CASE REPORTS: SC Clarifies Rules on Initiating Contempt Proceedings; Absolves Lawyer

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

The Supreme Court recently absolved Atty. Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado of indirect contempt as the proceedings against her had been improperly initiated. The Court held that Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for two ways to initiate indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. It found that the contempt proceedings against Atty. Regalado were improperly initiated by the filing of an unverified Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. Evidently, the proceedings attendant to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado for indirect contempt suffered a serious procedural defect to which this Court cannot close its eyes without offending the fundamental principles enunciated in the Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated, the Court said, even as it accorded respect to the Court of Appeals factual findings that Atty. Regalados acts constitute indirect contempt. The Court of Appeals earlier had convicted Atty. Regalado of indirect contempt and fined her Php5,000 for facilitating a compromise agreement in an illegal dismissal case on appeal with the appellate court without the presence of the opposing partys counsel. (GR No. 167988, Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado vs. Antonio S. Go, February 6, 2007)

Benchmark Online February 2007

Love in the Words of the Court

Compiled by Atty. Richard Pascual, !!ice o! the Reporter

In this month of hearts, we have compiled the following passages from decisions of the Court throughout the decades that speak of that mysterious thing called LOVE. Love of country should be something permanent and lasting, ending only in death; loyalty should be its worth of offspring. The outward manifestation of one or the other may for a time be prevented or thwarted by the irresistible action of the occupant; but this should not in the least extinguish nor obliterate the invisible feelings, and promptings of the spirit. (GR No. L-409. Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa, January 30, 1947) There is nothing objectionable in her taking advantage of the law to give tangible expression to her maternal love, which is, without any doubt, universally considered the most sublime feeling nature has infused in human hearts. The feeling is so elemental that it is not unknown even to the lowest phyla of the animal kingdom. That even the fiercest wild animals are not devoid of such feeling is a wonder that cannot fail to move [the] most indifferent person. (GR No. L- 1663, Florentina Villahermosa v. The Commissioner of Immigration, March 31, 1948) Men may differ and do differ on religious beliefs and creeds, government policies, the wisdom and legality of laws, even the correctness of judicial decisions and decrees; but in the field of love of countrythey can hardly afford to differ, for these are matters in which they are mutually and vitally interested, for to them, they mean national existence and survival as a nation. (GR No. L-13954, Genaro Gerona, et al. v. The Honorable Sec. of Education, et al., August 12, 1959) The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial promise of love (f)or better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part, are sometimes easier said than done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of matrimonial shoals. In the case now before us for appellate review, the marriage literally ended under circumstances which the criminal law, disdainful of romanticism, bluntly calls the felony of parricide. (GR No. 102984. People of the Philippines v. Ruben Takbobo, June 30, 1993) Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. (GR No. 119190, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao- Tsoi, January 16, 1997) Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing, and safeguard their best interest and welfare. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offspring invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child. (GR No. 114742, Carlitos E. Silva v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Suzanne T. Gonzales, July 17, 1997) We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason. (GR No. 97369, Patricia Figueroa, v. Simeon Barranco, Jr., July 31, 1997) That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other. (AM P-02-1651, Estrada v. Escritor, August 4, 2003) The Court, like all well-meaning persons, has no desire to dash romantic fancies, yet in the exercise of its duty, is all too willing when necessary to raise the wall that tears Pyramus and Thisbe asunder. (AM No. P-02- 1564, Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, November 23, 2004)

Benchmark Online March 2007

SC Affirms Reinstatement of Employee Dismissed on Account of Pregnancy

By Arcie M. "ercado

It is illegal to terminate an employee on account of her pregnancy. The Supreme Court found that Del Monte Philippines, Inc. illegally terminated the employment of its field laborer Lolita Velasco after she had been absent from work due to a urinary tract infection contracted during pregnancy. It ruled that absences due to a justified cause cannot be a ground for dismissal, even if the dates of her absences do not correspond to those in her medical certificates because pregnancy is a long-term condition accompanied by an assortment of related illnesses. The Court found that Velasco was able to justify her absences in accordance with company rules and policy. Prior to her absences, Velasco consulted the companys doctor, who advised her to have rest-inquarters for several days. Likewise, she attempted to file leaves of absence, which Del Montes supervisor unjustifiably refused to receive. The Court also ruled that Del Monte had no legal basis to terminate Velasco on the ground that the latter had an alleged long history of unauthorized absences committed several years beforehand and that these absences should also be considered. The Court held that Velascos last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained. These cannot be considered together with her previous infractions as gross and habitual neglect. Article 137 of the Labor code states that it is unlawful for any employer to discharge a woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. (GR No. 153477, Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Lolita Velasco, March 6, 2007)

Court Upholds Retainer Contract

By Gleo "p. Guerra

The Court upheld the validity of a retainer contact between Aurora B. Camacho and Atty. Angelino Banzon whereby the former undertook to convey 5,000 sq. m of her property as payment for the latters legal services. It, however, ruled that Atty. Banzon is no longer entitled to an additional 1,000 sq.m., it appearing that the parties had agreed upon specific sums of money as attorneys fees for their other cases. The Court held that Lawyers areas much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of the counsel. The duty of the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. If lawyers are entitled to fees even if there is no written contract, with more reason that they are entitled thereto if their relationship is governed by a written contract of attorneys fees. (GR No. 127520, Aurora Fe B. Camacho v. Court of Appeals and Angelino Banzon, February 9, 2007)

SC Adopts Addl Rules re TROs on Foreclosures of Real Estate Mortgages

By #ay B. Rempillo

The Supreme Court has issued additional guidelines on the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TROs) or writs of preliminary injunctions enjoining foreclosures of real estate mortgages, effective March 10, 2007. The following guidelines are contained in the Courts three-page resolution adopting the following additional rules on Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages as recommended by the SC Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court: 1. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment; 2. No TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least 12 percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending; 3. Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the SC, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving Php10 million and above; 4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order. (AM No. 99-10-05-O, Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial Or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages, February 20, 2007)

MERALCO Ordered to Pay Damages to Subscriber

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

The Supreme Court recently ordered the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to desist from collecting an unjustified billing adjustment from its subscriber Ma. Victoria Jose and to pay her moral and exemplary damages. MERALCO previously issued a differential billing adjustment after alleging that defects caused Joses meter to register only 50% of her actual electric consumption for a period of two years. Jose filed a petition with the lower court seeking to permanently restrain the collection of the adjustment, which amounted to Php232,385.20, and prevent MERALCO from discontinuing electrical services. The Supreme Court held that although MERALCO has the right to collect on differential billings, it was unable to establish the factual basis for arriving at the amount of the adjustment. The Court found that the adjustment was merely based on MERALCOs company policy, as testified by its billing clerk, and its own records of Joses billings, which revealed no dramatic increase nor decrease in electric consumption in the billing cycles preceding, during, and succeeding the period concerned. The Court also found that MERALCO was grossly negligent in failing to conduct regular precautionary tests on its meters and, thus, could not pass its liability for losses arising from defective meters onto the consumer by issuing a differential billing and threatening disconnection for nonpayment. MERALCO was thus ordered to pay Jose Php100,000 in moral damages and Php50,000 in exemplary damages for its callousness toward its customers and its inattention to its duty of keeping its facilities and equipment well maintained. (GR No. 152769, Manila Electric Company v. Ma. Victoria Jose, February 14, 2007)

CASE REPORTS: SC Acquits Illiterate Fisherman of Double Murder

By Gleo "p. Guerra

The Supreme Court recently acquitted an unschooled fisherman, Jerry Rapeza, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable doubt of two counts of murder, thereby reversing the latters conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court held inadmissible the thumbmarked extrajudicial confession executed in Filipino of Rapeza, as it was not sufficiently established that Rapeza, who is not well-versed in Filipino, was assisted by an interpreter during the execution thereof. It further held that Rapezas confession was not made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel of his choice, as the only participation of the lawyer concerned appears to be the notarization of the extrajudicial confession. Thus, the Court ruled that the lack of legal assistance, along with the circumstance that the confession contains facts and details appearing to have been supplied by the police investigators themselves, belies the voluntariness of the confession. It also noted that the confession does not dovetail with the autopsy report. Finally, the Court said that no motive for the crimes can be ascribed to Rapeza. In conclusion, the overriding consideration in criminal cases is not whether appellant is completely innocent, but rather whether the quantum of evidence necessary to prove his guilt was sufficiently met. With the exclusion of appellants alleged confession, we are left with no other recourse but to acquit him of the offenses charged for the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overcome only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Court concluded. (GR No. 169431, People v. Rapeza, April 4, 2007)

CASE REPORTS: SC Settles LP Leadership Controversy

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

The Supreme Court recently upheld Senator Franklin M. Drilons leadership, over that of Mayor Jose Lito L. Atienza, Jr.s, in the Liberal Party (LP) claim, at the same time confirming the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the LPs leadership issue and exercising its power of judicial review over the contested COMELEC resolutions. The Court upheld the COMELEC ruling voiding the elections held by Atienza, but found that the Daza-Drilon amendments to the LP Constitution, which effectively gave Drilon a fresh term as party president, were validly ratified. Thus, it overturned the COMELECs finding that Drilons position was merely hold-over in nature until it conducted elections for a new president. Consequently, the Court held that the issue as to whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to order the LP to hold the election of its officers has become academic. The rift in LPs leadership began when Drilons camp withdrew their support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in July 2005, causing Atienzas camp to hold the invalidated elections for new party leadership. Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Dante O. Tinga, and Cancio C. Garcia wrote separate opinions. Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part as he had previously participated in the subject LP Elections prior to being appointed to the Judiciary. (Res., GR Nos. 174992 & 175546, The Liberal Party v. COMELEC & Atienza v. COMELEC, April 17, 2007)

CASE REPORTS: SC: Bail Can Be Granted to Potential Extraditee on Basis of Clear and Convincing Evidence
By #ay B. Rempillo

The Supreme Court recently held that a potential extraditee may be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the Court saw the need to reexamine its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan that limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the Constitution. The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty.However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met, the Court said. RP, being a signatory to the 1996 UN General Assembly which adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty, the Court held. The case involved the petition of the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to nullify two orders by a Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) allowing potential extradite, Juan Antonio Muoz, to post bail. The RP and Hong Kong signed in 1995 an extradition treaty, which became effective in 1997. Later, Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent, in violation of sec. 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Manila RTC, Branch 8 to determine whether Muoz is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If Muoz is not entitled to such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. (GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007)

CASE REPORTS: SC Clarifies Evidentiary Value of Duplicate Originals

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

All notarized copies of deeds of conveyance are duplicate originals, which for all legal intents and purposes may be considered as the best evidence of the transaction they embody. The Supreme Court recently clarified the evidentiary value of such duplicate originals when it corrected both the appellate and trial courts for treating two copies of the same Absolute Deed of Sale as different documents for the purpose of determining the genuineness of the signatures therein. It held that the two copies presented in evidence were duplicate originals as they were executed at or about the same time and contained identical contents. Original does not mean the first paper written, in contrast to a copy or transcript made later. The original depends upon the issue to be proved. It is immaterial whether that document was written before or after another, was copied from another, or was itself used to copy from, as long as its contents are the subject of inquiry. Hence, one or some of these copies are still considered as originals, and they have equal claims to authenticity As a matter of practice, deeds of conveyance are prepared in several copies for notarization and record purposes. After notarization, the notary public retains copies pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice, one for his record and the other for transmittal to the court, through Clerk of Court concerned, where he secured his notarial commission All the notarized copies are originals, the Court said. The case involved a contested Deed of Absolute Sale, wherein an expert witness was presented to testify on the genuineness of the signatures contained therein. Differing factual findings of the appellate and trial courts led the High Court to delve into the facts of the case. Finding the testimony presented to be inconsistent and unconvincing, it upheld the validity of the contested sale as there was no clear, positive, and convincing evidence of forgery that would impugn the due execution of the contested deed, which remains the best evidence of the transaction. (GR No. 162864, Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, March 28, 2007)

CASE REPORTS: SC OKs Graft Charge Against PIATCO Chairman and President
By Gleo "p. Guerra

The Supreme Court recently upheld the information for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Henry T. Go, Chairman and President of Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). Along with former Secretary of Transportation and Communication Vicente C. Rivera, Go had been charged by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan regarding the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIAIPT III), alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. The charge was a result of the May 5, 2003 ruling of the Court declaring, among others, the ARCA null and void for being contrary to public policy and that Paircargo, PIATCOs predecessor-in-interest, lacked the requisite financial capacity to bid for the NAIA-IPT III project. In a 20-page decision penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the SC Third Division held that private persons, like petitioner Go, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. Citing as precedents the cases of Luciano v. Estrella, Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that its ruling is in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. (GR No. 172602, Go v. Sandiganbayan, April 13, 2007)

SC Orders Comelec to Disclose Party-List Nominees Names

By #ay B. Rempillo

Upholding the peoples right to information on matters of public concern, the Supreme Court has compelled the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to disclose the names of the nominees of the accredited party-list groups or organizations participating in the May 14 party-list elections. The Comelec, which initially refused to reveal said information, had complied with the Courts directive and released the names of the nominees of the party-list groups before the May 14 polls. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia, the Court En Banc said that the Comelec commited grave abuse of discretion when it refused the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective positions. It said that the Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups. The Court cited section 7, Article III of the Constitution (the right of people to information on matters of public concern) and section 28, Article II of the Constitution (the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest) as its basis in ordering the poll body to divulge the said names. The Court noted that no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. It said that the prohibition imposed on the Comelec not to disclose the names under section 7 of RA 7941 (Party-list System Act) is limited in scope and duration as it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. It further said that to stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. (GR No. 177271, BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec; GR No. 177314, Rosales v. Comelec, May 4, 2007)

Benchmark Online May 2007

Fixed Savings Deposit Subject to Documentary Stamp Tax

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

A passbook representing an interest- earning deposit account issued by a bank qualifies as a certificate of deposit drawing interest and is therefore subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Affirming the Court of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court has upheld a deficiency assessment of Php71,005,757.77 against the International Exchange Bank (IEB), representing deficiency DST on its Fixed Savings Deposits (FSD) for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court found that sec. 179 (180) of the NIRC, as amended by RA 9243, specifically includes certificates or other evidences of deposits that are either drawing interest significantly higher than the regular savings deposit taking into consideration the size of the deposit and the risks involved or drawing interest and having a specific maturity date as one type of debt instruments subject to DST, to which the FSD belongs. The Court said that not all certificates of deposit are negotiable. A certificate of deposit may or may not be negotiable as gathered from the use of the conjunction or, instead of and, in its definition. A certificate of deposit may be payable to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to some other person or his order In any event, the negotiable character of any and all documents under Section 180 is immaterial for purposes of imposing DST. To claim that time deposits evidenced by passbooks should not be subject to DST is a clear evasion of the rule on equality and uniformity in taxation that requires the imposition of DST on documents evidencing transactions of the same kind, in this particular case, on all certificates of deposits drawing interest, the Court said. (GR No. 171266, International Exchange Bank v. CIR, April 4, 2007)

SC: Intel Entitled to Tax Refund, Leniency in VAT Implementation Imperative

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

There is no law, internal revenue rule, or regulation requiring a Value Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity engaged in export sales to obtain authority from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to print its sales invoices or requiring such authority to be reflected or indicated therein. Thus the Supreme Court held when it ordered the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to determine and compute the tax credit or refund due to Intel Technology Philippines (Intel) for its unutilized VAT input taxes on domestic purchases of goods and services attributable to its zero-rated sales. Although finding Intel to be legally entitled to its claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate, the tax and appellate courts previously denied its claim on the ground that it purportedly failed to comply with invoicing requirements under Sections 113 and 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) since the Intels invoices do not bear the BIR authority to print, and in some cases failed to indicate Intels VAT-Registered Entity Tax Identification Number (TIN-V). This prompted the High Court to declare that law and revenue regulations do not provide that failure to reflect or indicate in the invoices or receipts the BIR authority to print, as well as the TIN-V, would result in the outright invalidation of these invoices or receipts. Neither is it provided therein that such omission or failure would result in the outright denial of a claim for tax credit/refund. It bears reiterating that while the pertinent provisions of the Tax Code and the rules and regulations implementing them require entities engaged in business to secure a BIR authority to print invoices or receipts and to issue duly registered invoices or receipts, it is not specifically required that the BIR authority to print be reflected or indicated therein. Indeed, what is important with respect to the BIR authority to print is that it has been secured or obtained by the taxpayer, and that invoices or receipts are duly registered What applies to petitioner, as a PEZA-registered export enterprise, is the Courts pronouncement that leniency in the implementation of the VAT is an imperative, precisely to spur economic growth in the country and attain global competitiveness as envisioned in our laws. The incentives offered to PEZA enterprises, among which are tax exemptions and tax credits, ultimately redound to the benefit of the national economy, enticing as they do more enterprises to invest and do business within the zones, thus creating more employment opportunities and infusing more dynamism to the vibrant interplay of market forces, the Court said. Setting aside the Court of Appeals decision affirming the CTAs denial of Intels claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of Php11,770,181.70, the High Court found that Intel, as a VAT-registered and Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)-registered entity engaged in the export of advanced and large-scale integrated circuits, is entitled to its claim representing the input taxes it has paid on domestic purchases of goods and services for the period of April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998, in accordance with the NIRC as amended by RA 9337. (GR No. 166732, Intel Technology Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, April 27, 2007)

Award of Damages vs. Electric Cooperative Upheld

By Gleo "p. Guerra

The Supreme Court has affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court in holding an electric cooperative liable for damages for disconnecting an electric meter of one of its subscribers for alleged tampering without notice to the latter. In a decision penned by Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez for the Courts Third Division, Samar Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SAMELCO) was ordered to pay jointly and severally with its inspector Baltazar Dacula a total of Php37,000.00 in damages to Estrella Quijano and to immediately reconnect the latters electric meter upon her request. The Court held electricity to be a basic necessity, the generation and distribution of which is imbued with public interest, and its provider is a public utility subject to strict regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. Failure to comply with these regulations will give rise to the presumption of bad faith or abuse of right. In this case, the Court noted that under the law in force at the time of disconnection, PD 401, SAMELCO should only resort to disconnection after notice of differential billing to Quijano and affording her opportunity to settle the same, which it had failed to do. It also failed to give her notice when it disconnected her electric meter. The purpose of the notice requirement is to afford electric consumers opportunity to witness the

SC Unseats Mabalacat, Pampanga Mayor

By #ay B. Rempillo

The Supreme Court has unseated Mabalacat Mayor Marino Boking Morales whom it found ineligible to have run in the 2004 elections as being a fourth-term candidate and ordered the vice-mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga to immediately head its local government until June 30, 2007. The Court granted the petitions of lawyers Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick De Guzman to cancel Morales Certificate of Candidacy (COC) dated December 30, 2003. The Court also dismissed the petition of mayoral candidate Anthony Dee for being moot since Morales was disqualified from continuing to serve as Mabalacat mayor. The Court found that Morales had served as mayor for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 2004 elections. Citing Ong v. Alegre, the Court said that the three-term limit rule as provided for in RA 7160 or the Local Government Code applies to Morales, making him ineligible to run for a fourth consecutive term. Having found Morales ineligible, the Court said the formers COC for the 2004 elections should also be cancelled per sections 6 and 7 of RA 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987). Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. (GR No. 167591, Rivera v. Comelec; GR No. 170577, Dee v. Comelec, May 9, 2007)

SC: Same Benefits for INP, PNP Retirees

By Arcie M. "ercado

Integrated National Police (INP) retirees should have the same retirement benefits as those of Philippine National Police retirees (PNP). Thus the Supreme Court held when it affirmed the Court of Appeals, which declared that the INP retirees are entitled to the same retirement benefits accorded upon retirees of the PNP under RA 6975, An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, as amended by RA 8551, The Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998. The Court ordered the Department of Budget and Management and concerned government agencies to implement the proper adjustments on the INP retirees retirement benefits. It found that the INP was never abolished by RA 6975 but was, instead absorbed, transferred, and/or merged, along with the other offices comprising the Philippine Constabulary (PC)-INP, with the PNP. As the INP was merely transformed into the PNP, its retirees cannot be excluded from the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees. The Court likewise found that RA 6975 provides for its retroactive application to those who had retired prior to its effectivity. Prior to the Courts decision in this case, INP retirees and PNP retirees of the same rank had a disparity in their monthly pensions of as high as Php10,628. The PNP was created through RA 6975 on December 13, 1990, to establish a police force that is national in scope and purely civilian in character, and to erase the stigma spawned by the militarization of the police force under the PC-INP structure. (GR No. 169466, Department of Budget and Management v. Manilas Finest Retirees Association, Inc., May 9, 2007)

P.I. Matters Held to be Privileged Communication

By Arcie M. "ercado

Materials presented during preliminary investigation cannot be used as a basis for libel. Thus the Supreme Court held when it upheld the lower courts order granting the withdrawal of the information for libel against an estafa complainant on the ground that the newsletter, upon which the complaint was based, was considered privileged communication. Complainant Vicente C. Ponce previously filed an estafa case against Nicasio I. Alcantara. Ponce submitted a newsletter to the investigating prosecutor as an annex to his complaint-affidavit, discussing how Alcantara defrauded him of his shares in the Iligan Cement Corporation. This in turn prompted Alcantara to file a libel complaint against Ponce. The Court found that the newsletter was presented during the preliminary investigation of the estafa case, thus making it a form of privileged communication which consequently exempts it from libel. Referring to the United States case of Borg v. Boas, the Court stressed that preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have been given absolute privilege. The Court explained that the controversial statements in the newsletter were made in the context of a criminal complaint against petitioner and were disclosed only to the official investigating the complaint and thus, were relevant to the investigation. Privileged communication is communication which takes place within the context of a protected relationship, such as that between an attorney and a client or in this case, between a complainant and a prosecutor and cannot be used as basis for a libel case. (GR No. 156183, Alcantara v. Ponce, February 28, 2007)

SC Clarifies Conditions for Discharge of State Witness

By $atrina M. Martinez

The testimony of a prospective state witness is not required to be substantially corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who are not among the accused in the same criminal case. Otherwise, the condition that there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness will be rendered nugatory. Thus the Supreme Court First Division, through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, clarified when it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals discharging accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the information in a murder case to become state witnesses. The Court held that the corroborative evidence required by rules on the discharge of an accused to be a state witnesse does not have to consist of the exact same evidence that will be testified on by the anticipated state witnesses. We have ruled that a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other methodEven if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence, the Court said. (GR No. 143093, Salvanera v. People, May 21, 2007)

Mercury Drug Liable for Selling Wrong Medication

By Arcie M. "ercado

The Supreme Court recently ordered Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) to pay Php50,000 and Php25,000 in moral and exemplary damages, respectively, due to its employees error in selling the wrong medicine to a customer. As a result, the customer fell asleep on the wheel and had an accident. In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Guttierez, the Courts First Division found that respondent Sebastian M. Baking would not have fallen asleep and lost control of his car had the employee of Mercury Drug issued the correct medication. Thus, the Court found Mercury Drug liable for the resulting injuries as its employees negligence implies that there has also been negligence on its part. Baking, who was diagnosed with high blood sugar and triglyceride in November 1993 was sold Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet, instead of the prescribed Diamicron, in an Alabang branch of the Mercury Drug Corporation because the latters sales representative had misread his prescription. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one pill of Dormicum for three consecutive days. On the third day, he fell asleep on the wheel, causing his car to collide with another vehicle. (GR No. 156037, Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, May 25, 2007)

Administrative Proceedings: Not Arena for Squabbling Lawyers

By Madeleine U.V.G. Avanzado

Mutual bickering and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from the Court. Thus the Supreme Court Special Third Division held in a resolution penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia denying a motion for contempt and/or disbarment against Attorney Justo Paras filed against him by his estranged wife, Rosa Yap-Paras, for the formers alleged violation of the suspension order meted upon him by the Court. The Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well as petitioner-movants counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioners counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor, and civility, the Court said. The Court found no sufficient bases to support Yap-Paras allegation and, instead, found that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one-year suspension from law practice for committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath. However, the Court reprimanded Atty. Paras for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with its directive to comment on Yap-Paras motion for contempt and/or disbarment. (AC No. 4947, Yap-Paras v. Paras, June 7, 2007)

SC Orders PEA to Pay Php94 Million in Just Compensation

By Gleo "p. Guerra

The Supreme Court recently ordered the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to pay Php94,380,000.00 as just compensation for the property on which the southern abutment of the Zapote bridge of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road had been constructed. In a decision penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Courts First Division reversed the Court of Appeals (CA) and reinstated the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202 of Las Pias when it held that PEA should pay the propertys owner Julieta P. Tan the said propertys zonal valuation at Php20,000 per square meter when PEA filed its petition for expropriation in 2003. The Court said that the CA erred in ruling that the PEAs taking of the property occurred in 1985 and that just compensation should be based on the zonal valuation in that year (Php2,000 per square meter). It noted that PEAs entry into the property in 1985 was not for the purpose of expropriating the property but on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of Php10,000.00 and that, up to the present, no agreement had been reached for the sale of the property to PEA. The Court also held that the CA erred in not dismissing PEAs petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for being the wrong remedy since the RTCs orders fixing the just compensation and denying PEAs motion for reconsideration, respectively, are final in nature and should instead be appealed. (GR No. 170740, Tan v. Republic, May 25, 2007)

Benchmark Online July 2006

CASE REPORTS: 'Disgraceful' Clerk Fined

By #oshua P. %apuz

For making offensive and foul remarks, a clerk was recently fined by the Supreme Court. Sheryll Madlangbayan of the Mandaluyong City Regional Trial Court, Branch 210 was fined Php1,000 for her disgraceful conduct against Leilani Nacionales, her erstwhile friend. "Even if respondent acted in retaliation to complainant's calling her 'Sheryll Maniac' when she uttered 'fuck you' and made a dirty finger sign, that these were done in public by a court employee who was then wearing the office uniform creates a bad impression not only against respondent as an employee but also against the judiciary," the Court said. "Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by their employees within and around their vicinity necessarily diminishes their sanctity and dignity," it added. (AM No. P-06-2171, Leilani E. Nacionales vs. Sheryll S. Madlangbayan, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch !", June 15, 2006)

CASE REPORTS: 2 Lawyers Suspended, Notary Commissions Revoked

By #oshua P. %apuz

Two lawyers were recently suspended for one year and their commissions as notaries public revoked by the Supreme Court for dereliction of duty and inexcusable negligence. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga were found guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath for the incorrect entries in their respective notarial registers. They were also disqualified from reappointment as notaries public for two years. "...[T]he notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register. Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their secretaries, a reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open condemnation," the Court said. (AC No. 5377, #ictor Lingan vs. $ttys. Ro%eo Caluba&uib and 'i%%y (. Baliga , June 15, 2006)

CASE REPORTS: One-Year Suspension for Moonlighting Stenographer

By #oshua P. %apuz

Judicial employees out to make extra money on the side be warned. Emiladie Anacan, Court Stenographer of the San Jose, Occidental Mindoro Regional Trial Court, Branch 45 was recently suspended for one year for "moonlighting." She was found guilty of conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service for facilitating payments to landowners for expropriated lands in Occidental Mindoro for a fee. "[T]he Court frowns upon 'moonlighting' activities of court employees. While 'moonlighting' is not normally considered a serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held, it amounts to a malfeasance in office," the Court said. (AM No. P-04-1816, Eusebio M. Baron vs. E%iladie T. $nacan, Court
Stenogra)her III, RTC*Branch +,, San 'ose, -ccidental Mindoro , June 20, 2006)

CASE REPORTS: Judge Reprimanded for Impropriety

By #oshua P. %apuz

Judge Jose Nacional of the Naga City Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1 was recently reprimanded by the Supreme Court for improper conduct for discussing the merits of a pending case pending before his sala with a party without the latter's counsel and the adverse party. "Respondent had exceeded the boundaries of propriety and regularity. Respondent should have known fully well that in every litigation, the manner and attitude of a judge are crucial to everyone concerned. It is improper for respondent to meet with the complainant and his wife to discuss the merits of the case without the presence of the accused and his counsel no matter how noble his intentions may have been," the Court said. (AM No. MTJ-05-1605, (edro C. $besa vs. 'udge 'ose (. Nacional, Munici)al Trial Court, Branch !, Naga City , June
8, 2006.)

CASE REPORTS: Lawyer Suspended for Representing Conflicting Interestsy

By #oshua P. %apuz

Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. was recently suspended for three months by the Supreme Court for representing conflicting interests. The Court said that when Lokin appeared in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as counsel for the therein respondents PHILCOMSAT, et al., he was clearly representing a party which had an interest in preventing the implementation of the Compromise Agreement the same agreement which Lokin and his law firm previously negotiated for Potenciano Ilusorio, the adverse party. "The act alone of representing a subsequent client against a former client in any manner related to the subject of the previous litigation thus constitutes a violation of the rule against representing conflicting interests," the Court said. It added that whatever may be the tenor or merit of the arguments Lokin made in behalf of his clients in the SEC case, his mere act of appearing therein against a former client already constituted professional misconduct in view of the clear relation of the subject matter in that SEC case to that of the earlier case in the Sandiganbayan. (AC No. 6554, Erlinda .. Ilusorio*Bildner vs. $tty. Luis .. Lokin, 'r., and