Martin Kusch

Disagreement and Picture in Wittgenstein's "Lectures on Religious Belief"

1. Introduction

In 1938 in Cambridge, Wittgenstein gave a lecture course on belief. One art of the course discussed religious belief. !he lecture notes of three students "ho attended this art#$ush $hees, %oric& 'm(thies and )ames !a(lor#"ere later *com iled* and ublished b( C(ril +arrett '. ). under the title *,ectures on $eligious +elief* -. LRB/ in the 1900 volume Wittgenstein: Lectures & Conversations.1 LRB is difficult to understand. It is hard to ma&e out a central, overall train of thought1 the te2t is fragmentar(1 man( sentences are incom lete and un3grammatical1 and it is occasionall( unclear "hether a given assage summarises Wittgenstein4s vie"s or those of one of the students. !he fact that +arrett leaves the rinci les of his editing unstated further com licates the situation. It thus is eas( to agree "ith Cora 5iamond that in LRB "e see Wittgenstein4s osition onl( *through a &ind of fog*. 6 7 te2t of this &ind is bound to give rise to conflicting inter retations. In this a er, I shall ut for"ard and defend a ne" reading of m( o"n. It can be summarised in five claims8 -1/ 9or LRB there is no incommensurabilit( bet"een religious and ordinar( discourses. -6/ LRB allo"s that a non3believer can understand, "ithout converting, the ro ositional attitude, and the content, of religious belief. -3/ 7ccording to LRB, a non3 believer can criticise religious believers8 first, on the basis of the standards of the religion in :uestion1 second, on the basis of shared general rinci les -e.g. that self3dece tion is to be avoided/1 and, third, on the basis of rinci les not shared "ith the believer. -;/ LRB rules out, ho"ever, that a non3believer can criticise the ro ositional attitude of religious belief rel(ing on standards that the non3believer and the believer have in common. 7nd finall( -</, for the Wittgenstein of LRB, a =relativism of distance> is a ermissible

res onse to the lac& of common standards bet"een the believer and the non3believer "hen the ver( a ro riateness of having attitudes of religious belief is at issue.

2. Disagreement Lost

Consider "hat one might call *the standard model* of a straightfor"ard disagreement and its hiloso hical rendering. )ones sa(s8 =I believe Wiener 'chnit?el tastes good.> 7nd 'mith re lies8 =I believe Wiener 'chnit?el tastes bad.> !he standard anal(sis tells us that )ones and 'mith have ic&ed out the same ro osition -Wiener Schnitzel tastes good 1 that the( both have the same ro ositional attitude of !elie"1 but that )ones affirms the ver( ro osition that 'mith denies. Our e2am le can also serve as an instance of a disagreement that is *faultless*. It is natural to thin& that in forming their res ective beliefs about Wiener 'chnit?el, neither )ones nor 'mith need to have made a mista&e. 7fter all, "e are, b( and large, comfortable "ith the thought of different, e:uall( acce table, standards of taste. 7 relativism of taste has a lot of initial lausibilit(. @eedless to sa(, in other areas "e are less "illing to countenance relativistic ossibilities. 7ssume that )ones asserts *I believe that 08A<B.16<*, and 'mith re lies *I believe that 08A<B.<*. !o most of us, this does not loo& li&e a faultless disagreement. If b( *A* 'mith means addition, then the disagreement is not faultless. 7nd if b( *A* 'mith refers to some other mathematical function, then he does not disagree "ith )ones. With these reliminaries out the "a(, "e can turn to the case that matters most for LRB. 7ssume )ones utters -a/ and 'mith -b/8

-a/ I believe there "ill be a ,ast )udgement. -b/ I believe there "onCt be a ,ast )udgement.

I sus ect that most of us "ould be inclined to thin& that )ones and 'mith disagree and that their disagreement is not faultness. Dnter the Wittgenstein of LRB. Ee confesses not to have the belief e2 ressed b( -a/. Ee goes on to insist that not having the belief e2 ressed b( -a/ does not commit him to having the belief e2 ressed b( -b/. 7nd he concludes that he does not disagree#at least not in an( standard sense of disagreement#"ith the believer "ho utters -a/8

'u

ose that someone believed in the ,ast )udgement, and I don4t, does this mean osite to him, Fust that there "on4t be such a thingG I "ould sa(8

that I believe the o

*not at all, or not al"a(s.= ... *5o (ou contradict the manG* I4d sa(8 *@o.*3

Wh( does Wittgenstein thin& that not having the belief e2 ressed b( -a/ does not commit him to having the belief e2 ressed b( -b/G #rima "acie Wittgenstein seems to give t"o Fustifications. !he first turns on the idea of t"o different uses of *believe* and thus on the idea of t"o different ro ositional belief3attitudes. !he second Fustification a ears to focus on Wittgenstein4s difficulties in gras ing the ro ositional content of -a/, and thus focus on his difficulties in understanding the meaning of the term *,ast )udgement*. I shall no" develo both o tions in a little more detail. LRB distinguishes bet"een *ordinar(* and *e2traordinar(* uses of *belief*, and thus bet"een ordinar( and e2traordinar( belief3 attitudes. Ordinar( belief3attitudes are found in em irical and scientific beliefs1 e2traordinar( belief3attitudes are characteristic of religious beliefs.; LRB allo"s that one and the same ro osition#for instance, that there $ill !e a Last %udgment#can serve as the ro ositional content for both an e2traordinar( and for an ordinar( belief3attitude8 *... eo le "ho ... ma&e forecasts for (ears and (ears ahead1 and the( describe some sort of )udgement 5a(. . . . HsuchI belief ... "ouldn4t at all be a religious belief.< Wittgenstein dra"s his students4 attention to five central features of ordinar( beliefs. 9irst, *o inion*, *vie"*, or *h( othesis* are ever(da( "ords for ordinar( beliefs. 'econd,

ordinar( beliefs can be measured as more or less reasonable, that is, as more or less "ell su orted b( evidence. !hird, mere ordinar( beliefs com are unfavourabl( "ith

&no"ledge. !he rational erson "ill usuall( aim to obtain the evidence needed for turning his ordinar( belief into &no"ledge. 9ourth, *I am not sure*, or * ossibl(* are often a ro riate res onses to someone else4s e2 ression of an ordinar( belief. 7nd fifth, ordinar( beliefs do not normall( have the o"er to ma&e us change our lives.0 D2traordinar( beliefs differ from ordinar( beliefs in all these res ects. *9aith* and *dogma* rather than *o inion* and *h( othesis* are the non3technical terms commonl( used for e2traordinar( beliefs1 e2traordinar( beliefs are not on the scale of being confirmed or falsified b( em irical evidence1 although e2traordinar( beliefs are the *firmest* of all beliefs, the( are not candidates for &no"ledge1 the( are tied to strong emotions and ictures1 the( guide eo le4s life1 and their e2 ression can be the

culmination of a form of life.B Wittgenstein sa(s sur risingl( little regarding connections and com arisons bet"een ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs. What he does mention is that the t"o &inds of beliefs have entirel( different connections, and that in the case of other cultures "e might find it difficult to se arate ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs from each other. Ee also notes that an e2traordinar( belief can bloc& or overturn even a ver( "ell su orted -=indubitable>/

ordinar( belief. +ut he sa(s nothing on the :uestion "hether there is a common core for, or similarities or inferential lin&s bet"een, the t"o uses of =belief>. 8 !o sum u , Wittgenstein4s first e2 lanation for "h( he cannot contradict the religious believer "ho utters -a/ -. I believe that there "ill be a ,ast )udgement/ is the follo"ing. -a/ involves the ro ositional attitude of e2traordinar( belief. Wittgenstein does not have this attitude in his re ertoire of ro ositional attitudes. Moreover, if *believe* in -b/ -. I believe that there "on4t be a ,ast )udgement/ is ta&en as ordinar( belief, then -b/ does not contradict -a/. Jsing the non3technical terms for the t"o t( es of attitudes, -a/ becomes -aK/ and -b/ -bK/8

-aK/ I have faith that there "ill be a ,ast )udgement. -bK/ I have the h( othesis that there "onCt be ...

Wittgenstein holds that someone could coherentl( have both the belief e2 ressed b( -aK/ and the belief e2 ressed -bK/. I no" turn to the second e2 lanation for "h( Wittgenstein feels unable to contradict the believer in a ,ast )udgement. Lrevious inter reters have seen this e2 lanation as central. On this account, Wittgenstein is unable to ic& out the ro ositional contents of religious beliefs since he cannot translate religious language into his o"n. Lut differentl(, the languages of the believer and the non3believer are, in im ortant res ects, incommensurable. !here is some su ort for such a reading in the te2t. Wittgenstein sa(s that he *has no

thoughts* about &e( religious themes, or that he lac&s the believers * ictures*. !he later oint is ertinent here since LRB also stresses that it is religious ictures that give religious terms their meaning.9 @evertheless, in "hat follo"s I shall argue that ultimatel( LRB is not endorsing the incommensurabilit( ro osal. !he onl( reason "h( Wittgenstein is rinci all( unable to disagree -in the standard sense of disagreement/ "ith the believer in the ,ast )udgement is that Wittgenstein lac&s e2traordinar( belief3attitudes. +ut this lac& does not revent him from learning the meaning of religious language. !he &e( tool in this underta&ing is grammatical investigation. 7s a result Wittgenstein is able to ic& out the ro ositional content to"ards "hich the believer ta&es the attitude of e2traordinar( belief.

&' Con"licting Inter(retations I: )he *eaning o" Religious )erms

!he best3&no"n advocate of an incommensurabilit( thesis regarding Wittgenstein4s vie"s on religion is of course Kai @ielsen. 1M I shall discuss @ielsen4s *fideist* reading later in this a er. 7t this oint it seems more instructive to focus on C(ril +arrett4s Wittgenstein

on +thics and Religious Belie" -1991/ and Nenia 'chOnbaumsfeld4s , Con"usion o" S(heres -6MMB/.11 @either of them a(s attention to the distinction bet"een "hat I have called the *first* and the *second e2 lanation* above. +oth concentrate on the *second*. +arrett and 'chOnbaumsfeld hold that for Wittgenstein religious language involves a *reorientation* of ordinar( language. Moreover, the( im l( that the non3believer can come to gras the meaning of religious language onl( b( converting. 7nd the( suggest that the non3believer suffers from a &ind of conce tual as ect3blindness. +arrett "rites that for *a believer Hreligious termsI have a meaning that transcends ordinar( em lo(ment of language ...*16 Ee goes on to as& "hether the non3believer *can ... be said to suffer from as ect3blindnessG*, and ans"ers "ith a :ualified *(es*8 *In a sense, (es ... Ee fails to see "hat the believer sees ... 4their e(es the( have closed8 lest at an( time the( should see "ith their e(es ... and be converted4 -Matthe" 13, 1</ ...>13 'chOnbaumsfeld notes that *a Pconce tual reorientationC ... ha ens in religious conte2ts ... Nod moveHsI the religious

believer to use the "ords PfatherC or Pfatherl( loveC almost as ne" "ords.*1; +arrett acce ts that on his reading a religious term li&e *father* *cannot be translated into its ordinar( use.*1< 'ur risingl( enough, given the assage Fust :uoted,

'chOnbaumsfeld nevertheless does not "ish to attribute the incommensura3bilit( thesis to Wittgenstein8

$eligious discourse cannot ... be Pself3containedC or Psealed offC from other linguistic PdomainsC, for it is recisel( the :uotidian senses of "ords that ma&e ossible the Prene"edC uses or a lications of these "ords in religious conte2ts. In

this res ect, religious discourse, li&e artistic language3use, involves an e-tension or trans"ormation of ever(da( discourse and conse:uentl( canCt be

PincommensurableC "ith it.10

I am not convinced. 9irst, the fact that religious discourse *rene"s* ordinar( "ords does not establish that this discourse is translatable into those "ords. 7rguabl( DinsteinCs

conce t of mass *rene"s* @e"tonCs conce t#and (et, this is the aradigm case of incommensurabilit( in the histor( of science. 'econd, if it needs Nod4s intervention to give the religious believer *almost ne" "ords>, then "hat#short of a conversion#can enable the non3believer to understand these "ordsG !hird, 'chOnbaumsfeld4s arallel bet"een artistic and religious language3use does not seem a t for demonstrating commensurabilit( of religious and ever(da( language. =Nod is the father> is not sufficientl( li&e =)uliet is the sun>. +( 'chOnbaumsfeld4s o"n criteria gras ing religious discourse for the first time amounts to a fundamental change in form of life. Jnderstanding an artistic meta hor surel( does not -or onl( in e2tremel( rare circumstances/. M( main goal in the ne2t section is to argue that the central assages of LRB

contradict the incommensurabilit( reading. +ut it might be useful to indicate ho"ever briefl( alread( here that there is also eri heral internal as "ell as e2ternal evidence against the it.

!he eri heral internal evidence#internal to LRB#is the follo"ing assage8

'u

ose someone "ere a believer and said8 *I believe in a ,ast )udgement,* and I

said8 *Well, I4m not so sure. Lossibl(.* ... It isn4t a :uestion of m( being an("here near him, but on an entirel( different lane, "hich (ou could e2 ress b( sa(ing8 *%ou mean something altogether different, Wittgenstein.> !he difference might not sho" u at all in an( e2 lanation of the meaning. 1B

!he last sentence is the &e( statement here8 in order to understand Wittgenstein4s res onse to the believer in the ,ast )udgement "e might not have to invo&e considerations relating to meaning. +ut if that is true then incommensurabilit( cannot be the central e2 lanation.18 !he reliminar( or eri heral e-ternal evidence against incommensurabilit( in

Wittgenstein are remar&s from 193M, 1931, and 19;0 res ectivel(8

7 language that I do not understand is no language.19 Whatever the language that I might construct, it has to be translatable into an e2isting language.6M It is an im ortant fact that "e assume it is al"a(s ossible to teach our language to men "ho have a different one.61

'omeone "ho insists on translatabilit( as a criterion for something being a language is not going to ma&e an e2ce tion for religious language.

&. )he Disagreements !et$een Sm/thies and Wittgenstein

!he central evidence in LRB against the incommensurabilit( of religious and ordinar( discourses is to be found in the t"o debates bet"een %oric& 'm(thies and Wittgenstein. !he first controvers( culminates in Wittgenstein accusing 'm(thies of being *muddled*1 the clima2 of the second confrontation is Wittgenstein4s calling 'm(thies4 vie" *rubbish*. On m( reading, in the first disagreement Wittgenstein insists that religious discourse de ends on ordinar( discourse. 7nd in the second dis ute he sho"s ho" grammatical investigations enable non3believers to come to understand religious language. 7 cou le of "ords on %oric& 'm(thies -191B3198M/ seem a ro riate at this oint. 'm(thies "as robabl( the main note3ta&er for LRB -he comes first in +arrett4s list/. Ee "as one of Wittgenstein4s favourite students and follo"ed his teacher4s advice not to become a hiloso her. Ee became a librarian in O2ford instead. In 19;; he converted to Catholicism, an event that Wittgenstein commented on in an im ortant letter -that I shall use later in this a er/.66 Most im ortant for our concerns ho"ever is the fact that in 19;< 'm(thies returned to the Cambridge to give a tal& on *Meaning* in the Moral 'ciences Club "ith Wittgenstein in the chair. In his a er 'm(thies defended rivate *acts of

meaning*. !he secretar( of the Club, Dli?abeth 7nscombe, summar(8

roduced the follo"ing

Mr 'm(thies ut the :uestion "hat ha

ens in m( mind "hen I sa( =draughts> and

mean =chess>. Ee thought that there must be an act of meaning *chess* "hich could not be identified either "ith ossible mental accom animents of sa(ing *draughts*, or "ith surrounding circumstances, such as m( behaviour before and after. It did not seem to him to be a nonsensical su osition that at the time of

reading his a er he meant b( its sentences the sentences of a :uite different a er, e.g. one on Moore4s arado2, though he had no memor( of this later, and gave no sign of it at the time.63

I submit that 'm(thies 19;<3 a er continued the first 19383controvers( bet"een 'm(thies and Wittgenstein. Jnfortunatel(, "e do not &no" directl( "hich vie" 'm(thies advanced in 19381 all "e have is Wittgenstein4s res onse. +ut if "e assume that 'm(thies defended in 1938 roughl( the same vie" that he argued for in 19;<, and if additionall( "e ta&e it that 'm(thies in 1938 ut for"ard this vie" "ith s ecial reference to religious language, then the ieces of LRB fall into lace. $econstructed and slightl( regimented, 'm(thies4 19383 osition comes to this8

-a/ -b/ -c/

7n individual &0 i can rivatel( assign an( meaning to a sign3vehicle. i alone then &no"s "hat i means b( that sign. i can intros ect the meaning in one moment of time -i.e. "ithout considering a ractice or techni:ue of use/.

-d/

7 referential term introduced in this "a( has one uni:ue determinate inter retation, inde endentl( of a ractice.

@o3one "ho is familiar "ith the general outlines of WittgensteinCs later hiloso h( "ill be sur rised b( his res onse to 'm(thiesC osition. !hus Wittgenstein reFects the idea of signs that can be inter reted in onl( one "a( as based on a muddled *idea of a su er3 icture*, that is, a icture "ith one uni:ue method of roFection. Moreover, the religious believer must ta&e his starting oint from the ractices and techni:ues of ordinar(

language. Onl( against this bac&dro can he introduce religious ictures and narratives in terms of "hich he e2 resses and formulates his religious beliefs. !he ictures, including the techni:ues for their use, can be e2 lained to others, non3believers and believers ali&e. !he idea of su er3 icture is the central muddle8

!he first idea ... is that (ou are loo&ing at (our o"n thought, and are absolutel( sure that it is a thought that so and so. ... It seems to be a su er3 icture. ... With a icture, it still de ends on the method of roFection, "hereas here it seems that (ou get rid of the roFecting relation ... 'm(thies4s muddle is based on the idea of a su er3 icture.6;

!he follo"ing three short assages oint out the im ortance of ublic techni:ues of usage. ,i&e an( s ea&er, so also the religious believer, is unable to sideste techni:ues8 these

=... I &no" "hat I mean* ... It loo&ed as though (ou could tal& of under3standing a "ord, "ithout an( reference to the techni:ue of its usage. ... We are all here using the "ord *death*, "hich is a ublic instrument, "hich has a "hole techni:ue Hof usageI. ... If (ou treat this H(our ideaI as something rivate, "ith "hat right are (ou calling it an idea of deathG ... If "hat he calls his *idea of death* is to become relevant, it must become art of our game.6<

7nd finall(, Wittgenstein gives an e2am le of someone "ho teaches him to understand the meaning of a :uasi3religious term, *not ceasing to e2ist after death*, b( "a( of a icture8

I haven4t an( clear idea "hat I4m sa(ing "hen I4m sa(ing *I don4t cease to e2ist,* etc. ' iritualists ma&e one &ind of connection. ' iritualist sa(s *7 arition* etc. 7lthough he gives me a icture I don4t li&e, I do get a clear idea.60

!urning from 'm(thies *muddle* to his *rubbish*, here "e are concerned in more detail "ith the relationshi bet"een religious ictures, religious language, and grammar. !he &e( is the follo"ing much3debated assage that I shall :uote in an abbreviated form8

HWittgenstein8I *Nod4s e(e sees ever(thing*#I "ant to sa( of this that it uses a icture. ... We associate a articular use "ith a icture. 'm(thies8 4!his isn4t all he does#associate a use "ith a icture.4 Wittgenstein8 $ubbish. I meant8 "hat conclusions are (ou going to dra"G etc. 7re e(ebro"s going to be tal&ed of, in connection "ith the D(e of NodG ... If I sa( he used a icture, I don4t "ant to sa( an(thing he himself "ouldn4t sa(. ... !he "hole "eight ma( be in the icture. ... I4m merel( ma&ing a grammatical remar& ...6B

!he assage raises t"o maFor :uestions of inter retation8 What "orried 'm(thies about WittgensteinCs claim =We associate a articular use "ith a icture>G 7nd "hat anno(ed Wittgenstein about 'm(thies4 remar& =!his isnCt all he does#associate a use "ith a icture>G 7n ans"er to the second :uestion must also e2 lain Wittgenstein4s oint in invo&ing the *"eight* of ictures and in referring to grammar. Concerning both :uestions I "ant to motivate m( o"n res onses b( sho"ing that the to3date best ans"ers are not -full(/ satisfactor(. I am thin&ing here of the discussions in

Eilar( Lutnam4s Rene$ing #hiloso(h/ -1996/, Cora 5iamond4s *!he Nulf bet"een Js* -6MM</, and Nenia 'chOnbaumsfeld4s , Con"usion o" S(heres -6MMB/.68 7ll three authors are in full agreement regarding 'm(thies4 "orr( about the *using a icture* ro osal. Lutnam ta&es 'm(thies to thin& that on Wittgenstein4s suggestion *religious language is non3cognitive*. 5iamond has 'm(thies obFect to Wittgenstein4s alleged reduction of religion to *e2 ressing a resolve to live in a certain "a(*. 7nd 'chOnbaumsfeld a rovingl( cites 5iamond4s rendering.69 !here is a bit more variet( "ith res ect to Wittgenstein4s sentence *the "hole "eight might be in the icture*. Lutnam suggests that it is best understood in light of a diar( entr( of 19;98 *... "e al$a/s eventuall( have to reach some firm ground, either a icture or something else, so that a icture "hich is at the root of all of our thin&ing is to be res ected ...*3M In other "ords, the "eight( icture is the "undamental icture. 5iamond sides "ith Lutnam in em hasising the relevance and im ortance of the 19;9 comment. +ut she also introduces a further thought "hich she finds in theologians such as 9ran? $osen?"eig, Kornelis Mis&otte and Eelmut Noll"it?er. !his is the idea that the religious icture is "eight( insofar as it enables us s ea& to Nod as erson. !he "eight( icture is *the anthro omor hic icture3language, used of Nod*. Nod =ma&es Hthis ictureI

available for us to use in s ea&ing of him>. !his icture is inesca able since it alone enables the believer to tal& about and to Nod, and to listen to him. 31 9inall(, 'chOnbaumsfeld ca tures Wittgenstein4s thought b( "riting that the *the icture is HnotI instrumentall( intersubstitutable*, that it is *irre laceable Q non3 ara hrasable*.36 I am not convinced b( the three authors4 inter retation of 'm(thies4 "orr(. Wh( should the idea that religion centrall( involves the use of ictures commit Wittgenstein to a non3cognitivist vie" of religionG Eo" can the non3cognitivist understanding of religion be 'm(thies4 central concern "hen non3cognitivism had alread( been e2 licitl( reFected b( Wittgenstein earlier in LRBG33 7nd, most im ortantl(, ho" can a reference to the "eightiness of ictures alleviate 'm(thies4 discomfortG If ma&ing the use of ictures central to religion commits one to non3cognitivism, "h( does the use of $eight/ ictures

cancel out this commitmentG Jnfortunatel(, Lutnam, 5iamond and 'chOnbaumsfeld do not address these :uestions. Eere is a different and sim ler reading of 'm(thies4 "orr(. 'm(thies fears that Wittgenstein is utting for"ard a reductive account of religion8 that religion is nothing !ut the mani ulation of ictures. 7nd this is unacce table to 'm(thies. 'uch reductive account, he thin&s, ignores the essence of religion, that is, the relationshi bet"een the believer and Nod. 7s "e shall see in a moment, on this inter retation it is not difficult to see "h( the "eightiness of religious *rubbish*. !urning to our three inter reters4 ro osals on the "eightiness of the ictures, I have alread( indirectl( indicated m( main obFection in the last aragra h. If I am right about 'm(thies4 "orr(, then it is not clear ho" an insistence on either the fundamental character, or the anthro omor hic nature, of the "eight( icture rovides a remed(. I also miss in all three authors a detailed attention to Wittgenstein4s reference to grammar. 7nd, last but not least, I am uncomfortable "ith the hermeneutic strateg( of inter reting a 1938 te2t via a 19;9 comment, or via the "or& of three theologians that Wittgenstein robabl( never read. M( o"n inter retation starts from the fact that Wittgenstein resents his observations about the role of ictures in religion as *a grammatical remar&*. !his is not of course the first and onl( time that Wittgenstein connects religion and grammar. 9or instance, the "ell3&no"n R3B3 of the #hiloso(hical Investigations reads8 ictures constitutes a res onse to 'm(thies4

Nrammar tells us "hat &ind of obFect an(thing is. -!heolog( as grammar./ 3;

7s "e &no" from 7lice 7mbrose4s and N. D. Moore4s notes on a lecture course from 1936333, Wittgenstein had been interested in the lin& bet"een theolog( and grammar at least from the earl( 193Ms on"ards. 3< Eere I refer to focus on a later assage, both because of its length and richness, and because of its tem oral ro2imit( to the 1938

lecture course on religious belief. !he assage I am referring to is a diar( entr( from 9ebruar( 193B8

One &neels do"n S loo&s u S folds one4s hands S s ea&s, S one sa(s one s ea&s "ith Nod, one sa(s that Nod sees ever(thing that I do1 one sa(s Nod s ea&s to me in m( heart1 one s ea&s of Nod4s e(es, hand, mouth, but not of other arts of the bod(8 learn from this the grammar of the "ord =Nod*T -'ome"here I have read that ,uther has "ritten that theolog( is the Pgrammar of the "ord of Nod4, the hol( scri ture./30

!hese lines hel

"ith understanding R3B3 of the #hiloso(hical Investigations.

!heolog( is a grammar of the "a(s in "hich the religious believer s ea&s and thin&s about Nod, of the actions he deems ossible vis3a3vis Nod, and of the ro erties he attributes to Nod. Jnfortunatel( Wittgenstein does not tell us "here he read that ,uther thought of theolog( as the *grammar of the "ord of Nod*. I venture the follo"ing suggestion8 the source "as )ohann Neorg Eamann -1B3M31B88/, or someone "riting about him. Eistorians of theolog( tell us that ,uther himself never actuall( said that theolog( is the grammar of the "ord of Nod. 3B 'omething close to this e2 ression "as ho"ever used b( Eamann "ith reference to ,uther. In one lace Eamann "rote that *it "as a religious scholar of enetrating "it "ho called theolog( a grammar for the language of the hol( scri ture*, and in another lace he rofessed to *follo" ,uther in turning the "hole of UU( -. hiloso h(/ into a grammar*. !he second :uote ma&es it li&el( that ,uther is the *religious scholar of enetrating "it* mentioned in the first. 38 +e this as it ma(, for resent concerns it is most im ortant to note that *theolog( as grammar* offers a method for ho" the non3believer can come to understand the language of the religious believer. !he non3believer needs to stud( carefull( the religious narratives and rituals, and he needs to identif( and tabulate the various descri tions, intentions and

actions involved in these narratives and rituals. In this "a( he can learn both the use of the -literal and meta horical/ ictures and the meanings of religious terms. Moreover, the ur ose of this investigation is not to reduce or critici?e religion1 the ur ose is to understand it. @o "onder then that Wittgenstein felt seriousl( misunderstood "hen 'm(thies im licitl( accused him of reducing religion to a mere mani ulation of ictures. 7s concerns the meaning of Wittgenstein4s *the "hole "eight ma( be in the icture* it also hel s to ta&e the Eamann connection seriousl(. $ecall that, on m( reading, 'm(thies insisted that a vie" that reduces religion to the use of ictures misses its most im ortant as ect8 the relationshi bet"een the religious believer and Nod. Wittgenstein4s res onse to this criticism "as to sa( that an(one "ho dra"s the contrast bet"een the t"o ideas -of the ictures and of the relationshi / in this "a( must assume that the ictures are of little "eight. On Wittgenstein4s rendering of the role of ictures and narratives in religion the( do not stand in the "a( of a relationshi "ith Nod. On the contrar(, the( are essential to that relationshi . !his vie" is clearl( e2 ressed in the follo"ing assage from Eamann8

... the miracles that the "ord of Nod does in the soul of ious Christians ... are as great as the miracles narrated in it1 an understanding of this boo& and faith in its contents can onl( be reached through the ver( s irit that has moved its authors1 and the ineffable sighs that this s irit causes in our hearts are of the ver( same nature as the ine2 ressible ictures hea ed u ... in the hol( scri ture. 39

9or Eamann the hol( scri ture is not Fust a re ort on Nod4s deeds, it is first and foremost a divine action to"ards us. We understand the bible onl( because Nod enables us to do so1 and the te2t and our reaction to it are of one iece. In other "ords, for Eamann the bible is a "eight( icture because it is the icture through "hich Nod relates to us, and "e to him.

&1 Im(lications: Criticism2 3aultlessness2 Relativism o" Distance

One central strand of the debate over Wittgenstein4s vie"s on religion has been the :uestion "hether Wittgenstein allo"s the non3believer an( form of rational criticism of religious belief and doctrine. In the remainder of this a er I "ant to e2 lain "hat ans"er emerges from m( inter retation of LRB. In addressing this :uestion it is crucial to distinguish bet"een different cases and scenarios. 7 first t( e of situation in "hich Wittgenstein allo"s outsiders to criticise religion are cases "here the believer has committed *blunders*, that is, "here he has deviated from the s(stem of assum tions and rules of his religion. Wittgenstein mentions an e2am le earl( on in the lectures8

5uring the "ar, Wittgenstein sa" consecrated bread being carried in chromium steel. !his struc& him as ludicrous.;M Whether a thing is a blunder or not#it is a blunder in a articular s(stem. )ust as something is a blunder in a articular game and not in another. ;1

7 second t( e of scenario in "hich outside criticism of religion is ossible and un roblematic is "here the religious believer can be sho"n to be guilt( of a violation of some general to ic3neutral demands, for e2am le, the demand not to deceive himself. 7 case in oint in LRB is 9ather O4Eara "ho sought to ma&e religion acce table to a secularised3scientific "orld b( assimilating religious to scientific belief. Eis mista&e is not so much a *blunder* as a case of blindness concerning the ver( nature of religious belief.

9ather O4Eara is one of those eo le "ho ma&e it a :uestion of science. ;6 +ut I "ould ridicule it, not b( sa(ing it is based on insufficient evidence. I "ould sa(8 here is a man "ho is cheating himself.;3

!he third and

erha s most note"orth( case concerns the ver( attitude of

e2traordinar( belief. Wittgenstein holds that although the non3believer might feel inclined to criticise the believer for having e2traordinar( attitudes, an( such criticism must be ineffective. It must be ineffective since eo le "ho have, and eo le "ho do not have, e2traordinar( belief3attitudes do not share rinci les on the basis of "hich the ver( ado tion of such belief3attitudes could be rationall( evaluated. In the follo"ing assage Wittgenstein refers to e2actl( such &ind of *controvers(*8

!hese controversies loo& :uite different from an( normal controversies. $easons loo& entirel( different from normal reasons. !he( are, in a "a(, :uite inconclusive.;;

!his suggests that the attitude of e2traordinar( belief lies too dee for it to be subFect to standards. Lresumabl( the same a lies to the stance of not having e2traordinar( attitudes. 7nd thus the t"o stances each are internall( related to different sets of reasons. !he last :uotation s ea&s of the encounter bet"een the religious erson and someone "ho lac&s e2traordinar( beliefs as a *controvers(*. !his might seem to be in tension "ith Wittgenstein4s un"illingness to call the difference bet"een himself and the religious believer -over the :uestion of the ,ast )udgement/ a *disagreement*. On closer ins ection it turns out, ho"ever, that Wittgenstein does not "ish to legislate "hether "e can use the term *disagreement* here. Com are the follo"ing assages8

*5o (ou contradict the manG* I4d sa(8 *@o.* ...;< ... does this mean that I believe the o ... (ou can call it believing the o normall( call believing the o osite ... G =... not at all, or not al"a(s.* ;0

osite, but it is entirel( different from "hat "e

osite.;B

!hese controversies loo& :uite different from an( normal controversies. ;8

It seems to me that these var(ing statements are best understood in light of RB9 of the #hiloso(hical Investigations8 *'a( "hat (ou choose, so long as it does not revent (ou from seeing the facts.* @ot much hinges on "hether "e use the term *disagreement* for Wittgenstein4s distance from the believer "ho asserts his belief in the ,ast )udgement. What is im ortant is to understand the eculiarit( of this &ind of distance, and ho" it differs from more familiar or standard forms of disagreement. I therefore ro ose the term *non3standard faultless disagreement* to ca ture the s ecial form of distance that e2ists bet"een Wittgenstein and the believer. !he terms *non3standard* and *faultless* should be clear from "hat has alread( been said. !he label *disagreement* seems a ro riate at least insofar as one cannot assert, "ithout

contradiction, both -a4/ and -b4/8

-a4/ I have faith that there "ill be a ,ast )udgement, and -b4/ I lac& the attitude of faith -in a ,ast )udgement/ altogether.

Of course, the realisation that in a certain domain disagreements are -often or invariabl(/ faultless can trigger various res onses. One such res onse is sce ticism, that is, the thought that, since "e cannot rationall( agree, no &no"ledge or Fustified belief is ossible in this domain. 7nother ossible res onse is relativism8 each of us is right relative to their res ective standards or stances, but there is no vie" oint from "hich such standards or stances themselves can be evaluated. In LRB Wittgenstein does not seem to be tem ted b( either of these vie"s, at least not in their canonical form. !here is ho"ever a certain non4standard form of relativism that fits the osition of LRB. !his osition is a variant of "hat +ernard Williams once called *relativism of distance*.;9 !he central element of this vie" is the *notional* confrontation, that is, a confrontation in "hich the vie" of the other side is not a real or live o tion for oneself. One cannot image going over to it. Williams also sa(s that in such confrontation one4s ordinar( *vocabular( of a raisal* seems out of lace8 *... for a reflective erson the

:uestion of a

raisal does not genuinel( arise ... in urel( notional confrontation.* <M +oth

features are central in Wittgenstein4s encounter "ith the believer. !heir confrontation is notional since onl( a conversion, and thus reordering of all real or live o tions, "ould ta&e Wittgenstein to the religious stance. 7nd the idea that one4s vocabular( of a raisal seems out of lace surfaces in Wittgenstein4s insistence that in such confrontation reasons must a ear inconclusive. !he oint is also visible in ,$+4s re eated insistence on not

"anting to e2 ress an( vie" that might be offensive or insulting to the believer8

I couldn4t a

roach his belief at all b( sa(ing8 *!his could Fust as "ell have been

brought about b( so and so* because he could thin& this blas hem( on m( side. <1 If I sa( he used a icture, I don4 t "ant to sa( an(thing he himself "ouldn4t sa(. <6 7ll I "ished to characteri?e "as the conventions HsicTI he "ished to dra". If I "ished to sa( an(thing more I "as merel( being hiloso hicall( arrogant. <3

&5 Con"licting Inter(retations III: Criticism o" Belie" in 6od

It remains for me to contrast m( reading of Wittgenstein on the criticism of religion "ith the best3&no"n alternative, Kai @ielsen4s *fideist* inter retation. In a recent @ielsen sums u his inter retation as follo"s8 a er,

... "hat cannot be done, on a Wittgensteinian fideist vie", is relevantl( to criticise belief in Nod -"here PNodC is ro erl( conceived/ ... H!Ihere is ... no intelligible "a( of sa(ing that the ver( idea of Nod is incoherent or that belief in Nod rests on an illusion or that PNod e2istsC is false.<;

!his vie" does not sit "ell "ith m( argument above. When Wittgenstein em hasises the lac& of shared standards, he is tal&ing about the difference bet"een a erson "ho has e2traordinar( belief3attitudes, and a erson "ho lac&s them. !hat is to sa(, at issue is the

resence or absence of such attitudes, at issue are not their s ecific contents. !his leaves o en the ossibilit( of various forms of criticism#on the basis of shared standards#of articular doctrines concerning Nod. @ote also that although criticism on the basis of shared standards is im ossible in cases of non3standard faultless disagreement, Wittgenstein does not rule out critical assessments on the basis of criteria that are not shared. 9or instance, "hen 'm(thies informed Wittgenstein about his conversion to Catholicism in 19;;, the latter re lied that he had his o"n "a(s of assessing "hether 'm(thies4 move "ould be a success or a failure8 *... "hat sort of man (ou are and "ill be. !his "ill, for me, be the eating of the udding.><< Eere Wittgenstein seems little bothered b( the thought that his criteria for such an evaluation might be different from the criteria em lo(ed b( the believer 'm(thies.

&7 Conclusion

In this a er I have develo ed a ne" inter retation of LRB. Central to m( reading is the claim that there is no incommensurabilit( bet"een religious and ordinar( discourses1 that Wittgenstein offers grammar as a method for overcoming roblems of understanding bet"een believer and non3believer1 that the non3believer can understand the ro ositional attitude and the ro ositional content of religious belief -"ithout converting/, and that a non3believer can criticise religious believers on various grounds. !he onl( thing that is ruled out is a criticism, on the basis of shared standards, of the ver( ado tion of e2traordinar( standards. @eedless to sa(, there is lent( of unfinished business. In order to ma&e Wittgenstein4s osition convincing, "e need a better ta2onom( of different uses of *believe*1 a ta2onom( of ossible different forms of e2traordinar( beliefs -religious, magical,

commitments to various forms of life/1 an account of similarities as "ell as differences bet"een ordinar( and e2traordinar( beliefs1 and a more detailed account of "h( reasons give out in the defence of e2traordinar( beliefs.

@otes

*,ectures on $eligious +elief,* in Wittgenstein: Lectures & Conversations on ,esthetics2 #s/cholog/ and Religious Belie", edited b( C(ril +arrett -+er&ele( and ,os 7ngeles8 Jniversit( of California Lress, 1900/, <33B6.
2

Cora 5iamond, *Wittgenstein on $eligious +elief8 !he Nulfs +et"een Js,* in Religion and

Wittgenstein8s Legac/, edited b( 5. V. Lhilli s and Mario von der $uhr -7ldershot8 7shgate, 6MM</, 99313B, here 99.
3

Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <3. *In a religious discourse "e use such e2 ressions as8 PI believe that so and so "ill ha en,C and

use them differentl( to the "a( in "hich "e use them in science.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <B./ # *... there is this e2traordinar( use of the "ord 4believe4. One tal&s of believing and at the same time one doesn4t use 4believe4 as one does ordinaril(.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <9./
5

Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0. =4Well, ossibl( it ma( ha en and ossibl( not4 ...> -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0./# *... one

"ould be reluctant to sa(8 4!hese eo le rigorousl( hold the o inion -vie"/ that there is a ,ast )udgement4. ... It is for this reason that different "ords are used8 4dogma4, 4faith4.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <B./ # %ou might sa( -in the normal use/8 *%ou onl( believe#oh "ell ...> Eere it is used entirel( differentl(1 ... it is not used as "e generall( use the "ord 4&no"4.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <930M./
7

*We don4t tal& ... about high robabilit(. @or about &no"ing.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <B./

#*@o induction. !error. !hat is, as it "ere, art of the substance of belief. ... a certain icture might la( the role of constantl( admonishing me ...* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0./#*Wh(

shouldn4t one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a ,ast )udgementG* -Wittgenstein,

*,ectures,* <8/.
8

*We come to an island and "e find beliefs there, and certain beliefs "e are inclined to call

religious. ... Dntirel( different connections "ould ma&e them into religious beliefs ...* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <8./#* ... and there can easil( be imagined transitions "here "e "ouldn4t &no" for our life "hether to call them religious beliefs or scientific beliefs.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <8./# *7 religious belief might in fact fl( in the face of such a forecast, and sa( P@o. !here it "ill brea& do"n.C* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0./
9

... *Wittgenstein, (ou don4t ta&e illness as unishment, so "hat do (ou believeG*#I d sa(8 *I don4t have an(

thoughts of unishment.* ... I thin& differentl(, in a different "a(. I sa( different things to m(self. I have different ictures.* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <<./# *!a&e PNod created manC. Lictures of Michelangelo sho"ing the creation of the "orld. In general, there is nothing "hich e2 lains the meanings of "ords as "ell as a icture ...* -Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* 03./
10

'ee e.g. 9. @ielsen2 *Wittgensteinian 9ideism $evisited,* in Wittgensteinian 3ideism, edited b(

5. V. Lhilli s and Kai @ielsen -,ondon, 'CM, 6MM</, 9B3131.

11

C(ril +arrett, Wittgenstein on +thics and Religious Belie" -O2ford8 +lac&"ell, 1991/1 Nenia

'chOnbaumsfeld, , Con"usion o" the S(heres: 9ier:egaard and Wittgenstein on #hiloso(h/ and Religion -O2ford8 O2ford Jniversit( Lress, 6MMB/.
12

+arrett, Wittgenstein, 168. +arrett, Wittgenstein, 1;;. 'chOnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 18;. +arrett, Wittgenstein, 168. 'chOnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 193. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <3. Cf. Eilar( Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/ -Cambridge, Mass.8 Earvard Jniversit( Lress, 1996/,

13

14

15

16

17

18

1<1.
19

,ud"ig Wittgenstein, ;achlass: )he Bergen +lectronic +dition -C53$om, O2ford8 O2ford

Jniversit( Lress, 6MMM/, 1M9 190.

20

Wittgenstein, ;achlass, 11M 1;;. ,ud"ig Wittgenstein, Remar:s on the #hiloso(h/ o" #s/cholog/ , <olume I -O2ford8 +lac&"ell,

21

198M/, R0;;.
22

Interesting biogra hical information can be found in Wol&er 7. Mun?, *,ud"ig Wittgenstein and

%oric& 'm(thies8 7 hitherto Jn&no"n $elationshi ,* in Wittgenstein und die =u:un"t der #hiloso(hie: +ine ;eu!e$ertung nach 1> %ahren &Beitr?ge der @sterreichischen Lud$ig Wittgenstein 6esellscha"t Wolume IX/ -Kirchberg am Wechsel 6MM1/, 96A9B.
23

N. D. M. 7nscombe, *9rom the Minutes of the Moral 'ciences Club, 1<.11.19;<,* in Wittgenstein

in Cam!ridge: Letters and Documents 1B1141B11 , edited b( +rian McNuinness -O2ford8 +lac&"ell, 6MM8/, 389.
24

Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* 0B. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* 08309. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* BM. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* B13B6. Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/1 5iamond, *Nulf*1 'chOnbaumsfeld, Con"usion. Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/, 1<;1 5iamond, *Nulf,* 1181 'chOnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 1BB. Lutnam, Rene$ing #hiloso(h/, 1<01 cf. ,ud"ig Wittgenstein Culture and <alue -Chicago8

25

26

27

28

29

30

Jniversit( of Chicago Lress, 198M/, 8;.

31

5iamond, *Nulf,* 1603168. 'chOnbaumsfeld, Con"usion, 18M. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* B1. ,ud"ig Wittgenstein #hiloso(hical Investigations. third edition, edited and translated b( N. D. M.

32

33

34

7nscombe -O2ford8 +lac&"ell, 6MM1/.

35

,ud"ig Wittgenstein, WittgensteinCs Lectures2 Cam!ridge2 1B'241B'1. 3rom the ;otes o" ,lice

,m!rose and *argaret *acdonald, edited b( 7lice 7mbrose -7mherst, @. %.8 Lrome3theus +oo&s, 6MM1/, 361 N. D. Moore, =WittgensteinCs ,ectures in 193M31933,* in ,ud"ig Wittgenstein, #hiloso(hical Dccasions: 1B1241B11, edited b( ).C. Klagge and 7. @ordman -Indiana olis8

Eac&ett, 1993/ ;0311;, here 1M3.

36

,ud"ig Wittgenstein, Den:!e$egungen: )age!Echer 1B'>41B'22 1B'F41B'5, edited b( I.

'omavilla -9ran&furt am Main8 9ischer, 1999/, 9M.

37

)ohannes von ,Y &e, *!heologie als 4Nrammati& ?ur ' rache der heiligen 'chrift48 Dine 'tudie ?u !heologieverstZndnis,* ;eue =eitschri"t "Er s/stematische )heologie und

,uthers

Religions(hiloso(hie 3;, 19968 66B36<M.

38

)ohann Neorg Eamann, *Wermischte 7nmer&ungen Yber die WortfYgung in der fran?Osischen

' rache,* in Eamann, S?mtliche Wer:e8 Gistorisch4:ritische ,usga!e, edited b( )osef @adler, volume 6 -Wien8 Eerder, 19<M/, 16B3130, here 1691 and )ohann Neorg Eerder, Brie"$echsel, volume B, edited b( 7rthur Een&el -9ran&furt am Main8 Insel, 19B9/, 109.
39

)ohann Neorg Eamann, *Nedan&en Yber meinen ,ebenslauf,* in Eamann, S?mtliche Wer:e,

volume 6, 93<;, here ;3.

40

Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <3. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <9. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <B. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <9. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <3. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <3. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <<. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* <0. +ernard Williams, *!he !ruth in $elativism,* in +ernard Williams, *oral Luc:, -Cambridge8 Cambridge

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

Jniversit( Lress, 1981/, 13631;3.

50

Williams, *$elativism,* 1;1. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* 01. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* B1. Wittgenstein, *,ectures,* B6.

51

52

53

54

@ielsen, *9ideism $evisited,* . 1M3. ,ud"ig Wittgenstein, *,etter to 'm(thies, 7 ril Bth, 19;;,* in Wittgenstein in Cam!ridge, 303.

55

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