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Thematic Network FIT Fire in Tunnels

Technical Report Part 3

Fire Safe Design


Rapporteur Norman Rhodes, Mott MacDonald

Thematic Network FIT Fire in Tunnels is supported by the European Community under the fifth Framework Programme Competitive and Sustainable Growth Contract n G1RT-CT-2001-05017

Overview of the FIT reports

Overview of the FIT reports


The Thematic Network FIT Fire in Tunnels aims to establish and develop a European platform and optimise efforts on fire safety in tunnels. The Networks ambition is to develop a European consensus on fire safety for road, rail and metro tunnel infrastructures and enhance the exchange of up-to-date knowledge gained from current practice and ongoing European and national research projects. The outcome of the FIT network is presented in 3 complementary formats: FIT website (www.etnfit.net) General report Technical Reports on o Design fire scenarios; o Fire safe design; and o Fire response management

The FIT website (www.etnfit.net) contains the 6 consultable databases, the co-membership, the presentations of the International Symposium on Safe and Reliable Tunnels (Prague 2004) and the technical reports. The reports are available after registration as a corresponding member. The General report presents the outcome of the FIT activities. After the introduction of the FIT Network, the general approach to tunnel fire safety is presented. This chapter can be considered as a strategic introduction to the consecutive safety aspects and the integrated approach to safety in tunnels. It introduces the highlights of the technical reports of the FIT network with the executive summaries on design fire scenarios, fire safe design and fire response management. The Technical reports on the FIT workpackages presents the detailled reflexion and results of the network on the items in more then 450 pages state of the art research work. The reports are available from the FIT website after registration as a corresponding member. Technical report Part 1 Design fire scenarios describes recommendations on design fire scenarios for road, rail and metro tunnels. Design fires to cover different relevant scenarios (e.g. design fires referring to the evacuation of people, design fires referring to ventilation purpose or design fires referring to the structural load) are presented and recommended. In Technical report Part 2 Fire Safe Design, a compilation of relevant guidelines, regulations, standards or current best practices from European member states (and important tunnel countries like e.g. Japan and USA) is given. The analysis is focused on all fire safety elements regarding tunnels properly said and are classified according to the transport nature: road, rail and metro. The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from the tunnel users, the operators and the emergency services. The Technical report Part 3 Fire response management presents the best practices which should be adopted by these different categories to ensure a high level of safety.

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Overview of the FIT reports

The Technical reports on the FIT workpackages presents the detailled reflexion and results of the network on the items in more then 450 pages state of the art research work. The reports are available from the FIT website after registration as a corresponding member. Technical report Part 1 Design fire scenarios Rapporteur Alfred Haack, STUVA The technical report of FIT Work Package 2 is devoted to design fire scenarios for road, rail and metro tunnels. It collects data from different countries (e.g. Germany, France, Italy, UK), international organisations (e.g. PIARC, ITA, UPTUN) as well as from the experiences in individual tunnels (e.g. Mont Blanc, Tauern, Nihonzaka, Caldecott, Pfnder). The report includes basic principles of design fires, tunnel fire statistics and impacts of fires and smoke in tunnels on people, equipment and structure. The data is analysed and different sets of data are compared to ascertain the degree of confidence attributed to the information. Recommendations are made within the text on specific issues when this was deemed appropriate and reliable. Technical report Part 2 Fire Safe Design Rapporteur Bruno Brousse, CETU Fire Safe Design Road Niels Peter Hoj, COWI Fire Safe Design Rail Giorgio Micolotti, RFI Fire Safe Design Metro Daniel GABAY, Arnoud Marchais, RATP The FIT Workpackage Compilation of guidelines for fire safe design presents the compilation of relevant guidelines, regulations, standards or current best practices from European member states, including reference documents from important tunnel countries like e.g. USA and Japan, or from European or international organisations, e.g. PIARC and UN/ECE. The report is classified according to the transport nature in three similar main sections: road, rail and metro tunnels. The three sections in the report presents the collected guidelines and regulations, their analytical abstract and table of content. About 50 safety measures are presented and compared related to structural measures (19), safety equipment (36) and structure and equipment with response to fire (3). For each type of measure the impact on safety is presented with a synthesis and a detailed comparison of the comprehensive list of safety measures. Technical report Part 3 Fire Response Management Rapporteur Norman Rhodes, Mott MacDonald The objective of the FIT Work Package 4 Best practise for Fire Response Management is the definition of best practices for tunnel authorities and fire emergency services on prevention and training, accident management and fire emergency operations. The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from the tunnel users, the operators and the emergency services. The technical systems which are installed in many tunnels are described in Chapter 2. These systems contribute to the possible levels of safety that can be achieved and are mentioned later in relation to response planning. The viewpoint of the fire brigade is then presented in Chapter 3 in order to establish the context of fire response management. Best practices for Road, Rail and Metro tunnels then follow in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. They are presented according to the conceptual phases before, during and after a fire, taking into account the different involved parties (users, operators and emergency services).

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Table of contents

Table of contents
Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 1.1 Objectives 1.2 Outline of the Report Chapter 2 : TUNNEL SYSTEMS 2.1 General 2.2 Ventilation and smoke exhaust systems 2.3 Fire Detection and alarm systems 2.4 Fire Fighting systems 2.5 Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems 2.6 Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobile telephones 2.7 Electrical - traction power isolation systems 2.8 Emergency lighting 2.9 Closed Circuit TVs (CCTVs) 2.10 Public Address (PA) System 2.11 Signage 2.12 Traffic Management System 2.13 Passive fire protection relation to fire response management 2.14 Fire compartmentation 2.15 Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases 2.16 Use of fire resistant materials 19 19 20 23 23 23 24 25 25 26 27 27 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 30

Chapter 3 : THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES PERSPECTIVE 3.1 Concept of Tactics for Rescue Operations 3.2 Fire and Rescue Operation 3.3 Methods Available to the Fire Services for Fighting a Tunnel Fire 3.4 Fires in Road Tunnels 3.5 Fires in Railway Tunnels 3.6 Fire and Rescue Operation Problems Encountered in Tunnel Fires

31 31 33 33 35 38 41

Chapter 4 : ROAD TUNNELS 4.1 Factors before a Fire 4.1.1 Objectives 4.1.2 Tunnel Operator 4.1.3 Emergency Services 4.1.4 Users 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 4.3.4 Safety Factors curing a Fire Objectives Tunnel Operator Emergency Services Users Safety Factors after a Fire Objectives Tunnel Operator Emergency Services Users
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47 47 47 47 51 53 54 54 54 55 56 57 57 57 57 58

Table of contents

Chapter 5 : RAIL TUNNELS 5.1 Safety Factors before a Fire 5.1.1 Objectives 5.1.2 Operational Company 5.1.3 Eergency Services 5.1.4 Passengers 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.3 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 Safety Factors during an Fire Objectives Operational Company Emergency Services Passengers Safety Factors after a Fire Objectives Operational Company Emergency Services Passengers

59 60 60 60 62 64 65 65 65 66 66 67 67 67 67 68

Chapter 6 : METRO TUNNELS 6.1 Safety Factors before a Fire 6.1.1 Objectives 6.1.2 Operational Company 6.1.3 Emergency Services 6.1.4 Passengers 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.3 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.4 Safety Factors During a Fire Objectives Operational Company Passengers Safety Factors after a Fire Objectives Operational Company Emergency Services Passengers

69 69 69 70 72 74 74 74 74 76 77 77 77 77 78

Chapter 7 : REFERENCES

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FIT Partnership

FIT PARTNERSHIP

BELGIAN BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE (BBRI) (Co-ordinator & WP1 leader on Consultable Databases) Johan Van Dessel Yves Martin www.bbri.be BUILDING RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT LTD (BRE) (Manager Database 3: Overview of numerical computer codes) Suresh Kumar Stewart Miles www.bre.co.uk

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FIT Partnership

CENTRE FOR CIVIL ENGINEERING RESEARCH AND CODES/CENTRE FOR UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION (CUR/COB) Jan P.G. Mijnsbergen www.cur.nl www.cob.nl

ENTE PER LE NUOVE TECNOLOGIE, L'ENERGIA E L'AMBIENTE (ENEA) Franco Corsi www.enea.it

GESELLSCHAFT FUER ANLAGEN- UND REAKTORSICHERHEIT(GRS) Klaus Kberlein www.grs.de

HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE) Richard Bettis www.hse.gov.uk

INSTITUTO DE CIENCIAS DE LA CONSTRUCCION "EDUARDO TORROJA" CSIC (IETCC) Angel Arteaga www.csic.es INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT INDUSTRIEL ET DES RISQUES (INERIS) (Manager Database 2: Tunnel test site facilities) (Manager Database 5: Assessment reports on fire accidents) Guy Marlair www.ineris.fr

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FIT Partnership

SP SWEDISH NATIONAL TESTING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SP) Haukur Ingason www.sp.se/fire

NETHERLANDS ORGANIZATION FOR APPLIED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (TNO) Kees Both www.bouw.tno.nl

TECHNICAL RESEARCH CENTRE FINLAND (VTT) Esko Mikkola www.vtt.fi/rte/firetech

FIRE SAFETY ENGINEERING GROUP UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH (UOG) E. R. Galea http://fseg.gre.ac.uk

OVE ARUP PARTNERSHIP (ARUP) Paul Scott www.arup.com

COWI CONSULTING ENGINEERING AND PLANNERS AS (COWI) (General approach to tunnel fire safety & WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design - road) Niels Peter Hj Steen Rostam www.cowi.dk DEUTSCHE MONTAN TECHNOLOGIE GMBH (DMT) (Manager Database 4: Data on safety equipment in tunnels) Horst Hejny Werner Foit www.dmt.de
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FIT Partnership

FIRE SAFETY DESIGN AB (FSD) Yngve Anderberg Gabriel Khoury www.csic.es

MOTT MACDONALD LIMITED (WP 4 rapporteur Fire response management) Norman Rhodes www.mottmac.com

SISTEMI ESPERTI PER LA MANUTENZIONE (SESM) Fulvio Marcoz www.sesm.it

STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT FUER UNTERIRDISCHE VERKEHRSANLAGEN E.V. (STUVA) (WP 2 rapporteur Design Fire scenarios) Alfred Haack www.stuva.de

FOGTEC BRANDSCHUTZ GMBH & CO KG Stefan Kratzmeir Dirk Sprakel www.fogtec.com

TRAFICON NV Ilse Roelants www.traficon.com

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FIT Partnership

DRAGADOS CONSTRUCCION P.O., S.A. Enrique Fernandez Gonzalez Carlos Bosch www.dragados.com

HOCHTIEF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT Hermann-Josef Otremba www.hochtief.com

ALPTRANSIT GOTTHARD AG Christophe Kauer www.alptransit.ch

CENTRE ETUDE DES TUNNELS (CETU) (Chair & WP3 rapporteur on Fire Safe Design) Didier Lacroix Bruno Brousse www.cetu.equipement.gouv.fr

FRANCE-MANCHE SA (EUROTUNNEL) Alain Bertrand www.eurotunnel.com

METRO DE MADRID S.A. Gabriel Santos www.metromadried.es

REGIE AUTONOME DES TRANSPORTS PARISIENS (RATP) (WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design - metro) Daniel Gabay Arnaud Marchais www.ratp.fr

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FIT Partnership

SUND & BAELT HOLDING A/S Leif J. Vincentsen Ulla Vesterskov Eilersen www.sundbaelt.dk

STOCKHOLM FIRE BRIGADE Anders Bergqvist www.brand.stockholm.se

KENT FIRE BRIGADE Ian Muir Manny Gaugain www.kent-fire-uk.org

LYON TURIN FERROVIAIRE (LTF) Eddy Verbesselt www.ltf-sas.com

RETE FERROVIARIA ITALIANA S.P.A. (RFI) (WP3 rapporteur Fire Safe Design rail) Giorgio Micolitti Raffaele Mele www.rfi.it

TECHNICAL UNIVERSITT GRAZ - INSTITUT FR VERBRENNUNGSKRAFTMASCHINEN (TUG) Peter-Johann Sturm www.virtualfires.org

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FIT Partnership

FIT Co-membership The FIT partnership is strengthened with a co-membership (co-opted members and corresponding members) to receive ample feedback and input and obtain a larger forum for the dissemination of its outcome.
The objectives of the corresponding and co-opted membership is the following: provide a large platform for the FIT working items ensure European feedback and input via organizations active in 'fire in tunnels' ensure member-state support via national and regional representatives Co-opted members are organisations invited to contribute to the FIT activities in a very intensive way. They have the same access level as FIT network members (working document, etc.). Co-opted members are bound by an agreement of collaboration and confidentiality. Seventeen organisation have been invited and agreed as FIT Co-opted members. Corresponding members further enlarge the FIT Network. Corresponding members are these organisations and national representatives that are interested to follow closely the activities of FIT and registered themselves via the FIT website. They have a priviliged access to the endorsed FIT working documents and the Consultable Databases on fire and tunnel. A FIT public working document is a draft document that is being prepared for final edition by the FIT network. It is made available for the FIT corresponding members for consultation, input and comment. More then 1200 corresponding members have been registered on the FIT website www.etnfit.net (status March 2005).

FIT CO-OPTED MEMBERS


Amberg Engineering AG (Hagerbach test gallery) Contact name: Mr. Felix Amberg Rheinstrasse 4, Postfach 64, 7320 Sargans Switzerland Asociacion Latinoamericana de metros y subterraneos Contact name: Mr. Aurelio Rojo Garrido Cavanilles 58, 28007 Madrid - Spain CENIM - UPM Contact name: Mr. Enrique Alarcon Jos Gutirrez Abascal 2, 28006 Madrid - Spain Centro Ricerche Fiat Societa Consortile per Azioni Contact name: Mr. Roberto Brignolo Strada Torino, 50, 10043 Orbassano (TO) - Italy Railway Scientific and Technical Centre Naukowo-Techniczne Kolejnictwa Contact name: Mrs. Jolanta Radziszewska-Wolinska ul. Chlopickiego 50, 04275 Warsaw - Poland CTICM Contact name: Mr. Jol Kruppa Technical report Part 3 Fire Safe Design 15/79

FIT Partnership

Btiment 6 domaine de Saint Paul - 102 route de Limours 78471 Saint Remy-Les-Chevreuse - France Deutsche Bahn AG Contact name: Mr. Klaus-Juergen Bieger Taunustrasse 45, 60329 Frankfurt - Germany European Association for Railway Interoperability Contact name: Mr. Peter Zuber Boulevard de l'Impratrice 66 1000 Brussels - Belgium European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and Transport Contact name: Mr. Bernd Thamm rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Brussels - Belgium European Fire Services Tunnel Group (EFSTG) Contact name: Mr. Bill Welsh ME13 6XB Tovil, United Kingdom Eurovirtunnel Contact name: Mr. Gernot Beer Lessingstrasse 25/II, 8010 Graz - Austria Federal Highway Administration Contact name: Mr. Tony Caserta 400 Seventh Street S.W., HIBT-10 Washington, D.C. 20590 - USA Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology Contact name: Dipl. Ing. Rudolf Hoerhan Stubenring 1, 1010 Wien - Austria Holland Rail Consult Contact name: Mr. Mark Baan Hofman Postbus 2855, 3500 GW Utrecht - The Netherlands Ministerie van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest Contact name: Mr. Pierre Schmitz Vooruitgangstraat 80/1 1030 Brussels - Belgium Ministry of Transport, Public works and Watermanagement Contact name: Ir. Evert Worm PO Box 20.000 3502 LA Utrecht - The Netherlands Norwegian Public Roads Administration Contact name: Mr. Finn Harald Amundsen PO Box 8142 Dep 0033 Oslo - Norway

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Chapter

Technical Report Part 3

Fire Safe Design


Rapporteur: Norman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald)

Contributions:
Norman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald), Ulla Eilersen (Sund & Bealt), Anders Bergqvist (Stockholm Fire Brigade), Christophe Kauer (AlpTransit Gotthard Ltd), Eddy Verbesselt (Lyon Turin Ferroviaire), Arnaud Marchais (RATP), George Leoutsakos (Athens Metro), Gabriel Santos (Metro de Madrid)

Workpackage Members
Norman Rhodes (Mott MacDonald), Christophe Kauer (AlpTransit), Johan Van Dessel (BBRI), Manny Gaugain (Kent Fire Brigade), Eddy Verbesselt (Lyon Turin Ferroviaire), Gabriel Santos (Metro de Madrid), Arnaud Marchais (RATP), Anders Bergqvist (Stockholm Fire Brigade), Leif Vincentsen, Ulla Eilersen (Sund & Bealt), Peter-Johann Sturm (TUG)

Introduction

CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

1.1

Objectives

The objective of Work Package 4 (WP4) is the definition of best practices for tunnel authorities and fire emergency services on prevention and training, accident management and fire emergency operations. The occurrence of a fire in a tunnel provokes a need for response from the tunnel users, the operators and the emergency services. The purpose of WP4 is to define these responses in the context of these different categories and so determine the best practices, which should be adopted to ensure a high level of safety. The tunnel users will in all probability be unfamiliar with their environment and with the technical features available in the tunnel. It may be in their best interests to take action with regard to self-rescue prior to the arrival of the emergency services. This may depend on their prior education with regard to tunnel safety. The tunnel operator understands the features available and should take appropriate action to implement procedures, which will minimise the danger to occupants. The operator will call in the emergency services and generally follow a pre-prescribed plan. The development of this plan and how it should be refined through exercises and training is also addressed. The emergency services face an unpredictable situation on their arrival at the fire site. An understanding of the tunnel details and the knowledge of tunnel operational possibilities are required to take control of the situation and begin the rescue operation with maximum safety. The complexity of this interface cannot be underestimated, with a need to interpret possibly incomplete information in a situation, which may change rapidly, and to deal with human behavioural problems. The knowledge of safety related to a specific tunnel and the responses in case of an accident will differ, depending on the tunnel operator, the emergency services and the users. It is important to have in mind that a balance between prevention of accidents and reduction of consequences (for structure, human life and environment) has to be based on a risk analysis for the individual tunnel with its own specific geometry, traffic, environment etc. Best practice for emergency response requires the consideration of several safety factors which influence the level of safety in a tunnel. No consideration has, in the list of safety factors, been taken to account for different tunnel lengths and traffic volumes. An attempt to divide safety factors in compulsory and optional has been found to be too theoretical depending on the fact that each tunnel is individual in many different aspects. Some of the safety factors are not relevant for all tunnels, for example, responses from traffic operators if no manned control room exists. The concept of best practice is presented in the form of a three-dimensional matrix, Figure 1.1, which shows the complexity of tunnel safety and emphasises the dependences required between different dimensions in order to create safety at a high and balanced level. The first dimension covers the parties involved in the different phases namely the tunnel operator, emergency services and tunnel users. The second dimension covers the conceptual phases namely (1) before a fire, (2) during a fire and (3) after a fire. The third dimension covers safety factors for each phase and each involved party.
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Introduction

Figure 1.1: Tunnel Safety Matrix

Safety factors should be evaluated for each individual tunnel, since each tunnel operator or other organisation is presumed to be able, from their own knowledge and competence, to judge the convenience of implementation. It is important to stress that tunnel operation at a high safety level and with efficient handling of incidents and accidents can be achieved only in a close co-operation between the three involved parties - the tunnel operator, the emergency services and the tunnel users All the safety factors are not always relevant for all parties or for all phases. For example, the safety factors comprising strategies/analysis are only relevant for the conceptual phase before a fire. Not surprisingly best practise in the conceptual phase before a fire are the most extensive because this gives the basis to the whole tunnel safety set-up. For the conceptual phases during a fire and after a fire the most important safety factors for all involved parties are to act according to this set-up.

1.2

Outline of the Report

The structure of the best practice guidelines are presented in global terms as Road, Rail and Metro, to differentiate the conditions and actions required for these different situations. Within each of these sections, the conceptual phases before, during and after a fire form the main divisions. Prior to the discussion of these details, however, the technical systems which are installed in many tunnels are described in Chapter 2. These systems contribute to the possible levels of
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Introduction

safety that can be achieved and are mentioned later in relation to response planning. The viewpoint of the fire brigade is then presented in Chapter 3 in order to establish the context of fire response management. Clearly, tunnel users and the fire & rescue services encounter the highest risk in the event of a fire in a tunnel. Best practices for Road, Rail and Metro tunnels then follow in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The ultimate aim of best practice for emergency response is to create a situation where the tunnel users and fire and rescue services are exposed to the least risk.

These guidelines are written in the context of the other FIT work packages which establish the present level of knowledge of the conditions within a tunnel following an accident and regulatory frameworks that might apply. WP2 Design Fire Scenarios provides information on the development of actual fires, recommendations for design fires and technical issues relating to structural integrity and safety equipment, such as ventilation, thus providing a foundation for the development of life-safety issues. WP3 Fire Safe Design brings together knowledge of current guidelines for fire safe design, hence defining regulatory expectation of facilities, equipment, standards and procedures which will prevail in a design or refurbishment exercise. These recommendations are summarized in terms of structural safety facilities (emergency exits, rescue teams access, safety niches, etc.) safety equipment (power supply, ventilation / smoke control, signs, sensors, communication, monitoring, fire suppression, etc.) and reaction and resistance to fire of structures and equipment.

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Tunnel Systems

CHAPTER 2 : TUNNEL SYSTEMS

2.1

General

In the Fire Response Management for an incident in a road, railway or metro tunnel, several electromechanical and railway systems are usually involved. These systems provide the operators with tools and means to optimise the response, provide the necessary information to everyone involved and eventually assist in the minimisation of the loss of lives and/or injuries. Immediate and coordinated use and activation of these systems is critical to the incident response. These systems include: Ventilation and smoke exhaust systems Fire Detection systems Fire Fighting systems Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobile telephones Traction power isolation systems Emergency lighting CCTVs Public address Signage Traffic Management systems

In parallel, the passive fire protection design which includes: Fire compartmentation, Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases Use of fire resistant materials,

is also of critical nature in the planning of a fire incident response, for road, railway and metro tunnels and systems. The above are outlined in turn in the following sections:

2.2

Ventilation and smoke exhaust systems

The ventilation and smoke exhaust systems that take part in fire response typically comprise of the following installations. Large size axial fans with all their related auxiliaries such as motorised dampers, sound attenuators, electrical installations etc. which generate the air flows that prevent smoke backlayering in tunnels thus providing a smoke free evacuation route. In railway and metro systems, axial fans may also be used for dedicated smoke extraction from public areas of stations where the number and the concentration of passengers is high, and every effort is directed in keeping these public areas free of smoke for as long as it is possible. Jet fans usually ceiling mounted in tunnels, providing longitudinal ventilation and often assisting and complementing the axial fan installations. Saccardo nozzles in tunnels (this option forms a special case of a momentum device delivering high velocity through a special nozzle design in the tunnel civil works)
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Tunnel Systems

In certain cases of railway and metro stations, smoke control may be assisted by windows and hatches which are opened in case of a fire incident and allow the smoke to leave the confined areas and spaces, as a result of its buoyancy.

The main principles and operation objectives for the ventilation and smoke exhaust systems are: Flow reversibility capabilities in tunnels that imply fully reversible fan installations. Evacuation of people/passengers is selected in the opposite direction to that of the air flows generated by the forced ventilation.. All related equipment (fans, dampers, cables etc) exposed to the exhaust airflows should be fire resistant (typical specification is 250 O C for 1 hour). All cables, flexible couplings, paints and other materials that may eventually catch fire should be free from toxic fumes and halogen free All power supply systems providing power to the fan installations should be redundant, ie power should be available from at least two independent sources. In road tunnels ventilation may be provided in a longitudinal, semi transverse or fully transverse manner, depending on the tunnel size, length and tunnel design specifics, while this issue also relates to the normal tunnel operation. Recent developments in the semi transverse and transverse types of ventilation on road tunnels involve smart motorised dampers which maximise the smoke extraction by activating the smoke extraction dampers only close to the fire incident, thus optimising the smoke extraction process at the incident location. For certain metro systems, this also applies to the platform level of certain stations, where vertical downstand barriers under the ceiling create smoke reservoirs to each one of which there is a motorised damper activated automatically according to the smoke extraction needs.

2.3

Fire Detection and alarm systems

Various types of fire detection systems are currently in use in road, railway and metro tunnels as well as railway and metro underground stations. Fire detection systems cover all public areas, technical areas, staff areas while more specialised systems are often used in the tunnels where the environmental conditions are more demanding and the need for regular periodic testing and maintenance is higher. Some of the main characteristics of fire detection systems are outlined below: They may be triggered as smoke or heat detectors, They have capabilities to operate in an addressable mode thus giving the exact incident location, while facilitating maintenance and replacement In tunnels, linear heat detectors may be used (long cables with linear sensors) which are more robust and require less maintenance In public areas of railway/metro stations they may operate optically thus reducing the number of visible cables and resulting in architecturally accepted solutions In technical areas (e.g. a substation) they are interfaced with the ventilation and fire suppression systems, optimising the response Digital technology and related algorithms practically eliminate false alarms through cross checking of several detectors It must be stressed that fire detection and alarm systems become very effective when they are correctly interlocked with several other systems, mainly with the ventilation and smoke

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Tunnel Systems

exhaust, the fire suppression systems which depend on the area, as well as with other alarms.

2.4

Fire fighting systems

Fire fighting systems offer the principal means for response to a fire incident, whether in a road or railway/metro tunnel or a passenger station where the concentration of people is likely to be high especially at specific hours of the day. The type of systems installed, usually depend on the function of the area they serve, and they usually include: Dry stand pipe systems with outlet valves at specific distances, eg every 60 m for metro tunnels, less often used in other railway tunnels. Dry systems are used in order to minimise the risks of electrocution from the 3rd rail. In a tunnel incident, power will be cut first remotely or locally, while firemen will need to carry fire hoses that will be connected to the outlet valves nearest to the incident location. The dry system shall be energised and automatically fill with water within approximately 1-2 minutes upon a remote or a local command from a control centre or adjacent station, using electrically activated central valves. Redundancy provisions are always made to have at least two separate points where the dry standpipe system will fill with water. In a metro system this is usually between the two adjacent metro stations. Wet stand pipe systems with fire hoses in road and rail tunnels which depending on the location of the tunnel -, are fed from usual water supply networks or assisted by fire fighting pumping stations if the tunnel length is significant. Automatically activated fire suppression systems based on inert gases in the case of electrical equipment rooms (eg. traction power substation, telecommunications equipment room etc). These systems are interlocked with the ventilation systems that shut down, all fire dampers close thus isolating the incident room, and then the area is flooded with an inert gas that puts out the fire by reducing the oxygen content, as the room is filled with the inert gas. These systems are designed so that the oxygen content that remains is such that it is just sufficient to allow a person to enter the room safely. Water sprinkler systems, which are sometimes used in special areas such as railway depots whether overground or underground, with careful provisions taken to minimise electrocution risks. Also, for rooms containing electrical equipment but with human occupancy (such as a station master room or a control room) water sprinkler systems could be used, but with a dry stand pipe system within the room. Auxiliary fire fighting equipment located at easy to reach locations usually within metro or railway stations, containing equipment such as fire extinguishers, axes, blankets, buckets with sand, breathing apparatus etc. A recently developed fire fighting technique with wide applications is based on water mist that is sprayed at or near the fire from fixed piping systems with spray nozzles. The water mist particles fight the fire by lowering the temperature of the materials under fire as well as in the near vicinity, while capturing the smoke particles and thus improving the visibility. This method is not used in tunnels, but certain metro operators have started using it for specific limited applications in passenger stations and vehicles.

2.5

Computerised controls for ventilation and smoke exhaust systems

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Tunnel Systems

One critical link in the chain of fire response is the computerised/automation controls that monitor and control the ventilation and smoke exhaust systems upon command from an operator or upon input from fire detection systems. These central control systems usually termed as controls for ECS (Environmental Control Systems) or BMS (Building Management Systems) or as a recent European Standard EN_ISO 16484 uses the term BACS (Building Automation and Control Systems), have the following capabilities: They can energise pre-programmed emergency scenarios with the optimum response combination of the involved tunnel fans, activated with a mouse click, without the need of the operator to decide at the hour of the incident which fan combinations to use, thus minimising the response time and ensuring the correct fan combination activation. The scenarios involve activation of several items of equipment such as fans, dampers, roller shutters etc. Activation of the correct scenario and further coordinated actions to inform the people and passengers to follow a specific evacuation direction are important for the fire response management and its success. They allow further individual fan operations to be activated from the operator, if decided by the incident management team to further improve the smoke extraction process. On a local level, in railway /metro stations, a control panel easily accessible and visible is often installed. This control panel, sometimes called a fireman's box, has buttons that automatically energise specific response scenarios (e.g. fire in station platform) regarding the fans emergency operation, and this may be performed either by a fireman at the incident scene or by a staff member after consultation with the control centre.

The above mentioned control systems are usually interlocked with fire detection and fire fighting systems in order to maximise the transmission of the critical information and alarm signals and optimise the fire response.

2.6

Radio telecommunication, telephone systems and mobile telephones

Communication systems are used for conveying the information about an incident to the people and organizations that need to be involved in the fire response. These systems include: Emergency telephones installed at specified locations in road or rail tunnels that enable drivers (in road tunnels) or railway staff (in rail/metro tunnels) to communicate directly to the operator control centre and report the exact location and nature of the incident. In some cases these emergency telephones may allow communication directly to the police, fire brigade and other authorities. The main difference between road and rail/metro tunnels is that anyone may use the emergency telephones in a road tunnel (eg a private car driver) while in rail/metro tunnels this action shall usually be taken by a member of the staff (eg a train driver or attendant) and is thus more controlled and reliable. In metro tunnels these telephones are sometimes situated side by side with emergency plunger buttons that cut the electrification power. From the time that an incident has been reported, a well-organised sequence of activation of various authorities should follow, and depending on the incident, these may include the police, the fire brigade, the ambulances, special emergency crew units, near by hospitals and others. For optimisation of the cross communication between emergency services, usually operator control centres for road and railway/metro tunnels and systems have direct telephones to the police and the fire brigade.

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Radio telecommunications offer a parallel means of communication that is independent of location or position. Usually tunnel operators do provide a radio telecommunications system for their staff mainly for facilitating maintenance but for incident response as well. A point of special interest here is that it would be very helpful if the radio telecommunications of not only the tunnel operator but of several or all of the parties involved such as the police, the fire brigade, the ambulances etc should be organised to go under the same telecommunications umbrella. An example is that of the recent 2004 Olympic Games in Athens where all the radio telecommunications for the road operators, the metro, the tram, the suburban railway, the police, the fire brigade, the ambulances etc were under one universal (called TETRA) radio system which made cross communication between the various services and incident response much easier to implement. Another facility which may prove critical to the early activation and incident response is the coverage of road and rail/metro tunnels by the mobile telephone companies, since this would greatly enhance the capability of any driver of passenger to communicate and inform of the fire incident at its beginning, well before it is developed beyond control.

2.7

Electrical - traction power isolation systems

In metro tunnels and other railway tunnels, a system is provided to cut out the electrical (traction) power to that section of the tunnel close to the incident. This action may be performed remotely from the control centre or locally from emergency plunger buttons installed at regular distances in the tunnels. Cutting of the electrical power is the first action that needs to be taken in a tunnel fire incident.

2.8

Emergency lighting

Tunnel lighting systems should be designed for the case of a fire incident. Although the lighting fixtures themselves are usually not fire resistant, one may assume that a number of lighting fixtures will be destroyed in a fire incident, but sufficient lights and lighting levels shall remain for the people/ passengers to escape from the incident location. Hence tunnel lighting systems need to be designed with redundancy, using different electrical phases for different sequential lighting fixtures, power supply shall need to come from both sides of the tunnels, while UPS or individual battery systems shall need to be used to ensure a minimum level of lighting in the event of total power loss. Periodic maintenance of tunnel lighting systems is important to ensure their correct operation in an incident. In railway/metro stations, lighting systems are designed with several degrees of redundancy (multiple electrical circuits, fed from multiple power sources, backed up by UPSs and battery systems) as the large number and concentration of people require certain minimum lighting levels for emergency evacuation, especially in cases where smoke is present. In all cases of tunnels and stations, battery based safety lights, lighting the emergency exit signs and pictograms, in case of a total power loss, are also installed in addition to emergency lighting. In certain recent metro systems a series of small size, intense level indication lights are installed along the route of emergency and evacuation exits to facilitate evacuation of passengers under low visibility conditions. In all cases all lighting cables are toxic fumes free and halogen free.

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2.9

Closed Circuit TVs (CCTVs)

CCTVs, are extensively used in road tunnels and in railway/metro stations, for monitoring the normal operation as well as providing immediate pictures in case of an incident. CCTVs may be of the type with a fixed view field or may have electrically activated pivoting mechanisms which enable monitoring of a much wider field, with also zoom in/out capabilities, as operated from the control centre of the Operator. In case of a fire incident, they provide information on the exact incident location, they give an indication of the smoke visibility levels and offer a very valuable tool for decision making on the fire response management, while the incident may be video-taped for further analysis and evaluation. The usual problem with CCTVs is that the human operators that monitor them at the control centre level, are usually insufficient for the coverage that the CCTVs provide and an incident may take place without anybody noticing, until it may be too late. Hence efforts are under way to develop smart CCTVs that may be programmed for automatic recognition of an incident. An example of that of a system that has been proposed for further development for railway/metro stations, that takes continuous digital images from CCTVs, compares them on line with pre-specified flows of passengers of a laminar or turbulent flow nature and hence decides whether an incident has taken place, since people move with different patterns (faster and in a more random manner) in the case of an incident.

2.10

Public Address (PA) System

Public address systems are usually not installed in road or rail and metro tunnels, but they are an important system in the fire response management in railway/metro stations. Announcements from the PA systems shall need to be exercised with great care in the case of a fire incident, aiming to promote the orderly evacuation of the passengers from the station and prevent panic that in many cases has proved to be more destructive and fatal than the fire incident itself. Also, it is extremely important that the directions and instructions given to the public and passengers from the operator through the PA system either on a local level from a station master or remotely on a control centre level, are the correct actions to be followed, totally in line with the evacuation strategy that has been decided. A number of fatal incidents have resulted from changes in the fire response strategy, mid way during an incident.

2.11

Signage

Signage is a passive measure whose role in a fire response is to indicate clearly and unambiguously the evacuation routes and exits from the incident area. In certain cases signs become lit if required. Signs are usually placed in visible locations at a sufficient height, and the line of sight to the signs should not be impeded by other information signs or other equipment such as road signs or jet fans in road tunnels, or destination signs, clocks etc in rail/metro stations. In evacuation exits and staircases, fluorescent stripes are sometimes installed at the edge of steps or on the sidewalls, to further assist evacuation under low visibility conditions.

2.12

Traffic Management System

Although the term refers to road traffic in road tunnels, the principle equally applies to railway/metro tunnels. In road tunnels the electronic information signs along roads and
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motorways leading to the tunnels should immediately be programmed from the control centre to inform drivers not to enter the incident tunnel. This action although it is likely to create traffic queues before the tunnels, will allow the cars that are already inside the tunnels to exit, while access to the fire brigade, the police, the ambulances and the emergency services will be facilitated. In railway/metro tunnels, the train traffic operators shall immediately direct the train drivers to keep away from the incident tunnel.

2.13

Passive fire protection relation to fire response management

All the above measures, with the possible partial exception of signage, refer to active measures for managing the response to a fire incident. However, mainly for the case of railway/metro stations, the passive fire protection is an integral part of the fire response management, as it provides barriers to fire and smoke and assists in formulating the fire response strategy. Passive fire protection covers mainly three areas, the fire compartmentation, the evacuation routes, shafts and staircases, and the preventive measure to maximise the use of fire resistant materials. Each one is outlined in turn in the following sections.

2.14

Fire compartmentation

In the case of railway/metro stations, all staff and equipment areas where a fire incident may take place have been designed with fire compartmentation in mind. This at the least ensures that a local fire incident in one of those areas will not affect the public areas, while the fire detection and fire fighting systems may be triggered automatically. Response in such incidents is usually fast because it involves only staff members, and possibly emergency services, while the automatic fire suppression and fire fighting systems usually perform satisfactorily. Fire compartmentation also protects the technical and staff rooms from a fire in the public areas, so that the systems in the technical areas shall continue to operate safely and the staff could continue to operate and deal with the incident.

2.15

Evacuation routes, shafts and staircases

All types of road and railway/metro tunnels and all types of railway/metro stations have been designed with evacuation routes, shafts and staircases that provide the means for escaping safely from a fire incident. In tunnels, evacuation routes, shafts and staircases are provided at regular intervals according to the codes (NFPA or other) while fire response management with respect to the minimization of casualties and loss of lives, is related to the maximised use of these safe evacuation routes. The strategy of evacuating people or passengers from a tunnel or a station, is built around the capabilities and capacities offered by these safe evacuation routes, since time is the principal factor in all the strategy analyses. Another important factor to be considered in the evacuation strategies is the use of these evacuation routes as access routes by the emergency services, in order to reach the incident location in the least possible time, without however moving towards the incident concurrently while the escaping passengers are moving in the opposite direction. Finally, the pressurisation of emergency evacuation routes and staircases is another safety measure that may enhance safe evacuation, but this issue is sometimes debated with regards to the technical solutions proposed for its implementation.

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2.16

Use of fire resistant materials

Minimization of the combustible materials in tunnels and stations is an ever-developing topic as it indirectly dictates the time available for responding safely to a fire incident. Reduction of the combustible materials, development of fire resistant materials, development of materials that even when burned do not produce toxic fumes and other dangerous products may provide the additional critical time to safely evacuate the people/passengers involved in an incident, hence it is important that system Operators do invest in the technology of materials. This topic is more applicable to railway/metro tunnels and stations where efforts are continuously being made to improve on items such as train floors and seats, cables, plastics used in lighting fixtures, insulation materials, paints etc. For the case of road tunnels the issue is redirected to the automobile manufacturers for similar items as above, while however the petrol carried in vehicles is an inflexible item with regards to fire safety and presents the highest risk. In conclusion, all the above active and passive means that are involved in fire response management can only be effectively used if the strategies are analysed and actions are programmed in detail beforehand. This involves not only the Operator/Authority that runs the system (road or railway/metro) but also the fire brigade, the police, the hospitals and the ambulances, other emergency units and crews, the press etc. Each one of the above should be well trained to take part in a fire response, while central coordination between all the above during the incident from the operator/authority is also important. In cases of emergency at a larger scale the central coordination may be undertaken by a higher-level governmental entity. Fire response drills and tests and similar rehearsals need to performed periodically, in order to test the response characteristics of each system involved in particular as well as the overall fire response mechanism and its management.

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CHAPTER 3 : THE FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICES PERSPECTIVE


As mentioned above, incorporating safety into the design of tunnels involves thorough investigation of the various safety features in terms of both design and construction and is generally accompanied by extensive risk analyses. Work includes consideration and calculation of the various design rating events and their consequences, with careful analyses of how persons involved in accidents are likely to behave. The knowledge derived from these investigations and analyses is used to design and determine the necessary capacities of safety systems in the tunnels. An essential part of the design process is a detailed description of the various pro-active and consequence-reducing actions which can be taken once an accident has occurred. These would normally be performed by the Fire and Rescue Service. The role of the Fire and Rescue Service should be seen as an integral part of the tunnels overall safety concept. Tunnel designers need to understand the factors which enable the Fire and Rescue Service to safely, quickly and efficiently deal with any accidents that occur, and the services needed on hand to assist the tunnel owners/operators in determining the necessary capacity of services required. Fire and Rescue Authorities generally have two roles to play. One role is to be that of a public authority, ensuring that the design of the tunnel fulfils the guidelines and various forms of practice that ensure a sufficient level of safety for individual users. They also provide the organisation that maintains and applies the various actions and responses in the event of accidents. Tunnel owners have a major responsibility in terms of preparedness for accidents, which includes making it possible to perform rescue work and to limit damage arising from an accident. Legislation can impose a responsibility on an operator or owner to ensure that conditions are such that rescue work could be carried out in the event of an accident, and particularly if the property is large and complicated, such as a tunnel. By working closely with the Fire and Rescue Authority, a tunnel owner can arrive at a solution that integrates the Fire and Rescue Service with other safety aspects of the tunnel.

3.1

Concept of Tactics for Rescue Operations

In simple terms, fire and rescue operations can be said to consist of a number of different elements: The working methods or active measures for which the personnel have been trained and equipped, with the outcome depending largely on the ability of the personnel to make best use of the equipment under the conditions of the particular accident with which they are dealing. Coordination of the various individual methods, so that they work together to produce an effective rescue action. Selection of tactics for effectively fulfilling the objective of the rescue action.

The tactics in fire and rescue operations can be described as the ongoing decisions by the incident commander regarding the resources to be used, and the actions to be carried out in order to achieve the objectives in the most efficient manner, Figure 2.

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The specific tactical thrust will be dependent on the type of accident concerned, the local conditions, the objective of the work, the resources available and the competence of the personnel available for the action. Clearly, the fire and rescue operation in connection with a fire in a cable tunnel will be carried out in a different manner to tackling a fire involving private cars in a tunnel. The biggest difference between these two can be seen to be the fact that the main thrust of the operation in the road tunnel would be to rescue persons involved, which is not the main purpose of operation in the cable tunnel. Fire-fighting operations need to be adapted to suit the many different situations.
Objective of the rescue action

Resources available for the rescue action

Tactical execution of the rescue action

Results of the rescue action

The type of accident and the environment in which it has occurred

Figure 3.1: Tactic for rescue actions

There are considerable variations in the design of tunnels throughout the world, and fires can differ greatly in terms of intensity or extent, depending on what is burning. In road tunnels, it may be road vehicles that burn; in railway tunnels, it can be trains or fires can occur in accumulations of rubbish. It is therefore difficult to define a fire in a tunnel. However, this report will concentrate on how rescue and fire services can deal with catastrophic fires in tunnels. As far as the Fire and Rescue Services are concerned, the most important measures that can reduce the severity of accidents are: That there should be short distances to, and simple means of reaching, escape routes for those escaping from a fire. That the fire fighters can approach the fire as safely as possible. That the fire cannot grow excessively before fire-fighting work can start.

These various conditions can be achieved in different ways, but there must be an overall safety programme that identifies all the parameters involved, makes them work together and creates the best conditions for high safety levels.

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3.2

Fire and Rescue Operation

Safety in tunnels depends on many different factors and conditions: the actual design of the tunnel itself, and the type of traffic using it, will have a considerable effect. Escape routes and approach routes for the public fire service are only parts of this overall safety, although they are the vital parts that must operate satisfactorily in the event of an extensive tunnel fire. The fire and rescue operations should be so structured, and matched to the design of the tunnel and the conditions likely to be encountered, as needed to suit each particular specific case. Todays Fire and Rescue Service have developed many methods for dealing with different types of accidents. In general, it can be said that the more common the type of accident, the more developed are the methods for dealing with it. The concepts of upstream and downstream of the fire relate to the direction of air flow in the tunnel. The area upstream of the fire is that away from the fire and against the direction of air flow. Downstream of the fire is the zone away from the fire itself, in the direction of the air flow. It is in this latter direction that most of the fire gases flow. Backlayering is the phenomenon by which the fire gases flow against the direction of air flow in the tunnel. The distance to which this effect can occur depends on the size of the fire, the volume of the air flow in the tunnel and other parameters.

3.3

Methods Available to the Fire Services for Fighting a Tunnel Fire

In principle, the Fire and Rescue Services apply the following tactical approaches to tackling fires in tunnels: Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught in it, Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those caught in the fire, to get them out of the tunnel as quickly as possible, Ventilation of the tunnel, where possible, in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting, Fighting the fire from a safe position, in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel.

These various approaches must then be brought together to provide a suitable combination for dealing with each specific accident. An important aspect is that of the time before the fire starts to grow rapidly. These results seem to indicate that fires tend to take hold fiercely after about the first 5 - 10 minutes. This can be compared with the golden 60 seconds that are available for tackling aircraft fires, and which indicate the maximum time that can elapse before the first fire-fighting work starts. If the Fire and Rescue Services are to be able to start fighting fires within about ten minutes, much needs to be done in order to improve the efficiency of their work. The working methods normally employed by Fire and Rescue Services have come to reflect the accidents and fires most commonly encountered today. In the case of major fires in tunnels, it is highly likely that it will be necessary to use very different methods from those employed in tackling fires in residential buildings or ordinary traffic accidents. Serious fires, such as those in the Mont Blanc Tunnel or the Tauern Tunnel, show all too clearly that the methods employed by the Fire and Rescue Services are based on the necessary responses after the fire has been brought under control, and the assumption that the Fire and Rescue Services will be able to get to the fire easily. Working methods that can be considered for dealing with fires in tunnels are as follows.
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Entry into the tunnel to ascertain conditions, i.e. to note the conditions at the accident site and to obtain an overall picture. This is done with the aim of providing information needed for further work. It may be necessary to do this in smoke-filled conditions, which means that those carrying it out must be appropriately protected. It must also be done immediately on arrival, and be fast and effective, in order not to delay the rest of the work. Entering the tunnel to extinguish the fire and eliminate the threat to persons in the tunnel. This may have to be carried out under dangerous conditions, facing smoke and high thermal radiation levels, which means that those involved must be suitably protected. Actually extinguishing the fire may be very difficult, and can probably be done in a number of different ways, of which the following are examples of possible methods: o The use of ordinary hoses and nozzles. o The use of portable water monitor. o The use of vehicle-mounted water monitor. o The use of fans, with water being injected into the air flow. o Moving the burning object etc. out of the tunnel. o The use of remotely controlled fire-fighting equipment. Work in the tunnel in order to guide those escaping from the fire, i.e. those capable of fleeing. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smoke and high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must be suitably protected. Work in the tunnel physically to carry out victims, i.e. what is generally called lifesaving. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smoke and high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must be suitably protected. Work in the tunnel to rescue those involved in the fire and help them to survive in the vicinity. This may also have to be carried out under dangerous conditions of smoke and high radiation levels, which means that those performing the work must be suitably protected. Ventilation of the tunnel in order to control the quantity and direction of flow of smoke in the tunnel. The purpose of this can be: o to ventilate the tunnel in order to assure the existing air flow through it, thus facilitating evacuation and rescue work. o to ventilate the tunnel in order to start air flow through it, thus creating a possible escape route and a means of approach for the firefighters. o to ventilate the tunnel in order to reverse the direction of flow of smoke, thus facilitating the rescue of those in the smoke downstream of the fire site. Advanced care for victims, under safe conditions in the vicinity of the fire. This method is likely to require very considerable resources if large numbers of persons are involved.

The prime aim of all these methods is to save lives, although they also represent different and, in many cases, equally important, methods of ensuring an effective input, depending on the particular conditions of the accident. The reason that several of these methods are often not considered as methods of saving life is probably because most fires occur in considerably less complicated areas, involving considerably fewer persons. Under such circumstances, it is not as apparent that, for example, information is one of the most
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important points when starting the work, or that quickly evacuating those who are first found is not necessarily the most effective way of saving lives.

3.4

Fires in Road Tunnels

The size of a fire in a road tunnel will have a very considerable effect on the ability of the Fire and Rescue Service to perform effective rescue and/or fire-fighting operations. When tackling fires in road tunnels, personnel and equipment should be capable of dealing with fires of the magnitude that can be encountered. This is important, as many persons can be involved in road tunnel fires. Fires in private cars in twin-bore tunnels will almost be within the capabilities of a fire-fighting force to handle. However, the same fire in a single-bore tunnel could lead to considerable difficulties, depending on whether there is any air flow through the tunnel or whether there is a ventilation system capable of evacuating the smoke from the fire. The factors that will set the capacity requirements for fighting a fire in a tunnel will be: The number of persons whom the rescue and fire services must assist out to safe conditions The size of the fire, and thus the temperature and thermal radiation power that will face the fire-fighters The distance that the fire-fighters have to travel in a smoke-filled environment to reach the fire.

Fires in trucks and coaches are likely to reach such output levels that it can be difficult effectively to tackle the fire. As the carriage of goods by road is generally increasing in Europe, this can also mean that the probability of fires in freight vehicles is also increasing. Many tunnels have been designed with capacities that are capable only of dealing with fires with outputs of up to 20 30 MW[1]. Fires of this order of size will generate very high radiation levels, both from the smoke and from the actual flames. The table below shows the thermal radiation levels recorded at the fire trials in the Runehammar Tunnel in Norway in 2003.

Basis of the fire

Thermal output (peak), HRR (MW) 200 MW

Wooden pallets and plastic pallets, 10 tonne Wooden pallets and

170 MW

Radiation level 5 m upstream of the fire q (kW/m2) 110 (peak) 40-60 (17 minutes) 29-35 (5

Radiation level 10 m upstream of the fire q (kW/m2) 10-12 (17 minutes) 9-19 (6 minutes)

Radiation level 20 m upstream of the fire q (kW/m2) 2 (peak)

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mattresses, 6 tonne Furniture, 7.7 tonne. 130 140 MW Truck tyres, 0.8 tonne Cartons of plastic beakers on wooden 70 80 MW pallets, 2.6 tonne

minutes) 20 (short period) 40 (short period)

9 (short period) 8 (short period)

2 (peak) 4 (peak)

Table 3.1: Measured thermal outputs and radiation values from fire tests in the Runehammar Tunnel, September 2003 [4].

Tackling fires in twin-bore tunnels When a fire breaks out in a twin-bore tunnel, traffic in the affected bore must be stopped upstream of the fire. The normal ventilation of the tunnel must ensure that those escaping upstream from the fire are not affected by smoke from it. All traffic downstream of the fire should be able to continue to drive out of the tunnel before it is filled with smoke. Traffic in the other bore of the tunnel must be stopped, so that the Fire and Rescue Service can enter the tunnel and reach the fire via the connections between the two tunnel bores.

Air movement

Figure 3.2: Tackling a vehicle fire in a twin-bore tunnel [4]

Tackling this type of fire will involve the following elements: Stopping all further traffic into both bores of the tunnel. Experience shows that this closure must be in the form of an actual physical barrier. The fire tenders enter the unaffected tunnel in the normal traffic direction from the nearest entrance point. It is important that there should be clear access routes for the fire service vehicles, as there is likely to be traffic chaos outside the tunnel. First personnel to arrive quickly tackle the fire in the vehicle. At the same time, the smoke-free part of the tunnel upstream of the fire site should be evacuated. Depending on the size of the fire, the second and third crews to arrive should assist the first crew in putting out the fire and start to extinguish any fires downstream of the original fire and search the tunnel for persons trapped. The purpose of this action is to rescue anyone trapped in the smoke, and to remove the danger of the fire spreading to any vehicles in the smoke downstream of the fire: see Figure 3.

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If the tunnel is in a major urban environment, it is very likely that there will be traffic queues. Dealing with a tunnel fire under such circumstances means that the most important step in protecting those already in the tunnel is unavailable: vehicles downstream of the fire will not be able to drive out of the tunnel, but will be trapped in the traffic queue and unable to move. This means that there will be a large number of persons trapped in the smoke downstream of the fire. Some of them will escape through the connections to the parallel tunnel bore, but is unlikely that all will do so. As a result, the fire service will suddenly be faced with the problem of dealing with large numbers of people trapped in the smoke.

Air movement

Figure 3.3: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a twin-bore tunnel with queuing vehicles [4]

Tunnel ventilation, activated after the fire has been extinguished, will dilute the dangerous gases in the smoke, thus improving survival conditions in the smoke. If the firefighters fail to extinguish the fire, it will be necessary to reverse the direction of air flow and smoke in the tunnel after the tunnel upstream of the fire has been cleared of people and vehicles. The effect of this will be to create a safe environment for those trapped in the original downstream direction of the fire: see Figure 5.

Fan

Air movement

Figure 3.4: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a twin-bore tunnel with queuing traffic, after reversal of the direction of air flow Tackling fires in single-bore tunnels Tackling a fire of this type will involve the following elements: Quick reconnoitring of the tunnel in order to obtain a picture of the situation, and also to see how far the smoke has spread. Ensure an air flow through the tunnel by starting ventilation in the most suitable direction. If possible, those who were first into the tunnel to investigate the conditions should start to put out the fire in the vehicle. If not, they should take themselves out of the tunnel: see Figure 9. Evacuate persons in the tunnel upstream of the fire site. Enter the tunnel from the downstream end (against the smoke) with the aim of rescuing anyone in the smoke close to the tunnel mouth.
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Once the fire has been put out, ventilate the tunnel in order quickly to reduce the toxic concentrations in the smoke, thus improving the prospects for survival of those trapped in the smoke. If it is not possible to put out the fire, the air direction in the tunnel must be reversed in order to dissipate the toxic smoke from anyone trapped in the tunnel, after the upstream end has been cleared of persons and vehicles.

Flkt

Air movement

Figure 3.5: Tackling a car fire in a single-bore tunnel

Fan

Air movement

Figure 3.6: Fire and rescue operation dealing with a car fire in a single-bore tunnel after reversing the direction of air flow

3.5

Fires in Railway Tunnels

Railway tunnels may be relatively long and large, in which respect they differ very considerably from the normal fires tackled by fire services, occurring in apartments or houses, and of which it is relatively easy to quickly to grasp a situation overview. However, in the case of fires in tunnels, it is very difficult to get any impression at all of what is really happening and why smoke is coming out of the tunnel. This difficulty creates major coordination problems for the operative management of the work at the site. The work is considerably complicated by the relatively large geographical areas and distances involved, as the Fire and Rescue services may need to attack the fire from several different points along the tunnel. If such a large operation as this is to be successful, it is most important that the work has been properly planned and equally properly carried out. In turn, this requires careful pre-planning of the work and facilities that would be needed in the real event. The information that the fire and rescue services need in order to deal with such a situation is as follows: The length of the tunnel. The location of the train. The location of the fire on the train. The location of the passengers and crew. Whether there are any other trains in the tunnel and their location. The size of the fire and its growth rate. The air direction in the tunnel. The slope of the tunnel.

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The location of access points to the tunnel - can the fire and rescue services find their way to the site, to the tunnel openings and to access roads, and how will they know where they are in the tunnel? How will coordination be arranged between the various parties involved in any such extensive rescue operation? How well prepared are the fire and rescue services to use all the necessary equipment? This is a factor that is often forgotten. Local fire services, for example, often find it very difficult to keep up to date with information on everything for which special knowledge is required.

One of those with whom the incident commander establishes contact is the tunnel operator, in the form of the operational company, in order to obtain information. Information must be presented in such a way that it can be assessed and used by the rescue services' decision-makers working under stress at an accident site. Movements of firefighters with breathing apparatus, and work carried out by them, can be very difficult and slow in a smoke-filled area. Problems are likely to be encountered due to the lack of visibility in the smoke and the limited working time available, as determined by the amount of air carried. This is further complicated by the fire itself and its direct consequences, in terms of high temperatures and possible thermal radiation from the fire and fire gases. In addition, the tunnel must be searched, looking for persons escaping from the fire, with the further burden of the heavy physical load of the necessary equipment and, last but not least, the pulling of fire hoses, which often have to be water-filled. There is little knowledge of experience of putting out major fires in tunnels. Once a fire has started in a carriage or locomotive, the work of putting it out will be very difficult due to the thermal radiation, the fire gases and the physical obstacles presented by the rail vehicles, all combining to make it difficult to reach and extinguish the fire. Monitoring and surveillance equipment, if it is available in a tunnel, can provide information that provides answers to the questions that the fire and rescue services will need to put in order to decide how best to deal with the fire. This equipment might include detectors for CO, CO2 and O2, air flow meters, television monitoring, hot bearing detectors, combinations of temperature and smoke detectors and indicators for showing the positions of trains. Locomotives and carriages, if they are fitted with such detectors, can provide early alarms to the train crew, and to assist the fire and rescue services in assessing the size and extent of the fire. Sprinklers in locomotives and carriages can be one way to improve protection in trains. Early detection, in combination with an automatic fire-fighting system, would radically improve the ability to tackle fires on trains. In addition, such a physical protection system needs to be complemented by training of the train crew in tackling fires effectively. One of the important factors to be determined, whether in prior planning or at the time of the event, is what means of evacuation there are in the tunnel. Is the tunnel designed, and/or of sufficient size, for those involved in a fire to be able to get away from the fire, or is it the intention that they should be assisted by the fire services? Is evacuation possible through emergency exits or only through the tunnel openings? Which of these strategies is reasonable, and what is the capacity of the local fire services in the event of an evacuation or life-saving situation? If there are emergency exits in the tunnel, it is important that they are so designed that they will actually be used by those escaping from the fire. Considerable thought must be put into their design, so that they can be found in the circumstances of a situation in which evacuation is necessary.
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In a tunnel where it is not possible to control the direction of air flow, it can be difficult to decide in which direction it is best to attempt to evacuate. In the worst case, the evacuation may be directed by persons who, in their normal work, are not accustomed to dealing with critical or uncommon accident situations. This can mean that their decisions may complicate an evacuation, depending on their ability and procedures for handling the situation. In the situation of a fire in a train in a tunnel, it seems that basic human reactions drive people to escape from the fire, without thinking about the spread or direction of smoke. It is the fire and its flames that drive evacuation more than the spread of smoke, which means that those escaping from the fire will leave in any direction available, regardless of the wind direction. As a result, some will go downwind, and have a long distance to go before they reach safety outside the tunnel. In order to reduce the time taken by evacuation, the train crew should be trained and rehearsed in dealing with passengers in accident situations. They should also have access to technical equipment to assist the evacuation. The fire and rescue services should develop methods of enabling firefighters wearing breathing apparatus to assist those escaping from the smoke. The fire and rescue services need to develop improved methods of assisting evacuation by driving the smoke away from those fleeing from the train, together with improved methods of extinguishing the fire and thus eliminating the underlying threat. As described above, the work of assisting evacuation requires a good knowledge of conditions in the tunnel, which needs to be available to the fire officer from the start and throughout the rest of the work. As it is very difficult to forecast the progress of a fire if it is not known how much is on fire, any risk assessment of a tunnel fire becomes very difficult. How can the risk of the fire overwhelming the train, and developing very high temperatures, be assessed? It is difficult, too, to assess what will be the effect of flames and heat on the tunnel walls and roof, and how they will be affected by the shock of extinguishing with cold water. The fire officer needs to constantly assess the risks, in order to reduce risks to those in the tunnel. Additionally, all types of rescue work on or near rail tracks involve considerable risks with electricity and other trains. In order to be able correctly to assess the real-time risk situation while work is in progress, the incident commander must have a good knowledge of the performance capacity of his service in dealing with the particular type of situation. He should know clearly what the service can do, and what it cannot do. With this knowledge, he knows the limitations of the framework within which he can act. Those likely to be in charge of such situations need to carry out rehearsals of this complicated risk assessment process in an accident situation. This training and rehearsal need to be carried out with an eye to the various situations that the persons concerned may be called upon to face. The incident commander must be actively supported in order to enable him to assess the risk situation. This support can be in the form of various checklists or outline plans, which can provide a better basis for tackling the work. There should be an active analysis of the risks to which the personnel are exposed, with the results being used actively to reduce these risks. It is equally important that the owner of the site or facilities should be aware of what the fire and rescue services can do, so that other parts of the safety system can be provided with the necessary abilities and capacities.

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3.6

Fire and Rescue Operation Problems Encountered in Tunnel Fires

The rescue and fire services will be faced with several problems which must be considered when tackling the fire. Some of these problems are described in more detail below. A picture of the fire scene A first priority for the Fire and Rescue Service is to establish the conditions at the fire site. This is made difficult by lack of communication, possibly poor visibility and a potentially rapidly changing situation. There is therefore a considerable lack of information on what is happening, which makes it difficult to decide what to do, resulting in time lost. Design aspects can help to resolve these difficulties. Probably the most effective way is for the tunnel-owner to install surveillance equipment and to ensure that there is good communication with the Fire and Rescue Service. If there is no physical equipment to provide the information, the Fire and Rescue Service will have to make inspection of the fire site a priority. This needs to be done quickly and effectively, and must provide an accurate picture of conditions. More investigation is needed of combinations of rapid methods, either using vehicles or on foot, and with the assistance of aids such as IR cameras and illuminated tracking lines, laid by the fire-fighters, and without pulling fire hoses with them into the tunnel. Controlling the air flow in the tunnel Together with the tunnel operators, the firefighters need to know in what direction to drive the smoke in order to facilitate evacuation, rescue and fire-fighting. Ventilation is likely to be the only effective method of tackling serious tunnel fires, as mentioned in the typical procedures outlined above. It is important, therefore, to know the capabilities and operational methods of the ventilation systems employed in the specific tunnel and any limitaitons that the system may have. Large and complicated objects Tunnels can be large and extensive structures having long and complicated routes from safe environments, to the final point where rescue or fire-fighting is needed. Plans should be made in order to find ways for the Fire and Rescue Services to make their way to a safe position in the vicinity of the fire and to those requiring rescue. On the international plane, this has been resolved in a number of different ways in long single-bore tunnels, using everything from special rescue vehicles to special trainsets in the tunnel, and also with special-purpose access tunnels in parallel with the main tunnels. This need not normally be a decisive problem in the case of twin-bore tunnels, as in most cases it is possible to provide relatively frequent connections between the two bores. Tackling the smoke Smoke-filled tunnels make it necessary to use breathing equipment when entering them. This severely limits the scope for action, as well as the distance that can be covered in the tunnel. Breathing apparatus is generally more suited to use in normal house fires. Such equipment and methods have definite limitations when used in tunnel environments. Tests to investigate the effective working range of a firefighter wearing breathing apparatus in a tunnel environment are as shown in the table below.

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Test conditions

Movement speed (m/minute)

Maximum range (m)* 58 243 1080 80

Smoke-filled tunnel, dry hose 4.3 Non-smoke-filled tunnel, pulling a 18 water-filled hose Non-smoke-filled tunnel, no hose 80 Trials in an industrial environment in 6 another investigation * Based on 2400 l of air, an air consumption of 62 l/min and ability to retreat

Table 3.2: Movement speed and range of breathing apparatus groups in tunnel environments [4]

Clearly, these limitations need to be considered when planning Fire and rescue Service interventions. Extinguishing the fire Actually extinguishing the fire can be very difficult. It has been found that fires in trucks and buses can be relatively extensive, reaching high temperatures and producing high levels of radiation and dense smoke. If the tunnel is ventilated, the Fire and Rescue Service can probably reach the seat of the fire without having to pass through excessive smoke or heat. Nevertheless, radiant heat at the site of the fire can be very considerable, imposing severe limitations on the ability to stay in the vicinity of the fire for a sufficiently long period of time to put it out and so reduce the amount of thermal radiation. If, on the other hand, there is no ventilation in the tunnel, tackling the fire will be very dependent on the choice of approach route, as there will only be the natural draught in the tunnel to determine the direction of flow of the smoke. It is also very likely that, under such conditions, there will be substantial backlayering of the smoke as a result of insufficient air flow, which will create dangerous temperature conditions in the fire gases and radiation from them and from the fire, regardless of from which side the fire is tackled. The firefighters will probably use water to tackle the fire: other methods of extinguishing have not been sufficiently developed, or are not sufficiently widely used at present. How much water will be needed in order to put out the fire? This is an important question to answer, as it determines the use of a certain number of jets for a certain period of time. In turn, these jets require a certain number of firefighters, working under difficult conditions. The quantity of water needed to extinguish a vehicle fire in a tunnel, based on the extinguishing requirements for fires occurring in non-residential buildings, is given in Table 4. In such fires, the firefighters had straightforward access to the fire. In this context, we need to remember that vehicle fires are particularly difficult to put out, which means that the following simplifications must be seen as an absolute minimum requirement in terms of water quantities.

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Type of vehicle Private car Van Truck

Fire area (m2) 10 35 200

Heat realease (MW)

Minimum extinguishing water requirement (l/min) 5 226 15 462 100 1250

Number of 360 l/min jets 1 2 4

Table 3.3: Absolute minimum water requirements for extinguishing a vehicle fire[4]

Water must reach the seat of the fire in order to extinguish it, and this is particularly difficult in the case of a vehicle fire. Hence, the firefighters have to get very close to the vehicle in order to fight the fire. The water flow rate then has to be maintained for a significant period in order to put out the fire. It may take about 30 minutes, with at least the above quantity of extinguishing water, in order to put out a fire in a truck. Although firefighters are protected against toxic smoke and high temperatures, they cannot withstand high temperatures or high radiation levels for a long period of time. Experiments have shown that firefighters could withstand a heat load of 5 kW/m2 for at least seven minutes. However, for a firefighter to withstand a stay of 20 minutes, the radiation level cannot exceed 2 kW/m2. Summarising the above, it can be seen that the Fire and Rescue Service will have considerable problems in tackling a fully established tunnel fire with a higher rate of heat release. The firefighters need to get sufficiently close to the fire to be able to get water on the flames and the fire. This is essential in order to reduce the amount of radiant heat, so that they can get closer to the vehicle and get water on to the seat of the fire. If they cannot do this, they will not be able to control the fire, or to reduce its rate of heat release. The main obstacle in preventing firefighters from getting close to a fire is thermal radiation from the fire and from back-layered fire gases. It should be possible to deal with these fire gases, using ventilation to increase the airflow, but thermal radiation from the fire and from any residual backlayering will be difficult to deal with. Development of some form of protection against thermal radiation is needed in order to assist tackling fires of this type, perhaps through the use of water mist jets or water curtain jets. Other considerations which need to be made when developing response plans are: Getting fire-fighting water to the position where it is required. This can be extremely difficult if thought has not been given to this problem when designing the tunnel. The Fire and Rescue Service may find itself faced with a major evacuation and rescue situation, involving large numbers of persons, for which it must be prepared. It is very difficult to assess the risks to which the fire and rescue personnel are exposed when tackling a tunnel fire. These risks can range from failure of the air supply from a breathing apparatus to falling rock from the heat-affected tunnel roof. There must be a reliable communication system between those in safe positions and those in the tunnel. Summary and Conclusions

3.7

Designers of tunnels and safety systems cannot assume that the Fire and Rescue Authority will be able quickly, safely and effectively to deal with any accidents that occur. It will be very important that the Fire and Rescue Services can conduct a dialogue with tunnel operators concerning their rescue capacities, particularly as it ought to be the responsibility of the tunnel-owner to ensure that the tunnel can be safely evacuated, and persons rescued, if necessary. The tunnel-owner has important responsibilities in creating the right conditions so
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that rescue operations can be carried out if needed, but it is only when working closely with the local rescue and fire service that the tunnel-owner can draw up a solution describing how the work of the rescue and fire services can be integrated with other safety features and systems in the tunnel. The way in which the Fire and Rescue Service performs its work will be very dependent on the type of accident that has occurred, on the environment in which it has occurred, the consequences that the accident has had, the objective of the work and the resources available. The tactical approach adopted will be very much affected by the competence of those available for the rescue action. Together, all these various aspects will affect the tactical approach to the rescue operation. Training exercises will greatly enhance the knowledge of all parties and ensure better understanding and communication in the event of an accident. As far as the Fire and Rescue Authority are concerned, the most important consequencereducing measures that can be incorporated in a tunnel to reduce the severity of accidents are: Short distances to, and simple means of reaching, escape routes for those evacuating a fire. That the fire-fighting personnel can safely approach the fire and that the fire cannot grow excessively before fire-fighting work can start. The size of the fire in a road tunnel will have a very considerable effect on the ability of the rescue and fire service to perform an efficient rescue action. Fires in private cars will not be the determining factor for a normal fire and rescue operation in a twin-bore tunnel, but they will be critical in a single-bore tunnel. What is likely to be the determining factor in the ability to deal with a fire in a tunnel is the number of persons who will need to be assisted out into safe conditions, the size of the fire (and thus the temperature and radiation level to which the fire-fighting personnel will be exposed) and the distance that the firefighters have to travel in smoke-filled conditions. The tactical approach that the rescue and fire service can adopt in dealing with a tunnel fire consists of combinations of the following: Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught in it, Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those people caught in the fire, to get them out of the tunnel as quickly as possible, Ventilation of the tunnel in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting, Fighting the fire from a safe position, in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel. It is clear that the thermal output of a vehicle fire seems to rise rapidly after about the first 5-10 minutes. Much has to be done in order to improve the efficiency of fighting tunnel fires if the Fire and Rescue Service is to be able to reach the fire and start work within about ten minutes of receiving the alarm. This shows that the method of tackling such fires has to have been very well planned if it is to be carried out efficiently and limit damage and injury before it is too late. If fire-fighting is to be carried out effectively, the rescue and fire service must obtain an overall picture of the situation. This means that obtaining relevant information is probably the first step to be taken in such a situation, which means that methods need to be developed in order to ensure that this can be done quickly and effectively.

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It has also been found that the efficacy of the work is dependent on being able to get close to the seat of the fire, which emphasises the importance of being able to control ventilation at the site and establish the flow of air to carry away the fire gases. With present-day methods and equipment, the use of breathing apparatus is not an efficient method of dealing with fires in larger tunnels. The working methods involved need to be investigated, and new methods developed. Putting out a fire can be very complicated. In order properly to extinguish a vehicle fire, the extinguishing water must reach the seat of the fire, which requires the firefighters to get close to the vehicle. Under such conditions, thermal radiation from the fire is likely to make this very difficult, and so there is a need to develop methods to protect firefighters from thermal radiation

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CHAPTER 4 : ROAD TUNNELS

4.1

Factors before a Fire 4.1.1 Objectives

The best practice for safe operation involves the elimination or reduction of the probability of an incident occurring. Should an incident occur, it is important to be prepared to manage it and reduce its consequences. Hence, the conceptual phase Before a fire comprises three objectives: Prevention of an incident Prevention of an incident developing into a serious accident Preparedness to manage a serious accident such as a big fire in order to reduce consequences

4.1.2

Tunnel Operator

Safety Organisation Responsibilities and authorities for different functions in the organisation should be clearly described and made well known to all employees and collaborators. Especially important are the authorities of the traffic operators e.g. their right to close the tunnel. In order to have a continuous focus on safety matters, independent of all other activities, it is important that the organisation appoints a Safety Manager to supervise all safety aspects related to tunnel operation; to ensure that proper preventive actions are taken when necessary and that all incidents/accidents are evaluated and corrective actions taken where necessary. For the same tunnel there should only exist one single control room for supervision and control of traffic and technical systems. This will avoid conflicting actions in an accident situation by providing a focus for all information, enabling a clear overview of the incident. It is also important to evaluate the benefits of having a back-up control room in case the principal control room is lost due damage or technical problems. A system of Qualifications should be set up for traffic operator staff assuring they are capable of handling crisis situations. It is extremely important that the staff can react in a rational manner in accident situations. Whilst operators in an alarm centre handle emergency situations on a daily basis and develop practical experience, traffic operators do not, and so have to maintain their knowledge by training and exercises. The traffic operators attitude should be proactive meaning that they should focus and react on each incident in order to take appropriate actions to prevent an accident from happening or even more importantly preventing an accident from escalating into a catastrophe. It is important to be notified in advance if, for example, it is foreseen that traffic volumes will be abnormal or if special traffic movements are expected. To improve safety it is important to establish a 24 hour Road Assistance service to assist or remove vehicles stopped in the tunnel as soon as possible in order to avoid the situation

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escalating into an accident. This assistance can, if possible, be an emergency service responsibility. A Road Patrol whose mission is to inspect the tunnel regularly for dropped goods or damage to structures and installations is likewise needed. They will also set up fixed signs when introducing traffic restrictions for maintenance or similar exercises. Only one organisation familiar with the traffic concepts and procedures should be allowed to perform this operation. A maintenance organisation has to be available round-the-clock in order to correct technical defects affecting safety.

Strategies and Analyses


The tunnel operators safety attitude has to start in the boardroom. The safety priority and accepted risk levels should be based on an overview of all aspects related to safety in maintenance and operation of the tunnel. Minimum acceptable safety levels should be established, such as a stopped car being removed after a prescribed time, or that acceptable accident levels in terms of the number of accidents per million-vehicle kilometres are set.. Procedures should be established for preventive maintenance activities, exercises and test activities affecting traffic. The rules should comprise decision processes, general requirements for highest acceptable traffic volumes during maintenance and plans for how the public should be informed, for example, via radio or road directions, when introducing traffic restrictions. A maintenance strategy that is a balance between preventive and corrective maintenance, taking safety aspects into consideration, should be established. This would, for example, consider degraded functionality and the minimum requirements for safe traffic operation. Corrective maintenance strategy should include different time perspectives for when the correction has to be performed from a safety point of view. The strategy should also reflect the importance of keeping traffic restrictions to a minimal level. An education and exercise strategy should be adopted which addresses general requirements, such as the frequency between refresher courses, and theoretical and practical exercises on an individual traffic operator level. In order to make self rescue possible for tunnel users and to create an environment making it possible for emergency services to perform a safe rescue effort a ventilation strategy should be implemented. The strategy should be agreed upon in close co-operation between the tunnel operator and the emergency authorities Also, an Evacuation strategy for the tunnel users, based on self-rescue, should be agreed upon in close co-operation between the emergency authorities and the tunnel operator and proper signage and lighting should guide the tunnel users to safe place. A Risk Analysis should be performed. The probability of an event occurring and the consequences of an event should be compared with other similar tunnels and relevant open roads in surrounding regions in order to decide the risk acceptance level. Also, Risk Analyses should be performed in a broad perspective e.g. when changes in restrictions affect the traffic on alternative routes. Normally, results from risk analyses can be divided into three different areas namely risks where improvements are necessary, risks where improvements will be evaluated after cost-benefit analyses and acceptable risks where no improvements are necessary. On the basis of actual accidents, potential accidents and changes in the
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infrastructure and traffic conditions the Risk Analysis should regularly be reviewed and improvements introduced when found necessary. Despite the result of a Risk Analysis risk reduction evaluations should be separately performed concerning the advantages obtained by lowering the maximum speed allowed, introduction of restrictions for hazardous goods transport and obtaining rules for minimum distances between vehicles and no overtaking. Procedures and Plans The tunnel operator must prepare the necessary procedures and plans in order to operate and maintain the tunnel in a safe way. Operational Procedures should be developed which regulate how the traffic operators handle normal operation concerning, for example, supervision of traffic, and how to handle different incidents like traffic incidents and accidents as well as the proper action in case of alarms from the technical systems. A goal to achieve is that different traffic operators handle the same situation in the same way. Degraded functionality Procedures prescribing how to act when a technical fault reduces the functionality and influences safety. Actions can be the introduction of different traffic restrictions, in a worst case closing of the tunnel, compensation of the lost function with other means, for example, regular patrolling in the tunnel or placing the fire brigade at the tunnel entrances. Concepts for traffic restrictions should be implemented in the operation and maintenance organisations to be used when performing maintenance or service work close to traffic. Such standard set ups should reflect the safety for both tunnel users and the maintenance staff. Procedures should be implemented for testing technical systems with safety impact on a regular basis. Such tests minimise the probability for degraded functionality in an accident situation. An internal information/communication plan should be implemented regulating how the tunnel operator communicates in case of incidents/accidents. Several aspects should be reflected. For example, the traffic operators should only inform a limited number of people and the importance of involving different competencies in the organisation like the operation and maintenance managers and information staff. Maintenance procedures regulating how to perform maintenance work from the initial stage, where the work is identified, up to the documentation of the work are needed. All aspects including safety and quality should be taken into consideration and if necessary risk evaluation should be performed before initiating critical maintenance. Rules for the performance of maintenance work concerning personal safety devices, rules for using chemical products should be implemented. Another important factor is the education of maintenance staff in how to work and behave in a safe way, how to avoid accidents and how to react in case of an accident. All workers have to receive and pass a course before entering the tunnel and this requirement should be checked systematically by the control room. A Maintenance Management System should be implemented in order to create an overview of the planned and performed maintenance activities and up to date status of all safety related equipment. The system makes it possible to plan the maintenance activities, to get a

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statistical overview of technical system defects with related safety impacts and also to decide on system changes, to have the correct spare parts. A Maintenance programme should be implemented for planning and co-ordinating maintenance and service activities. Such a programme is extremely useful to co-ordinate activities in order to perform as many activities as possible during the same traffic restriction, thereby minimising the number of restrictions and the probability of an accident occurring. The programme is also a valuable tool for the traffic operator's day to day administration of maintenance activities. The consequences for safety should be taken into consideration in a systematic manner during the planning process for all maintenance activities. Training and Education An education plan comprising both education of new employees and repeated education should be implemented covering all staff dealing with safety including maintenance contractors. The plan should be a planning and a follow-up instrument for individual staff, and acceptable time intervals for different education areas should be incorporated. As a part of the education plan the traffic operators should, on a regular basis, carry out exercises which focus on prevention and handling of incidents/accidents and seldom used procedures. Technical equipment and Systems A Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system (SCADA) Simulator should exist for the education of new traffic operators as well as repeated education. The simulation system is also a valuable tool for testing of modifications/changes in the SCADA system before implementation. Without a simulation programme both education and testing of changes has to be performed in the operative system, which is not desirable from a safety point of view. A specially designed programme for the operators effective handling of incident/accident responses should exist in the SCADA system in order to facilitate the operators responses by. For example, by minimising the number of commands. A Traffic Management System should make it possible for the operator to detect an incident, judge the situation, and activate necessary traffic restrictions. There should also exist possibilities for communication with all involved parties and for creation of an acceptable environment by removing pollution such as smoke. Tunnel Operator interventions Information and warnings to users are essential when incidents occur in order to avoid series of accidents following the first one. Fast introduction of Traffic control restrictions such as closing of a tunnel will reduce the consequences of an incident. The ability of the traffic operator to provide a fast and effective call for resources, using a computer-based alarm system, in an incident is essential. Quality Assurance Safety related events and defects in technical systems should be evaluated in an organised way in order to identify improvements in organisation, procedures, technique etc. These should be performed in co-operation with the emergency services. The quality of the education should be verified by, for example, theoretical or practical tests/exercises. When part of a course or exercise is finished an evaluation of its quality should be performed. Necessary improvements should be identified and implemented.

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From a safety point of view the entire tunnel operation should be examined and evaluated yearly including techniques, procedures, organisation, education and drivers behaviour in order to detect safety risks and identify appropriate actions. This would provide identification of possible weaknesses of safety related items and the development of safety trends compared with earlier assessments. Appropriate actions should be taken from both results. Prerequisites of the Risk Analysis should regularly be checked in order to verify whether they correspond to reality.

4.1.3
Organisation

Emergency Services

A frequent organised dialogue between the tunnel operator and the emergency services is essential. The agenda should cover all aspects related to safety such as incidents/accidents which have occurred, changes in traffic volumes, changes in technical systems affecting the tunnel rescue strategies, education and exercises. Common understanding and confidence between emergency services and the tunnel operator are essential. The responsibilities of each organisation and changes of responsibilities if special interfaces exist must be decided. When different rescue organisations (from different organisations or from two countries) need to co-operate special attention should be paid to decisions concerning the command structure, who is in charge, and to different organisational structures and culture. Necessary resources should be evaluated and obtained so that they are always available in case of a tunnel incident/accident. The resources can be incorporated, for example, into the equipment of nearby emergency services. Strategies and Analyses The emergency services attitude to incidents should be that an incident could rapidly develop into an accident. Fast and pre-planned response from the authorities is recommended in certain incidents e.g. a stopped car in the tunnel. Tunnel rescue strategy should be discussed in detail, decided, tested and implemented in the emergency services organisation. The rescue strategy should be co-ordinated with the tunnel operators interventions concerning ventilation, traffic barrier activation etc. Another important rescue strategy comprises how to enter a tunnel fire in a safe way. A communication strategy and discipline is essential in tunnels since, for technical reasons, there are often some limitations compared with the open environment. Access times for the emergency services and substitute forces should be analysed from different perspectives. Risk exposure and limits should be identified and reviewed regularly in order to take proper action when rescue staff are approaching a fire situation and the possibility of structural failure or tunnel collapse can be influential. Procedures and Plans

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A contingency plan should be implemented which comprises predefined events, the organisations which need to be notified, whether or not they will attend the incident, initial responses, emergency numbering system and special turn-out routes. These should take into account the ventilation- and evacuation-strategy. Specific rescue effort plans should exist based on the contingency plan. A common information/media plan should be agreed upon between the emergency services and the tunnel operator. The plan should comprise information activities to media with the aim of keeping tunnel users and the media focused on safety aspects. Activities can the provision of articles, information on tunnel safety records or to bring attention to a safety item. The plan should also comprise the information responsibilities during and after an accident. Specifically, what information the tunnel operator can communicate. Training and Education An education plan should be implemented for all rescue staff and should include both the education of newly employed staff and refresher courses. Acceptable time intervals for different education areas should be incorporated. The education should not only reflect the actions to be taken by different categories of rescue forces but also knowledge of the tunnel construction, the technical systems functionality and limitations, for example, in communication. Small scale exercises should be used to obtain the optimum knowledge of specific systems like fire hydrants, fire central units and special turn-out routes. It is important to develop as a follow up on the education a common exercise plan. Common exercises involving both the emergency services and the tunnel operator staff can be either theoretical or practical full-scale exercises. Theoretical exercises have the opportunity for the participants to learn and understand the different roles and activities for all those involved in an accident situation. Technical equipment and Systems The handling of a tunnel accident implies a number of environmental conditions for the rescue forces that are different from those in the open. The need for specific tunnel rescue facilities/equipment should therefore be analysed and if found favourable from an efficient and safe rescue point of view incorporated in the emergency services normal rescue facilities. In case of an accident an efficient and clear alarm for resources is essential. When emergency services from different organisations or from two countries are involved there is great advantage in having a computer based alarm system ensuring that all involved parties get the same information at the same time no matter who has initiated the alarm. Such a system eliminates the risk for misunderstandings due to two different languages and speeds up the response time. Reliable, efficient and fast communications between the rescue staff internally in the tunnel and externally with the rescue centres are essential. The emergency services and the tunnel operator should perform common functional tests regularly to demonstrate the technical functionality as well as the staffs ability to handle the equipment, for example communication radios. Emergency services intervention Interventions should always be performed according to the contingency plan.

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Users behaviour should be regularly supervised and controlled and necessary actions to be co-ordinated with the tunnel operator. Quality Assurance The tunnel operator and the emergency services should frequently perform common evaluation of safety-related events and risk trends. The tunnel operator and the emergency services should evaluate common exercises performed and identify and implement necessary actions. The emergency services should evaluate their own education and exercises and implement necessary actions.

4.1.4
Organisation

Users

A great part of the tunnel users are organised in Motorist- and Transport Associations. Both the tunnel operator and the emergency services should exert influence on the Associations to make them active concerning communication on tunnel safety in order to improve drivers tunnel behaviour. Strategies and Analyses Safety strategies for users on how to behave during normal tunnel driving, accidents etc. should be developed by the tunnel operator. A dialogue between representatives from the users (e.g. a commuter association) and the tunnel operator should be organised in order to collect useful information from drivers as well as proposals on issues such as signage during restrictions and thereby improving the user effectiveness of safety behaviour. Procedures and Plans A common information and media plan should be drawn up by the tunnel operator and the emergency services comprising activities with the aim of keeping tunnel users and media focused on safety aspects and to frequently influence drivers behaviour when driving under normal conditions and when involved in an incident/accident. The plan should also define responsibilities for communications during and after an accident. Training and Education It is important that users of the tunnel are familiar with signage, technical equipment and how to behave in different situations. This can be arranged by distribution of information leaflets from the tunnel operator to the users.

Technical equipment and Systems Facilities such as emergency telephones help buttons and fire extinguishers should exist in the tunnel
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Users interventions User interventions in an incident/accident situation are to follow the tunnel operators orders from a public address system, radio system or according to emergency signs and guidelines of appropriate behaviour stated in information leaflets. Quality assurance The tunnel operator and the emergency services should follow-up and take necessary corrective actions to safety related incidents caused by users attitude and behavior.

4.2

Safety Factors curing a Fire

4.2.1

Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase During a fire is: To manage the fire in a safe, efficient and co-ordinated manner in order to minimise the consequences for involved road users, the tunnel structure and the environment.

4.2.2
Organisation

Tunnel Operator

In the initial stage of an accident situation the tunnel operator should perform the activities dictated by the agreed procedures as quickly as possible. Shortly after the initial phase there will be incoming calls from the emergency services, tunnel operator organisation and also media. Establishing a procedure whereby fast assistance from other staff could be secured for the operator would enable the tasks to be shared, the operator focussing on the handling of the accident, other staff dealing with traffic management, for example. It should be noted that the assisting staff have to be familiar with the accident procedures. Procedures and Plans Operational Procedures based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed. Technical equipment and Systems There should exist the possibility for the operator to detect or be aware of an incident. For example, the detection of a stopped car, calls from emergency telephones or activated fire alarms. The operator should then be able to judge the situation by CCTV-cameras.

Tunnel Operator interventions In a fire situation the operator should always:

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Alarm rescue resources according to operational procedures. Give support to emergency services comprising information of the course of events, creation of access passages and possible change of operational mode of technical systems in order to create the best conditions for the rescue operation. Activate internal information according to communication plan. Handle the external information to media and public according to the common information- and media plan.

Other tunnel operator interventions depend on the specific tunnels and their technical systems. Interventions could be: Activation of necessary traffic control restrictions and co-operation with emergency services on site if other activities concerning traffic restrictions are required. Activate fire ventilation scenario in order to ensure safe self-rescue and a safe environment for the rescue services approaching the fire. Co-operate with the fire brigade in operating the ventilation system if changes are wanted. Give information and orders to users by using the public address system or the radio system on how to act in the tunnel.

4.2.3

Emergency Services

Procedures and Plans Rescue effort plans based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed. Technical equipment and systems There should exist the possibility for rescue forces to communicate at least with their own control centre during turn out to get information about the cause of event. There should also exist the possibility for rescue forces inside the tunnel to communicate internally and with their control centre. There should exist facilities for fire fighting, for example, a pressurised fire hydrant system in the tunnel.

Emergency services interventions Co-ordinated interventions should always be performed according to the rescue effort plans which follow the strategy laid down by the contingency plan, at least in respect of the number of resources for the initial rescue phase. The intervention should also follow plans concerning how and in which way to approach the accident location, organisation of rescue vehicles inside the tunnel and resources waiting outside. The rescue leaders mission at the arrival to the tunnel can be expressed as making structure out of chaos by obtaining relevant information and by judging the situation carefully before entering the tunnel, performing initial rescue efforts, reconnoitring, and performing final rescue.

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The tactical approach that the rescue and fire service can adopt in dealing with a tunnel fire consists of combinations of the following: Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those people caught in the fire, to get them out of the tunnel as quickly as possible, Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught in it, Ventilation of the tunnel in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting Fighting the fire from a safe position in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel.

4.2.4

Users

Technical equipment and Systems There should exist the possibility for tunnel users to call for help using emergency telephones, help buttons or making mobile calls to the alarm centre. Fire extinguishers should be available for the tunnel user in order to avoid a small fire from developing into a big one. There should be facilities for the tunnel users to follow the emergency signs and evacuate to a safe place without assistance from rescue forces. User interventions Tunnel users should stop the vehicle on the right side, turn on warning lights and stop the engine. They should follow the fundamental rules of first aid including: try to extinguish the fire and then, if necessary give first aid and call for help.

When there is a fire in the tunnel users should evacuate spontaneously or following an evacuation order from the tunnel operator via specially activated signs, messages sent to the users car radio or via public address system. The user interventions also comprise helping others evacuate e.g. disabled people.

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4.3

Safety Factors after a Fire

4.3.1

Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase After a fire is: To examine possible damages to the construction. To bring the tunnel back to a safe operation. (If there is a degraded functionality by using emergency procedures). To find out what can be learnt from the fire case and introduce improvements where necessary in organisation, procedures, technique etc.

4.3.2
Organisation

Tunnel Operator

It is important to take care of staff involved in the handling of the accident. The tunnel operator may have been involved in a very stressful situation for the first time. It may be appropriate to involve external resources for crisis treatment. Technical equipment and Systems After a fire, damage to the tunnel structure and the technical systems should be carefully investigated by checking that all technical facilities are functioning in an acceptable manner. Quality assurance An internal evaluation of the handling of the accident should be performed. The evaluation should comprise a description of what happened, including time elapsed, possible deviations from procedures and as a conclusion the identification of necessary improvements, which should be implemented as soon as possible.

4.3.3
Organisation

Emergency Services

Even if emergency services staff have a lot of experiences in the handling of fires, provision should be made for their care.

Quality assurance An internal evaluation of rescue efforts should be performed for all involved emergency services - see tunnel operator evaluation.

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When the internal evaluations have been made a common evaluation should be performed between the tunnel operator and the emergency services. The evaluation should comprise the identification of necessary actions in order to improve safety and these should be implemented as soon as possible. The result of the common evaluation should be communicated to the public about accident reasons, consequences and evaluation conclusions.

4.3.4
Organisation

Users

The common evaluation result should be communicated to user organisations. These organisations should take proper action e.g. what concerns user behaviour specifically when driving in tunnels.

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Rail Tunnels

CHAPTER 5 : RAIL TUNNELS


As with Road Tunnels, the best practice for safe operation of rail tunnels involves lowering the probability of occurrence of an incident and preparation to manage and reduce its consequences should an incident occur. Rail tunnels have some advantage over road tunnels with regard to safety. The trains are guided by the track and, in contrast with road tunnels which may have a highly variable traffic distribution, the train movements are controlled by a fail-safe signalling system. Modern rolling stock is fire hardened and passenger services can be segregated from trains carrying hazardous materials. Motorists using a road tunnel will vary widely in their behaviour in response to an accident, some having very little concept of what actions to take. Train drivers and crew would, on the other hand, be trained to ensure the safety of their trains and could lead an evacuation of a train in an incident. The development of best practice guidelines for rail tunnels is greatly facilitated by two recent works on safety in railway tunnels. A report from the UNECE member countries[2] provides experts recommendations on safety in rail tunnels. These experts also referenced the work of the International Union of Railways (Union Internationale de Chemin de Fer UIC), whose report [3] also detailed possible safety measures. The general principle which both of these groups adopt sets out the classification of safety measures under the headings: Prevention of accidents. Mitigation of the consequence of accidents. Facilitation of escape. Facilitaiton of rescue.

For each of these categories, consideration is given to measures which relate to either infrastructure, rolling stock or operation. The UIC and the UNECE recommendations provide useful guidance on factors that might be considered in the pursuit of increased safety and will be referenced in this report. Safety factors should be evaluated for each individual tunnel and the kind of traffic in an overall safety evaluation. It is presumed that each tunnel operator and other organisations are able from their own knowledge and competence to judge the convenience of the implementation of different safety attributes. The role of the Rescue services is very important. Ideally, the rescue service should reach the place of the incident as quickly as possible in order to increase their effectiveness and support the self-rescue process. It is more often the case that the time taken for the rescue services to be called and to travel to the scene is such that support of the self-rescue process is not possible, the fire having developed to a point where intervention is difficult.

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5.1

Safety Factors before a Fire

5.1.1

Objectives

The best practice for safe operation is to eliminate or reduce the probability of an abnormal situation occurring and at the same time to be prepared to manage an accident in order to reduce its consequences should it occur. The conceptual phase Before a fire comprises three objectives: Prevention of an abnormal situation occurring Prevention of an abnormal situation developing into a serious accident Preparedness to manage a serious accident such as a fire in order to reduce consequences

5.1.2
Organisation

Operational Company

A safety manager should operate at the top level of the organisation and be responsible for safety throughout the organisation. Every employee of the company should have responsibility for their own safety, the safety of other persons affected by their work activities, and for the operations under their control. They should ensure that they understand and follow the rules and the instructions laid down for their work and report all incidents or accidents of which they become aware. Each level of management and supervisory staff should have delegated powers which, through job descriptions, specify their roles with regard to safety, and they should be responsible for the correct application of the relevant areas of the safety management system. In addition, all levels of management and supervisory staff should have the responsibility to: Stop any operation where clear and immediate danger exists Ensure that safe working practices in their areas are clearly defined and formally documented Ensure a regular review of the working practices

Operational managers should be responsible for controlling safety through a system of walkabouts, inspections, task observation and safety review meetings in order to identify potential problem areas. The safety manager and his team should independently monitor the overall level of performance and ensure that the defined level of safety is being maintained. All safety related incidents should be examined in order to find the underlying causes and the preventive measures and corrective actions that can be proposed and implemented. Larger fires are associated with burning trains and so fire prevention begins with examining the rolling stock. The behaviour of the rolling stock in a fire, the degree to which the fire grows and spreads, and the toxicity of the resulting smoke, can have a significant effect on the ability to respond to an incident. The UIC report raises the following issues with regard to rolling stock:

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Fire protection measures can be built into the design and specification of new rolling stock to reduce the possibility of a fire breaking out and spreading and to reduce the toxicity of smoke produced in the event of a fire. The fire load can be reduced by separation, for example, compartment-type construction with interconnecting doors constructed as fire doors; use of fire-resistant materials; replacing flammable by hardly-flammable material; introducing fire-resistant layers inside seats although these increase the fire load. Procedures for maintenance and inspection should have regard for the effectiveness of fire-hardening measures Whilst false alarms may reduce confidence in detection measures, on-board fire detection, in traction units and/or coaches allows detection of fires at an early stage and therefore provides the train crew with more flexibility with regard to response the train could be driven out of the tunnel and the fire dealt with in an inherently safer location and the fire fighting can proceed with less delay. Derailment indicators on train are mentioned in the UIC report, although these are not regarded as a tunnel specific safety measure. Recommended for new trains such as TGV, ICE and for some existing rolling stock such as those transporting dangerous goods, but not as a standard measure for all vehicles. If a fire occurs in a tunnel it is necessary to maintain the movement capability of the train so that, if possible, it can be taken out of the tunnel or stop at a designated emergency evacuation point. Hence a system to override or neutralise the emergency brakes is desirable. This may be in the form of an alarm system, whereby the train driver is notified and takes appropriate action. However, different systems are possible and note should also be taken of compatibility in an international context. Rapid fire fighting is possible if portable fire extinguishers are provided on traction units and in coaches, or automatic or manually-operated extinguishing systems on traction units. Portable fire extinguishers can be used by passengers or crew. Central control of air conditioning for switching off air-conditioning in an emergency to slow down the spread of fire and smoke in the coaches. Each train is equipped with at least one first aid box. First aid can be dispensed immediately in the event of a small accident. The train crew should be equipped with easily accessible escape equipment, such as megaphones for communication and lamps, to be able to inform passengers in the event of evacuation. Coaches should have emergency exits/accesses for rescue services. These should be well marked for both passengers and rescue services. Rescue services should be equipped with adequate tools to open the vehicle body or windows in the event of an emergency

Procedures and Plans Operational Procedures should be developed which define how the operator handles normal and emergency operation as well for maintenance periods. The emergency response to any incident is prioritised as follows: Safety of passengers and staff. Avoidance of escalation. Protection of the incident site. Protection of the environment. Re-establishing the commercial service. Reporting.

Regular interface meetings between the infrastructure owner and regulatory authorities and other train operating companies should be held in order to respond to changing external

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circumstances, such as potential regulatory changes planned for the transportation and related industries, An emergency plan has to be developed to ensure all parties involved in responding to an emergency, are aware of, and understand, the strategy and overall arrangements to be adopted in the event of an accident affecting the railway tunnel, to facilitate a clear and coordinated response. Interfacing documents will outline the response of all relevant parties, in-house staff, fire brigade, police and ambulance services. The emergency plan is based on following principles: Permanently staffed railway control centres Incident coordination centre to be activated On-site teams trained in fire and rescue (first line of response)

Note that all measures in the emergency plan have to reflect the specific tunnel and railway systems. Consideration should be given to other trains in the tunnel. In the event of a train on fire in a tunnel, other trains should be stopped before they enter the tunnel. Other trains in the tunnel should be allowed to continue and leave the tunnel but it may be necessary to restrict their speed in order to minimize any adverse aerodynamic effect on the incident train. The following trains already in the tunnel should be stopped as soon as possible in order to minimize any risk of them encountering any trailing smoke from the incident train. Training and education Training and exercises should be carried out on a regular basis to ensure understanding of the procedures by all parties and to validate the emergency plan The train driver should be trained in emergency procedures, communications and making decisions as to where to stop the train after a fire has been detected. The first preference of the train driver should be to get the train out of the tunnel and stop it in a place where the self-evacuation of passengers and easier access by emergency and rescue services is possible. If the incident train is unable to run out of the tunnel, the driver should bring the incident train to a controlled stop at a known marker, and if possible taking advantage of the availability of cross-passages or intervention points. The train crew should receive regular training to prepare to take rapid and correct action in an emergency. This will include procedures for verifying an incident, where to stop the train after a fire has been detected, reporting to the operations centre, decision-making, first aid/fire fighting actions, and passenger self-rescue. Quality system In order to achieve a highest possible level of safety competence of all its employees the infrastructure owner ensures that health and safety is an integral part of its companys process of carrying out training needs analysis. In order to achieve a high reputation the safe system and the safety concept has to be communicated to the public (communication concept).

5.1.3

Emergency Services

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Organisation A frequent organised dialogue between the tunnel operator and the emergency services is essential. The agenda should cover all aspects related to safety such as incidents/accidents which have occurred, changes in operation, changes in technical systems affecting the tunnel rescue strategies, education and exercises. Common understanding and confidence between emergency services and the operational company are essential. The responsibilities of each organisation and changes of responsibilities if special interfaces exist must be decided. When different rescue organisations (from different organisations or from two countries) need to co-operate special attention should be paid to decisions concerning the command structure, who is in charge, and to different organisational structures and culture. Necessary resources should be evaluated and obtained so that they are always available in case of a tunnel incident/accident. The resources might be incorporated, for example, into the equipment of nearby emergency services. Strategies and Analyses The emergency services attitude to incidents should be that an incident could rapidly develop into an accident. Fast and pre-planned response from the authorities is recommended in certain incidents e.g. a stopped train in the tunnel. Tunnel rescue strategy should be discussed in detail, decided, tested and implemented in the emergency services organisation. The rescue strategy should be co-ordinated with the operational companys interventions concerning ventilation, train operation, how to enter the incident tunnel in a safe way etc. A communication strategy and discipline is essential in tunnels since, for technical reasons, there are often some limitations compared with the open environment. Access times for the emergency services and substitute forces should be analysed from different perspectives. Risk exposure and limits should be identified and reviewed regularly in order to take proper action when rescue staff are approaching a fire situation and the possibility of structural failure or tunnel collapse can be influential. Procedures and Plans A contingency plan should be implemented which comprises predefined events, the organisations which need to be notified, whether or not they will attend the incident, initial responses, emergency numbering system and special turn-out routes. These should take into account the ventilation- and evacuation-strategy. Specific rescue effort plans should exist based on the contingency plan. A common information/media plan should be agreed upon between the emergency services and the operational company. The plan should comprise information activities with the aim of keeping tunnel users and the media focused on safety aspects. Activities can include the provision of articles, information on tunnel safety records or to bring attention to a safety item. The plan should also comprise the information responsibilities during and after an accident. Specifically, what information the tunnel operator can communicate.

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Training and Education An education plan should be implemented for all rescue staff and should include both the education of newly employed staff and refresher courses. Acceptable time intervals for different education areas should be incorporated. The education should not only reflect the actions to be taken by different categories of rescue forces but also knowledge of the tunnel construction, the technical systems functionality and limitations, for example, in communication. Small-scale exercises should be used to obtain the optimum knowledge of specific systems like fire hydrants, fire central units and special turnout routes. It is important to develop as a follow up on the education a common exercise plan. Common exercises involving both the emergency services and the operational staff can be either theoretical or practical full-scale exercises. Theoretical exercises have the opportunity for the participants to learn and understand the different roles and activities for all those involved in an accident situation. Technical equipment and Systems The handling of a tunnel accident implies a number of environmental conditions for the rescue forces that are different from those in the open. The need for specific tunnel rescue facilities/equipment should therefore be analysed and if found favourable from an efficient and safe rescue point of view incorporated in the emergency services normal rescue facilities. In case of an accident an efficient and clear alarm for resources is essential. When emergency services from different organisations or from two countries are involved there is great advantage in having a computer based alarm system ensuring that all involved parties get the same information at the same time no matter who has initiated the alarm. Such a system eliminates the risk for misunderstandings due to two different languages and speeds up the response time. Reliable, efficient and fast communications between the rescue staff internally in the tunnel and externally with the rescue centres are essential. The emergency services and the tunnel operator should perform common functional tests regularly to demonstrate the technical functionality as well as the staffs ability to handle the equipment, for example communication radios.

5.1.4

Passengers

In the event of a fire in a tunnel passengers will probably be uncertain about what action to take. Emergency information for passengers should be available which provides guidance on what to do in the event of an emergency, particularly with regard to incidents in tunnels. This can be given through posters, leaflets, on-board announcements and/or TV. Care should be taken to ensure simplicity of language and clarity of information, given the wide range of nationalities that might be exposed to this information. Details of the number and length of tunnels through which the train will be passing and any relevant safety facilities. Users behaviour should be supervised and controlled and any necessary actions coordinated with the tunnel operator.

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5.2

Safety Factors during an Fire

5.2.1

Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase During a fire is to manage the fire in an efficient and co-ordinated manner in order to minimise the consequences for involved users, staff, the tunnel construction and the environment.

5.2.2

Operational Company

All involved persons have to follow the emergency procedures. In the initial stage of an accident situation the tunnel operator should perform the activities dictated by the agreed procedures as quickly as possible. Shortly after the initial phase there will be incoming calls from the emergency services, tunnel operator organisation and also media. Establishing a procedure whereby fast assistance from other staff could be secured for the operator would enable the tasks to be shared, the operator focussing on the handling of the accident, other staff dealing with traffic management, for example. It should be noted that the assisting staff have to be familiar with the accident procedures. concerned. Procedures and Plans Operational Procedures based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed. Tunnel Operator interventions In a fire situation the operator should always: Alarm rescue resources according to operational procedures. Give support to emergency services comprising information of the course of events, creation of access passages and possible change of operational mode of technical systems in order to create the best conditions for the rescue operation. Activate internal information according to communication plan. Handle the external information to media and public according to the common information- and media plan.

Other tunnel operator interventions depend on the specific tunnels and their technical systems. Interventions could be: Activation of necessary train control restrictions and co-operation with emergency services on site if other activities concerning train restrictions are required. Activate fire ventilation scenario in order to ensure safe self-rescue and a safe environment for the rescue services approaching the fire. Co-operate with the fire brigade in operating the ventilation system if changes are required. Give information and orders to passengers by using the public address system or the radio system on how to act in the tunnel.

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5.2.3

Emergency Services

Procedures and Plans Rescue effort plans based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed. Technical equipment and systems The rescue forces should be able to communicate with their own control centre during turn out to get information about the cause of event. There should also be the possibility for rescue forces inside the tunnel to communicate internally and with their control centre. Emergency services interventions Co-ordinated interventions should always be performed according to the rescue effort plans which follow the strategy laid down by the contingency plan, at least in respect of the number of resources for the initial rescue phase. The intervention should also follow plans concerning how and in which way to approach the accident location, organisation of rescue vehicles inside the tunnel and resources waiting outside. The rescue leaders mission at the arrival to the tunnel can be expressed as making structure out of chaos by obtaining relevant information and by judging the situation carefully before entering the tunnel, performing initial rescue efforts, reconnoitring, and performing final rescue. The tactical approach that the rescue and fire service can adopt in dealing with a tunnel fire consists of combinations of the following: Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those people caught in the fire, to get them out of the tunnel as quickly as possible, Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught in it, Ventilation of the tunnel in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting, Fighting the fire from a safe position in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel.

5.2.4

Passengers

Technical equipment and Systems There exists the possibility for passengers notify the train driver through an alarm system. The braking system should be by-passed so as not to stop the train in the tunnel. Fire extinguishers should be available for passengers to deal with a small fire. There should be facilities for passengers to follow emergency signs and evacuate to a safe place without assistance from rescue forces. User interventions When there is a fire in the tunnel passengers should follow the train crews instruction.

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5.3

Safety Factors after a Fire

5.3.1

Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase After a fire is: To check that all technical facilities are functioning in a normal manner. To examine possible damages to the construction. To bring the tunnel back to a safe operation. (If there is a degraded functionality by using emergency procedures). To find out what can be learnt and introduce such improvements.

5.3.2
Organisation

Operational Company

It is important to take care of staff involved in the handling of the accident. The tunnel operator may have been involved in a very stressful situation for the first time. It may be appropriate to involve external resources for crisis treatment. Technical equipment/systems After a fire, damage to the tunnel structure and the technical systems should be carefully investigated by checking that all technical facilities are functioning in an acceptable manner. Quality Assurance An internal evaluation of the handling of the accident should be performed. The evaluation should comprise a description of what happened, including time elapsed, possible deviations from procedures and as a conclusion the identification of necessary improvements, which should be implemented as soon as possible.

5.3.3
Organisation

Emergency Services

Even if emergency services staff have a lot of experiences in the handling of fires, provision should be made for their care. Quality assurance An internal evaluation of rescue efforts should be performed for all involved emergency services - see tunnel operator evaluation. When the internal evaluations have been made a common evaluation should be performed between the tunnel operator and the emergency services. The evaluation should comprise the identification of necessary actions in order to improve safety and these should be implemented as soon as possible. The result of the common evaluation should be communicated to the public about accident reasons, consequences and evaluation conclusions.

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5.3.4
Organisation

Passengers

The common evaluation result should be communicated to user organisations. These organisations should take proper action e.g. what concerns passenger behaviour specifically when traveling in tunnels.

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Metro Tunnels

CHAPTER 6 : METRO TUNNELS


Metro tunnels have broadly similar infrastructures to railway tunnels and so the the emergency response practices will also be similar. Differences do arise as metro system tunnels are connected via undeground stations. These provide additional opportunities for evacuation facilities and as the tunnels are generally shorter the evacuation distances are also shorter. Differences arise from potentially higher passenger loadings and more frequent train headways. Other trains in the system may also cause draught effects which need to be condsidered in the overall ventilation response. The location of Metro systems in cities also brings a benefit in that a larger resource of Fire and Rescue services and the possibility that trained operational personnel will be available close to the scene of the fire. There may also be more possibilities for access to the system. Regulatory constraints may dictate the sizing of emergency walkways in tunnels for evacuation and the distance between the train and this walkway. The presence of passengers and operating staff may provide quicker detection and alarm of any fire. Machine rooms which are unoccupied may have detection and suppression systems. The design of Metro systems allows for a more direct approach to achieving a high level of safety. The major design items can be summarised as follows: The selection of materials used either in stations, tunnels or on the trains can be chosen to ensure fire resistance, low emission of dangerous gas and strict compliance with standards. Ventilation systems can be sized to provide smoke exhaust in tunnels. There is also the possibility to place the fire zone in negative pressure and the surrounding zones in positive pressure in order to prevent smoke spread and provide evacuation routes in clean air. Specific accesses to the system and equipment can be placed at the disposal of the fire brigade. There can be secure means of communication. Procedures and regular training can be aimed at implementing an efficient cooperation between the fire brigade and the operator.

6.1

Safety Factors before a Fire 6.1.1 Objectives

As with railway tunnels, the best practice for safe operation is to eliminate or reduce the probability of an abnormal situation occurring and at the same time to be prepared to manage an accident in order to reduce its consequences should it occur. The conceptual phase Before a fire comprises three objectives: Prevention of an abnormal situation occurring
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Prevention of an abnormal situation developing into a serious accident Preparedness to manage a serious accident such as a fire in order to reduce consequences

With regard to new tunnels specific rules may be applied in their design and the preparation of operating procedures in order to focus on the main safety objectives which may be expressed as: To limit the probability of a fire happening. To detect any abnormal condition. To be able to fight a fire. To protect passengers, facilitate their evacuation and the action of the rescue services.

6.1.2

Operational Company

A safety manager should operate at the top level of the organisation and be responsible for safety throughout the organisation. Stations may be placed under the unique responsibility of a line manager (one per line of metro). When connecting stations are concerned, one line manager is selected among the two or more that are concerned. Every employee of the company should have responsibility for their own safety, the safety of other persons affected by their work activities, and for the operations under their control. They should ensure that they understand and follow the rules and the instructions laid down for their work and report all incidents or accidents of which they become aware. Each level of management and supervisory staff should have delegated powers which, through job descriptions, specify their roles with regard to safety, and they should be responsible for the correct application of the relevant areas of the safety management system. In addition, all levels of management and supervisory staff should have the responsibility to: Stop any operation where clear and immediate danger exists Ensure that safe working practices in their areas are clearly defined and formally documented Ensure a regular review of the working practices

Operational managers should be responsible for controlling safety through a system of walkabouts, inspections, task observation and safety review meetings in order to identify potential problem areas. The safety manager and his team should independently monitor the overall level of performance and ensure that the defined level of safety is being maintained. All safety related incidents should be examined in order to find the underlying causes and the preventive measures and corrective actions that can be proposed and implemented. When other parties are concerned the responsibility of the management in the various areas is specified through agreement between all these parties, and in particular the geographic limits of every zone are described.

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Procedures and Plans Operational Procedures should be developed which define how the operator handles normal and emergency operation as well for maintenance periods. The emergency response to any incident is prioritised as follows: Safety of passengers and staff. Avoidance of escalation. Protection of the incident site. Protection of the environment. Re-establishing the commercial service. Reporting.

Regular interface meetings between the infrastructure owner and regulatory authorities and the metro operating company should be held in order to respond to changing external circumstances, such as potential regulatory changes planned for the transportation and related industries, An emergency plan has to be developed to ensure all parties involved in responding to an emergency, are aware of, and understand, the strategy and overall arrangements to be adopted in the event of an accident affecting the railway tunnel, to facilitate a clear and coordinated response. Interfacing documents will outline the response of all relevant parties, in-house staff, fire brigade, police and ambulance services. The emergency plan is based on following principles: Permanently staffed control centres Incident coordination centre to be activated On-site teams trained in fire and rescue (first line of response)

Note that all measures in the emergency plan have to reflect the specific tunnel and railway systems. The preparation of an operational plans might include instructions relevant to the zone to be considered and namely: The ventilation process to be used and the location of the various control points. The usual direction of the smoke and the efficiency of the exhaust process. The station selected for the evacuation of the passengers and the arrival of the rescue services. Marking devices, signalling, track connections, ventilation shafts, enabling location of the fire. The identification of possible actions to improve the evacuation of the passengers.

Consideration should be given to other trains in the tunnel. In the event of a train on fire in a tunnel, other trains should be stopped before they enter the tunnel. Other trains in the tunnel should be allowed to continue and leave the tunnel but it may be necessary to restrict their speed in order to minimize any adverse aerodynamic effect on the incident train. The following trains already in the tunnel should be stopped as soon as possible in order to minimize any risk of them encountering any trailing smoke from the incident train.

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Training and education Training and exercises should be carried out on a regular basis to ensure understanding of the procedures by all parties and to validate the emergency plan. The train driver, if any, should be trained in emergency procedures, communications and making decisions as to where to stop the train after a fire has been detected. The first preference of the train driver should be to get the train out of the tunnel and stop it in a place where the self-evacuation of passengers and easier access by emergency and rescue services is possible. If the incident train is unable to run out of the tunnel, the driver should bring the incident train to a controlled stop at a known marker, at a cross-passage or an intervention point. The train crew should receive regular training to prepare to take rapid and correct action in an emergency. This will include procedures for verifying an incident, where to stop the train after a fire has been detected, reporting to the operations centre, decision-making, first aid/fire fighting actions, and passenger self-rescue. All the procedures could be made inefficient through human errors. Hence, training exercises have to be organised on a regular basis and in conditions as close as possible to the actual conditions which could be met in case of incident. They may be organised at night when the traffic is stopped and simulations with the use of cold smoke may provide more rea;listic training conditions. Quality system In order to achieve a highest possible level of safety competence of all its employees the infrastructure owner ensures that health and safety is an integral part of its companys process of carrying out training needs analysis. In order to achieve a high reputation the safe system and the safety concept has to be communicated to the public.

6.1.3
Organisation

Emergency Services

A frequent organised dialogue between the tunnel operator and the emergency services is essential. The agenda should cover all aspects related to safety such as incidents/accidents which have occurred, changes in operation, changes in technical systems affecting the tunnel rescue strategies, education and exercises. Common understanding and confidence between emergency services and the operational company are essential. The responsibilities of each organisation and changes of responsibilities if special interfaces exist must be decided. When different rescue organisations need to co-operate special attention should be paid to decisions concerning the command structure, who is in charge, and to different organisational structures and culture. A procedure has to be implemented to organise and co-ordinate the action of the various involved parties: fire brigade, other rescue services, metro operating staff.
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Necessary resources should be evaluated and obtained so that they are always available in case of a tunnel incident/accident. The resources can be incorporated, for example, into the equipment of nearby emergency services. Strategies and Analyses The emergency services attitude to incidents should be that an incident could rapidly develop into an accident. Fast and pre-planned response from the authorities is recommended in certain incidents e.g. a stopped train in the tunnel. Tunnel rescue strategy should be discussed in detail, decided, tested and implemented in the emergency services organisation. The rescue strategy should be co-ordinated with the operational companys interventions concerning ventilation, train operation, how to enter the incident tunnel in a safe way etc. A communication strategy and discipline is essential in tunnels since, for technical reasons, there are often some limitations compared with the open environment. Access times for the emergency services and substitute forces should be analysed from different perspectives. Risk exposure and limits should be identified and reviewed regularly in order to take proper action when rescue staff are approaching a fire situation and the possibility of structural failure or tunnel collapse can be influential. Procedures and Plans A contingency plan should be implemented which comprises predefined events, the organisations which need to be notified, whether or not they will attend the incident, initial responses, emergency numbering system and special turn-out routes. These should take into account the ventilation- and evacuation-strategy. Specific rescue effort plans should exist based on the contingency plan. A common information/media plan should be agreed upon between the emergency services and the operational company. The plan should comprise information activities with the aim of keeping tunnel users and the media focused on safety aspects. Activities can the provision of articles, information on tunnel safety records or to bring attention to a safety item. The plan should also comprise the information responsibilities during and after an accident. Specifically, what information the tunnel operator can communicate. Training and Education An education plan should be implemented for all rescue staff and should include both the education of newly employed staff and refresher courses. Acceptable time intervals for different education areas should be incorporated. The education should not only reflect the actions to be taken by different categories of rescue forces but also knowledge of the tunnel construction, the technical systems functionality and limitations, for example, in communication. Small-scale exercises should be used to obtain the optimum knowledge of specific systems like fire hydrants, fire central units and special turnout routes.

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It is important to develop as a follow up on the education a common exercise plan. Common exercises involving both the emergency services and the operational staff can be either theoretical or practical full-scale exercises. Theoretical exercises have the opportunity for the participants to learn and understand the different roles and activities for all those involved in an accident situation. Technical equipment and Systems The handling of a tunnel accident implies a number of environmental conditions for the rescue forces that are different from those in the open. The need for specific tunnel rescue facilities/equipment should therefore be analysed and if found favourable from an efficient and safe rescue point of view incorporated in the emergency services normal rescue facilities. In case of an accident an efficient and clear alarm for resources is essential. When emergency services from different organisations or from two countries are involved there is great advantage in having a computer based alarm system ensuring that all involved parties get the same information at the same time no matter who has initiated the alarm. Such a system eliminates the risk for misunderstandings due to two different languages and speeds up the response time. Reliable, efficient and fast communications between the rescue staff internally in the tunnel and externally with the rescue centres are essential. The emergency services and the tunnel operator should perform common functional tests regularly to demonstrate the technical functionality as well as the staffs ability to handle the equipment, for example communication radios.

6.1.4

Passengers

In the event of a fire in a tunnel passengers will probably be uncertain about what action to take. Emergency information for passengers should be available which provides guidance on what to do in the event of an emergency, particularly with regard to incidents in tunnels. This can be given through posters, leaflets, on-board announcements and/or TV. Care should be taken to ensure simplicity of language and clarity of information, given the wide range of nationalities that might be exposed to this information. Details of the number and length of tunnels through which the train will be passing and any relevant safety facilities. Passengers behaviour should be supervised and controlled and any necessary actions coordinated with the tunnel operator.

6.2

Safety Factors during a Fire 6.2.1 Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase During a fire is to manage the fire in an efficient and co-ordinated manner in order to minimise the consequences for involved users, staff, the tunnel construction and the environment.

6.2.2

Operational Company

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All involved persons have to follow the emergency procedures. In the initial stage of an accident situation the tunnel operator should perform the activities dictated by the agreed procedures as quickly as possible. Shortly after the initial phase there will be incoming calls from the emergency services, tunnel operator organisation and also media. Establishing a procedure whereby fast assistance from other staff could be secured for the operator would enable the tasks to be shared, the operator focussing on the handling of the accident, other staff dealing with traffic management, for example. It should be noted that the assisting staff have to be familiar with the accident procedures. concerned. Two main phases areneed to be considered in a severe accident. Before the arrival on-site of the emergency services, the operator is the responsible body. After the arrival on-site of the emergency services: these services (fire brigade in case of fire) assume the responsibility of the management of all the actions. Procedures and Plans Operational Procedures based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed. Tunnel Operator interventions In a fire situation the operator should always: Alarm rescue resources according to operational procedures. Give support to emergency services comprising information of the course of events, creation of access passages and possible change of operational mode of technical systems in order to create the best conditions for the rescue operation. Activate internal information according to communication plan. Handle the external information to media and public according to the common information- and media plan.

Other tunnel operator interventions depend on the specific tunnels and their technical systems. Interventions could be: Activation of necessary train control restrictions and co-operation with emergency services on site if other activities concerning train restrictions are required. Activate fire ventilation scenario in order to ensure safe self-rescue and a safe environment for the rescue services approaching the fire. Co-operate with the fire brigade in operating the ventilation system if changes are required. Give information and orders to users by using the public address system or the radio system on how to act in the tunnel.

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6.2.3

Emergency Services

Procedures and Plans Rescue effort plans based on the contingency plan should be carefully followed.

Technical equipment and systems The rescue forces should be able to communicate with their own control centre during turn out to get information about the cause of event. There should also be the possibility for rescue forces inside the tunnel to communicate internally and with their control centre. Emergency services interventions Co-ordinated interventions should always be performed according to the rescue effort plans which follow the strategy laid down by the contingency plan, at least in respect of the number of resources for the initial rescue phase. The intervention should also follow plans concerning how and in which way to approach the accident location, organisation of rescue vehicles inside the tunnel and resources waiting outside. The rescue leaders mission at the arrival to the tunnel can be expressed as making structure out of chaos by obtaining relevant information and by judging the situation carefully before entering the tunnel, performing initial rescue efforts, reconnoitring, and performing final rescue. The tactical approach that the rescue and fire service can adopt in dealing with a tunnel fire consists of combinations of the following: Working in the tunnel to assist/rescue those people caught in the fire, to get them out of the tunnel as quickly as possible, Working in the tunnel to extinguish the fire, thus eliminating the threat to those caught in it, Ventilation of the tunnel in order to drive the smoke away from the fire in one direction, thus facilitating evacuation and fire-fighting Fighting the fire from a safe position in order to limit its consequences, Actively dealing with those escaping from the fire to safe conditions or outside the tunnel.

6.2.3

Passengers

Technical equipment and Systems There exists the possibility for passengers notify the train driver through an alarm system. The braking system should be by-passed so as not to stop the train in the tunnel. Fire extinguishers should be available for passengers to deal with a small fire. There should be facilities for passengers to follow emergency signs and evacuate to a safe place without assistance from rescue forces. User interventions When there is a fire in the tunnel passengers should follow the train crews instruction.
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6.3

Safety Factors after a Fire 6.3.1 Objectives

The objective for the conceptual phase After a fire is: To check that all technical facilities are functioning in a normal manner. To examine possible damages to the construction. To bring the tunnel back to a safe operation. (If there is a degraded functionality by using emergency procedures). To find out what can be learnt and introduce such improvements.

6.3.2
Organisation

Operational Company

It is important to take care of staff involved in the handling of the accident. The tunnel operator may have been involved in a very stressful situation for the first time. It may be appropriate to involve external resources for crisis treatment. Technical equipment/systems After a fire, damage to the tunnel structure and the technical systems should be carefully investigated by checking that all technical facilities are functioning in an acceptable manner. Quality Assurance An internal evaluation of the handling of the accident should be performed. The evaluation should comprise a description of what happened, including time elapsed, possible deviations from procedures and as a conclusion the identification of necessary improvements, which should be implemented as soon as possible. Risk analysis and feedback are essential in order to draw lessons from any incident that has occurred.

6.3.3
Organisation

Emergency Services

Even if emergency services staff have a lot of experiences in the handling of fires, provision should be made for their care. Quality assurance An internal evaluation of rescue efforts should be performed for all involved emergency services - see tunnel operator evaluation. When the internal evaluations have been made a common evaluation should be performed between the tunnel operator and the emergency services. The evaluation should comprise
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the identification of necessary actions in order to improve safety and these should be implemented as soon as possible. The result of the common evaluation should be communicated to the public about accident reasons, consequences and evaluation conclusions.

6.3.4
Organisation

Passengers

The common evaluation result should be communicated to passenger organisations.

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References

CHAPTER 7 : REFERENCES
[1] Ingason, H, Bergqvist A, Frantzich H, Hasselrot K, Lundstrm S. Planning for Man ual Firefighting and Rescue in Tunnels. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Safety in Rail and in Road tunnels. Madrid 2-6/11. 2001. Recommendations of the Multidisciplinary Group of Experts on Safety in Tunnels (Rail) UNECE, TRANS/AC.9/9, 1 December 2003. Safety in Railway Tunnels. Union International des Chemins de Ferre, UIC-Codex 779-9 Ingason, H, Bergqvist A, Lnnermark A, Frantzich H, Hasselrot K. Rddningsinsatser i vgtunnlar, Rddningsverksrapport P29- 459, Sweden, 2005

[2]

[3]

[4]

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