Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW TO BUILD ON RESOLUTION 1701 ................................ 20 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LEBANON...............................................................................................................24 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................25 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST ..........................................26 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................28
1 November 2006
Israel/Hizbollah/Lebanon: Avoiding Renewed Conflict Crisis Group Middle East Report N59, 1 November 2006
Page ii
Such shared modesty must be preserved lest the fragile stability unravel. 1701 is not the proper framework for the necessary resolution of underlying issues in the Israeli-Lebanese relationship, and it must not be construed as such. It is inherently ambiguous, allowing for different interpretations, offering vague timelines, and covering conflicting long-term goals behind similar wording: strengthening Lebanese sovereignty means neutralising Hizbollah for some and defending against Israel for others. It does not address Lebanons domestic political situation. It places disproportionate emphasis on the question of Hizbollah and offers nothing to parties (Syria and Iran) with considerable interest and means of obstruction. Like its predecessor, Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), it unwisely seeks to internationalise a particular aspect of the problem (Hizbollahs armament) without regionalising its solution (addressing the broader Arab-Israeli conflict or the growing U.S.-Iranian differences). In sum, 1701 all at once elevates Hizbollahs armed status to the rank of core international concern; entrusts its resolution to a process (Lebanons internal dialogue) that is structurally incapable of dealing with it; and defers the key political step (progress toward a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace) that is a precondition for settling it. In carrying out 1701, therefore, the international community should keep its eye on the risks. With its deterrent power severely damaged by a military draw most interpreted as a defeat, Israel will not tolerate brazen attempts by Hizbollah to resupply. Conversely, Hizbollah will not accept efforts by Israel, UNIFIL or its Lebanese opponents to try to achieve politically what could not be done militarily. Implementation should focus on several interrelated goals: