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Study Hayek's Road to Serfdom with Tom DiLorenzo

"Every economy has its contradictions. What counts is results, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet planning system has been a powerful engine for economic growth." Paul Samuelson, Economics, !"# edition "$ontrary to what many s%eptics had earlier believed, the Soviet economy is proof that a socialist command economy can function and even thrive." Paul Samuelson, Economics, !"! edition "&wo'thirds of a century after (The Road to Serfdom) got written, hindsight confirms how inaccurate its innuendo about the future turned out to be." Paul Samuelson, *++! ,n !--, when .riedrich /. 0aye% published his classic boo%, The Road to Serfdom, he was loudly denounced by academic statist apologists in England, where he resided at the time, and in /merica. ,n the preface to the !12 edition of the boo%, 0aye% noted that a prominent philosopher even denounced the boo% despite admitting that he had not read it3 4ut average citi5ens did read it. &he boo% was a gigantic success in /merica, 6uic%ly buying over half a million copies. 7illions of copies of a condensed Reader's Digest version of the boo% were also sold and widely read. &he court historians in academe were not concerned about 0aye%8s age'old warnings about the dangers that centrali5ed political power posed to liberty and prosperity, for they intended to be beneficiaries of that power as well'paid advisers to the state. 7illions of average citi5ens were not as enthusiastic especially /mericans who, during the war, had e9perienced oppressive and confiscatory ta9ation, the slavery of military conscription, government' imposed product rationing, pervasive shortages of basic staples, and endless bureaucratic bungling. 0aye%8s motivation for writing The Road to Serfdom was the shoc%ing speed at which so many Europeans especially in :ermany had simply forgotten all that they had learned over the centuries about the virtues of a free society, the need for limitations on government power, the dangers of centrali5ed power, and the wor%ings of capitalism as a worldwide networ% of mutually advantageous e9change. ,t only too% a couple of decades of socialistic sloganeering to persuade :ermans to abandon their classical'liberal roots and embrace big government of the worst sort. 0aye% was deeply concerned that the same despotic ideas were also becoming more and more popular in England, /merica, and in other countries. /s the above 6uotations of 7,&8s Paul Samuelson demonstrate, much of /merica8s educational "elite" was enamored with Soviet communism and central planning. Samuelson even went so far as to say in his te9tboo%, which was by far the biggest seller of its day, that "it is a vulgar mista%e to thin% most people in Eastern Europe (during communism) are miserable." &he parallels to today8s world are unsettling, to say the least. Perhaps this is why The Road to Serfdom ascended to #1 in sales on Amazon.com after :lenn 4ec% discussed the boo% on his .o9 ;ews $hannel program. &here may not be a 0itler on the hori5on, but the e9tent to which

governments all over the world have simply ignored the lessons of the past in response to the economic crisis that they created with their own monetary policies and other interventions is mind'boggling. &he <S government, in particular, responded to the bust portion of the :reenspan .ed8s boom'and'bust cycle with the most economically destructive but politically centrali5ing policies= trillion'dollar bailouts of failing corporations that will create moral'ha5ard problems the li%es of which have never been seen> an escalation of the money supply that dwarfs the monetary inflation of the :reenspan .ed> the Soviet'style nationali5ation of automobile companies, ban%s, and much of the healthcare industry> government regulation of e9ecutive compensation> the appointment of do5ens of dictatorial "c5ars" with unaccountable power to regulate and regiment myriad industries> trillion'dollar'a'year deficits> and an ex ansion of the powers of the .ed. /nd we now have a president who believes he has the power to fire corporate e9ecutives, nationali5e industries, and send unmanned drone bombers to any country in the world on a whim. Washington, ?$, no longer recogni5es any limits at all to its powers to socially plan all aspects of /merican life. &his totalitarian impulse is not limited to national politics. &he mayor of ;ew @or% $ity believes he has the power to regulate all of the eating and drin%ing habits of ;ew @or%ers, even including how much salt they consume with their meals and what type of soft drin%s they can enAoy. &he subtitle of the !12 edition of The Road to Serfdom, published by the <niversity of $hicago Press, is "/ $lassic Warning /gainst the ?angers to .reedom ,nherent in Social Planning." &he e9ponential e9plosion of governmental powers in response to the current, government'generated economic crisis ma%es The Road to Serfdom as relevant today as it ever was Bas :lenn 4ec%8s audience instinctively understandsC. &his is why the 7ises ,nstitute is offering a special 2'wee% online class, &he Doad to Serfdom= ?espotism &hen and ;ow, under my direction through the 7ises /cademy, beginning on Wednesday, Eune F. &he course will be an in'depth e9amination and discussion of 0aye%8s analysis, its relevance to today8s world, and how such ideas can be used to put /merica and other parts of the world bac% on the road to freedom. &he writings of 0aye%8s mentor, Gudwig von 7ises, will also be an integral part of the course, which will utili5e selections from 7ises8s own classic on governmental tyranny, !mini otent "overnment. We will discuss 7ises8s ideas regarding the nature of the state, fallacies of "economic nationalism," the delusions of worldwide economic "planning," governmental "peace schemes" li%e the <nited ;ations, the delusions of foreign'trade'planning bureaucracies Be.g., ;/.&/C, the catastrophes caused by monetary "planning," and why :erman fascism and 7ar9ian socialism were essentially the same thing. 0aye%8s insights were remar%able and remain so to this day. 0e understood and e9plained the power of ideas= European fascism could never have been adopted without a *#'year propaganda campaign against individualism Bbasic respect for the individualC, classical liberalism, and free'mar%et economics. 0e pointed out the "fatal conceit" of believing that government bureaucrats could plan an entire society. 0e e9plained why socialism including its fascist variant meant little more than "e6uality in restraint and servitude." "7ar9ism has led to .ascism and ;ational Socialism," he wrote, "because, in all its essentials, it is .ascism and ;ational Socialism (i.e., ;a5ism)."

0aye% saw through all the rhetorical tric%s and gimmic%s of the socialists of his day, one of which was the constantly repeated refrain that socialism and government planning were inevitable> therefore, it is futile to oppose them. ;or did he fall for the gimmic% of wrapping totalitarian socialism in the mantle of the god of democracy. :overnment planning is inherently incom ati#le with both democracy and the rule of law in the long run, he e9plained, and leads to some degree of economic dictatorship. /ny business person who has had to deal with the do5ens of federal, state, and local government regulatory agencies %nows that economic dictatorship is a %ey feature of the current /merican political system. &he worst always rise to the top of the political heap under a regime of government planning, 0aye% e9plained, for they are the ones with the least 6ualms about brutali5ing their fellow citi5ens and depriving them of their liberties. /ll of this can only be sustained by what 0aye% called "&he End of &ruth," or the effects of massive government propaganda that demoni5es the civil society, individualism, and the system of peaceful voluntary e9change and private property BcapitalismC, while glorifying all aspects of the state.

&he purpose of this course, &he Doad to Serfdom= ?espotism &hen and ;ow, is to educate students about these resent dangers and arm them with the intellectual ammunition that they will need to oppose them and champion freedom instead. &he totalitarian socialists of the early *+th century understood that they could not succeed unless they first discredited the ideas of freedom. &he only way to stop their intellectual descendants B"the totalitarians in our midst," as 0aye% would call themC is to counter their totalitarian ideas. 0aye% was a hero of society for putting his career as a renowned economic theorist on hold Bfor most of the rest of his life, it turned outC to lay out one of the most articulate arguments for a free society ever made. We must revisit and strengthen these arguments if we are to choose capitalism and freedom over socialism and serfdom.

The Road to Serfdom

Main article: The Road to Serfdom

0aye% was concerned about the general view in 4ritain8s academia that fascism was a capitalist reaction to socialism and The Road to Serfdom arose from those concerns. ,t was written between !-+ and !-F. &he title was inspired by the .rench classical liberal thin%er /le9is de &oc6ueville8s writings on the "road to servitude".(F+) ,t was first published in 4ritain by Doutledge in 7arch !-- and was 6uite popular, leading 0aye% to call it "that unobtainable boo%", also due in part to wartime paper rationing.(F ) When it was published in the <nited States by the <niversity of $hicago in September of that year, it achieved greater popularity than in 4ritain.(F*) /t the arrangement of editor 7a9 Eastman, the /merican maga5ine Reader's Digest also published an abridged version in /pril !-#, enabling The Road to Serfdom to reach a far wider audience than academics.

&he economist Walter 4loc% observed critically that while The Road to Serfdom is "a war cry against central planning", it does show some reservations with a free mar%et system and laissez$faire capitalism,(FF) with 0aye% even going so far as to say that "probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain

rules of thumb, above all the principle of laisse5'faire".(F-) ,n the boo%, 0aye% writes that the government has a role to play in the economy through the monetary system, wor%'hours regulation, institutions for the flow of proper information, and other principles on which most members of a free society will tend to agree. &hese are contentions associated with the point of view of ordoliberalism. 0owever, when central planning reaches into areas on which people will probably not agree, the tendency is created for dictatorship and totalitarianism Bi.e. "serfdom"C, as a means of coercing implementation of one8s plan. &hrough analysis of this and other of 0aye%8s wor%s, 4loc% purports, "in ma%ing the case against socialism, 0aye% was led into ma%ing all sort of compromises with what otherwise appeared to be his own philosophical perspective H so much so, that if a system was erected on the basis of them, it would not differ too sharply from what this author e9plicitly opposed". (FF) ;otwithstanding such criticisms, the boo% is still widely popular and is prominent among wor%s advocating individualism and classical liberalism. http=IImitsloan.mit.eduIosgIpdfIsteinberg+1+".pdf FOLLOW THIS LINK

The Great Transformation is a boo% by Jarl Polanyi, an /ustro'0ungarian political economist. .irst published in !--, it deals with the social and political upheavals that too% place in England during the rise of the mar%et economy. Polanyi contends that the modern mar%et economy and the modern nation'state should be understood not as discrete elements, but as the single human invention he calls the "7ar%et Society". / distinguishing characteristic of the "7ar%et Society" is that man%ind8s economic mentalities were changed. Prior to the great transformation, people based their economies on reciprocity and redistribution and were not rational utility ma9imi5ers.( ) /fter the great transformation, people became more economically rational, behaving as neoclassical economic theory would predict.(*) &he creation of capitalist institutions not only changed laws but also fundamentally altered man%ind8s economic mentalities such that prior to the great transformation, mar%ets played a very minor role in human affairs and were not even capable of setting prices because of their diminutive si5e.(F) ,t was only after the creation of new mar%et institutions and industriali5ation that the myth of man%ind8s propensity to barter and trade became widespread in an effort to mold human nature to fit the new mar%et based economic institutions.(-)

General argument
Polanyi argued that the development of the modern state went hand in hand with the development of modern mar%et economies and that these two changes were ine9orably lin%ed in history. Essential to the change from a pre'modern economy to a mar%et economy was the altering of human economic mentalities away from a non'utility ma9imi5ing mindset to one more recogni5able to modern economists.(#) Prior to the great transformation, mar%ets had a very limited role in society and were confined almost entirely to long distance trade.(2) /s Polanyi wrote, "the same bias which made /dam SmithKs generation view primeval man as bent on barter and truc% induced their successors to disavow all interest in early man, as he was now %nown not to have indulged in those laudable passions."(1) &he great transformation was begun by the powerful modern state, which was needed to push changes in social structure and human nature that allowed for a competitive capitalist economy. .or Polanyi, these changes implied the destruction of the basic social order that had

reigned due to pre'modern human nature and that had e9isted throughout all earlier history. $entral to the change was that factors of production li%e land and labor would now be sold on the mar%et at mar%et determined prices instead of allocated according to tradition, redistribution, or reciprocity..(") 0e emphasi5ed the greatness of the transformation because it was both a change of human institutions and human nature. 0is empirical case in large part relied upon analysis of the Speenhamland laws, which he saw not only as the last attempt of the s6uirearchy to preserve the traditional system of production and social order, but also a self'defensive measure on the part of society that mitigated the disruption of the most violent period of economic change. Polanyi also remar%s that the pre' modern economies of $hina, ,ncan Empire, ,ndian Empires, 4abylon, :reece, and the various %ingdoms of /frica operated on principles of reciprocity and redistribution with a very limited role for mar%ets, especially in settling prices or allocating the factors of production.(!) &he boo% also presented his belief that mar%et society is unsustainable because it is fatally destructive to human nature and the natural conte9ts it inhabits. Polanyi attempted to turn the tables on the orthodo9 liberal account of the rise of capitalism by arguing that Llaisse5'faire was plannedM, whereas social protectionism was a spontaneous reaction to the social dislocation imposed by an unrestrained free mar%et. 0e argues that the construction of a Nself'regulatingK mar%et necessitates the separation of society into economic and political realms. Polanyi does not deny that the self'regulating mar%et has brought Lunheard of material wealthM, however he suggests that this is too narrow a focus. &he mar%et, once it considers land, labor and money as "fictitious commodities" Bfictitious because each possesses 6ualities that are not e9pressed in the formal rationality of the mar%etC Lsubordinate(s) the substance of society itself to the laws of the mar%et.M( +) &his, he argues, results in massive social dislocation, and spontaneous moves by society to protect itself. ,n effect, Polanyi argues that once the free mar%et attempts to separate itself from the fabric of society, social protectionism is societyKs natural response> this he calls the Ndouble movementK. Polanyi did not see economics as a subAect closed off from other fields of en6uiry, indeed he saw economic and social problems as inherently lin%ed. 0e ended his wor% with a prediction of a socialist society, noting, "after a century of blind 8improvement8, man is restoring his 8habitation.8"( )

Before Market Society

Polanyi ma%es the distinction between mar%ets as an au9iliary tool for ease of e9change of goods and 7ar%et Societies. 7ar%et Societies are those where mar%ets are the paramount institution for the e9change of goods through price mechanisms. Polanyi argues that there are three general types of economic systems that e9isted before the rise of a society based on a free mar%et economy= Dedistributive, Deciprocity and 0ouseholding.
1. Redistributive: Trade and production is focused to a central entity such as a tribal leader or feudal lord and then redistributed to members of their society. 2. Reciprocity: The exchange of goods is based on reciprocal exchanges between social entities. n a macro level this would include the production of goods to gift to other groups. !. "ouseholding: #conomies where production is centered around individual household production. $amily units produce food% textile goods% and tools for their own consumption.

&hese three forms were not mutually e9clusive nor were they mutually e9clusive of mar%ets for the e9change of goods. &he main distinction is that these three forms of economic organi5ation were based around the social aspects of the society they operated in and were e9plicitly tied to those social relationships. Polanyi argued that these economic forms depended on the social principles of $entricity and Symmetry and /utar%y BSelf'SufficiencyC. 7ar%ets e9isted as an au9iliary avenue for the e9change of goods that were otherwise not obtainable. &hey relied on the social Principles of $entricity and Symmetry.

Polanyi8s ideas have been critici5ed by economic historians, especially his claims that man%ind8s economic mentalities were less rational and utility ma9imi5ing in the pre'modern era. ;obel laureate ?ouglass ;orth argued that Polanyi confused reciprocity and redistribution with side'payments that would e9ist rationally as e9plained by the $oase theorem. ;orth further argued that every society uses reciprocity, redistribution, and mar%ets to allocate resources. ;orth called upon other economic historians to investigate Polanyi8s claims that humans had different economic mentalities before the modern economy was created. /ccording to /le9 ;owrasteh of the $ato ,nstitute, Polanyi8s claims have not withstood the assault of neoclassical economic historians prompted by ;orth8s paper. ,n a summary of some of the peer'reviewed articles critici5ing Polanyi8s wor%, ;owrasteh wrote, "(t)he peculiar economic mentalities of people seem to be a constant throughout history rather than a result of a relatively recent government edict." 0owever, Polanyi8s theory has remained relevance for heterodo9 and 7ar9ian scholars of economic history, particularly in response to the mar%et failures of the *++" financial crisis.

Authoritarian Persona ity

by Saul 7cGeod published *++! /dorno et al. B !#+C proposed that preAudice is the results of an individualKs personality type. &hey piloted and developed a 6uestionnaire, which they called the .'scale B. for fascismC. /dorno argued that deep'seated personality traits predisposed some individuals to be highly sensitive to totalitarian and antidemocratic ideas and therefore were prone to be highly preAudicial. &he evidence they gave to support this conclusion included= O !ase studies, e.g. ;a5is O Psy"hometri" testin# Buse of the F$s"a eC O ! ini"a inter%iews revealed situational aspects of their childhood, such as the fact that they had been brought up by very strict parents or guardians, which were found of participants who scored highly on the .'scale not always found in the bac%grounds of low scorers. &hose with an authoritarian &ersona ity tended to be=

O 0ostile to those who are of inferior status, but obedient of people with high status O .airly rigid in their opinions and beliefs O $onventional, upholding traditional values /dorno concluded that people with authoritarian personalities where li%ely to categories people into LusM and LthemM groups, seeing their own group as superior. &herefore, the study indicated that individuals with a %ery stri"t u&'rin#in# by critical and harsh parents were most li%ely to develop an authoritarian personality. /dorno believed that this was because the individual in 6uestion was not able to e9press hostility towards their parents Bfor being strict and criticalC. $onse6uently, the person would then displace this aggression I hostility onto safer targets, namely those who are wea%er, such as ethnic minorities. /dorno et al. felt that authoritarian traits, as identified by the .'Scale, predispose some individuals towards 8fascistic8 characteristics such as= O Ethnocentrism, i.e. the tendency to favor one8s own ethnic group= O Pbsession with ran% and status O Despect for and submissiveness to authority figures O Preoccupation with power and toughness. ,n other words, according to /dorno, the Eichmanns of this world are there because the have authoritarian personalities and therefore are predisposed cruelty, as a result of their upbringing. &here is evidence that the authoritarian personality e9ists. &his might help to e9plain why some people are more resistant to changing their preAudiced views.

Evaluation for the Authoritarian Personality

&here are many wea%nesses to /dornoKs e9planation of preAudice= O 0arsh parenting style does not always produce preAudice children I individuals O Some preAudice people do not conform to the authoritarian personality type. O ?oesnKt e9plain why people are preAudice against certain groups and not others. .urthermore, the authoritarian e9planation of preAudice does not e9plain how whole social groups Be.g. the ;a5isC can be preAudiced. &his would mean that all members of a group Be.g. ;a5isC would have an authoritarian personality, which is 6uite unli%ely. $ultural or social norms would seem to offer a better e9planation of preAudice and conflict than personality variables. /dorno has also been critici5ed for his limited sample. /lso, 0yman and Sheatsley

B !#-C found that lower educational level was probably a better e9planation of high .'scale scores than an authoritarian

The Authoritarian Personality

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The Authoritarian Personality is a !#+ sociology boo% by &heodor W. /dorno, Else .ren%el'4runswi%, ?aniel Gevinson, and ;evitt Sanford, researchers wor%ing at the <niversity of $alifornia, 4er%eley, during and shortly after World War ,,.

The Authoritarian %ersonality "invented a set of criteria by which to define personality traits, ran%ed these traits and their intensity in any given person on what it called the 8. scale8 B. for fascistC."( ) &he personality type /dorno et al. identified can be defined by nine traits that were believed to cluster together as the result of childhood e9periences. &hese traits include conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti'intellectualism, anti' intraception, superstition and stereotypy, power and "toughness", destructiveness and cynicism, proAectivity, and e9aggerated concerns over se9.(*)(F) &hough strongly critici5ed for bias and methodology, (-)(#) the boo% was highly influential in /merican social sciences, particularly in the first decade after its publication= L;o volume published since the war in the field of social psychology has had a greater impact on the direction of the actual empirical wor% being carried on in the universities today.M (2)


1 )nstitutional context 2 Sources and influences

! *ontent + ,uthors and conflicts - Responses . See also / 0otes and references 1 $urther reading

Institutional conte t
&he impetus(need &uotation to verify) of The Authoritarian %ersonality was the 0olocaust, the attempted genocidal e9tinction of European Eews by /dolf 0itler8s ;ational Socialist party. /dorno had been a member of the ".ran%furt School", a predominantly Eewish(1) group of philosophers and 7ar9ist theorists who fled :ermany when 0itler shut down their ,nstitute for Social Desearch. /dorno et al. were thus motivated by a desire(citation needed) to identify and measure factors that were believed to contribute to antisemitic and fascist traits. &he boo% was part of a "Studies in PreAudice" series sponsored by the /merican Eewish $ommittee8s ?epartment of Scientific Desearch.(")(!)

Sources and influences

The Authoritarian %ersonality was based in part on earlier .ran%furt School analyses underta%en in :ermany, but with a few %ey changes. .irst, their 7ar9ist and radical(need &uotation to verify) roots were downplayed. .or e9ample, the earlier Lauthoritarian personalityIrevolutionary personalityM a9is was changed to an Lauthoritarian personalityIdemocratic personalityM a9is in /merica. &hus, values and behaviors earlier associated with revolutionary 7ar9ism were now associated with support for democracy.( +) Second, the boo% abandoned andIor modified traditional 7ar9ist sociological and economic e9planations for human behavior in favor of psychological e9planations, earning scorn from more orthodo9 7ar9ists.( )(need &uotation to verify) :enerally, /dorno et al. too% an antipositivist position>( *) they did not believe their theories re6uired e9ternal verification or falsification.( F)(#etter source needed)

/ central idea of The Authoritarian %ersonality is that authoritarianism is the result of a .reudian developmental model. E9cessively harsh and punitive parenting was posited to cause children to feel immense anger towards their parents> yet fear of parental disapproval or punishment caused people to not directly confront their parents, but rather to identify with and idoli5e authority figures.( age needed) 7oreover, the boo% suggested that authoritarianism was rooted in suppressed homose9uality, which was redirected into outward hostility towards the father, which was, in turn, suppressed for fear of being infantili5ed and castrated by the father. ( -) &his hypothesis was consistent with prevailing psychological theories of the time, and even though .ren%el'4runswi% reported some preliminary support, empirical data have generally not confirmed this prediction.( #)( age needed)(need &uotation to verify) /uthoritarianism was measured by the .'scale. &he "." was short for "pre'fascist personality." /nother maAor hypothesis of the boo%

is that the authoritarian syndrome is predisposed to right'wing ideology and therefore receptive to fascist governments.( age needed)

Authors and conflicts

Sanford and Gevinson were both psychology professors at 4er%eley. &hey did much of the preliminary wor% on ethnocentrism and statistical measurement. .ren%el'4runswi% e9amined personality variables and family bac%ground with a series of interview studies. /dorno provided a political and sociological perspective to the boo%. /lthough /dorno8s name heads the alphabetical list of authors, he arrived late to the proAect and made a relatively small contribution.( 2)(need &uotation to verify) /dorno, in a !-1 letter to 0or%heimer, said that his main contribution was the .'scale, which in the end was the "core of the whole thing."( 1) /n agreement among the authors held that each one was to sign the individual chapters to which he or she had contributed, and that all four were to sign the chapter on the .'scale>( 1) /dorno was credited in # of the *F chapters. &he initially planned title for the boo% was The 'ascist (haracter and the )easurement of 'ascist Trends, but as early as !-1 /dorno feared that the assistants at 4er%eley would try to saniti5e it to a more innocuous title li%e (haracter and %re*udice. &he final title was the result of a compromise.( 1)

The Authoritarian %ersonality inspired e9tensive research in psychology, sociology, and political science during the !#+s and early !2+s on the relation between personality traits, behavior, and political beliefs. The Authoritarian %ersonality has often provo%ed polari5ed responses= L&he 4er%eley study of authoritarian personality does not leave many people indifferent.M( ") &he study "has been subAected to considerable criticism"( !) since the !#+s, particularly for various methodological flaws, including sample bias and poor psychometric techni6ues.(*+)
( age needed)(need &uotation to verify)

,n !1F, :aensslen et al.(* ) found that, contrary to predictions by /dorno et al.,(need &uotation to verify) rigidityIdogmatism is not intrinsically maladaptive> e.g., rigidity can be associated with discipline and productivity.(need &uotation to verify) ,n !"+, sociologist E.E. Day(**) argued that the proAect of The Authoritarian %ersonality was seriously flawed(need &uotation to verify) on several points= for not as%ing 6uestions regarding libertarian politics Bwhich according to Day are typically more anti'authoritarian than right' or left'wing politics(need &uotation to verify)C> for failing to demonstrate that authoritarianIright'wing beliefs are correlated with psychopathology> and, most importantly, for failing to demonstrate that authoritarian beliefs are associated with authoritarian behavior. ,n !!F, over a decade later, the latter point was also critici5ed by 4illings, et al.(*F)(#etter source needed) &he boo% concludes that right'wing, authoritarian governments produce hostility towards racial, religious or ethnic minorities. Psychologist 4ob /ltemeyer argued against that conclusion, saying that .ascist ,taly was not characteri5ed by antisemitism, and that Eews

occupied high positions in 7ussoliniKs government until pressure from 0itler disenfranchised these Eews.(*-) &hough The Authoritarian %ersonality was intended to identify antisemitism by its posited association with right wing politics and authoritarianism, DubensteinKs research in ,srael revealed that that Prthodo9 Eews scored higher on the these traits than Deform Eews, and that both groups scored higher than secular Eews.(*#) Some observers have critici5ed what they saw as a strongly politici5ed agenda to The Authoritarian %ersonality. Social critic $hristopher Gasch(*2) argued that by e6uating mental health with left'wing politics and associating right'wing politics with an invented LauthoritarianM pathology, the boo%8s goal was to eliminate antisemitism by LsubAecting the /merican people to what amounted to collective psychotherapyby treating them as inmates of an insane asylum.M Similarly, Slovenian philosopher SlavoA Qi5e% wrote, L,t is precisely the %ind of group loyalty, respect for tradition, and consciousness of differences central to +e,ish identity, however, that 0or%heimer and /dorno described as mental illness in :entiles. &hese writers adopted what eventually became a favorite Soviet tactic against dissidents= anyone whose political views differed from theirs was insane. () $hristian self'denial, and especially se9ual repression, caused hatred of the Eews (according to /dorno et al.).M(*1) The Authoritarian %ersonality remains widely cited in the social sciences and continues to inspire research interest today.(*")

Introdu"in# the Frank(urt S"hoo

Ben"amin # $orkheimer # Adorno # Marcuse
Feeds: 2osts *omments 3 Summary: The &or' of ,rt in The ,ge of Mechanical Reproduction Theodor ,dorno: Reflections on *lass Theory 4

Summary # %ialectic of Enlightenment

.ebruary *", *++" by ginal .or Jant, Enlightenment liberates us from authority. &hose who hold authorityhave mystery. &he priest has special access to the mystery of religion> it is through him where :od comes towards us. &he Enlightenment says that human reason is capable of answering all the 6uestions that the previous authority had answers to. When you have a rational claim, youKve laid a path that someone else can easily follow to the same conclusion. &he light of the Enlightenment leads to %nowledge in this respect. .or Jant, this frees us from authoritarianism> we now understand the light of the world from our own reason.

,n ?ialectic of Enlightenment, 0or%heimer and /dorno contest Jant and the positivity of Enlightenment. .or 0or%heimer and /dorno, there is a continuity of the age of myth within Enlightenment and modernity in general. 7odernity fulfills what myth always wanted to. ?o we really see the world in the light of our reasonR ,s that the effect of the EnlightenmentR $an we be placed bac% into a position of reflection after this shift of modernityR ,s there something about modernity itself which sustains a purposes in the violence of second half of the twentieth centuryR .or 0or%heimer and /dorno, what was promised to us in the age of Enlightenment was never an honest one= now it is a nightmare. 0or%heimer and /dorno as% what it means to thin% of modernity as progress in this post' Enlightenment eraR Why would anyone li%e the Enlightenment anyway when all it has done is lead us down this violent and barbaric pathR ,s this the price we must pay for progress> a simple bitter pill we have to swallow in order to %eep going forwardR /s rational creatures, we are authorities on to ourselves, since reason itself is an authority. What could possibly be wrong with this descriptionR 0ere 0or%heimer and /dorno try to account for why the world is the way it is. &he irrationality that lies within a non'rational observation leaves us not with a 6uestion of truth, but of effect which in and of itself constitutes a new construction of truth. &here is a loss of animism in modernity, leaving us with the %nowledge that there is no soul or spirit in every obAect. 4ut if man is no longer an eidos, then where does this leave usR /fter the Enlightenment, man becomes a master of nature. &he mind does not con6uer matter, rather, there is a Lhappy matchM between the two. What goes on in the mind matches well with nature once man has become a master of it and for the most part, himself. &he LmasteryM of nature is a confirmation of said Lhappy matchM, thus ma%ing mastery something we are totally fine with. ,tKs no coincidence then, that the Enlightenment is connected to the scientific method= where there is place for everything that has yet to be thought and con6uered. ,n this happy match between mind and matter we are bound to ourselves. Sovereignty in this instance ta%es on two roles= one of unlimited %nowledge where we are unlimited in what we can now and that in and of itself is a nucleus of power. Second, that there is freedom and being unbound by tradition. Scientific reasoning then, is a reali5ation of these two points. &hat science is the model of scientific reasoning as the only plausible Band bestC e9planation for the way things are gives us power over tradition, ma%ing us feel free of it. &he unlimited %nowledge leaves science as an arbiter of what remains legitimate. 0owever, the sovereignty of the human becomes one of bureaucracy and technology, wherein there is a perfect rational management of life. &here is a removal of mystery in nature, where the curiosity to discover what has yet to be %nown is removed. &his lies within the relationship between fear and mastery for /dorno and 0or%heimer. / fear of what lies outside of what we %now begs for us to 6uestion where our security rests. /n alleviation of fear and an emergence of complacency is where we stand in this new age of manKs rational sovereignty. Enlightenment is technology and it is also progress. Progress is rendered as something other than progress in this moment> progress and barbarism are not opposed to each other here. &echnology shows us that the myths of the past are false and this brea% with myth is a transformation of a certain conception of myth in total. Enlightenment overturns myth as an animism and disenchants the world. &echnology is a mindset= a worldview and a way of being. ,nstruments in the world becomes symptoms of modernity and Enlightenment. ,tKs a total way of being= there is an e9planation and a reason for everything. 4ureaucratic reason then, portrays this way of being that manages our human reason rationally. &here is a promise in the Enlightenment to return bac% to our rationality> everyone has the same sense of reason

and we can all be rationally understood and bureaucratically managed because of it. ,s it possible to be re'enchanted with the worldR ,s it possible for us to reflect on our sovereign rationalityR ,s there a way for us not to be bureaucratically managedR Pr, would it inevitably lead us bac% into a constant re'plugging into a system which has only served to envelop us in violence, barbarism, a false sense of unity, and isolationR Jey Passages= LEnlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. @et the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity. EnlightenmentKs programs was the disenchantment of the world. ,t wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with %nowledgeM B/dorno, 0or%heimer, C. LJnowledge, which is power, %nows no limits, either in its enslavement of creation or in its deference to worldly matters. Eust as it serves all the purposes of the bourgeoisie economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins. Jings control technology no more directly than do merchants= it is as democractic as the economic system with which it evolved. &echnology is the essense of this %nowledgeM B/dorno, 0or%heimer, *C. LWhat human beings see% to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings. ;othing else counts. Duthless towards itself, the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its self'awareness. Pnly though which does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter mythsMB/dorno, 0or%heimer, *C L&he disenchantment of the world means the e9tripation of animismMB/dorno, 0or%heimer, *C. L.or the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately one, is illusion> modern positivism consigns it to poetry. <nity remains the watchword from Parmenides to Dussell. /ll gods and 6ualities must be destroyedMB/dorno, 0or%heimer, -'#C. LEach human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from all the others, so that it could all the more surely be made the sameMB/dorno, 0or%heimer, !C. L0umans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything un%nownMB/dorno, 0or%heimer, C.

Dialectic of Enlightenment
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Dialectic of Enlightenment
Max "or'heimer Theodor &. ,dorno Dialektik der Aufklrung 6ermany 6erman 2hilosophy Sociology 17+/ 17/2 2aperbac' !8+ 8918+/9!.!!92 +11-1+717! 21 :!2/7."1+/! 2-1! 2882

Author Original title Country anguage !ub"ect #ublication date #ublished in $nglish %edia type #ages &!'( OC C (umber )e*ey )ecimal C Classification

Dialectic of Enlightenment B:erman= Diale-ti- der Auf-l.rungC is a wor% of philosophy and social criticism written by .ran%furt School philosophers 7a9 0or%heimer and &heodor W. /dorno and first published in !--. Pne of the core te9ts of $ritical theory, it e9plains the socio'psychological status &uo that had been responsible for what the .ran%furt School considered the failure of the /ge of Enlightenment. &ogether with The Authoritarian %ersonality B !#+> also co'authored by /dornoC and .ran%furt School member 0erbert 7arcuse8s !ne$Dimensional )an B !2-C, it has had a maAor effect on *+th century philosophy, sociology, culture, and politics, inspiring especially the ;ew Geft of the !2+s and !1+s.


1 "istorical context 2 Topics and themes ! #ditions

+ See also - 0otes . #xternal lin's

$istorical conte t
2art of a series on the Frankfurt !chool

%a"or *orks Reason and Revolution The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction clipse of Reason scape fro! "reedo! Dialectic of Enlightenment Mini!a Moralia ros and #ivili$ation %ne&Di!ensional Man 'egative Dialectics The (tructural Transfor!ation of the )u*lic (phere The Theor+ of #o!!unicative Action

(otable theorists Max "or'heimer + Theodor ,dorno "erbert Marcuse + &alter :en;amin #rich $romm + $riedrich 2olloc'

<eo <=wenthal + (>rgen "abermas &mportant concepts *ritical theory + ?ialectic + 2raxis 2sychoanalysis + ,ntipositivism 2opular culture + *ulture industry ,dvanced capitalism 2rivatism + 0on9identity *ommunicative rationality <egitimation crisis

v t e

Pne of the distinguishing characteristics of the new $ritical &heory, as /dorno and 0or%heimer tried to elaborate it in Dialectic of Enlightenment, is a certain ambivalence concerning the ultimate source or foundation of social domination. &his ambivalence gave rise to the LpessimismM of the new $ritical &heory over the possibility of human emancipation and freedom.( ) &his ambivalence was rooted in the historical circumstances in which Dialectic of Enlightenment was originally produced= the authors saw ;ational Socialism, Stalinism, state capitalism,(need &uotation to verify) and mass culture as entirely new forms of social domination that could not be ade6uately e9plained within the terms of traditional $ritical &heory.(*) .or /dorno and 0or%heimer Brelying on the economist .riedrich Polloc%Ks thesis on ;ational SocialismC,(F) state intervention in the economy had effectively abolished the tension in capitalism between the "relations of production" and "material productive forces of society," a tension which, according to traditional $ritical &heory, constituted the primary contradiction within capitalism. &he mar%et Bas an "unconscious" mechanism for the distribution of goodsC and private property had been replaced by centrali5ed planning and sociali5ed ownership of the means of production.(-) @et, contrary to 7ar9Ks famous prediction in the %reface to a (ontri#ution to the (riti&ue of %olitical Economy, this shift did not lead to "an era of social revolution," but rather to fascism and totalitarianism. /s such, traditional $ritical &heory was left, in ESrgen 0abermasK words, without "anything in reserve to which it might appeal> and when the forces of production enter into a baneful symbiosis with the relations of production that they were supposed to blow wide open, there is no longer any dynamism upon which criti6ue could base its hope."(#) .or /dorno and 0or%heimer, this posed the problem of how to account for the apparent persistence of domination in the absence of the very contradiction that, according to traditional $ritical &heory, was the source of domination itself.(citation needed)

To!ics and themes

&he problems posed by the rise of fascism with the demise of the liberal state and the mar%et Btogether with the failure of a social revolution to materiali5e in its wa%eC, constitute the theoretical and historical perspective that frames the overall argument of the boo% H the two theses that L7yth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.M (2) &he history of human societies, as well as that of the formation of individual ego or self, is re' evaluated from the standpoint of what 0or%heimer and /dorno perceived at the time as the ultimate outcome of this history= the collapse or LregressionM of reason, with the rise of ;ational Socialism, into something resembling the very forms of superstition and myth out of which reason had supposedly emerged as a result of historical progress or development. &o characteri5e this history, 0or%heimer and /dorno draw on a wide variety of material, including the philosophical anthropology contained in 7ar9Ks early writings, centered on the notion of Llabor,M ;iet5scheKs genealogy of morals Band the emergence of conscience through the renunciation of the will to powerC, .reudKs account in Totem and Ta#oo of the emergence of civili5ation and law in murder of the primordial father,(1) ethnological research on magic and ritual in primitive societies,(") as well myth criticism, philology and literary analysis. &he boo% coined the term culture industry, arguing that in a capitalist society mass culture is a%in to a factory producing standardi5ed cultural goods films, radio programmes, maga5ines, etc.(!) &hese homogeni5ed cultural products are used to manipulate mass society into docility and passivity.( +) &he introduction of the radio, a mass medium, no longer permits its listener any mechanism of reply, as was the case with the telephone. ,nstead, listeners are not subAects anymore but passive receptacles e9posed "in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put by different stations." http=IIuserwww.sfsu.eduIepfIAournalTarchiveIvolumeTU,,,T !!"IandrewsTm.pdf FOLLOW THIS LINK

The %ialectic of Enlightenment

0o *omments% @ncategoriAed% by ,dministrator.

Pf the three diagnoses of World War ,, we are considering, /dornoKs and 0or%heimerKs is the most difficult to grasp. . 0aye% wants us to believe that all concentrations of political power, because they place limits on individual choice, place us on the Doad to Serfdom. J Polanyi wants us to appreciate both why the self'regulating free mar%et re6uires an unprecedented and continuous intervention by absolutist states and why the public periodically intervenes to protect itself against the e9cesses of so'called self'regulating mar%ets. 4y contrast, /dorno and 0or%heimer want us to critically reflect on the %inds of individuals for whom fascism and /nti'Semitism prove attractive. 0ow can such individuals e9ist and what part does society play in their formationR &o begin with, no one , thin% will doubt that our personalities are intimately shaped and structured by our e9perience. /nd few will doubt that these e9periences in turn are intimately shaped by the conditions of our formation as children and adolescents. &a%ing this as a foundation, /dorno and 0or%heimer invite us to reflect on the deprivation and violence, both direct and indirect, that bring social actors to view other human beings who have caused them no harm as e9istential threats both to themselves and to their way of life. What deprivation

and violence might bring us to hold the elimination of these other human beings as necessary for my own growth and fulfillmentR &heir answer is both social and psychological. &heir answer is social insofar as they fault the capitalist economic system for creating the conditions under which individuals come to dominate and be dominated by one another economically. 4ut their answer is psychological insofar as both the commodities produced as well as the manner of their production reinforce the %inds of neuroses and pathologies upon which the reproduction and e9pansion of the social system depends. ,n the language of S .reud, upon whose theories /dornoKs and 0or%heimerKs wor% relies, the Egos of modern social actors are brought to misidentify the threats to their e9istence and to completely overloo% the actual threats. 7oreover, the producer and mediator of the actual threats Bwhich they elsewhere identify with the Lculture industryM within a the Ltotally administered societyMC comes to occupy the place traditional religions once occupied, as the Superego that appears to supply accurate, shared, truthful information about the world around them, correcting and corroborating a Lreality principleM that is no longer fully functional. .inally, the ,d, the seat of animal pleasure and pain, is manipulated at will by societyKs careta%ers in order to elicit desired responses from a completely compliant public. 4ut what , would li%e students to pay particular attention to is the manner in which /dorno and 0or%heimer replace the 0egelian or 7ar9ist historical dialectic with a transcendentally idealistic Bi.e., JantianC subAect'obAect dialectic. ,n the 0egelian or 7ar9ist version, a comple9 social and historical formation composed of a variety of different movements and forces is held nevertheless to be systemically integrated> that is to say, 0egel and 7ar9 believed that the many different elements within this formation both shaped and were in turn shaped by one another. 4ut ta%en by itself this does not yet constitute a LdialecticM since we can well imagine all of these elements simply bouncing off of one another without any particular result. ?ialectical interaction issues in a directional movement. /nd it issues in a directional movement because the individual elements out of which it is composed, ta%en as a whole, come to bear a logical and rational relationship to one another. When compared to 0egelKs and 7ar9Ks dialectic, JantKs transcendentally idealistic subAect' obAect dynamic turns out not to be a LdialecticM at all H but merely an oppositional form. &his helps to e9plain why /dorno and 0or%heimer habitually revert to terminology drawn from transcendental idealism where the transcendental SubAect faces off against an PbAect and where the relationship between the two H the subAect'obAect relation H is believed to compose Lreality.M Pbviously, this raises serious 6uestions for /dorno and 0or%heimer about what part of reality the SubAect supplies out of its own e9perience and what part the PbAect supplies from its own 4eing'in',tself. /t times the SubAect can completely annihilate its PbAect, depriving it of its very being. /t other times the PbAect can completely engulf and annihilate the SubAect, determining its very being and depriving it of its subAectivity. 4ut the first thing students will need to recogni5e is that although it is dynamic, this relationship is not dialectical= it is going nowhere. /nd it is in this sense and for this reason that it is also not historical. &his helps to e9plain why, when they revert to subAect'obAect terminology, /dorno and 0or%heimer also abandon their historical perspective and adopt what might be called an anthropological or even ontologically absolutist position. /t such points in their te9t, /dorno and 0or%heimer ta%e off

on tangents in which they discuss aboriginal human society or protohominids or basic animal psychology. Such tangents are not without value. We are biologically and psychologically related to all other hominids. @et, if we are trying to account for the specific pathology that appeared between !*! and !-# in central Europe, then references to the subAect'obAect relationship or to the psychology or anthropology of all hominids throughout all time are not li%ely to help us e9plain why this specific pathology appeared between !*! and !-# and not, say between "*! and "-#. 4ut, let us assume that /dorno and 0or%heimer are correct. Get us assume that the SubAect has been completely annihilated and that we live in a totally administered society. .rom whence then arises that critical subAectivity capable of recogni5ing, naming, and interpreting this total administrationR ,t cannot arise from within, for everyone within this society is, well, totally administered. Which means that it must arise from without. 4ut from where withoutR /nd why would an insight completely removed from the totally administered society be in a position to accurately interpret itR Why, in other words, should we believe that these completely e9trinsic, independent, interpretive categories bore anything other than a conventional, purely formal, arbitrary relationship to the totality it hoped to interpretR &hese 6uestions point to a second problem with /dorno and 0or%heimerKs approach. &ruth is held to arise from a place completely removed from the obAect of research. &his is why such research imagines itself to be LobAective.M 4ut is there in fact ever such a placeR /re we not all always completely embedded in and shaped by the world we are interpretingR 7oreover, /dorno and 0or%heimerKs approach raises a 6uestion about the lever they feel we would have to pull, the action we would have to ta%e, to emancipate social actors from their totally administered society. 0ere /dorno and 0or%heimer are best when they address the substantive conditions that ma%e for freedom H absence of violence and want along with the presence of care, curiosity, and creativity. ,t is when they revert to subAect'obAect language that they become less helpful. 0ow might , preserve my subAect position without destroying the obAectR 0ow might , recogni5e and respect the precariousness of my own subAect positionR Pr, more generally, how might we distribute competent psychoanalysts liberally among the entire populationR So perhaps we need to reflect more carefully and more critically over how social theory of the variety practiced by /dorno and 0or%heimer might have been shaped by its own historical and social landscape and why this variety has proven so popular among a specific segment of the intellectual, literary, and artistic community. /t the same time, it is also worth reflecting on the psychological damage violence, want, and loss on such a massive scale might cause and how we might even begin to treat the neuroses, psychoses, and pathologies caused by this violence.

September 30th, 2013

&riedrich $ayek' Balkan (ars' and the )S Government Shutdo*n

0o *omments% @ncategoriAed% by ,dministrator.

Eoseph W.0. Gough When viewed from eastern 4osnia and 0er5egovina, the <S government and its current Band recurringC budget crisis may seem a long way away. 4ut as this wee%Ks readings from .riedrich 0aye% show, for better or worse, Washington ?$ and &u5la, 4i0, are virtual neighbors. ,t is not only that the global economic downturn beginning in the !1+s signaled the end to rapid economic e9pansion not only for the <S, but also for Europe, and not only for Europe, but also for the Eastern 4loc. $iti5ens of the former @ugoslavia may still recall the initial flush of power and pride they felt when in the !1+s their fortunes seemed ready to turn. Every ribbon'cutting at a new factory seemed to promise the dawn of a new day. .ew, however, will li%ely associate this sudden burst in productive potential with the impending collapse of global mar%ets, labor unrest in the !"+s, the contraction of orders throughout the soviet bloc, and the eventual collapse of soviet hegemony in !"!. ;or will they draw the connection between this global economic contraction and the spread of a new, post' Jeynesian, economic orthodo9y, the Washington consensus that underwrote not simply the privati5ation of formerly public assets, but the consolidation of these assets, scooped up at fire sale prices, in the hands of a new global oligarchy. &he global economic downturn beginning in the !1+s forms an important chapter both in post'war social, political, and economic transformation and therefore also in the brea%up of the former Soviet <nion and the entrenchment of a new post'$old War global oligarchy. 4ut it is not only only or even the most important chapter. /fter all, it was the complete gutting of the European and /sian economies in the !F+s and -+s, due in large measure to the war, that catapulted the <S into global economic leadership. /nd it was this leadership, fre6uently confused with the moral variety, that transformed Europe and /sia briefly into the outlets of overabundant <S consumer goods and loans. &hen, in the !2+s, the economies of :ermany, /sia, and even the soviet bloc, fully now recovered from the devastation of their productive capacities lost during the war, began to e9ert competitive, downward pressure on world mar%ets. 4ut, between !F* and !2- H outside of the brief spi%e in Eapanese productivity provo%ed by its war efforts, and of :erman productivity between !F* and !-+ H the <S was the only game in town. &his is not to diminish EapanKs or :ermanyKs industrial achievements, which were not insignificant during the !F+s and -+s. ;evertheless, we should not allow these achievements to obscure the larger theme= that <S economic growth and economic leadership from !F* to !2- was built largely upon the destruction of European and /sian productive capacity. When in the late !2+s global competition initiates a proverbial Lrace to the bottom,M we need to remember that the economic leadership that the <S briefly enAoyed was based in large measure on the vagaries of war and its aftermath. Which brings us to this wee%Ks readings, first of .riedrich 0aye%, then of Jarl Polanyi Bwith whom we will concern ourselves in another postC. 0aye%, of course, is a darling within the von 7ises libertarian crowds, second only to $arl 7anger among free'mar%et prophets. /nd, so, it is 0aye% Bamong othersC who bears much of the theoretical credit Bor blameC for the impending <S governmental shutdown. :iven his current celebrity status, it might be difficult for us to recall how completely peripheral he was among policy ma%ers and economic theorists in the !-+s and !#+s, when the devastation of EuropeKs and /siaKs economies, along with war credits to western Europe, helped fuel a post'war neo'Jeynesian bacchanalia in the <S. 7oreover, given recent memory of the role unregulated mar%ets had played generating social unrest and political turmoil in fin de siVcle Europe and /sia, and the even

more prominent role they had played in the interwar period, small wonder that no one in the !#+s was ready to pay much attention to 0aye%Ks warnings of the Doad to Serfdom he felt both :reat 4ritain and the <S were wal%ing in their half'hearted embrace of centrali5ed state' administered economies. ,t was therefore only with the global economic downturn, beginning in the late !2+s, that anyone began to pay any attention at all to 0aye%Ks dire warnings of impending serfdom or to his spirited defense of free mar%ets. &oday, on the eve of still another government shutdown and possibly a default on <S government loans, 7r. 0aye% and his defenders are riding high in the saddle. &hey believe that free private mar%ets and not government bureaucrats should set prices and that it is prices and not government services or policies that should mediate our relations with one another. ?escending from the heights of theory to everyday life, however, we are made aware of an entirely different story. &hus, we can well understand why a citi5en born into the /ustro' 0ungarian Empire might not fully grasp the distinction between the state administrative apparatus and democratic government> might not grasp, that is to say, why democratic government is not 6uite the same thing as rule by committee members appointed by state bureaucrats and oligarchs. Eust as we can understand why a theorist trained in the /ustrian School might hold such deep and abiding animus against everything :erman, specially if connections can be drawn Bwhich they canC, between the :erman 0istorical SchoolKs embrace of a benevolent state H above both politics and economics H administering or regulating all parts of society for the good of the whole and the ;ational Socialist and Soviet appropriations from and perfections of centrally'administered state governing structures. 0is near complete unfamiliarity with 4ritish common law or <S republicanism also helps e9plain 0aye%Ks aw%ward interactions with 4ritish and <S officials. &he notion that publicly elected representatives might be charged with restricting free mar%ets not on behalf of a small oligarchic elite, but on behalf of the democratic maAorities who elected them, was completely foreign to 0aye%. Which meant that his only academic and policy allies were drawn from the e9treme right wing fringe, members of the 7ontpellier Society who habitually mistoo% opposition to regulated mar%ets and democratic socialist institutions for opposition to ;ational Socialist and Soviet totalitarianism. 0aye% himself, who could not erase the :reat ?epression or its aftermath from his personal memory, was prepared to debate the merits of some %ind of social welfare H available to and used by all, for e9ample universal health care, education, and other supplements for housing, food, and clothing. What he most feared was a government that treated citi5ens selectively> prohibiting individuals from applying for certain Aobs or pursuing certain careers, on the one hand, or selecting others for precisely these Aobs and careers, irrespective of the individualsK merits. 0aye% was not an altogether unreasonable man. @et, this not altogether unreasonable man was hamstrung by an interpretive framewor% that was far less reasonable. /nd it upon this far less reasonable interpretive framewor% that the &ea Party and its Depublican allies in the <S $ongress are erecting their barricades. /ccording to this framewor% P<4G,$ W $E;&D/G $P;&DPG and PD,U/&E 7/DJE& W ?E7P$D/$@, which means that any publicly administered or regulated program poses a ris% to true democracy. /nd this includes the military as well, which true believers feel should be completely privately administered and staffed. What could be simplerR &wo individuals meet in a mar%etplace to sell and e9change goods. ;o war. ;o conflict. Eust two individuals settling on a price. ,f they agree upon a price, they both go away happy. ,f they donKt agree, then they return home with their goods, none the worse off, until either they lower their price

or the good increases its value in their eyes. ;o government intervention re6uired. ;o committee needed. ,t is, as 7ilton .riedman and :ary 4ec%er pointed out during the !#+s and !2+s ad infinitum, the perfect democracy. @et, what these two elo6uent $hicago stat Aoc%s and their /ustrian idol could not grasp was the profound ine6ualities separating the various agents entering the far'from'neutral mar%etplace. .or .riedman, 4ec%er, and 0aye%, it was simply a matter of twea%ing the regulatory apparatus LAust so,M to create a Llevel playing field.M Should one or another private player H a Doc%efeller or a 7urdoc% H accumulate too much power or influence, then let another player run onto the field, offer the same good at a lower price, produce the same good more efficiently> and viola3 ?emocracy saved once again3 &hey clearly did not imagine a world in which legislators and Aurists would become wholly owned subsidiaries of the oligarchs to which they owed their power. 7ore significantly, they had no grasp of, much less sympathy for the 1th and "th centuriesK resuscitation of classical republican theory> the theory that granted democratically elected representatives the responsibility under constitutional law of establishing, e9panding, and protecting res u#lica, the wealth we hold in common Bor commonwealthC= the Depublic. ,n their view, republican values and institutions are a complete oddity, an anachronism superseded by the free mar%et. 4ut, for this very reason, they are completely comfortable when military Auntas intervene to suppress popular uprisings directed against e9cesses in the free mar%et. .or although the free mar%et is Lself'correcting,M it can only self'correct in the absence of public intervention. Should the public threaten the unimpeded functioning of the mar%et mechanism, then the state or the military, or both, have the duty to intervene and restore peace and the rule of law. ,t was, in fact, in order to restore this unimpeded functioning of mar%ets that the ;ational Socialists were elected in !F*> to clear the streets of communists, anarchists, and Eews. /nd so it was in the !"+s in the former @ugoslavia that nationalists were able to ta%e advantage of widespread labor unrest and social ine6uality, promoting both war and independence as means for restoring law and order. Pf course the causes for conflict in the former @ugoslavia are comple9. @et, once we recogni5e their place in the broader global economic downturn beginning in the !2+s, we may also be able to appreciate how and why 0aye% and his $hicago School colleagues were hailed as saviors by investors see%ing an e9planation for their declining rates of profit. &he e9planation was inefficiency caused by public regulation of private institutions. Shrin% governments, gut regulations, reduce public supports and restore high rates of profit. /nd so we find ourselves in much the same position globally as the world found itself in !F*. /lready facing historic levels of under' and unemployment, with popular unrest spreading throughout the 7iddle East, ;orthern /frica, and South $entral Europe, the Depublican leadership in the <S $ongress is readying to unleash the largest anti'stimulus the world has ever seen. WhyR Well, in part it is because they are spellbound by what they mista%e for the genius of the free mar%et. 4ut this begs the 6uestion= why are they so spellboundR &hey are spellbound because the private agents who now completely control both what people %now Bthe mediaC and who they elect Bthe $ongressC are very effective wi5ards. 4ut, in a few short wee%s, when the bottom drops out of world mar%ets and the under' and unemployed empty into the streets, we shall

see the limits to their wi5ardry. /re there enough tan%s, military police, right wing militias, thugs and s%inheads to put down such massive unrestR Will the right wing nationalists, always standing ready to ta%e advantage of social unrest, be able to turn this crisis too into an international bloodbathR /nd, should this prove possible, how will this effect overall capital flows and investmentsR Who will win and who will loseR Which is why everyone has one word on their lips= $hina.

September 27th, 2013

The Sha!e of +ur %isaster

0o *omments% @ncategoriAed% by ,dministrator.

Eoseph W.0. Gough , have Aust posted five selections under the ?ownloads tab= .riedrich 0aye%Ns Doad to Serfdom Be9cerptC, Jarl PolanyiNs :reat &ransformation Be9cerptsC, &heodor /dorno, et alKs /uthoritarian Personality Be9cerptsC, &heodor /dorno and 7a9 0or%heimerNs &he ?ialectic of Enlightenment Be9cerptsC, and ?avid 4lac%bourn and :eoff EleyNs Peculiarities of :erman 0istory Be9cerptsC. Pver *.#X of the worldKs population, 2+ million people, lost their lives in World War ,,, an event and a number that deserve some %ind of accounting. 4ut, of course, the accounting scholars offer will not be altogether different from the accounting they offered prior to the war. &hus, even the best of scholars are not immune from a %ind of normali5ation and naturali5ation of events and numbers that are by any rec%oning abnormal and unnatural. .riedrich 0aye%, trained prior to the war in /ustrian marginal utility economics, inevitably views the war as an outgrowth of the Lpeculiarities of :erman history,M the title of ?avid 4lac%bourn and :eoff EleyKs critical reflection on post'war historical interpretation. Jarl Polanyi, by contrast, was trained in :erman critical social theory and historical interpretation. &heodor /dorno and 7a9 0or%heimer were also trained in this tradition, supplemented by a heavy dose of .reudian psychoanalytic theory. &heir views of the causes of the war and its li%ely futures reflect the training they received and the interpretive categories they developed prior to the war. Which is not to say that the war had no impact on their subse6uent interpretations. &he war reinforced and validated these interpretations. &hus, for e9ample, prior to the war .riedrich 0aye% was widely viewed as a %oo% and a charlatan. 0e had no success landing a leading position in England, whose policy establishment, wor%ing under the spell of Eohn 7aynard Jeynes, had little time for his free'mar%et orthodo9y. .ollowing the war, 0aye% continued to be viewed as a %oo%. 0owever, World War ,, outfitted 0aye% with an additional argument= if you donKt listen to me, you too could wind up wandering down the same Lroad to serfdomM as the followers of 0itler and Stalin.
,mong historians of all varieties% "aye' continues to be viewed as a 'oo' and charlatan. Bet% among a small but influential group of policyma'ers C men and women who% along with "aye'% had only the thinnest appreciation for historical% social% political and economic

explanation C "aye'Ds dire warnings hit their mar'. :y contrast% Earl 2olanyi% Theodor ,dorno% and Max "or'heimer C all trained in and intimately familiar with advanced methods of social scientific interpretation C en;oyed reputations critical of capitalism. ,s a result% they were widely shunned by the policy9ma'ing establishment% even though among social scientists their interpretations came to carry significant weight.

Since, however, we are not holding a beauty pageant, we are free to e9amine these arguments on their own merits, not with a view to changing economic or social policy, but with the goal of grasping the formation of social, cultural, and economic life in the !2+s, 1+s, and beyond. /nd it is in this light that , am hoping we can read and discuss these seminal wor%s.