey, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.106-124) I have argued that the twentieth-century geopolitical practices by which states like Turkey construct their national identity and delineate borders have produced a politics hostile to diversity. State building and the reproduction of national identity depend upon silencing differences such as ethnicity and gender within the polity. They also depend upon envisioning space as something that can be homogenized and bounded, and is ultimately linked to territory. While homogenizing space is an integral part of defining and reproducing a unified national identity, homogenizing national identity also becomes an important strategy for strengthening territorial jurisdiction. This politics is today, more than ever, a dangerous politics around which to organize, since globalization brings greater movement and interaction between cultures and peoples. Students of the social sciences need to rethink geopolitics to find a more preaceful way to live with difference. In the introduction, two ways of envisioning the nation were presented. The alternative vision of society described by Yasar Kemal, in which multiple identities share space, needs to be given careful consideration. Implementing this alternative vision requires resisting notions of homogeneous identity and space so integral to present forms of state governance. Rethinking space, for example, might begin with Michael Shapiros observation that states, and many nations within states have residual aspects of cultural alterity within them. Such aspects of difference cannot be resummoned by redrawing geographical boundaries; they exist as invisible forms of internal otherness. Every practice which strengthens boundaries produces new modes of marginalized difference (1994: 496). Living more peacefully with difference therefore requires relaxing the spatial imperatives of the order (ibid: 499). Rethinking identity, on the other hand, might begin by accepting Kemals vision of the state as a place where a thousand cultures grow. Rather than viewing the state as bounded territory that contains an unproblematic, fixed, homogeneous identity, we might recognize that identities are always unfixed, contested, multiple and hybrid. By hybrid, I refer to the fluid and historically and discursively constructed nature of identity, the observation made by Edward Said, who wrote Partly because of empire, all cultures are involved in one another, none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic (1993: xxv). In other words, rather than pitting identities against one another, we might regard identities as mutually constitutive, the national state identity defined in relation to a range of other ethnic, cultural and gender identities. For Turkey, this means acknowledging that multiple identities do exist and the Kurds may identify themselves as both Turkish citizens and as Kurdish. Moreover, it means seeing Kurdish not as something different and antithetical to Turkish identity but rather as an identity that, while different, is deeply connected to the history of the peoples living in the region and to the history of Turkey. The histories and cultures of the carious ethnic groups are too intertwined with ine another to be separated by simple notions of distinct bounded communities or policies that try to purify the group, whether on part of the state or by the PKK.

A2: Realism Good

[1/2] Realism is not neutral, its an intellectual construct maintained by the U.S. to close off other alternatives acting as if were a unified nation-state causes uncritical foreign policy based on us-them dichotomies that recreate violence. George 1997 (Jim; International Relations Lecturer, Australian National University; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 65)
In this way the sovereign state (the U.S.A.) can be understood to have constructed its global identity in terms of the discourse of anarchy and danger external to it. Its foreign policy, consequently, is accorded an irreducible logic that privileges the theory and practice of power politics in its efforts to respond to the anarchical world it must control for the sake of systemic order. Similarly, a hierarchy of meaning and relevance is established that expunges from the legitimate analytical task questions concerning the internal self and all matters of interpretive ambiguity concerning the self/Other, identity/difference theme. But, Campbell insists, these are questions that must be explored if we are not to further close off the possibilities for sensitive and more appropriate foreign policy in the future. Most importantly, the United States must begin to critically reflect upon itself, to reflect that is identity, framed in relation to danger between states in an anarchical world, is part of a much larger regime of discursive framing concerned with the disciplining of dangers within the state. Understood in these terms, of course, the Cold War can be understood not as the only realistic response to anarchical necessity but as a disciplina ry strategy that was global in scope but national in design. More precisely the Cold War and orthodox readings of it can be understood as another site at which the anarchy problematique was invoked to provide a sovereign, foundational presence from which the threat of (internal) difference and Otherness could be rendered unified and controllable.

Realism is out of date, ideas and people circulate through national borders, reasserting the state causes violent reactionary movements Connolly 1997 (William E.; Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 144)
This series of correspondences between people, territory, state, unity, freedom, and legitimacy has been fractured in recent centuries through the international commerce of people, things, and ideas, but it has yet to be reconfigured significantly in either the dominant theories of politics circulating through western states or in the political cultures prevailing in them. In fact, the accelerated circulation of people, communications, cultural dispositions, things, and currencies across state boundaries often fosters reactive movements of nationalism and fundamentalism that are extremely violent toward heterogeneity inside and outside their regimes. Evidence of the violence in these inscriptions keeps returning, even in the etymology of territory. Territory, the Oxford English Dictionary says, is presumed by most moderns to derive from terra. Terra means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium, solid, fading off into indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the OED says, suggests that it derives from terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And territorium is a a place from which people are warned. Perhaps these two occupy a territory is to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. Territory is land occupied by violence.

[2/2] Even if realism is good the plan is still bad intervention assumes the U.S. knows the will of other people better than themselves, this results in state failures

Brickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch in 07 (Ed. Christopher J. Brikerton, Philip Cunliffe and
Alexander Gourevitch. Politics without sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations. University College London Press(UCLP). 2007 pg. 100) The fact, therefore, that sovereignty is something abstracted from society does not mean that it can be mechanically severed from society by an external agency, and then grafted back on. To reconstitute sovereignty in this way is to vitiate the entire process by which political will is formed within society. With the intervention of external forces and agencies into the process of shaping state institutions, politics and sovereignty become ever more mediated, more abstract and more distant from the immediate concerns of the members of the society in question . The institution of sovereignty is replaced by an alternative network of internationalized relations in which the liberties and interests of citizens are no longer the essential foundation of political order . One of the most explicit examples of this is the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self -Government in Kosovo, a document that outlined political arrangements in the province after the 2001 elections. What is remarkable about the Framework is that it is among the first constitutional documents (though tellingly in itself, not a constitution) in modern political history, whose preamble explicitly relegates the will o f the people to only one among a number of factors that will be taken into consideration by the UN officials administering the province. To relativize the will of the people in such a way denudes the end products of state-building of their political content; namely, the people as sovereign. It is this external mediation of the process of political creation that gives state-building its fragile and contingent character. State-building is erecting institutions with few social or political foundations. It is unsurprising therefore, that state-building constantly recreates politically dependent administrations, in need of international support to survive. This is the meaning of state-building as state failure. Having outlined the internal contradictions of contemporary state-building, we must now turn to the historical process through which external support came to be seen as a vital prop to domestic order. A critical examination of the concept of state failure will act as the bridge to cross from the logical analysis of the contradictions of state-building to grasping the historical emergence of state-building in international politics. State-building has emerged as a specific response to a concrete historical phenomenon, namely the exhaustion of post-colonial independence in many developing countries an issue addressed in the theory of state failure.

States are constantly contested, but this is never shown on the geopolitical map a state-centric vision is maintained through constant violence Shapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xx)
The political consolidations represented by the state territorial map the international imaginary -- were achieved through violent confrontations . Moreover, although space appears innocent, the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupied and used, and haas already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not alwys evident in the land scape, it remains contested. The violence continues as states attempt, physically and discursively, to marginalize or destroy various aspects of centrifugal otherness: ethnic solidarities, reasserted nationalisms, indigenous movements, and draft resistances, all dissonant elements proclaiming the tenuous hold of states over territories and identities. Although these affronts to the state system do not appear on standard territorial maps or within the conceptual spaces of modernitys dominant political discourses, the challenges they pose have become increasingly registered as the former stabilities of the bordered world become more fragile and states react to reassert control.

A2: Borders Good

Borders are used to impose a euro-centric vision of the nation-state their uncritical acceptance causes them to be applied where they dont work Xenos 1997 (Nicholas; Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 238-239)
The political upheavals that generated the movement of peoples at the beginning of this century were phenomena associated with the consolidation not of states but of nation-states. That is, the modern state, with a few important exceptions, is an association that claims not only territorial integrity but also a specific national identity. In this claim, the French nation state has been the archetype. The notion of sovereignty had been applied since at least the sixteenth century in debates over the power of the emerging state and its relation ship to multiple competing sources of power within European societies, debates that were bound up with among other things, questions of religious toleration. It was in Catholic France, however, that a sea change occurred in June 1789 when the representatives of the Third Estate, in what amounted to a coup detat, declared themselves the National Assembly. The full import of this move became apparent two months later when, in the Third Article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, it was asserted that the source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. In one stroke, t he National Assembly had shifted the battle lines for the control of state power to the terrain of national identity: henceforward, those who were able to impose their version

of who the nation was could claim to represent the national will and to direct the state. Aristocrats, the clergy, the monarchy, and anyone deemed in opposition to the revolution, including virtually the entire population of the Vendee, were among those who were at one time or another written off the roles of national membership.

The development of the nation-state in accord with the French model came to be all about borders. These demarcations were inscribed both on maps and in the souls of citizens. The nation-state had to have its territorial identity marked off against other nation-states without as well as against the others within, those whose physical presence within the mapped borders belied an alien identity. The French Revolution thus had to fight wars on two fronts. Along the internal borders, first the Reign of Terror and then the levee en masse helped to create an usle peopledoing battle with themthe aristos and their brethren. State-directed festivals and, later, educational uniformity also contributed to the purposive construction of a national identity. Preservation of the nations spatial territory meant an aggressive war against real or imagined threats beyond geographical contingencies that began to take on a new significancethe Pyrenees, the Alps, The Rhine, or the Channel. The Sometimes paradoxical result of these wars to defend the sovereign nation and its state was the stimulation of newly discovered national identities elsewhere in Europe (and, to the horror of the metropolitan French nation, in Haiti). Out of the French revolutionary experience was born the nineteenth-century pattern of nations looking for their states (Italy, Greece, Germany, Hungary). This pattern reached its apogee in the aftermath of World War I, when the idea of the sovereign nationstate was codified in the peace treaties, only the old pattern was asked to solve problems for which it had not been cut.

Borders are a recent creation of European colonialism which now underpin global violence Agathangelou & Ling 04 (Anna M.[Lecturer at the University of Houston-Clear Lake and
Director of Global Change Institute], L.H.M.[ Associate Professor Graduate Program in International Affairs at The New School]) Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire from September 11. International Studies Quarterly Volume 48 Issue 3 Pg. 520.
Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics. Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but their significance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999). Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the

spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonization proceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past to rationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the "West." George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed against America but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizational discipline against all "terror." (The Bush administration's semantic shift from "terrorism" to "terror" offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaders transgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an "international coalition" against terrorism for Bush; "global jihad," for bin Laden ; and,

A2: Hegemony Good

[1/2] U.S. hegemony relies on ever-increasing speed and destructiveness in combat, its endpoint is the state as imperial killing machine Tuathail 98 (Gearoid O. professor of political science, Post Modern Geopolitics?: The
Modern geopolitical imagination and beyond, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.16-34)
Responding to threats which are potentially everywhere, the US military is now organized around two central strategic concepts: overseas presence and power projection. Overseas presence is the stationing of US military forces throughout the globe as well as the development of alliances with loval and regional forces, the pre-positioning of equipment in certain sites, and the maintenance of a routine program of air, ground, and naval deployments across the surface of the planet. Power projections is the ability of the US military to organize the various elements of its overseas presence into coherent, C412ized, multi-option, fighting force. It involves strategic mobilization and mobility with information coordination, speed, and flexibility fundamental to its operation. Swift, flexible, power projection as a fast geopolitics buys time for liberal politics (Luke and O Tuathail 1998): the ability to project tailored forces through rapid, strategic mobility gives national leaders additional time for consultation and increased options in response to potential crises and conflicts (Joint Chiefs of Staff1995: 7). The logic of this strategy is the annihilation of space by military speed-machines in order to create flexible decision time in dromological crisis situations. Its institutional consequence is the restructuring of the US military as a globe-spanning collective of networks manned by cyborgs dedicated to spacedestroying speed. This is described in the US military doctrine as strategic mobility enhancement, its four components and imperatives being increased airlift capability, additional pre-positioning of heavy equipment afloat and ashore, increased surge capacity of our sealift, and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force (ibid: 7). Liberalism gives us our cyborgian way of life for the our here is thoroughly cyborgian. With collectives and cyborgs so obviously a part of the theorization and practice of geopolitics at the end of the twentieth century, the contrast foregrounded by question 5 is an unacknowledged and under theorized one (see Delanda 1991). Critical geopoliticians need to begin to recognize the pervasive yet unproblematized presence and anonymous functioning of collectives of humans and nonhumans in world politics (Luke 1997). Contemporary geopolitics obviously gives life and sustenance to military collectives and their networks, but do the networks of everyday collectives have secret geopolitical lives? Follow, Latour-style, our automobile network for just a short connection and we quickly encounter the very military nets we have just described and many other geopolitical quasi-objects and quasi-subjects: oil tankers, the House of Saud, autocyborgs, Fordism, petrol pump politics, George Bush, the Nigerian military, dromomechanics, Exxon, aircraft carriers, polluted beaches, and dying forests. What strange forms of life are revealed by Japanese transplants, strategic chokepoints, and whats good for GM or Exxon is good for America? Proceed further into the network and one encounters the transcendent cyborg creature, Hydrocarbon Man and his megamachine dromocracy, the Occidental Petroleum Worshipping Collective, a developed, voracious, and accelerating form of life that reacts primitively and violently to any threat, real or imagined, to its speedscapes and lifelines (Virilio 1995). Track the automobile actor-network and the Gulf War and many other wars soon reveal themselves (Yergin 1991). The Network collective lives and expands as it kills and depletes. Some conscientious cyborgs within the collective can protest about its poisonous effects on what they still imagine is nature and the human habitat, but none will ever be powerful enough to control or dismantle the collective (Luke 1996a). It has us rather than us having it. It gives us its geopolitics.

[2/2]

U.S. hegemony is based on an imperial delusion that our dominance is historically ordained avoiding global conflict becomes an excuse to oppress minorities Shapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xv-xvi)
Jim Georges essay also is addressed to a current situation in which discursive control is contentious. He notes that the distribution of discursive assets has been shifting, for the traditional hierarchical rituals of global power relations are no longer controlling the agenda. To develop the implications of this idea at the level of discourse, he summons a remark by Czech President Vaclav Havel, who has noted that the U.S. strategic elite is now deluded in thinking that it has the capacity to explain and control everything that exists. This elite has been used to hearing nothing but its own voice, articulation its own problematics. Because the United States had operated from a relatively uncontested frame of reference, it, along with the powerful political units that shaped first the colonial world and then the postcolonial, Cold War world, functioned within a delusional political narrative. It imagined itself as a part of a story in which its dominance in the world order is a historic destiny and a utopian end to global political forms. This political imaginary has been nowhere more apparent than in two very well entrenched domains of political science analysis in the West. One is political psychology and the other comparative politics. Both subdisciplines, which took shape in the aftermath of World War II, selected as their constituting frame the avoidance of another Adolf Hitler. In the case of political psychology what was enjoined was a search for the fascist personality, understood to be a deviant type susceptible to authoritarian impulses or appeals. This search resulted in, among other canons in political psychology, the authoritarian personality studies of Thodor W. Adorno and his associates, Milton Rokeachs work on open versus closed minds, and H.G. Eysencks addition of a tender-minded versus tough-minded axis of opinion to the study of political ideology. In the case of comparative politics, the study of political parties has been dominated by a fear of instability and, accordingly, a disparagement of those multiparty systems that allow for the aggregation of extreme or marginalized voices and interests. Those visible eruptions of discontent that do not operate through party politics have become social movements, the analysis of which has tended to operate within psychologizing rather than politicizing frames. A safe civic culture, one that would never allow a Hitler to emerge, must have structural impediments to the articulation of extreme appeals in the political process. Such was the anxiety of the imperial center as it produced many of the conceptual commitments of post war political science.

Impacts

Wars! Impact
The affirmation of a collectivized identity is the basis for antagonism and violence. Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 173)
The second insight derives from Maclntyres various demonstrations that the intelligibility of action is dependent on its location within a nar rative with historical depth. Using the metaphor of the theatrical char acter, he argues that as individual agents we are at best only coauthors of our narratives: We enter upon a stage which we did not design... [ we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making? Mac- - Intyres recognition of the centrality of narrative goes a long way toward avoiding the empty abstractions that analytic philosophys model of the self produces in its commitment to universal, contextless bases for judg ment. However, he fails to recognize the depth and contentiousness of the narrative aspect of identity. And his spatial imaginary is too narrow, for it is focused on the immediate location of the speech act rather than the complex set of boundaries and divisionswhether consensual or contentiousthat constitute the order as a whole. Seeking to restore an Aristotelian basis for virtue, Maclntyre treats narratives in terms of their forward aims, their projections toward a future world. This teleological frame obscures what is at once more basic and more contestable in the narrative context of the actor. While it is the case that, at the level of im mediate public intelligibility, peoples actions take on much of their sig nificance through the temporal extension of stories, which help justify the goals of the actions, it is also the case that actions participate in other kinds of stories; they belong to people in the sense that they reaffirm who they are, where they are, and how it is that they have become part of an assemblage or a people in a collective sense. The identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person (e.g., Jew versus Arab, native versus immigrant) and that te-rritorialize identities (e.g., resident versus nomad, citizen versus foreigner) are the foundations for histori cal and contemporary forms of antagonism, violence, and interpretive contention over the meaning of actions.

Boundaries of identity pit groups against each other leading to violence and territorial struggles. Shapiro, 99 (Michael, J[Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii] The Ethics
of Encounter: Unreading, Unmapping the Imperium Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 59.
The identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person-man versus woman, national citizen versus nomad, one versus another ethnicity, and so on-provide the foundations for historical and contemporary forms of antagonism, violence and interpretive contention over the meaning of actions. For example, to be a member of a particular tribe, ethnicity, or nation, a person must be located in a particular genealogical and spatial story. Such stories precede any particular action aimed at a future and provoke much of the contestation over claims to territory and entitlement to collective recognition. They are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility and tend to escape explicit contentiousness within ongoing political and ethical discourses. To produce an ethics responsive to contestations over identity and the spatial stories upon which structures of recognition rest, it is necessary to disrupt the dominant practices of intelligibility.

We have to reject borders to ethnically address others and prevent violence Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 34)
What is involved in reopening the book? The most important step is to get out of the historically and ethically impoverished. As the geopolitical map was formed out of violent confrontations, state boundaries developed and cultural ones were effaced. As a result, states ai nations within states have residual aspects of cultural alterity witl Such aspects of difference cannot be

resummoned by redrawing geographical bound aries, for they exist as invisible forms of internal, otherness. Every boundary-firming practice will simply produce new modes of marginal ized difference. It is therefore necessary, as Homi Bhabha states it, to change the treatment of difference. . . from the boundary outside to its finitude 10k The production of a geography within which marginalized peoples can be recognized and accorded political status and moral solicitude requires both a resistance to state system maps that deny otherness within and narrative recoveries that add temporal depth to the global map.

Imperialism! Impact
Western Cartography is used to control knowledge and suppress minorities Johnson, Louis, & Pramono 06
(Jay, Dept of Geography U of Hawaii, Renee Pualani, Dept of Geography U of Hawaii, Albertus Hadi, Dept of Geography U of Hawaii. Facing the Future: Encouraging Critical Cartographic Literacies in Indigenous Communities, ACME E-Journal of International Critical Cartographies, p. online) Encouraging critical cartographic literacy will entail, as Freires critical consciousness work has demonstrated, the development of an awareness of cartographys role in dispossessing Indigenous communities of land and resources. Harley observes that maps were the first step in the appropriation of territory. Such visualizations from a distance became critical in choreographing the Colonial expansion of early modern Europe (1992b: 532). Western cartography served European imperialism through acts of geographic violence, by renaming, reframing and controlling the space of the colony (Turnbull, 1998: 17; Mitchell, 1988). The maps produced in the colonial expansion of North America described a bounded land, controlled by coordinates of latitude and longitude, whose silences described a land without the encumbrance of the Indians (Harley and Laxton, 2001: 187). The colonial map asserted the external centralized power of the state to dominate its territory and expanded the judicial control out toward the blank spaces of the Indigenous nations (Harley and Laxton, 2001). The power that Western cartography asserts is not only though the power of the external judicial control of the metropole over the colony, it is also the internal power asserted by the cartographer over the knowledge of the world made available to people in general (Harley and Laxton, 2001: 112). The conventional signs, rules and specifications of Western cartography serve not only to dominate the landscape, they also serve to control the way in which we envision and represent the landscape. As surely as the lands of Indigenous communities have been appropriated through the labor of the surveyor and cartographer, so the way in which Indigenous peoples view the world has been influenced by the standardization and universalizing nature of Western cartographic knowledge. It is this colonization of the processes of making the world known through the standardized knowledge system of Western cartography which has colonized the cartographic traditions of non-Western peoples (see Turnbull, 1998).

Patriarchy! Impact
The image of borders forecloses the consideration of underrepresented groups. This upholds a system of politics that favors white, western males and cannot resolve global problems Anne Orford, 1996. (Lecturer, Faculty of Law, The Australian National University. A
SYMPOSIUM ON REENVISIONING THE SECURITY COUNCIL: ARTICLE: THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. Winter, 1996 University of Michigan Law School. Ln)

A related assumption is that state borders exist to protect citizens from the disordered and chaotic world which exists outside those borders. Ann Tickner suggests that historically, the identity of states has been closely tied to their role as national security providers. Given the assumption that threats are in the external realm, a sound national security policy demands that states try to increase their capabilities and enhance their power, the most important component of which is military power. 99 Today, the image of strong impermeable borders is presented in a nostalgic way in mainstream international relations and international law texts, where commentators talk of the new and frightening interdependence of global communities and the fact that we are all less secure because borders are now perceived as incapable of protecting us from unregulated flows of refugees, environmental degradation, or nuclear devastation. 100 Yet for many individuals, the model of safety and unity inside strong state borders, and anarchy and difference outside, has never represented reality. The dominant model distracts attention from the conditions of insecurity which define existence for many groups within Western states, including women, indigenous peoples, the mentally ill, gay men, lesbians, and ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. For the members of those groups, the existence of strong state borders simply does not come close to guaranteeing security, or even survival. In that sense, it could be said that many subjects of Western democracies have always been "beyond the sovereign state." More importantly for my analysis, the model itself is implicated in the form of creation of conditions of insecurity for women and other marginalized groups, both concretely and ideologically. The focus on creating a strong state, with increased military and economic power, contributes to the conditions which create women's insecurity in Western cultures, and masks the material and ideological conditions which should be addressed to guarantee women's security. 102 [*398]