SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS.

JUDGE LANTION FACTS: On June 18, 1999 the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include: 1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US 2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax 3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television 4. False statement or entries 5. Election contribution in name of another The Department of Justice, through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the ff. grounds: 1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable. 2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents. 3. Finally, the country is bound to the Vienna convention on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties. The respondent filed for petition of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The RTC of NCR ruled in favor of the respondent. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. ISSUES AND RULING: 1. Whether or not private is respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing RULING: Yes. Section 2(a) of PD 1086 defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the Department of Justice as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheels for the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request and the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a

prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation, the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice and hearing according to Art. 3 sec 14(1) and (2), as well as Art. 3 sec 7the right of the people to information on matters of public concern and the corollary right to access to official records and documents. The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of the prospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent. The basic rights of notice and hearing are applicable in criminal, civil and administrative proceedings. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein and present their side. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a.When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b.Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, and the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time (summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c.Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. 2. Whether or not this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? RULING: No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation doesnt fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Section 3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON there is any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition treaty RULING: No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty. No conflict. Veil of secrecy is lifted during trial. Request should impose veil at any stage.

Judgment: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. Kapunan, separate concurring opinion: While the evaluation process conducted by the DOJ is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from hima fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. Puno, dissenting: Case at bar does not involve guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake if our governments international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. Panganiban, dissenting: Instant petition refers only to the evaluation stage.US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before the Supreme Court in GR 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Supreme Court issued its 17 October 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 15 April 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses (2) tax evasion, (3) wire fraud, (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD 1069. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that Jimenezs application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of

Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001. The DOJ filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Held: Extradition is different from ordinary criminal proceedings. There is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from

general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

RODRIGUEZ VS. PRESIDING JUDGE

HONGKONG VS.JUDGE OLALIA FACTS: Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms. On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and detained. On November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for his extradition. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted. Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same judge. ISSUE: Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail. HELD: The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

ATTY. ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE BAGTAS

PEOPLE VS. BUCALON FACTS: After the prosecution rested its case in a Murder case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence .The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order of March14, 2002, because: The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in this case. The defense thereupon presented evidence in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, and as such, he could be released on bail. HELD: The Demurrer to Evidence is tantamount to an application for bail. He could be granted bail.

DE LA CAMARA VS. ENAGE Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7 November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968. Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against de la Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by de la Camara with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of 21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II) started the trial of de la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10 July 1969. The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting de la Camara's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however remained adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the meanwhile, de la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail. Issue: Whether the judge has absolute discretion in the determination of the amount of bail, excessive enough to discourage the accused from fleeing. Held: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970 fixing

the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by de la Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in the present case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses. No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call for repudiation from the Supreme Court. PESTANO VS. JUDGE VELASCO ???

PEOPLE VS. DONATO

Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody. ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail. HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.