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Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals Author(s): Simon Blackburn Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7, Language and Logic (1993), pp. 259-279 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214125 . Accessed: 26/11/2013 21:29
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7, LanguageandLogic, 1993 Perspectives, Philosophical

and Biconditionals Smells Finks, Circles,

SimonBlackburn ofNorth Carolina University

1. Setting the Scene a large, has generated in 'response-dependent' concepts interest The recent to that contributors although complexliterature, and increasingly impressive to be.I concepts theytake such widely in how important differ literature includePhilip Pettitwho believes in a global formof responseOptimists dependence,and otherssuch as CrispinWrightwho give it modifiedbut David Lewis, and workto do.2 Theyalso includeMichael Smith, important such accountsof all present who in their1989 symposium Mark Johnston, hat, a different includeHuw Priceand, under Pessimists evaluative concepts.3 response seldom are concepts our actual who thinksthat Mark Johnston, of our actual theory to an error he is also sympathetic although dependent, are so.4 cousinsthat hygienic them with anda programme ofreplacing concepts, thebelief expressed have directly and Wright, Johnston At leasttwooptimists, and supersede terms, ofevaluative for instance analyses, dependent that response They sympathize. like Lewis clearly sidelineexpressivist accounts, and others expressivist since historically thusturn thewhirligig of timeone moreround, of thesubjectivist because of thefailure accountsof concepts came in partly paperis to My aimin this is a successor. towhich dependence response analyses itwas. where should havestayed showthat thewhirligig a formof What are the issues? The centralidea has been to refurbish used and understood that seem somehow anthropocentric, analysisof concepts The standard or affective systems. sensory only because we have particular like concepts secondary qualities, include ofcolorand other concepts examples thetastesof some identifiable reflect or chic that centrally beingfashionable group,or thoselike being boringor comical,wherethe applicationclearly people). The of people (or some particular on thereactions dependssomehow

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Blackburn 260/Simon and even causation and values,intentional concepts, idea rapidly generalizes, concepts. as response-dependent havebeenadvertised analysisof some conceptis notof coursenew: The idea of a subjective of such up on G. E. Moore cut our teethon refutations thoseof us brought becausewe have becomemore has quickened interest analyses.But therecent 'account'of a aboutwhata response-dependent or morerelaxed, sophisticated, succumb. to whichit might and thekindsof argument involve, conceptmight thata notionof analysis In fact,it is no longerplain to manyphilosophers foran 'account'maynotinvolve needsto be putintoplayat all. Our standards One in other terms. thesameconcept expressing equation, a straight providing But on thismodemsophistication. of mymainaimsis to poursomecold water by thinking start we can usefully it is agreedon all sides is that to beginwith, we can write as follows: in terms whoseform ofa biconditional [circumstances]. to [reaction] under X is 4 _ [persons] aredisposed wouldbe: equation A variation on this [circumstances] under from [persons] X is 4 _ X tends toelicit[reaction] as equivalent (in maybe taken of this paperthetwoforms and forthepurposes of thebasic later).Instances it getsmodified thereader, case 'tends' worries wouldbe: equation tojudgeX redin normal X is red- normal peoplewouldbe disposed light tochooseX whenfaced X is good ordinary peoplewouldbe disposed withit _ most acrossX X is boring peoplewouldgo to sleepon coming is that workwell forsome they view of suchequations and so on. A common havean work wellitis becausethey where they and that concepts butnotothers, view is thattheyworkwell wheretheydo Another a priori form. interesting we can see them that Thismeansin effect toleft'. becausethey can be read'right on mentioned X is red/good/boring in virtueof thedispositions as claiming that These of dependence. by thenotion theright handside,and thisis suggested occupyus later. refinements of thebiconditional givesus arisesbecausetheform obviously Complexity choicescan be made foreach. and different three places forfillings, different we have: thepossibilities Amongst us as we theexperts, all of us,thosewhoare normal, myself, [persons]: us as we wouldbe after improving, actually are,us as we wouldbe after somespecified process... empirical a judgement reaction, a cognitive reaction, a non-cognitive [reaction]: an experience, terms, is 4,a judgement couchedin other that something

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 261 a piece ofbehavior... common conditions ofacquaintance, standard conditions, [circumstances]: conditions appropriate especially toX, conditions ofpaying appropriate X as an intentional attention to X or having object, idealconditions, . whatever-conditions-it-takes... I shall abbreviate thesethree place-holders as [P], [R] and [C]. Whennothing hinges on separating them, I shalllump[P] and [C] together as [P,C]. The many degrees of freedom they introduce are increased whenwe turn to another choice point. For any equation of this kind mightbe advanced for different philosophical purposes, and we shouldkeepin mind at leastthese.Thereis the purposeof old fashioned analysis. This is to displayon theright handside the very concept from theleft, with itsstructure madevisibleon themodelof 'to be a vixenis tobe a female fox'.The bicondifionals as couldtherefore be rewritten straight analyses: The concept of 4 is that of tending to elicit[R] from [P,C] I havementioned butthesophistication allowsthat we do nothaveto be saying this.The purposeof identifying aboutthe'logic' of theconceptor something its applicationmay not 'explicating'it or givingthe conditions governing demand a strict an analysis do? Notably, less than identity. Whywillsomething it has been suggested, a condition on an old fashioned analysiswill be nonfor other this neednotbe so. We might whereas circularity, elucidatory purposes presumably learnsomething about theapplication conditions of 'boring'by X is boring we theconditions itsapplication are that beingtoldthat governing tendto be boredby X under normal conditions. Thatthisis a substantive claim is provedby its actuallybeing false (normalconditions might be the noisy crowdedtheatrical but milieuhostileto realizingthatX is notat all boring, imaginative anddemanding).5 Adopting a useful term from Richard Holton, we can say thatwe have an 'echo' proposalwhen4 reappears hand on theright X is 0), and theclaim side.6Echoingbiconditionals can clearly be true (X is 4 _= now is thatthe echo does not disqualifythemfromdoing at least some philosophical work.7 How much remains tobe seen. A different truth condition. purposemight be that of givinga substantive on the Thiscan be supposed tobe something theabove,modelled different from of 'substantive' identity ofwater andH20 orheatofa gas andthekinetic energy its molecules.But fewof thoseinvestigating see them as thesebiconditionals playingthisrole. Accepting Kripke'saccount,thesescientific are identities necessarily true, butnot a priori. But thekindof biconditional envisaged for, of the say, boringor red is usuallythought of as a priori: partof theinterest matter is thatif truetheyenable us to knowa priori thatwhat[PI [reactto] under orred.8 [C] is indeed boring I have laid out At thispointit is important to keep in minda distinction.

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262/Simon Blackbum thelandscapeso faras if our interest is in a kindof concept or equivalently a kindofjudgement, whichtheright handside is supposed to illuminate in some way. We need to keep in mindthatanother focus of interest might be the property referred to by thepredicate '4'. For someof us there is notmuchofa difference here:I myself see properties as thesemantic shadows ofpredicates, not as self-standing objectsof investigation. But others see thematter differently: of there 4 theythink beinga substantive scienceof identifying theproperty which is not the same thingas identifying the concept 4, or the role 4 judgements playin ourthought. Thusa popular kindof moral realism ('Cornell realism')searches fornatural properties withwhichto identify theproperty of beinggood. Property identity becomesa topicof its own. I shall call thisthe substantive of properties. Withit we get a sense/reference way of thinking distinction for Two predicates thesameproperty, butin predicates. might denote X is good is notthe X creates different ways.Thejudgement that judgement that happiness, evenif,on sucha philosophy, there is buttheone property, creation whichis also to be seen as goodness, of happiness, although seeingit thisway is doing something extra.We can put thisby sayingthatthere is something of happiness under theheading specialaboutseeingthecreation of beinggood, andwe wouldnotunderstand ethical until we havea senseof whatis judgement I return the to thispointbelow,butforthemoment specialaboutthatheading. on thebasic biconditionals. topicis itsimpact To makethisplainletus focuson a simple example: (P) X is poisonous X tends to elicitillnessor deathfrom mostof us on beingingested.

This,I hope,soundsaboutright, and anyrough edges are notpresently to the In fact, it lookslikea good old-fashioned butin point.9 analysis of theconcept, or explication some elucidation of it. Whatdoes it tell us any eventit affords about theproperty? The substantive means thatit allows a way of thinking further huntforfinding whattheproperty of beingpoisonousactuallyis. For instance, supposethat all andonlythings with cyanide molecules arepoisonous. This Thenhaving cyanide molecules might be theproperty of beingpoisonous. one property the othercan be seen underthe one heading-chemically-or no doubt orsociologically. medically-and many others-economically aboutthe As I say, I am notmyself an advocateof thisway of thinking I am notobjecting out semantics to it,butpointing ofpredicates. Butat present its consequences for the presentissues. What it means is thatit is quite ofbeing consistent to holdthat we needabouttheconcept (P) tellsus everything is that it is also truethat of beingpoisonous theproperty poisonous, although of containing under one heading, molecules. theproperty cyanide (P) identifies and thisidentifies it under To takea and each is perfectly another, acceptable. moreinteresting example, supposewe have

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 263 (C) X is red_ X tends tomakenormal peoplesee-redly under suitable conditions ofobservation

then thisis quitecompatible with thekindofphysicalist hunt fortheproperty of redness, that hopesto locatesomedisjunction of physical properties holding of all and onlyredthings.10 On thesubstantive picture, thishunt is nota rivalto an analysislike(C), anymorethanin thepoisonouscase, buta supplement to it. If (P) is necessary,thenthingswithcyanide molecules would not be poisonousunlessthey tended to elicitillnessordeathfrom mostof us on being ingested.The righthand side of the biconditional gives us the identifying in virtue or that is condition, ofwhich theproperty ofhaving cyanide molecules that of beingpoisonous.It explains whyhaving cyanide molecules can be seen under thatheading. handside of (C) tellsus whyreflecting Similarly theright light of700 nanometers (or...or...) can be seenunder theheading ofbeingred. Here we shouldnoticeone cost of thesubstantive way of thinking. So far as all is well: we haveitthat is thesameproperty containing cyanide molecules us whatit is aboutthe beingpoisonous, and we have thebiconditional telling property that makesitdeserve that appellation. Butwe might reflect that evenif if thingsof just one or anothermolecular trueit seems highlycontingent a contingently true structure elicitillnessand death, so we seemto be peddling property identity: theproperty ofcontaining cyanide molecules is theproperty of beingpoisonous, butit might nothavebeen.This is quitecompatible withthe substantiveway of thinking, but it offendsagainst one strongsemantic '4)' intothenounphrase'the intuition, whichis that whenwe turn thepredicate 4' If the property of being we end up witha rigiddesignator of a property. property of being4 is theproperty of being(p,there oughtnotto be possible in whichthey If we wantto heedthisintuition worlds ('they') are notidentical. we shouldabandon(thankfully in myview) thesubstantive of way of thinking ifthebiconditionals properties, and go back to saying that giveus theproperty, thenfurther investigation is simply one of telling us whatexplainswhythings are poisonousor whatexplainswhythings are red.We need not thenworry or red,as we whether theseare theonlythings that could havebeenpoisonous haveto ifrigid reference is in play.Butfor this paperI am notgoingto takethis as an as decisive,and shall allow thesubstantive argument way of thinking and I shall It is not whollyforeign alternative. to everyday ways of thought, in thearea. that ithascausedconsiderable arguelater confusion 2. Dispositions and Finks Beforeassessingthe workthesebiconditionals may do, a further point in terms of I have deliberately remains to be madeaboutthem. couchedthem A more ambitiousprojectwould removethat dispositionsand tendencies.

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Blackburn 264 /Simon conditionals: and substitute terminology,

) if [P] encounter X in [C] there arises[RI. X is 4

on the notionof a formmightbe used instead.Elaborating A subjunctive counterexamples hasbeenactiveingenerating MarkJohnston situation 'finkish' situation a thing is disposedin some In a finkish to analysesof thisform.11 it will comeabout, thedisposition manifesting aptfor way,butifcircumstances butif in some way, not be disposed may a thing it.Or conversely, notmanifest so. This it will do about, come thedisposition aptformanifesting circumstances Or is fulfilled. conditional of the antecedent when the maybe becauseitchanges or that 'masked', calls Johnston is what disposition the be because it may although the dispositionis absent it is mimicked.Examples of finkish but an angel has decided thatif it is situations are: a thingmay be brittle, ifitis dropped itwill not will it itis brittle, she make hard;so although dropped if will render that she has decided A thing butthesameangel maybe hard, break. will break. ifitis dropped, it andso ifitis dropped brittle we make likethem showthat that thesecases and others Johnston suggests andthe intrinsic nature the is thing's by between what 'underwritten a distinction nature intrinsic a thing's situations laws' and whatwouldhappenif...Infinkish it will actually although and thelaws makeit suchas to breakwhendropped, forwe may natures, to intrinsic not,or vice versa.Thereare costsin appealing and of the nature at all of a thing's whether we have anynotion well wonder But we need terms.12 couchedin dispositional that is notitself laws of nature, as faras thesecases go. For we should natures to intrinsic notfollowJohnston agencythisresponse as thecases involvesupernatural also noticethatinsofar ifits is brittle a thing court: nature tout can hardly be needed: we canjustinvoke anditslaws. with nature when is inaccordance dropped breaking we try toputtheangelonfinkish cases where It is notso easy to construct but naturally beingbrittle wordsimaginea thing boardas it were,or in other If hard. of something intothat transforms whenitis dropped itsnature suchthat theunderlying whatever it seemsnotto be brittle, failsto break, it continually Suppose dispositions. so forother evolutions of physical state. Thisis certainly I am strong, agile, nature'of a capable rockclimber: thatI have the'intrinsic of rock the I more have one proximity that quirk: trained, eager.Except fearless, and thistemporarily stopsme causes me to change(myhandsbecomesweaty), and I becomeapt to falloff. as a capablerockclimber havingthesame nature mostof thetime, I am a capablerockclimber is notthat description The natural This is but finked whenI get on therock,but thatI am a bad rockclimber. or pianist:it feelsas if the usuallywhatit feelslike beinga bad rockclimber Butthis shrink. to makeyour realmerit ofperformance conspire circumstances My rockclimberis not a capable rock climberwho is false consciousness. is a 'standing illusion' of beingworsethanhe is. The disposition generates arisingon the and natural changesin a thing assessed by the conditional,

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 265 do notaffect thedescription. circumstance ofmanifestation oftheconditional betweenexternal or supernatural finkish We can signal thisdifference thebiconditionals: situations, and natural evolutions, bywriting [P] in [C] X is 4 - X is naturally suchas to elicit[R] from wherethe 'naturally might be 4 although such as to' warnsthatsomething does notallow something to angelsstopitperforming as such.Butthisformula in to prevent be 4 ifitsown mechanisms manifestation. trip intrinsic natures is also supposedto Johnston's further case forinvoking properties suchas color.Thisis unseat response-dependent analyses ofsecondary This sitsin thedarkone color, thecase of the 'shy butintuitive' chameleon. color,red,if thelightis puton. It is green, butreadyto changeto a different Johnston sees such actually green, butbytheequation (C) itis red.Butalthough cases as support forhis invocation of an intrinsic nature, thematter is notso to it is theintrinsic of thischameleon nature simple.After all, in sucha story to therock-climber go intoitsredmode,so we shouldexpecttheparallelresult between itis important to distinguish case, namely that itis alwaysred.Perhaps of theintrinsic nature thething and itssurface, claimwillbe that andJohnston's in thedark, to say is that thesurface is that of a green so theright thing surface, the chameleon'ssurface, and hence the chameleonis green,in thedark.So reacts tobombardment a light by that instantly supposeinstead sensitive surface like photographic paper,onlymore photons by changing itsstructure slightly, and indeed It is never everseen as green, so. Perhapsmyredrubyis like that. in thedarkitssurface with that is physically isomorphic could notbe, although in thedark? in good light, of things Is itgreen lookgreen. which, whenlikethat nature'of this The 'intrinsic Johnston's formula gives us no clear guideline. So redlight. surface and thelaws ensurethat whenthelight goes on it reflects takenone way we shouldthink of it as red in thedark;on theotherhandits physicalstructure is such thatwereit to stayas it is whenput in thelightit wouldreflect green light. of beingsuch The case seemsto be a 'don'tcare', hinging on theelasticity in somerespects as to do something: of theruby is suchas to appear thesurface with because ifit stayed red,and in other respects it is suchas to appeargreen, thereflective ithas in thedarkthat is howitwouldappear.We make properties a verdict on thesecases by imaginingseeing the surfaceas it now is, and retailing thevisual experience we imagineourselvesto have. Whatthecase on nowis, andconcentrating givesus is twowaysof looking at howthesurface of one way we think of ourselves as seeinggreen, and theother way we think intored ourselves as seeingred,(forthissurface staysas it now is by clicking modewhenthere is anylight). Bcrkeleyan genre. Herearesomeother examples ofthis of Case 1: the finkish skunk.Suppose skunkswiththe magic property come near all themolecules emitback in whenolfactory systems sucking they

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266 /Simon Blackburn not:you can think any.Do they emitbad smells?We might enoughto detect pets.Now suppose safely haveone of theseas a pet,butyoudon'twantsmelly and they retract all thebad molecules system is present that whenan olfactory -even whenthey arealonein theforest? fragrant releaseChanelno 5. Arethey then these havea wonderful smell. skunks haveno smell, If thepurely retractive emitgood or bad to say thattheskunks Or, we may,like Hylas,be tempted impossibility of ofthelawlike smellsdepending on themolecules andregardless I suggest we havea 'don'tcare': lookedat one Again, anysmellbeing perceived. is nota space you wouldwantto be in (keep way,thespace roundtheskunks itis fine (keep Lookedat another, and imagine sniffing). themolecules constant, We can exercisethe thenature of theskunks constant, and imaginesniffing). way. imagination either as itis Case 2: The finkish pig.The flesh of thesepigswouldtastefrightful bad effects on that have well known It contains molecules actually constituted. andmakesthem themolecules, ordismemberment destroys taste-buds. Butdeath orshould gambol round theyard, pigsdelicious as they taste delicious. Arethese to be notwateras we look at them? Here there is less temptation our mouths and irritating is even something off-color even temporarily puzzled,and there as for to give thesameanswer aboutthequestion.13 But we are surely inclined therockclimber. tout court. (Maybepigsandpheasants Thesepigsaredelicious, our rephrasing are actually like this).'Delicious' maybe analyzedby slightly biconditional: if [C] then X is delicious suchthat [P] give [R] at t X is naturally counts.For pigs,whatever making it plain thatit is whathappensin [C] that that beingdelicious else it includes, beingdead. It does notfollow [C] includes the cannot be predicated handsidedoes notinclude of livepigs,becausetheleft 'in [C]'. Itcouldread'X is delicious always_...'. Equallywe could qualification simply does not ordinary thought modify bothsides with'at t'. Quitepossibly care whattemporal modifier and thiswould explainour irritation goes there, whether thelivepig is delicious.14 with thequestion and thefinkish pig fairly So farwe have it that we solve therockclimber I have and to be ambivalent, apt one way.With theskunk we aremore definitely the has to what settled stay not having that this is a consequence of suggested the skunk.Johnston's same as we put ourselvesin thesituation of smelling verdict going there is a definite he thinks problem withcolor,I takeit,is that notred,in thedark. theotherway. The chameleonis supposedto be green, in thedark, andone way present colorsarecategorically People wantto say that to insert of tightening we haveno freedom intuition wouldbe to saythat up that handside. as we wishon theleft temporal modifications an I cannotsee this tellingus anything deep about color, nor putting obstaclein front analysis.For even if we shareJohnston's of a dispositional analysis can accommodateus. Suppose we are intuition, the dispositional

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 267 adamant thatthechameleon is green.Then,just as if we are adamant thatthe lone skunksmellsawful,all we need to do is to weight our selectionof the feature dominating the 'is naturally such that'clause. Perhapssimpleminded in colorscorrelating faith straightforwardly with physical properties of surfaces encouragesthisselection,so thatwe imaginethe chameleon'scolor or the skunk's smell by imagining good circumstance of seeing and smellingbut fixing thecorrugations of thesurface or thedistribution of molecules. We then in good circumstances soft-pedal thefactthat of seeingand smelling thiswill notbe theset-up anymore.Also,ifwe wereattracted to thesubstantial viewof properties, we mayhave identified thecolorgreenwiththeproperty of having suchandsucha corrugated willtipourjudgement andthis surface, that violently way,and evendo thesamefor theskunk andpig.Otherwise itis hardto see the argument, and I suspect that thosewhoplace great importance on objectsbeing in thedarkforget coloredone way or another thatwe imaginethecolors of reflective surfaces in thedarkbyimagining thelight on. The upshotis thatwe can avoid finkish problemsby stayingwiththe I started, with which dispositional suggestions and we can sidestep chameleons, in how we think ilk by lookingout forelasticities skunks, pigs and their of things as being,or whatwe think it wouldbe forthings to staythesame. We mark thisbyrephrasing thebiconditionals: X is 4-_X (is naturally suchas to) tendto elicit[R] from [P] under [C] where thebracketed reminds us that phrase something maybe suchas to do this in some respects and not in others, and thatthesewill give rise to wrongly disputed cases. 3. Explanatory Priorities and Analysis The points already in play enable us to deflectone across-the-board reservation aboutthesuccessofresponse-dependent accounts ofconcepts. Mark Johnston puts it by findinga tension between the a priori statusthe as an biconditionals have,and theway in whichthelefthandside functions is that empirical of theright.15 The 'missing explanation explanation argument' frequently itis explanatory to say that itis becauseX is 4 that ithas or we have thedispositions on theright see the identified handside; this beingso we cannot biconditionals as a priori true. worksat Johnston thatthisargument suggests least exceptforconceptsthatwear their responsedependenceon theirface (pleasing, shy-making, In particular nauseating). itworks for valuesanditworks forsecondary properties. He suggests thattheargument shows thatordinary areresponse-independent, concepts he concedesthat thisleavesopena although programme of reform, suggesting that their response is theupshot independence of something likea projective error.

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268/Simon Blackburn The argument is a daring one,in thelight of all thewell-known pragmatic and contextual factors that lead us to allow that one thing is an explanation of another. We can undoubtedly hearourselves saying that things are disposedto lookgreen tous in favourable circumstances becausethey aregreen; seemboring to us because they are boring, and so on. But thesuperficial linguistic data will not carrytheload of thisargument, because it is quitecompatible withan a prioriequivalence between explanans and explanandum. As Wright points out, we can equallyhearourselves saying that thefigure is a circlebecauseit is the locus of a line equidistant from a point, or thatsuchand such a connective is material implication because it has thetruth tableTFTT. An a priori status is jeopardized onlyiftheexplanation is a contingent one. Johnston recognizes this, in questionare and in a responseto Wright emphasizes thattheexplanations contingent, empirical and causal, although he also makes it plain thattheir causal status is less important than theother two.16 As well as showing that theuse of thelefthandside to -explain is theright use of a contingent or empiricalor causal connexion,the argument needs extreme careovertheexplanandum andexplanans. The biconditionals maybe a priori and indeedanalytic, butstillwe wouldbe able to explainwhywe found X is on an occasionor whyI findX boring, something boring by sayingthat or false.For it maybe and suchexplanations true boring, maybe contingently whether on this occasionI or we wereboredbecauseof X beingsuch contingent as to exciteboredomfrom theoccasion whether [P,C]. It maybe contingent countedas [C], or I or we as [P]. It may be thatwe were boredbecause of outside we wereoutofsorts, orthere wereroadworks something quitedifferent: thetheater. The explanation that rulesoutthese possibilities: itworks bysaying we weretrue-to-form bybeingbored.(This point parallels one commonly made aboutopiumand itsdormative virtue.) To putthisaside supposewe takethewholepopulation, as we shouldbe doing: X elicits[R] from [P] in [C] because itis 4 can we get a readingwhich is contingent or empiricalor causal, for the ofthetwosides? appropriate cases,andthereby rules outthea priori equivalence It seemsstrange that there should it be an empirical orcausal scienceof whether is boring things that boreus,or redthings are that we see as red.I suspect there waysofreading suchsentences as contingent, andcausal.But andevenempirical on no wayof so reading These waysare quite them does theconclusion follow. compatiblewiththe a prioristatusof the biconditional. Here are foursuch possibilities: (1) [C] or [P] or [R] could be chosen so badly thatthereis indeed a contingent, causal, and empiricalgap betweenthe two sides withthe inept in place. But thisis clearlyirrelevant of the substitutions to thea prioristatus conditional of whether withbetter The different judged substitutions. question

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 269 fitthebill entirely occupiesus in thenextsection. anysubstitutions maybe an (2) Even when[C] and [P] and [R] are chosenwithcare,there some favourable in the offing. Suppose we identify empiricalinvestigation The question may still arise why these are thefavourable circumstances. Butthis mayenter theanswer. and contingent andcausal factors circumstances, a kiteis well designed it flies does notimpugn thea prioricity.For example, force windconditions. Whichare those?Let us say between well in favourable prevail quite conditions? Becausethey thefavourable twoandsix.Whyarethose it in them, because air has thedensity frequently, because we are comfortable and theyunderliethe choice of these does. All of these are contingent, statusof the original conditions. But thatdoes not impugnthe definitional It simply introduces a newtopicof interest. biconditional. so the introduce reference to properties, (3) Perhaps'because' contexts X elicits[R] etc.becauseof having theproperty that explanation readsin effect of properties (see above) thismaybe contingent, theory 4. Givena substantive withan analytic is compatible but we saw in section1 thatthiscontingency forthebiconditional. status He cites againstWrightthe 'Cornell Johnston misses this possibility. into predicates in ethics, ofputting ethical whoemphasize thepropriety realists' thatwe and allow, forinstance, thatit is contingent contexts, explanatory the of things becausethey are good. Buthe does notsee that generally approve of theory Cornellrealists are bad allies at thispoint.Theyhave a substantive are thosenatural to in theexplanation referred properties, and theproperties of the excite our approval. The contingency propertiesthatcontingently of the related compatible with the a prioricity explanation is perfectly is good it is suchas to excite[R] in [P,C]); thisis the biconditional (a thing of a thing beingpoisonous. withthenotion pointI made above in connexion concepts. information, or itsconstituent a prioricity concerns The pointis that Since properties between properties. therelationship Explanation hereconcerns in different ways,an a priori are heretreated as capableof beingapprehended betweenthem.The pointwas relationship proposition can mask a contingent caused 4, withevents:if something made familiar by Davidsonin connexion thentheproposition thattheevent4 was caused by thecause of 4 is a priori, in a contingent buttheevents causal relationship. stand timea thing mayhave evolvedto be as it is because of the (4) Through This successful. that itmaybe thecolorthat has madetheflower effect induces: But it way round. claimtheother theexplanatory gives us one way of reading itas Johnston does. Thisis easierto see ifwe use also givesus a wayofreading thelonger form: X is naturally [P] in [C] becauseit is 4 suchas to elicit[R] from as ofthesameproperties us to thinking points and herethe'suchas to' formula becauseof the before-thebase or underlying -now said to be there properties

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270/Simon Blackburn Compare:thiscircuit diminishes the rednessor whatever thattheyunderlie. has a resistor in it because it voltagebecause it has a resistor in it; thiscircuit andeach is compatible diminishes thevoltage. Each can be true, andcontingent, being for with therebeing an analyticequivalence betweena component diminishing thevoltage anditsbeinga resistor. In theselasttwocases thesubstantive viewofproperties confuses theissue of contingency plausible. But as and makesJohnston's claimlook superficially has no consequences forthea thesense/reference distinction reminds us, itthen priori status of thebiconditionals. On theother theory of properties, what hand,ifwe eschewthesubstantive Russellonce said it was favoritism to reading can we give to theexplanation? thatare red,and I suppose thatthethings thatseem to us red are thethings of be an empirical and causal investigation supposetheidea thatthere might whether thisis so in general reflects thesame idea. But it does notgripus for fortherealcolorof long.If it is contingent whether ourcolorvisionis adapted false,butwhatkindof investigation things thenit is verylikelycontingently haveno odor? ammonia Might really couldanybody holding that be envisaging? in us beingpoisonedby things are notreally that Has a finkish nature resulted in the dispositionalaccount of secondary poisonous? Anybodyinterested properties will replywith justicethat partof thepointof theanalysisis to get we are disposedto makeand away from a general gap between thejudgements thetruth. The case of values introduces further issues. Once morehoweverit is a is capableofraising incredible that a scientific, empirical, causal,investigation theright handside is theright and lefthandsides-unless generalgap between chosenso badlythatone of thefour optionsabove is in play. Whatis trueis in our thought thatwe can alwaysdistinguish between something beinggood in a givenpopulation, and it eliciting that and we can prosecute any reaction notby a causal empirical but an ethicalone, as we investigation, possibility reaction, or thecircumstances). mulloverthedefects of thepopulation (or their But thisirreducible normativity waits forthenextsections.Meanwhile,the of an is that the'missing putsno obstaclein front upshot explanation' argument a priori status forthebiconditionals. 4. Analyses and Circularity. Withsuchexcavations behind us thesebiconditionals mayseemto be well ofvarious a suitable setto do thework claimed for andprovide explication them, on whatseemsto me tobe a realproblem, So it is timeto concentrate concepts. of whichis that of circularity. claimedthata feature As I have said, it is often handside-need echo in thesebiconditionals-the of4 on theright reappearance rather thananalysis.But notmatter, since ourgoal is explication of a concept

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/ 271 Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals thisis at besta halftruth: in fact, morelikea one tenth truth, and often wholly false. The principleto keep hold of is thatif you want some thingsyour it biconditional will needto observesomeconstraints, whenifyouwantothers might not.Suppose,forinstance thatyourconcern is withwhatit is to judge thatsomething is 4. Then you will be disappointed withan echoingbiconofthiskind: ditional X is 4 X (is suchas to) dispose[P] in [C] tojudge itto be 4. you Because it is whatthese persons aredoinginjudging something to be 4 that wantedexplained.For example,if you wantto knowwhatit is to judge that something is good,your questhasnotbeenadvanced by: X is good X (is suchas to) dispose[P] in [C] tojudge itto be good. are doing For evenifthisis true, yougainno understanding of whatthepersons or social (what it has to do withtheir rationality, or emotions, or standards situations, or whatever troubles you). Obviouslya regress arises if we tryto make theproposalhelp withthis question by substituting theright handside intothecontent ofthe judgement: X is good X (is suchas to) dispose[P] in [C] tojudge that X (is such as to) dispose[P] in [C] tojudge.... Andthis regress is vicious, becauseeither itis never closed,or itleavesthevery itis closed. activity youwanted explained unanalyzed on theclauseon which Ourgoal is frequently is 4. Indeed, to understand judgement that something and sincewe are supposedly of 4, and sinceconcepts theconcept investigating judgements are the same topic,it maybe hardto see how we can be doing It case insouciance abouttheecho is entirely unjustified. anything else,in which is however hadnotbeenyour true that if,surprisingly, understanding judgement feel theverysame proposalmight have had some point.You might concern, are well enoughwhatpeople are up to whojudge thatthings you understand and true, good,butlackanyunderstanding of whatcouldmaketheir judgements in thecontext whatmakesit of that predicament thesuggestion couldbe helpful: true is that(it is such that) [P] in [C] so judge it. Thus I mightfeel no is boring philosophicalproblemsabout what it is to judge thatsomething I havea simplefunctional tomakepeoplefallasleepon (perhaps story: 'tending is boring a thing actually contemplating it') and be helpedbybeingtoldthat [P] in [C] judge itboring. So itall depends whatwe wantexplaining. In thiscontext theregressdoes not arise,because thereis no reasonto in another in thecontent Thejudging is understood substitute of thejudgement. this benefit that tootonotice way,and theregress sidestepped. Butitis essential as incursa cost. For there is a certain lack of harmony betweenthereaction on thisaccount,that to fallasleep-and thecontent specified-tending that, I might tendto fallasleep without judging judgement actuallyhas. Naturally

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272/Simon Blackburn that[P] in [C] so tend, and I might judge thisas it werein an anthropological spirit without myself tending to fallasleep. My own disposition to thereaction will be one thing, butthejudgement thatX has 4 (i.e. is such as to elicit[R] from [P,C]) is herequiteanother. Thisremains true evenifas puresubjectivists we replace[P] with me,sinceI maytend to fallasleep without judging that I do, and without is that judgingthat theconditions are [C]. The lack of harmony a prominent semanticanchor for 'X is boring' is thatI am absolutelyand I am straightforwardly entitled to voice it on having beenboredbyX. Whereas by no meansentitled to voice thelefthandside on havingbeen boredby X, unlessI can takemyself tobe representative of [P] andmycircumstances tohave in thefinal beenin theset [C]. The problems thiscausesreturn twosections. X is 4. Supposewe staywiththegoal of understanding thejudgement that The nextproblem we meetis notone ofregress, butone of navigating between I shallcall Scyllaand Charybdis. twodisasters, the that Scyllais that we falsify 'X is 4' actually kindofjudgement makes.Charybdis is that we get thisrightthesame butat thecost of making as in theregress (notmentioning, problem) kind of judgement at some place withinthe righthand side. It may be no with hand that we makethesamekindofjudgement theoverallright objection side, and indeedit can with justicebe urgedthatthiswill be thepointof the whenthisis taken biconditional as an analysis. Butit can wellbe objectionable within theright hand achievedby including theverysame kindof judgement side. This structure is familiarin the case of value. Scylla is thatwe go naturalistic or empirical; Charybdis that we makean ethical judgement on the right handside.Contrast: X is good X is suchas toelicitdesires from us as we actually are, whenwe comeacrossit. X is good X is suchas to elicitdesires from goodpeoplewhenthey comeacrossit. mustbe The first, considered as an attempt to understand ethicaljudgement, deemedto fail,because it onlygives us an equationwitha natural judgement ifourinterest hadbeenin a aboutX, certifiable byempirical means.Noticethat have been acceptable.We substantive of ethicalproperties, thismight theory thisis a candidate forbeingthe wouldsay,in thespirit that of Cornellrealism, of whatit is to see property of goodness.This leaves to one side thequestion thisproperty underthe headingof thegood, as opposed to seeing it as just Butsince another natural property, possibly instanced byvery regrettable things. we are supposing ourinterest ethical that is in understanding judgement, seeing and this it under the special heading is the very topic we are pursuing, it.Thus Scylla. suggestion has mistaken The secondproposal failsin thecomplementary way,sincewhatithasdone butethical is equateone ethical judgement with another: ittakes notobservation

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/ 273 Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals from good is suchas toelicitdesires whether something judgement todetermine in principle people,sinceyouhavetojudge whoarethegoodpeople.Of course, be somehow ethics couldcomeaboutthisway,sinceitmight an advancewithin easiertojudge whoare thegood peoplethanit appearsto be tojudge X's. But judgement perse. It of ethical thiswill notbe an advancein ourunderstanding order moral theory. local advanceinfirst wouldbe a strictly dive intoit spectacular gape? For a particularly How wide does Charybdis consider: theideal X is good_ X is suchas toelicitdesires from peopleunder goodthings. which peopledesire i.e. those under circumstances, hereis indeed The running-on-the-spot Everybody acceptsthatthisis trivial. and [P] is identified. of theway theeach of [R] emphasized by theirrelevance just as well have: Thatis, you might X is good X is suchas toelicitastonishment polarbearsunder from theidealcircumstances if you identify as those underwhich polar bears are ideal circumstances for can be constructed equations astonished at good things. Obviouslysimilar handside? anyjudgement at all. But how muchethicalcan be leftin theright youbring to it.Butso longas theright context Again,itwilldependhow much as theleft,it will not serveto handside makesthesame kind of judgement ofjustone of thecurly schemathepresence elucidate thekind.In thefollowing will disqualify bracketed terms theequationfromthe taskof understanding ethical andcolor judgement respectively: judgement X is good X (deserves)the that itis (good) from judgement under persons (ideal) conditions (good/improved/virtuous...) X is red = X is naturally that itis (red) judgement suchas toelicitthe for(color) under conditions favourable from non-(color blind)persons discrimination. without stripping the can be removed willbe whether thebrackets The question intotheclutches to have,and falling of anya priori status they ought equations of Scylla. Puttingfig leaves over the bracketedtermsonly postponesthe problem.17 of a will flank to understand judgement anyattempt Scylla and Charybdis Butit maybe hard kindbymeansof these biconditionals. sui generis particular that them. to believethatthere is no roomto navigate Remembering between the goal is to understand we shouldrecall thatan some kindof judgement, Forinstance maybe contextual. increase in understanding X is boring X is suchas to elicitsleepdispositions normal from X circumstances that aregoodfor appreciating peopleunder

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Blackburn 274/Simon It will if thebest we can say about might look as if it drownsin Charybdis. X are:circumstances suchthat ifX is funny, good for appreciating circumstances we we laugh; if X is tragicwe heave,if X is boringwe get bored...(equally are theones ifthebestthat they peopleis that can be said aboutnormal drown But ifwe can do getboredbywhatis boring). who laughat whatis funny...and thanthat,the equationmight be an advance. It will be if we already better notion of a general and can understand other kindsof appreciation, understand of normal and have a generalnotion of appreciation, circumstances evaluating within is boring that something people. We thenlearnto place thejudgement thiswill Once more, thisfamily, we needed. and that couldbe theunderstanding but at thetable, of concepts placingone of a family local advance, be a strictly theissuehinges table.Again,then, appreciative to place thegeneral nothelping on theexplanatory context. in general valuejudgements All theattempts I knowof to understand that inCharybdis. meetScyllaordrown dispositional accounts bygiving 5. Looking at Ourselves? of [P], casual abouttheidentity seemsto havebeenrather Ordinary thought have successphilosophers [C], and even [R], if we are to judge by thelimited truth that theevident This confirms instances. privileged had in recommending smellsorcolorswe do not regarding toenablea learner to use andcommunicate like: with something haveto load them mostnormal X smellsfoxy suchthat itelicitsfrom _ X is naturally in disabilities, relevant peoplewhodo nothavecoldsorother the no other smells(!) present, judgement circumstances of stillairwith X smellslikea fox. that a betokens here displayed theconcepts On thefaceofit,using andunderstanding there is that howto report than knowing sophistication muchgreater conceptual and by by ostension, a foxysmellin thegarden, whichwill have been taught such claims to a certain of subjecting flexible practice intoa fairly induction theresponseofcritical see more below).Ofcourse, amount scrutiny (for which, butas we foran analysis, theorist mayreplythathe is nottrying dependence of the forsome elucidation saw above thishas costs: she is after all trying thatthe and the pointis thatwe have no reason forconfidence judgement, showsus howthe biconditional works. judgement are morelike often these withthisis thepointthat Connected judgements under group reactions ofsomeother verdicts than aboutthesuspected hypotheses or was beautiful If I am askedwhether thepicture someputative circumstances. that I dissemble ifI say that theplay interesting, it was because I hypothesize I personally standit.Whatis expected couldn't it so, although mostpeoplefind

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/275 Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals 'Yes, itwas fascinating' expresses howI found is that I givemyownverdict. it. My verdictcan be challengedof course,but the challengeis not itselfan to show thatmy feelingwas hypothesis about [P] and [C], but an attempt I ought orfascinating. Noticetoo notto havefound itbeautiful unwarranted-that be) 'well, I thought it was as it might thatif I thenretreat to say (huffily, I am notretreating was thatit was to sayingthatmyhypothesis fascinating' myown verdict or expressing [P,C]. I am repeating such as to elicit[R] form myownreaction. We herehavewhatI earlier thereaction between calledthelackofharmony uponit.The logical and thethings that maketruethebiconditional elaborated hypothesis is notthatof an empirical space I enterwhenI make myverdict aboutthereactions group of people.As Kantputitforthe of some identifiable of case of beauty, thejudgement of tastedoes not 'postulate'theagreement 18'The else as necessary'. it,or 'exactsitfrom everyone everyone, but'imputes' butthat is notthat ourjudgement, willfallin with everyone assertion everyone it'.19 ought to agreewith in thatis prominent by another phenomenon Kant's insight is confirmed X is suchas to elicit[R] from thesecases. I mayknowempirically that [P,C], of X, I cannotwithout misrepresentation but because I have no experience I can onlyanswer that thequestion 'Is X beautiful/boring/fascinating...?' answer I am longing court that to see it.I cannot other say tout peoplethink so, or that I have impression that without giving an overwhelming it was one or theother to makea judgement, andhavemadeit.Thisis highly myself beenin a position as a straight mysterious on the hypothesisthat the judgementfunctions inidentified circumstances. ofan identified group descriptions ofthereactions hand on theright Of course,a normative can be overtly included element side: X is 4 X is suchthat [P] in [C] ought to give [R]. is boring= people enoughas faras it goes. A thing And typically thisis right to ourright turns to be boredby it.As Kantsaw,thewholequestion then ought do notretain to invokenorms or in his terms whyourjudgements at thispoint, a purely'subjectivevalidity'.20 This is thesame as thequestionof how the a genuine can be space for of is as much howthere taste as possible: judgement ourright to a judgmental here.The quasi-realist of earning project judgement ifthis andcenter-stage form is byno meansby-passed butis actually highlighted giventhatwhere on offer. And thisis inevitable, is thekindof biconditional at butpointsus straight value terms are in play theecho is notat all benign, For theright handside is another exampleof thekindofjudgement Charybdis. we might tounderstand. havebeenhoping

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Blackburn 276/Simon 6. Secondary Properties Again have lost Even if thebiconditionals properties. to secondary Let us return us how evaluation works, might they retain a ground as a device forshowing explanation and themissing from theargument place here?We havedeflected clearto relying seemrelatively so thewaymight complexities, from thefinkish impredicativity lightly On theother to taketheechoing handreluctance on them. theimpropriety has stressed work Forenough to accommodate. willbe difficult property of a different and imagining of avoidingtheecho by goingprivate in question. If that routeis to thereaction amounts whosepresence experience is as that of thereaction theonlywayof identifying itis, then closed,as I think or sounds is red,or smellslike ammonia, someonewhojudges thatsomething is now: of theoffering A. So theform likeconcert [P,C]. that it is 4 from X is 4 -=X is suchas to elicitthejudgement helpus tounderstand it is a priori) (or theclaimthat Does thiskindof offering in spiteof theecho? The thewayjudgement of coloror smellor soundworks, fillings in [P] and [C] complicates theissue.But foranysubstantive flexibility in the theseequationsintroduce is wrongakin to themisdirection something 900 and our gaze through case of values. Therewe do not,as I put it, turn ourgaze on And heretoo we do notturn concern ourselves with ourreactions. we do havea senseofourjudgements Certainly ourpopulation orcircumstances. outto ifenough turns them, or thelight peopledo notconfirm beingcorrigible, have been deceptive.21But we do not wrap this practiceof corrigibility, whatto expect,intothe as it is forthepurposeof communicating necessary content fortheactualjudgement of color. If we did, thoseof us unfortunate fillings for[P] and [C] wouldbe enoughnotto have a gripon some favoured unabletojudgecolor. The point here can be easy to miss. In the contextof defendinga 'Whatwouldone account McDowellonceaskedrhetorically: John dispositional something's beingsuchas to lookred,ifnotto expectit tobe liketo experience as looking, experiencethe thingin question (in the rightcircumstances) Imagine anyone able to precisely,red?'22 The answeris straightforward. itis redfrom that is suchas toelicitthejudgment determine whether something contrast monochromatic soundwhenstruck, [P,C] byanymeanswe like:touch, is poisonous a thing that might determine as a chemist withother objects.Just so any of of its molecular construction, visual experience by givinghimself ofa thing. It willbe purely contingent thesemethods thedisposition maycertify The point secondary quality. anyparticular whether there for existsuchmethods in abouta secondary quality that arriving atan hypothesis anybody is, ofcourse, such a way is notjudgingits color. She is in thesame positionas someone thatit is spirit says in theanthropological who,nothavingseen thepainting, of ofthosewhohave.It is thereaction beautiful becausesheknowsthereactions

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Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals / 277 thosewhoarejudging thecolororthebeauty that we needtounderstand; thefact thatan outsidecould plug intotheexistence of their reaction, and make the dispositional judgementon her own account,shows thatthe dispositional judgement is notwhat was wanted. McDowell insiststhatthe crucialreaction'presents itselfas perceptual awareness ofproperties genuinely possessed bytheobjects that confront one' and in thishe maybe right. Buttheperceptual awareness does nottypically include in its scope [C] (mostpeople cannot just see forinstance whether it is a clear northern light, or one of a different colortemperature). Stillless does it include [P] and how they wouldbe disposedto react.Similarly, by tasting a substance and beingpoisonedI maybe in a position to guessthat others wouldbe so too, but I am certainly notin a position to knowthat, and stillless do I have the content ofthat judgement presented Thatwouldbe something perceptually. quite likea movieofpeoplecollapsing. different, The crucial residualproblemfor secondary qualityperception is now apparent. Colorsareseen,soundsheard, The problem is notthat smellssmelled. McDowell's remark is true,but of understanding how it can be true.Our reactions do present themselves as perceptual awareness, yetwe haveno stable of their to so present true situation is probably conception right themselves.The muchmoreeasilyunderstood with smelland tastethan with color:we are more to think that thenose orpalatetellsus nothing aboutthe easilyled by Berkeley world thanthatchromatic vision does not. The problemof rightis exactly with that analogousto Kant'sproblem thejudgement of beauty, butthesolution we want a normative ofdemanding is not practice a similar from others response nearly so plausible. Dispositional accounts solvetheproblem of right, butmake colorsand therestessentially that we confront imperceptible. Rebounding from theproblem of how thebare subjectivity itselfintoa of responsetransforms genuineawarenessof a property.23 Once more then,farfromsuperseding whichwrestle withtheproblem theemergence of approaches of understanding judgement from human response, concentrationon the dispositional biconditionals threatens to conceal even the need forjust such an understanding.24
Notes 1. Volumes substantially devoted to the subject include Response Dependent Concepts, (Canberra:ResearchSchool of Social Sciences, Australian National and University, 1991) and, given the scale of the papers by Mark Johnston CrispinWright, Realism and Reason, (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1992). Since thisvolumeis in Press at thetimeof writing cannotbe givenin the pagination references. 2. Pettit, 'Realism and Response Dependence', Mind, 1991, p. 588. Wright, 'Wittgenstein'srule-followingConsiderations and the Central Project of TheoreticalLinguistics',in Reflectionson Chomsky, ed. A. George (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989)

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Blackburn 278/Simon
Volume 1989, pp. 89Society,Supplementary 3. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 174. in Response DependentConcepts,and 4. Huw Price 'Two Paths to Pragmatism' Mark Johnston, 'Explanation, Response Dependence and Judgement in Realism and Refigured' Dependence' in the same volume,and 'Objectivity Reason. My exploration of thisissue owes a greatdeal to Price's paper. 'The Dispositional Theoryof Value', pp. 147-8. 5. See also Johnston, from Error'in and Immunity Response-Dependence 6. RichardHolton,'Intentions, Concepts Response-Dependent 7. Echoing explications are endorsed by, among many others,McGinn, The Subjective View (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1983) and McDowell, 'Values and and Objectivity, ed. Ted Honderich, (London: Secondary Qualities',in Morality to credited up is often & Kegan Paul, 1985). The idea of openingthem Routledge David Wiggins. here is stressedby CrispinWright,'Moral Values, 8. The value of a prioricity Society Projectionand SecondaryQualities' Proceedings of the Aristotelian of fillingtheplaceholders so that Volume 1988. The difficulty Supplementary out by are not trivialbut remaina priori is well brought the biconditionals Richard Holton, op. cit., and JimEdwards, 'Secondary Qualities and the A Priori',Mind 1992. forfoodstuffs, butnotformanysnakes,whichare poisonousalthough 9. It is right This showsthat[C] mayvarywithX. benignwheningested. will be hopelesslyunwieldy.To 10. Of course, it is known thatthis disjunction repeat,I am not advocatingthat we thinkof any such thingas 'being the at all. in theseterms of redness',because I do notadvocatethinking property to David 2. I owe theterm'finkish' Appendix 'Objectivity Refigured', 11. Johnston, is useful. finkish, but theterm avoids callinghis situations Lewis: Johnston 12. See my 'Fillingin Space', Analysis,April 1990 whereit is notchangethat janus faceddispositions 13. We feel quitefreewithother kinds of venom. Suppose a is involved.Many snakes inject several different snake adaptednot to poison mammals butonlybirds,and supposethatonlyone of its venoms is poisonous in mammalswhile its second chemical acts as to neutralize the poison. Is it a poisonoussnake? It injectsa poison,but you can We don't muchcare: in some respectsit is such as to step on it withimpunity. or mean that danger, angels guardfrom not. Do guardian poison, and in others there is no danger? different chameleonby a slightly 14. CrispinWright reactsto the shybut intuitive modification. He revokes the simple biconditional, and substitutes a is phi iff[R]'. No verdict 'if [C], thena thing equation, of theform 'provisional' is given on the chameleon or the lone skunk or the live pig, because the chimeswiththe circumstances of good observation do not hold. This certainly is no whenthere irritation we feelwithquestions like 'is he a good rockclimber, equation rock about?'.My reason foravoidingit is thatI believe thattheright even when not can be instanced should show us how a dispositional property manifested. 15. 'Objectivity Appendix1. Refigured', op. 16. Mark Johnston, 'Remarkson ResponseDependence' in Haldane & Wright, cit. sees red', has sees-redly, 17. Potential normal, suitable, standard, figleaves: merits, a visual experience as of seeingEnglishpillarboxes.... trans.JamesMeredith,(Oxford: 18. ImmanuelKant, The Critiqueof Judgement, ClarendonPress, 1952), pp. 52-59. 19. Ibid, p. 84. thattheydo. in effect 20. For aesthetics, think manypeople now probably We do notonlysay is interesting. 21. Although workthislatter theway we actually 'it wasn'tgreen: the lightwas misleading'but also 'funny:it is greenin that to singlecoloursforobjects is quite casual. Metamerism light'.Our attachment

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/ 279 Circles,Finks,Smellsand Biconditionals

from of thesame color,whichappeardifferent is notusuallydescribed as things each otherin different lights,but thingsof the same color in one light,and different color in different lights. Qualities',p. 112. 22. John McDowell, 'Values and Secondary and SecondaryQualities' (Philosophical 23. In his excellentpaper 'Of Primary Descartessayingthat'even bodies are Review, 1990) A. D. Smithhighlights of imagination...'. not properly speakingknownby the senses or by thefaculty to think that to understand It is one thing Descarteswas wrong, butquiteanother how. is due to C. B. Martin, whosepaper 'Powers 24. The notionof a finkish disposition and Conditionals' was readat theChapel Hill Colloquiumin 1968.

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