T H E O T T O M A N EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

Politics;, Society and Economy

EDITED BY

OTTOMANS, HUNGARIANS, AND HABSBURGS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest

S U R A I Y A FAROQHI A N D HALIL

INALCIK

Advisory Board Fikret A d a n i r Idris Bostan Axnnon C o h e n C o r n e l l Fleischer Barbara F l e m m i n g Alexander de G r o o t Klaus Kreiser Hans Georg M a j e r Irene M e l i k o f f A h m e t Yaar Ocak Abdeljelil T e m i m i Gilles Veinstein Elizabeth Zachariadou

E D I T E D BY

G Z A D V I D AND P L

FODOR

V O L U M E 20

BRILL
LEIDEN BOSTON KLN 2000

This book is printed on acid-frcc paper.

L i b r a r y of C o n g r e s s Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

CONTENTS

Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest / edited by Gza Dvid and Pl Fodor. p. cm. (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage, ISSN 1380-6076 ; v. 20) Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N 9004119078 (alk. paper) 1. Europe, CentralHistoryTo 1500. 2. Europe, CentralHistory16th century. 3. Europe, CentralHistory1 7th century. 4. Europe, C e n t r a l History, Military. I . Fodor, Pl. I I . Dvid, Gza. I I I . Scries. D A W 1038 . 0 8 8 2000 943dc21 00-034284 CIP

LIST OF MAPS NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE PREFACE (PL FODOR) INTRODUCTION (GZA DVID and PL FODOR)

V I I VIII IX XI

PART O N E : T H E H U N G A R I A N - H A B S B U R G FRONTIER Die Deutsche Bibliothek - C I P - E i n h e i t s a u f n a h m e Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe : the military confines in the era of Ottoman conquest / ed. by Gcza David and Pal Fodor - Leiden ; Boston ; Kln : Brill, 2000 (The Ottoman Empire and its heritage ; Vol. 20) I S B N 90-04-11907-8 GZA PLFFY The O r i g i n s and Development of the Border 3 Defence System A g a i n s t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n H u n g a r y ( U p to the Early Eighteenth C e n t u r y )
ANDRS

K U B I N Y I The

Battle

of

Szvaszentdemeter-Nagyolaszi 71 117

(1523). O t t o m a n A d v a n c e and H u n g a r i a n Defence on the Eve of Mohcs

JZSEF K E L E N I K

The M i l i t a r y R e v o l u t i o n i n H u n g a r y

ISSN ISBN

1380-6076 90 04 11907 8 KLRA HEGYI

PART T W O : T H E O T T O M A N

FRONTIER 163

The O t t o m a n N e t w o r k of Fortresses i n H u n g a r y ... Costs of the O t t o m a n Fortress-System m

) Copyright 2000 by Komnklijke Brill Mi Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted m any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Bnll provided that tlw. appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, Rosewood Drive 222, Suite 910 DanversMA 01923, USA Fees are subject to change.
P R I N T E D IN T H E N E T H E R L A N D S

GBOR GOSTON The

H u n g a r y in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries PL FODOR M a k i n g a L i v i n g on the Frontiers: Volunteers i n the Sixteenth-Century O t t o m a n A r m y GZA DVID A n O t t o m a n M i l i t a r y Career on the H u n g a r i a n Borders: Kasim Voyvoda, Bey, and Pasha SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX 265 299 315 229 195

LIST OF M A P S

1. The castles of the Croatian and Wendish-Bajcsavar confines i n 1582 2. The castles of the Bajcsavar, Kanizsa, and G y o r confines i n 1582 3. The castles of the M i n i n g Town's and Upper H u n g a r i a n confines in 1582 4. Southern H u n g a r y at the end of the fifteenth century 5. The battle of Szavaszentdemeter, 1523 6. Ottoman fortresses in H u n g a r y 65 67 69 82 106 173

E ORIGINS A N D D E V E L O P M E N T OF T H E BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEM A G A I N S T T H E O T T O M A N EMPIRE I N H U N G A R Y (UP T O T H E EARLY E I G H T E E N T H C E N T U R Y ) GZA PLFFY

"The system of fortresses is the only means by w h i c h Y o u r Majesty w i l l be able to contain the p o w e r and the advance of the enemy, and behind which Your countries and peoples w i l l be secure." This is h o w H a b s b u r g military leaders summarized their o p i n i o n about the significance of the Hungarian border defence system protecting the i m p e r i a l city of Vienna, the Austrian hereditary lands, and the German E m p i r e i n 1577. It w o u l d be difficult to find a better expression to define the role of the defence system established b y the late sixteenth century on the frontier zone of Hungary and its southern annexed provinces (Slavonia a n d Croatia) against the Ottoman Empire. Even though the H u n g a r i a n defence system constituted only a section of the long and varied frontier zone w h i c h stretched from N o r t h e r n Africa via the Mediterranean islands, Italy, a n d Hungary to the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian territories a n d protected Europe against the O t t o m a n attacks, it is evident that the decisive events of the century long Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation occurred o n the territory of Medieval H u n g a r y . O n the basis of recent archival research and the achievements of Austrian, Southern Slav, a n d H u n g a r i a n historiography, this study attempts to p r o v i d e an outline of the system and its development, concentrating on the sixteenth a n d seventeenth centuries. Towards the end of the twentieth century it is even more timely as, while several monographs have been published i n different w o r l d languages about the defence systems on the Croatian a n d Slavonian
1 2

Pl Szeg,

Vgvraink

szervezete a trk betelepedstl

a tizentves

hbor

kezdetig

(1541-1593) [The Organization of the Hungarian Border Fortresses from the Establishment of the Ottoman Rule to the Outbreak of the Fifteen Years' W a r ] , Budapest, 1911, 52.
2

Cf. Pl Fodor,

"Ottoman

Policy

Towards

Hungary,

1520-1541,"

Acta

Orientlta

Academiae Scientiarum Hungancae

45:2-3 (1991) 271-345.

4
3

GZA PLFFY

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

territories, no w e l l documented study has been w r i t t e n about the system of the H u n g a r i a n defence districts and border fortresses w h i c h played a m u c h more i m p o r t a n t role than the above mentioned areas i n the whole structure.
4

line against the Ottomans' can only be understood m the knowledge of

1

Earlier investigations have only discussed the Croatian-Slavonian part, that is a special section of the defence system established in the sixteenth century to resist the O t t o m a n advance, w h i c h was less decisive f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w of the whole area, and have treated it simply as the antecedent of the m i l i t a r y frontier (Militdrgrenze) organized at the b e g i n n i n g of the eighteenth century. But the development of the defence
5

the w h o l e H u n g a r i a n and Croatian-Slavonianborder defence system and this is true for the history of its subsequent periods, too. Below this system w i l l be examined as a whole, v i e w e d f r o m the administrative centres, that is f r o m Buda until 1526, then t e m p o r a r i l y f r o m Pozsony and Vienna, and f r o m 1556 u p to the abolition of the m i l i t a r y frontier in the nineteenth century, f r o m the Imperial C i t y a n d f o r an intermediary p i o d from Graz (1578-1705) respectively. This is the only aspect w h i c h can provide us w i t h a more coherent and complete picture about the strategy of defence of the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m and that of the Habsburg military leadership, and about h o w the system was controlled.
e r

T h e most important works in chronological order: Fr[antisek] Vanicek, Specialgeschichte I - I V . W i e n , 1875. Jakob Arnstadt, Die k. k. Militdrgrenze 1522-1881 (mit einer (Inaugural-Diss.) Wrzburg, 1969. Gunther Erich Rothenberg, The Austrian 1522-1747. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 48.) Urbana, Institution.

der Militrgrenze. Militari/ 1960,

Gesamtbibliographie).

THE PERIODIZATION O F THE HISTORY O F THE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN HUNGARY AGAINST THE OTTOMANS The new approach makes it necessary to establish a new penodization for the history of Croatian and Slavonian territories which defines the most important shifts based on the qualitative changes w i t h i n the whole system. The former penodization advanced in 1960 by Fedor Moacanin, and only partly corrected by those working on the problem later on, can hardly be used for the Hungarian territories in the narrow sense constituting the major and more decisive part of the defence system. The Croatian author divided the nearly 500-year-old history of the Croatian-Slavonian defence region into the following t w o major and some minor periods:
7

Barder in Croatia,

and idem, The Milttan/ Border in Croatia 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Militdrgrenze

C h i c a g o , 1966, and the two volumes together in G e r m a n : Gunther Ejrich] Rothenberg, Die sterreichische in Kroatien 1522 bis 18S1. W i e n - M n c h e n , 1970. Die k. k. Militr(Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen M u s e u m s in Wien, Geschichte und Auswirkungen. E d . by Gerhard grenze. Beitrage zu ihrer Geschickte.

6.) W i e n , 1973. Die sterreichische Militrgrenze. jina. Povijesni pregled-histonografija-rasprave. also W i n f r i e d Schulze, Landcsdefension sterreichischen Militarisierung de frontires. Temtorialstaates der agrarischen L'Autriche

E m s t . (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 8.) Regensburg, 1982. Vojna KraE d . by Dragurin Pavlicevic. Zagreb, 1984. Cf Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerund Staatsbildung.

(1564-1619). (Verffentlichungen der K o m m i s s i o n fr neuere Gesellschaft m der kroatisch-slawonischen Militrgrenze (1535-

Geschichte sterreichs, 60.) W i e n - K l n - G r a z , 1973. Karl Kser, Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die 1S81). (Habilitationsschrift) G r a z , 1985, and the most recent work by Jean Nouzille (Histoire et l'Empire ottoman. Prface par Jean Brenger. Paris, 1991) w h i c h is, h o w e v e r , a dull s u m m a r y of earlier results.
4

So far Kurt Wessely has been the only one to realize that for an understanding of the

1. period: From the beginning to 1593, the outbreak of the so-called 'Fifteen Years' W a r ' or 'Long War'. W i t h i n this, he differentiated three subperiods:
border fortresses (Grenzgebiet. Grenze, Grenzfestungen) were qualitatively different from the m i l itary frontiers organized in the early eighteenth century. Another remarkable mistake of Austrian historiography is to call the Croatian-Slavonian border territories Austrian Militarv Frontiers (sterreichische Militrgrenze, see notes 3 and 25), as in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries it was not these that were called Austrian border fortress zone (sterreichische Grenze), but the border castles subordinated to Gyr. Therefore it is more accurate to use the term 'the Habsburg defence system against the Ottoman Empire' in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries for the imperial-royal border defence system in H u n g a r y . Cf. K u r t Wessely, "Reply to Rothenberg's C o m m e n t s , " Austrian History Yearbook 9-10 (1973-1974) 119. It is to be noted that scholarly works have so far identified the border defence system against the Ottomans with the chain of fortresses, but this latter was, besides the mobile field troops and soldiery kept by the counties, etc., onlv one, though decisive element in it.
fi

w h o l e defence system against the Ottoman Empire it is indispensable to k n o w the history of the H u n g a r i a n border defence zones as well: Kurt Wessely, " T h e Development of the H u n g a r i a n Military Frontier Until the Middle of the Eighteenth C e n t u r y , " Austrian in Die russische Gesandschaft am Regensburger Reichstag 1576. History Yearbook 9-10 (1973-1974) 55-110, and idem, " D i e Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576," Mit Beitrgen von Ekkehard Vlkl u n d K u r t Wessely. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 3.) Regensb u r g , 1976, 31-55. Cf. also Istvn Sinkovics, "Obrana madarskog pogranienog teritorija od T u r a k a u X V I i X V I I stoljecu," in Vopna Krajina, 163-174. The most important Hungarian monographs: Szeg, op. cit., and Imre Sznt, A vgvri rendszer kiptse s fm/kora orszgon H u n g a r y ] . Budapest,
5

Magyar-

1541-1593 [The Organization and Golden Age of the Border Defence System in 1980. even H u n g a r i a n w o r k s , the Croaalready from the

In Austrian, G erman, Croatianand sometimes

tian-Slavonian defence zones are called military frontiers (Militrgrenze)

m i d d l e of the sixteenth century, w h i c h is, in my opinion, a capital mistake. T h e units of the defence system of the sixteenthth and seventeenth centuries, the respective areas of the

Fedor Moacanin, "Periodizacija histonje Vojne Krajine ( X V - X I X S t . ) , " Historijski 13 (1960) 111-117.
7

zbornik

GZA

PLFFY

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

1.1. From the outset to 1522, w h e n Ferdinand I , A r c h d u k e of Austria, sent an a r m y at his o w n expense to help the defence of the A u s t r i a n territories threatened by the Ottomans. 1.2. F r o m 1522 to 1578, w h e n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Croatian and Slavonian border fortresses was subordinated to the n e w l y established Inner A u s t r i a n W a r Council (Innersterreichischer Hofkriegsrat, Graz), separating them f r o m the H u n g a r i a n defence districts. 1.3. F r o m 1578 to 1593. 2. p e r i o d : F r o m 1593 to 1881, the e l i m i n a t i o n of the system of m i l i t a r y frontiers. W i t h i n this period Moacanin defined five smaller sections, o u t of w h i c h t w o should be mentioned in connection w i t h the era discussed in this paper. 2.1. Turkish network Danube, From 1593 to 1683, the beginning of the so-called reconquering w a r (1683-1699). This w a r made it possible to establish the of border fortresses and m i l i t a r y frontier along the Sava, Tisza, and Maros. to 1755, the first reform of the m i l i t a r y frontiers
8

to create a q u a l i t a t i v e l y new defence system called the ' m i l i t a r y frontier' (Mditdrgrenze). In the d e f i n i t i o n of the subperiods of the t h i r d phase (1699-1881), historians are m o r e or less of the same o p i n i o n , so i t is w o r t h accepting the periodization of Moacanin and Rothenberg. In the f o l l o w i n g I w o u l d like to summarize the development of the border defence system up to the organization of the m i l i t a r y frontiers i n the early eighteenth century. B y s h o w i n g briefly the subperiods I w i l l make an attempt to analyze the most i m p o r t a n t sections of the continually changing n e t w o r k and to evaluate its l a n d m a r k s given the constraints of time and space. A t the same time I w o u l d like to justify the significant changes I have a p p l i e d i n the periodization used so far.
1 T H E DEFENCE SYSTEM OF THE MEDIEVAL H U N G A R I A N 1526) KINGDOM

(FROM T H E O U T S E T TO THE BATTLE OF M O H A C S IN

2.2. F r o m 1683

1 1. The origins of the defence system against the Ottomans (late fourteenth century-mid-M70s) In the 1360s, the military and political leadership of the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m d i d not recognize the danger it faced w i t h the appearance of the O t t o m a n troops i n Europe. A l t h o u g h the conquests of the g r o w i n g military state were far away f r o m the borders of the subsidiary provinces of King Louis A n j o u I (1342-1382), the conspicuous p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y expansion of the Ottomans was a clear signal that they w o u l d h a r d l y stop on the south-eastern Balkans after gaining the upper hand i n the struggle among the Southern Slav rulers as their auxiliary troops. T h o u g h Louis I attemptedeven if i n a somewhat unprepared mannerto contain the conquerors by establishing the Bulgarian banate of V i d i n between 1365 and 1369 and b y placing H u n g a r i a n soldiers i n the castles there, the strikes by the Ottomans i n the 1370s and 1380s directly threatened the southern frontiers of H u n g a r y . The situation was made worse by the fact that, towards the end of his rule, K i n g Louis d i d not pay too m u c h attention to the reinforcement of the southern border fortresses along the Lower Danube, and the confused years after his death further accentuated the problems of southern defence.
10

considered i m p o r t a n t by Moacanin.

T h o u g h the authors of monographs prepared after 1960

corrected

Moacanin's periodization in some points/ their approach to the border defence system shows no real change at all. This state of affairs can be ascribed to the fact that, due to language problems and a lack of archival research, they knew practically nothing about the Hungarian border defence system and therefore neglected it. So the periodization to be presented here is the first attempt to define new periods from the point of view of the whole defence system in Hungary against the Ottoman Empire, and also applicable to the history of the Croatian-Slavonian region. In m y opinion the following three major and several minor periods can be differentiated: The first one lasted f r o m the beginning to 1526, the termination of the m e d i e v a l H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . D u r i n g this era, the southern defence n e t w o r k stretching f r o m the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania was an organically coherent defence line of the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . The second period began in 1526 (the year of the battle at Mohcs) and continued t i l l the peace treaty of K a r l o v i t z i n 1699, w h i c h closed the epoch of the reconquering Turkish wars (1683-1699) and O t t o m a n rule i n H u n g a r y . A f t e r the peace had been concluded i t again became possible
8

Further periods: 2.3. 1755-1807, 2.4. 1807-1848, finally 2.5. 1848-1881. See the works cited in note 2.

1 0

O n the history of the organization of the defence system before 1526, cf. Ferenc Szakly, Warfare Before the Battle of M o h c s (1365-1526)," Acta

"Phases of Turco-Hungarian

G Z A PLFFY

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

After Sigismund of L u x e m b u r g , the H u n g a r i a n K i n g (1387-1437) later Holy Roman Emperor (1410-1437), experienced the immediate threat by the Ottomans on the battlefield of Nicopol (1396) and his western neighbours d i d so by means of the constant attacks," there remained only one possibility to defend H u n g a r y . It became imperative that thev lay the foundation of a border defence system capable of competing effectively w i t h the enemy at the frontiers in the long r u n . Bearing this purpose in m i n d , Sigismund ordered that the border fortresses along the Lower Danube should be given into royal hands, they should be reinforced, and that new castles should be b u i l t between Szrny and Nndorfehrvr (for example Szentlszl). In a d d i t i o n , he started to place the mobile troops of the southern counties, of the banates existing since the time of the rulers of the rpd House, and the soldiers serving in the border fortresses under central control. In the diet of 1397, held in Temesvr, which was of crucial importance concerning the defence of the southern borders, he tried to enforce his intention of q u a l i f y i n g the Hungarian military organization for defence purposes by means of several military laws.
12

The reforms led to the establishment of the so-called militia portalis" by which the ruler intended to create a light cavalry of considerable number which could be deployed on the frontiers. In order to increase the number of sold iers on the borders, Serbian refugees were more and
Orientlta Academiae Scientiaruni Hungancac 33 (1979) 65-111. Idem, "The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse," in From Hunyadi to Rkczi. War and Society m late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary. (War and Society in Eastern Central E u r o p e , 3.) Ed. by Jnos M. Bak-Bla K. Kirly. Brooklyn, 1982, 141-158. C f . also Leopold K u p e l w i e s e r , Die Kampfe Ungarns mil den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohcs, 3526. Wien, 1899 . (I used these works in presenting all three subpenods, so I am not going to refer to them separately below.)
2

more frequently hired as light hussars, boatmen [naszdos) on the Danube or more increasingly, though temporarily, as peasant soldiers (vopiiks, Soidatenbauer) i n return for certain exemptions. The incomes of the country d i d not render it possible to maintain a regular army paid by the king protecting the frontiers, apart f r o m the bandrium of the ruler. In parallel to the enlargement of the defensive m i l i t a r y forces, the organization of border defence was made more coherent. The m i l i t a r y forces of the counties of the Temeskz were subordinatedthough only temporarily, for some major actionsto the high sheriff of county Temes (comes Temesiensis), w h o , at the same time, was appointed captain of the garrison soldiers, besides heading his o w n bandrium. A similar process started in the n e i g h b o u r i n g banate of Macs, l y i n g west of the Temeskz. Through personal negotiation, Sigismund, under the terms of the treaty of Tata in 1426, acquired f r o m Djordje Brankovic the castle of Nndorfehrvr (Belgrade), w h i c h was essential for the strengthening of the defence. Ten years later he attached the castle to the banate of Macs, and as a result a defence zone similar to the one i n Temeskz came into being, since the ban of Macs disposed of the m i l i t a r y forces of the n e i g h b o u r i n g counties of Baranya, Bodrog, Bcs, Szerem, and Valk. The t w o ban on the Croatian-Slavonian territories had similar m i l i t a r y authority, w h a t is more, the favourable natural e n d o w m e n t s were further enhanced by reinforcing the fords on the Sava w i t h w o o d e n forts. A t the same time, in the Temeskz, a chain of about twenty fortresses handled by the k i n g secured the defence of the border.
14

11 For the earliest attacks against Hungary, cf. Bdog Milleker, A trkknek els betrsei Dl-Magyarorszgba Zsigmond s Albert kirlyok idejben s Keve s Krass vrmegyk 1393-1439 (The First Attacks by the Ottomans megsznse. Against H u n g a r y in the Time of K i n g s der Turkenemfallc Veremes 5-23. in fur

Sigismund and Albert, and the End of Counties Keve and K r a s s f Temesvr, 1914. O n the attacks against Transylvania, cf. Gustav G u n d i s c h , Z r berlieferung "Die ersten Trkeneinflle (1396, 1415, 1418)," Zeschnft des Siebenbrgen. Kolozsvr, 1947. O n the first raids in Austrian territories, see Hans Pirchegger, Histonschen

The f o r m a t i o n of the defence n e t w o r k under relatively calm conditions was facilitated by the fact that the O t t o m a n state u n d e r w e n t one of the most critical periods of its history d u r i n g the so-called interregnum between 1402 and 1413. The H u n g a r i a n m i l i t a r y leadership, however, d i d not make use of the o p p o r t u n i t y to chase out the Ottomans. Still, due to the activity of the comes Temesiensis, Pip of Ozora (Filippo Scolari), w h o implemented the m i l i t a r y reforms of Sigismund and the Thallczi brothers (Matk and Frank), and o w i n g to the campaigns and
1 4

Steierrrmrk 18 (1922) 63-73. See also the latest s u m m a r y of the Southern Slav literature bv Vasko Simoniti, Vojaskn organtzaaja na Slovenskem v 16. stoletju. Ljubljana, 1991, 12 Elemr Mlyusz, Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn 1387-1437. Budapest, 1990, 136-166 13 It meant that well-to-do noblemen had to field one mounted archer for every 20, later, after 1435, for every 33 peasants. Andrs Borosy, "The Militia Portalts in H u n g a r y Before 1526," in From Hunyadi to Rkczi, 63-80.

At the turn of the 1430s Sigismund put the Teutonic O r d e r in charge of the bannte of with

Szrny defending the entrance at the L o w e r Danube. But his hopes in connection U n g a r n 1429-1432. Mitteilungen aus dem Staatsarchiv Knigsberg," Mitteilungen fr sterreichische Geschichtsforschung des

this plan soon failed. Erich Joachim, "Knig S i g m u n d und der Deutsche Ritterorden in Instituts Banate]," 33 (1912) 87-119, and recently Jen Glck, " A n m e t

lovagrend a X V . szzadi Bnsgban [The Teutonic O r d e r in the Fifteenth-Century Zounuk. A Jsz-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levltr vknyve 8 (1993) 33-44

10

GZA PLFFY

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G BORDER D E F E N C E S Y S T E M S

11

organizational activity of Jnos H u n y a d i i n the 1440-1450s, the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m managed to b u i l d u p a system on the southern territories of the country, w h i c h was still not coherent enough but adequate for permanent defence. 1.2. The furination of a coherent defence system: the military reforms of Matthias Corvinus and their aftermath (147S-152V Though the foundations of the border defence system were laid during Sigismund's reign, the siege of Nndorfehrvr i n 1440 indicated that those buffer states in the Balkans which had previously served to protect Hungary w o u l d soon be ruined by the Ottoman advance. I n the long r u n , neither the so-called winter campaign (1443-1444) by Jnos H u n y a d i , nor his success in Nndorfehrvr in 1456, nor even the Bosnian actions by Matthias Corvinus in 1463-1464 could stop the process by w h i c h the Hungarian military force was once and for all driven back to the frontiers of the country by the 1460s, except for the north-western Bosnian fortresses around Jajca. The nearly fifty years' 'peace-time' starting i n the mid-1460s, w h i c h was characterized by the clashes of the raiding troops of the contending parties, offered an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y for the H u n g a r i a n K i n g to u n i f y and reform the defence system constructed by his predecessors, that is to make preparations for permanent defence. The shift i n the foreign policy of Matthias C o r v i n u s (1458-1490) f r o m the South-East to the West m i g h t have served the same purposes. Presumably, he intended to create
15

an Eastern-Central-European great power w i t h material resources to be able to finance the reorganized defence line and to compete successfully w i t h the O t t o m a n Empire that had changed into a European great p o w e r w i t h the capture of Constantinople in 1453. The reorganization of the defence system was accomplished in the middle of the 1470s. The aims of the innovations were to create a more coherent defence system, which could be controlled f r o m the centre and was not divided into many political, military administrative centres, furthermore to establish an army that could be mobilized faster and i n a more unified way to protect the borders. In the southern regions from the Adriatic to the Eastern-Carpathians, Matthias Corvinus united and integrated under the command of three military officials the t w o basic elements of the defence system: on the one hand, the military forces and the network of the border
G y u l a Rzs, " H u n y a d i Mtys trk politikja [The Ottoman Kzlemnyek 22 (1975) 305-348. Policy of Matthias

fortresses, and on the other, the bandena, county and noble troops, that is the military of the areas n e i g h b o u r i n g the frontiers. This was the most decisive and most significant part of his reforms. As a first step, in 1476 Matthias united the offices of the ban of CroatiaDalmatia and Slavorua. His intention was to subordinate the commanders of border fortresses, as well as the mobile troops of the counties, barons and nobles of the area, under the unified control of the Croatian-Slavonian ban (banus Croatuie et Slavoniae) from the sea to the Lower Danube. Though he had already attempted to unify the two offices as early as in the mid-1460s, his endeavours were frustrated for a decade by the pursuits for independence of the ban of Macs, Mikls jlaki, w h o was appointed King of Bosnia in 1471."' After the occupation of Szabcs in 1476 and the death of jlaki in 1477, nothing could prevent h i m from implementing his plan. A t the same time, he organized the region of the Lower Danube into a unified border defence system, similar to the Croatian-Slavonian terntones. To this end he created the office of the captain-general of the Lower Parts (supremus capitenus paiiium regra Hungaruie inferiorum), which was, w i t h a few exceptions, assumed by the high sheriffs of county Temes. From that time on, besides their bandena of considerable numbers, the captain-generals disposed of the military forces of both the border fortresses and the neighbouring counties. A t the same time, as high sheriffs of county Temes, they were also responsible for the civil administration of the area. While the Croatian-Slavonian ban was personally m charge of the military and civil administration of Dalmatia, Old Croatia, and the Slavonian counties
17 lh

l * A n d r s K u b i n y i , " D i e Fragen des bosnischen Knigtums von N . jlaki," Studui Slavica Acadermae Scientmrum
1 7

Hungancae 8 (1958) 373-384

T h e captaincy-general of Pl Tomori (1523-1526), the Archbishop of Kalocsa, w h o had

his residence in Ptervrad and died in the battle of Mohcs, has to be r a n k e d among these. '8 It is appropriate to note here that Croatia and Slavonia as administrative and territorial notions had different meanings d u r i n g the middle ages and in the territory extended between sixteenth-eighteenth on centuries. T h e medieval ' O l d ' Croatia was situated south-west of the river Sava, and its the K a p e l l a Mountain and the A d r i a t i c Sea, bordering Slavonia in the north-east Slavonia proper was located between the D r a v a valley and the advance

Kapela Mountain, extending as far as the river Vrbas in the east. T h e Ottoman

created a completely new situation by the second half of the sixteenth century. By that time the southern parts of O l d Croatia were lost, its population sought refuge in the north, and for this reason in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries the name Croatia designated the areas stretching from the Adriatic to the Sava, then, in the eigtheenth century, to the D r a v a , w h i c h w a s formerly named Slavonia, then U p p e r Slavonia. For Slavonia proper shrank to the territory between Drava, Sava, a n d C s z m a by the 1570s. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, it included the counties Pozsega, Valk, and S z e r e m (the so-called L o w e r Slavonia), and from that time on, Slavonia meant exclusively that territory.

1 3

C o r v i n u s ] , " Hadtrtnelmi

12

G Z A PLFFY

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBL'RG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

13

of Zgrb, Vrasd, Krs, Verce, Dubica, Szana, and Orbsz, due to the reforms of Matthias, the captain-general of the Lower Parts h a d the same responsibilities over the six counties of Temeskz (Keve, Krass, Temes, Torontl, A r a d , and Csand), over the n e i g h b o u r i n g six counties of Bodrog, Bcs, Csongrd, Bks, Zarnd, and Bihar, and over the counties of Pozsega, Valk, and Szerem between the Drava and Sava, that is all the m i l i t a r y and administrative duties over the territories called the Lower Parts.' The third great u n i t of the defence line was led by the Voivode
9

peasant soldiers paid by the k i n g . ' So in case of danger, the captaingenerals of the border territories, as the leaders of the more secure interior counties, disposed of a significant n u m b e r of banderia, county and noble troops, and unanimously controlled b o t h the border fortresses and the mobile field troops. Their concrete tasks were determined by the ruler, w i t h o u t h a v i n g an independent b o d y controlling the m i l i t a r y affairsarrived at decisions on the defence of the country after consultation w i t h the Royal Council (consilium regis/regni) residing in Buda.
2 w n 0

of Transylvania (vajvoda authority.

20

Transilvaniae/Transilvaniensis)

with

the same

3.3. The fall of the defence system of the medieval Hungarian (1521-1526)

Kingdom

As a result of the reforms of Matthias Corvinus, the bases of the defence system against the Ottoman Empire laid d o w n by Sigismund of L u x e m b u r g were transformed and changed into a coherent system. At the end of the fifteenth century the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m was surrounded by a vertically and horizontally d i v i d e d , unified n e t w o r k of defence. In d e p t h it consisted of t w o parallel lines of border fortresses. The southern line stretched f r o m Szrny via Orsova, Szentlszl, Nndorfehrvr, Z i m o n y , Szabcs, Szrebernik, Jajca, and K n i n u p to Skardona and Kiissza, the second, northern line f r o m Lgos, Karnsebes, and Temesvr via Ptervrad, the m i n o r castles of the Szermsg and Dubica, K r u p a , and Bihcs to Zengg on the Dalmatian coast. The same system was divided i n t o three sections vertically together w i t h the Transylvanian territories: the Croatian-Slavonian part w i t h Bihcs as its headquarters, the area east of it ranging to Wallachia w i t h the centre of Temesvr called L o w e r Parts and the Transylvanian border area. A l l three parts had the function of serving and s u p p o r t i n g the border fortresses, in w h i c h there were several thousand Southern Slav and Hungarian garrison soldiers, boatmen, and
' For the history of the captaincy-general of the L o w e r Parts, see recently Lszl Fenyvesi, "A temeskzi-szrnysgi vgvrvidk funkcivltozsai (1365-1718) [The Changes in Function of the Border Fortress Area of the Temeskz and S z r n y s g ] , " in Vgvrak s rgik a XVI-XVII.
2 0

Before the loss of Nndorfehrvr, the key fortress of the Danube line, in 1521, the system of border defence d i d not seem to differ m u c h f r o m the network that came into being after the reforms of Matthias C o r v i n u s . While one element of the defence, however, the chain of fortresses still existed, t h o u g h in a bad state of repair, the other main component, the mobile troops of the neighbouring and inner parts of the country became practically unusable. So i n the disastrous economic, social, and political conditions of H u n g a r y in the Jagellon-era (1490-1526), the defence system became mutilated already before the fall of Nndorfehrvr. The loss of the most important castle then launched a process that culminated i n total collapse. Given the lack of a field a r m y that could be m o v e d a n d controlled quickly and coherently, Nndorfehrvr could only have been replaced by a castle of similar size and significance along the Danube. A stronghold of such strength, however, was to be found only several hundred kilometers further north, i n the centre of the country, in Buda.
22

The fall of Nndorfehrvr resulted in a huge breach in the defence line and brought about the loss of several neighbouring fortresses: Z i m o n y and Szabcs were captured i n the same year, Orsova, K n i n , and Skardona one year later, Szrny, the other b u l w a r k of the L o w e r Danube, fell i n t o Ottoman hands in 1524. The perdition of the castles entailed the loss of
2 1

szzadban. (Studia Agriensia, 14.) Eger, 1993, 238-246. captain-general of the L o w e r Parts. A l l this might be in
2 2

T h e only debatable element of the reform is w h y Nndorfehrvr d i d not become the

Cf. A n d r s K u b i n y i ' s article in the present volume Ferenc Szakly has dealt with the reasons and circumstances of the loss of the k e y

seat of the n e w l y nominated

connection with the devaluated office of the ban of Macs held by Lrinc, the son of Mikls jlaki. T h o u g h it might have seemed wiser to send the captain-general of the L o w e r Parts to Nndorfehrvr, the events afterwards justified the decision by Matthias C o r v i n u s as the office with the seat in T e m e s v r s u r v i v e d the fall of Nndorfehrvr in 1521, and continued to function until 1556 with different centres as will be discussed later on. C f . the different opinion by Ferenc Szakly, A mohcsi csata [The Battle of M o h c s i (Sorsdnt trtnelmi napok, 2.) Budapest, 1977, 55-56.
!

fortress in several studies, w h i c h obtains very useful points of reference Ferenc Szakly, "Nndorfehrvr, 1521: T h e Beginning of the E n d of the M e d i e v a l H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m , " n Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Suleyman the Budapest, 1994, 47-76. Idem, A Magnificent. Ed. by Gza Dvid and Pl Fodor mohcsi csata, 56-58, a n d

'em, " N n d o r f e h r v r 1521-es ostromhoz. E g y kirlyi a d o m n y l e v l kztrtneti tanulsgai [On the Siege of Nndorfehrvr in 1521. T h e Historical Lesson to Be D r a w n F r o m a Royal Deed of G i f t ] , " Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 25 (1978) 484-499.

14 those

GZA PLFFY

T H E HL'NCARl AN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

15

villages whose inhabitants had p r e v i o u s l y served

as

peasant

proposed to send several thousand German i n f a n t r y m e n to support Hungary. O n the basis of the documents at our disposal, it can be stated that about 2,000 i n f a n t r y m e n set off for H u n g a r y , and this was the first time w h e n there was an actual attempt by the A u s t r i a n provmces to assist in the defence of the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . - From 1522 to the defeat at Mohacs more and more frequently d i d field troops arrive f r o m the neighbouring A u s t r i a n provinces to the area controlled by the Croatian ban, but they were not placed into the border fortresses as constant garrisons y e t . T h o u g h the regular A u s t r i a n m i l i t a r y aid seemingly strengthened the defence in this section of the border, i n fact it dissolved the unified leadership of the m i l i t a r y force that had been commanded by the ban up to this time. The captain-generals (Obnstcr Feldhauptmann der nwderoblermchischen Landc) of the troops sent by the A u s t r i a n estates were appointed by the latter and were not subordinated to the ban, t h o u g h the consequences of this duality d i d not manifest themselves in these years, but only after the fall of the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m i n 1526. As the most decisive element of the defence system, the chain of fortresses still remained under the control of the ban at that time.
3 34

soldiers for a pay of some months and for different exemptions. So Sleyman the Magnificent, the new sultan (1520-1566), extinguished the southern line of the frontier fortressesexcept for Jajca and Kiisszawithin a period of some years. These castles served as stepping-stones for h i m to do away w i t h the last remnants of the second line as w e l l , except for some Croatian fortresses, in the decades after the battle of Mohcs in 1526. W i t h the collapse of the southern chain of fortresses, the H u n g a r i a n m i l i t a r y leadership lost the zone that was to have defended the whole k i n g d o m . The second, northern line in the interior of the country was not facilitated by the natural surroundings to such an extent as the previous one that was situated almost entirely along m o u n t a i n s and rivers. There was a threat that if the gaps could not be filled very fast, Ptervrad, w h i c h was chosen to substitute Nndorfehrvr, could not be reinforced, and no mobile troops were fielded, the w h o l e interior plain area of the country w o u l d soon fall. A l t h o u g h some measures were taken by the palatnus Istvn Bthorv and the captain-general of the Lower Parts Pl of the second line into a T o m o r i a i m e d at b r i n g i n g the fortresses

defensible c o n d i t i o n and at r e i n f o r c i n g t h e m w i t h p a i d i n f a n t r y m e n and bandena, these failed one after the other, due to the modest incomes of the country. As a result, the entire southern defence system inevitably collapsed in 1526, when the last units of the mobile field troops and the major border fortresses perished. The death of Louis II (1516-1526) at the same time b r o u g h t about the fall of the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . Before the collapse of the medieval border defence system, a change took place whose effects could not be felt i n the 1520s, but w h i c h proved very i m p o r t a n t i n the long r u n . A l r e a d y i n the early 1500s, Kings Vladislav I I (1490-1516) and Louis I I and the Croatian barons and nobles turned to Emperor M a x i m i l i a n 1 (1493-1519) for help to jointly avert the danger threatening the Austrian provinces as w e l l . But d u r i n g the rule of M a x i m i l i a n 1, the external military support assisting the ban of Croatia remained only a plan. H o w e v e r , after the fall of the first chain of fortresses, A r c h d u k e Ferdinand I , assessing the danger threatening the Austrian provinces governed by h i m m a i n l y Carniola (Krain), Carinthia (Kamten), and Styria (Steiermark)resigned himself to a significant step. D u r i n g the siege of Nndorfehrvr in 1521 he s u m m o n e d his estates for a special meeting and, at the request of his b r o t h e r - i n - l a w , Louis I I , he
23 Lajos T h a l l c z y - A n t a l Diplomticas Partium H o d i n k a , Magijarorszg Adnexarum). mellktartomnyainak Vol. 1. A horvt oklevltra (Codex Regno Hungurtae vghelyek oklevltra. Hunganae 1490-1527 [Archives of the Croatian Border Fortresses 1490-1527). (Monumenta 1-10

Histrica I. Diplomataria, X X X I . ) Budapest. 1903, 34-38: Nos. X X X V and L X U - L X X I I 1 : Nos. T h e year 1521 w h i c h I propose to start a new period, is both appropriate for marking the defence system of the medieval 1521. Hungarian the collapse of the first chain of fortresses and for referring to the date w h e n Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria began to support monograph (The Austrian
; j

K i n g d o m with his financial and military power. That is w h y the year 1522 in Rothenberg's Military Border) is worth modifying to In connection with this, see G u n t h e r E. Rothenberg, " T h e O r i g i n s of the A u s t r i a n MilReview 38 (1960) 493-498. Cf. also Winfried Schulze, " D i e sterreichische MilitarMitteilungen 9 (1971) 191-192 T h o u g h Rothenberg proved in

itary Frontier in Croatia and the Alleged Treaty of 22 December 1522," Slavonic and East European grenze," Militrgeschichtliche

his study published in 1960 that the alleged treaty of December 22, 1522 between L o u i s II and Ferdinand, A r c h d u k e of Austria is merely the result of a mistake by Frantisek Vanicek (F. Vanicek, op. of., 5-6) w h o misinterpreted the talks at the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) of Regensburg in 1522-1523, he (Rothenberg) was not the first to realize this. Lajos Thallczy, in his introduction to the above quoted collection of documents had already corrected the mistake (L. T h a l l o c z y - A . H o d i n k a , op. at., Nos. L V 1 I I - L X and L V L I I : n. 1). Rothenberg's often von merit is that he again drew attention to the problem, as Thallczy's results were ignored even by Hungarian scholars. Pal Szeg, op. at., Rill. Frst und Hof in sterreich Molics (7523/22 bis 3526). Bd. 1. Auenpolitik von den habsburgischen Teungsvertrgen bis zur Schlacht

13 and 32. C f . recently G e r h a r d

und Diplomatie. (Forschungen z u r Europischen

und Vergleichenden Rechtsgeschichte, 7.) W i e n - K l n - W e i m a r , 1993, 42-43: n. 17.

16

GZA PLFFY

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

17

2. THE DEFENCE SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMANS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES The defeat at Mohcs opened up a new era in the history of Hungary The country lost not only its ruler, but almost the w h o l e of its southern defence system, including both the network of border fortresses and the neighbouring parts s u p p o r t i n g them w i t h their field troops. A l l this resulted i n the establishment of Ottoman rule in H u n g a r y , the coronations of John Szapolyai I (1526-1540) and Ferdinand I (1526-1564) as kings of H u n g a r y , and the division of the country into three parts. Though the sovereignty and independence of the country d i d not entirely disappear in the f o l l o w i n g centuries, its territory became the battleground of two great powers, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire. I n 1526, however, the question was whether H u n g a r y w o u l d be able to organize a new defence system or whether it w o u l d share the fate of what had been its vassal states in the Balkans. A n d if the country was to succeed, in which part of it, in w h a t f r a m e w o r k , and under whose leadership w o u l d the new defence system come into being. 2.1.a. One and a half decades of confusion: the period of the commandersin-chief of the royal army paid by Ferdinand I of Habsburg The fifteen years after 1526 remind us of the events at the turn of middle of the fifteenth century. O n l y the performers of the Christian party had changed: n o w the Austrian provinces were in the same situation as the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m had been earlier. The question was the same: w o u l d they manage to stop the enemy in front of the borders, on the territories of H u n g a r y under the authority of Ferdinand 1, crowned the king of this country, or, as the Croatian-Slavonian ban Tams Ndasdy expressed it in his letter to Ferdinand in the summer of 1539: " I f Your H o l y Majestv does not support this country w i t h your other provinces it w i l l certainly happen that, due to the loss of this country, the other provinces of Your Holy Majesty w i l l be lost." But the extent of the danger was not adequately assessed i n Vienna at the end of the 1520s. To p u t it more accurately: even if they recognized the Ottoman threat, they d i d not have the power to act against it effectively. For the
25

rganization of a new defence systemas had been implemented on the southern frontiers of H u n g a r y i n Matthias Corvinus'- timethere was a need for a longer period of peace, for the appropriate economic and financial background and political support, for a diplomacy that was aware of the Ottoman's customs and methods, for an appropriate apparatus to organize and control the system, and last but not least for a thorough knowledge of local H u n g a r i a n circumstances. None of these conditions were met at that time. The conflict between the two rulers of Hungary brought about civil w a r conditions in the country and its annexed provinces (Slavonia and Croatia). To save his territories, John I was forced to cooperate w i t h the Ottomans, while they advanced capturing more and more fortresses in the Szeremseg and Croatia. But these southern territories of Hungary seemed far away enough from Vienna, not to mention the palace of emperor Charles V ^51 9-1556) in Toledo, for w h o m the Hungarian theatre of war was overshadowed by the Mediterranean and Italian provinces also threatened by the Ottomans. Although it was obvious to those k n o w i n g the geographical situation of Hungary that if the castles of Buda and the plain areas could not stop the Ottomans, they w o u l d get several hundred kilometers nearer the centre of the Austnan provinces. In vain did the siege of Vienna in 1529 cause a shock, the Habsburg military leadership was unable to perform the tasks of defence against the Ottomans. Though among those Austnan commanders w h o knew little about the conditions in Hungary there were some w h o realized the severe consequences of delay,
26 27 28

2 6

Gabor Barta, " A Forgotten Theatre of W a r

1526-1528 (Historical

Events and

Preceding Diplomatic

the Ottoman-Hungarian A l l i a n c e of 1528)," in Hungarian-Ottoman Relations. 93-130.

2 7

Military bis 1532.

Christine Turetschek, Die Trkenpolitik 1968. After the royal

Ferdinands I. von 1529

(Dissertationen the

der Universitt Wien, 10.) W i e n ,

2 S

troops led by Hans Katzianer

captured the castle of Szepesvr,

residence of the family Szapolyai, Ulrich Leysser chief field armoury officer meister) suggested to his ruler on March 28, 1528,

(Obrist-Feldzeug-

that the artillery arsenal here and in other Geschucz, Grniczen

places should be transported to the southern border fortresses and the ruined cannon should be cast again with the same purpose: " E u e r Kunigliche Majestt etc. hetten solh hetten Euer Kunigliche Majestt etc. new geschuez giessen v n n d die Turgkhisch klain vnd gro behaltenn, vnd die ortflegkhen gegen dem Turgkhenn damit versechenn ... damit versechen lassenn." StA Kriegsarchiv [hereinafter K A ] Alte Feldakten [hereinafter A F A ] '528/3/16 c. It is not a coincidence that it was Leysser w h o made these proposals as he had already taken part in the recruitment of the auxiliary troops commanded to Croatia from 1522 so he was among those who rightly assessed the real degTee of the Ottoman threat (see L. Thadczy-A. Hodinka, op. at.. 145-147: No. X C I and 148-149: No. XCOI).

35 " N i s i Vestra Sacratissima Maiestas alicunde ex aliis regnis suis huic regno provident, a c t u m erit de eo, et ex amissione h u i u s regni amittentur alia etiam regna Vestrae Sacratissimae Maiestatis." Wien, sterreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereinafter StA], Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereinafter H H S t A ] , Ungarische Akten (Hungarica) [hereinafter Hunganca), Allgemeine Akten [hereinafter A A ] , Fase. 39. Konv. F. 1539. Juni-Juli fols. 36-37.

18

G Z A PLF-FY

THE H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

19

Ferdinand's political, economic, and m i l i t a r y resources allowed tw things i n this period. O n the one hand, w i t h his troops sent to Hungary he g r a d u a l l y broke the p o w e r of his rival k i n g , and on the other hand' w i t h the help of the most endangered provinces of Carniola, Carinthia' and Styria, he started to reorganize under his o w n control the Croatian border defence system coordinated by the ban.
2v

and the Austrian commander-in-chief. We can assume that the parties '"ere perfectly aware of the high stakes in the struggle for the sphere of thority The p o i n t was that the w i n n e r could take charge of the Hungarian and Croatian m i l i t a r y affairs and simultaneously the control f the border defence system. So in the next fifteen years the Habsburg
m

The t w o processes took place i n a s i m i l a r framework and were accompanied by similar problems. In order to strengthen his power both in H u n g a r y and in Croatia and Slavonia, Ferdinand sent considerable numbers of foreign (mainly German) troops. These were supplemented by the paid soldiers of the H u n g a r i a n and Croatian nobles supporting the Habsburgs, and by the units of the counties and insurgent fielded under the laws of he country. The cooperation of the German and H u n g a r i a n troops was not unclouded. The question of control caused serious conflicts from the m o m e n t the first l.nmisknecht set foot on H u n g a r i a n soil, as the commander-in-chief of the troops serving in H u n g a r y or Croatia (Obnster Feldhauptmann der mederosterreichischen Lande in Ungarn/in Kroatwn) at the cost of the ' L o w e r Austrian estates' (at that time still composed of Lower Austria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria) tried to extend his authority both over the H u n g a r i a n and Croatian contingents. But according to the so-called palatnus' articles of 1485, the d e p u t y c o m m a n d i n g these troops in the absence of the king was the palatnus regni Hungri. " The situation was further complicated by the fact that this office had not been filled since 1530 and the governor (locumtenens regni Hungarme), the leader of the governorship {locumtenentta regia), created to replace the palatnus, d i d his best to keep control over the H u n g a r i a n troops. There was a similar conflict between the Croatian
3 31

litary leadership made an attempt at w h a t Sigismund of L u x e m b u r g campaigns led outside the Austrian provinces and by taking control

"nd his successors could not achieve. They tried to ensure their power b of the military affairs and border defence in such areas they sought to stop the Ottoman advance. For this purpose the economic and military power of the Austrian provinces sufficed even if Charles V was reluctant to g i
v e

support. For H u n g a r y to preserve its sovereignty and territory to

some extent, it seemed that it had to pay an enormous price in return. The Hungarian m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l officeholders and the estates formerly controlling the country and its defence had to renounce their positions in leading the m i l i t a r y . There was hardly any reassuring w a y out of the dead end. Up to the peace of Vrad in 1538 made w i t h John Szapolyai, the foreign troops led to H u n g a r y by the Austrian commanders-in-chief securedif not quite satisfactorilythe territory on w h i c h the new defence system could be organized later on. A l t h o u g h Kassa, the key to Upper Hungary remained i n the hands of John 1, and then passed to his son, John Sigismund between 1536 and 1552, an adequate counterpoint was created by s u p p l y i n g the castle of Sros w i t h a significant Habsburg garrison. The fortresses protecting Vienna (Komrom, Esztergom, Tnta, and Gyr) were similarly p r o v i d e d w i t h soldiers of various nationality (i.e. Germans and Spaniards) p a i d by k i n g Ferdinand. These military decisions, however, lacked any kind of strategy aimed at the formation of a coherent defence system. Practically, they were decisions made in an emergency situation. Between 1526 and 1541, the m i l i t a r y affairs of H u n g a r y and the annexed areas were almost exclusively controlled by the above mentioned Austrian commanders-in-chief of Ferdinand. After the battle of Mohcs the only efficient a r m y was constituted by the German troops and by the cavalry units paid also f r o m abroad but led by H u n g a r i a n and Southern Slav captains (Blint Trk, Lajos Pekry, and Pl Bakics). As the payment of these troops was covered by the ruler f r o m his A u s t r i a n provinces, his right to command them c o u l d n o t be debated. So i n these confused times

^ T h o u g h in the summer of 1528 Martin Fleugaus, the armoury officer of Ferdinand in Carniola (Zeugwart in Kram), mustered the border fortresses (Szeged, Temesvr, Csand, and L i p p a ) in Temeskz with the aim of checking how they could be strengthened to serve the purpose of defence against the Ottomans, they could not prevent them from getting into the hands of John I. StA K A A F A 1528/7/6. See also StA H H S t A Hunganca AA. Fasc. 8. Konv. 1. 1528. Jan.-Juni fols 175-176. 1000-1526. vi trvnyczikkek (Articles of 1000-1526). 3 Magyar torvnytr. (Corpus juris Hungria)
3 1

Explained and referenced by Dezs Mrkus. Budapest, 1899, 398-399: article No 4. Istvn R. Kiss, A magyar helytarttancs l. Ferdinnd korban s 1549-1551. vi leveles knyve (The H u n g a r i a n Locumtenentia under Ferdinand I and its Letter Book from 1549 to 1551). Budapest, 1908, a n d Gyz Ember, " A helytarti hivatal trtnethez a X V I . szzadban [To the History of the Locumtenentia in the Sixteenth C e n t u r y ] , " in Emlkknyv szletsnek hatvanadik vforduljnak nnepre. Budapest, 1938, 142-156. Szentptery Imre

20

GZA PLFFY

THE HUNGAR1AN-HABSBURG BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

21

the 'task' of the governors (locumtenens regni Hungri)

in Pozsony was

only to consult the commanders-in-chief not well-versed in the H u n g a r i a n conditions and to quarrel about the spheres of authority. The real military assistants of the c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f were the f i e l d m a r s h a l s (Feldmarschall) commanded to help him and the w a r councillors (verordnete Knegsrdte) either staying beside h i m or in V i e n n a i n c l u d i n g a war secretary (Knegssckretdr):'' So in this period a new military administrative organization came into being, which, though subject to changes in its personnel, showed some signs of stability and became of great significance as the precedent of the Aulic War Council (Wiener Hofknegsrat). In Croatia the changes in the m i l i t a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and border defence were similar and even faster than in H u n g a r y . John I , after the death of his captain-general and ban* Kristf Frangepn in September 1527, had less power to support his followers there. After the resignation in 1528 of Ferenc Batthyny, the Croatian-Slavonian ban w h o had supported Ferdinand, the vacancy of the office offered an excellent opportunity to curtail the sphere of authority of the ban, and the locumtenens in Pozsony had hardly any w o r d in the direction of these remote territories. At the same time, the Ottomansas in the next one and a half centuriesregarded this territory as a secondary theatre of w a r besides the main Hungarian front in its narrow sense. In spite of this fact, the Austrian provinces were mostly threatened in these areas i n this period, and therefore the estates of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria soon managed to transfer control of this section of the defence system of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom to Archduke Ferdinand and reorganize it for their own protection.
34

but it d i d not entailand it could not w i t h i n the medieval H u n g a r i a n Kingdomthe transformation of the defence system. However, Ferdinand I m his capacity as K i n g of Hungary and Croatia, sent troops paid by his Austrian estates to the castles of Zengg and Kiissza in 1527 and to Bihcs after the resignation of Ferenc Batthyny in 1528. In addition to t a k i n g charge of the major border fortresses, more and more field troops also arrived in the Sava region to stop the Ottoman raids, and their commanders-in-chief (Mikls Jurisics, Hans Katzianer) began to organize the border fortresses under royal administration into a coherent system. As a first step, in 1538 they set up the post of the captain-general whose responsibility encompassed the region called the O l d Croatian confines (alte krabatische/kroatische Grenze) in later sources. In the last days of A p r i l , w h e n the ban Pter Keglevich, defending Bihcs again, renounced his control over the castles he had been in charge of, Ferdinand a p p o i n t e d Erasm v o n T h u r n the captain-genera! of Zengg, Bihcs, Ripacs, and Otocsc, and the m i n o r fortresses belonging to them, that is of the O l d Croatian confines. W i t h the appointment of T h u r n the construction of the western section of the Croatian border defence system extending f r o m the Una to the Adriatic Sea actually started, and the w o r k was continued by the commanders-in-chief in Croatia and Slavonia (Obnstcr Feldhauptmann windischer und krabatischer/kroatischer Lande) appointed after 1540, firstly by Hans U n g n a d . ' In accordance w i t h the practice followed i n the case of the commanders-in-chief in H u n g a r y they were also assisted by
35 36 3

35 L . T h a l l c k z y - A . Hodinka, op. at., 671: No Nos. D X X X U - D X X X V and LV11.

3 6

D X X I V , 672-674: No. D X X V I and 677-686: confinia T u r c h a r u m iacentium locis ... in

Thus the Habsburg military administration started to f o r m the first unit of the new defence system against the Ottomans i n the Croatian border area. It has already been mentioned as a precedent that after 1521 field troops paid by the Austrian estates regularly marched to Croatia,

"Pro

conservandis

partium

istarum

ad

C a p i t a n e u m assumpsimus et constituimus attinentiis curam administrationemque

illique Castrorum et O p p i d o r u m

nostrorum eorundem Capitaneum nostrorum

Bihigij et Repatz, Civitatisque nostrae Segmensis et Ottoschutz c u m omnibus d e m a n d a v i m u s " , and " i n s u p r e m u m

u n i v e r s o r u m regni nostri Croatiae locorum finimorum simul et gentium ibidem nostrorum, nec non Civitatis nostrae Segnensis et Attatschvz ac praeterea et o p p i d o r u m Bihigij et Repath assumpsimus ct constituimus." StA H H S t A Hungarica A A . Fasc. 35

On the war councillors, see the Hungarica collection of OStA H H S t A ( A A . Fase 2 -Fase. 70. passen) from the period 1526-1550 "Cnstoforus de Frangepanibus rcgnorum Dalmaciae, Croaciae et Sclavoniae banus ac capitaneus regius generalis" (Vehke. August 27, 1527) O S t A H H S t A Hungarica A A Fasc. 7. Konv. 3. 1527. fol. 38. Cf. Gbor Barta, La route qui mne Istanbul 1526-1528. (Studia Histrica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 195.) Budapest, 1994, 12-13 and 86. On the help given by the Styrian estates: Gnther Burkert, Ferdinand I. und die stemschen Stande Dargestellt anhand der stemschen Lmdlagc 57-173. 1526-1541. (Inaugural-Diss.) G r a z , 1976,

K o n v . 1. 1538. Apr. fols. 94-95. Cf. ibid., fols 86-87, 89, 93 and 96-99.
1 7

Budapest, Magyar Orszgos Levltr [hereinafter M O L ] E 144, Magyar kincstri levl-

trak, Magyar Kamara Archvuma [hereinafter M K A j Trtnelmi emlkek. Belgy box 1 fols. 63-64. January 12, 1540. Without place The Bestallung of Ferdinand I for H a n s U n g n a d "Oberister V e l d h a w b t m a n vnnserer Funff Niderosterrcichischen, W i n d i s c h e n v n d Crabatischen L a n n d e " . Cf. Bernd Zimmermann, " L a n d e s h a u p t m a n n H a n s U n g n a d von Sonnegg (1493-1564). E i n Beitrag z u seiner Biographie," in Siedlung, Macht und Wirtschaft. E d . by Gerhard Pferschy. Graz, 1981, 210. Festschrift Fritz Posch zum 70. Geburtstag. (Verffentlichungen des Steiermrkischen L a n d e s a r c h i v s , 12.)

22

G Z A PLFFY

THE HUNGAR1AN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

23

war councillors delegated by n e i g h b o u r i n g provinces. " In parallel to this the settlement of and offering of privileges to the Vlachs (Valaclu) and Uskoks (Uscoci) started i n the Croatian-Slavonian areas, whose certain groups later on played an i m p o r t a n t role in the defence of border fortresses and then f r o m the eighteenth century i n th m i l i t a r y frontiers.* In the p e r i o d lasting f r o m the battle of Mohcs to the fall of Buda the formation of a new defence system was initiated by the Habsburg m i l i t a r y leadership only i n the Croatian border area between Zengg and Bihcs. Ferdinand I took the necessary steps only in the territories mostly threatened by the Ottomans and even if he recognized the real nature of this danger (namely that Vienna was also menaced) he was unable to create a coherent defence system to avoid it. W i t h his troops regularly sent to Croatia-Slavonia and H u n g a r y each year, he only spontaneously retorted his r i v a l k i n g John I ; at the same time, he commissioned commanders-in-chief to take charge of the m i l i t a r y affairs and border defence in H u n g a r y . A n d t h o u g h he d i d not seek to organize a new defence system in these far away areas of H u n g a r y , that is he was not energetically i n v o l v e d against the Ottomans, w i t h these steps he still ensured those regions where later on the new chain of fortresses could be built u p as the basis for the organization of the new defence system. He could also benefit from the serious mistakes committed by the Ottoman m i l i t a r y leadership; i n 1529 and 1532, Sleyman I w i t h d r e w his troops to the line of the Lower Danube and Drava and d i d not retain those fortresses w h i c h afterwards faced h i m as the b u l w a r k s of the new defence n e t w o r k and c o u l d only be regained at the expense of severe losses.
3

Croatian areascould be postponed, n o w there was no further possibility f delay due to the threat to Styria, Lower Austria (Niedersterreich), and Vienna. Immediate action was needed in the Slavonian parts, i n H u n g a r y , and particularly in the foreground of Vienna, w h i c h the Ottomans had already menaced by m a r c h i n g to the Austrian frontiers. The pattern and the methods were given: border defence regions had to be f o r m e d that were similar to those w h i c h used to protect the southern borders of the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m ; the basis had already been established in the Croatian border zone. This was no easy tasknot only for financial or military reasons. W h i l e the m i l i t a r y leaders of the estates of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria i n the Croatian territories already had a certain knowledge of the place and some practice in the basics of h o w to create a defence line, the leaders of the endangered L o w e r Austria c o u l d only start their job w i t h the help of the commander-in-chief delegated by them and of the H u n g a r i a n estates. A t the same time, the opposite was true as well. It was not by chance that the estates of H u n g a r y , whose territory decreased to the shape of a crescent, stressed so many times m the following years that, for the maintenance of the border fortresses, "there is a need for the financial and m i l i t a r y assistance of the H o l y I m p e r i a l and Royal Majesties and of the Imperial Princes... because the H u n g a r i a n war tax (subsidium) alone cannot cover all these at a l l . " The parties fighting for control over the H u n g a r i a n m i l i t a r y affairs were forced to cooperate in order to survive. Fortunately, there were politicians and military leaders on both sides w h o understood the real consequences of the lack of cooperation.
4 0

2.1.b. The first attempts to organize a new defence system

(1541-1556)

The fall of Buda in 1541 and of the fortresses of Sikls, Pcs, Szkesfehrvr, Tata, Ngrd, H a t v a n , then of Esztergom on the Danube, a n d the loss of Valp and Atyina in Slavonia d u r i n g the 1543-1544 campaign justified those few w h o were of the opinion already i n the 1530s that these fortresses w o u l d have to be reinforced and a new defence system covering the w h o l e country organized. The repeated advance of the Ottomans created a completely new situation. W h i l e up to this point the creation of the new s y s t e m w i t h the exception of the most endangered
3 Schulze, Landesdefension, 60-61. Banditry, Adriatic. Ithaca-London, 1992.

T h o u g h the H u n g a r i a n estates elected t w o captain-generals of the country (supremus capitaneus regm Hungri, Obrister Landeshauptmann in Ungam) at the diet of Besztercebnya in 1542," they c o u l d not f u l f i l their tasks due to the lack of financial resources. The districts of those fortresses that could be fitted into a new line were ruined o w i n g to the O t t o m a n

4 0

" S u b s i d i u m vel pecuniarum, vel gentium Sacrae Caesareae et Regiae Majestatum

ac

imperii p n n c i p u m omnino est necessarium..., nam H u n g a r i c u m per se s u b s i d i u m ad ista omnia h a u d q u a q u a m satis futurum esse, j a m majestas sua intelligit." 1547: article 16. lmnytr. 198-199. A n t a l Fglein, " X V I . szzadi kzigazgatstrtneti adatok Z l y o m v r m e g y b l [Data on the Administrative History of C o u n t y Z l y o m in the Sixteenth C e n t u r y ) , " Szzadok 57-58 (1923-1924) 474: n. 1. (Corpus Juris Hungria) 1526-1608. rvnyczikkek [Articles of Accompanied by explaining notes by Dezs Mrkus [hereinafter C/HJ. Budapest, Magyar 1899, 1526-1608).

3^ Kaser, op. at., 60-79. Catherine W e n d y Bracewell, The Uskoks of Sen/. Piracy, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century

24

C.7.A P A L F F Y

HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

25

campaigns so their upkeep and the payment of soldiers could not be covered bv their diminished incomes. Realizing this, the Hungarian estates asked Ferdinand I i n 1546 to care for the fortresses of Domb, Kaposjvr Somogyvr, Lak, Szigetvr, Tihany, Csesznek, and Szentmrton m Transdanubia, for Sg, Pszt, Drgely, Szcsny, Bujk, and Lva north-east of the Danube w i t h the help of his Austrian provinces, as these fortresses had been deprived of all their incomes by the O t t o m a n a d v a n c e " Bv this time the Ottomans quickly moved forward despite their military mistakes, for after their occupation of the fortresses in the Szermsg there were no natural obstacles (mountains, major rivers or marshy areas) u p to Lake Balaton or the N o r t h e r n and Transdanubian M o u n t a i n s w h i c h could have stopped them. The field troops led by the royal commanders-in-chief were not able to counterbalance the disadvantages d e r i v i n g f r o m the natural surroundings so the fortresses enumerated by the estates could rely on only d i m i n i s h e d support. W h i l e before 1521 all the m i l i t a r y and financial resources of the country could be mobilized in order to protect the t w o southern border castles defence lines, bv the late 1540s this task was m a i n l y entrusted to the Austrian provinces and to the German Empire. In v a i n d i d the H u n g a r i a n estates try to finance the fortresses from the war tax (subsidnim or dica) of the decreased country in 1546; and later too, their efforts resulted each time in f a i l u r e .
41

more and more frequently turned to their ruler for help. The reason for this was that the Croatian-Slavonian ban, g r a d u a l l y deprived of the military authority he had possessed before the battle of Mohcs, w a s unable to protect this territory effectively w i t h the infantry and cavalry troops consisting of only a few h u n d r e d people paid by the k i n g f r o m the dica, that is he remained as helpless w i t h o u t the support of the neighbouring Austrian provinces as the t w o captain-generals of the country elected by the H u n g a r i a n estates. In the foundation of the new defence system in the 1540s, a decisive role was played by N i k l a s Graf zu Salm, royal commander-in-chief, and Pal Vrday, Archbishop of Esztergom and lucumtcncns. Salm, c o m m a n d er-in-chief for the whole theatre of w a r against the Ottomans (Obrister Feldhauptmann der Krone Ungarn, der Windischen, Kroatischen und Niedersterreichischen Lande)' * and appointed in 1546, had a better w o r k i n g relationship than his predecessors w i t h the locumtenens and w i t h the Transdanubian captain-general (supretnus capitnneus partium Transdanubianarum) and the 'Cisdanubian' captain-genera) (supremus capitnneus partium Cisdanubtanarum) appointed to the territories north and east of the D a n ube. The process w h i c h resulted in the f o r m a t i o n of a coherent defence system r a n g i n g f r o m the Adriatic Sea to the Transylvanian border in twenty years was the f r u i t of their w o r k starting at the turn of the 1550s. Furthermore, the methods w h i c h were a l w a y s applicable in their perfected forms if n e w defence zones had to be created against the O t t o m a n advance, came into being in this period. A n d though the m i l i t a r y leadership in Vienna was still far f r o m organizing the defence on the basis of a coherent strategy, the many forced measures b r o u g h t their first results by 1556. The restructuring w o r k was hampered bv the fact that most of the castles to be included i n the new system of fortresses were privately o w n e d at that time. A n outstandingly i m p o r t a n t task of Salm, Vrdav, and their successors was either to take these fortresses entirely i n t o r o y a l use (Szigetvr, Eger, Gyula) or to make sure that the royal garrison should be placed i n the private ones (Papa, Csesznek, Devecser). Sometimes n e w fortresses (Olhjvr)mainly palisadeswere erected, t h o u g h this was still not c o m m o n practice. It was of more importance, t h o u g h , that several m i n o r forts were strengthened in the district of royal castles and were
1

From all this the m i l i t a r y leadership i n Vienna came to the conclusion that the field troops occasionally sent to H u n g a r y and Croatia-Slavonia were not sufficient to protect their provinces. Lower Austria and Styna were n o w faced w i t h the same task as Carniola and C a r i n t h i a w h i c h had been financing the O l d Croatian border for a decade. Their o d d support, often granted yearly, but still depending o n the extent of the O t t o m a n menace had to be replaced by constant p a r t i c i p a t i o n . W h i l e L o w e r Austria, i n order to survive, had to undertake the s u p p l y of the fortresses protecting Vienna and its district and the castles north of Lake Balaton, Styria had the same job concerning the border fortresses of Slavonia shrunken to the territories between the Sava and Drava west of Pozsega. A t the same time, the estates of Carniola and Carinthia were confronted w i t h new tasks from the 1550s on as the owners of the fortresses in the region from Bihcs to Sziszek and n o r t h of the river Una

a r h c l " e

^ T s l s T ^

a c

P"

*P**

*un ."
t

154*

StA

H H S t A Hungarica

AA

Fasc. 54.

1546-1547

fols. 14-29. Contemporary

copy

M O L E 554 M K A Vrosi s kamarai iratok. Fol. Lat. 851

(Vienna, March 21, 1546).

26

G Z A PL F F Y

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H ABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

27

m a n n e d f r o m large fortresses and that the castles, mansions and cloisters not f i t t i n g i n the system were destroyed. But these actions were always accomplished i n the last m i n u t e so the establishment of the n e w defence n e t w o r k proceeded quite haltingly; and the abandoned castles that were not b l o w n u p often became very i m p o r t a n t elements i n the Ottoman system of strongholds i n H u n g a r y . The taking over of the castles by the king and the supply of them with soldiers were followed by their fortification. However, most of the construction w o r k s in this period were not subject to comprehensive controls and b u i l d i n g s were not constructed according to modern architectural procedures but in a rough-and-ready way, mainly by building palisades made of soil and beams. The exception to this rule was the fortification of the strategically most important castles such as Esztergom, Komrom, Gyr, Szolnok, Eger, and Kassa under the direction of Italian professional m i l i t a r y architects hired by the Vienna high c o m m a n d . A t the same time, there were halts i n the war supplies and provision of food, and the use of German and Hungarian soldiery together caused some further problems so far u n k n o w n to the Habsburg military leadership. Though in order to defend the hinterland provinces they started to create a system of signalling w i t h gunshots and fires (Kreidschuss- und Kreidfeuersystem)" the whole defence line still d i d not w o r k effectively enough. To develop this border defence into a coherent system there was a need for a central directing body that c o u l d govern them according to the same concept. But before the establishment of this i n 1556 the formation of the units of the new defence system began, if not i n integrated frameworks. The following table provides information on these defence zones, the cavalry and infantry troops serving in them, and on the monthly and annual costs of their pay.
45 46 48

T h

, organization of the defence system against the Ottomans and the number and payment of the soldiers in the border fortresses, 1D56
Number of fortresses Number of infantry 565 dumber of cavalry 241 Total monthly payment 6433 r. f. 50 k. Total a n n u a l payment 77 206 r. f.

^Id^^roatiaTTci^

2 major fortresses + minor ones

"vv^ndislTconftnes

15 + field troops

944

900

9263 r. f 21 k.

I l l 160 r f. 12 k. 28 056 r. f. 97 730 r. f. 15 k.

^rToopT^ed by the ban Border fortresses around Szigetvar Sziget + minor ones Border fortresses around G y o r Komarom Confines protecting the mining towns Border fortresses in Upper Hungary Captaincy-general of the L o w e r Parts min. 4 + field troops min. 2 + field troops Imperial troops in Transylvania Total about 50 1 7 8

200 1080

300 826

2338 r. t. 8144 r. f. 11 k. 1 d.

1874

987

11 933 r. f. 36 k.

143 203 r. f. 12 k. 69 456 r. f. 80 539 r. f.

928 "
5

150 826

5788 r. f. 6711 r. f. 35 k.

762

1375

51

859"

10 250 r. f.

123 000 r. i.

250

915

4927 r. f. 5 k.

59 125 r. f.

1000

2000

13 000 r. f.

156 000 r. f.

8978

8004

78 789 r. f. 38 k. 1 d .

945 475 r. f. 39 k.

4 5

V i d o r Pataki, " A X V I . szzadi vrpts M a g y a r o r s z g o n [The Fortification of Castles Trtneti Intzet vknyve 1 (1931) del 1975,

R. f - R h e n i s h forint; k=Kreuzer; d=Pfennig

in H u n g a r y in the Sixteenth C e n t u r y ] , " A Bcsi Magyar 98-132.

4 6

E n d r e Marosi, "Partecipazione

di architetti

militari veneziani alia costruzione

4 9

I counted the 24-person auxiliary staff of the c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f i n c l u d i n g the artil-

sistema delle fortezze d i confine in Ungheria tra il 1541 e il 1593," in Rapporti veneto-ungheresi all'epoca del Rmascimento 195-215.
4 7

lerymen serving in the fortressesin the infantry.

5 0

(Studia Humanitatis, 2.). E d . by Tibor K l a n i c z a y . Budapest, or Larmmrscr

T h e 928 infantrymen consisted of 528 H u n g a r i a n boatmen (naszados) (Landsknecht).

and 400 G e r m a n

G e r m a n Mrser

zu Kreidschssen

= Latin mortanum pro dando signo seu = Croatish 1955/56.

infantrymen
5 1

rumore or bombarda ad sonum apta = H u n g a r i a n hrlv mozsr or hrpattanty Fernmeldewesens

4

I included in this figure the muster master (Mustermeister),

the muster scribe inspector

(Muster(Kriegs-

glasnik a n d T u r k i s h haberdar. Simoniti, op. cit., 169-179. G u s t a v Otruba, " Z u r Geschichte des in sterreich," in Technologisches Cewerbemuseum. Jahresbericht V i e n n a , 1956, 15-43. 1556: StA H H S t A Hungarica A A . Fase. 76. K o n v . 1. 1556. Jan.-Juii fols. 16-37.

schreiber), the w a r paymaster (Knegszahlmeister), zahlmeister-Kontrolleur)

and the war paymaster

w h o were employed to supply the fortresses from Pozsony to G y u l a ,

and also the 125 infantrymen calculated from the amount of p a y they received in the castle of Saros. Together w i t h the 59 coach-horses (Postpferd)
5 2

used in H u n g a r y .

28

GZA

PLFFY

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

29

U p to 1556 there were no essential changes in the organization of the O l d Croatian confines established by 1538. Their fortresses were d i v i d e d into t w o captaincies (Hauptmannscluift), the castle districts of Zengg (Otocsc, Brinje, Brlog) and Bihcs (Ripacs, Szokol, Izacsics, and Toplicski t u r a n j ) . I n a d d i t i o n to their garrison, the troops of the border zone i n c l u d e d the soldiers serving in the guard-houses (German Skart, Skarthaus; Latin excubia; H u n g a r i a n gr; T u r k i s h cardakf* and i n the forests paid b y the ruler (Skartleut), whose task wasaccording to a contemporary d o c u m e n t t o watch day and n i g h t and signal i n case of a raid by the enemy.' The sailors on the Adriatic Sea, w h o played an i m p o r t a n t role in c o n t r o l l i n g the coastline south of Zengg, belonged to this organization as w e l l . Besides the troops of the commander-in-chief, the Croatian border area was defended by the bans Pter Keglevich and T a m s Ndasdy (1537-1542), then f r o m 1542 b y ban Mikls Zrnyi (1542-1556) w i t h a few h u n d r e d of his cavalry and infantry, especially on the territories r a n g i n g f r o m Bihcs to Sziszek along the Una and the Kulpa.
53 5

commanders-in-chief (Verwalter der obristen Feldhauptmannschaft) several rimes, after his death i n 1550, the title of the commander-in-chief of Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia was d i v i d e d into t w o parts. W h i l e his tasks in H u n g a r y were assigned to Sforza Pallavicini appointed f i e l d marshal (Obrister Feldmarschall in Ungarn, supremus bellicus mareschallus in Hungria), Hans U n g n a d became commander-in-chief i n the C r o a t i a n Slavonian border area (Obrister Feldhauptmann an den imndischen und kroatischen Grenzen) i n 1553. In the control of this second defence r e g i o n and i n the communication w i t h the three provinces p a y i n g the soldiers, assistance was p r o v i d e d by a Styrian, a Carniolan, and a Carinthian w a r councillor, apart f r o m the field marshal (Feldmarschall) i n the mid-1550s. The personnel of the commander-in-chief also included a muster master (Mustermeister), a w a r paymaster (Knegszahlmeister), a p r o v i s i o n officer (Proviantmeister); furthermore, on the Croatian border a special d e p u t y (Leutnant) was also c o m m a n d e d to help h i m .
% 57

Since the Ottomans were gradually advancing on the Slavonian territories between the Drava and the Sava in the 1540s, in order to defend Styria, the foundations of the so-called Wendish, that is Slavonian border defence zone (windische Grenze) were relatively q u i c k l y laid. Soldiers paid by the Stynan estates were sent to the border fortresses of the river valleys (Lnya, Cszma, Drava) south and south-east of Vrasd, w h i c h were supported by the field troops of the commander-in-chief, even occasionally by the army of the ban i n case of a major O t t o m a n raid. In addition to the 1,800 royal troopssimilarly to the Croatian border lineseveral nobles had their o w n armies, w h i c h also took part i n the defence of the more and m o r e threatened part of the country, though these were not subordinated to the commander-m-chief. N i k l a s Graf zu Salm appointed in 1546 w o r k e d in H u n g a r y , w h i c h was more endangered than Slavonia, therefore, as he had been represented in this border region by his assistant
Radoslav Lopasic, Spomcma hrvatske krajme (Acta histrim confirm militaris Croatia illustrancia). III. Od godme 1693 do 1780 i u dodatku od g. 1531 do 1730. (Monumenta Spectantia H i s t r i m S l a v o r u m M e n d i o n a l i u m , XX.) Zagreb, 1889, 390-391: No. III.
5 3 5 4

The establishment of the n e w defence zones i n H u n g a r y was m o s t rapid on territories protecting Vienna and Lower Austria. A n i m p o r t a n t step in this d i r e c t i o n w h i c h also determined later developmentswas s that, i n parallel to the appointment of Salm as commander-in-chief i n 1546, the fortresses n o r t h of Lake Balaton (Gyr, Ppa, Veszprm, a n d Szentmrton) were supplied w i t h soldiers paid by the L o w e r A u s t r i a n estates. Thus the organization of a border fortress zone was also i n i t i a t e d
58

in H u n g a r y , a zone similar to both the one that had existed before the battle of Mohcs and the one that had already taken shape i n Croatia. That this new defence u n i t was of extreme importance to Vienna is s h o w n by the fact that i n its eight fortresses there were many more soldiers in 1556 than i n the t w o dozen castles of the O l d Croatian and Slavonian confines protecting the three Inner Austrian provinces.

3 6

See note 65. [ F H K A J , Hofkammerarchiv [hereinafter H K A ]

57 Lopasic, op. cit., 1889, 420-426: No. X V . 5 StA Finanz- u n d Hofkammerarchiv Niedersterreichische K a m m e r R N 46. 1566. Jan. (without fols.) and ibid., H o f f i n a n z U n g a r n [hereinafter: H F U ] R N 2. 1546. fols. 48. a/ 1-18. See also Lajos Gecsenyi, " U n g a r i s c h e S t d t e im Vorfeld der T r k e n a b w e h r sterreichs. Z u r Problematik der u n g a r i s c h e n w i c k l u n g , " in Archiv und Forschung. Stdteentfr Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung Wien-Mnchen, 1993,

See the picture of a typical example in Vojna Krajina, supra, 33. " T a g und nacht zwischen den trkischen Schlssern auf der Wacht Hegen mssen." 1915, were employed on the Croatian border later, too. In 1573 for example 1573/11/1.

5 5

S n d o r Takts, Rajzok a trk vilgbl [Sketches from the Ottoman World], II. Budapest, 70: n. 2. Skartleuts eight g u a r d s were serving " a m Wasserflus V n n a " : StA K A A F A

die Geschichte sterreichs und Europas. (Wiener Beitrge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 20/1993.) E d . by Elisabeth Springer u n d Leopold Kammerhofer. A n g e l i k a Hametner, 1970, 84. Die niedersterreichischen 64-65, and Landtage von 1530-1564. (Phil. D i s s . ) W i e n ,

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PLFFY

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31

U p to his death in spring 1550, N i k l a s Graf zu Salm controlled the defence of the country and started to fashion the new defence system w i t h his d e p u t y , his w a r councillors and his secretary, and w i t h the locumtenens Pl Vrday (died i n 1549), cooperating w i t h h i m efficiently. He was greatly assisted by Tams Ndasdy, the Transdanubian and Andrs Bthory, the Cisdanubian captain-general of the c o u n t r y . While Ndasdy, after the royal taking over of Szigetvr in 1546, tried to create a coherent system out of the castles south of Lake Balaton and the ones protecting his estate of Kanizsa (Szigetvr, Kaposvr, Domb, Lak, Berzence, Babcsa, Segesd, Kiskomrom, etc.) w i t h the help of the captain of Szigetvr under his captaincy-general,^ Andrs Bthory attempted to f u l f i l similar tasks in Upper H u n g a r y . M e a n w h i l e , in 1551, w i t h the help of George M a r t i n u z z i , there was an unsuccessful a t t e m p t to place T r a n s y l v a n i a under Habsburg leadership. W h i l e Ferdinand I sent a major army to the principality led by Gianbattista Castaldo, the Ottomans captured fortresses of crucial importance (Veszprm, Palota, Drgely, Szcsny, Hollk, Bujk, Sg, Gyarmat) d u r i n g their 1552 campaign. O n l y the heroic f i g h t i n g of the garrison of Eger could stop the enemy threatening the u p p e r parts of the country. But Szolnok and Temesvr were occupied and h a d to be replaced b y Gyula and Vrad, as in 1550, after the taking of Temesvr for Ferdinand, the Vienna h i g h c o m m a n d had tried to reorganize the captaincy-general of the L o w e r Parts (capitaneatus partium regm Hungri inferiorum) created by Matthias C o r v i n u s i n the mid-1470s as part of the new defence system. In accordance w i t h the medieval concept, considerable number of soldiers were sent to Temesvr and the neighbouring m i n o r fortresses; furthermore, an attempt was made to mobilize the nearby counties in the hinterland to defend these strongholds, though they were rather exhausted by the Ottoman devastation. The loss of T e m e s v r and Szolnok i n effect shattered this experiment. A n d although in 1554 the office often called i n this time the captaincy-general of the areas beyond the Tisza (supremus capitaneatus partium Transtibiscanarum) was held by the Bishop of Vrad and laterafter Vrad was attached to Transylvania (1557)by the captain of Gyula, it was only a matter of time before the remnants of the captaincy-general organized in

the southern parts of the country in the 1470s submitted to O t t o m a n advance. The occupation of the fortresses in county Ngrd i n 1552 and of Flek t w o years later cut an enormous wedge into the country u n d e r Ferdinand I's rule. There was a chance that the Ottomans w o u l d sever the connection between the territories near Vienna and the areas and fortresses on the t w o banks of the Tisza. A t the same time, the m i n i n g towns situated in H u n g a r y along the river Garam, still p r o v i d i n g a lion's share of incomes i n the d i m i n i s h e d country, passed into the forefront of Ottoman conquest. Vienna regarded their p r o t e c t i o n s i m i l a r l y to the significant Upper H u n g a r i a n partsas extremely i m p o r t a n t . After the fall of Flek in 1554, they placed Jnos Balassa, the high sheriff and captain of Zlyom (comes and capitaneus Zoliensis) in charge of the border fortresses defending the m i n i n g towns f r o m Lva to Divny (Lva, Korpona, Bozk, Zlyom, Kkk, Divny, Libetbnya, etc.). Balassa held this office called the captain-general of the m i n i n g t o w n s (supremus capitaneus civitatum montanarum) u p to 1562. Similar tasks were fulfilled i n Upper H u n g a r y by Gbor Pernyi (1554-1555), the successor of Andrs Bthory, w h o was appointed V o i v o d e of Transylvania (1552-1553), and by Istvn Dersffy, the captain of Kassa (1556-1557) after Pernyi deserted to John S i g i s m u n d . Albeit the instruction sent to field marshal Sforza Pallavicini i n November 1552 decreed that all the soldiers in the border fortresses n o r t h ,
61 62 63 64

> A s u m m a r y

of all this: Gza Plffy, "Vdelmi ve/etek

a Tisztl keletre a X V I

szzadban [Defence Zones East of the River T i s z a in the Sixteenth C e n t u r y ] " in In memonam Barta Gbor. Tanulmnyok
6 1

Barta Gbor emlkre. E d . by Istvn L e n g v r i . Pcs, 1996, 209-227. 1554. Eme histonsch-auellenExpansion 1994. Z l y o m , July 9, 1555. die 8. Martii s u p r e m u s t'ol. 7. regm un ostlichen Mitteleuropa. (Zur Kund Sdost-

Mrkus Khbach, Die Eroberung von Flek durch die Osmanen Sludie zur osmanischen

krittsche
6 2

europas, 11/18.) W i e n - K l n - W e i m a r , of Jnos Balassa to T a m s N d a s d y

6 3

M O L E 185 M K A A r c h v u m familiae N d a s d y [hereinafter E 185], Missiles. T h e letter O n the appointment of Pernyi: " A n n o C h n s t i 1554.

Ungariae dux et capitaneus a rege Ferdinando constiruitur." Budapest, O r s z g o s Szchnyi Knyvtr [hereinafter O S z K [ , Kzirattr [hereinafter K t ] Fol. L a i . 1402. Agreement with h i m on the payment of his soldiers: M O L E 211 M K A L y m b u s Series II. Item 24. fols. 74-75.
6 4

For these smaller castles, see Csaba Csorba, "Erdtett s vrr alaktott kolostorok a into in the Ottoman Era],"

D l - D u n n t l trk kori v g v r i rendszerben [Cloisters Fortified a n d C o n v e r t e d Castles in the South-Transdanubian System of Border Fortresses Somogy megye mltjbl. Levltri vknyv 5 (1974) 13-47.

Dersffy's instruction: Kosice, Archv Mesta Kosic, Collectio Schwartzenbachiana 8. H i s appointment:

No.

1780 and O S t A K A A F A 1557/6/ad Fasc. 11. No. 35.

M O L E 142 M K A Acta publica

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33

west, and east of the Danube were to obey h i m / this d i d not come into effect except for the castles south-east of Gyr designated as his headquarters. '' I n the curtailment of Pallavicini's authority those interests can be recognized w h i c h motivated the t w o captain-generals of the country and first of all Tams Ndasdy, appointed palatnus i n 1554. They d i d not w a n t to give u p the leadership of the defence system or at least active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n it. A n d the successes of the Ottomans between 1552 and 1554 prevented the Habsburg m i l i t a r y leadership and Pallavicini from s o l v i n g the p r o b l e m of a u t h o r i t y amongst the most urgent defence measures. The n e w system could not be organized w i t h o u t the Hungarian landowners and m i l i t a r y leaders possessing castles near the border and well-versed i n warfare against the Ottomans (such as Ndasdy, Balassa, Bthory, Pernyi, Dersffy, Ferenc Tahy, or Jnos Krusith), not to mention the Croatian-Slavonian bans. The reason for this was that there were scarcely any L o w e r or Inner Austrian m i l i t a r y leaders at that time w h o c o u l d have efficiently replaced the H u n g a r i a n nobles k n o w i n g the H u n g a r i a n m i l i t a r y and political situation. It seemed advisable to involve the H u n g a r i a n s in controlling certain units of the defence system at the expense of some compromise. As palatimis, Ndasdy was practically in charge of the fortresses around Szigetvr south of Lake Balaton; Jnos Balassa organized the castles protecting the m i n i n g towns; Gbor Pernyi and then Istvn Dersffy undertook the military control of the Upper Parts of the country east of county Gmr (partes superiores).
5 6

central control at that time. I n the long r u n , however, the v a r i e d zones and units of the system could not be efficiently operated w i t h o u t the coordination of the central m i l i t a r y administration because i t was at t h a t time that m i l i t a r y affairs i n Europe started to develop i n such a w a y w h i c h was later labelled as the ' m i l i t a r y r e v o l u t i o n ' b y m o d e r n historians. Strategy and tactics were gradually transformed, firearms became more and more decisive, the new methods of the castle fortification were invented i n Italy, the m i l i t a r y sciences u n d e r w e n t an unusually fast development, huge armies began to be employedjust to mention the basic and w e l l - k n o w n changes. A l l this required that qualitatively new methods of logistics should be w o r k e d out, economy should serve the purposes of war, and last b u t not least that military-administrative reforms should be carried out w i t h the aim of facilitating central control and the logistics of the armies and the b o r d e r defence zones. A n d though u p to 1556 the signs of these changes could hardly be recognized in the Hungarian theatre of war, the n e w system could not be controlled w i t h o u t a central supreme c o m m a n d even i n this immature f o r m . This was realized i n time in Vienna, w h i c h h a d just become an I m p e r i a l City, w h e n i n N o v e m b e r 1556 the A u l i c W a r C o u n c i l (Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Consilium Bellicum) was set u p .
67

2.2.A. The consequences of the foundation of the Aulic War in Vienna (1556-1566)

Council

By the mid-1550s the establishment of the n e w defence system had been commenced all over H u n g a r y ruled by Ferdinand I . This huge m i l itary organizationeven in European t e r m s d i d not w o r k u n d e r unified
6 5

"Dans

ad universos ac smgulos capitaneos, castcllanos ct milites nostras ex utraque obedientiam 1552. in nostrorum

Danubii parte existentes firmissimis mandatis, ut eundem tanquam s u p r e m u m bellicum m a r e s c a l c u m nostrum colant et observent ipsique debitam et convenientem Nov. fols. 108-112. C f . also regni nostri "ipsique s i m u l c u r a m partibus, ex arcium utraque et locorum praestent" (Ebcrsdorf, November 16, 1552). O S t A H H S t A H u n g a r i c a A A . Fasc. 68. superioribus Hungri Danubii parte

existentium

d e m a n d a v e r i m u s " (Ebersdorf, November 16, 1552). Ibid., Fasc. 49. K o n v . A . 1542. Okt. fols. 39-40 (under bad archival placement) and M . Khbach, op. t., 214-215, furthermore StA K A M e m o i r e n 28/1334/11. pp. 268-269. " V i g o r e instructions ratione officii mei bellimarsalcatus mihi datae universi praesidiarh milites, equites et pedites ex utraque parte Danubii adusque Tijbiscum et D r a v u m existentes m i h i subiacent, v e r u m deinde postquam bellimarsalcatus officio fungor, me inscio plures capitanei et milites cum sunt dimissi vel noviter conducti, turn de uno in a l i u m locum traducti ..." M O L E 185 Missiles. T h e letter of Sforza Pallavicini to T a m s N d a s d y . Gyr, July 6, 1555.

Before 1556 the theatre of w a r against the Ottomans in H u n g a r y h a d been governed by the commanders-in-chief of Ferdinand I and the m i l i t a r y councillors (verordnete Kriegsrdte) ordered to help them, w h o were a p pointed only for the period of a campaign. The control of the n e w defence system was greatly hampered by the fact that the commanders-in-chief had to share their tasks w i t h the bans i n the Croatian-Slavonian b o r d e r areas, and in H u n g a r y w i t h the locumtenens, f r o m 1554 to 1562 w i t h the palatinus, and also w i t h the t w o captain-generals of the country. W i t h the establishment of the A u l i c W a r C o u n c i l i n 1556 the p r o b l e m of c e n t r a l
67 1 mention only some authoritative works: Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, and the Military Military Ed. by military

1560-1660. Belfast, 1955. Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution. Change and European Revolution Clifford Rogers. Society,

Military Innovation

Rise of the West, 1500-1800. Cambridge, 1988. Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution? 1550-1800. Macmillan, 1991, a n d most recently The Transformation 1995. of Early Modern For the impact Europe. of the Francisco-Oxford, Debate. Readings on the Military Boulder-San

revolution in Hungary, see the article of Jozsef Kelenik in the present volume.

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GZA P A L F F Y

THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBL'RC BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

35

military leadership and administration was finally settled. The command ers-in-chief and their councillors were replaced by a board of experts that had a considerable number of members and met daily. The board had the task of exercising complete central control over the m i l i t a r y admin istration. So its measures taken i n the name of the ruler could not be defied either by the locumtenens or the captain-generals of H u n g a r y and the bans. A l l this decided the struggle for the leadership of the central m i l i t a r y control w i t h the H u n g a r i a n estates and their leaders to the advantage of the ruler and his A u s t r i a n estates. After the death of the influential locumtenens and palatums, Tams Ndasdy, i n 1562, the locumtenentm regia finally lost its function of controlling m i l i t a r y affairs and it could not regain it after the considerable strengthening of the estates i n the seventeenth century either. The establishment of the A u l i c War Council was necessitated by the requirement that the different parts of the new defence system be organized into a unified whole. This was expressed by the fact that diplomacy towards the O t t o m a n state closely connected w i t h the defence was mostly administered by the War Council u n t i l the early eighteenth century. On the other hand, all those offices that were to be organized or stabilized in the f o l l o w i n g decades to coordinate the different fields of military affairs f u l l y served the supply of the border fortresses i n the sixteenth century. The control over the arsenals of the border fortresses and the hinterland s u p p l y bases (Graz, Laibach, Triest, Prague, Kassa, etc.) and over the central direction of w a r supplies was p u t in charge of the chief arsenal officer (Obrist-Zeugmeister). The fortification w o r k s i n the border areas were coordinated by construction supervisors (Bausuperintendent, for example in Vienna, G v o r - K o m a r o m , the Croatian-Slavonian confines), then later as their superior, by the chief fortification commissary (ObnstBaukommissar) residing in Vienna from the 1560s. The t w o most problematic areas of m i l i t a r y affairs were also led by separate officers w i t h their increasing staff. Food provision was organized by the chief food provision officer (Obnst-Proviantmeister), the p a y m e n t of the soldiers was solved by the chief muster master (Obrist-Mustermeister) and his
68

bordinates, the war paymasters {Kriegszahlmeister). The chief p o n t^neer (Obrist-Schiffmeister, then Obnst-Schiffbrckmeister) and the directors of the arsenals (Zeugwart) i n Vienna and Pozsony had a great task the field of w a r supplies and the equipment of the Danube fleet.
hV

After 1556, the duties of the War Council and diplomacy towards the Ottomans were discharged by the staff of the Aulic War Chancery (Hofknegskanzlei Cancellaria Bellica) which was composed of t w o secretaries (Sekretr), one Registrator, one Expeditor, several drafters (Konzipist) and scribes (Schreiher) some servants (Diener) and a translator (Dolmetscher).' A t the same time, ue to the administrative reforms of Ferdinand 1, the financial matters of Hungary and the A u s t n a n provinces had been managed for some decades by separate offices also constantly meeting at certain headquarters and working as a team. The Aulic Chamber (Hofkammer, Camera Aulica) set up in 1527 was the leading organ of financial administration. As a result, in certain matters it exerted some influence on the Hungarian Chamber (Ungarische Kammer, Camera Hunganca) w o r k i n g in Buda i n 1528-1529, then in Pozsony after its reorganization in 1531. Their role in financing the military was of utmost importance as the War Council itself had only restricted financial powers; the payment of the garrison soldiers was ordered by the War Council, but it was actually assigned by the chambers. The Lower Austrian Chamber (Niedersterreichische Kammer, Camera Austriaca) also had special tasks in this respect as from the 1540s the payment of the soldiers in the fortresses in the vicinity of Gyr that were defending Vienna was taken up by the Austrian province.
0 u

In parallel to the establishment of the central l e a d i n g organ of the military affairs, negotiations started between Ferdinand I and the Austrian and Hungarian estates in 1555-1557 to create a coherent defence system. Though it is beyond the scope of this study to present these negotiations in
* On the chief arsenal officer (1567): StA F H K A H K A Niedersterreichische Herrschaftsakten W - 6 1 / C / 9 0 / B . R N 300/2. fols. 1050-1053; on the construction supervisors: V Pataki, op. cit., and E. Marosi, op. at.; on the chief fortification commissary (1578): StA K A Sonderreihe des Wiener Hofkriegsrates, Hofknegsrtliches Kanzleiarchiv [hereinafter H K R K1A] VI. 6; on the chief food provisional officer (1558): StA K A Protokolle des Wiener H o f kriegsrates [hereinafter H K R Prot.] Reg. Bd. 140. fols. 89-90; on the chief muster master: O . Regele, op. cit., 84: Anlage 9, and on the chief pontooneer (1557-1558): W i l h e l m Brinner, Geschichte des k. k. Pionnier-Regimentes wesens in Oesterreich.
/ 0

h 8

T h o m a s F e l l n e r - H e m r i c h Kretschmayr, Die sterreichische 1. bis zur Vereinigung der sterreichischen der bersicht. (Verffentlichungen 234-241, and

Zentralvenvaltung. Hofkanzlei neuere fr

I. Abt. Von (1749). 1 Geschichte Hofkriegsrat

m Verbindung

mit einer Geschichte

des

Knegs-Brcken-

Maximilian Geschichtliche

und bhmischen Kommission Der

Wien, 1878, 7-9 and 611-613: No. 1. Archiv fur Kunde sterreichischer Geschichts-Quellen 30

Friedrich Firnhaber, " Z u r Geschichte des sterreichischen Militrwesens. S k i z z e der des Hofkriegsrathes,"

sterreichs, 5.)

Wien, 1907,

Oskar Regele,

sterreichische

Entstehung

1556-1848. (Mitteilungen des sterreichischen Staatsarchivs, E r g . Bd. 1/1.) W i e n , 1949, 13-17.

(1864) 98-99 and 140-147: No. X V I .

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37

detail, t w o major developments demonstrate the k i n d of preliminary w o r k needed to qualitatively transform the border defence zones. In January 1556 i n Vienna, the representatives of Lower and Upper Austria (Obcrosterreich), Stvna, Carniola, Carinthia, and Grz assembled to take measures against the Ottoman assaults for at least t w o or three vears in advance and to discuss h o w they could make the defence more efficient w i t h their financial aid. A t this meeting the estates arranged for the establishment of the War Council, granted considerable sums for the provision of the border fortresses protecting their provinces and declared their claim that the captain-generals of the troops i n border castles paid by them should be chosen from among their candidates. This time it was finally decided that f r o m then on the Austrian estateseven if thev had to be forcedshould participate in the upkeep and direction of the H u n g a r i a n and Croatian-Slavonian border defence zones not only with field troops b u t w i t h permanent garrisons, too.' A t their talks w i t h the ruler and the representatives of the Austrian estates in 1555-1556, the military leaders of the H u n g a r i a n estates also accepted out of necessity that i n addition to the central direction of border defence, they w o u l d gradually lose control of the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses and the ones south of Gyr. However, they tried to ensure the w a r taxes paid by the counties and other resources of the country to s u p p l y the troops of the bans and the captain-generals of H u n g a r y and of the line of border fortresses south of Lake Balaton and
1

The structure of the border defence zones developed in accordance w i t h e pretensions put forward at the negotiations between the Austrian and Hungarian estates in the decades up to 1566. As the Ottomans were gradually advancing in 'peace-time' as well, especially along the Drava, there was a need for organizing the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses under a single captain-general. In terms of this idea and of the decisions made at the meeting in Vienna mentioned above, Hans Lenkovic was appointed the first captain-general of the Croatian-Slavonian confines (Obrist wmdtscher und kroatischer Grenze) in spring 1556 rather than a commander-in-chief (Obrtster Feldliauptmann an den windischen und kroatischen Grenzen). Another fundamental change took place in the summer of 1559. The so-called N e w Croatian confines (near kmatische Grenze) " had been organized by this time on the north-western bank of the Una from Sziszek to Bihcs and opposite Kostajnica. which had been captured three vears earlier. A t the same time, Lenkovic was again appointed the captain-general of the t w o O l d and NewCroatian and Wendish confines, and he was assisted by deputies (Obrist-Leutnant) in the three sub-zones." This practically meant the final completion of the Croatian confines (krontiiche/krabatische Grenze/Grenzgebiet) combining t w o smaller parts in a short time and the Wendish border castles (windische Grenze/Grenzgebiet), though they were for a long time controlled by one captain-general.
m 74 73 7

ranging f r o m Pozsony to as far as G y u l a . So they managed to gam control of these frontier zones. In their application submitted the f o l l o w i n g year they proposed the supply of the most important border fortresses w i t h permanent royal troops. W i t h their proposal they effectively designated the most significant elements of the system of border castles u p to 1566: south and east of the Danube Komrom, Olhjvr, Lva, Bozk, Murny, Eger, Ged, Kassa, Huszt, Ecsed, Vrad, and G y u l a ; i n Transdanubia Gyr, Ppa, [ZalaJSzentgrt, [ZalaJKomr, [NagyjKanizsa, Csurg, Berzence, Palota, Tata, Vzvr, and T i h a n y .
72 73

The field marshal Sforza Pallavicini had similar authority in the area protecting Vienna in the period before the establishment of the A u l i c War Council. His successor, A d a m Gall, appointed the captain-general of Gyr (Obrist/Oberst zu Raab) at the same time as Lenkovic in M a r c h 1556, practicallyif not by decreehad the authority of a captain-general over the troops in the border, fortresses south-east of Gyr.'" From 1546 the
Staatsarchiv Nrnberg [hereinafter StA Nrnberg], Ansbacher Reichstagsakten
r

7 4

(Rep Best]

136.) Bd. 40. No. 19.

7 5

StA K A Sonderreihe des W iener Hofkriegsrates,

Bestallungen [hereinafter in 1553, (Obrister

No. 35. T h o u g h recent literature considers

Hans U n g n a d , appointed

the first

border defence captain-general, his rank as commander-in-chief possessed bv L e n k o v i c (Grenzobnst). Cf Rothenberg,

Feldhauptmann) captain-general Militargrenze, .37

was only a transition to the formation of the office of border defence Die sterreichische
7 1

Jod. Shlz, "Aussohustag der fnf niederosterreichischen L a n d e in Wien 1556," Archiv Kunde sterreichischer Geschichts-Queen 8 (1852) 155-173. M O L E 156 M K A Urbaria et Conscriptiones Fase. 23. No. 7. M O L E 142 Fase. 3. No. StA K A A k t e n des Wiener Hofkriegsrates [hereinafter H K R Akten] E x p . 1557. 162. Mrz

and 236-237: n. 33
7 6

fr
7 2

" D i e N e w Crabatisch V n n d Yeczo die geferlichist Grniczen " StA K A Best. No. 80 and StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 141. April 12, 1559, Gecsenyi, op. cit., 66-67. Cf. StA K A Best. No 41 and StA K A M e m o i r e n No. 77

7 7

10 a n d StA H H S t A Hungarica A A . Fase. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 40-62.

7 3

and ibid., September 1. No. 1.

7 8

28/1334/11.

No.

pp. 213-215.'

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GZA PLFFY

T H E HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

39

garrison troops were paid almost entirely by the Lower A u s t r i a n estates w h o therefore demanded that an A u s t r i a n or German captain-general delegated by the m i l i t a r y leadership in Vienna be placed in charge of them. D u r i n g the term of office of Gall (1556-1560), and then that of his successor, Eck Graf zu Salm (1560-1574), the authority of the captaingeneral of Gyr further increased over the border fortresses south-east of Gyr, w h i c h practically resulted i n the formation of the Gyr confines (raaberische Grenze/Grenzgebiet). I n 1562, this was i m p a r t e d to the commanders of the border fortresses as well (capitaneis in finibus Austriacis intra Damibium et lacum Balathon exislentibus) w h e n it was ordered that they acknowledge Salm their superior and captain-general (pro antecessor et supenore capitaneo), that is the captain-general (Grenzobrist) of the border fortresses a r o u n d G y r .
79

shrunk to the areas between counties Pozsony and Zlyom. This d i d not cause a p r o b l e m as the latter office was vacant at that time. W h e n i n 1564 Istvn Dersffy was appointed the new Cisdanubian captain-general, he was also commissioned to be responsible for the border fortresses protecting the m i n i n g t o w n s and earlier directed by Jnos Balassa (1554-1562) and Istvn Dob (1562-1564). From that time on these border fortresses together w i t h the castle of Olhjvr began to be called confinia antemonlana or confinia ante montanas cwitates in Latin and bnyavrosok eltti vgvrak i n H u n g a r i a n (confines in front of the m i n i n g towns), but m German they continued to be called bergstadterische Grenze, w h i c h also meant the border castles protecting the m i n i n g t o w n s .
82

2.2-fc. The consolidation of the new defence system: the Border Fortress District Captaincy-Generals (1566-1578)

and

Local direction of the border castles a r o u n d Szigetvr, and of those protecting the m i n i n g towns and U p p e r H u n g a r y was carried out by the m i l i t a r y leaders of the H u n g a r i a n estates u n t i l 1566. The small fortresses south of Lake Balaton were controlled directly by the chief commanders of the fort of Szigetvr (supremus capitaneus arcis Sziget) a n d were under the influence of palatnus Tams Ndasdy u n t i l 1562. From 1563 to 1566, they belonged to Mikls Zrnyi, the Transdanubian captain-general, w h o at the same time held the title of captain-general of Szigetvr. The defence of U p p e r H u n g a r y was organized i n a similar w a y ; border fortresses and counties were p u t i n charge of I m r e Thelekessy, the captain-general of Kassa and U p p e r H u n g a r y (supremus capitaneus civitatis Cassoviensis et partium regni Hungri superiorum) by A r c h d u k e M a x i m i l i a n i n M a y 1559. As a result, the territories east of county Gmr were w i t h d r a w n f r o m the authority of the Cisdanubian captain-general and together w i t h the border fortresses to be f o u n d there they were subordinated to the n e w l y established U p p e r H u n g a r i a n captaincygeneral. So the authority of the mentioned Cisdanubian captain-general
80 81

StA K A Best. No. 102.

R 0

The instruction of Zrnyi as the Transdanubian captain-general

( A p r i l 28,1563): StA

K A H K R Prot. E x p . Bd. 142. fol. 166. H i s Bestallung

(May 28, 1563): StA K A Best. N o . 122,

a n d StA K A H K R Akten Exp. 1564. Juni No. 24. T h e survey of his forces as captain-general (after January 19, 1564): StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 143. fols. 8-9. The instruction of Thelekessy (May 8, 1559): M O L E 136 M K A Diversae instructiones [hereinafter E 136] No. 173. fols. 323-331. A letter w a r n i n g the H u n g a r i a n troops in Upper H u n g a r y to be obedient in connection with his appointment: StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 141. 1559. M a i . 13. No. 66.

In the course of the last H u n g a r i a n campaign of sultan Sleyman, Szigetvr and Gyula were captured by the O t t o m a n s i n 1566. The loss of the t w o key fortresses brought about the p e r d i t i o n of a w h o l e chain of castles, as the m a m feature of the defence system was that its units, the border zones were composed of a major stronghold and several m i n o r castles subordinated to it. W h i l e the fall of G y u l a m a r k e d the end of the history of the captaincy-general of the L o w e r Parts (capitaneatus partium regni Hungri inferiorum) created by Matthias C o r v i n u s i n mid-1470s, the d o w n f a l l of Szigetvr resulted in the loss of the areas south of Lake Balaton. A l r e a d y in the early 1560s G y u l a fell i n t o the same isolated situation as Jajca after the battle of Mohcs. Its occupation was only a matter of t i m e as it was surrounded by O t t o m a n castles (Szolnok) to the west and east or fortresses (i.e. Vrad) belonging to the O t t o m a n vassal state of Transylvania. A n d up to as far as Tokaj i n the n o r t h there was no other castle that could have substituted it. So the royal defence system was pressed back several hundreds of kilometers to the line of the Tisza and the N o r t h e r n Mountains. As opposed to G y u l a , there were more favourable opportunities to make u p for the loss of Szigetvr. The h i l l y areas of the counties of Zala and Somogy, the marshy valley of the river Kanizsa a n d the medieval castles to be f o u n d there c o u l d be transformed into a system similar to the one around Gyr after a chief castle and the headquarters of a new captain-general had been designated. The necessity

82 Dersffy's Bestallung

(January 22, 1564): StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. B d . 143. fol. 10. H i s

instruction (after February 6, 1564): ibid., fol. 16. Cf. 1563: article 16. C J H 488-491.

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GZA PLFFY

THE HUNGAK1AN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

41

of this was immediately recognized i n Vienna a s - w i t h the loss of southern Transdanubia-the eastern border of Styria and the Wendish confines became more threatened than ever before. The peace treaty of A d r i a n o p l e (Edirne) made for eight years in 1568 opened u p a new phase i n the Habsburg-Ottoman struggle f o l l o w i n g the battle of Mohcs. U n t i l the outbreak of the L o n g War i n 1591 no serious O t t o m a n attack was launched against H u n g a r y ; still, peace was only ostensible at the border of the t w o w o r l d empires. This period was characterized by constant incursions, attempts to extend taxation to the territory of the enemy, and by skirmishes on the frontier to capture some m i n o r border fortresses. For this reason the era is called the 'Little War' (Kleinkrieg). The situation is well illustrated by a command of Emperor M a x i m i l i a n I I (1564-1576); he ordered the captain of the fortress of Kiskomrom situated at the southern end of Lake Balaton to keep his soldiers in such readiness "as if there was no peace of any k i n d " " in order to protect the neighbouring territories.
1

N o t only d i d the long peaceful period facilitate the creation of the offices controlling the different areas of m i l i t a r y affairs mentioned above, but it also ensured that the defence system could really assume a coherent character. In the long r u n this process, w h i c h lasted for several decades, was determined by h o w the Austrian provinces took part in financing the border defence zones in H u n g a r y and to w h a t extent the A u l i c War C o u n c i l was able to control defence and restrict the leading m i l i t a r y role previously held by the H u n g a r i a n estates. This question came to the forefront after 1566, as the territory of H u n g a r y under Habsburg authority s h r u n k to a rather narrow strip stretching f r o m the Adriatic Sea to the Danube between Pozsony and Komrom after the loss of Szigetvr. Only in the Cisdanubian area as far as county Zlyom and in Upper H u n g a r y d i d some territories remain u n t o u c h e d by O t t o m a n incursions. Consequently, the defence system in H u n g a r y became deprived of any hinterland. In this situation M a x i m i l i a n II and his successors had no other

choice but to use the resources of his provinces and the German Empire to supply the H u n g a r i a n marches. The necessity of this step was soon realized by the H a b s b u r g military leadership f r o m those m i l i t a r y registers that were prepared nearly every year to calculate the a m o u n t needed to pay the soldiers serving in the border fortresses i n H u n g a r y . It is w o r t h selecting three muster- and pay-registers (Muster- and Soldliste) from the sixteenth century (1556, 1576, 1593) and using them to determine to w h a t extent H u n g a r y was i n need of the support of the n e i g h b o u r i n g provinces and the German E m p i r e . The incomes of H u n g a r y in the sixteenth century are not entirely known due to the divergent financial administration and the lack of sources. But we can rely on the estimates made by G y u l a Szekfu i n 1935, which have been generally accepted. Szekfu put the total income of Hungary in the second half of the sixteenth century at 750,000 Rhenish forint (reinisch Gulden) at most. This sum could never be collected completely as, on the one h a n d , most of it was locally remitted, and on the other hand, it could not be entirely spent on m a i n t a i n i n g defence and on the payment of the soldiers. According to Szekfu, a m a x i m u m of 350,000 Rhenish forint was spent on military expenses out of this amount. ' T h i s is half of the total income, which seems an over optimistic estimate given that the data suggest only 20.4% of the cash income of the H u n g a r i a n Chamber was spent on the military in 1555-1562 Despite this it is w o r t h comparing the t w o m a x i m u m estimated values w i t h the amounts of the pay of the soldiers i n the three years mentioned above. The f o l l o w i n g graph provides i n f o r m a t i o n on the ratio between the total annual income of H u n g a r y and the sums spent on the military and the a m o u n t of money needed for the p a y m e n t of the soldiers in the border castles.
84 85 8 1 87

8 4

O n these, cf. Gza Plffy, " A magyarorszgi s dlvidki v g v r r e n d s z e r 1576. s 1582. Kziemnvek 108:1 (1995) 114-185. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 16-37. 1576: Trkenkrieges

vi jegyzkei (The Registers of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian Border Fortresses of 1576 and 1582]," Hadtrtnelmi
8 5

1556: StA H H S t A H u n g a n c a hh.

Fasc. 76. Konv

H ?

"Milites autem die noctuque

nostros nihilommus pro nostrae ditionis tibi subiectae in eorum officio et statione, excubantes atque in omnem fortunae casurn

et

vicinae Semper

StA H H S t A Reichstagsakten der Reichskanzlei [hereinafter R T A ] Fasc. 53. fols. 350-369 Published by Plffy, op. at., Heft 6.) Prag, 1899, 19-29.
8 6

securiore permansione essent,

non secus, quam si nullae induciae promptos (Pozsony,

141-158. 1593: Alfred H . Loebl, Zur Geschichte des

von 1593-1606. 1. Vorgeschichte. (Prager Studien aus dem Gebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft, G y u l a Szekfu, Magyar trtnet [Hungarian History], III. Budapest, 1935, 134 and 137
2

retineas." M O L P 485 Csaldi levltrak, Majthnyi csald, 8. csop. 1. fols. 2-3 Croatien whrend sieben 'Friedensjahren' von 1575 des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs bis 1582.

July 14, 1567). C f . Gustav von Gmry, "Trkennoth und das G r e n z w e s e n in U n g a r n und Nach Quellen des k. k. 172-196. K r i e g s - A r c h i v s , " Mitteilungen (1885) 155-178 and Vasko Simoniti, Turki

8 7

Gyz Ember, " A m a g y a r kirlyi kamara pnzbeli bevtelei s s z m a d s a i 1555-1562 116

[The C a s h Incomes and Accounts of the Hungarian Chamber in 1555-1562]," Szzadok (1982) 537.

so v deleli ze. Turski vvadi na slovensko ozemlje v 15. m 16. stoletju. Celje, 1990,

42
1 800 000 1 600 000 1 400 000

GZA PLFFY

T H E HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

43

1 658 736,5

The m e t h o d of f i n a n c i n g the b o r d e r defence m e n t i o n e d by the W a r

1572 533

I '

I annual payment ' in theory the maximum estimated annual income of Hungary

Council is of special significance because it f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n f l u e n c e d the final s t r u c t u r e of the defence system. I n the past, the s o u t h e r n defence line of the m e d i e v a l H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m had been m a i n t a i n e d from the c o u n t r y ' s o w n incomes, b u t the s i t u a t i o n h a d changed

drastically by the mid-1560s. W h i l e H u n g a r y preserved its sovereignty and independence after the battle of Mohcs, a defence system came into b e i n g on its t e r r i t o r y that w a s financed b y the hereditary provinces of Habsburgs a n d the G e r m a n E m p i r e , etc. The price of the support of the A u s t r i a n provinces was h i g h . The H u n g a r i a n estates, along w i t h the central c o n t r o l of the m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s a n d the O t t o m a n d i p l o m a c y w h i c h meant f o r e i g n affairs as w e l l g r a d u a l l y h a d to renounce the d i r e c t i o n of the border fortresses w h i c h w e r e of c r u c i a l importance to the protection of the n e i g h b o u r i n g p r o v i n c e s . H o w e v e r , they c o u l d not be totally i g n o r e d i n the local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the border defence, as the c o u n t y , n o b i l i t y , and other H u n g a r i a n t r o o p s could n o t be s u b o r d i n a t e d to G e r m a n captain-generals. This c o n f l i c t was perceived i n Vienna a n d i n the k n o w l e d g e of the r e s u l t s i t can be f i r m l y stated that it was solved satisfactorily. A c o m p r o m i s e h a d to be f o u n d w h i c h p e r m i t t e d the A u l i c W a r C o u n c i l to exert c o n t r o l over the b o r d e r defence, b u t d i d n o t exclude the H u n g a r i a n estates. In order to achieve this, the b o r d e r fortresses m a i n t a i n e d f r o m the support of the A u s t r i a n provinces w e r e g r a d u a l l y w i t h d r a w n f r o m the authority of the office-holders of the H u n g a r i a n estates, the C r o a t i a n Slavonian ban, then later the T r a n s d a n u b i a n and C i s d a n u b i a n captain-generals of the c o u n t r y . As a consequence, the defence system against the O t t o m a n s assumed a d u a l i s t i c character. To p u t i t m o r e precisely: on each t e r r i t o r y of H u n g a r y t w o k i n d s of captaincy-general came i n t o b e i n g . In the organization of the border defence the most decisive role was played by the so-called supretnus border fortress captain-generals (Grenzobrist/Grenzoberst, capitaneus confiniorum). They were responsible (Grenzfestungen/Grenzas

1556

H the m a x i m u m part ^ of Hungary's annual income spent on military expenses

1576 1593

The data i n the g r a p h clearly show that the m a x i m u m estimated incomes of H u n g a r y could not cover the pay of the soldiers in the border fortresses. A n d if w e o n l y examine the m a x i m u m estimated s u m spent o n m i l i t a r y expenses w e m a y conclude that it was enough to cover only 25-30% of the pay of the soldiers in the established border defence system. The sums in 1576 indicate clearly w h y Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Lower A u s t r i a , the G e r m a n E m p i r e , and even Bohemia and M o r a v i a had to participate constantly i n the maintenance of the border defence system in H u n g a r y . It also has to be emphasized that this calculation does not include such 'considerable sums' as the O t t o m a n d i p l o m a c y , fortification of castles, the p r o d u c t i o n and supply of a m m u n i t i o n , food p r o v i s i o n , intelligence service, w a r posts and the costs of the Danube fleet, t h o u g h these amounts were g r a d u a l l y increasing due to the perfection of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the results of the m i l i t a r y revolution. A s a consequence, the border defence against the Ottomans became a c o m m o n task of the w h o l e of Eastern Central Europe and the H a b s b u r g Empire. It was not accidentally stressed by the War C o u n c i l before the T h i r t y Years' W a r (1618-1648) that "every province should upkeep their o w n confines i n H u n g a r y . "
88 89

8 8

" E G 1st aber alhie Z u m e r c k h e n , das hierczue rut gerait wiirt, was auf die Jarliche welches

T u r c k h i s c h e verehrung, alles nottwendig gepew, Artoloreij, Munition, Arsional, Prouiandt sachen, was auch durchs Jar auf Musterung v n d andere Comissions sach lauftt, m a n nit eigeritlich wissen k h a n , Aber auft dise abbemelte Possten
8 9

for the d i r e c t i o n of the m i n o r b o r d e r castles orten, confinia)

s u b o r d i n a t e d to a m a j o r key fortress d e s i g n a t e d

Lauftt Jarlichen ain 1613)

their h e a d q u a r t e r s i n a certain area, t h a t is i n the confines or b o r d e r fortress zone (Grenze/Grenzgebiet). erals (Kreisobrist/Kreisoberst, I n p a r a l l e l to t h e m , o n the same Hungri, territories and at the same t i m e , the so-called d i s t r i c t c a p t a i n - g e n supremus capitaneus partium regni

ansehenliche grusse S u m m a gelts." O S t A H H S t A R T A Fasc. 53. fol. 369. " D a s Jedes landt seine sondere G r a n i c z e n in H u n g e r n Z u e r h a l t e n " (December 29, O S t A K A H1CR Akten Reg. 1613. Dez. No. 68.

44
90

GZA PLFFY

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

45

prorex banus ) were operating. They directed the military affairs of the counties i n the districts (Kreis, partes) under their authority and disposed of the troops directly subordinated to them consisting of the out-of-date n o b i l i t y , county, and t o w n insurgent troops and of the so-called district captain-general a r m y of some h u n d r e d cavalry a n d infantry paid by the k i n g . W h i l e the office of border fortress captaincy-general was filled bv the representatives of the Austrian estates or H u n g a r i a n nobles accepted by them, the district captain-generals were exclusively Hungarian subjects. The separation of the border fortress and the district character of the defence system is further complicated b y the fact that the two offices were o f t e n i n some parts of the country alwaysheld by the same person. A l l this depended on whether the War Council wished to exercise complete control over a border defence zone or whether it ceded the direction to Hungarians (mainly on territories w h i c h were not so dangerous for the Austrian provinces). In order to understand the seemingly complicated system w e have to enumerate the border fortress and district captaincy-generals that had been created by the mid-1570s f r o m the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania. In Croatia and Slavonia the border defence had been organized by the Croatian-Slavonian ban (banus Croatiae et Slavoniae, ban in Kroatien und Slavomen/ban in Windischland) before the battle of Mohcs. The ban was the m i l i t a r y commander of his banderia, the royal garrisons, and the insurgent noble and county troops in his area. After 1526 he lost control of the O l d Croatian border fortresses and then of the Slavonian and New Croatian castles. Later, after several decades, i n 1559 their direction was taken over by the Croatian-Slavonian border fortress captain-general (Ofensf dcr kroatischen und wmdischen Grenze) and b y his deputies, the assistant Croatian (Obristleutnant der kroatischen Grenze) and Wendish b o r d e r fortress captain-generals (Obristleutnant der wmdischen Grenze). As the incomes of the d i m i n i s h e d country d i d not cover the supply of the border fortresses, they were financed by the estates of Camiola, Carinthia, and Styna, and thus the ban was forced to renounce control over them. F r o m that time on his authority in his capacity as district captain-general
T h e contemporary Hungarian term to designate the district captain-generals was "captain of the country" (orszghadnagi/, orszgkapitnya). See Gr. lllshzy Istxmn ndor fljegyzse! 1592-1603. s Hdvgi Mik Ferencz histrija 1594-1613 [The Records of the palatnus C o u n t Istvn lllshzy 1592-1603 and The History of Ferenc Hidvgi Mik 1594-1613]. ( M o n u m c n t a H u n g r i Historica II. Scnptores, V I I . ) E d . by C b o r Kazinczy. Pest, 1863, 8, 16, 28, 43 and 56.
9 0

a s restricted to the m i l i t a r y affairs of the counties in Croatia and Slavonia, that is to the practically unusable noble insurrection and the troops fielded by the counties of Krs, Vrasd, Zgrb, and to his o w n forces m a i n l y consisting of 250 cavalry and 250 i n f a n t r y . The latter can be regarded as his previous bandrium, though their pay was assigned from the war taxes granted by the Croatian estates and by other Hungarian incomes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centunes (see map 1). On the territory between the Drava and the Danube, a similar fate befell the Transdanubian captaincy-general set up in 1542 by the H u n g a n a n estates. After the Lower Austrian estates assumed the burden of financing the border fortresses protecting Vienna in 1546, their command was taken over by field marshal Sforza Pallavicini and thenby the late-1560sby the captain-general of the confines around Gyr (Obrist in Raab und zugehriger Grenzfestungen). The authority of the Transdanubian district captain-general (Kreisobrtst in Transdanubium, supremus capitaneus parlnan regm Hungri Transdanubiannrum) was subsequently restricted to the military affairs of eleven counties (Mosn, Sopron, Vas, Zala, Gyr, Komrom, Veszprm, Fejr, Somogy, Tolna, and Baranya) and the border fortresses around Szigetvr, south of Lake Balaton, and a further 150 cavalry and 100 infantry. After 1566, his sphere of influence was even more limited. After the fall of Szigetvr the Aulic War Council organized a new border fortress captaincy-general w i t h Kanizsa as its centre, and appointed Ferenc Tahy as its separate captain-general. Although he was still called the captain-general of the border fortresses between Lake Balaton and the nvers Mura and Drava (supremus capitaneus inter lacum Balaton et fluvios Muram et Dravum regni Hungri finium) by contemporary sources/' his successors held the title of the captain-general of the border fortresses around Kanizsa (Obnst in Kanisclia und zugehriger Grenzfestungen). Following the Ottoman occupation of the counties of Tolna and Baranya, the authority of the Transdanubian captain-general shrank to the military affairs of the Transdanubian district (partes Transdanubiarme) consisting of the nine counties left and his infantry and cavalry troops mentioned above. This captain-general had no permanent residence; it always depended on whether the person holding the office chose to be stationed in his o w n private estate or m a border castle w i t h his troops. In the latter case he was the commander
w

'" The extract of T a h y ' s instruction (November 13, 1567): StA K A A F A 1566/11/1 also from 1567: " f i n i u m intra lacum Balaton et D r a v u m ac M u r a m s u p r e m u s StA F H K A H K A Familienakten D - T . 5. fol. 1 and fol. 4.

See

capitaneus"

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GZA PLFFY

T H E HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS

47

of that castle as well. In order to protect the border more efficiently and to enhance cooperation, this practice was applied more often. This explains w h y Gyrgy Zrnyi, son of Mikls Zrnyi (died i n 1566, Szigetvr), could be both the captain-general of the border fortresses around Kanizsa and the Transdanubian district captain-general (see map 2) at the same time in t w o periods (1574-1575 and 1583-1592).
92

The structure of defence on the Cisdanubian territory east of Pozsony up to as far as county Zlyom was to a certain extent different from the setup in Croatia-Slavonia and Transdanubia. The fortresses here were of special significance for the security of the Bohemian and Moravian provinces. Their estates, at the incentive of the ruler, started to take part m the supply of the border castles protecting the mining towns (confinai antemontana or confinia ante montanas civitates, bergstcidterisclie Grenze) from the 1570s on, mainly from the fortification of the totally new border fort, rsekjvr (Neuhusel) They, however, d i d not want to interfere in their control, so this was carried out by the captain-general of the border fortresses defending the m i n i n g towns (bergstadterischer Grenzobrist, supremus capitaneus confimorum antemontanonim) from 1564. He was the district captain-general of the ten counties (Pozsony, Nyitra, Trencsn, Bars, Turc, rva, Lipt, Hont, Ngrd, and Zlyom) of the Cisdanubian parts (caries Cisdanubianae). Thus, after 1564, the office of the Cisdanubian district captain-general (Kreisobrtst in Cisdanubium, supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungri Cisdanubianarum) practically comprised the office of the captain-general of the border fortresses defending the mining towns as well. This is testified by the fact that, when Simon Forgch in 1569 was appointed the captain-general of the confines and the district, he received only one instruction (see map 3).
93 94
9 2

That the two offices were distinct is s h o w n by the fact that Z r i n y i received in both captaincy-generals (Grenzobristleutnant and

two

instructions w h e n he was appointed in 1574, a n d in 1588 he w a s supported by two assistant captain-generals Kreisobristleutnant). 1574: A u g u s t 14, 1574: "Instruction vber die Craihaubtmanschaff herdihalb der T h o n a w . " StA K A H K R K1A I X . c. 1 and StA K A H K R Prot. Reg. Bd. 159. fol. 14. September 4,

The border defence i n U p p e r H u n g a r y h a d a more distinct character. ftere there was constant warfare w i t h the vassal of the Ottomans, John S z a p l y and his son John Sigismund u n t i l the late-1560s. For strategic reasons the direction of the garrison troops, of the armies of the counties and of the E m p i r e sent here could not be separated. These were unanimously subordinated to the Upper H u n g a r i a n captain-general of e field troops and other forces (Feldobnst/Generalobrist in Oberungarn, supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae supenorum), f r o m 1559 to the above mentioned I m r e Thelekessy (1559-1560), then to Ferenc Zay (1560-1565), formerly imperial ambassador to Constantinople, and to the Europe-wide famous Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schwendi f r o m 1565 to 1568. After the treaty of Speyer w i t h Transylvania i n 1570, there was no need to separate the troops of the border fortresses and of the counties either, so i n the Upper parts of the country (partes superiores) the same captaingeneralthe so-called Upper H u n g a r i a n m i l i t a r y assistant of the ruler (prorex, kirlykpe: "image of the k i n g " ) w a s responsible for b o t h the border fortresses and the 13 counties of the area (Gmr-Kishont, Heves, Borsod, Szepes, Sros, Torna, Abaj, Zempln, U n g , Szabolcs, Szatmr, Bereg, and Ugocsa). In this manner in U p p e r H u n g a r y a captaincy-general came into being (see map 3) w h i c h resembled that was existing i n the southern parts of the country (partes inferiores regni Hungariae) before the battle of Mohcs. H o w e v e r , the offices a n d ranks f o r m e d , o w i n g to the development of m i l i t a r y administration and logistics, m a r k e d an essential difference. A t the incentive of Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schwendi, a separate chamber (Szepesi Kamara, Zipsensche Kammer, Camera Scepusiensis) was set up in Kassa i n 1567 to finance the border fortresses m o r e efficiently. I n addition to the local centralization of the financial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , several offices were established whose task was to act as substitutes of the central office holders of the Aulic War Council i n this remote area.
ai m 95 96

"Instruction vber die oberst Haubtmanschafft Z u K a n i s c h a . " ibid., fol. 15. 1588: A r c h i v des G e r m a n i s c h e n Nationalmuseums N r n b e r g [hereinafter A r c h i v G N M N r n b e r g ] , Weltliche Frsten [hereinafter W F ] , Siebenbrgen Z R 7657. fol. 75 and fol. 80.
9 3

5 Wilhelm Janko, Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi oberster Feldhauptmann und Rath Kaiser Maxi14 (1987) 27-46. (Obrist-Zeugmeister-Leutnant in Oberungarn, judex

milian's U. Wien, 1871, and Roman Schnur, "Lazarus von Schwendi (1522-1583). E i n unerledigtes Thema der historischen Forschung," Zeitschrift fr historisclie Forschung
9 6

Upper H u n g a r i a n deputy of chief arsenal officer in V i e n n a

O n this, see the documents of the Bohemian diets. Die bhmischen

Landtagsverhandlungen archivu ministerstva

m Oberungarn) from 1567; U p p e r H u n g a r i a n military j u d g e (Kriegsrichter bellicus in parttbus regni Hungariae supenoribus) (Baumeister in Oberungarn) ivahrer in Oberungarn)

und Landtagsbeschlusse vom fahre 1526 an bis auf die Neuzeit. I-VTI. 1526-1591. E d . by Kniglich B h m i s c h e s Landesarchiv. Prag, 1877-1891 and Regesta fondu Mitare vnitra
9 4

from 1568; U p p e r H u n g a r i a n chief architect (Salitterverpaymaster

around 1580: Upper H u n g a r i a n saltpetre supervisor in Oberungarn), war

R C i \ V Praze. Dil I. 1527-1589. (Prameny

k C e s k o s l o v e n s k y m dejinm vojenskym. 1937.

from the mid-1590s, and temporarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth pontooneer (Sc/iif/fanicicmtisfer in Oberungarn) m Oberungarn). and food pro-

S v a z e k 1.) K v y d n i pfipravil Frantisek Roubik. Praha, 351 (October 26, 1569).

centuries: Upper H u n g a r i a n muster master (Mustermeister (Knegszahlmeister in Oberungarn), visional officer (Proviantmeister

StA F H K A H K A H F U R N 21. 1570. A u g . fols. 100-108 and M O L E 136 N o . 173. fol.

O n these, see Gza Plffy, " A fkapitnyi

48

GZA

PLFFY

H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R D E F E N C E S Y S T E M S

49

W i t h i n this structure in Upper Hungary a separate p t a i n c y - g e n e ] was set u p on the territories adjacent to the Principality of Transylvania i n the mid-1560s. U p o n the proposal of Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schwendi the captain-general of Szatmr or the territories b e y o n d the river Tisz ' (Obrist zu Sakmar samt zugehrigen Ortflecken jenseits der Thei, supremus capitaneus Zatmariensis et partium Transtibiscanarum) was p u t in charge of the m i l i t a r y administration of the border fortresses (Kall, Kisvrda Ecsed, and Szatmr) and the counties (Szabolcs, Szatmr, Ugocsa, and p a r t l y Bereg) east of the Tisza. By this measure the defence of the territories far away from Kassa was effectively ensured. W i t h the captaincygeneral of Szatmr a special Hungarian frontier zone came into being w h i c h d i d not protect the territories under the authority of the Hungarian k i n g against the Ottoman Empire, but against a rising Christian state that was a vassal of the sultan.' A t the same time, the principality itself established its o w n border defence zone against the Ottomans whose castles (Zska, Bajon, Sarkad, Bl, Belnyes, Szkelyhd, Adorjn, etc.) were controlled by the captain-general of Vrad (Obrist in Wardein, supremus capitaneus Varadiensis) w i t h powers of authority similar to those of the border fortress captain-generals in the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m .
ca ra a 7

n e x f

The fortress of Komrom also had a distinguished role i n the defence system. This was v i v i d l y expressed by the palatinus Mikls Eszterhzy (1625-1645): "Komrom is a fort of its o w n , i t does not depend on any c a p t a i n - g e n e r a l " Its special situation was due to its extreme significance. Komrom served the defence of the Imperial C i t y directly w i t h its Danube fleet, w i t h the Hungarian boatmen (naszdos). Its chief commander (Obnsi in Komorn, supremus capitaneus Comaromiensis) was in charge of the G e r m a n infantry stationed in the fort, the boatmen serving i n the town
98

the fortress, and the H u n g a r i a n hussars. His only superior was Council, whose leaders after 1566 appointed exclusively ^rhief c o m m a n d e r s w i t h the exception of Mikls Plffy (1584German cm icaq)to head the border castle. When the peace treaty of Adrianople w i t h the Ottomans expired i n the Habsburg border defence i n Hungary constituted a w e l l organized ' In the 123 border castles registered at this time, there were 22,500 system. ^ f t r y troops. The most decisive task i n the defence was nalfuled by the border fortress and the district captaincy-generals i n Hungary ro er By way of illustration it is enough to say that only 22% of the whole amount of pay was spent on the salary of the soldiers serving in the 72 castles of the Croatian-Slavonian border, while 14% was allocated to the nine fortresses in the confines around Gyr, and 32% to the 13 castles in Upper Hungary. By that time, the significance of the Croatian-Slavonian confines, undoubtedly more important for the Austrian provinces i n the 1520s-1530s, was overshadowed by the Hungarian defence zones. A t this time a n d throughout the following century, the bulwark of Lower Austria, primarily of Vienna and of the German Empire was Hungary in the narrow sense. The Croatian-Slavonian border defence zone lay far away from the immediate direction of the Ottoman advance. Thus the Aulic War Council was able to yield its administration i n 1578 to the leaders of the Inner Austnan territories, which had strengthened and become independent i n the meantime.
] i c W a r 0 1 6 i n a n 99

2.3.a. The endeavours to modernize and their results: the reforms of the great military conference in Vienna (1578-1591) While the border defence developed into a coherent system b y the mid-1570s, the Ottomans had established their o w n line of border fortresses, and these served as a basis for their slow b u t steady advance. They expanded their tax-collecting activity i n H u n g a r y b y constant plundering and then also occupied dozens of villages. In 1575 they
100 101

hadiipari m h e l y kiplse Kassn s nyersanyagellt forrsai [The Formation of the Arsenal of the Captain-General in Kassa and its R a w Material Resources]," in Vgvr s krnyezet. (Studia Agriensia, 15.) E d . by Tivadar Petercsk a n d Ern Peth. Eger, 1995, 183-221. Idem, Katonai igazsgszolgltats a kirlyi Magyarorszgon a XVI-XVIl. szzadban [Military Jurisdiction in H a b s b u r g - H u n g a r y in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]. Gyr, 1995, 84-85. Cf. also Ondrej R. Halaga, Poiatky Kosc a zrod metropoly. Hospodrsko-socilne, sprune a kultme
9 7 9 8

" " C r o n Vngernein Propugnakel v n n d V o r M a u r Deutscher L a n n d e n " (1570). S t A Nrnberg, Ansbacher Reichstagsakten (Rep. 136.) Bd. 43. No. 19.
1 0 0

dejmy. Kosice, 1992, 380-390.

Klra Hegyi, Trk berendezkeds Magyarorszgon

[Ottoman Rule in F l u n g a r y ] . (Histria

Plffy, " A magyarorszgi s dlvidki v g v r r e n d s z e r , " 124-125. " C o m a r o m i u m per se est, quod a nullo supremo generli capitaneo d e p e n d e ! " Az vi meghisult orszggyls idszaka (1640 december-1643 mrcius) [The Period of the [Administration

knyvtr. Monogrfik, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 81-117.

1 0 1

The Ottoman advance is testified by those reports w h i c h were prepared by the military

1642.

administration of Vienna on the attacks and damages made by the enemy a n d sent to the ambassadors to Constantinople in order to make a complaint to the sultan. See for example: StA H H S t A Trki (Turcica) Karton 43. K o n v . 1. 1580. "p cit., and Simoniti, op. cit. N o v . - D e z . fols. 25-32 and S t A KA H K R Akten Exp. 1589. A u g . No. 88 and ibid., Reg. 1591. D e z . No. 41. Cf. also G m r y ,

Uncelebrated Diet in 1642 (Dezember 1640-March 1643)]. (Esterhzy Mikls ndor iratai I [Documents of palatnus Mikls Esterhzy]. Kormnyzattrtneti iratok 1984. Documents].) E d . by Istvn Hajnal. Budapest, 1930, 129: No. 45. C f . also Lszl Kecsks, Komrom az erdk vrosa [ K o m r o m , the T o w n of Forts]. Budapest,

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51

launched more serious attacks; in addition to their raids, they captured the castles of Divny, Kkk, Somosk in the mining district and Fonyd by Lake Balaton, and they fought a nearly constant battle near Budacki by the nver Korana in the Croatian confines, where the assistant captain-general of the Croatian border fortresses (Obristleutnant der kroatischen Grenze), Herwart Freiherr v o n Auersperg (1568-1575) fell, too. In the meantime the peace treaty of Adrianople expired, and then Emperor Maximilian I I died; therefore the Aulic War Council deemed it necessary to discuss the problems and, based on the experience gathered i n the control of defence, to reorganize the system i n an even more considered way. I n order to achieve this they asked the central and local leaders of the border defence for preliminary proposals concerning the shortcomings as early as 1576; they made the Imperial Diet (Reiclistag) in Regensburg grant a considerable military aid; and they summoned a great military conference i n Vienna (Wiener Hauptgrenzberatung) in the middle of August 1577 to solve the problems. A t the m i l i t a r y conference, w h i c h lasted for one and a half months and was chaired by A r c h d u k e Ernest, the basic questions concerning the defence system and strategy were discussed. The problems of military d i s c i p l i n e , the fortification of castles, w a r supplies, a n d food provision were dealt w i t h . The Defensionsordnung of the Austrian provinces a n d the difficulties of financing the border fortresses were also d i s p u t e d , and w h a t is more, the possibility of settling d o w n the Teutonic O r d e r in H u n g a r y was also b r o u g h t upas it had been d u r i n g the rule of Sigismund of L u x e m b u r g i n the finteenth c e n t u r y . But the central
102 103 104 105

question was whether the peace w i t h the O t t o m a n s m a d e for eight years in 1568 could be maintained o r whether offensive w a r s h o u l d be launched against the enemy. F r o m a m o n g the proposals made by Lazarus Freiherr v o n S c h w e n d i and U p p e r - H u n g a r i a n captain-general Hans Rueber v o n Pchsendorf (1568-1584), the participants s u p p o r t e d the ideas of the first, a n d voted f o r an even m o r e organized a n d thoughtful defence strategy by realistically weighing the power of the German Empire and the Austrian provinces of the Habsburgs. Since the establishment of the new defence system, this w a s the first a n d last occasion that the problems of border defence h a d been so t h o r o u g h l y discussed a n d a concept based on active defence (defensive w a r i n other words) elaborated. Lazarus Freiherr v o n Schwendi's strategy c o m p r i s e d the formation of closed a n d strictly controllable defence zones, w h i c h , being based on the favourable natural surroundings, could resist the raids of the Ottoman forces more efficiently and at the same time stop the ever increasing O t t o m a n tax-collection i n the H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m . Before d w e l l i n g on the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of the reforms it m u s t be mentioned that the conference was an i m p o r t a n t step i n the process that lasted f r o m 1564 to 1578 a n d as a result of w h i c h the Croatian-Slavonian confines became subordinated to the Inner A u s t r i a n W a r C o u n c i l (Innersterreichischer Hofkriegsrat, 1578-1705) i n Graz. Thanks to the m o n o graph of W . Schulze, the circumstances of this are w e l l k n o w n , " so it is enough to underline that the control of the defence system against the Ottoman E m p i r e was d i v i d e d into t w o parts i n 1578. A r c h d u k e Charles was made responsible for the direction of the Croatian a n d Slavonian border areas as the captain-general of the C r o a t i a n - W e n d i s h confines (General-Obrist kroatischer und windischer Grenze) under the central leadership of the Inner A u s t r i a n W a r C o u n c i l , a n d at the same t i m e A r c h d u k e Ernest was p u t i n charge of the f o u r H u n g a r i a n confines extending f r o m the Drava to Transylvania (the b o r d e r fortresses a r o u n d
1 0

102 P [ t e r ] von Radics, Herbard VIII. Freiherr von Auersperg (1528-1575), em kramischer Held
e

und Staatsmann.
l u 3

Wien, 1862, V11I-1X and 368-369. 2. M O L P 108 Csaldi Levltrak, Esterhzy

The minutes of the great military conference (Hauptgrenzberatung) in Vienna survived in

several copies: 1. O S t A K A A F A 1577/13/2.

csald hercegi gnak levltra, Repositoriumok 77. Fase. N . 3. Archiv G N M Nrnberg, W F sterreich Z R 7670. 4. Wien, sterreichische Nationalbibilitohek [hereinafter N B ] , H a n d schriftensammlung C o d . 8678. 5. N B C o d . 8345. 6. N B C o d . 12 660. The military conference has not been given due attention by historians. C f Wessely, " D i e Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576," 38-49. Schulze, Landesdefension, 65-69, and extracts of the conference published in H u n g a n a n by Istvn Gecze, " H a d i tancskozsok az 1577-ik vben [Military Conferences in the Year 1577)," Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 7 (1894) 502-537 and 647-673.
W i

Plffy, Katonai igazsgszolgltats,

75-77.
1 0 6

1 0 5

Hans von Zwiedeneck-Sdenhorst, " b e r den Versuch einer Translation des Deutschen Geschichte 56 (1878) 403-445

S c h u l z e , op. cit. C f . also V i k t o r T h i e l , " Z u r C e s c h i c h t e d e r innersterreichischen Vereines fr Steiermark 12 Vereines fr Steiermark

O r d e n s an die ungarische G r e n z e , " Archiv fr sterreichische der ungarischen G r e n z e , " Archiv fr sterreichische Geschichte

Kriegsverwaltung i m 16. Jahrhunderte," Zeitschrift des Historischen den Beherrscher Innersterreichs (1578)," Zeitschrift des Historischen

W i l h e l m Erben, " D i e Frage der H e r a n z i e h u n g des Deutschen O r d e n s z u r Vertheidigung 81 (1895) 513-599 and Jnos Illssy, "Trekvsek a nmet lovag-rend meghonostsra M a g y a r o r s z g o n [Endeavours to Settle the Teutonic Order in H u n g a r y ] , " Szzadok 36 (1902) 233-248.

(1914) 159-170. A r t u r Steinwenter, " D i e b e r n a h m e der G r e n z v e r t e i d i g u n g in Kroatien d u c h 20 (1924) 43-59. Gnther Probszt-Ohstorff, " D i e innersterreichische Hofkriegsordnung u n d die windisch-kroatische G r e n z e , " Bltter fr Heimatkunde 35 (1961) 92-98.

56
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E Z A PALFFY
THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG BORDER D E F E N C E SYSTEMS
o n

57

w a s attached t o the defence area, b u t , as i t was kept only for a year the t e r r i t o r i e s n o r t h of Lake B a l a t o n the border before the Long War was restored. U n t i l 1606 the C h r i s t i a n t r o o p s w e r e able to m o v e only the borders of t h e confines of rsekjvr f u r t h e r s o u t h . W i t h the recapture of Flek N g r d , Szcsny, a n d s e v e r a l m i n o r O t t o m a n fortresses in counties H o n t , N g r d , and G m r i n t h e w i n t e r of 1593, the border area f r s e k j v r p r o t e c t i n g the m i n i n g t o w n s was considerably reinforced M e a n w h i l e , Eger, being i n a f o r w a r d p o s i t i o n s i m i l a r l y to Bihcs, had to be replaced i n the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y by Szendr, w h i c h had been g r a d u a l l y f o r t i f i e d f r o m t h e 1570s, a n d its n e i g h b o u r i n g castles (Putnok S z d v r , n o d , Tokaj, K r a s z n a h o r k a , etc.). The most serious difficulty w a s caused by the loss of K a n i z s a i n 1600, asunlike i n the case of Bihcs a n d E g e r o n l y some i n s i g n i f i c a n t m e d i e v a l castles existed i n the border fortress captaincy-general i n i t s hinterland. Thus a completely new border zone h a d to be set u p w e s t o f L a k e Balaton. This so-called border area f a c i n g Kanizsa {gcgen Kanischaiuarts ligende Grenze, confinia Canisae opposita) w a s at first established a l o n g t h e r i v e r s Rba and Zala w i t h centres at K r m e n d and the r e m o t e S r v r . H o w e v e r , the rebellion against the H u n g a r i a n K i n g R u d o l f l e d b y I s t v n Bocskai frustrated the fast dev e l o p m e n t of the new b o r d e r d e f e n c e zones all over H u n g a r y . Their o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d o n l y be c a r r i e d o u t after the peace treaty of Zsitvat o r o k i n 1 606.
0 1 1 9

was efficiently replaced by the border fortresses along the rivers Tsza Sajo, and Bodva, above all by Szendro and Tokaj. After 1607 the Confines facing Kanizsa were finally organized w i t h the centre of rszen on the river Zala and in the districts of the castles of Lenti and Kjskomrom. In theory, the fortress of Lgrd at the confluence of the prava and the Mura also belonged to this border zone, but practically the members of the Zrnyi family were put in charge of it together w i t h some other garrisons i n the Murakz (praesidu Legradiensis ac tothis Insulae Murakz supremus capitaneatus, Zerinische Grenze). A t the same time, the Styrian estates reinforced and organized into a coherent unit their border fortresses in the direction of Kanizsa (Hardberg, Frstenfeld, Feldbach, Radkersburg, and Pettau) under the name of the Styrian confines (steinsche Grenze, steirische Konfinien-Plalze), though this was not a captaincy -general.
120

The Wendish border area w i t h the centre of Vrasd was united w i t h Petrinja on the southern bank of the Kulpa and assumed the name of Wendish-Petrinja captaincy-general confines which (wmdische was und petrimanische Zengg Grenze, west of regni the Slavomae confinia et Petrinia). That part of the Croatian border fortress situated around

Mountain Kapela was w i t h increasing frequency called the m a r i t i m e confines (Meergrenze, confinia maritima) from the m i d d l e of the sixteenth century. As a result, the captaincy-general centered a r o u n d Krolyvros was called the Croatian-maritime confines (kroatische und Meergrenze, confinia Croatica et maritima/confima Croatiae et maritima) by the early

2.4. The organization of new border of border defence (1606-1699)

zones and the new methods

seventeenth century. The border fortresses under the leadership of the ban along the river K u l p a (banische Grenze, confinia banalia) were often named as the Kulpa confines (confinia Colapiana). w h i c h constituted the The six border fortress captaincy-generals

I n 1606 another l o n g p e r i o d o f peace, or more precisely an era of ' s k i r m i s h e s ' or Klernkrieg o n t h e b o r d e r s , began. This p e r i o d lasted for m o r e t h a n h a l f a c e n t u r y i n t h e H u n g a r i a n theatre of w a r . As during the r u l e o f M a t t h i a s C o r v i n u s a n d M a x i m i l i a n I I , the years of peace made it possible to f o r m n e w d e f e n c e u n i t s o n the basis of the sixteenth-century m e t h o d s a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e . O n the territory beyond the river Tisza, S z a f m r retained its e a r l i e r s t a t u s , t h o u g h d u r i n g the rule of Gbor Bethlen (1613-1629), a n d t h e n o f G y r g y Rkczi I (1630-1648) and his son (1648-1660), i t was often u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l of the Transylvanian princes.

decisive element of the defence system and the temporary captaincygeneral led by the ban survived until 1663 in an unchanged f o r m . The captaincy-generals were listed by palatnus Mikls Eszterhzy i n his memorandum to the ruler in 1641: " U n d e r the jurisdiction of the Saint Crown of Hungary there are six captain-generals, or captaincy-generals from the Adriatic Sea to the Transylvanian borders, namely the ones of Kassa, [rsekjjvr, Gyr, the border fortresses facing Kanizsa, the Slavonian [that is the one of Vrasd], the Croatian [that is the one of

Pf

tA

^ H K R KIA IX. c. 4, M O I _ P
trzsi ,
M e m o r a l e v l t r a k

csald levltra, A Batthyny c s a l d

- A herceg Batthyny

A k t n de.s n n e r s t e r r e i c h . s c h e n H o f k r i e e s r ^ ' i ' i a No. 237 and StA KA H s r a t e s . C r o a t i c a 1600. Nov. No. 1.
b

" O N B Handschnftensammking C o d . 9225. fol. 4 and fol. 34

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59

Krolyvros), w i t h the exception of the confines that are led by the Croatian-Slavonian ban."
]2>

After the Ottoman w a r i n 1663-1664, however, a significant change took place in the borders defending the m i n i n g towns. After the fall of the centre of the frontier castles captaincy-general (rsekjvr), Vienna, Lower Austna and the Bohemian-Moravian provinces became directly threatened, therefore a modern fort (Liptvr) was erected on the bank of the Vg and a new border area was organized around i t i n 1665. This new defence zone was called the confines facing rsekjvr [gegen Neulwitsel ligende Grenze, confinia contra jvr posita) or of Liptvr (leopoldische Grenze)} The role of this zone was almost as important as that of the confines around Gyr, also reinforced to be able to defend Vienna in this time. The administration of the fortresses around Liptvr and of Pozsony was w i t h d r a w n from the authority of captain-general of the m i n i n g towns a n d was confen-ed o n the German commander-in-chief of Liptvr, who was the immediate representative of the A u l i c War Council.
122 23

In a d d i t i o n t o the border fortress captaincy-generals, the system of district captaincy-generals also survived i n the course of the seventeenth century. I n 1669 these were listed by a contemporary, Jnos Vanoviczi, a missionary belonging to the Order of St Paul, i n his submission to the H o l y Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith [Sacra Congregatw De Propaganda Fide) i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: " O u t of the district captaingenerals [ i n H u n g a r i a n : kirlykpe] the first lives i n Vrasd, Croatia, the second i n Nmetjvr, H u n g a r y , the t h i r d i n Sempte, n o r t h of the Danube, the f o u r t h , the U p p e r H u n g a r i a n captain-general i n Kassa." The first district captain-general mentioned was the Croatian ban Pter
124

Zrnyi (1665-1670) residing i n Vrasd, w h o , in his capacity as a border fortress captain-general, also administered the special confines belonging to the ban along the river K u l p a . The Transdanubian district captaingeneral, Kristf Batthyny, h a v i n g his seat i n Nmetjvr, controlled the confines facing Kanizsa, w h i l e the Cisdanubian captain-general Pl Esterhzy, residing i n Sempte, supervised the confines protecting the mining towns, w i t h the exception of Liptvr and its zone. Consequently, the leadership of border fortress zones that were not of v i t a l importance for the defence of the A u s t r i a n provinces was, as in the sixteenth century, given to H u n g a r i a n district captain-generals. A l t h o u g h , d u e to the shortcomings of the county and noble troops, the district captaincygenerals h a d lost most of their military importance b y that time, this arrangement was reasonable because the H u n g a r i a n estates h a d consolidated their p o w e r i n the seventeenth century. H a v i n g p r o v i d e d their blood as tax these estates still tenaciously insisted o n m a i n t a i n i n g these posts because these l e g i t i m i z e d their actual p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the defence, or at least i n its local administration. Besides the system of confines and district captaincy-generals, new forms and methods of frontier defence appeared and strengthened in the seventeenth century. These were related to the l o n g period of peace and the policy of the Habsburg high c o m m a n d against the O t t o m a n Empire. During the T h i r t y Years' War the empire joined the c o m p e t i t i o n of great powers by m i l i t a r y means, and for this reason it tried to keep peace w i t h the Ottomans. Less and less support was sent t o s u p p l y the H u n g a r i a n theatre of w a r . A s a result, the number of b o r d e r fortresses w i t h royal troops i n them decreased f r o m 120 i n the late sixteenth century to 88, and the n u m b e r of garrison troops f r o m 22,000 to 17,000. The system of guard houses previously controlled by the r o y a l border fortresses and the roughly 5,000 soldiers paid by the king were d i f f i c u l t to replace. As a solution to this p r o b l e m , the landlords l i v i n g near the frontiers took a more active part i n the defence against the O t t o m a n raids w i t h their private troops and w i t h their subjects doing m i l i t a r y service i n return for various exemptions, the so-called peasant soldiers (Soldatenbauer), w h o
125

" S u n t h u i u s m o d i supremi generales capitanei seu capitaneatus sub jurisdictione Sacrae Coronae H u n g a n a e a Mari A d n a t i c o usque ad limites et terminus Transylvaniae sex, urpote: C a s s o v i e n s i s , N o v a e Arcis, Jauriensis, praesidiorum C a n i s a e oppositorum, Sclavoniae et Croatiae regnorum, praeter confinia banalia, quibus banus Croatiae et Sclavoniae praeest." Hajnal, op. cit., 128: No. 45.
1 2 1

Frantisek Sedlk, " Z dejn pevnosti Leopoldov," Vlastivedny Casopis 12 (1963) 151-153 and Jozef Simoncic, "Mesto Leopoldovjeho v z n i k a v y v o j , " Vlastivedny Casopis 20 (1971) 72-73.
1 2 2

N B H a n d s c h r i f t e n s a m m l u n g C o d . 7235. fols. 83-93 and O S t A F H K A H K A H F U R N 219. 1665. M r z fols. 166-215.

1 2 3 1 2 4

"Proreges, unus Varasdini in Croatia, altr in Nemet U y u a r , in Vngaria, terrius in arce missionariorum de Hungria el Transilvania 11627-1707). (Bibliotheca Academiae

1 2 5

Hajnal, op. cit., 128-131: No. 45. It was only after the 1663-1664 Ottoman w a r that the in great numbers to the hadgyi fejldsnek Istvn C z i g n y , A kirlyi Magyarorszg

Sente ultra D a n u b i u m , quartus Cassoviae, prorex partium s u p e n o r u m regni Vngariae " Relationes H u n g r i in Roma. Fontes 1.) E d . by Istvn Gyrgy Tth. Roma-Budapest, 1994, 151: No. 14

Aulic W a r C o u n c i l sent G e r m a n troops attached into regiments H u n g a r i a n border fortresses.

sajtossgai s eurpai sszefggsei 1600-1700 [The Characteristics and European Connections of the Military in Habsburg-Ruled Hungary 1600-1700]. Unpublished P h . D . Diss. Budapest, 1996.

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126 n an

T H E H U N G ARI A N - H A B S B U R G B O R D E R D E F E N C E S Y S T E M S

61

were often settled on those t e r r i t o r i e s O n the C r o a t i a n - S l a v o i borders the same role was played by the Vlachs (Valachi) and Uskoks (Uscoci), w h o obtained royal privileges i n return for their military service. The significance of the g r o w i n g number of royal and private H e y d u c k settlements also increased from the early seventeenth century Thus the territories behind the m i l i t a r y confines h a d to participate more actively i n the border defence. The system of garrisons previously m a i n t a i n e d by the k i n g was replaced by a system of fortified settlements and g u a r d houses defended by peasant soldiers and Heyducks and controlled by the border landlords and captain-generals. This second, hinterland defence line complemented the royal border defence system very w e l l , as the latter and the district captaincy-generals were often administered by the same person in these places, w h i c h made closer cooperation between the royal and private troops possible.
127 ,;R

n e

3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY FRONTIERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY As a result of the so-called reconquering Turkish w a r launched i n 1683 and concluded in 1699 by the peace of Karlovitz, the frontier between the t w o w o r l d empires was pushed back to the line of the Sava, Danube, Tisza, and Maros. The termination of Ottoman rule i n H u n g a r y made the maintenance of the border defence system built by the mid-sixteenth century by the Habsburg m i l i t a r y leadership unnecessary. W i t h the exception of Nndorfehrvr (Belgrade) and the Temeskz reoccupied only i n 1718, the frontiers w h i c h had existed before the battle of Mohcs were restored by the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The question in this situation was whether the n e w t h e t h i r d b o r d e r defence system i n the southern territories of H u n g a r y against the O t t o m a n Empire should reflect the structural a n d administrative f r a m e w o r k existing before Mohcs or the one in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, or whether it should be a completely different one.

T w o proposals were w o r k e d out concerning the establishment of the w border defence system. One of them was f o r w a r d e d bv the palatums pl Esterhzy (1681-1713) and the H u n g a r i a n estates in connection w i t h the new establishment of the country i n 1688,' '* the other was the concept of the Aulic W a r Council formed i n the 1690s. The Hungarian estates wanted to revive the medieval defence system w i t h the restoration of the banales and the defence captaincy-generals, and the earlier authority of the palatums, the m i l i t a r y assistant of the ruler. A t the same time, they wished to s u p p l y the border fortresses w i t h regularly paid standing troops consisting of 12,000 German and 12,000 Hungarian and Southern Slav soldiers under the joint leadership of German, Hungarian and Southern Slav captain-generals. They w o u l d have fielded the latter ones out of the previous border castle soldiers i n Hungary, t h o u g h i n a similar w a y to the German a r m y i n the f r a m e w o r k of regiments. They considered the w a r tax of the reconquered country sufficient to cover the payment of the 24,000 soldiers. The concept of the Aulic War Council was fundamentally different from the proposal of the estates. The m i l i t a r y leaders in Vienna wanted to create a qualitatively new border defence system, w h i c h was t o a certain extent similar to the setup in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They intended to separate the zones of the new system f r o m the reviving c i v i l local administration, f r o m the Hungarian counties, and to establish a distinct military frontier [Militargrenze). They d i d not w i s h to involve the Hungarian estates in the control of the m i l i t a r y frontiers to be d i v i d e d into regiment districts (Regimentbezirke/Kompaniebezirke), as they intended to control the new border defence network completely f r o m Vienna and not from Buda as had been the case in the m i d d l e ages. Under
2 ,w

E m m a Ivnyi, " E s t e r h z y Pl n d o r es a m a g y a r rendek tervezete az o r s z g j Kzlemnyek

berendezkedsvel kapcsolatban [The Proposal of palatnus Pl Esterhzy a n d the H u n g a r i a n Estates in Connection with the N e w Establishment of the C o u n t r y ] , " Levltri kizsnek i d s z a k b a n . A z E i n r i c h t u n g s w e r k [ S c h e m e s 42 (1971) 137-161 and Jnos J Varga, "Berendezkedsi tervezetek M a g y a r o r s z g o n a trk for a N e w E s t a b l i s h m e n t in Szzadok 125 (1991) H u n g a r y After the Expulsion of the Ottomans. T h e Einrichtungswerk},"

* stvan N . Kiss, Gesollschaft und Heer in Ungarn un Zeitalter der Turkenkriege Das S o l d a t e n b a u c r n t u m , " in D,e wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Turkenkriege (Grazer'Fors c h u n g e n zur Wirtschaft- und Soz,aIgesch,chte, 1.) E d . bv Othmar Pickl. Graz, 1971 273-^96 E k k e h a r d Vlkl. " M i l i t r g r e n z e u n d ' S t a . u . a V a l a c h o r u m V in Die sterreichische Mihtargrcnze, 9-24. Kser, op. ct., passim. Bracewell op at -'erreichte Istvn Rcz, A hajdk a XV!,. szzadban (The H e y d u c k s in the Seventeenth C e n t u r y ] ( M a g y a r trtneti tanulmnyok, 2.) Debrecen, 1969.

449-488.'
]

~ Apart from the works quoted in note 3, see recently Kurt Wessely, " N e u o r d n u n g der
]

unganschen G r e n z e n nach d e m grfin T u r k e n k r i e g , " in Die k. k. Militargrenze, hatrrvidken a XVIII.

29-93

From

the H u n g a r i a n literature: k o s Koroknai, Gazdasgi s trsadalmi viszonyok a dunai s tiszai szzad elejn [Economic and Social Conditions on the M i l i t a r y Frontier 1974. A l o n g the D a n u b e a n d the T i s z a in the Early Eighteenth C e n t u r y ] (rtekezsek a trtneti t u d o m n y o k korbi. j sorozat, 73 ) Budapest,

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this p l a n they c o u l d s i m p l y abolish the earlier d i v i s i o n of the defence system i n t o district and border fortress captaincy-generals, and could establish the u n i f i e d authority of the new m i l i t a r y offices. As opposed to the d r a f t p l a n of the palatums, they d i d not w a n t the H u n g a r i a n border castle soldiers to take part i n the protection of the frontiers. O n the one h a n d , they themselves were reluctant to leave their border fortresses, a r o u n d w h i c h they were more and more often engagedin the seventeenth c e n t u r y i n the cultivation of land or animal husbandry, on the other h a n d , the dismissed and homeless members of the H u n g a r i a n border castle soldiery had already been recruited into H u n g a r i a n imperial regiments f r o m the 1670s and 1680s. Due to their special light cavalry tactics they were needed on the French battlefields of the Habsburg Empire. Thus, apart from the German regiments, the troops of the new m i l i t a r y frontiers were made u p of Serbian, Croatian, and Vlach refugees w h o had settled in the southern territories of H u n g a r y , d o i n g m i l i t a r y service i n r e t u r n for land and privileges. O n l y one c o m m o n element of the ideas of the H u n g a r i a n estates and of the A u l i c W a r Council was left: the reconquered country had to contribute financially to the s u p p l y of the n e w m i l i t a r y frontiers to be established on the southern borders of the c o u n t r y . The foundations of the new border defence system were laid i n the first decade of the eighteenth century according to the concept of the A u l i c W a r C o u n c i l . F r o m the A d r i a t i c Sea to Transylvania, the m i l i t a r y frontiers of Karolyvaros, of the ban, of Varasd, the Sava, the Danube, the Tisza a n d the Maros were organized; these frontiers were later d i v i d e d into w e l l distinguishable regiment districts. W h i l e the major and p r i v i l e g e d peasant soldier sentries served border fortresses were defended by the regular German regiments, the landed in the g u a r d houses (cardaks) situated between them. Their central control was entirely taken over b y the A u l i c W a r Council after the dissolution of the Inner A u s t r i a n W a r C o u n c i l i n 1705. The H u n g a r i a n estates were f u l l y excluded f r o m the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the new border defence system established i n the territories of H u n g a r y . The m i l i t a r y leadership i n Vienna solved three p r o b l e m s w i t h the creation of the m i l i t a r y frontiers. It decided the struggle for the central and local a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of m i l i t a r y affairs and b o r d e r defence i n the sixteenth and seventeenth century to its o w n advantage; by settling and incorporating i n the border defence the mass of Southern Slav refugees, i t abolished a possible centre of social tensions;

at the same time, it created a new b o r d e r defence system w h i c h c o u l d effectively century. Our survey of the 500 year l o n g history of the border defence system in Hungary against the O t t o m a n Empire cannot have answered all questions that the reader m i g h t have. W e are g o i n g to f i n d these i n the m o n o g r a p h y to be w r i t t e n on this topic. This piece of w o r k has achieved its purpose if i t c o u l d ' d e m o n s t r a t e that the development of the defence system against the Ottomans can only be understood i n the k n o w l e d g e of the complete H u n g a r i a n theatre of w a r , i n the three periods designated above, as the real changes i n the organization and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the defence system occurred i n 1526 and 1699. U n t i l the battle of Mohcs the medieval H u n g a r i a n K i n g d o m contained the advance of the Ottomans w i t h its coherent border defence system controlled by the C r o a t i a n Slavonian ban, the captain-general of the L o w e r Parts (supremus capitaneus parthim inferiorum) and the V o i v o d e of Transylvania. After the collapse of the K i n g d o m , the Habsburg rulers were expected to solve the p r o b l e m of stopping the enemy on the territory of H u n g a r y a n d of d e f e n d i n g the Austrian provinces. In the organization of the new defence system, however, they could not reject the help of the H u n g a r i a n estates, their counterparts i n the dualistic state structure, and for practical reasons they could not oust them entirely f r o m the local management of the system. This explains w h y the border defence was d i v i d e d i n t o a t w o f o l d system: the confines captaincy-generals financed by the ruler and based on the border castles and the district captaincy-generals based on the o u t d a t e d insurrection of the nobility and the county troops. T h o u g h the f o r m e r constituted the most i m p o r t a n t part of defence, i t was only at the beginning of eighteenth c e n t u r y a n d after the settlement of Southern Slav peasant soldiersthat the A u l i c W a r C o u n c i l was able to create a system of m i l i t a r y frontiers i n the southern territories of the c o u n t r y w h i c h excluded the H u n g a r i a n estates. protect H u n g a r y and the Habsburg Empire against the Ottoman troops u n t i l the f o r m a t i o n of the n a t i o n states i n the nineteenth

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APPENDIX

ABBREVIATIONS B = Bosnia; Cro = Croatia; H = H u n g a r y ; R = Romania; Slo = Slovakia; Slov = Slovenia; U = Ukrainia MAP l : THE CASTLES OF THE CROATIAN AND WENDISH-BAJCSAVAR CONFINES IN 1 5 8 2
1 . Laibach, Ljubljana, Slov 2. Sankt Veit a m P f l a u m , Fiume, Rijeka, C r o 3. Ledenice, C r o 4. Z e n g g , Segnia, Senj, C r o 5. Bag, K a r l o b a g , Cro 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Brinje, C r o Brlog, Cro Otocac, Otocsc, C r o Dabar, C r o Jesenica, Licka Jesenica, C r o 34. K r c u z , Krs, K r i z e v c i , Cro 35. Cradec, Cro 36. Ivanic, I v a n i c g r a d , Ivanics, Cro 37. H e i l i g e n k r e u z , Szentkereszt, Sveti K r i , C r o 38. C i r k v e n a , C r o 39. Sanktpeter, Szentpter, Sveti Petar Cvrstec, Cro 40. Topolovac, Topolovc, C r o 41. Sanktgeorgen, Szentgyrgyvr, Djurdjevac, C r o 42. N o v i g r a d , N o v i g r a d - P o d r a v s k i , Cro 43. K a p r o n c a , K o p n n i z , K o p r i v n i c a , Cro 44. 45. 46. 47. Dernye, Drnje, C r o Keresztr, Murakeresztr, H Ftyehza, H Bajcsavr, Bajcsa, H

11. O g u l i n , C r o 12. Svetica, C r o 13. M o d r u s , M o d r u s , C r o 14. D r e z n i k , D r e z n i k G r a d , C r o 15. Trzac, C r o 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Izacic, Izacsics, B Bihac, Bihcs, B Ripac, Ripcs, B Slunj, C r o C e t i n , C e t i n g r a d , Cro Mala Kladusa, B

22. Hresno, C r o 23. Smrckovic, C r o 24. Blagaj, C r o 25. Budacki, C r o 26. Karlstadt, Krolyvros, Karlovac, C r o 27. Petrova gora, Petrovac, C r o 28. H r a s t o v i c a , Hrasztovica, C r o 29. Srednji Gradac, Cro 30. W a r a s d i n , Varasd, V a r a z d i n , Cro 31. V a r a z d i n s k e Toplicc, C r o 32. Remetinec, C r o 33. L u d b r e g , C r o

The territories under the command of the Croatian-Slavonian ban in 1582

Croatia Krs c o u n t y Varasd c o u n t y Zgrb county

; E

HUNGARIAN-HABSBURC

BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEMS

67

66

GZA PLFFY

MAP 2: THE CASTLES OF THE BAJCSAVR, KANIZSA, AND GYR CONFINES IN 1 5 8 2

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. Keresztr, Murakeresztr, H Fityehza, H Bajcsavr, Bajcsa, H Lgrd, L e g r a d , C r o Kanizsa, N a g y k a n i z s a , H Szentmikls, Miklsfa, Nagykanizsa-Miklsfa, H

The counties under the command the Transdanubian district captain-general in 1582
Fejr Gyr Komrom Mosn Somogy Sopron Vas Veszprm Zala

0j

51. Botszentgyrgy, Romlottvr, H 52. Kanizsa m e l l e t t i t o r o n y , Nagykanizsa, H 53. judvar, H 54. Kacorlak, H 55. K o m r , K i s k o m r o m , Zalakomr, H 56. C s k n y , H 57. Kthely, H 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. K i e l m a n s z i g e t , Kilimn, H Rajk, Alsrajk, H Zalavr, H Isabor, Isebor, Pacsa-lsabor, H Plske, H Kapornak, Nagykapornak, H Csny, Zalacsny, H Szentgrt, Zalaszentgrt, H Br, Zalabr, H K e m e n d , Kemendollr, H Lv, Zalalv, H Gyr, Raab, H Ppa, H Keszthely, H Szigliget, H Csobnc, H

74. T i h a n y , H 75. Vzsony, V z s o n y k , Nagyvzsony, H 76. 77. 78. 79. Veszprm, H "Palota, Vrpalota, H Csesznek, H Tata, H

O tt 4-

The cases of Ihe Bajcsavr confines The cases of ihe Kanizsa confines The castlcs of the Gyr cofincs Komrom, "a border fort of its own'

80. S z e n t m r t o n h e g y , Szentmrton, Pannonhalma, H 81. K o m r o m , K o m o r n , K o m a r n o , Slo