Wittgenstein and the Open Concept of Art Joe Dobzynski jr.

The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation. Wittgenstein[1] The foregoing quote shows the main problem with philosophical investigation to the present day. Philosophers have been concerned with finding the essence of things, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in defining the terms we use in everyday life. Good, bad, beauty, truth, virtue, etc have all been hopelessly pursued within the confines of our language to discover the common elements of a term in order to properly dispense in using it. Wittgenstein is best known for challenging this particular desire, moving past finding the commonalities between uses of a concept, and moving forward into a new way of looking at concepts in our lives as family resemblances. The influence of this concept is seen in all aspects of philosophy, from the philosophy of language, it's obvious correlation to postmodernism, and the focus of this paper: aesthetics. Morris Weitz, a prominent aesthetic philosopher, utilized this concept of family resemblances in his work "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics" to create the open concept of art. This open concept of art led to quite a stir in aesthetic theory from which it seemed that no recovery was possible. Maurice Mandelbaum, an opponent to the open concept of art, formed a defense against the open concept in his work "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts", in which he strikes at the nature of Wittgenstein's development of family resemblances to show that something is missing. Weitz formed a countercriticism against Mandelbaum in his work The Opening Mind to show that family resemblances does succeed, and that this open concept of art moves forward past a reliance on family resemblances. The goal of this paper is to show that the concept of family resemblances ultimately succeeds as an adequate representation of art in lieu of Mandelbaum's criticism of Weitz's theory. It will start by defining the nature of family resemblances, move on the Weitz's open concept of art, and end with a critique of Mandelbaum's criticism from Weitz's standpoint and my own. It will further go to show that while art remains an open concept, there is hope for art evaluation and art criticism, and that aesthetics can pursue into many different areas. Wittgenstein's Doctrine of Family Resemblances The first mention of family resemblances appears in The Blue and Brown Books after a discussion on the concept of language-games. A language-game is the use of simple concepts that have diverse meanings in the highly complex language that we use.[2] For instance, those that believe in some higher deity attribute the term, and

therefore concept, of God. The use of the word God is multi-faceted in our language. We can refer to God as the head of any of the three major monotheistic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). We can use it to refer to a mythological deity, such as Apollo, a god. We can use it as a qualifier for things that appear super-human, such as the god-like strength of someone. All of these meanings for the concept of God are summed up in a single word: God. The usage of that term by every individual is assumed to be common to everyone else, though in reality the concept that we have formed in our minds as to what God is varies from person to person. Yet, we still persist in using the simple term, God. This is an example of a language-game. Wittgenstein examines why we use language-games by stating four tendencies in human nature. First, we tend to look for something in common in items under a general term or concept. Second, we tend to assume that once a person has the concept of a general term that a general picture is formed in their mind of that term. Third, we confuse the term with a mental state of usage and consciousness. Fourth, we are preoccupied with the scientific method[3]. These four tendencies lead us to constantly persist in language-games, and leads to confusion in the usage of terms. Thus, because we constantly seek necessary and sufficient conditions in defining a term, we fail to see the doctrine of family resemblances. The doctrine of family resemblances states that, in short, general terms do not possess necessary and sufficient conditions to define them. Instead, the items that we place under the heading of a general term are related to one another by characteristics they possess[4]. To illustrate, I will use Wittgenstein's own concept of 'games'. He states that if you look at all the totality of what we call games in the world, we find that there are no universally common threads that form necessary and sufficient conditions for defining a term. Card games are similar to ball games, yet also very different. The same is true comparing either one to board games or children's games. What we do find is that there are similar characteristics threaded through each concept. For example, while board games and card games may involve the use of cards, card games do not require a board to play upon. Or while ball games and children's games may be amusing, chess is not necessarily an amusing game. Therefore, the concept of games illustrates a family resemblance. Does this mean that we cannot use the concept of games since we cannot define it? As Wittgenstein would answer, "Not at all!"[5] In fact, it is clear that we do use the concept of game to describe things in the world, even though it is a concept not framed by necessary and sufficient conditions. When we use the concept of a game, we employ it for a special purpose, and because of that, we draw a boundary, closing the concept. When I speak of a game, I may be referring to a card game, which would limit the concept for that special purpose. So, even with concepts categorized by family resemblances, we can still use the concept.

Wittgenstein's two-fold plan with the family resemblances is to first state that we engage in language games in everyday discourse, using simple concepts in order to employ them in complex language. Because of this and our tendency to seek commonality in concepts, we are unable to see the idea of family resemblances. Family resemblances are a way of construing a concept not based on universal characteristics that form necessary and sufficient conditions, but a way of grouping things together by looking at threads of commonality between some items underneath a concept, but not all. Thus, family resemblances give us an adequate means of determining the definition of a concept. Weitz's Open Concept of Art Weitz drew heavily on Wittgenstein's family resemblances in his development on the open concept of art. Much like Wittgenstein saw the need for commonality among members of a class as a shackle of philosophical investigation, Weitz saw this same idea as the barrier for defining a concept of art. In the introduction to "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", Morris Weitz states his purpose: I want to show that theory - in the requisite classical sense - is never forthcoming in aesthetics, and that we would do much better as philosophers to supplant the question, "What is the nature of art?," by other questions, the answers to which will provide us with all the understanding of the arts there can be [6]. Weitz is rejecting any form of closed concept concerning art. He states this in three ways. First, he moves to show that traditional theorists are misconstruing the logic of the concept of art [7] Second, he uses a historical argument that throughout history we have yet to find a theory that is sufficient to encapsulate the whole of the concept of art[8]. Finally, he wants to show that the definitions of art come first from recognizing items categorized as art, then defining a concept to explain art, and finally using that concept to evaluate art [9} The first form of evidence against a closed concept of art is that the logic of art demands that the concept remain open. He does this by instead of asking, "What is art?" to asking, "What sort of concept is art?"[10] It is at this point that Weitz uses Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblances to discern why the concept is to remain open. In trying to define art, Weitz maintains that the nature of art is one of family resemblances, in which there are no necessary and sufficient conditions that exist to define art, and thus cannot be closed. Art is an empirically descriptive concept, and as such can only be arbitrarily closed in order to use the concept [11] The second form of evidence is a historical argument. He shows the inadequacies of all the prior theories as theories that either emphasizes too few properties, neglect important concepts, or are too general so as to include objects that we would not consider art [12] It must be noted that this criticism alone does not justify keeping the concept open as there is a possibility of a theory arising, a holy grail of aesthetics, that would encompass all artworks correctly. However, this historical criticism, combined with

understanding the nature of art as an open concept, leads to show that the historical search for necessary and sufficient conditions is flawed in many ways. The final form of evidence is the way in which we identify concepts, which is also drawn from Wittgenstein. Weitz stated that "[in] effect, this whole procedure, subtly descriptive as it is, amounts to a transformation of correct criteria for recognizing members of certain legitimately closed classes of works of art into recommended criteria for evaluating any putative member of the class."[13] Wittgenstein states that in order to begin using a concept defined as a family resemblance, we simply give examples to be viewed and labeled as games. Once enough examples are given, we can assume that the person understand the concept of games, even though the breadth that we give examples is an initial closing of the concept. The concept later opens when more examples are presented outside that closed concept[14] Building on Wittgenstein's method for defining family resemblance concepts, we see that the problem of art lies in taking a concept of a closed set of artworks, discerning some common characteristics among them, and using this data to declare that all art must have these characteristics. These criteria are then used in evaluating the artwork to tell whether it is (1) an artwork and (2) the quality of the artwork. This whole method, given art as a concept defined as a family resemblance, is faulty. It starts to meld the concept of a classificatory and evaluative use of the concept of art. Weitz is looking for a distinction between the classificatory and the evaluative, and rightly so. He wants to show that even with an open concept of art, art criticism and art evaluation can still persist and flourish. Further argumentation will occur after we analyze the criticism of the open concept of art.

Mandelbaum's Criticism of the Open Concept of Art Mandelbaum criticized the open concept of art in his article "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts" in three parts. First, he offered criticism about Wittgenstein's use of family resemblances. Second, he criticized Paul Ziff's work on the open concept of art. Lastly, he critiqued Weitz's open concept of art. A review of all three criticisms and counter-criticism will reveal how the open concept of art truly works, and how Mandelbaum's criticism ultimately fails. (1) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Family Resemblances Mandelbaum is highly critical of Wittgenstein's method for discovering family resemblances. He states that Wittgenstein missed something in his analysis by not looking for "genetic connections" between members of a class under a family resemblance[15]. He uses two examples of seeing someone using cards as fortune telling that resembles a card game or a scuffle between two boys on a playground as a similarity to wrestling to state that something is missing in the conception of what is a game and what is not. It would appear that because the directly exhibited traits of what is considered a card game and what is fortune telling would allow us to place fortune

telling as a game and solitaire as a form of divination all at once. However, there are two major problems with this criticism. First, Mandelbaum is only centering in on one directly exhibited trait show an indistinguishable relationship between fortune telling and a card game. This disregards the criss-crossing of Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances in that it's not a single trait that overlaps, but many. Second, his desire to look for a "genetic connection" between all games immediately presupposes that there is such a concept underlying the concept of games. He states that because Wittgenstein failed to take this into account, which I would argue Wittgenstein did not fail to do as such, he is lacking something that exists between games and hence for a definition of family resemblance. Mandelbaum proposes that games could be determined as "absorbing non-practical interest to either participants or spectators". I would argue that the same could be said of reading a book, in which I would be placing nonpractical interest in the activity as the sole participant. The criterion that Mandelbaum is putting forth is neither necessary (playing a game for money, say poker or professional sports, is putting a practical interest at stake), nor hence not sufficient to classify something as a game. If anything, Mandelbaum's criticism only reinforces the open concept of a game, and thus strengthens the concept of a family resemblance. It is also worth nothing that Mandelbaum is addressing the essence of art whereas Weitz is discussing how the concept is used. Weitz argues that the way in which we use the concept is based on family resemblance, but that it isn't necessary in defining art as a class of items [16]. The question was really "Do we need a theory of art to talk about art intelligibly?" and the answer is no. This was the use of family resemblances. Weitz states that the concept is necessarily open in order to accommodate new practices and new view of art. The nature of art demands it to be open, and does not rest on family resemblances per se. In fact, Mandelbaum's criticism fails of family resemblances. (2) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Paul Ziff The second part of the article attacks Paul Ziff's description of an artwork in that it necessitates that he is putting forth a theory concerning art. Ziff puts forward seven criteria for describing Poussin's Rape of the Sabine Women in determining the value of a work of art. In listing these characteristics, Mandelbaum sees Ziff putting forward contains an implicit aesthetic theory because he is including certain characteristics, but not others [17]. Thus, even in stating what characteristics that Ziff is using to evaluate the artwork, Ziff is putting forward an aesthetic theory. Again, two problems arise with this criticism. First, Mandelbaum is putting forth the characteristics necessary for evaluating an artwork, in this case a painting, are characteristics for all artwork. This is a clear fallacy of composition. Because Ziff is pointing out features in Rape of the Sabine Women in no way states that those characteristics being put forward are in some ways

necessary and sufficient conditions of evaluation for all artwork. Ziff is picking and choosing those characteristics are good for the evaluation of this artwork, not all artwork.

Second, Mandelbaum is doing exactly what Weitz warned against in putting forward art as an open concept by combining what makes art with what evaluate art. Ziff is using the term work of art in an evaluative sense, and not in a classificatory sense. He is evaluating Rape of the Sabine Women, not classifying it, which both Mandelbaum and Ziff agree is already a work of art. I would further argue that the criteria that Ziff is producing are characteristics that criss-cross and overlap in the family resemblance of art as an open concept. That Ziff is focusing on it being "made deliberately and selfconsciously with obvious skill and care" and noting "the play of light and color, to dissonances, contrasts, and harmonies of hues, values, and intensities" are picking out those similar strands of characteristics to art, but are neither necessary nor sufficient for it being an artwork[17]. Ziff is pointing out the family resemblances to evaluate the art, not implicitly classify it. He presupposes that it is an artwork before evaluating it, and makes his evaluation based upon those overlapping criterion. He is not generalizing art by discussing one painting. (3) Mandelbaum's Criticism of Morris Weitz Mandelbaum's aim is upset the historical argument put forth by Weitz for the open concept of art, and the nature of art throughout the ages. It would appear that Mandelbaum is trying to pigeonhole Weitz into saying that all novelties brought into the concept of art necessitate a stretching of the concept of art, and I would agree with Weitz on one level and disagree with Mandelbaum on another. The quote that Mandelbaum uses as the basis for his argument is the following: What I am arguing, then, is that the very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties. We can, of course, choose to close the concept. But to do this with "art" or "tragedy" or portraiture, etc. is ludicrous since it forecloses the very conditions of creativity in the arts [18]. Mandelbaum assumes that Weitz is trying to argue that every novelty that comes into trial as a work of art necessarily involves a stretching of the concept. This seems to misinterpret what Weitz is getting at. Weitz doesn't mean that every novelty that comes along (and novelty is an open concept all by itself) is necessarily put on trial to stretch the definition of art. Mandelbaum uses the example of a representational painting as the basis of his claim, and the advent of photography and motion pictures and forms of representational painting that need not stretch the concept of art in new ways, but merely in the practice of art [19]. However, there seems to be a difference in the meaning of novelty here. The practice of art can change without affecting the current, accepted totality of art as relates to a specific form of art, mainly representational painting. Mandelbaum has already qualified art in this case as representational, and any work

that is representational, with the 'novelty' of a camera or camcorder, is simply a different medium for the same type of art. Mandelbaum is closing the concept of art (though not completely) by limiting what art is to be reviewed. In essence, anything that is representational has the possibility of being considered art at this case, and since photography and movies have this representational aspect, the actual practice of art has change, but the concept of representational art has not. The 'novelty' used by Weitz is that art which comes forward as a challenging all norms of art whatsoever. For example, Duchamp's Fountain. Duchamp was known for his readymade art, or found art. This novelty of found art is something that challenges the concept of art previous to it, and requires that art broaden its definition in order to include it. The same could be said of accidental art. These different types of art are the novelties that force art to expand its boundaries, not merely using a new medium. This keeps the concept of art necessarily open. Thus, I see Mandelbaum and Weitz with a divergence on the meaning of novelty in bringing in new forms of art.

criticisms. However, they are all artworks, which the open concept of art will allow. Thus, I argue that Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances opens up new avenues of sub-classification (for instance, Formalist art), appreciation (Formalist appreciation), and criticism (Formalist criticism) that intensify the relationship of the appreciator and critic of artworks. We are now able to develop new forms of the three avenues to further explore and examine the nature of art given its station as an open concept. Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances did help generate Weitz's open concept of art, and stands against the criticism made by Mandelbaum.

Dissolving a Universal Definition of Art Mandelbaum's criticisms ultimately fail in some way or another of the three arguments he puts forth against an open concept of art. The greater concern is whether criticism or appreciation can take place without a standard boundary of what counts as art and what does not. I would argue that both could take place without a traditional theory of art. With regards to appreciating a work of art, the conception of appreciation needs to move away from art having set characteristics in all art to make it worthy of appreciation. Because art does not have necessary and sufficient conditions in defining an artwork, we can nonetheless still appreciate art based upon those criss-crossing and overlapping similarities. Wittgenstein asks "[for] why should what [concepts] have in common be more interesting to use than what distinguishes them?"[20] There is a lot to be said from this statement. The subject of appreciation such become those characteristics that some artworks share, and even in how artworks utilize those characteristics as a whole. It leads to appreciate of the differences of artworks, and their relationship to other artworks, which I do not seem to find the least bit dissatisfying. With regards to evaluating a work of art, we can move along the same lines. The theories that have come before (Formalist, Organicist, Expressionist, Intentionalist, etc...) need not be thrown out, but recycled into forms of criticism. We throw out the concept of art criticism being wholly objective to artworks based upon shared characteristics and create kinds of criticism. For example, one could perform a Formalist criticism of an artwork to discuss how well its form or structure relates without the artwork in criticizing it. This leads to some artworks have positive Formalist criticism and negative Formalist

Endnotes 1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969), 19. 2 Ibid. 17. 3 Ibid. 17-8. 4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), 65, 31. 5 Ibid. 69, 33. 6 Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (1953): 27. 7 Ibid. 28. 8 Ibid. 30. 9 Ibid. 33. 10 Ibid. 30. 11 Ibid. 31. 12 Ibid. 29. 13 Ibid. 33. 14 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 71, 34. 15 Maurice Mandelbaum, "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts", Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 140. Originally published in The American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 no. 3 (1965). 16 Morris Weitz, The Opening Mind, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 58. 17 Mandelbaum, 147. 18 Weitz, "Role of Theory", 32. 19 Mandelbaum, 148-9. 20 Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, 19. References Mandelbaum, Maurice. "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the Arts." Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977). Originally published in The American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 no. 3 (1965). Weitz, Morris. The Opening Mind. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977). Weitz, Morris. "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 62 (1953). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1969). Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953).