Borders Negative Core

Topicality

Immigration is FX
The aff is FX at best Immigration results in EE Newendorp, Lecturer at Harvard University, 2008 *Nicole DeJong, Uneasy Reunions:
Immigration, Citizenship, and Family Life in Post-1997 Hong Kong Stanford University Press, MM] The blurring of social, cultural, and political boundaries created through these actual cases of movement back and forth over border areas, and through the creation of "new" and "different" kinds of borders both through the formation of supranational regional areas, such as the European Union and NAFTA, and the "reunification" of Hong Kong with the PRC, can certainly be unsettling for citizens and residents of these areas. These changes also have the potential to be exciting for immigrants (and sometimes for citizens), whose subjectivities may be altered through new possibilities of social, political, and economic engagement engendered by this movement . For many mainland wives who immigrated to Hong Kong, the potential to experience a new lifestyle in "modern," "cosmopolitan" Hong Kong, where children could be educated in English, where wives would have the right to cross freely back and forth over the I long Kong/ mainland border, and where they could imagine travel to places beyond Hong Kong, created the desire to stay in I long Kong despite the hardships they experienced there. May, one of the immigrant wives whose experiences figure prominently throughout this book, told me: The longer I live in Hong Kong, the more I understand it. But the place I like is where I was born (fillgei thursai goelouh). But that's not to say that I long Kong is bad. That is, to be a woman and marry a manwherever he is am' to follow himwhether it's in Hong Kong or someplace else ... to follow your husband to the place he was born. Is that good or bad? It depends on the person. I'm not in a hurry to go back to the mainland.

More ev of FX Ibrahim, Contributor to DIASPEACE, 2010 *Mohamed Hassan, Somalilands Investment

in Peace: Analysing the Diasporas Economic Engagement in Peace Building, DIASPEACE Working Paper 4, August 2010, MM] From a local perspective, the economic engagements of the diaspora have had a positive impact on the local inhabitants outlook to the future. They have helped to restore a sense of confidence and self-esteem and granted them hope. A legislative member of the House of Representatives said, describing how such involvements provided aspiration to local communities: It is a sign for the locals, when they see people *diasporas+ coming from a country that is peaceful, stable and has more opportunities investing here [post-conflict place] it gives hope. As they say to themselves, these guys know something we dont know, so it provides them aspiration.87 More specifically, the diasporas economic engagement has been a driving engine behind the economic recovery of the country, especially due to the limited aid Somaliland receives from the international community. In the words of one researcher, diaspora investment first and foremost has been responsible for economic engagement and job placement. They are behind all the existing small investments in the country that create employment opportunities for many people.88

Economic Engagement is a direct effect of immigration changes. Suroor, Journalist for The Hindu Newspaper, 10
(Hasan, August 22, 2010, The Hindu, Threat to relocate jobs over Britain's immigration cap, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/threat-to-relocate-jobs-over-britainsimmigration-cap/article588076.ece, Accessed 7-12-13, RH) They pointed to Union Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma's recent remarks that the proposed immigration curbs could hurt economic engagement between the two countries.

Immigration leads to increased Economic Engagement Easson, Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors and of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 13
(Michael, February 9, 2013, The Australian, Skilled migration is the key to a thriving and cohesive economy, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/skilledmigration-is-the-key-to-a-thriving-and-cohesive-economy/story-e6frgd0x-1226573810800, Accessed 7-12-13, RH) Australia's skilled migration program is also a key part of Australia in the Asian Century. In 201112, seven of the top 10 permanent migration source countries were Asian; India became our largest source of permanent migrants for the first time. This immigration trend is deepening our economic engagement with the fastest growing region in the world.

Framework

A2: State Inclusion Bad

Detaching domestic policy from its assumptions foregoes the plight of millions who experience nonstop suffering Jarvis, Associate Professor of IR at the University of British Columbia, 0
[Darryl S. L., International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-129, MM]

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashleys project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the migrs of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no . This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessaryor in some way badis a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, So what? To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this debate toward *a+ bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashleys assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and , in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

Solvency

Open Borders Fail

Opening the border for inclusion only masks other forms of exclusion- making immigrants even more hesitant to cross the border Motomura 07
(Hiroshi, Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, 2007, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States, pg 13) This entire inquiry reflects my hope that national citizenship in the United States can be a viable context for a sense of belonging and for participation in civic, political, social, and economic life that is inclusive and respectful of all individuals. There are certainly other models of belonging, including transnational models that reflect a sense of belonging to more than one nation, and postnational models that think beyond national citizenship entirely. But the apparent inclusiveness of these other approaches to belonging can mask other modes of exclusion. If national citizenship matters less, ties of religion, race, class, and other groupings that are less cosmopolitan or democratic than national citizenship will matter even more than they do already. The result may be a world without national walls but also a world of a thousand petty fortresses, as political philosopher Michael Walzer once put it.10 Making national citizenship into an inclusive vehicle is not easy. It requires a welcome of immigrants crystallized in the idea of Americans in waitingthat has faded from law and policy in the United States. Although this idea has weakened and is in danger of weakening further, it should be restored to prominent influence because it captures this basic truth: a sensible we/they line must reflect the understanding that many of them will become part of us. This understanding was the conceptual engine for integrating generations of immigrantsmostly those from Europe. With much of this understanding gone, we should not be surprised if more recent waves of immigrants, especially immigrants of color, seem more reluctant to cross the we/they line into American society. Recovering the lost story of immigrants as Americans in waiting is thus crucial not only to giving immigrants their due, but also to recovering the vision of our national future that is reflected in the phrase a nation of immigrants that America is made up of immigrants, but still one nation.

Open Borders do not solve for either economic equality, worker oppression or Democratic representation Johnson 2007 Dean of UC Davis School of Law(Kevin R., 2007Opening the Floodgates;
Why America Needs to Rethink Its Borders and Immigration Laws) An open-borders solution is, of course, not the silver bullet that would instantly cure all of the nations woes. Far from it. Inequalities in the modern U.S. capitalist system will persist. The receding of the immigration laws will allow greater labor mobility and free the labor market to operate more efficiently in response to market forces than the current system of immigration controls does. Efficient markets, however, rarely operate without perpetuating or increasing economic inequality. Other tools would be needed to address the endemic problems of economic inequality in American social life. Several proposals in this book, however, are designed to help ameliorate the problems of economic inequality exacerbated by open borders. Wealth redistribution policies that transfer benefits from those economic actors who gain from easy labor mobility to the poorest citizens of the United States constitute one possibility. Those, such as lower-skilled workers, who benefit littleor perhaps lose groundbecause of the

immigration of workers should receive transfer payments or tax reductions funded by taxes paid by the beneficiaries of free labor migration, primarily businesses and employers. In addition, the federal government, which collects the lions share of A Call for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform | 43 tax revenues paid by noncitizens, should provide adequate resources to state and local governments that today provide services, such as emergency services and a public education, to immigrants. To a limited extent, states have aggressivelyat times successfully pressed the federal government on an ad hoc basis for financial assistance to defray the costs of immigration and immigrants. To help cover those costs, resources could be redirected by the federal government to states with large immigrant populations. This would reduce the fiscal pressures at the state and local levels, which often fuel resentment and anti-immigration sentiment. Last but not least, the federal government must do much more to ensure that wage and labor protections are enforced for all workers in the United States. Currently, the law completely fails to regulate the secondary labor market, in which immigrants are exploited and lack wage and labor protections. The existence of the unregulated secondary market undercuts the efforts of labor in the primary market, in which employers tend to comply with the law, to improve its treatment by employers. On a related note, open borders as advocated in this book would do nothing to solve the dilemmas of democracy American style. That project, of course, deserves the nations attention. As the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004 show, much work remains to be done in the United States to ensure that all U.S. citizens enjoy a truly democratic election process that does not disenfranchise a large percentage of the greater community. With millions of noncitizen residents barred from voting, the United States already has serious problems with ensuring true democracy for all residents. A similar problem continues to afflict many minority citizens. One possibility to improve the responsiveness of government to immigrants, which is beyond the scope of this book and would surely provoke controversy, might be to extend the franchise to noncitizen residents of the United States.86 The United States finds itself at a historical crossroads. Immigration is on the front pages of newspapers across the country. Restrictionist messages fill talk show radio and the national news. Immigration deserves the nations attention. But it warrants sober analysis, not sound bites designed to rile base instincts and insult and alienate members of the national community. A real effort must be made to address the most fundamental problem with U.S. immigration law: that our laws are dramatically out of synch with the social, economic, and political reality of immigration in the modern world.

Borders GoodLiberty
Borders create competition between governments that is key to maintaining individual liberty

Morriss 2004 [Andrew, Chairholder in Law and Professor of Business at the University of Alabama, Borders and Liberty, Foundation for Economic Education, The Freedman, Vol 54 No 7, http://www.fee.org/publications/thefreeman/article.asp?aid=4646]
Borders play a critical role in our lives. Some of the borders that matter to us are ones we establish ourselves: this is my house and property; that is your house and property. By choosing what is mine and using the legal system to mark it off from what is yours, I create a border. While not quite as invulnerable as suggested by the maxim A mans home is his castle, my property gives me a firm border against you. Borders come from property rights and are essential to a free society. At the macro level we have political bordersunrelated to property rights, more permeable than personal-level borders, but just as important to ensuring liberty. When I drive from my home to my office, I cross the borders of multiple political subdivisions of the state of Ohio, moving from Columbia Township to Cleveland, from Lorain County to Cuyahoga County. Those borders are invisible but important. Cleveland confiscates 2 percent of my salary because my work lies within its borders (Ohio cities can levy local income taxes). Columbia Township taxes my home. Columbia does not tax my income, and so income I earn at home is worth 2 percent more to me than wages at work. Cleveland cannot tax my home, freeing me from the concern that people I cannot vote for could tax property as well as income. (Of course I also worry about people I can vote for taxing my income and assets, but at least there is a theoretical possibility of throwing the rascals out when I vote.) These borders are all permeable: I do not need to show identification to pass across any of them and do not need to justify my purpose in moving among the various cities and towns along my drive to and from work. Other macro-level borders are less permeable. When I walk across the U.S.Mexican border near my parents home in Yuma, Arizona, in one direction I must satisfy Mexican authorities that my purpose is legitimate. In the other, I must satisfy U.S. authorities that my return is legitimate. In both directions, people with guns are standing by, ready to keep me out should I fail to satisfy them about the legitimacy of my purpose. Only the Americans with guns seem worried about who is entering the United States. They look at my identification, ask what I was doing in Mexico, and, sometimes, have dogs sniff my vehicle and belongings. In many respects, these macro-level borders are wonderful things. Lorain and Cuyahoga counties in Ohio must compete for my familys residence. Choosing to live where we do is related to the taxes charged by the communities where we might have lived. Investors make similar choices. The choices by families about where to live and invest their money influence communities public policies. Choosing bad policies produces an exodus; choosing good policies leads to immigration of both capital and people. For example, Cleveland is trying to reverse its postWorld War II decline in population by offering to exempt new construction from real-estate taxes for 15 years. Such competition isnt perfect, of course, and only operates on the margin. Desirable locations such as New York City will be able to impose higher taxes than less-desirable locations such as Cleveland. Nonetheless, the competition offered on local taxation policy and other regulatory issues is important in restraining governments from infringing liberty . Macro borders with competition enhance liberty. At the state and local level the only way politicians can prevent such competition is by eliminating borders. In Cleveland, regional leaders are pushing consolidation of local governments into one big entity as the solution to the exodus of

population and investment to lower-tax jurisdictions. Fortunately, politicians self-interest also cuts against consolidation since it would mean fewer positions for them.

The Mexican border is specifically key to individual liberty Morriss 2004 [Andrew, Chairholder in Law and Professor of Business at the University of Alabama, Borders and Liberty, Foundation for Economic Education, The Freedman, Vol 54 No 7, http://www.fee.org/publications/thefreeman/article.asp?aid=4646]
National borders are also important sources of liberty. The Mexican border, for example, offers a choice between a drug-regulatory regime that requires a doctors prescription for most pharmaceuticals and one that does not. The streams of visitors to towns such as Algodones, Baja California, are not merely seeking lower prices. Some are seeking medicines unapproved in the United States; others are looking for medications for which they have no U.S. prescription, whether for recreational (such as Viagra) or medical (antibiotics) use. Mexico does not offer the pro-plaintiff tort doctrines of U.S. product-liability law, has lower barriers to entry for pharmacists, and a wide-open market for pharmaceuticals that includes openly advertised price competition. U.S. residents near the Mexican border thus have a choice of regulatory regimes for their medicine that those of us who live farther away do not. Border-region residents can buy medicines either with the U.S. bundle of qualities, restrictions, and rights, or the Mexican bundle. From the level of traffic of elderly visitors Ive seen at the border crossing, it appears the Mexican bundle is more attractive for many. Borders are thus friends of liberty in two important ways. First, without borders we would not have the competition among jurisdictions that restricts attempts to abridge liberty. The impact of borders goes beyond those who live near them. Pharmacists try to prevent the free sale of prescription drugs, but they would be much more successful if Mexico did not offer an alternative for at least some consumers. It is the margin that matters, and so free availability of pharmaceuticals in Mexico benefits even those of us who live in Ohio. Jurisdictions thus compete to attract people and capital. This competition motivates governments to act to preserve liberty. Famously, for example, states compete for corporations, with Delaware the current market leader. Delaware corporate law offers companies the combination of a mostly voluntary set of default rules and an expert decision-making body (the Court of Chancery). As a result, many corporations, large and small, choose to incorporate in Delaware, making it their legal residence. (Their actual headquarters need not be physically located there.) Corporations get a body of libertyenhancing rules; Delaware gets tax revenue and employment in the corporate services and legal fields. That states position is no accident. At the beginning of the twentieth century, New Jersey was the market leader in corporate law. When New Jerseys legislature made ill-advised changes to its corporations statute that reduced shareholder value, Delaware seized the opportunity and offered essentially the older version of New Jerseys law. Within a few years, the vast majority of New Jersey corporations became Delaware corporations. The second way that borders further liberty is that they allow diversity in law and other community norms, letting each individual find the setting that most resembles the type of society he or she desires. Everyone in Ohio need not agree on how to organize town activities: I can live in a township with few taxes and few services, and my more left-wing colleagues at the university who prefer a more interventionist society can live in Cleveland Heights, a suburb with an aggressive central-planning mentality and high taxes.

Borders GoodIdentity
Turn rejection of fences-as-borders is unethical separation of communities is a necessary precondition for human identity Williams, professor of IR at the University of Durham, 3
[John, 7-1-3, Geopolitics, Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good Fences Still Make Good Neighbours?, p. 37-40, Academic Search Complete, MM] Defending the Ethics of Territorial Borders- The foregoing discussion leads us to two issues to discuss in relation to developing a partial and limited defence of the ethics of territorial borders. The ontological strength of territorial borders leads to questions about the ethical component of the depth of practice that supports this. Here, the article wishes to point to evidence that borders of some sort, including territorial borders, are deeply rooted in ethics. The second ethical issue that arises relates to the defence of a neo-classical constructivist mode of enquiry into international relations. This is an ethically consequentialist account that looks at the desirable elements of practice that flow from the more fundamental ethical role of borders. Turning to the first of these tasks, it is implausible to assert that institutions as enduring as territorial borders-as-fences inextricably linked to the sovereign state have endured for so long and are so entrenched unless borders are in some way representative of a need for division in human ethical life. There is evidence in both the material already surveyed and from elsewhere in normative and ethical accounts of division, distinction and differentiation to support the idea that the ontological strength of territorial borders in international relations can be connected to a deep-rooted need for division in human ethical life. In relation to the material at the heart of this paper, territorial borders are synonymous with division. 'Boundaries, by definition, constitute lines of separation or contact.... The point of contact or separation usually creates an "us" and an "Other" identity.' 62 In their idealised essentialism they divide tones of sovereign control: they divide inside from outside: they divide foreign from domestic: they divide our identities as citizens; they divide national communities: they divide those to whom we owe primary allegiance from those who come second (if anywhere) in moral calculation: they divide us from them. The endurance of borders and boundaries in human society, whether they be territorial borders or otherwise, implies that borders and the need to create an 'us' and an 'other' are very powerfully entrenched in human relations and our ability to identify and understand ourselves. The critique of reified sovereign territoriality in political geography does not lead to the abandonment of territorial borders. Instead they are reinterpreted as features of hegemony, for Agnew and Corbridge, of power for Tuathail and of identity for Newman, requiring the re-territorialisation, rather than the de-territorialisation, of social life under conditions of globalisation. The anthropological work of Dorman and Wilson points to the need for boundary distinctions between social groups and the vital role that these play in the maintenance and development of identity ." Frances Harbour's survey of universal ethical propositions, also drawing on anthropological work, suggests a necessary division in human ethical life. By extension, the power-riddled, historically conditioned, accident prone and even arbitrary, careless or plain misguided creation of territorial borders does have deep roots. Borders, including territorial borders, may be inescapable in international politics not just for reasons of power, but for reasons of right, too. Recalling

Hutching's injunction not to separate these into essentially incommensurable categories of thought we can argue that the weight of evidence about the ubiquity of borders points to their being a necessary part of human life, and a basic category of ethical thought about that life. Philosophical weight can also be brought to bear in defence of a view of borders and boundaries as being pan of the human condition through the work of Hannah Arendt. She famously argued that 'we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who lived, lives or will live..." The unique, distinctive individual finds their self-understanding through interaction with fellow human beings with whom they share community and in spaces where they can meet as equals. This equality importantly includes an equality of community membership granting them a set of shared ideas, experiences and values, rather than some sort of de-contextualised equality such as that experienced behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance." Arendt's account emphasises the requirement for communities to retain their distinctiveness from one another , including through the use of borders and boundaries. [Human] dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.' In simple terms, borders can be seen as either being prior to and creative of difference, or that difference is prior to and creative of borders. This stark juxtaposition of opposites is resolved in favour of the latter option by the arguments that borders are social phenomena and that the human condition is characterised by an essential diversity of human beings and the necessary relationship between distinctive individuals and their communities. The durability and depth of sedimentation of territorial borders as fences suggest that division, and division on a territorial basis, speaks to a deep-seated need of human identity and also in human ethics. We need to have reasons for granting a privileged position to some that is not available to others, perhaps in the form of recognising rights and duties of special beneficence, and accepting that proximity, both geographical and emotional, and location upon one side of the line on the map or the other, does make a difference.' Territorial division in the form of states is an important, but certainly not the only, aspect of this. The endurance of the territorial border-as-fence as the primary mechanism for division in international politics cannot , though, be treated as prima facie ethically irrelevant or straightforwardly contingent. However, its position as a social phenomenon also means that the creation and re-creation of the border-as-fence has to be held up to constant ethical questioning and critique. The arguments of tradition, culture and precedent as to who is to count and who is not, who is to be a citizen and who is not, what the role of territory ought to be and how it should be delimited cannot be taken for granted." As the normative theorists insist, a part of ethical analysis and enquiry is to constantly question dominant ethical arguments. This may be crucial in exploring the current location of territorial borders and the enunciation of the role that they play, but such a critique may not be able to land an ethical knock-out blow upon a feature of human ethical thought and life that seems to be highly durable. Location and role may change, but that borders will have locations and play roles, and that these should he critically explored, may be a fixture. A cosmopolitan international ethic thus needs to engage with the desirability of division as well as to promote inclusiveness. There is a need for cosmopolitan ethics to go further than identifying the consequences of territorial borders that are the frequent target of normative critique. Repression, religious intolerance, discrimination, ethnic cleansing and so on have become inextricably associated with the territorial state. The consequences of the

existence of territorial borders can indeed be extreme and morally repugnant. However, whether such effects are an inevitable and essential result of the existence of territorial borders seems far less certain . We may argue that the role of territorial borders to divide in international politics is potentially ethically justifiable. Such justification needs to be rooted in elements of existing practice and values that are generally regarded as legitimate and serving important purposes in shaping the way the world ought to be. If we accept the view of normative theory outlined earlier then we can see that the social creation and recreation of ethics includes, via mechanisms like territorial borders, a view of division and distinction that is ethically valued. An appreciation of the constructed and dynamic nature of territorial borders holds out the prospect of being able to detach these aspects from the more violent practices that have also accumulated around territorial borders. This, of course, is easier said than done.

Diversity threatens the survival of the national American identity Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) But the most important factor driving the rise of these groups is that, although the United States has always been a multiracial country, many whites view it as having been created by and for Christian whites. Beginning in 1965, when racial immigration quotas were abolished, large numbers of immigrantsparticularly Latinosentered the country at the same time that birth rates for native-born whites were falling precipitously. As darker skinned immigrants arrived in places that had only rarely seen such newcomers, many whites reacted with fear and anger. This has been greatly exacerbated by the U.S. Census Bureau's prediction that whites will lose their absolute majority in the United States in 2042; the news in 2000 that California had lost its white majority had already fueled these fears. As other states follow suit in coming years, more whites may well resort to extremism. For white supremacists, this coming date spells impending doom, a fact that many white supremacist ideologues have harped upon relentlessly. Jared Taylor, editor of the racist American Renaissance magazine, offers what is probably the most cogent critique of mainstream, politically correct viewsa critique that seems to have found great sympathy. Some think that it's virtuous of the United States, after having been founded and built by Europeans, according to European institutions, to reinvent itself or transform itself into a non-white country with a Third World population, Taylor told an interviewer for The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Immigration (Swain, 2002). I think that's a kind of cultural and racial suicideWere all now more or less obliged to say, Oh! Diversity is a wonderful thing for the country, whereas, practically every example of tension, bloodletting, civil unrest around the world is due precisely to the kind of thing were importingdiversity (Swain, 2002). These factors have created a situation ripe for organizers of the radical right. Already, in the wake of Obama's elections, groups ranging from the white nationalist Stormfront to the neo-Confederate League of the South, were claiming to have experienced dramatically increased interest (Scheer, 2008).

A2: Borders Unethical

No ethical barriers to immigration control stabilization for the future is key FAIR, national, nonprofit, public-interest membership organization, 9
[9-9, Federation for American Immigration Reform, The United States Is Already Overpopulated, http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-united-states-is-already-overpopulated, accessed 7-9-13, MM]

The predominant role of immigration in causing U.S. population growth means that Congress can effectively stabilize the population through a change in immigration policy. Unsustainable growth stems from two policy decisions in Washington the increase in immigration quotas to record levels since 1965 and the ineffective enforcement of laws designed to deter illegal immigration. The U.S. accepts far more legal immigrants as a percent of our population than do the nations of Europe. As a result, the U.S. population is booming at about one percent per year, while Western Europe has reached stability. Recognizing that immigration was the dominant contributor to U.S. population growth, President Clintons Council on Sustainable Development acknowledged in 1996 that, reducing current immigration levels is a necessary part of working toward sustainability in the United States . Since then, immigration has reached never before seen levels and the U.S. population has grown by a 42 million. A change in U.S. immigration policy would not mean turning our back on cultural and ethnic diversity, but the number of immigrants coming to the U.S. each year must be reduced in order to achieve population stability. Each year nearly 300,000 people emigrate from the U.S. and become permanent residents in other countries. By bringing immigration and emigration into balance the nation can honor its immigrant heritage while stabilizing its population.37 There is no ethical or practical barrier to population stabilization .38 The only barrier is a lack of political will.

Removing BordersEnergy Consumption

Immigration increases energy consumption 40 years of data proves. Martin, Federation for American Immigration Reform Director of Special Projects, 9
(Jack, June 2009, Immigration, Energy and the Enviornment, page 2-5, http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/energy_enviro.pdf?docID=2941, Accessed 7-9-13, RH) Between 1974 and 2007 total immigrant admissions were 27 million persons. Thus direct legal immigration accounted for 31.5 percent of the U.S. population increase during this period.The share of population growth attributable to immigration is still higher when illegal immigration and the children born to the immigrants after their arrival are included. The close correlation between increased U.S. energy consumption and increased population is further illustrated by the data in Table 3, which presents a breakdown of energy consumption by consuming sector. The table shows that per capita energy consumption in the residential sector remained virtually unchanged over the 19732007 period. Thus the entire 44.7 percent increase in residential energy use was entirely a factor of population growth. By contrast, in the industrial sector energy consumption was virtually unchanged between 1973 and 2007 while per capital consumption actually declined about 30 percent. Several factors were responsible for this decline. In response to the increase in energy prices that commenced in 1974, U.S. industry installed more energy efficient production equipment. Secondly, some historically energyintensive industries such as steel and basic materials have moved offshore. Finally, the decrease in per capita consumption in this sector reflects a basic structural change that has occurred in the U.S. economy. Today, a greater percentage of GDP is derived from service industries such as banking, financial services, medical services, travel services, etc. Most of the energy used in these service industries appears in the commercial energy category in Table 3. Indeed, when per capita energy consumption data in the commercial and industrial sectors are added together, the total has still declined by about 16 percent while total energy consumption in these two sectors increased from 42.2 quads to 50.9 quads (21%). Thus, once again, this 8.7 quad increase may be attributable entirely to population growth. In the transportation sector, there was a 9 quad increase in energy consumption between 1974 and 2007. However, in this sector, there was also a 9.1 percent increase in per capita energy consumption, a fact which likely relates to more cars per capita, increased purchase of less economical vehicles such as sport utility vehicles [SUVs] and Humvees, as well as the extended use of older, less fuel-efficient cars by population segments with limited means. Per capita motor gasoline consumption in the U.S. was little changed between 1974 and 2005, i.e., a seven percent increase despite major improvements in the fuel efficiency of new vehicles.3 However, total gasoline consumption increased over the same period by 53 percent. The driving factor behind gasoline consumption is vehicle-miles, which in turn is driven by population growth. Total vehicle-miles for passenger cars, motorcycles, light trucks and SUVs rose approximately 113 percent between 1974 and 2000. The fact that the growth in vehicles-miles was more than 3 times as fast as the population increase should not be surprising. In the first place, as the population of an urban region grows, the urbanized area increases in size, and the residential areas are almost always on the periphery of the urban region. Therefore commute distances are increased. Secondly, population growth has caused property values near some urban centers to rise dramatically. People with modest incomes who have been priced out of the housing market in these urban

centers have been buying homes in small towns that, in some cases, are located considerable distances from their places of employment. Finally, it should be noted that the fastest growing component of transportation energy has been jet fuel. Between 1974 and 2000, jet fuel consumption increased from 1.60 quads to 3.587 quads and per capita consumption rose from 56 gal. in 1974 to 94 gal. in 2000.6 This increase in per capita consumption was responsible for about 1.5 quads of the 2.0 quad increase in jet fuel consumption between 1974 and 2000. Looking at the total usage, population growth is again indicated as a primary factor in the overall 34.1 percent increase in energy consumption over this same period because overall usage per capita decreased by 6.3 percent.

Biopower Answers

A2: Biopower Bad

Biopower does not make massacres vitala specific form of violent sovereignty is also required. Ojakangas, 05 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium
for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki 2005 (Mika, The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://www.foucaultstudies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf) Admittedly, in the era of biopolitics, as Foucault writes, even massacres have become vital. This is not the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of biopolitics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the reverse of biopolitics, it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as the effect, the result, or the logical consequence of biopolitical rationality. Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the demonic combination of the sovereign power and biopower, of the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (fathers unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura maternal (mothers unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of biopower for which death is the object of taboo. They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.

Biopower does not cause racism or massacresit is only when it is in the context of a violent or racist government that it is dangerous. Ojakangas, 05 - PhD in Social Science and Academy research fellow @ the Helsinki Collegium
for Advanced Studies @ University of Helsinki 2005 (Mika, The Impossible Dialogue on Biopower: Foucault and Agamben, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, http://wltstudies.com/no2/ojakangas1.pdf) It is the logic of racism, according to Foucault, that makes killing acceptable in modern biopolitical societies. This is not to say, however, that biopolitical societies are necessarily more racist than other societies. It is to say that in the era of biopolitics, only racism, because it is a determination immanent to life, can justify the murderous function of the State.89 However, racism can only justify killing killing that does not follow from the logic of biopower but from the logic of the sovereign power. Racism is, in other words, the only way the sovereign power, the right to kill, can be maintained in biopolitical societies: Racism is bound up with workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power.90 Racism is, in other words, a discourse quite compatible91 with biopolitics through which biopower can be most smoothly transformed into the form of sovereign power. Such transformation, however, changes everything. A biopolitical society that wishes to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, even in the name of race, ceases to be a mere biopolitical society, practicing merely biopolitics. It becomes a demonic combination of sovereign power and biopower, exercising sovereign means for biopolitical ends. In its most monstrous form, it becomes the Third Reich. For this reason, I cannot subscribe to Agambens thesis, according to which biopolitics is

absolutized in the Third Reich.93 To be sure, the Third Reich used biopolitical means it was a state in which insurance and reassurance were universal94 and aimed for biopolitical ends in order to improve the living conditions of the German people -- but so did many other nations in the 1930s. What distinguishes the Third Reich from those other nations is the fact that, alongside its biopolitical apparatus, it erected a massive machinery of death. It became a society that unleashed murderous power, or in other words, the old sovereign right to take life throughout the entire social body, as Foucault puts it.95 It is not, therefore, biopolitics that was absolutized in the Third Reich as a matter of fact, biopolitical measures in the Nazi Germany were, although harsh, relatively modest in scale compared to some present day welfare states but rather the sovereign power: This power to kill, which ran through the entire social body of Nazi society, was first manifested when the power to take life, the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State but to a whole series of individuals, to a considerable number of people (such as the SA, the SS, and so on). Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbours, if only because of the practice of informing, which effectively meant doing away with the people next door, or having them done away with.96 The only thing that the Third Reich actually absolutizes is, in other words, the sovereignty of power and therefore, the nakedness of bare life at least if sovereignty is defined in the Agambenian manner: The sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns.97

Biopower is inevitable Wright 08 (Nathan, Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy, Camp as Paradigm:
Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben, 2008 http://ccjournal.cgu.edu/past_issues/nathan_wright.html) TYBG Perhaps the one failure of Foucaults that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to statesanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem. It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucaults failure to solve the problem of state racism and to elaborate a unitary theory of power (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio-politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism.

Biopower is strategically reversibleit can become a tool of resistance and empowerment Campbell, 98 (David, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle,
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 204-205) TYBG The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the bio-power discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government the ongoing agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the strategic reversibility of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the history of government as the conduct of conduct is interwoven with the history of dissenting counterconducts.39 Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of the political has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, the core of what we now call citizenship consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war. In more recent times, constituencies associated with womens, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society. These resistances are evidence that the break with the discursive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of the political has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policys concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity. As Judith Butler concluded: The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.

Democracy Checks
Democracy checks radicalization of biopoliticsempirically proven. Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of CaliforniaDavis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004) pgs. 18-19) TYBG In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault's ideas have "fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state ... and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its 'microphysics.'"48 The "broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus" on "technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science" was the focus of his interest.49 But the "power-producing effects in Foucault's 'microphysical' sense" (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of "an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice" (Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the volkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s. Indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism, mass sterilization, mass "eugenic" abortion and murder of the "defective." Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such poli? cies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

Democracy checks biopolitical coercion and violence.

Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of California-Davis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004), pg 32.) Again, as Peukert pointed out, many advocates of a rights-based welfare structure were open to the idea that "stubborn" cases might be legitimate tar-gets for sterilization; the right to health could easily be redefined as primarily a duty to be healthy, for example. But the difference between a strategy of social management built on the rights of the citizen and a system of racial policy built on the total power of the state is not merely a semantic one; such differences had very profound political implications, and established quite different constraints. The rights-based strategy was actually not very compatible with exclusionary and

coercive policies; it relied too heavily on the cooperation of its targets and of armies of volunteers, it was too embedded in a democratic institutional structure and civil society, it lacked powerful legal and institutional instruments of coercion, and its rhetorical structure was too heavily slanted toward inclusion and tolerance.

Democracy checks biopolitical violence Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of CaliforniaDavis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004) pg. 35) TYBG In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder . Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90

Liberal government solvesbiopower must be combined with a concept of racial sovereignty to cause their impacts Dean 04 (Mitchell, professor of sociology at the University of Newcastle, Four Theses on the
Powers of Life and Death, Contretemps 5, December 2004, http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/5december2004/dean.pdf) TYBG Second Thesis: It is not merely the succession or addition of the modern powers over life to the ancient right of death but their very combination within modern states that is of significance. How these powers are combined accounts for whether they are malign or benign. According to this view, it is not the moment that life became a political object in the eighteenth century that defined the disturbing features of modern states. Rather, the different ways in which bio-politics is combined with sovereign power decide their character. Certain passages from Foucaults lectures and from the History of Sexuality can be interpreted in this way. In a passage from the latter, Foucault shows that the genocidal character of National Socialism did not simply arise from its extension of bio-power.16 Nazism was concerned with the total

administration of the life, of the family, of marriage, procreation, education and with the intensification of disciplinary micro-powers. But it articulated this with another set of features concerned with the oneiric exaltation of a superior blood, of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race. In other words, if we are to understand how the most dramatic forces of life and death were unleashed in the twentieth century, we have to understand how bio-power was articulated with elements of sovereignty and its symbolics. Pace Bauman, it is not simply the development of instrumental rationality in the form of modern bio-power, or a bureaucratic power applied to life that makes the Holocaust possible. It is the system of linkages, re-codings and re-inscriptions of sovereign notions of fatherland, territory, and blood within the new biopolitical discourses of eugenics and racial hygiene that makes the unthinkable thinkable. The fact that all modern states must articulate elements of sovereignty with bio-politics Contretemps 5, December 2004 21 also allows for a virtuous combination. The virtue of liberal and democratic forms of government is that they deploy two instruments to check the unfettered imperatives of bio-power, one drawn from political economy and the other from sovereignty itself.17 Liberalism seeks to review the imperative to govern too much by pointing to the quasinatural processes of the market or of the exchanges of commercial society that are external to government. To govern economically means to govern through economic and other social processes external to government and also to govern in an efficient, cost-effective way. Liberalism also invokes the freedom and rights of a new subjectthe sovereign individual. By governing through freedom and in relation to freedom, advanced liberal democracies are able to differentiate their bio-politics from that of modern totalitarian states and older police states.

Biopower Good
Biopower goodit doesnt create bare life; instead it produces extra-life. Ojakangas 5 (Mika, Doctorate in Social Science, Impossible Dialogue on Biopower, Foucault
Studies) Moreover, life as the object and the subject of biopower given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere is in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms of life, from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political existence of man.43 Instead of bare life, the life of biopower is a plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.44 Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridicoinstitutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of biopower, however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, biopower cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist which also makes understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of biopower. Biopower needs a notion of life that corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of biopower? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault emphasizes, to multiply life,45 to produce extralife.46 Biopower needs, in other words, a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It enables biopower to invest life through and through, to optimize forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern. It could be argued, of course, that instead of bare life (zoe) the form of life (bios) functions as the foundation of biopower. However, there is no room either for a bios in the modern biopolitical order because every bios has always been, as Agamben emphasizes, the result of the exclusion of zoe from the political realm. The modern biopolitical order does not exclude anything not even in the form of inclusive exclusion. As a matter of fact, in the era of biopolitics, life is already a bios that is only its own zoe. It has already moved into the site that Agamben suggests as the remedy of the political pathologies of modernity, that is to say, into the site where politics is freed from every ban and a form of life is wholly exhausted in bare life.48 At the end of Homo Sacer, Agamben gives this life the name formoflife, signifying always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power, understood as potentiality (potenza).49 According to Agamben, there would be no power that could have any hold over mens existence if life were understood as a formoflife. However, it is precisely this life, life as untamed power and potentiality, that biopower invests and optimizes. If biopower multiplies and optimizes life, it does so, above all, by multiplying and optimizing potentialities of life, by fostering and generating formsoflife.50

Turn - Biopolitics are not totalitarian it strengthens democracy and prevents the impacts they describe. And, the type of power present in democracy is wholly distinct from the type of power responsible for their impacts Ross, Berkeley history professor, 2004
(Edward, Central European History, AD:7-8-9March, p. 35-36) PMK In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the disciplinary society and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce health, such a system can and historically does create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a logic or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany. Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of liberty, just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not opposites, in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept power should not be read as a universal staring night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively the same. Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, tactically polyvalent. Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies

(like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate.

Biopolitics creates a better life- benefits outweigh the costs Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of CaliforniaDavis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004)) TYBG It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modernization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.1 And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of or at least discussed in any detail as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all. Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.2 The expansion of infant health programs an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement and any number of others like it really was. There was a reason for the Machbarkeitswahn of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a Wahn (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the inevitable frustration of delusions of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.

Biopolitics creates strong government through citizen benefits- key to democracy and freedom Dickinson 04 (Edward Ross, Associate Professor of History at the University of CaliforniaDavis, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse about "Modernity", in Central European History, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2004)) TYBG Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds.
1 2 See for example Usborne, The Politics and Grossmann, Reforming Sex. MB. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 17501970 (New York, 1975), 130. By 1969 it had fallen to 2.3 percent (132).

Grossmann s birth control movement was but one instance of the explosive growth of the universe of associational life in the field of biopolitics, which itself was only one small part of a much broader development: the self-creation of a new, urban industrial social order, the creation of a self-government of society through myriad nongovernmental organizations. In these organizations, citizens were acting to shape their own lives in ways that were often fundamentally important as part of lived experience of the life world. Of course there was nothing inherently democratic about these organizations or their social functions many were authoritarian in structure, many cultivated a tendentially elitist culture of expertise, and some pursued exclusionary and discriminatory agendas. Nevertheless, they institutionalized pluralism, solicited participation, enforced public debate, and effectively sabotaged simple authoritarian government. Again, National Socialist totalitarianism was in part a response precisely to the failure of political, social, and cultural elites to contain and control this proliferation of voices, interests, and influence groups.3 Private organizations, further, were not the only ones that helped to build habits and structures of participation. The German state deliberately recruited citizens and nongovernmental organizations to help it formulate and implement welfare policy. It had to, for no state could possibly mobilize the resources necessary for such a gigantic task. And of course often the policy initiative came from the other direction from private organizations engaged in elaborating biopolitical discourses of various kinds, and working to mobilize the authority and resources of the state to achieve the ends they defined for themselves. That was an intended consequence of the creation of a democratic republic. As S. N. Eisenstadt wrote in 2000, an important part of the project of modernity was a very strong emphasis on the autonomous participation of members of society in the constitution of the social and political order.4 Again, the massive, state- orchestrated mobilization of the German population in the Nazi period or in the German Democratic Republic (not least in welfare organizations) should remind us that such mobilization is not necessarily democratic in nature; this is a point made amply for the Weimar period too by, for example, Peter Fritzsche.5 But obviously, it could be, and in fact, before 1933 and after 1949 in the Federal Republic of Germany, very often was. One answer might be to argue as Michael Schwartz and Peter Fritzsche have suggested that regimes that arise for reasons having little to do with this aspect of modernity choose their biopolitics to suit their needs and principles. Victoria de Grazia, for example, has suggested that differing class coalitions determine regime forms, and that regime forms determine the shape of biopolitics.6 This is obviously not the approach that has predominated in the literature on Germany, however, which has explored in great depth the positive contribution that modern biopolitics made to the construction of National Socialism. This approach may well exaggerate the importance of biopolitics; but, in purely heuristic terms, it has been extremely fruitful. I want to suggest that it might be equally fruitful to stand it on its head, so to speak. One could easily conclude from this literature that modern biopolitics fits primarily authoritarian, totalitarian, technocratic, or otherwise undemocratic regimes, and that democracy has prevailed in Europe in the teeth of the development of technocratic biopolitics. Again, however, the history of twentieth-century Germany, including the five decades after World War II, suggests that this is a fundamentally implausible idea. A more productive conclusion might be that we need to begin to work out the extent and nature of the positive
3 See Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill, 1985) and Margaret Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton, 2000). There is a good discussion of these issues in Geoff Eley, The Social Construction. 4 Eisenstadt, Multiple, 5. For an even more positive assessment of Western modernity, see Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Public Culture 14 (2002): esp. 92, 99, 103. 5 See Fritzsche, Did Weimar Fail?, 638; also his Germans and Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany (New York, 1990). 6 See Victoria de Grazia, How Fascism Ruled Women (Berkeley, 1992), 3.

contribution biopolitics has made to the construction also of democratic regimes. Why was Europes twentieth century, in addition to being the age of biopolitics and totalitarianism, also the age of biopolitics and democracy? How should we theorize this relationship? I would like to offer five propositions as food for thought. First, again, the concept of the essential legitimacy and social value of individual needs, and hence the imperative of individual rights as the political mechanism for getting them met, has historically been a cornerstone of some strategies of social management. To borrow a phrase from Detlev Peukert, this does not mean that democracy was the absolutely inevitable outcome of the development of biopolitics; but it does mean that it was one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization.7 Second, I would argue that there is also a causal fit between cultures of expertise, or scientism, and democracy. Of course, scientism subverted the real, historical ideological underpinnings of authoritarian polities in Europe in the nineteenth century. It also in a sense replaced them. Democratic citizens have the freedom to ask why; and in a democratic system there is therefore a bias toward pragmatic, objective or naturalized answers since values are often regarded as matters of opinion, with which any citizen has a right to differ. Scientific fact is democracys substitute for revealed truth, expertise its substitute for authority. The age of democracy is the age of professionalization, of technocracy; there is a deeper connection between the two, this is not merely a matter of historical coincidence. Third, the vulnerability of explicitly moral values in democratic societies creates a problem of legitimation. Of course there are moral values that all democratic societies must in some degree uphold (individual autonomy and freedom, human dignity, fairness, the rule of law), and those values are part of their strength. But as peoples states, democratic social and political orders are also implicitly and often explicitly expected to do something positive and tangible to enhance the well-being of their citizens. One of those things, of course, is simply to provide a rising standard of living; and the visible and astonishing success of that project has been crucial to all Western democracies since 1945. Another is the provision of a rising standard of health; and here again, the democratic welfare state has delivered the goods in concrete, measurable, and extraordinary ways. In this sense, it may not be so simpleminded, after all, to insist on considering the fact that modern biopolitics has worked phenomenally well.

Peukert, Genesis, 242,236.

Focus on Biopolitics Kills V2L

The kritik creates a distinction between biological and political life that destroys value to life Fassin, 10 - Social Science Prof at Princeton (Didier, Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach
to the Politics of Life Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Fall, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)//dm Conclusion Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it opens an ethical space for reflection and action. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era. However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention. In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to mere life, but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, [End Page 93] manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression. But let us go one step further: ethnography invites us to reconsider what life is or rather what human beings make of their lives, and reciprocally how their lives permanently question what it is to be human. The blurring between what is human and what is not human shades into the blurring over what is life and what is not life, writes Veena Das. In the tracks of Wittgenstein and Cavell, she underscores that the usual manner in which we think of forms of life not only obscures the mutual absorption of the natural and the social but also emphasizes form at the expense of life.22 It should be the incessant effort of social scientists to return to this inquiry about life in its multiple forms but also in its everyday expression of the human.

Migration DA
Immigration destroys the environment and causes urban sprawl - population stabilization lessens future and proximate causes of environmental destruction Beck, immigration and urban sprawl expert, B.A. in journalism, 6
*Roy, 6, the Social Contract Press, Mass Immigration: Resources and Sprawl, http://www.thesocialcontract.com/booklets/common-sense-mass-immigration/immigrationresources-sprawl.html, accessed 7-10-13, MM] In every traffic-choked, infrastructure-stressed, park-congested, school-overcrowded community of the land, Americans live with the same fear: that their quality of life will forever deteriorate under an inevitable, never-ending population explosion. Woods, brooks, and fields at the edge of town that once helped soothe their souls have been cleared, scraped, paved, and built on. Every ride or hike through countryside near the new urban edges is like a walk through a hospital ward for the terminally ill - the days of these nearby open spaces are numbered. U.S. population grows by 3 million a year. That, according to federal data, is roughly half the cause of the destruction of 2.2 million acres of natural habitat and farmland each year. But the relentless deterioration is not inevitable - government has the power to correct this. With native-born Americans adopting a slightly-below-replacement-level fertility since 1972, the only cause of long-term U.S. population growth is immigration and the high fertility of immigrants. For three decades the federal government has increasingly sabotaged the American people's dreams for environmental quality by snowballing total immigration over traditional numbers by 400-700%. Lest anybody misunderstand, the immigrants themselves are not to blame . Rather, the responsibility for environmental damage rests with the officials who have set and allowed the unprecedented immigration levels. Some supporters of high population growth contend that immigrants can't cause sprawl because they are so poor and huddle in crowded urban tenements. Federal data, however, show that the majority of immigrants live in the suburbs. Many construct housing in the rural strip around the suburbs. Many more buy existing suburban houses from American natives who would not otherwise have the money to construct their houses on the rural edge. The children of immigrants flee the urban core cities at exactly the same rate as the children of natives. For many reasons, massive immigration drives massive destruction of natural habitat . America at the first Earth Day in 1970 was filled with 203 million people and now has grown by 100-plus 90 million. The Census Bureau projects that current immigration policies will drive our population to 420 million by 2050, nearly three times the 1950 number. We can stop that from happening and allow for a decent quality of life for America's future human, animal, and plant inhabitants.

Environment collapse causes extinction Diner 94 (Major David N.; Instructor, Administrative and Civil Law Division, The Judge Advocate
General's School, United States Army) "The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who's Endangering Whom?" 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161l/n)

Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure . The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.

Immigration Causes Environment Collapse

Unmitigated population growth leads to resource exhaustion and accesses every ecological impact reductions are key FAIR, national, nonprofit, public-interest membership organization, 9
[9-9, Federation for American Immigration Reform, The United States Is Already Overpopulated, http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-united-states-is-already-overpopulated, accessed 7-9-13, MM]

The United States is already overpopulated in the sense that we are consuming our national ecological resources at an unsustainable rate. Our growing dependence on foreign energy supplies is a prime example. We now depend on foreign imports for 28.8 percent of our energy consumption: two-thirds of our petroleum products and about one-sixth of our natural gas consumption.1 Because of the abundance of our nation's resources, we have long been careless about our level of consumption, but it is the precipitous rise in the U.S. population over the last four decades that has resulted in our outstripping of our national resources. We are living beyond our means and are doing so increasingly as our population expands. This is a serious problem with major implications for future generations. This imbalance cannot be remedied without curbing both population growth and consumption as well as increasing productivity. We must become more sensitive to the issue of consumption of finite, nonrenewable resources and to the limits of renewable resources. Reining in population growth requires immigration reduction, and that objective should be at the top of the agenda for policy makers because it is the most immediate and the most amenable to change through public policy. In 1972, the Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future recommended population stabilization, concluding: The health of our country does not depend on [population growth], nor does the vitality of business nor the welfare of the average person. The Commissions recommendation was based on the 1970 Census finding that the population had reached more than 203 million residents. Since 1970, the U.S. population has added more than 100 million residents, about a 50 percent growth in fewer than 40 years. As the root cause of land and resource shortages, ecological degradation and urban congestion, sustained and growing overpopulation is jeopardizing the natural inheritance we leave for future generations. The United States has a national environmental policy but no national population policy. As a result, environmental policy decisions are made in a vacuum. By determining the long-term ecological carrying capacity of the United States, Congress would be able to make informed decisions regarding the impact of U.S. population change on achievement of long-term environmental objectives. This report does not attempt to quantify the carrying capacity of the United States; it simply explains how current population growth is damaging the U.S. environment and lowering the average Americans quality of life. A local example of what should be undertaken at the federal level has been launched in Albemarle County, Va. (Charlottesville) where Advocates for a Sustainable Albemarle Population (ASAP) is promoting a population limit for the county. Its focus is to, use smart growth tools to manage development in the short term, but simultaneously insist that local governments identify an optimal sustainable population size to cap growth in the community, and use this right size as a basis for municipal planning decisions.2 An obvious drawback to dealing with overpopulation at the local level is that the possibility for dealing with the issue of immigration

 which ASAP acknowledges accounts for 85 percent of national population growth is very limited.

Turn their call for continual growth is a Ponzi scheme, which necessarily collapses into decreased standards of living for citizens FAIR, national, nonprofit, public-interest membership organization, 9
[9-9, Federation for American Immigration Reform, The United States Is Already Overpopulated, http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-united-states-is-already-overpopulated, accessed 7-9-13, MM]

The argument that population growth is essential for economic growth employs the logic of a Ponzi scheme. It works only if there is endless population growth. Common sense tells us that there are limits to sustainable population growth just as there is a limit to the land area of our country. The U.S. population is now 307 million residents with an annual average growth rate of 0.975 percent.21 Slightly less than one percent per year seems like a small level of growth, but in fact it is a high level of growth for a population as large as ours. As of July 4, 2009 the U.S. was officially 233 years old, so lets project what another 233 years of the current rate of population growth would produce. Todays population (307 million) increased by the current annual growth rate (1.00975) 233 times equals a population of 2,944,205,941 just shy of three billion people and nearly ten times our current population and it would not stop there. We must rethink the assumption that continued population growth is necessary for economic growth . Our economic competitors in Europe and Japan have proved that assumption is false. True increases in per capita wellbeing depend on productivity growth based on technological or organizational innovation, not population growth. At the same time, a growing population reduces the natural resources and land available per person and decreases the nations biodiversity, while increasing pollution, traffic congestion, and sprawl. A few economic elites do benefit from overpopulation by skimming a percentage off the labor of an ever-increasing workforce. But, the population growth Ponzi scheme will fall apart - like all Ponzi schemes because it cannot be indefinitely sustained. The land simply cannot support a continually increasing population and it is already facing the threat of collapse because the country is already in ecological deficit.

Unmitigated chain migration puts the US on a path to destruction accesses resources and quality of life Hull, president of CAPS and PhD in behavioral science, 6
[Diana, 6, Californians for Population Stabilization, Mass Immigration: Illegal vs. Legal Entry and Chain Migration, p. 5, BeePDF, MM+ Mass immigration makes U.S, cities and their surrounding areas unacceptably crowded, canceling the deliberate decision of U.S. citizens to limit their numbers by having fewer children. A nation's people have a right to choose the size of their national family, but allowing three million or more immigrants to settle here every year removes the majority of Americans from the decision-making loop. From 2000 to 2005, 86% of U.S. population growth was the result of immigration and births to immigrants and there will be about 500 million people in the United States by mid-century. Without securing the border and limiting legal immigration to about 200,000 a year, we are on a path to a billion Americans by 2100. Illegal

immigrants are self-selected. We don't know their true identity, whether they are able bodied or sick, schooled in any language or skill, or have a history of crime or violence. Yet once in the interior of the country, they are rarely apprehended and often remain in the U.S. for a lifetime. Their presence lures others from their family and community, so every illegal alien establishes a base camp for others. Yet almost every major city in the U. S. accommodates their presence and police rarely ascertain their immigration status. Between 12 and 20 million illegal aliens live among us. Legal immigrants add another one million people every year. There are many routes to legal residency. Most applicants gain entry under the family reunification provisions of the immigration law. This is known as "chain migration." Chain migration allows relatives to immigrate, not only a spouse, minor children, and parents, but also siblings and adult children who can bring in their spouses who can sponsor their siblings, parents, and relatives, ad infinitum. Together chain immigration and illegal entry have essentially replaced the right of the majority citizen-stakeholders to set national immigration levels . But even more serious is the ratcheting up of our numbers. This propels the exponential population growth curve with steep and dangerous momentum. Inevitably, the nation will become even more seriously over-populated, natural resources will dwindle, and the quality of life will erode. The size, composition, and distribution of the United States population is a national issue of the highest urgency. Our citizens must act, or our country and environment will pay a terrible price.

Econ DA

1NCEcon
Immigration causes unstable population growth, downward pressure on wage levels, and a loss of billions. Stoll 1997 *David, anthropologist and writer, March 1997 In Focus: The Immigration Debate
Volume 2, Number 31, http://www.theodora.com/debate.html, Accessed 7/10/13- JM] Among the factors affecting these different assessments are a rising sense of economic and social insecurity in many U.S. communities, dependence of many economic sectors on immigrant labor (from childcare to agribusiness), an increasingly interconnected global economy characterized by the relatively free flow of capital and trade, and rising crime and drug trafficking in border states. Current immigration policy is failing on numerous accounts. Stricter border controls have proved unable to stem illegal immigration flows, leading instead to rising human rights abuses and victimization of border-crossers. Immigration clearly contributes to a downward pressure on wage levels and to decreased job availability in certain economic sectors. Many refugees fleeing repressive governments and violent political situations find themselves rejected by Washington. Economists tend to agree that immigration is a net benefit to the U.S. economy. Immigrants fill jobs that U.S. citizens often reject, help the U.S. economy maintain competitiveness in the global economy, and stimulate job creation in depressed neighborhoods. But net benefits for the economy can conceal serious losses for vulnerable sectors of the U.S. population. It is no secret that many employers ranging from suburbanites to small contractors to major corporations would rather hire foreigners who often work harder for less pay than U.S. citizens. As such, immigration has long been a contentious labor issue. The infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was, among other things, a reaction to the importation of indentured laborers, who were paid far less than other workers. The immigration debates of the late 19th and early 20th centuries anticipated contemporary alliances between selfinterested capitalists and open-door idealists on the one side, and nativists and protectionists on the other. One consequence of the Great Wave from 1880 to 1924 (with immigration averaging more than a half million annually) was that northern manufacturers relied on imported southern and eastern Europeans rather than hiring southern blacks. Long employed in the agricultural sector, immigrants since the 1970s have become a major presence in other industries that have reorganized to take advantage of cheap labor and undermine union wage scales. A prominent example is the meatpacking industry, which has replaced U.S. workers with Mexicans and Southeast Asians at far lower pay. The chronic oversupply of labor from south of the border has kept farm wages low and obstructed successful labor organizing. The low-wage economy of border towns like El Paso is also partially explained by heavy immigration flows. El Paso, which has grown rapidly in macro terms, is for the most part a low-wage, labor-intensive treadmill with high unemployment, earnings a third lower than the national average, and twice the national poverty rate. Low-skill workers, particularly recent immigrants and blacks, are among the most common casualties of this process. But they are not the only ones. The 1990 expansion slots for high-skill immigrants have contributed to rising levels of unemployment in the U.S. for engineers, computer programmers, and Ph.Ds in technical fields. Immigration also has implications for U.S. population growth, environmental protection, and the demand for new infrastructure. In the 1970s the U.S. population was approaching stability at less than 250 million around the year 2030. Currently, immigration (including new arrivals and their children) accounts for an increase of about 1.5 million more people a year, which represents more than

half of total U.S. population growth. At current levels of immigration, the U.S. population will approach 400 million by the year 2050. If immigration is reduced to half the current level, the U.S. population would still approach 350 million by that year. Given the voracity with which U.S. residents consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources, the accelerated growth of this population is far more troubling than that of third world residents, who consume so much less. Immigration's fiscal costs and contributions are hotly debated. Rice University economist Donald Huddle argues that, in 1994, legal and illegal immigration drained $51 billion more in social welfare and job displacement costs than immigrants paid in taxes. But according to the Urban Institute, immigrants contribute $25-30 billion more in taxes than they receive in services. Clearly immigrants are stressing the social infrastructure in some states. But cutting them off from hospital care, schooling, and assistance creates conditions of destitution that are even more costly to address apart from the ethical issues such action poses.

Economic collapse causes nuclear war Harris and Burrows, PhD European History at Cambridge and NICs Long Range Analysis Unit, 9 (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf, 6-31-13) Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become selfradicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict

and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Immigration Kills Econ

Allowing the border to open will cut economic progress while exponentially increasing growth rate poverty is widespread Ayon 09 (David R., Senior Research Associate at Loyola Marymount University, James A. Baker
III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, March 27, Developing the US-Mexico Border Region for a Prosperous and Secure Relationship: The Impact of Mexican Migration and Border Proximity on Local Communites, accessed 7-12-2013, AR) This very preliminary and partial sketch of the migration-related demographics of border communities already suggest a number of policy concerns that bear on the regions migratory relationship and socioeconomic integration with Mexico. The still-prominent role of agriculture in the
regions economy alone is suggestive of a low-wage, seasonal labor force that is comprised of cross-border migrants and U.S. residents. However, the

great restructuring of migrant labor in the service and sales sectors has not closed the border wage penalty. The 2008 Federal Reserve study found that border migrants earn 16 percent less than migrants in the interior of the United States. In the words of the authors, the border wage penalty appears to be largely related to the nature of border labor supplyapparently in a manner that cuts across economic sectors. It is not only the border crossers who pay the border wage penalty. U.S. communities along the
Mexican border are among the poorest in the country. Indeed, if we exclude San Diego, the per capita income of the other 23 counties in 2003 was below that of all 50 states. To quote the school districts study, Residents of La Frontera tend to be young, immigrant, and poorly educated. As the 2001 Federal Reserve study of Texas border cities put it, High

population growth is the source of the seeming paradox between a booming job market and continued stagnation of income Legal and illegal immigration and a high birth rate make it difficult to raise incomes in these six cities, despite whatat least from a labor market perspective looks like solid economic progress.

Immigrants are not needed they take unemployed US workers jobs Camarota and Jensenius, Director of Research for the Center for Immigration Studies, demographer at the Center for Immigration Studies, 9
(Steven and Karen, Center for Immigration Studies, December 2009, A Huge Pool of Potential Workers: Unemployment, Underemployment, and Non-Work Among Native-Born Americans, page 3 http://www.cis.org/UnemploymentAmongNativeWorkers) RH The fact that unemployment and the U-6 measure look so bad for less-educated and young workers is not proof that immigration has caused this situation. The severity of the current recession clearly is part of the problem. But unemployment, underemployment, and declining rates of labor force participation were a problem for less-educated natives long before this recession began. What we can say from the data is that those types of workers most in competition with immigrants face the most dire labor market situation. This is consistent with the possibility that immigration has harmed their job prospects. The other conclusion that we can draw from this data is that there is no shortage of less-educated workers in the country. If the United States were to enforce immigration laws and encourage illegal immigrants to return to their home countries, we would seem to have an adequate supply of lesseducated natives to replace these workers. Additionally, the United States could alter its immigration policy in response to the recession. The number of natives unsatisfied with their employment status (represented by U-6) raises the question of why new foreign workers are needed. In 2008, an average of 112,000 new foreign workers were authorized each month to work in the

United States. This includes new adult permanent residents (green card holders) and long-term temporary visas for guest workers and others authorized to work. It does not include several hundred thousand illegal immigrants who are already in the country when they change their status and are therefore technically not new arrivals. However, they too could be counted as new work authorizations.

Immigrants are detrimental to the economy they ruin our welfare system and have little to contribute. Malanga, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, 6
(Steven, Summer 2006, How Unskilled Immigrants Hurt Our Economy City

Journal,http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_3_immigrants_economy.html, RH) But the tale of Librado Velasquez helps show why supporters are wrong about todays immigration, as many Americans sense and so much research has demonstrated. America does not have a vast labor shortage that requires waves of low-wage immigrants to alleviate; in fact, unemployment among unskilled workers is highabout 30 percent. Moreover, many of the unskilled, uneducated workers now journeying here labor, like Velasquez, in shrinking industries, where they force out native workers, and many others work in industries where the availability of cheap workers has led businesses to suspend investment in new technologies that would make them less labor-intensive. Yet while these workers add little to our economy, they come at great cost, because they are not economic abstractions but human beings, with their own culture and ideasoften at odds with our own. Increasing numbers of them arrive with little education and none of the skills necessary to succeed in a modern economy. Many may wind up stuck on our lowest economic rungs, where they will rely on something that immigrants of other generations didnt have: a vast U.S. welfare and socialservices apparatus that has enormously amplified the cost of immigration. Just as welfare reform and other policies are helping to shrink Americas underclass by weaning people off such social programs, we are importing a new, foreign-born underclass. As famed free-market economist Milton Friedman puts it: Its just obvious that you cant have free immigration and a welfare state. Immigration can only pay off again for America if we reshape our policy, organizing it around whats good for the economy by welcoming workers we truly need and excluding those who, because they have so little to offer, are likely to cost us more than they contribute, and who will struggle for years to find their place here.

Immigrants compete for jobs and push out US born workers. Malanga, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, 6
(Steven, Summer 2006, How Unskilled Immigrants Hurt Our Economy City

Journal,http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_3_immigrants_economy.html, RH) The flood of immigrants, both legal and illegal, from countries with poor, ill-educated populations, has yielded a mismatch between todays immigrants and the American economy and has left many workers poorly positioned to succeed for the long term. Unlike the immigrants of 100 years ago, whose skills reflected or surpassed those of the native workforce at the time, many of todays arrivals, particularly the more than half who now come from Central and South America, are farmworkers in their home countries who come here with little education or even basic training in blue-collar occupations like carpentry or machinery. (A

century ago, farmworkers made up 35 percent of the U.S. labor force, compared with the under 2 percent who produce a surplus of food today.) Nearly two-thirds of Mexican immigrants, for instance, are high school dropouts, and most wind up doing either unskilled factory work or small-scale construction projects, or they work in service industries, where they compete for entry-level jobs against one another, against the adult children of other immigrants, and against native-born high school dropouts. Of the 15 industries employing the greatest percentage of foreign-born workers, half are low-wage service industries, including gardening, domestic household work, car washes, shoe repair, and janitorial work. To take one stark example: whereas 100 years ago, immigrants were half as likely as native-born workers to be employed in household service, today immigrants account for 27 percent of all domestic workers in the United States. Although open-borders advocates say that these workers are simply taking jobs Americans dont want, studies show that the immigrants drive down wages of native-born workers and squeeze them out of certain industries. Harvard economists George Borjas and Lawrence Katz, for instance, estimate that low-wage immigration cuts the wages for the average native-born high school dropout by some 8 percent, or more than $1,200 a year. Other economists find that the new workers also push down wages significantly for immigrants already here and native-born Hispanics. Consequently, as the waves of immigration continue, the sheer number of those competing for low-skilled service jobs makes economic progress difficult. A study of the impact of immigration on New York Citys restaurant business, for instance, found that 60 percent of immigrant workers do not receive regular raises, while 70 percent had never been promoted. One Mexican dishwasher aptly captured the downward pressure that all these arriving workers put on wages by telling the studys authors about his frustrating search for a 50 -cent raise after working for $6.50 an hour: I visited a few restaurants asking for $7 an hour, but they only offered me $5.50 or $6, he said. I had to beg *for a job+. Similarly, immigration is also pushing some native-born workers out of jobs, as Kenyon College economists showed in the California nail-salon workforce. Over a 16-year period starting in the late 1980s, some 35,600 mostly Vietnamese immigrant women flooded into the industry, a mass migration that equaled the total number of jobs in the industry before the immigrants arrived. Though the new workers created a labor surplus that led to lower prices, new services, and somewhat more demand, the economists estimate that as a result, 10,000 native-born workers either left the industry or never bothered entering it.

Increasing Immigration will simply cause the creation of a new underclass wages will plummet and empirical examples prove. Malanga, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, 6
(Steven, Summer 2006, How Unskilled Immigrants Hurt Our Economy City

Journal,http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_3_immigrants_economy.html, RH) Given these realities, several of the major immigration reforms now under consideration simply dont make economic senseespecially the guest-worker program favored by President Bush and the U.S. Senate. Careful economic research tells us that there is no significant shortfall of workers in essential American industries, desperately needing supplement from a massive guest-worker program. Those few industries now relying on cheap labor must focus more quickly on mechanization where possible. Meanwhile, the cost of paying legal workers

already here a bit more to entice them to do such low-wage work as is needed will have a minimal impact on our economy. The potential woes of a guest-worker program, moreover, far overshadow any economic benefit, given what we know about the long, troubled history of temporary-worker programs in developed countries. They have never stemmed illegal immigration, and the guest workers inevitably become permanent residents, competing with the native-born and forcing down wages. Our last guest-worker program with Mexico, begun during World War II to boost wartime manpower, grew larger in the postwar era, because employers who liked the cheap labor lobbied hard to keep it. By the mid-1950s, the number of guest workers reached seven times the annual limit during the war itself, while illegal immigration doubled, as the availability of cheap labor prompted employers to search for ever more of it rather than invest in mechanization or other productivity gains. The economic and cultural consequences of guest-worker programs have been devastating in Europe, and we risk similar problems. When postWorld War II Germany permitted its manufacturers to import workers from Turkey to man the assembly lines, industrys investment in productivity declined relative to such countries as Japan, which lacked ready access to cheap labor. When Germany finally ended the guest-worker program once it became economically unviable, most of the guest workers stayed on, having attained permanentresident status. Since then, the descendants of these workers have been chronically underemployed and now have a crime rate double that of German youth. France has suffered similar consequences. In the postWorld War II boom, when French unemployment was under 2 percent, the country imported an industrial labor force from its colonies; by the time Frances industrial jobs began evaporating in the 1980s, these guest workers and their children numbered in the millions, and most had made little economic progress. They now inhabit the vast housing projects, or cits, that ring Paris and that have recently been the scene of chronic rioting. Like Germany, France thought it was importing a labor force, but it wound up introducing a new underclass. Importing labor is far more complicated than importing other factors of production, such as commodities, write University of California at Davis prof Philip Martin, an expert on guestworker programs, and Michael Teitelbaum, a former member of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Migration involves human beings, with their own beliefs, politics, cultures, languages, loves, hates, histories, and families.

A2: Immigrants Create Growth

Immigrant labor results in little to no savings disadvantages outweigh costs Malanga, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, 6
(Steven, Summer 2006, How Unskilled Immigrants Hurt Our Economy City

Journal,http://www.city-journal.org/html/16_3_immigrants_economy.html, RH) In many American industries, waves of low-wage workers have also retarded investments that might lead to modernization and efficiency. Farming, which employs a million immigrant laborers in California alone, is the prime case in point. Faced with a labor shortage in the early 1960s, when President Kennedy ended a 22-year-old guest-worker program that allowed 45,000 Mexican farmhands to cross over the border and harvest 2.2 million tons of California tomatoes for processed foods, farmers complained but swiftly automated, adopting a mechanical tomato-picking technology created more than a decade earlier. Today, just 5,000 better-paid workersone-ninth the original workforceharvest 12 million tons of tomatoes using the machines. The savings prompted by low-wage migrants may even be minimal in crops not easily mechanized. Agricultural economists Wallace Huffman and Alan McCunn of Iowa State University have estimated that without illegal workers, the retail cost of fresh produce would increase only about 3 percent in the summer-fall season and less than 2 percent in the winterspring season, because labor represents only a tiny percent of the retail price of produce and because without migrant workers, America would probably import more foreign fruits and vegetables. The question is whether we want to import more produce from abroad, or more workers from abroad to pick our produce, Huffman remarks. For American farmers, the answer has been to keep importing workerswhich has now made the farmers more vulnerable to foreign competition, since even minimum-wage immigrant workers cant compete with produce picked on farms in China, Chile, or Turkey and shipped here cheaply. A flood of low-priced Turkish raisins several years ago produced a glut in the United States that sharply drove down prices and knocked some farms out of business, shrinking total acreage in California devoted to the crop by one-fifth, or some 50,000 acres. The farms that survived are now moving to mechanize swiftly, realizing that no amount of cheap immigrant labor will make them competitive.

Backlash DA

1NCBacklash
Immigration legislation fuels armed, right-wing extremist groups. Miller 09 (Greg, reporter for the Washington Post and former reporter for the LA Times and
winner of the Overseas Press Award, Los Angeles Times, Right-wing extremists seen as a threat, April 16, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/na-rightwingextremists16)
The department routinely issues intelligence warnings to state and local authorities, a role it was assigned in response to criticism that the federal government had failed to do so in the months preceding the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Describing right-wing groups' animosity toward Obama,

the report said extremist organizations were "harnessing this historical election as a recruitment tool." It cited two cases before the election where potential threats against Obama were disrupted by law enforcement. The assessment also listed economic factors -- including increases in real estate foreclosures and unemployment -- as creating a "fertile recruiting environment" for right-wing groups. And it describes evidence compiled by local law enforcement agencies that extremist groups are stockpiling weapons out of concern that Congress and the Obama administration might enact legislation requiring the registration of all firearms. The report also said a push for new immigration legislation that would grant residency or citizenship to people who entered the country illegally could fuel anger among groups fearing competition for jobs.

Preserving nationalism is key to prevent imminent race wars Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) Unlike the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi organizations, the ideology of most nativist extremist groups is not explicitly racist. But there are exceptions. Nine of the groups identified by the SPLC as nativist extremist are also listed as racist hate groups. That is because they disparage all Latinos on a racial basis, regardless of immigration status, or because they plainly endorse white nationalism, sometimes predicting impending race war. While only a few nativist extremist groups deal in such unvarnished white supremacist ideology, most of them are playing a role similar to that of traditional hate groups in the raging national immigration debate: they are interjecting racist conspiracy theories, disseminating false and defamatory statistics about criminal immigrants and the problems they create, blaming and targeting Latino immigrants as individuals, and promoting direct intimidation, mean-spirited harassment and even murder. Their rhetoric is shot through with paranoid conspiracy theories of invasions, and is frequently warlike. An army of illegal aliens, including criminals, drug smugglers, and terrorists, is invading our country, the Indiana Federation for Immigration Reform and Enforcement declared. America is being destroyed by a modern version of Genghis Khan's army, according to the Emigration Party of Nevada, whose leader, Donald Pauly, has called for the Department of Homeland Security to station sniper teams on the border and also suggested that all Mexican women should be forced to undergo sterilization after having their first child (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).

Causes Backlash
Radical anti-immigration groups have soared in number and have been driven by non-white immigration. Potok 10 (Mark, senior fellow of Southern Poverty Law Center and EIC of Intelligence Report, Southern Poverty Law
Centers Intelligence Report, Rage on the Right: The Year in Hate and Extremism, Spring 2010 Issue Number: 137, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/spring/rage-on-the-right) The radical right caught fire last year, as broad-based

populist anger at political, demographic and economic changes in America ignited an explosion of new extremist groups and activism across the nation. Hate groups stayed at record levels almost 1,000 despite the total collapse of the second largest neo-Nazi group in America. Furious anti-immigrant vigilante groups soared by nearly 80%, adding some 136 new groups during 2009. And, most remarkably of all, so-called
"Patriot" groups militias and other organizations that see the federal government as part of a plot to impose one -world government on liberty-loving Americans came roaring back after years out of the limelight. The

anger seething across the American political landscape over racial changes in the population,
soaring public debt and the terrible economy, the bailouts of bankers and other elites, and an array of initiatives by the relatively liberal Obama Administration that are seen as "socialist" or even "fascist" goes beyond the

radical right. The "tea parties" and similar groups that have sprung up in recent months cannot fairly be considered extremist groups, but they are shot through with rich veins of radical ideas, conspiracy theories and racism. We are in the midst of one of the most significant right-wing populist rebellions in United States history, Chip Berlet, a veteran analyst of the American radical right, wrote earlier this year. "We see around us a series of overlapping social and political movements populated by people [who are] angry, resentful, and full of anxiety. They are raging against the machinery of the federal bureaucracy and
liberal government programs and policies including health care, reform of immigration and labor laws, abortion, and gay marriage." Sixty-one percent of Americans believe the country is in decline, according to a recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. Just a quarter think the government can be trusted. And the anti-tax tea party movement is viewed in much more positive terms than either the Democratic or Republican parties, the poll found. The

signs of growing radicalization are everywhere. Armed men have come to Obama speeches bearing signs suggesting that the "tree of liberty" needs to be "watered" with "the blood of tyrants." The Conservative Political Action Conference held this February was co-sponsored by groups like the John Birch Society, which believes President Eisenhower was a Communist agent, and Oath Keepers, a Patriot outfit formed last year that suggests, in thinly veiled language, that the government has secret plans to declare martial law and intern patriotic Americans in concentration camps.
constitutional provision keeping all powers not explicitly given to the federal government with the states. And, at the

Politicians pandering to the antigovernment right in 37 states have introduced "Tenth Amendment Resolutions," based on the

"A Well Regulated Militia" website, a recent discussion of how to build "clandestine safe houses" to stay clear of the federal government included a conversation about how mass murderers like Timothy McVeigh and Olympics bomber Eric Rudolph were supposedly betrayed at such houses. The number of hate groups in America has been going up for years, rising 54% between 2000 and 2008 and driven largely by an angry backlash against non-white immigration and, starting in the last

year of that period, the economic meltdown and the climb to power of an African American president. According to the latest annual count by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), these groups rose again slightly in 2009 from 926 in 2008 to 932 last year despite the demise of a key neo-Nazi group. The American National Socialist Workers Party, which had 35 chapters in 28 states, imploded shortly after the October 2008 arrest of founder Bill White for making threats against his enemies. At the same time, the number of what the SPLC designates as "nativist extremist" groups organizations that go beyond mere advocacy of restrictive immigration policy to actually confront or harass suspected immigrants jumped from 173 groups in 2008 to 309 last year. Virtually all of these vigilante groups have appeared since the spring of 2005.

Endorsing multiculturalism and assimilation of local cultures will result in white backlash and racial violence Beirich and Potok 9

(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) None of the factors discussed here are likely to wane in the coming years. Immigrantslegal or otherwisewill very probably continue to flow into the United States, and whites will eventually lose their majority. Another challenge relates, of course, to economic globalization, particularly the transfer of many industrial jobs abroad and the spread of neo-liberal approaches to economic problems. Globalization has contributed to the loss of some national sovereignty, with its attendant spread of multiculturalism and multiracialism, and pressures on local cultures to assimilate into a kind of Western world culture. A backlash from some whites is to be expected, with its chances enhanced by the election of Barack Obama. These factors are now compounded by the large numbers of Americans who increasingly find they are facing hard economic times. It is not clear precisely how such economic developments will affect the growth of the radical right, although it seems certain that any correlation is not a simple onepeople who lose their jobs do not rush out to join radical groups without further ado. What seems more likely is that difficult economic times, particularly when they affect people not accustomed to seeing their prospects shrinking, give the radical right an opening. It is at such moments that the sometimes convoluted explanations of the world offered by radical ideologues get more of a hearing than they otherwise would have. And to some, the only possible defense against this homogenizing juggernaut is what is seen as the organic nationa nation that is based on race, a community of blood.

Invasion of immigrant workers on domestic workers creates controversy, there will be no harmony Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication) There is some evidence that low-wage immigrant workers in the United States, who immigrate to this country in substantial numbers, have palpable effects on the wage scale of the lowestpaid workers in the United States. Because these immigrants are willing to work for lower wages than are domestic workers, employers may offer to pay less. Unskilled U.S. citizens in urban, high-immigration areas are the most directly affected. One much-cited 2005 study by the Harvard economists George Borjas and Lawrence Katz attributed wage reductions for lowskilled workers to undocumented immigration from Mexico.42 Other empirical studies, however, undermine this claim.43 In fact, growing wage disparities may be attributable to factors other than undocumented immigration, such as globalization and decreasing unionization of workers in the United States.44 Even if the overall effects of immigration on unskilled citizens are relatively small, the impacts on discrete parts of the labor force are tangible and help generate tension between citizens and immigrants.45 Unquestionably, immigration has transformedand continues to transform certain labor markets. Over the past few decades, jobs in the poultry and beef industries in the Midwest and the Southeast and the janitorial industry in Los Angeles have increasingly been filled by immigrants. In some circumstances, jobs that were held predominantly by African Americans have come to be taken for the most part by Latina/o immigrants.46 These shifts have sparked tension and controversy.

Opening the border failscauses backlash Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication) Impediments to a regional arrangement do, of course, exist. The political unpopularity of immigration in the United States is one. Demographic differences are another. Racial, socioeconomic, and cultural differences among the populations of the NAFTA partners arguably exceed those of the original EU members. In addition, the staying power of antiMexican sentiment in the United States should not be underestimated. It has a lengthy history and is enduring. Fear of a mass migration of poor culturally and racially different people will likely generate considerable controversy for the foreseeable future and even greater fears about the national identity than currently exist.

Economic issues and increasing immigration is likely to lead to violence Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) A perfect storm is brewing. An economic meltdown, high rates of non-white immigration, rapid demographic change and now the election of America's first African American president are fueling widespread rage on America's radical right (and, to a lesser extent, in parts of the political mainstream). These developments are likely to lead to growth in the number of hate groups, higher levels of hate-motivated violence, and continuing domestic terrorism, presenting significant challenges for law enforcement professionals in the near future. And if antigovernment sentiment continues to grow in the wake of these political trends, law enforcement officials may well find themselves personally targeted, so a full understanding of these movements, from both the perspective of protecting the public and officer safety, is imperative. Some leaders of the organized radical right, reacting to the campaign and ultimate election of Barack Obama, have openly suggested that more violence is on the way. Thom Robb, an Arkansas Klan leader, described in November 2008 the race war he sees developing between our people, who I see as the rightful owners and leaders of this great country, and their people, the blacks (Robb, 2008). This rage has already resulted in two alleged violent plots, including one in which a pair of neo-Nazi skinheads in Tennessee were arrested just 2 weeks before the 2008 elections. They were accused of planning to murder black school children, shoot and behead other African Americans, and assassinate Obama, then still only a candidate.

Multiculturalism threatens Americans both economically and culturally insecurity results in the formation of hate groups Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1)

A remarkable thing occurred while America's Patriot movement rose and fell. Even as this very public phenomenon captured the attention of law enforcement, citizens and the press alike, hate groupsKlan, neo-Nazi and other organizations whose primary ideology is based on racial or other forms of explicit group hatredrose steadily. White nationalists, now describing themselves as separatists rather than supremacists, offered a racial analysis of the world that won increasing acceptance among extremists. By 2007, the latest figure available, the SPLC was tracking 888 hate groups, the largest number since the organization began monitoring extremism in the early 1980s.2 The number of hate groups has ballooned since 2000, when 602 groups were counted, a rise of more than 45%. It is now the hate movement, which stands to be boosted by the added fuel of the economic malaise and the election of the first black president, which presents the most direct challenge for law enforcement. Worryingly, the movement's increasingly revolutionary nature and extreme antigovernment positionsafter Obama's election, for example, David Duke said in a radio interview, that government is not our governmentmean that certain sectors of the radical right have now adopted the most dangerous aspects of the Patriot movement.3 This was emphasized by the two alleged plots by white supremacists to assassinate Obama that were busted up during the months running up to the November election, one in Denver, CO, and the other by skinheads from Tennessee and Arkansas. Current trends favour further growth in the number of hate groups. These trends [which] include the power of new communications technologies, the use of white power music to recruit youth, the falling proportion of whites in the U.S. population and rising Latino immigration. Hate groups see the government as not merely failing to address these problems, but as actually being secretly run by Jews and other nefarious types who are bent on encouraging these developments. At the same time, sharp economic pressures have borne down on young white workers, the middle class, farmers and workers in heavy industry pressures that are now increasing. Finally, globalization and other rapid social and economic changesaccompanied by the rise of a new, multicultural orthodoxyhave ignited an angry reaction among many who feel that they are losing their identity.

Backlash Causes War

Both physical and psychological hate violence will only escalate Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) Even as anti-immigrant vitriol and propaganda has increased in recent years, hate violence has risen against perceived illegal aliens. Between 2003 and 2007, the latest year for which FBI national hate crime statistics are available, anti-Latino hate crimes rose a total 40%. Those numbers likely understate the problem, because undocumented immigrants, fearing deportation, are highly unlikely to report attacks to the authorities (Potok, 2008a). The SPLC also documented several particularly egregious examples of physical and psychological violence directed at Latinos between 2004 and 2007 (Mock, 2007). The perpetrators ranged from racist skinheads to rogue border patrol agents to otherwise everyday citizens who took it upon themselves to repel an invader, terrorize a criminal alien, or exterminate a cockroach. In one particularly notorious case that occurred in January 2007, four heavily armed men wearing military-style berets and camouflage fatigues ambushed a pickup truck carrying 12 undocumented immigrants in a farm field near Eloy, AZ. The assailants shot and killed the driver and wounded one of the passengers. Survivors described the shooters as three white men and one Latino who spoke little Spanish. The ambush stood out because it lacked any characteristics of typical borderland violence committed by bandits or rival smugglers. No one was robbed in the Eloy ambush, no drugs were found in the truck and no one was kidnapped (rival immigrant smugglers, or coyotes, frequently steal one another's human cargo). Also, the fact that three of the men were white was exceedingly unusual rare for coyotes or border bandits. The incident remains under investigation. Symbolic of the increasingly violent rhetoric coming from nativist extremists, some applauded the attack. For example, Jeff Schwilk, the founder of the San Diego Minutemen, openly celebrated the murders. In America, we call incidents like that cleansing the gene pool, Schwilk declared in an email (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007). Public forums hosted by various nativist extremist groups were rife with support for the killers. I really hope it IS pissed off Americans who are taking justice into their own hands, doing what the Border Patrol and the National Guard ARE NOT ALLOWED to do, a member of the California-based hate group Save Our State wrote on the group's forum in early 2007. Go vigilantes! Where can I send a check? (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).

Backlash Turns Solvency

Protective measures are taken by nativist movements to ensure border security Beirich and Potok 9
(Heidi and Mark, Director of Research and Intelligence project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, USA: Hate Groups, Radical-Right Violence, on the Rise Policing, http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/pap020v1) Many whites have come to see the federal government, along with the nation's business elites, as specifically responsible for the failure to curb non-white immigration. On the radical right, the government often is seen as plotting to destroy the white race. Now, the white supremacist movement has been joined in its anger over America's immigration policy by a new nativist movement that seemingly came out of nowhere in the last few years. Starting with a meeting held in 2001 in Sierra Vista, AZ, which brought together several anti-immigrant hate groups to laud a border rancher known for detaining suspected immigrants at gunpoint, the organized anti-immigrant movement has exploded (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001a). By 2007, the SPLC had identified 144 nativist extremist groups active across 39 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). Most of these organizationsnearly 100 of themhad appeared since April 2006. The groups identified as nativist extremist target people, rather than policy. That is, they do not limit themselves to advocating, even in forceful terms, for stricter border security, tighter population control, or tougher enforcement of laws against hiring illegal immigrants. Instead, they go after the immigrants themselves, using tactics including armed vigilante border patrols; conspicuous surveillance of apartments and houses occupied by Mexicans and Central Americans; publicizing photos and home addresses of suspected illegal aliens and harassment and intimidation of Latino immigrants at day-labour sites and migrant-worker camps. Because their tactics frequently cross the line into illegal harassment and even violence, these groups sometimes represent another challenge for law enforcement. Though most heavily concentrated in Arizona, California and Texas, nativist extremist groups are active in all regions of the United States. Many of the groups in non-border states are local chapters of either the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps or the Minuteman Project, which comprised 57 of the 144 nativist extremist groups listed by the SPLC. These separate, competing nationwide organizations both emerged from the original month-long Minuteman civilian border patrol operation held in Cochise County, AZ, in April 2005. Minuteman chapters raise money for their parent organizations and muster volunteers for vigilante border actions. Many also hold protest actions or conduct surveillance ops at day-labor sites in their home cities. In states where it's allowed by law, their members openly carry firearms. The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and Minuteman Project have also spawned a slew of imitators and splinter groups that have no official affiliation with either national Minuteman organization. These rogue outfits include the Antelope Valley Minutemen, whose leader, Frank Jorge, has written on his website: We have a right, and an obligation, to defend our country, our homes, and our families not only from this invasion, but also from the very Government that is precipitating this treasonous act (Buchanan and Holthouse, 2007).

No Solvencytearing down the border would cause anti-immigration groups to just recreate borders ADL 2006 (May 23, Anti-Defamation League Extremists Declare 'Open Season' on Immigrants: Hispanics Target of Incitement and Violence, http://www.adl.org/main_Extremism/immigration_extremists.htm?Multi_pag e_sections=sHeading_1)
Anti-immigration border vigilante groups have also organized anti-immigrant events around the country this spring. The largest border vigilante group, the Minuteman Project, held a reprise in April of their 2005 vigilante border patrols along the Arizona- Mexico border, and followed up with a caravan that staged anti-immigration events across the country. One Minuteman event in Birmingham, Alabama, was organized by Mike Vanderboegh, a former militia leader. At the rally, an attendee distributed copies of Olaf Childress's racist and antiSemitic newspaper, First Freedom. Other anti-immigration groups held rallies from Arizona to Minnesota. Anti-immigration groups have also turned to publicity stunts. The Minutemen, for example, declared on May 9 that they would start building their own "border security fence" on private property along the border with Mexico, unless the federal government itself deployed the military or erected such fencing. The Minutemen claimed that they had received nearly $200,000 in donations to build such a fence. Other border vigilante groups have already begun or announced similar projects.

Anti Immigration Groups Rising

Right-wing, anti-immigration groups are risinglaundry list.
Miller 09 (Greg, reporter for the Washington Post and former reporter for the LA Times and winner of the Overseas Press
Award, Los Angeles Times, Right-wing extremists seen as a threat, April 16, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/16/nation/na-rightwing-extremists16)

The economic downturn and the election of the nation's first black president are contributing to a resurgence of right-wing extremist groups, which had been on the wane since

the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, according to a U.S. intelligence assessment distributed to state and local authorities last week. The report, produced by the Department of Homeland Security, has triggered a backlash among conservatives because it also raised the specter that disgruntled veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan might "boost the capabilities of extremists . . . to carry out violence." The assessment noted that domestic security officials had seen no evidence that such groups were planning attacks in the U.S. But it is the first high-level U.S. intelligence report to call attention to an array of recent domestic developments as potential harbingers of terrorist violence. Among

other factors cited in the report were increased prospects for gun control and immigration legislation under President Obama, as well as resentment over the rising economic influence of countries such as China, India and Russia. But the assessment focuses most of its attention on
animosity toward Obama and anxiety over the recession. "The economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for right-wing radicalization and recruitment," the report warns in the first of a series of findings. Overall, the

"similarities to the 1990s, when right-wing extremism experienced a resurgence fueled largely by an economic recession, criticism about the outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers." The unclassified report was not released publicly but was distributed among law enforcement agencies across the country before it surfaced online this week.

document describes an economic and political climate that has

Terrorism DA

1NCTerrorism
Allowing our borders to be opened will lead to loss of all American freedoms and nuclear terrorism Schlafly 1 (Phyllis, J.D., Oct, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, The Threat of Terrorism Is From Illegal
Aliens, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/oct01/psroct01.shtml) TYBG At the same time, Americans have some soul-searching to do about our security. Why were our FBI and CIA caught so completely by surprise? Why have they been spending their resources chasing after a few people who were no harm to society, such as one loner on a mountaintop at Ruby Ridge and a pathetic religious group in Waco, while the plotting foreign terrorists crossed our borders and lived in our country illegally, took their flight training in Florida, and repeatedly boarded our planes? The terrorists are foreigners, most or all of whom should not have been allowed to live in our country. As FBI Director Robert Mueller admitted, at least some of the hijackers were "out of status," i.e., they had no proper immigration documents. It should be repeated over and over again: The terrorism threat is from illegal aliens who are allowed to live in our midst -- and this is a failure of our immigration laws and our immigration officials. The criminals who were convicted of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, of the murders in front of the CIA headquarters in 1993, and who were involved in a 1998 plot to bomb New York's subway system were Middle East aliens who should not have been in the United States. They were either granted a visa that should never have been issued or had overstayed a visa and should have been expelled. The 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen were all carried out by radical Middle East groups. Since easy access into the United States has been repeatedly exploited by aliens bent on terrorism, it should have been no surprise that it was used by the World Trade Center/Pentagon hijackers. The policy of opening our borders to anyone who wants to sneak into our country illegally -- or to remain illegally after entering legally -- must be exposed and terminated. This is the most important security precaution our government must take. The flood of illegal aliens coming across our southern border from Mexico is well known. The opportunity for illegals to come across our vast northern border is not as well known, but offers easy opportunities for illegals bent on criminal acts. Canada has a no-questions-asked immigration policy, and many border crossings between the United States and Canada are unmanned. The third wide-open door for illegals is the issuing of visas by 3,700 U.S. consular officers around the world. Our State Department has a laissez faire policy on issuing visas and approves 80% of the 8 million visa applications every year. The State Department manual used by consular officials states that "mere membership" in a recognized terrorist group, or even "advocacy of terrorism," does not automatically disqualify a person from entering the United States. Congress passed a law ordering the immigration service to track foreign visitors and students and match their entry into this country with the expiration date of their visas. Congress also ordered the immigration service to create a database of foreign students that would be accessible to law enforcement. These requirements are not due to go into effect until 2003! Visa visitors -- whether tourist, student or worker -- should be tracked on a federal database that flags the names when their exit dates come around. It is inexcusable that visa applicants aren't screened more carefully, and that aliens aren't expelled when their visa expires. Immigration officials don't even know how many people are in the

United States on visas or how many are so-called "overstays," but it's clearly a substantial factor in illegal immigration. Many new airport security measures are now making airline travel longer and more difficult. The question should be asked how any of these measures, if they had been in place, would have prevented the 9/11 hijackings. We want security measures that will put criminals at risk, not harass law-abiding citizens. The chance of U.S. citizens hijacking a plane on a suicide mission is infinitely smaller than the chance of foreign enemies doing the same. Why are all passengers interrogated about their luggage rather than about their citizenship? It's time to rethink the rule that an airplane be a gun-free zone. If the foreign masterminds behind this attack had thought that the crew or passengers were armed, they might not have invested so much in this type of terrorism. The courageous actions of passengers against the hijackers on the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania apparently prevented the plane from reaching its target where many more people would have been killed. Self-help is essential in an emergency when no law enforcement officials are available. While we worry about hijacked planes today, we may soon worry about hijacked foreign missile silos. Terrorists who would commit the unspeakable crimes of 9/11 would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons.

Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war draws in Russia and China Ayson 2010(Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic
Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, July, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld) A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible

to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

Open Borders Causes Nuclear Terrorism

Opening the US Borders increases Terrorism Murdock, Fellow at Stanford Universitys Hoover Institution on War, 2013 (
Deroy, 6/1/13 The Union Leader, U.S. Mexican border welcomes terrorists, http://www.unionleader.com/article/20130502/OPINION02/130509896 , 7/12/13, TZ) There are at least 7,518 reasons to get the U.S.-Mexican border under control. That equals the number of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations that federal officials label "state sponsors of terrorism" plus 10 "countries of interest." Since January 2010, those flying into the United States via these 14 nations face enhanced screening. As the Transportation Security Administration announced at the time: "Effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders." U.S. national security merits at least that much vigilance on our borders. The roaring immigration-reform debate largely addresses Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the thousands who break into the United States from countries "where we have concerns, particularly about al-Qaida affiliates," a top State Department official told CNN. These include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese and Syrians, whose governments are federally designated "state sponsors of terrorism." As Customs and Border Protection's "2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics" reports, 198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating the USA. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2011, such arrests totaled 1,207. (These figures cover all U.S. borders, although 96.3 percent of detainees crossed from Mexico.) Like other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better lives here. But some may be vectors for the same militant Islam that tore Sudan in two - literally. In FY 2011, 108 Syrians were stopped; over the previous 10 years, 1,353 were. Syria supports Hezbollah, and Bashar alAssad's unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic opponents with chemical weapons. Among Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were captured over the previous 10 years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates "The Great Satan" - its name for the United States - and craves atomic weapons. The other 10 "countries of interest" are Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and: . Afghanistan, the Taliban's stronghold and current theater of America's longest war. (Afghans halted in FY 2011: 106; prior 10 years: 681.) . Nigeria. The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab suffers under Sharia law in its northern provinces. (Respective data: 591 and 4,525.) . Pakistan, hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden (525 and 10,682). . Saudi Arabia, generous benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace of 15 of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers (123 and 986). . Somalia. Home of Indian Ocean pirates and al-Qaida's al-Shabaab franchise. In October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers and dragged several of their bodies through Mogadishu's streets (323 and 1,524). The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight last November published "A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border." This study offers chilling portraits of some who consider the southern border America's welcome mat. . On Jan. 11, 2011, U.S. agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Jaziri traveled from his native Tunisia to Tijuana, he said, and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him across the border. France previously convicted and deported him for assaulting a Muslim whom he considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet Mohammed. . Somalia's Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he earned

up to $75,000 per day smuggling East Africans into America. His clients included three alShabaab terrorists. As the House paper states: "Dhakane cautioned that each of these individuals is ready to die for their cause. ..." . On June 4, 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America. Tracy told federal investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya to transfer 272 Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then trespassed into the USA. Tracy claims he refused to assist alShabaab. But officials discovered an email in which he casually wrote: "...i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH..." Remember: These anecdotes and statistics involve individuals whom authorities intercepted. No details exist about aliens who successfully infiltrated America.

Allowing illegal aliens in our country makes the U.S. a police state and risks a second 9/11 Schlafly 1 (Phyllis, J.D., Oct, The Phyllis Schlafly Report, The Threat of Terrorism Is From Illegal
Aliens, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/2001/oct01/psroct01.shtml) TYBG It's important for Americans to understand that the 9/11 hijackings are a problem of the U.S. government allowing illegal aliens to roam freely in our country and of promiscuously issuing visas without proper certifications. It's also a problem of our government failing to enforce current immigration and visa laws, and failing to deport illegal aliens including those who overstay their visas. At least 16 of the 19 hijackers fit in one or more of these categories. For more than two weeks prior to 9/11, the FBI had been trying to find one of the hijackers whom the CIA had spotted meeting with a suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole. But all the FBI had to go on was his visa application, which listed his address as "Marriott, New York City" (where there are ten Marriott hotels and he never went to any of them). The U.S. law that requires an alien's border crossing document to include a machine-readable biometric identifier (such as a fingerprint or handprint), and requires that the identifier match the appropriate biometric characteristic of the alien, has never gone into effect. We are not going to tolerate a system that treats U.S. citizens and aliens the same. All aliens are not terrorists, but nearly all terrorists are aliens. We do not want to live in a police state, where every American is treated like a terrorist, drug trafficker, money launderer, illegal alien, or common criminal. Larry Ellison, the head of Oracle Corp., the leading database software company, has offered to donate the tools for creating machine-readable ID cards that contain digitized thumbprints and photographs. Ellison's proposal would open up vast new markets for Oracle to promote privacyinvading database software, at the expense of law-abiding citizens. We should have a computerized database of all aliens entering the United States, whether they are tourists, students, or workers, and a tracking system that flags the file when a visa time expires. Aliens should be required to carry smart ID cards that contain biometric identifiers, the terms of their visas, and a record of their border crossings and travels within our country, similar to the rubber stamps used in all passports. Airports should be equipped with the machines to swipe the smart card every time an alien boards a plane. Dumb questions like "Has your luggage been under your control since you packed it?" should be replaced with useful questions like "Are you a U.S. citizen?". The National Commission on Terrorism reported last year: "The United States is, de facto, a country of open borders." It will do a lot more for the safety of Americans to close those open borders than imposing oppressive regulations on the travel of law-abiding citizens. We should expel all illegal aliens, especially from the Middle East, and place a moratorium on legal immigration and the issuing of visas, until the terrorism threat is resolved.

Immigration from mexico would cause terrorism, criminal activity, human trafficking, and increased gang violence Taylor 10 (Dr. Jameson, policy researcher at Mississippi Center for public policy, Illegal
Immigration: Drugs, Gangs and Crime http://www.jwpcivitasinstitute.org/media/publicationarchive/perspective/illegal-immigration-drugs-gangs-and-crime) TYBG Paramilitary groups trading fire with U.S. agents. Kidnappings and murders of U.S. citizens. Members of al-Qaida, Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations infiltrating the border on a routine basis. We are not talking about Iraq but Texas. One of the clearest indicators the United States has lost control of its southwest border is the ease with which thousands of tons of drugs and millions of illegal aliens are crossing the U.S. border on an annual basis. This open borders policy has opened the door to more than just cheap labor. The presence of millions of undocumented persons in our country has provided a perfect cover for various forms of criminal activity, ranging from drug trafficking to prostitution to identity theft. Federal investigators believe that as much as 2.2 million kilograms of cocaine and 11.6 kilograms of marijuana were smuggled into the United States via the Mexican border in 2005.1 With the decline of the Medellin and Cali cartels of Columbia, two Mexican drug cartels the Sinaloa cartel and the Gulf cartel are battling over the billion-dollar drug trade between Mexico and the United States. These cartels also have ties to U.S. gangs that serve as distribution networks in the interior United States. A 2006 study by the House Committee on Homeland Security warns that the Mexican cartels have essentially wrested control of the border from both the U.S. and Mexican governments: The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reports that the Mexican drug syndicates operating today along our Nations Southwest border are far more sophisticated and dangerous than any of the other organized criminal groups in Americas law enforcement history. Indeed, these powerful drug cartels, and the human smuggling networks and gangs they leverage, have immense control over the routes into the United States and continue to pose formidable challenges to our efforts to secure the Southwest border. The cartels operate along the border with military grade weapons, technology and intelligence and their own respective paramilitary enforcers. This new breed of cartel is not only more violent, powerful and well financed, it is also deeply engaged in intelligence collection on both sides of the border.2 Here in North Carolina, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reports a significant increase in drug-trafficking activity. Explains the DEA: The majority of the increased drug-trafficking activity is due to an unprecedented influx of foreign nationals into the state in particular Spanish-speaking, specifically Mexican, nationals. A 2003 report by the National Drug Intelligence Center corroborates the DEAs findings: Mexican criminal groups in southwestern states and Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico routinely use Mexican illegal immigrants in North Carolina as couriers to transport cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine and, to a lesser extent, heroin into and through the state. These criminal groups exploit a growing Mexican population in North Carolina to facilitate their illicit activities. Law enforcement authorities in North Carolina, principally in the western and southern areas of the state, indicate that Mexican criminal groups are also increasing their involvement in retail drug distribution.3 Needless to say, the majority of illegal immigrants are not directly involved in the drug trade. Nevertheless, the DEA has determined that their presence allows Mexican traffickers to effectively conceal their activities within immigrant communities.4 Johnston County Sheriff Steve Bizzell (R) estimates that 80 percent to 85 percent of the drug trade in his county is conducted by Hispanics.5 In 2002, the Wake County Sheriffs Office similarly reported that although Hispanics comprised only 5.4 percent of the population, they accounted for 46 percent of drug-trafficking arrests.6 As indicated above, transnational gangs, such as Surenos-

13 and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), are responsible for much of the low-level drug trade in North Carolina. Over the past several years, North Carolina has experienced a disturbing surge in gang activity. Between 1999 and 2004, Wake County saw a 5,743.3 percent increase in gang membership. During the same period, the city of Durham saw a 333.3 percent increase.7 A 2005 report by the Governors Crime Commission estimated that 22.2 percent of all gang members in North Carolina are Hispanic (with ethnicity unknown for another 19.4 percent).8 By contrast, Hispanics accounted for only 7 percent of total state population in 2004. Nationally, Hispanics are thought to comprise 49 percent of total gang membership. A majority of these gang members are illegal immigrants. Notes Duplin County Sheriff Blake Wallace (D), There is an increasing gang activity problem, particularly with MS-13 and studies have shown that the majority of those gang members are illegal aliens.9 Among these studies is a report published by the Governors Crime Commission which posits that 66 percent of Hispanic/Latino gang members are illegal aliens.10 In the case of MS-13, one of the most violent and powerful gangs in North Carolina, federal authorities estimate that approximately 90 percent of U.S. MS-13 members are foreign-born illegal aliens and depend upon the Texas-Mexico border smuggling corridor to support their criminal operations.11 As Forsyth County District Attorney Tom Keith (R) puts it, You cannot say drugs without saying gangs without saying illegal aliens.12 In addition to the drug trade, the Mexican cartels are becoming increasingly involved in human trafficking (i.e., prostitution) and human smuggling. According to Dr. Deborah SchurmanKauflin of the Violent Crimes Institute, Mexico is the number one source for young female sex slaves in North America. Each year thousands of women and children with 12-year-olds in top demand are smuggled across the border and sent to brothels across the United States. Such brothels, notes Schurman-Kauflin, can take the form of homes, apartments, spas, massage parlors, and hotels even middle class neighborhoods can be at risk.13

War DA

1NCConflict
Borders are necessary to prevent conflictpower sharing leads to more war Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The
SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR)

The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because the process of fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare. In light of these problems, this article argues that partition should be considered as an option for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article shows how failure to adopt partition in Kosovo has left that province
in a semi-permanent state of limbo that only increases the majority Albanian population's desire for independence. The only route to long-term stability in the region-and an exit for international forces-is through partition. Moreover, the article suggests that the United States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of implementing powersharing among Iraq's Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis. The conventional wisdom regarding borders in

political science and the policy community is that we already have plenty and do not need any more. Scholars and policymakers alike tend to oppose the creation of new states, especially as a means
to end civil conflict. They argue that secession and partition generate more problems than they solve and lead to new conflicts. The preferred solutions to these conflicts take the existing borders as given

and concentrate on fostering negotiated settlements that arrange power internally through such mechanisms as power-sharing, regional autonomy, or federalism. As Ted Robert Gurr has
written, "threats to divide a country should be managed by the devolution of state power and . . . communal fighting about access to the state's power and resources should be restrained by recognizing group rights and sharing power."1 Other researchers agree, maintaining that the key factor in sustaining negotiated settlements to ethnic conflicts is the degree to which the agreement institutionalizes powersharing or regional autonomy.2 Recently, however, scholars have begun to challenge this single-state-solution orthodoxy,

arguing instead that dividing states and creating new borders may be a way to promote peace
after ethnic civil wars. One view, represented by Chaim Kaufmann, stresses that ethnic civil wars cannot end until contending groups are separated into homogeneous ethnic enclaves. When groups are

intermingled, each side has an incentive to attack and cleanse the other. Once separation is achieved, these incentives disappear. With the necessary condition for peace in place, political arrangements become secondary. Unless ethnic separation occurs, Kaufmann argues, all other solutions are fruitless because ethnic intermingling is what fuels conflict.

Borders Prevent War

Separation of ethnic groups reduces conflict Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The
SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR)

In this article, I argue that partition-defined as separation of contending ethnic groups and the creation of independent states-should be considered as an alternative to power-sharing and regional autonomy as a means to end civil wars. Partition does not require groups to disarm and make themselves vulnerable to devastating betrayal. Nor do formerly warring groups have to cooperate and share power in joint institutions. Partition also satisfies nationalist desires for statehood and fills the need for security. In cases of severe ethnic conflict, when perceptions of the adversary's malign intentions are so entrenched as to impede any agreement based on a single-state solution, partition is the preferred solution. In the remainder of this paper, I will elaborate further on this argument and apply it to the case of Kosovo, demonstrating why autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia is impossible. Following an evaluation of the various options being considered for Kosovo's independence, I will argue for a partition of Kosovo along the Ibar River accompanied by the return of the Serbian population to Serbia. Finally, I argue that like it or not, partition is probably in Iraq's future.

Third party intervention and negotiated settlements wont solveborders are necessary Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR) Scholars have offered two solutions to the dilemmas and dangers of negotiated settlements. First, some argue that the more institutionalized the agreement is, the more it will allay the former belligerents' security fears and increase their ability to safeguard their interests . These optimists maintain that negotiated settlements, by creating institutions to share power in the central government or devolve power to sub-state regions, increase the likelihood of success by allowing groups to govern themselves and prevent others from implementing measures harmful to their interests. Examples of power-sharing institutions in the central government include reserving executive posts and government ministries for members of different groups, joint decision-making, proportional representation, and a minority veto. Institutions that devolve power include regional autonomy agreements or federalism. By working together in common institutions, groups may moderate their views of their former adversary's intentions and even come to trust each other.10 Second, intervention by a third party is thought to be an effective way to reduce security fears and facilitate agreement implementation. If the key problems are that both sides fear betrayal and there is no mechanism to enforce the agreement, interposing a third party into the situation can resolve these issues by increasing the likelihood that the parties will keep their promises and mitigating the costs to the other if one of them does not. Providing troops on the ground during the early phases of implementation is critical for stability, security, and protection when groups are disarming and institutions are

taking shape.11 Unfortunately, neither power-sharing institutions nor third-party intervention provide more than a temporary band-aid for the critical underlying problems, which are uncertainty about the adversary's intentions and inability to commit to the agreement. For several reasons, negotiated settlements are likely to fail even when they include provisions for institutions and third-party enforcement. Because an intervener's presence is likely to be temporary, former belligerents are reluctant to disarm and integrate their military forces with those of their past enemy. Once the third party leaves, the parties again have to rely on each other's promises to abide by the agreement. Fear of future betrayalfed by experiences of past malign intentions-prompts groups to keep their guns, which increases the likelihood of a return to war. In high-conflict or post-conflict environments, elections tend to resemble ethnic censuses. Out-group conflict increases in-group solidarity, and those who advocate compromise with former enemies are easily branded as traitors betraying the group's interests. In the aftermath of civil wars, people tend to support nationalist parties and politicians who promise to protect the group's interests. Post-war elections are likely to bring hard-line leaders to power who are reluctant to trust the other side and make the compromises necessary to implement the agreement. As a result, political institutions that require trust and accommodation are likely to be gridlocked. When these institutions break down, third parties may step in to govern in their stead, but this is only a stop-gap solution because it renders these institutions even less likely to work when the outside party leaves. Furthermore, if the war was characterized by ethnic cleansing, agreements that call for expelled minorities to return to their former homes may lead to further violence. The now-dominant majority group may destroy or inhabit the homes of those who were expelled. Minorities often face hostility, discrimination, and difficulty finding employment. When the third party leaves and no longer can provide protection, they may be forced out again. Finally, recent research on cease-fires in interstate wars has found a striking correlation between third-party intervention and increased risk of another war in the future. The logic is that "agreements that specify terms that do not correspond well with the expected military outcome of renewed fighting" are more likely to fail than those in which the terms reflect the outcome on the battlefield or the consequences that renewed fighting would bring. Third-party intervention often short-circuits a war before a clear battlefield outcome has emerged, and thus "considerable uncertainty remains regarding the consequences of continuing the war."12 This uncertainty undermines agreements because one or both sides may believe that it could achieve a better outcome by fighting. Third-party intervention also increases the likelihood of a mismatch between the agreement's terms and the probable outcome of the war. This is because outside parties tend to intervene to prevent one side from decisively defeating another and to restore the status quo ante. Agreements like these are particularly unlikely to last when the third party withdraws because the side that was winning in the previous round of fighting believes that it can achieve a better outcome by returning to war. Once the agreement's enforcer departs, the stronger side has an incentive to attack to revise the terms of settlement. Similarly, single-state-solutions imposed by third-party intervention when one or more of the parties prefers independence run an increased risk of failure because they go against the preferences of the groups involved.

Borders can only lead to peacethey take away incentive for war Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR)

The poor record of negotiated settlements in ethnic civil wars that leave borders intact, whether or not they are facilitated by third-party intervention, suggests that a new approach might be necessary: one based on partition rather than power-sharing. In this model, third parties would intervene not to turn back the clock to the pre-war situation, but to inflict a decisive defeat on one side or the other. This would reduce the likelihood that the defeated party would think it could gain anything by resorting to war in the future. In those cases where a third party intervenes on behalf of ethnic rebels, military victory will result in partition. Partition can only lead to peace, however, if it is accompanied by ethnic separation. Interveners should work to make sure that the states are as ethnically homogeneous as possible so as to reduce the likelihood of future cleansing, rebellions by the remnant minority for union with its brethren in the other state, or war to rescue "trapped" minorities. Finally, both sides should be militarily capable of defending themselves, and the borders between them should be made as defensible as possible to discourage aggression, either by following natural terrain features or by building demilitarized zones or other barriers.

Opening the border also brings in spillover violence that originates in Mexico Washington Post 11 (Clint McDonald, March 31, Dangers on the US-Mexico Border, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0331/opinions/35207272_1_border-patrol-agents-border-security-spillover-violence, accessed 7-12-13, AR)

There is a storm brewing along our border with Mexico, and our nation is relegating responsibility for quelling that storm to some of our poorest communities. In a visit to El Paso last week, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano claimed that there has been no spillover violence from Mexico into the United States. Regardless of the veracity, her point is irrelevant. It

is not spillover violence but spillover effects of hostilities in Mexico that pose the real threat to the United States. Spillover effects are the direct results of Mexican violence that influence U.S. citizens living in communities along the border. For example, Mexican gangs fighting to control territory around the frontier village of El Porvenir, in Chihuahua, have threatened for almost a year to kill its residents. To escape the violence, nearly the entire village eventually relocated to Texas border communities without, of course, being screened or processed. The results include schoolchildren fearing for their safety as their Mexican schoolmates talk of violence and murder, school buses tailed by armed private security guards and criminals relocating to the United States with their families and conducting their operations from this country. The single greatest spillover effect: U.S. citizens living in fear. While border security is undeniably a federal responsibility, spillover
effects are principally dealt with by local jurisdictions and along the U.S.-Mexico border, this is mostly sheriffs offices operating in large, sparsely populated county areas supported by small tax bases. Border counties are among the poorest in the United States and can barely afford to hire and equip sufficient, qualified law enforcement personnel to meet citizens needs.

Integration will result in increased tensions and inevitable conflict Kosovo proves Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR) The case of Kosovo is even more interesting. The United States and its NATO allies intervened in 1999 to stop Slobodan Milosevic's expulsion of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, but never supported the Albanians' claim to sovereignty over Kosovo. UN Resolution 1244 called for Kosovo to remain an autonomous province within Serbia and Montenegro. The United Nations has maintained this fiction while governing Kosovo since the war, engaging in so-

called "kick-the-can diplomacy," putting off the difficult decisions to the future.13 Rather than calming the situation, this delaying tactic has raised the ire of the Kosovar Albanians, who see their treasured goal of independence slipping away. "We are here, suffocated with UNMIK [the UN Mission in Kosovo] over our heads, and Serbia over our necks," protested one Albanian. "UNMIK is now six years here without a deadline. We want a deadline. To become independent from a stronger place you need action, not process."14 Veton Surroi, the Albanian publisher who now serves in Kosovo's parliament agrees: "The focus has been on buying time, and that's the only focus there has been."15 Even UNMIK officials concur with this assessment: "One of the profound problems bedeviling the international community," one bureaucrat noted, "is that it has not yet defined the goal of what we're working toward here."16 In short, the UN strategy of keeping Kosovo in a "deep winter," its refusal to endorse the objective of independence for Kosovo, and the delay in opening negotiations on the future of the province have caused the Albanians to become increasingly frustrated and led to outbursts of anti-Serb violence, such as the riots of March 2004 that killed 19 people.17 Kosovo is plagued by the problems that typically undermine single state solutions after ethnic wars. Given the province's uncertain political future, both Albanians and Serbs have incentives to remain armed. In June 2003, the United Nations Development Program estimated that there were approximately 333,000 to 460,000 privately held small arms in Kosovo, of which only 20,000 were legally owned.18 UN-sponsored gun collection drives bring in few weapons; one threemonth campaign that ended on Oct. 1, 2003, netted just 155 guns.19 Trepidation over Kosovo's future status makes both ethnic communities reluctant to part with their weapons. According to a report by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Faced with an uncertain future and constant wondering about whether conflict will ensue once again, people may want to keep weapons to provide protection and security if the situation once again becomes precarious."20 Comments by both Serbs and Albanians confirm this motivation. According to an Albanian tour guide in Drenica, for example, "Nobody knows if another war is going to happen or not. If they don't give us independence, that might mean that the Serbian forces will be allowed to come back-and most people here don't want to be caught empty-handed when that happens." Serbs, for their part, believe that self-help is the only way to safeguard themselves from vengeful Albanians. As one Serb from Gracanica commented, "We believe that none of the security forces operating in Kosovo at the moment are able to fully protect the Serbs, so we have to look out for ourselves."21

Lack of borders results in the marginalization of minority groupsIraq proves Downes, 06 (Alexander. Professor of political science and international affairs at the George
Washington University. "More Borders, Less Conflict? Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars." The SAIS Review of International Affairs 26.1 (2006): 49-61. ProQuest. Web. 8 July 2013. JMR) Despite international attempts to encourage power-sharing and federalism as a means to preserve a united Iraq, a partition of the country into three states-a Kurdish state in the northeast, a Shi'ite state in the south, and a Sunni state in the northwest-is probably unavoidable for the same reasons it is unavoidable in Kosovo. The history of violence and repression has made it hard for Iraq's ethnic groups to trust each other. The Kurds suffered such brutality that they insist on maintaining their own armed forces and prefer an independent Kurdish state to remaining part of a united Iraq. The Sunni Arabs-the dominant and privileged group under Saddam Hussein's regime-have suffered a major status reversal and are now marginalized. The Sunni-based insurgency that has raged since Saddam's downfall in

2003 signals not only many Sunnis' attachment to and reverence for Saddam, but also their mistrust and suspicion of Iraq's Shi'ites and Kurds. The 2005 constitution was negotiated mostly without Sunni input and over their vehement objections. Unsurprisingly, Sunnis voted overwhelmingly against the document. Last-minute promises by Shi'a and Kurdish leaders that would allow the constitution to be renegotiated following new parliamentary elections are small consolation to Sunnis, who will always compose a small minority of the country's elected representatives and thus will wield little power. The constitution's federal provisions represent Shi'ite leaders' recognition that the Kurds insist on near total autonomy-and thus that the Shi'ites should form their own federal bloc as well. Given the powerful centrifugal forces at play, this process will lead to the eventual partition of Iraq. Rather than continue to promote power-sharing institutions that are ineffective or insist on the maintenance of a single Iraqi state in the face of mounting evidence that three states are going to emerge, the United States and other international actors should begin preparing the ground for partition. Three issues will be of primary importance. First, the United States needs to work with Iraq's neighbors to ensure they will not interfere or seek to exert undue influence over the successor states. The United States should work to reconcile Turkey to a Kurdish state, extract promises from Iraqi Kurds not to foment or encourage Kurdish nationalism in other countries, and warn Iran that it must allow Iraq's Shi'ites to determine their own future. The next task will be determining the new borders of the three states. It is beyond the scope of this essay to propose what those borders should be. However, the Shi'ite state probably would comprise the nine southern provinces plus the southern part of Diyala province. The Sunnis likely would receive Anbar, Salahuddin, Ninevah province west of the Tigris, and the western parts of Ta'mim and Diyala. Kurdistan would probably consist of Dohuk, Erbil, Suleimaniyah, Ninevah east of the Tigris (including Mosul), and the eastern third of Ta'mim (including Kirkuk). Finally, there is the question of Baghdad, home to large numbers of all three groups. Options for Baghdad include making it an international zone or an area of joint control among the groups, or giving each state sovereignty over the areas where its people live. These tasks will not be easy, but they acknowledge the reality that, as Peter Galbraith has put it, "The fundamental problem of Iraq is an absence of Iraqis."31 The Kurds unanimously prefer independence, the Sunni Arabs fear oppression in a state dominated by their former victims, and the Shi'ites-although preferring a single Iraq that they would control-will accept a truncated state rich in natural resources and free of a Sunni insurgency. Civil wars generate intense mistrust, fear, and hatred that make the future maintenance of multiethnic societies via negotiated settlements and power-sharing institutions difficult. Iraq, like Bosnia and Kosovo, is no exception. After six years in Kosovo, the United States and the United Nations finally have realized that partition cannot be avoided. One hopes it will not take that long for a similar realization to dawn on them in Iraq.

DA Links

Politics
Despite some sympathy, border enforcement remains extremely popular to all parties Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication) Conservatives generally find themselves deeply split on the issue of immigration. Some staunch members of the Republican Party, including President George W. Bush, generally favor liberal admission policies, or at least more liberal policies than the ones currently in place. Economic conservatives see gains from immigration and inexpensive labor. In stark contrast, another wing of the Republican Party is deeply concerned with the alleged cultural impacts of immigration. This faction aggressively plays on populist fear about cultural changes blamed on immigrants and demands restrictionist policies and tougher border enforcement. Today, this arm of the Republican Party, represented most prominently by Congressman Tom Tancredo and the conservative icon Pat Buchanan, often exercises great influence over the direction of immigration law and policy by tapping into broad-based fears of economically and otherwise insecure U.S. citizens. Poor, working, and middle-income people worry about the changes wrought by immigration and are not likely to sympathize with the desire of big business for cheap labor. On the other hand, Democrats also find themselves divided on immigration. Economically, they are concerned with immigrations downward pressure on the wage scale and its impact on a long-time base of Democratic support, labor unions. Although change has come in recent years, organized labor, often supportive of the basic Democratic agenda, has historically supported restrictionist immigration laws and policies. Many liberals, however, desire the humane treatment of immigrants and often push for pro-immigration and proimmigrant laws and policies. There, however, is some common ground. Many Democrats and Republicans often agree that increased border enforcement is necessary. Like tough-oncrime stances, this has proved time and time again to be a politically popular position. This is even true for those sympathetic to 138 | The Economic Benefits of Liberal Migration of Labor Across Borders the plight of immigrants. In addition, influenced by public fears of being overrun by floods of immigrants, politicians of both parties often support limits on legal immigration and heavy border enforcement.

State Spending
Opening the borders would drown states in fiscal debt Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication) Immigration has had especially significant fiscal impacts on states in which large numbers of immigrants live. The state and local governments in high-immigration states must bear substantial costs. Consumption of emergency health services alone can have substantial impacts on state and local governments.73 The state of Arizona, for example, pays more than $90 million each year to provide emergency services to undocumented immigrants. The state is required to provides such services by federal law but receives only about $650,000 from the federal government to help cover the services , a fraction of its their costs.74 A public education, which is generally paid for by state and local governments, is also costly, even if it turns out to be a good economic investment for the nation. The costs of providing law enforcement protections to immigrants also can be formidable.

Job Loss
Increase of migrants leads to less jobs. Sanchez 09 (Rob, Timeout! The case for a moratorium on legal immigration, The Social
Contract Press, Volume:20, MCJC) One of the most obvious ways to stop job erosion in the U.S. is to stop illegal immigration and to put severe limits on employment based visas. Beware of politicians that ask us to accept the Faustian bargain of Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Their claim is fallacious that CIR will solve the illegal immigration problem, but only if we expand guest worker visa programs. The following statement by Sen. McCain is not unique as many variations of it have been repeated throughout the years by political elitists who care more about increasing the supply of cheap labor than preserving the viability of the American middle class: I believe we can pursue the security programs and at the same time set up a system where people can come here and work on a temporary basis. I think we can set up a program where amnesty is extended to a certain number of people who are eligible and at the same time make sure that we have some control over people who come in and out of this country. Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), news conference, 2003 We must be careful not to be fooled by the Mortons Fork (false choice) offered by McCain and other promoters of CIR, who ask us to accept more immigration by increasing the number of employment based worker visas and by giving amnesty to illegal aliens in trade for a promise of more border enforcement. Its not a fair deal because American workers lose jobs any time there are increases in immigration it really doesnt matter if the increase is due to legal or illegal immigration. The only thing that matters is how much our total population is allowed to grow by flooding the labor market with more immigrants. Increased immigration means the supply of workers goes up, demand goes down, labor arbitration forces wages to go down, and job opportunities for Americans dwindle. Its a lose-lose deal for American wage earners. There are two very obvious means to improve the employment situation in the United States: first we must stop illegal immigration, and second most of our employment based visa programs should either be severely restricted or abolished. Until both of these happen all proposals for Comprehensive Immigration Reform should be rejected especially if they allow any type of amnesty or the expansion of guest worker visa programs. If unemployment ever reaches zero, and we are sure our borders are secure, then it might make sense to have a public dialogue about the merits of liberalizing the immigration system.

K Args

CapRoot Cause
Capitalism is the root problem of economic inequality, not immigration Johnson 2007(Dean and Mabie-Apallas, Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o
Studies, Opening the Floodgates, New York University Publication) An inextricably related economic fear is that easy migration increases 144 | The Economic Benefits of Liberal Migration of Labor Across Borders wealth inequality. This line of reasoning, which finds some support empirically, sees cheap labor allowing business to reap greater profits, accumulate more wealth, and gain at the expense of labor. As the old adage goes, the rich get richer, the poor get poorer. This, however, may well be an enduring characteristic of capitalism and a market economy, rather than the result of immigration and liberal admissions policies. Even if such fears were real, it may not be possible through border enforcement measures to halt highly motivated immigrants from entering the United States. Other policies are necessary to address wealth distribution concerns.