Meeting of Team 3: Mike Hurley, Len Hawley, and Scott Allan with Vice-C~airmanJ

Hamilton and Chris Kojm

November 13, 2003
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Notes Taken by Ben Rhodes

Interviews: Mike Hurley said the Team has conducted at least 50 interviews, most with
mid-level people to "clear out brush" before interviewing high-level deputies and
principals. The Team also interviewed about 70 people on foreign travel. Lee asked how
the Washington Times got this story. Mike Hurley said someone they interviewed in
Pakistan probably leaked.

Agencies: Scott Allan is working on State - how diplomacy was used towards key
countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan in the run-up to 9/11. He is also working
on DoJ/FBI to assess their policy options. Bonnie Jenkins is working on DoD and their
policy options - what was the environment and planning for military strikes? Alexis
Albion is working on CIA, along with Dan Byman. Warren Bass is working on the NSC.

Task and Report: Lee asked howthe Team defines its task. Mike Hurley said they aim to
produce the most comprehensive and complete monograph possible on U.S. counter-
terrorism (CT). The monograph would detail the period from 1998 through 9/20101, and
then assess the policy side of the war on terror with an eye towards recommendations.
Lee asked what the product would look like. Mike Hurley said the Team is putting together
a timeline, and will tum that into a narrative chronology off of which they will build the
monograph. It will probably be highly classified.

Policy Critique: Lee asked how critical the Team will be. Mike Hurley said they will be
objective and offer factual details, but themes will emerge implicating policy failures. DoD
was not doing much pre-9/11 on offensive response and proactive strategy. State's efforts
toward the Taliban - sanctions and pressure on Islamabad - were not working, and
frustration was building within the Department. Did this diplomatic approach stand a
chance? The answer is probably no. Parts of the CIA understood the threat. But a small
group carried a heavy load; other elements of national power were needed. Len Hawley
said they would also look at homeland security. Mike Hurley said root questions are: what
did policymakers know, and what did they do to act on what they knew?

Help from Commission: Lee asked what the Commission could do to help. Mike Hurley
said they need their notes back from the White House. Warren Bass is taking detailed notes
that he needs to prepare for interviews and drafting. The White House thinks the notes are
too detailed and is holding on to them. Dan Marcus is working on the problem. Lee said to
let him know if anything further needs to be done.

Lee asked if the Team needs any subpoenas. Mike Hurley said no, but there are some
problems getting policy documents from DoD. Lee said that he and Phil Zelikow brought
this up with Secretary Rumsfeld, and he was supportive. Mike Hurley said DoD had been
forward-leaning on briefings - the Team is waiting for documents, and is pleased that DoD

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has identified 96 boxes in its archives. If Rumsfeld maintains a forward-leaning attitude
the Team should get what they need.

Specific Issues: Lee then turned to specific policy issues. He stressed that he spoke for
himself and not all Commissioners:

Organization: Lee asked if our government is structured to fight terrorism. How do we

bring all of these different strands together? He is interested in balance between military
and non-military response. Bush once said the non-military parts of the war on terror were
most important, but it seems the pendulum has swung towards a military response. Lee
feels the non-military aspects are just as important and need to be emphasized. For
instance, running down bank accounts is hard to sustain, but absolutely critical.

Al Qaeda: Lee asked which team is working on understanding al Qaeda. Chris said that it
is Team 1's responsibility, but Scott Allan added that there was natural overlap to policy
analysis. Lee said he is concerned about how little we understand al Qaeda and terrorism.
For instance, in Iraq we don't even know who we're fighting. We also don't understand the
attraction of al Qaeda as an ideological movement. Len Hawley said al Qaeda is not just a
group - it is a Jihadist movement with tremendous popularity in parts of the Muslim world.
It is not just UBL and his guys. Lee said we have chosen to personalize the war against al
Qaeda, which works for political purposes at home. But the Commission must instruct the
American people about the nature of al Qaeda.

Consequences of Policies: Lee said that he is concerned about the consequences of our
policies. He remembers no debate about putting troops in Saudi Arabia. That may have
been a good policy, but it triggered UBL. When we support Israel, that has consequences;
when we back Musharraf, that has consequences. There are limits to public diplomacy and
"getting the message straight" when some of our policies - no matter how justified - are
unpopular. Len Hawley said the Team seeks to identify policy trade-offs on different
issues. What would be the unintended consequences of certain actions? Lee raised Bush's
plan to democratize the Middle East. What about Pakistan and Saudi Arabia? If Bush does
not follow-up on his rhetoric, there could be a serious hypocrisy backlash.

Mike Hurley said this issue applies to CT choices as well as foreign policy. After the
embassy bombings we decided to harden our facilities abroad. The consequence of this
was pushing terrorists to softer targets. Recent attacks in Bali demonstrate this, though
such attacks may undercut popular support for terrorists.

Counter-Terrorism versus other issues: Lee said the Team should look at CT versus
other issues. President Bush sees everything through the prism of terror. Lee thinks we're
weighted too heavily in this direction. The Team needs to put terrorism in perspective.
Where does it fit in our foreign policy agenda? Len Hawley agreed that the perfect CT
policy might not be the most desirable because it shuts out other concerns.

Root Causes: Lee is concerned about root causes of terrorism, though he knows some
think it irrelevant. Scott Allan said Ambassador Chamberlain raised this issue. She does
not have much faith in public diplomacy - we need to spend our money building schools

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 and roads so that people see tangible gains. Mike Hurley said the task is too big. Saudi
Arabia has something like 80% illiteracy. How do you combat that? Lee recounted a
politician's trick. When someone asks for the impossible, you don't say no - you let them
know you're on their side and are sympathetic to their concerns. That alleviates some of
their distress. It's the same in foreign policy. Countless people around the world have
absolutely no future. As a Nation, we need to convey that we're on their side. Len Hawley
said al Qaeda preys on young men with no future by giving them an option. Lee said he
thinks terrorism is a young man's game. We need to convey to 15-30 year old Muslim men
that there is another option.

State-Sponsors: Lee raised state sponsors. The Team needs to assess whether this is the
heart of the problem. He thinks it is more varied and many groups act independently. Scott
Allan said our policy has evolved over twenty years. We came to realize that isolated
groups in the Philippines could be more dangerous than groups sponsored- by Libya or
Syria. Len Hawley raised the State Department's list of sponsors. It is a meaningless
documentthat serves domestic political concerns. Lee said he does not think the list helps
the war on terror.

Saudi Arabia: Lee raised the issue of Saudi Arabia. We have had a deal with them for
decades - oil for us, security for the House of Saud. It worked, but the relationship is
shallow, based on shared interests and not shared values. The Team should look at whether
we should continue that policy. We have to balance our interests. Some people want to pull
the rug out from under the Saudis, but then what would we do about oil?

Senior Level Interviews: Chris said there has been a good response for interviews at the
Assistant Secretary and Secretary levels. The remaining questions are Rice and Hadley,
and the Vice-Presidents and Presidents. Lee said that before Cabinet level interviews he
wants to know about the line of questioning. He stressed that time will be limited, and you
need to lead with important questions and ask for the right to submit written questions.
Secretaries will squeeze on time and filibuster. Chris said the Commission staff would sit
down with their timeline and work off of it in preparing for interviews.

Assigning Blame: Mike Hurley returned to criticism. He thinks it is inevitable that

analytical trends will emerge, but Lee has cautioned against assigning blame. Lee said he is
reluctant to blame one person or agency. But you have to write it straight. At the end of the
narrative you shift gears to lessons. What did we do right? What did we do wrong? Why
did we do this? It is possible someone messed up, but more probable that there were
systemic problems. Then you have to move on to what we've done since 9/11. What have
we done correctly? What have we done wrong? This leads to recommendations.

Families: Scott Allan asked about families. The Team has not interacted much with them.
Lee said there is a wide-range of views among the families. Many want to hang somebody
and will not be satisfied with the Commission's report. He understands they are deeply
frustrated at lack of transparency in the government. But it is hard to pin responsibility in
the USG. Chris pointed out that some of the families want to pursue tangents. Lee said the
Commission should do its absolute best to address their concerns, but he expects that some
of them will not be satisfied.