SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114928. January 21, 1997.]

THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
WILLIE A. DENATE and MYRNA LO DENATE, respondents.
Cirilo L. Manlangit for petitioner.
Artemio I. Vendivil for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; LIS PENDENS; REQUISITES. Lis
pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. To
constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the
two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief
sought. Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be
rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata the case on hand. LexLib
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. All these
requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in Davao and Caloocan cases are the
same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of
agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on the same
facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case would
amount to res judicata in the other.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; A SANCTION AGAINST MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. In
conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata as a doctrine, litis
pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. The principle upon
which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed
unnecessary and vexatious.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIOR PENDING ACTION OR SERVICE OF SUMMONS, NOT
REQUIRED. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The
phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss. As
worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is
enough that there is a pending action. Neither is it required that the party be served with
summons before lis pendens should apply.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CRITERIA IN DETERMINING WHICH CASE SHOULD BE
ABATED. It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that
the later case should yield to the earlier. The criterion used in determining which case
should be abated is which is the more appropriate action or which court would be "in a
better position to serve the interests of justice." Applying these criteria, and considering
that both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the Davao Court
would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the witnesses and evidence
would be coming from said area. LLjur
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Petitioner, The Andresons Group, Inc., questions the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the two orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 122

which denied private respondents' Motion to Dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground
of lis pendens.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that private respondent Willy Denate
entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its commission agent for the sale of
distilled spirits (wines and liquors) in Davao City, three Davao provinces and North
Cotabato.
On November 18, 1991, private respondents filed a civil action for collection of sum of
money against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 21, 061-91. In the complaint, private respondent Willie Denate alleged
that he was entitled to the amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions from
petitioner but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused to pay the same.
A month later, or on December 19, 1991, petitioner likewise filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15214. Petitioner alleged in the
complaint that private respondent still owed it the sum of P1,618,467.98 after deducting
commissions and remittances.
On February 5, 1992, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C15214 with the Kalookan RTC on the ground that there was another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with
the RTC of Davao City.
On February 14, 1992, petitioner filed its opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the RTC of Davao had not acquired jurisdiction over it.
On April 24, 1992, the RTC of Kalookan City issued the questioned order, the decretal
portion of which states:
"The Court finds the instant motion without merit.
Admittedly, the Davao case involves the same parties, and involves substantial identity in
the case of action and reliefs sought, as in the instant case.
Perusal of the record in this case, however, shows that jurisdiction over the parties has
already been acquired by this Court, as herein defendants received their summons as
early as January 8, 1992, and the plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment has been set for hearing last January 21, 1992, but which hearing was
cancelled until further notice because of the filing of the instant motion to dismiss by the
defendants herein on February 17, 1992, after asking for extension of time to file their
responsive pleading. Clearly, the instant case has been in progress as early as January of
this year. On the other hand, the summons in the Davao case has not yet been served as of
April 21, 1992, the date of the hearing of the instant motion, so much so that the said
Davao Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties."
On May 29, 1992, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the trial court on July 1, 1992. The case was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals which set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue set for resolution before the Court is: Should the action in the Kalookan
RTC be dismissed on the ground of lis pendens?
We hold in the affirmative.

Lis pendens as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action. 2 To
constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only are the parties in the
two actions the same but there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief
sought. 3 Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment which may be
rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata on the case on hand. 4
All these requisites are present in the instant case. The parties in the Davao and Caloocan
cases are the same. They are suing each other for sums of money which arose from their
contract of agency. As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on
the same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment rendered in one case
would amount to res judicata in the other.
In conceptualizing lis pendens, we have said that like res judicata as a doctrine, litis
pendentia is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits. 5 The principle upon
which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the latter action is deemed
unnecessary and vexatious. 6
Petitioner asserts that the Davao Court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties
as the summons had not been served as of April 21, 1992 and it claims that pendency of a
case, as contemplated by the law on lis pendens, presupposes a valid service of summons.
aisadc
This argument is untenable. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court. 7 The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause is a ground for motion to dismiss.
As worded, the rule does not contemplate that there be a prior pending action, since it is
enough that there is a pending action. 8 Neither is it required that the party be served with
summons before lis pendens should apply.
In Salacup v. Maddela, 9 we said:
"The rule of lis pendens refers to another action. An action starts only upon the filing of a
complaint in court.
The fact that when appellant brought the present case, it did not know of the filing of a
previous case against it by appellees, and it received the summons and a copy of the
complaint only after it had filed its own action against them, is immaterial. Suffice it to
state that the fact is, at the time it brought the present case, there was already another
pending action between the same parties seeking to assert identical rights with identical
prayers for relief based on the same facts, the decision in which would be res judicata
herein."
It must be emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require that the later case
should yield to the earlier. 10 The criterion used in determining which case should be
abated is which is the more appropriate action 11 or which court would be "in a better
position to serve the interests of justice." 12
Applying these criteria, and considering that both cases involve a sum of money collected
in and around Davao, the Davao Court would be in a better position to hear and try the
case, as the witnesses and evidence would be coming from said area.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74613. February 27, 1991.]
SPOUSES DR. FIDEL CALALANG and DRA. MARIA GENER CALALANG, and
FERDINAND CALALANG, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION), and HEIRS OF ERLINDA GRUTA,
respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Jose L. Aguilar for private respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse, nullify and set aside: (a)
the June 28, 1985 decision 1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals)
in AC-G.R. No. CV-04384 entitled "Heirs of Erlinda Gruta vs. Ferdinand Calalang, et
al." setting aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 83-18019 (for damages)
between the same parties. The trial court had dismissed the case on the ground of lack of
cause of action but the Court of Appeals ordered the case to be remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings; and (b) the resolution dated April 28, 1986 denying the
motion for reconsideration. LibLex
As gathered from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:
Erlinda Gruta, 15 years old, from the province of Samar, was employed as househelper in
the household of petitioners spouses Dr. Fidel Calalang and Dra. Maria Gener Calalang
and their son Ferdinand Calalang, in Bulacan (Rollo, pp. 357; 393).
On October 31, 1981, Erlinda Gruta died of malathion poisoning. Ferdinand Calalang,
son of the spouses Calalang, who brought Erlinda first to the Calalang's Clinic and then
to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where she died, was charged with murder for allegedly
poisoning her (Rollo, pp. 164; 393).
The case was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Then the case
was referred to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Malolos, Bulacan, for preliminary
investigation (Rollo, p. 164).
When the parents of the deceased arrived from Samar and after obtaining the Necropsy
Report from the NBI, a complaint for Murder was filed against Ferdinand Calalang with
the Provincial Fiscal of Malolos, Bulacan. Complainant Juanita Gruta, mother of the
deceased, presented the sworn statement of Dolores Ayuste, the aunt of the deceased
maid who was summoned during the incident and who was able to see her before she
died, the death certificate and the necropsy report (Rollo, p. 393).
Respondent Ferdinand Calalang never appeared nor presented his counter affidavit,
instead his mother Maria Gener Calalang presented a counter affidavit and two affidavits
of her maids who saw the deceased take a lethal dose of malathion and the report of Pat.
Bernabe (Rollo, p. 394).
After clarificatory questioning, the parties submitted their memoranda and later the
Investigating Fiscal Liberato Reyes dismissed the complaint on the ground of failure to
prove a prima facie case of the offense charged (Rollo, Annex "F" of request, pp. 74-80).

Complainant Juanita Gruta did not file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice.
On June 8, 1983, nearly two (2) years after the death of Erlinda Gruta and over a year
after the resolution of the Assistant Fiscal dated May 27, 1982, dismissing the murder
charge, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against Ferdinand
Calalang impleading the spouses Calalang docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18019 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on the claim that they are jointly and severally liable
(Rollo, Annex "A", pp. 42-45; 163) for actual and compensatory damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 for moral damages; P72,000.00 for loss of earnings; and finally
P30,000.00 for attorney's fees aside from incidental expenses of P10,000.00 (Rollo,
Annex "A", p. 44). LibLex
"Plaintiffs, the heirs of Erlinda Gruta, Rogelio Gruta and Juanita Gruta in their own rights
and co-heirs of the late Erlinda Gruta, are all with capacity to sue and be sued and are
residents of 617 Carbajal Street, Binondo, Manila; while defendants are likewise with
capacity to sue and be sued and are residents of 41 A. Fernando St., Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, where they all may be served with summons, writs and other court processes;
"Erlinda Gruta is a 15 year old girl and one of the children of Rogelio Gruta and Juanita
Gruta;
"Erlinda Gruta is now demise, she died on October 31, 1981 at Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital of poisoning, per necropsy report of the NBI.
"Erlinda Gruta at that time of her death was a domestic helper or servant of Dra. Maria G.
Calalang, of Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, receiving a salary wage of P200.00 a
month;
"On October 30, 1981, she was poisoned by defendant Ferdinand Calalang, son of the
other defendants Spouses Calalang, resulting in her death on October 31, 1981;
"The case was investigated by the NBI, after which the case was referred to the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation;
"Subsequently later, a case of Murder by poisoning was filed against defendant Ferdinand
Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan, which was however dismissed on the alleged
ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense charged;
"As a resulting consequences of the death of Erlinda Gruta, the parents and relatives
suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less,
resulting from burial expenses and others;
"Also as a result of the death of Erlinda Gruta, the parents and relatives suffered mental
anguish, wounded feelings, anxiety and shock and for which plaintiff demand P50,000.00
in Moral Damages from defendants jointly and solidarily;
"The parents of the late Erlinda Gruta, who received the meager salary of P200.00 a
month, lost such earning as a direct result of her untimely death, which if computed to the
age of 30 years old, the parents would be deprived of at least P72,000.00 in earnings;
"In prosecuting this case, plaintiffs obligated themselves to pay their lawyer the sum of
P30,000.00 contingent attorney's fee and will probably incur consequential expenses and
costs to the tune of P10,000.00 more or less.
"WHEREFORE, after hearing, judgment issue:
"1.
Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00
as actual or compensatory damages;

"2.
Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00
as Moral Damages;
"3.
Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay P72,000.00 as loss of earnings to
the plaintiffs;
"4.
Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of P40,000.00
for attorney's fee and consequential expenses and costs;
"5.
Praying for such other reliefs which are just and equitable under the premises."
(pp. 42-45, Rollo)
On August 2, 1983, petitioners filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim (Annex "B"). As the issues were joined, petitioners submitted a Request for
Admission (Annex "C"), under Rule 26. Private respondents, however, filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Admission (p. 123, CA's Original Record) which was not
resolved by the trial court.
On February 27, 1984, a preliminary hearing was conducted by the trial court on the
affirmative defenses of the defendants. Thereafter, on March 30, 1984, Hon. Judge
Antonio M. Martinez, RTC-Manila, Branch 20, issued an Order dismissing the case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding merit to the prayer for dismissal of the case at bar on the ground
of lack of cause of action, based on the affirmative defenses in the answer, this complaint
should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED.
"No pronouncement as to cost.
"SO ORDERED."
(Rollo, Annex "D", p. 84)
However, on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its decision dated June
28, 1985, reversing the order of the lower court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dismissing this case, dated March 30, 1984, is
hereby SET ASIDE and the original records are ordered remanded to the court below for
further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-appellees.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 174)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners on August 1, 1985 (Rollo, Annex
"H", pp. 175-201) and a resolution was rendered on April 28, 1986, denying the motion
for reconsideration (Rollo, Annex "M", pp. 241-245).
Hence, this petition.
Under Section 5, Rule 16 "Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule,
except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." This is to save the
expense involved in the preparation and trial when the case can be otherwise disposed of.
The preliminary hearing should be conducted as ordinary hearings: the parties should be
allowed to present evidence and the evidence recorded (Asejo vs. Leonosa, 78 Phil. 467),
except when the affirmative defense is based on par. g., Section 1, Rule 16 "that the
complaint states no cause of action." In determining sufficiency of cause of action, only
the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered. (De Jesus, et al., vs. Belarmino,
et al., 95 Phil. 365; Dimayuga vs. Dimayuga, 96 Phil. 859).
It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action, the question submitted for determination is sufficiency of
allegation in the complaint itself. The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on

the face of the complaint itself in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground. (Clavano vs.
Genato, 80 SCRA 217). This rule applies when the only affirmative defense is the failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action. It does not apply when the grounds relied upon
by way of affirmative defenses state other matters. Thus the trial court, in the case at bar,
did not commit any error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses
of herein petitioners. prcd
The finding of IAC that there was no preliminary hearing (tsn., February 27, 1984) has no
basis that can be verified from the records. The trial court set the case for preliminary
hearing on February 27, 1984 as per Order dated February 3, 1984: and the records bear
"minutes" of the preliminary hearing conducted on February 27, 1987. The rule that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals (formerly IAC) are entitled to great respect is not
inflexible. They are subject to some established exceptions. (Layugan vs. IAC, 167
SCRA 363). And one of these exceptions is when judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts (Castillo vs. CA., G.R. No. 48541, August 21, 1989). IAC relied solely on the
statement of the Clerk of Court that "this case was decided on the basis of pleadings,
memorandum, motion for reconsideration and opposition. No oral or documentary
evidence was presented" (Decision of IAC, p. 3; Rollo, Annex "G", p. 163) without going
to the records of the case. cdll
A perusal of the preliminary hearing indicates that the cause of action of respondents
(plaintiffs in the Civil Case) is based on the crime of murder allegedly committed by
Ferdinand Calalang.
"Court
So you are basing your claim on the murder case?
"Atty. Aguilar
Yes, your Honor.
(tsn., February 27, 1984, p. 12)
The alleged ambiguity of the cause of action in the complaint was clarified by the
admission of the respondents' counsel. Thus, the trial court concluded:
"Court
So you are basing this case on the murder case. That is what I want to make clear
(in) this case, and I wanted to have all the facts clear because your complaint, based on
par. 7, states: subsequently, later, a case of murder by poisoning was filed against
defendant Ferdinand Calalang with the fiscal's office of Bulacan, which was however
dismissed on the alleged ground of failure to prove a prima facie case of the offense
charged; and then on par. 8, states that as a resulting consequence of the death of Erlinda
Gruta, her parents and relatives suffered actual and compensatory damages to the tune of
P50,000 more or less, resulting from burial expenses and others; loss of income in the
amount of P72,000 and in the total amount more or less P220,000. So we may now have
a clear case, that is whether or not it is a murder case which lead to the filing of civil case
for damages." (tsn., February 27, 1984, pp. 12-13)
Since the only cause of action of the case is based on the criminal act, there is no reason
to implead the Calalang spouses. In their Memorandum in Support of Affirmative
Defenses, the Calalang spouses reiterated that:
". . . the complaint does not show any legal, statutory basis as to why and under what law
are they being included as defendants since the complaint admits that Ferdinand Calalang

has the capacity to sue; the truth is he (Ferdinand Calalang) is of age . . .." (Emphasis
supplied) (Memorandum in Support of Affirmative Defenses, p. 1; Rollo, p. 135)
Thus, We find merit in the finding of the trial court that:
". . . There is no valid legal ground for impleading the spouses Dr. and Mrs. Maria
Calalang. The complaint shows that except for the fact that the spouses Calalang are said
to be the employer of the deceased Erlinda Gruta; and, that the other defendant Ferdinand
Calalang is their son, there is nothing in the complaint which would connect them to the
untimely death of Erlinda Gruta. . . ..
"It is further observed that the complaint alleges that all of the defendants (Ferdinand
Calalang and spouses Calalang) are said to have the 'capacity to sue and be sued.'
Therefore, if Ferdinand Calalang has the 'capacity to sue and be sued,' then the spouses
Calalang can no longer be held civilly liable for any of his misdeeds, if any. . . . There
being no legal ground to implead the defendants-spouses Calalang, the case against them
should be dismissed." (Order, p. 2; Rollo, Annex 'D', p. 82)
A close scrutiny of the Order of Dismissal of the Regional Trial Court indicates that the
present case was not dismissed solely on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, but also on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against
Ferdinand Calalang, upon considering the "pleadings, memorandum, motion for
reconsideration and opposition" therein.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, Revised
Penal Code). In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the
same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof (Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325) LexLib
In the case at bar, counsel for private respondents admitted that his complaint for
damages is based on the commission of the crime. Stress must be made, however, that
under circumstances, it is a fundamental rule that the facts upon which the civil liability
might arise must exist to warrant the filing of a civil action.
Thus, "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily
extinguish the civil liability unless the Court declares in the judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist." (Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et
al., 97 Phil. 672). Similarly, "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." (De Mesa vs.
Priela, 24 SCRA 582; par. (b), Sec. 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court)
Verily, the dismissal of this criminal case as found by IAC is only by resolution of the
provincial fiscal and does not proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil case might arise did not exist, so that said case may be refiled
anytime without the effect of double jeopardy. (Rollo, p. 173). We held as early as the
case of People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026, that the dismissal of the information or the
criminal action (upon motion of the fiscal) does not affect the right of the offended party
to institute or continue the civil action already instituted arising from the offense, because
such dismissal or extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are
not between the same parties. Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and
weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings also exist. In a

criminal action the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the
defendant beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff
to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil.
681). Therefore, the insufficiency of evidence to support a murder charge does not imply
that there is no sufficient evidence to support the civil case based on the same alleged act.
llcd
It is highly speculative to conclude that the plaintiffs' cause of action would stand or fall
on the strength of the testimony of Dolores Ayuste who was convicted of perjury on such
alleged testimony. A decision should be based on facts not on mere speculations or
beliefs.
Finally, the trial court dismissed the case against Ferdinand Calalang motu proprio based
on the ground that there is no valid cause of action against him. This is not a ground for
dismissal of action under Rule 16; but the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action. The pleadings, memorandum and motion for reconsideration and opposition,
thereto, might show that there is no valid cause of action against Ferdinand Calalang;
still, the court is not allowed by law to dismiss the case motu proprio. As long as there is
a cause of action in the complaint itself, procedural due process demands that there must
be a hearing on the merits with the complaint as "prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." (People vs. Dy, 158 SCRA 111). Therefore, the plaintiffs should be given their
day in court to vindicate their claim to the fullest. cdphil
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision remanding this case to the court a quo for further
proceedings is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the case against Dr.
and Mrs. Fidel Calalang is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110480. June 29, 2001.]
BANGKO SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE PABLO D. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
14, Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Nasugbu, Batangas and LEONIDA
UMANDAL-BAUSAS, respondents.
Edgar A. Pacis for petitioner.
Ricardo T. Diaz for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent Leonida Umandal-Bausas was a depositor of petitioner Bangko
Silangan Development Banko (BSDB) since 1985. As of April 1990, she had Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) deposited in her savings account. On April 23, 1990, she
attempted to withdraw Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) from that savings account but,
to her surprise, the bank teller told her that her brother had already withdrawn the amount
allegedly with her written authorization and that her remaining balance was only Eight
Hundred Pesos (P800.00). Respondent Bausas then inquired about the withdrawal slip
and found that the signatures appearing thereon were not hers and neither that of her
brother. Dismayed by the turn of events, she sought the assistance of a family friend,

Edmundo Villadolid. Villadolid sent petitioner BSDB a letter, together with an affidavit
executed by respondent Bausas. In substance, Villadolid, in his letter informed petitioner
BSDB of the "sad experience" of respondent Bausas. Also through a letter, petitioner
BSDB informed respondent Bausas that the investigation it had conducted on the matter
revealed that her brother bearing her passbook and the withdrawal slip to which her
signature was affixed, withdrew the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). The
petitioner bank asserted that it observed the usual procedure in bank-transaction. As a
result of that information, respondent Bausas sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation. After an investigation, a case was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and docketed therein. It appeared that respondent Bausas sought another
venue for airing her complaint the press. Aggrieved with the developments, petitioner
BSDB filed a complaint for damages against respondent Bausas, Villadolid, the
Philippine Journalists, Inc., and its officers and employees. The complaint alleged that the
"series of publications" were "clearly defamatory and libelous," and caused damage to the
"goodwill, integrity and good reputation" of the 21-year old bank. Respondents filed their
answer with compulsory counterclaim. While the civil case was pending in RTC-Manila,
respondent Bausas, joined by her husband Ricardo, filed a complaint for a sum of money,
with damages, against petitioner BSDB before the RTC of Batangas. Instead of filing a
responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioner BSDB filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
among others, that there was another pending action between the same parties for the
same cause, and that the filing of the complaint constituted forum-shopping. The RTC of
Batangas denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner BSDB then filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was likewise denied. Petitioner BSDB elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The Court of
Appeals rendered the now assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus and upholding the denial of its motion to dismiss. The
appellate court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, could
not be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Besides, the principle of litis pendentia
invoked by petitioner BSDB is not applicable to the case at bar. HIaSDc
According to the Supreme Court, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy to
question the denial of its motion to dismiss. The resolution and order of the RTC of
Batangas denying the motion to dismiss were merely interlocutory. The Court also ruled
that the filing of the latter case was not barred by litis pendentia. What is essential in litis
pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. Clearly, there
was no similarity of issues involved in the case at bar. Basically, that second case was a
collection suit founded on a contract of bank deposit, while the issue in the first case was
whether or not the alleged publications of the incident made by respondent Bausas and
Villadolid were defamatory so as to warrant petitioner's entitlement to damages. The
petitioner's contention that private respondent was guilty of forum shopping must
likewise fail inasmuch as the cause of action in the two civil cases were separate and
distinct from each other. The instant petition was denied for lack of merit. The challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed and the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
was directed to proceed with dispatch to resolve the case filed before it.
SYLLABUS

1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER;
ALWAYS UNDER CONTROL OF THE COURT AND MAY BE MODIFIED OR
RESCINDED UPON SUFFICIENT GROUNDS SHOWN AT ANY TIME BEFORE
FINAL JUDGMENT; BASIS; LIMITATION. The petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the Court of Appeals is not the proper
remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 221. The
Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the motion to dismiss are merely
interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case,
but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. It is always under the control and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent
power to control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or
that no injustice results thereby. These limitations were not transgressed by the trial court
in the case at bar when it denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss. The alleged "chaos
and confusion" arising from conflicting decisions that petitioner purportedly seeks to
avert by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 221 are actually far-fetched and contrived
considering that any adverse decision of the CTA can be made the subject of a proper
appeal. TEAcCD
2.
ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LITIS PENDENTIA; EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT; CONSTRUED; REQUISITES; WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IN LITIS
PENDENTIA IS THE IDENTITY AND SIMILARITY OF ISSUES UNDER
CONSIDERATION. Moreover, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action refers to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
More particularly, it must conform to the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. What is essential in litis
pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. There being no
similarity of issues in Civil Cases No. 91-56185 and 221, the filing of the latter case was
not barred by litis pendentia.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF
ACTION. The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the
same evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first, even if the form or nature of the two (2) actions are different from
each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has been considered the most
accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between
the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible.
4.
ID.; ID.; ACTIONS; FORUM SHOPPING; CONSTRUED. Forum-shopping
is "the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum,
of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by

appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
might look with favor upon the party. Where the elements of litis pendentia are not
present or where a final judgment in one case will not amount to res judicata in the other,
there is no forum-shopping. In the case at bar, there is no forum shopping, inasmuch as
earlier discussed, the cause of action in Civil Case No. 91-56185 is separate and distinct
from the cause of action in Civil Case No. 221. SDTIaE
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J p:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision 1 dated February 26,
1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-29659 which affirmed the Resolution 2
dated September 10, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14, Nasugbu,
Batangas in Civil Case No. 221. The said Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the motion
to dismiss filed by petitioner Bangko Silangan Development Bank (BSDB), Nasugbu
Branch, Batangas. The motion to dismiss was based on the ground of litis pendentia
allegedly arising from the same controversy, subject of Civil Case No. 91-56185, then
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. CASTDI
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Leonida Umandal-Bausas had been maintaining Savings Account No.
04-3652 as depositor of petitioner BSDB, Nasugbu Branch, Batangas since 1985. As of
April 1990, she had Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) deposited under her Savings
Account No. 04-3652. On April 23, 1990, respondent Leonida Umandal-Bausas
attempted to withdraw Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) from that savings account but,
to her surprise, the bank teller told her that the withdrawal could not be done because her
brother, Antonio Umandal, had already withdrawn on April 16, 1990 the amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) allegedly with her written authorization and that
her remaining balance was only Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00). Respondent Bausas then
inquired about the withdrawal slip and found that the signatures appearing thereon were
not hers and neither that of her brother. 3
Dismayed by the turn of events, respondent Bausas sought the assistance of a family
friend, Edmundo Villadolid, who was then the President-Manager of the Rural Bank of
Nasugbu, Batangas. On the following day, Villadolid sent petitioner BSDB a letter, dated
April 24, 1990, together with an affidavit executed by respondent Bausas. In substance,
Villadolid in his letter, informed petitioner BSDB of the "sad experience" of respondent
Bausas, a daughter of his kumadre, whose savings passbook had since been withheld by
the petitioner bank which allowed the withdrawal of the amount of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (P15,000.00) from her savings account without verifying whether the withdrawal
was duly authorized by respondent Bausas. Claiming that the withdrawal smacked of
"foul play" and "dubious exercise of unwarranted banking operation," Villadolid warned
the petitioner bank that he would be constrained to elevate the matter to "higher
authorities" should there be no "reasonable and convincing results at the earliest (sic)
possible". 4
Upon receipt of the letter, petitioner BSDB caused an investigation on the matter through
its auditor, Benedicto I. Ramirez. On May 4, 1990, Ramirez submitted a report, a portion
of which reads:

"Savings ledger No. 3652 under the name Leonida B. Umandal shows a FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESO (P15,000.00) withdrawal made last April 16. Said withdrawal is
evidenced by a withdrawal slip bearing the signatures of both the depositor, Leonida B.
Umandal and her representative, Antonio Umandal, which are genuine. Both Leonida B.
Umandal and her brother Antonio Umandal, who dropped by to complaint (sic) sometime
after April 22, 1990, denied having signed said withdrawal slip as per statements
gathered from the officers and staff of Nasugbu Branch. Said withdrawal was processed
in accordance with the standard operating procedure." 5
Subsequently, on May 15, 1990, Villadolid requested the Central Bank of the Philippines
to intervene and conduct an investigation on petitioner BSDB's banking operations on
account of the petitioner bank's "indifference" in the conduct of its investigation on the
unauthorized withdrawal from respondent Bausas' savings account. This was
subsequently referred by the Central Bank to petitioner BSDB's Head Office in Batangas
City.
On May 31, 1990, Villadolid wrote petitioner BSDB another letter, a copy of which was
furnished the Central Bank. He reminded the petitioner bank that it had been forty-five
(45) days since the failed withdrawal and that, notwithstanding the attempt of respondent
Bausas' father to thresh out the matter with Sofronio Comia, petitioner bank's officer-incharge, no "concrete results and/or remedies" has been arrived at. He warned that if,
within five (5) days, the petitioner bank would continue its "insulting treatment" on the
matter, respondent Bausas would be constrained to hire the services of a lawyer in order
that the proper charges would be filed against the petitioner bank. 6
In a letter dated June 6, 1990, petitioner BSDB, through Alberto Buquid, informed
respondent Bausas that the investigation it had conducted on the matter revealed that on
April 16, 1990, her brother, Antonio Umandal, bearing her passbook under Savings
Account No. 04-3652 and the withdrawal slip to which her signature was affixed,
withdrew the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). The petitioner bank
asserted that it observed the usual procedure in bank transactions it made the proper
verification, posted the withdrawal on the passbook and the bank ledger, and approved
the withdrawal. 7
As a result of that information, respondent Bausas sought the help of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) in Region IV, Batangas City. After an investigation, a case was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas on February 21, 1993 and
docketed therein as Investigation Slip (I.S.) No. 91-37. 8
It appears that respondent Bausas sought another venue for airing her complaint the
press. Thus, in the September 17, 1990 issue of the People's Journal Tonight, the
following headline appeared: "Bank Money Withdrawn w/o Depositor's Knowledge." 9
Aside from that publication, respondent Bausas and Villadolid reproduced by xerox
machine the said news item and posted the xerox copies in conspicuous places within the
municipal hall of Nasugbu. cda
Aggrieved, on February 22, 1991, petitioner BSDB filed in the RTC of Manila a
complaint for damages 10 against respondent Bausas, Villadolid, the Philippine
Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr. (publisher), Alfredo M. Marquez (managing
editor), Franklin Cabaluna (news editor), Benjamin Ayllon (city editor) and Raul S.
Beltran (reporter). Docketed as Civil Case No. 91-56185 in the RTC of Manila, Branch
24, the complaint alleged that the "series of publications" were "clearly defamatory and

libelous," and that the publication constituted the crime defined and penalized under
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code that damaged the "goodwill, integrity and good
reputation" of the 21-year old bank. 11 Petitioner BSDB prayed for compensatory
damages of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), moral damages of One Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00), exemplary damages of Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00), and attorney's fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00).
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim, 12 in Civil Case No. 91-56185 respondent
Bausas and Villadolid alleged that the withdrawal slip was a forgery and that Villadolid's
actions were moved by a "sense of moral duty" to respondent Bausas and her family.
They raised lack of actual malice as a defense and interposed a compulsory counterclaim
for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in moral damages, Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P250,000.00) in litigation expenses and other damages, Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) in exemplary damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) plus
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per appearance as attorney's fees.
While Civil Case No. 91-56185 was pending in the RTC of Manila, or on February 13,
1992, respondent Bausas, joined by her husband Ricardo, filed Civil Case No. 221, a
complaint for a sum of money, with damages, against petitioner BSDB before the RTC of
Batangas, Branch 14 in Nasugbu, Batangas. The complaint specifically prayed that
petitioner BSDB be ordered to pay them (a) Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) "plus
whatever balance" remained of her deposit, including accrued interests thereon; (b)
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as litigation expenses and/or damages; and (c) Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
per hearing attended by their lawyer. 13
Instead of filing a responsive pleading to the complaint, petitioner BSDB filed a motion
to dismiss, 14 alleging that (a) there was another action pending between the same parties
for the same case (sic); (b) the action caused the splitting of the cause of action raised in
the answer and counterclaim in Civil Case No. 91-56185; (c) the action violated the
principle of multiplicity of suits, and; (d) the filing of the complaint constituted forumshopping.
On September 10, 1982, the RTC of Batangas 15 issued a Resolution 16 denying the
motion to dismiss.
Petitioner BSDB then filed a motion for reconsideration 17 which the RTC of Batangas,
however, denied in an Order 18 dated November 19, 1992.
Petitioner BSDB elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, 19 seeking the reversal of the said Resolution and Order of
the RTC of Batangas.
On February 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed Decision
dismissing petitioner BSDB's petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
upholding the denial of its motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 221. 20 The appellate court
held that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being interlocutory, cannot be the subject
of a petition for certiorari.
Besides, the principle of litis pendentia invoked by petitioner BSDB is not applicable to
the case at bar. The appellate court correctly found and declared that: HcSaTI
"In the present case, while concededly, certain pieces of evidence may be identical (to)
both Civil Case No. 91-56185 and Civil Case No. 221, it cannot be said however, that

exactly the same evidence will support the decisions in both. In Civil Case No. 91-56185
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the issues raised are (1) whether the
publication in the September 17, 1990 issue of the People's Journal Tonight is false and
libelous and the action is directed, not only against private respondent Leonida UmandalBausas but also against the publisher and editorial staff of the publication concerned; and
(2) whether Leonida Umandal-Bausas acted with malice in causing the posting of xerox
copies of said publication at conspicuous places at the Municipal Building of Nasugbu,
Batangas. In Civil Case No. 221, however, the primary issue, shown (sic) of unessential
trimmings, is whether or not petitioner Bank could be held liable to Leonida UmandalBausas for the withdrawal from her savings account in the amount of P15,000.00.
Private respondent Bausas did not invoke as a permissive counterclaim in Civil Case No.
91-56185, that petitioner indemnify her of her savings deposit which she claims to have
been withdrawn by someone else without her authority.
We therefore rule that the court a quo did not commit an abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 221 on the ground of litis pendentia." 21
Petitioner BSDB's motion for reconsideration 22 thereof was denied in a Resolution, 23
dated June 7, 1993, of the appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioner BSDB raises the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS SEEKING TO NULLIFY AND
SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS "DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF
THE EXCEPTION" TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT AN ORDER DENYING A
MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AND CANNOT BE
THE SUBJECT OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR REVIEWABLE ON
APPEAL BY CERTIORARI WHEN IT DENIED DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION
AND TO HAVE DISMISSED THE SAME BECAUSE OF ITS FINDING THAT
THERE IS NO LITIS PENDENTIA BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO. 221 AND CIVIL
CASE NO. 91-56185.
Petitioner argues that respondent RTC of Batangas acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it refused to dismiss Civil
Case No. 221 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 91-56185 in the RTC of Manila. It
insists that litis pendentia barred the proceedings in Civil Case No. 221 because the
special and affirmative defenses raised by respondent Bausas in Civil Case No. 91-56185
are really the same cause of action which she relied upon in Civil Case No. 221. For that
matter, it claimed that respondent trial court abetted the possibility of conflicting
decisions between two (2) co-equal and coordinate courts that may in the end sow
confusion and chaos that would take years to untangle and settle. 24
Private respondent, on the other hand, counters that an order denying a motion to dismiss
is interlocutory, and hence, cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. She claims
that the remedy of petitioner bank should be to proceed with the trial and, in the event of
an adverse decision, interpose an appeal to the proper forum. aHcACI

As regards petitioner's claim of litis pendentia, respondent Bausas contends that the issue
in Civil Case No. 91-56185 is whether or not she and Villadolid acted with malice in
publishing the allegedly libelous letters so as to warrant their liability for damages
whereas the issue in Civil Case No. 221 which is an action for collection of a sum of
money, is whether or not there was an unauthorized withdrawal of her savings deposit
that would warrant the petitioner's liability therefor.
The petition, not being meritorious, the same should be, as it is hereby, denied.
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus interposed by petitioner before the
Court of Appeals is not the proper remedy to question the denial of its motion to dismiss
in Civil Case No. 221. The Resolution and Order of the RTC of Batangas denying the
motion to dismiss are merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor
finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is
finally decided on the merits. 25 It is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.
This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its process and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot
act with grave abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby. 26 These
limitations were not transgressed by the trial court in the case at bar when it denied the
petitioner's motion to dismiss. The alleged "chaos and confusion" arising from conflicting
decisions that petitioner purportedly seeks to avert by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 221
are actually far-fetched and contrived considering that any adverse decision of the CTA
can be made the subject of a proper appeal.
Our recent ruling in Espao, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals 27 applies to the case at bar, to wit:
"We find occasion here to state the rule, once more, that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course
of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed
in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment. This is exactly what petitioner should have done
in this case after his prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 21-88 was denied by the
trial court. Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there
is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, that
vitiating error is indubitably not present in the instant case."
Moreover, litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to a
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause
of action and that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. 28 More
particularly, it must conform to the following requisites: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. 29
The trial court was correct when it opined that
". . . [T]here has never been any allegation in the answer that would tend to show that the
herein plaintiff intended to collect her deposit of P15,000.00 from the defendant-bank
which is the subject matter of the instant complaint. Even the complaint above-cited filed

in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the same solely deals on the alleged damages
suffered by the defendant-bank Bangko Silangan Development Bank in the alleged
publication. On ground No. 2, the court finds that the counterclaim interposed by the
plaintiff in the instant case in Civil Case No. 91-51685 before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila is solely for moral damages, litigation expenses; attorney's fees and exemplary
damages. Nothing about the claim for the reimbursement or release of the P15,000.00,
subject matter of the instant case is ever made therein. HETDAa
Since the instant case is entirely different from the case now pending before the court of
Regional Trial Court of Manila, the court views that there is no such multiplicity of
suits." 30
Clearly, the issue in Civil Case No. 221 is whether or not petitioner was negligent in
validating the withdrawal slip and the alleged authority to withdraw of respondent
Bausas' brother so that it could by held responsible for the amount withdrawn. Basically,
that case is a collection suit founded on a contract of bank deposit.
On the other hand, the issue in Civil Case No. 91-56185 is whether or not the alleged
publications of the incident made by respondent Bausas and Villadolid are defamatory so
as to warrant petitioner's entitlement to damages.
What is essential in litis pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under
consideration. 31 There being no similarity of issues in Civil Cases No. 91-56185 and
221, the filing of the latter case was not barred by litis pendentia.
There is neither identity of rights asserted and reliefs sought by the parties in the two (2)
cases. Petitioner asserts its right to be compensated for alleged damage to its goodwill
and reputation in Civil Case No. 91-56185 of the RTC of Manila. Respondent Bausas, on
the other hand, asserts her right to be reimbursed the amount illegally withdrawn from
her savings bank account in Civil Case No. 221 of the RTC of Batangas. As to the reliefs
sought, while both petitioner and respondent Bausas seek damages, the reasons for such
reliefs prayed for are divergent. Thus, there is no identity of causes of action in the two
(2) cases.
The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same
evidence necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first, even if the form or nature of the two (2) actions are different from
each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the
subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has been considered the most
accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between
the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible. 32
While it is true that the two (2) cases are founded on practically the same set of facts, as
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it cannot be said that exactly the same
evidence are needed to prove the causes of action in both cases. Thus, in Civil Case No.
91-56185 of the RTC of Manila, the evidence needed to prove that petitioner sustained
damage to its reputation and goodwill is not the same evidence needed in Civil Case No.
221 of the RTC of Batangas to prove the allegation that a substantial amount of
respondent Bausas' bank deposit in petitioner's bank was illegally withdrawn without her
consent or authority. The RTC of Batangas and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
abuse their discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss which was based on the
ground of litis pendentia..

The petitioner's contention that private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping must

likewise fail.
Forum-shopping is "the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another
forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
(2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court might look with favor upon the party." 33 Where the elements of
litis pendentia are not present or where a final judgment in one case will not amount to
res judicata in the other, 34 there is no forum-shopping. In the case at bar, there is no
forum shopping, inasmuch as earlier discussed, the cause of action in Civil Case No. 9156185 is separate and distinct from the cause of action in Civil Case No. 221. aSDHCT
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED; and the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas, is hereby directed to proceed
with dispatch to resolve Civil Case No. 221.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.